PART II

THE ENVIRONMENT OF INSURGENCY

To defeat the insurgent, it is essential to control his habitat; to prevent insurrection from breaking out, it is essential to eliminate the conditions in which it breeds. The three substantial selections that follow describe one kind of environment—that found in underdeveloped and traditional societies undergoing modernization—which provides fertile soil for insurrection.

Walt W. Rostow's widely discussed theory of the historical evolution of human societies through a well-defined pattern of economic growth provides a useful theoretical framework for studying the environment of insurgency. The statement of the theory presented here (number 4) is not the one in his now classic book, The Stages of Economic Growth, which is set in a broad historical framework, but an analysis of the stages of growth represented by the emerging societies of the underdeveloped world today and the problems of modernization that they face. The processes and problems of modernization in traditional societies are described in more detail in the next selection (number 5), "The Transitional Process in Emerging Nations," extracted from a collaborative study, edited by Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, growing out of a report prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Finally, Lucian W. Pye, a political scientist from the same institution, examines in some depth one crucial sector of the modernization process, the role of professional military groups and organizations (number 6).
"THE STAGES OF GROWTH" AS A KEY TO POLICY *

By Walt W. Rostow

Over the past twenty years I have come to the view that it is possible and useful to generalize the pattern of modern economic history in the form of a series of stages of economic growth. It is, as you will quickly perceive, my alternative to the system of historical analysis developed by Karl Marx.

After outlining the stages of growth, I shall consider the position of underdeveloped areas in terms of the stages of growth; I shall define their key domestic problems of policy; and I shall consider the implications of their problems for the issue of Soviet-American coexistence in the underdeveloped areas. I shall examine what light the stages-of-growth theory throws on the problem of creating a system of world order within which nations of different culture and different ideological complexion may live on this small planet in tolerable harmony.

I believe all societies, past and present, may be usefully designated as falling within one of the five following categories: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass consumption. Beyond the age of high mass consumption lie the problems and possibilities which are beginning to arise in a few societies when the burdens of scarcity gradually retreat, and what Karl Marx called Communism is approached.

These five stages of growth are based on a dynamic theory of production. Out of this theory comes one key proposition: At any period of time the momentum of an economy is maintained by the rapid rate of growth in a relatively few key leading sectors. In some periods cotton textiles have been a key leading sector; in others railways, chemicals, electricity, and the automobile have served this function. Specifically, key sectors have two effects: their rapid growth sets up a direct demand for new inputs; second, the development of these new primary and secondary sectors induces new developments indirectly, elsewhere in the economy.

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Each stage of growth is associated with certain ranges of income and types of demand. But we must go beyond mere technical economic analysis. For at each stage of growth societies have been confronted with choices—basic choices of policy and of value—which transcend economic analysis.

How should the traditional society react to the intrusion of a more advanced power? When modern nationhood is achieved, how—in what proportions—should the national energies be disposed: in external aggression, to right old wrongs or to exploit newly created or perceived possibilities for enlarged national power; in completing the political victory of the new national government over old regional interest; or in modernizing the economy?

Once growth is under way with the take-off, to what extent should the requirements of increasing the rate of growth be moderated by the desire to increase consumption per capita and to increase welfare?

When technological maturity is reached—and the nation commands a modernized and differentiated industrial machine—to what ends should it be put, and in what proportions: to increase social and human security, including leisure; to expand consumption into the range of durable consumers' goods and services; or to increase the nation's stature and power on the world scene?

The stages of growth are, then, not a set of rigid, inevitable, predetermined phases of history. The process of growth does pose for men and societies certain concrete problems and possibilities from which they must choose, and these problems and possibilities may be observed at similar stages in each society—including contemporary societies. Modern history can be viewed as the consequence of differing choices made by various societies at various stages of their growth. But if we really believed history was inevitable, I would not be standing before you this afternoon and you would not be listening to me.

The Stages In History

I define the traditional society as one which has not learned to make invention and technological innovation a regular flow. The traditional society is not static; but its growth is constrained by a productivity ceiling beyond which it cannot penetrate. This ceiling decrees that something like 75 percent of the labor force will be in agriculture; that its
income above minimum consumption levels is likely to be dissipated in high living for those who command land rents (or otherwise dissipated); and that its social values will be geared to relatively limited fatalistic horizons.

Historically, the traditional societies of Western Europe were stirred into what I call the preconditions for take-off by the expansion of trade from, let us say, the sixteenth century forward. The rise of trade interacted with the development of modern science, invention, and innovation to produce an interlocking series of developments in transport, industry, and agriculture, as well as a rise in population. Britain was the first to move from the preconditions period into take-off.

Once the British take-off—or industrial revolution—was under way from, say, 1783, it set in motion a series of what might be called positive and negative demonstration effects. These profound demonstration effects, still operating actively in the world, will bring industrialization to virtually the whole of the planet. The last major take-off may well begin before two centuries have passed since the British showed the way.

Technically, there are three leading sectors in the preconditions period whose transformation is a necessary condition for sustained industrial growth. First, agriculture: a productivity revolution in agriculture is required to feed the expanding population of the preconditions period and to feed the cities likely to be expanding at even higher rates than the average. Second, the export sector: industrialization in its earliest stages is likely to create an expanded bill for imports which can be met only by quickly applying modern techniques to the extraction and higher processing of some natural resource. Third, social overhead capital: the technical transformation of a traditional society into a position where growth becomes relatively automatic requires large outlays on transport, education, sources of power, and so on.

The development of these sectors is not an antiseptic technical process; it requires profound social, psychological, and political change—from the attitudes of peasants to those of civil servants and politicians. Much analysis—both Marxist and non-Marxist—has emphasized the role of the new commercial and industrial middle class in bringing about this transformation. But the role of the middle class and the profit motive is only a part of the story. Both in the contemporary world and in the more distant past it is perfectly clear that another factor was the repeated demonstration that more advanced societies could impose their will on the
less advanced. This demonstration of the national and human costs of backwardness has accelerated the preconditions process in many lands. A reactive nationalism has been a major factor in leading men to take the steps necessary to permit growth to become a society's normal condition. This was so for the transitional periods of Germany, Japan, and Russia in the nineteenth century; and, earlier, it played a crucial role in the formation of the U.S. under the Federalists. And it is perfectly evident that in the contemporary world the most powerful motive for modernization in the underdeveloped areas is not the profit motive of the middle class but the widespread desire to increase human and national dignity.

Nationalism may be diverted to external goals or ambitions or it may be channeled at home into the economic and social modernization of the society. It is, therefore, one of the technical preconditions for take-off that the governments which come to power in the transitional areas be prepared to channel a high proportion of their peoples' energies, talents, and resources into the tasks of economic growth rather than other possible objectives. For the leading sectors of the preconditions—a productivity revolution in agriculture, the generation of increased foreign exchange, and the buildup of social overhead capital—all require a significant degree of governmental leadership and programing—phrases not to be confused with total government ownership and total planning, which I do not believe to be necessary conditions for the preconditions period.

In essence the take-off consists of the achievement of rapid growth in a limited group of leading sectors: textiles for Great Britain; railroads for the U.S., France, Germany, Canada, and Russia; modern timber cutting and railroads in Sweden. The take-off is distinguished from earlier industrial surges by the fact that growth becomes self-sustained. Investment rises and remains over 10 per cent net, sufficient to outstrip population growth and to make an increase in output per capita a regular condition.

After take-off there follows what I call the drive to maturity, defined as the period when a society has effectively applied the range of (then) modern technology to the bulk of its resources. During the drive to maturity new leading sectors gather momentum to supplant the older leading sectors of the take-off. After the railway take-offs of the nineteenth century—with coal, iron, and heavy engineering at the center of the growth process—it is steel, the new ships, chemicals, electricity, and the products of the modern machine tool that dominate the economy and sustain the over-all rate of growth.
I would offer the following sample as rough symbolic dates for the arrival of various societies at technological maturity, as I have defined it: Great Britain, 1850; United States, 1900; Germany and France, 1910; Sweden, 1930; Japan, 1940; U.S.S.R. and Canada, 1950. These dates for maturity come more or less sixty years after the dates established for the beginning of take-off. I would regard the sixty-year interval between take-off and technological maturity as a rough benchmark at best, pending more serious study.

As societies move toward technological maturity, a number of economic and non-economic changes occur: the working force not only becomes more urban but the category of semiskilled and white-collar workers expands; real incomes and standards of consumption rise; the professional managers begin to take over from the original buccaneers who launched the take-off and dominate the early stages of the drive to maturity. But there is a deeper change as well, reflected in literature, social and popular thought, and in politics: What is that change? Men react against the harshness of the drive to maturity; they begin to take growth and the spread of technology for granted; they cease to regard the further spread of modern technology as a sufficient human and social objective; and they ask this question: how shall this mature, industrial machine, with compound interest built firmly into its structure--how shall it be used? As I suggested earlier, there are essentially three directions in which the mature nation can go: toward social security and leisure; toward the expansion of power on the world scene; or toward what I call the age of high mass consumption--the diffusion of the mass automobile, improved housing, and the electric-powered household gadgetry--from iceboxes to TV--that an industrial civilization can offer to make life easier, more pleasant, and more interesting in the home.

American history in the twentieth century reflects, at different times, elements of each choice. There was the brief American flirtation with world power at the turn of the century. Then there was a phase of social reform in the Progressive era, followed by the plunge in the 1920's into the age of high mass consumption, with its new leading sectors: automobiles, rubber, oil, roads, suburban housing, and the familiar gadgetry. As for the Germans, at maturity they were terribly tempted and twice succumbed to the temptation of pressing for world power; and as Japan came to technological maturity in the 1930's, it did the same. In the past decade Western Europe has made that transition and is now experiencing a version of the American 1920's. And in Japan (at lower levels) something of the same sort is happening. This new phase of growth has given these economies a momentum beyond that predicted by the greatest optimists just after World War II.
As for the Soviet Union, in the 1920's it reorganized the society which had experienced a take-off between 1890 and 1914, but had broken down under the terrible pressures of the first world war. Then, in 1929, the drive to maturity began, and it was resumed with great energy after reconstruction of the damage of the second world war. This sequence then, since the 1890's, brings the Soviet Union to the point where the three-way choice of the technologically mature society now confronts its political life. That is, in what proportions shall the resources of the society be used for leisure or for mass consumption or for increased power on the world scene.

The Stages Today

While the stages of growth have been moving forward since the end of the second world war in reasonable order and briskness in the north-western part of the world, elsewhere a great historical drama has been unfolding; these vast societies, embracing the bulk of the world's population, have been accelerating the preconditions for take-off or actually moving into take-off. Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and--notably--China and India are actually in the take-off. These societies face many vicissitudes; but I believe the bases have been laid for sustained growth. The commitment to carry forward goes very deep. In China and India, for example, I do not believe--looking ahead over the next decade--that any of us can be confident of the political form those societies will assume; but they will, on the average, maintain investment rates that substantially outstrip current rates of population increase. South of the Sahara are societies in the traditional stage, which will need a longer preconditioning process.

The question now arises: Is it scientifically correct to use my concept of the stages of growth derived from a generalization of the historical past to analyze the contemporary problems of the underdeveloped areas? There is much that is familiar to the historian in the current scene. The technical problems of the preconditions still center about the three leading sectors of that stage: social overhead capital; the generation of increased exports; and a technological revolution in agriculture. The social and psychological transformations that must occur are, again, broadly familiar from the past: the siphoning off of land rents into the modern sector; the changing of peasant attitudes; the training of a new leadership--public, private, or both in various combinations--capable of bringing
modern techniques to bear in the various sectors of the economy. And, above all, we can again see, as in the past, that a reactive nationalism, tempted to move in directions other than economic growth, lies close to the heart of the political process in many of these regions.

But there is a major technical difference; the pool of technology available to these underdeveloped nations is greater than ever before. At periods in the past, other latecomers--Germany, Russia, Japan--have been able to benefit somewhat by learning from the leading nations. But in degree we must admit that there is a substantial difference between the present and the past stemming from the size of the pool of available technology.

This difference, however, cuts two ways: it both complicates the problem of growth and offers the possibility of accelerating growth. It complicates growth because the availability of modern techniques of medicine and public health leads to a radical fall in death rates, which yields much higher rates on population increase than those in most societies in the past. Excepting the U. S. and Russia, which had reserves of good land, population increase in the preconditions and take-off were under 1.5 percent--generally about 1 percent. Today the newer nations without reserves of good land are trying to move forward with population-increase rates of 2 percent and more. This means that higher rates of investment must be generated to achieve sustained growth; more precisely, it means that the revolution in agricultural technique must be pressed forward with great vigor if the whole development process is not to be throttled for lack of food.

The Conditions of Aid

Now what about peaceful coexistence in the face of this problem? If the only objective in the world of the Soviet Union and the U. S. were to assist these new nations into sustained growth, technically the more advanced countries should execute a joint program in three parts. First, offer the underdeveloped areas ample supplies of capital--to ease the general problem of capital formation under regimes with high rates of population increase. Second, offer these nations special assistance--to achieve prompt and radical increases in agricultural output. Third, conduct toward them policies which would encourage local politicians to concentrate their hopes and energies on the task of economic development; and avoid policies which would divert them from these objectives.
The U.S., for its part, would have to do these four specific things: first, accept the idea that its major objective in these areas was to create independent, modern, growing states, whether or not they were prepared to join in military alliance with the U.S.

Second, the U.S. would have to accept each nation's right to choose its own balance between private and public enterprise; and so long as the growth process was seriously pursued, it would have to refrain from imposing as a condition for loans the acceptance by other societies of American patterns of organization.

Third, the U.S. would have to accept the fact that the democratic process is a matter of degree and direction and not expect these transitional societies to blossom forth promptly with forms of political organization similar to those of the U.S. and Western Europe.

Fourth, with these objectives and self-denying ordinances, it would have to offer substantial, long-term loans and technical assistance on which the local politicians and planners could count over, say a five-year interval.

These are precisely the directions in which American policy has been moving in recent years. This trend lies behind the creation in 1957 of the Development Loan Fund and the recent initiatives in the U.S. Senate to enlarge that fund and put it on a long-term basis. Many in the U.S. -- including myself -- believe this trend has not gone far enough; and as citizens we are pressing to see it further developed. But I believe an objective assessment will support the judgment that this is the trend in American policy.

Many Roads to Growth

Now what about Soviet policy? Leaving China and Eastern Europe apart, what is required from Moscow is a parallel set of shifts in policy. The bulk of Soviet lending outside the Communist bloc has been localized in a few areas: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and India. It is clear that in each of these areas, excepting India, the Soviet Union has had clear, short-run strategic objectives -- objectives other than increasing the rate of growth. The Soviet economic-assistance program would have to be substantially modified if it were to offer a basis for a serious collaborative effort with the U.S. in the underdeveloped areas.
We all know, however, that the problem of coexistence is not merely a technical matter of collaboration in accelerating the process of economic growth. The presently underdeveloped areas are moving through the preconditions or into take-off in a world setting of cold war--of intense ideological and military competition.

It is the general theme of much Communist thought in the underdeveloped areas that only a Communist dictatorship is capable of overcoming the social and psychological resistances to modernization and of pressing forward into sustained economic growth. We in the West, on the contrary, believe--as a matter of history and faith--that the problems of the preconditions and of the take-off can be overcome without the surrender of human liberty which the Communist formula requires.

I would not wish to enter into the discussion going forward in Communist countries as to whether there is one or there are many roads to socialism. But, as an historian and a social scientist, I would assert categorically that there are many roads to economic growth. Coexistence demands that we leave the outcome of the ideological debate to the processes of history within each of these societies; and if we are anxious in our concern for their fate, that they proceed to solve their problems in a setting where capital and technical assistance is made available to them, without strings concerning their political and military orientation.

You may recall the famous phrase of Mao Tse-tung, shortly after the Communist victory in China in 1949. He announced his intention to pursue a lean-to-one-side policy. The condition of competitive coexistence in the underdeveloped areas is that we both pursue policies--both the U.S. and the Soviet Union--which encourage stand-up-straight policies.

The Truce Lines

Now this is no easy matter, as we all know. We know that very strong impulses press the Soviet Government and that of the U.S. to think of the underdeveloped areas not merely in terms of economic growth, not merely in terms of ideological orientation, but in terms of military and strategic importance. In the case of the U.S., for example, a high proportion of our aid in recent years has been military aid. This aid has been given not because we enjoy making military pacts, but because the Korean war occurred. It is a fact of history that the truce lines of the second world war were
violated in Korea by organized, armed formations. And it is a fixed basis of American policy--and I am confident that it will remain so--that the U.S. will take any steps necessary to protect those truce lines. And it is a hard fact of history that these truce lines run through various of the underdeveloped regions, giving them a strategic character and complicating the problems of peaceful ideological competition as well as the problems of economic growth itself. Thus, while we may be able to move some distance forward toward policies which make life and progress easier for the peoples in the underdeveloped areas, the greatest thing the Soviet Union and the U.S. could do for the areas is to bring the cold war and the arms race to an end--to make, at last, a serious peace.

The Cold War's End?

I turn now, therefore, to the third of my themes: the relation between the stages-of-growth analysis and the problem of making peace.

What is the situation we confront from which peace must be created? The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the U.S. now have in their hands--and soon France and others will have in their hands--instruments which grossly surpass in their destructive power anything that has gone before; but their use presents the risk of triggering circumstances which will destroy the user and us all. Moreover, the major powers operate under great restraint with respect to powers whose military potential in no way approximates their own. The paradox of the atomic weapons has permitted the lesser powers degrees of bargaining freedom they would not have if military force had not taken so violent and discontinuous a technical leap during the second world war and after.

Tito began the exploitation of this paradox, in a sense, with his successful defiance of Stalin in 1948; but in different ways on different issues Nehru, Nasser, Ben-Gurion, Adenauer, and many others have found ways of exploiting this paradox within the non-Communist world; and Mao and Gomulka as well as Tito have done it within the Communist bloc. The lesser power cannot always pull it off, as the young Hungarians in Budapest discovered in 1956; but they were not defeated with atomic weapons. They were defeated in a police action by old-fashioned infantry and tanks--a victory for which the Soviet Union has had to pay a high price in the other area of struggle: that is, the non-military struggle of diplomacy and ideology. And the whole of the West--not merely Britain and France--paid a similar
high price for the use of force at Suez at about the same time. In short, societies still in the preconditions period (e.g., Egypt) or in the early stages of take-off (e.g., India, China, and Yugoslavia) have been able to behave in world diplomacy as if they were major powers. In the longer run the diffusion of power will acquire a much firmer base than at present. For the central fact about the future of world power is the acceleration of the preconditions or the beginnings of take-off in the southern parts of the world and in China. Accept for a moment my notion of a sixty-year interval between take-off and technological maturity. We then can say that by 2000 or 2010—which is not very far away—India and China, with at least two billion souls between them, will be, in my sense, mature powers.

The arena of power will enlarge to become for the first time in history truly global. The numbers of effective power centers within the arena will increase. In this setting the central problem of peace requires the installation of a system of arms control and inspection to maintain an agreed level of armaments, which would offer all powers greater security than that now afforded by an arms race of mutual deterrence, with an increasing number of atomic powers in the game. Given the nature of modern weapons and the opportunities for their concealment, this in turn requires that all societies be opened up to inspectors who could, in effect, go anywhere, at any time, without notice. I am convinced that, despite honest and well-founded doubts and worries, the government of the U.S. would accept such a drastic alteration in national sovereignty if it were convinced that the inspection privileges within the Communist bloc were bona fide. And I am convinced that it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to accept such a policy.

A Fleeting Primacy

As we look out on the world—with vast areas moving into the preconditions and the take-off—it is clear that the Soviet Union and the U.S. stand at an interval of relative primacy; but that primacy is transient. We can dissipate that interval in a cold war for which history will offer us little respect and little thanks; we can, clearly, destroy each other and most of the planet in a hot war.

But there is also a great constructive option open to both countries. They can use the interval to create a system of arms control so solid and
secure over the coming decades that as the new nations move to technological maturity, they enter a world of orderly politics rather than one where the power struggle persists with weapons of mass destruction. That is the historical limit of our powers. The diffusion of power can be rendered relatively safe or very dangerous; but it cannot be prevented. The march of the stages of growth rules out the notion of an American century, a Chinese century, a German century, a Japanese century, or a Russian century.

This would not merely free vast resources for peaceful purposes, including aid, but would lift from the underdeveloped areas the burden of being located at points of strategic competition. In such a setting, we would find it quite possible for ideological competition to go on without grave danger.

I profoundly believe, therefore, that it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to exercise this historic interval of option to join the U.S. in imposing mutually on one another the one thing the world would accept from the two great powers; that is, an effective system of arms control.
THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS IN EMERGING NATIONS*

The Traditional Society

The nature of the transitional process which we are considering here—and which American policy confronts in many parts of the world—takes its start from the character of the traditional societies that are in the process of being superseded. We begin, therefore, by sketching briefly the major features of traditional societies.

These were societies with hereditary hierarchical rule, living under the sway of customs rather than of law. Their economies were static and remained at the same level of limited technology and low income from one generation to the next. Even though some ancient societies exhibited high proficiency in certain directions, they should be termed traditional since they were incapable of generating a regular flow of inventions and innovations and of moving into a phase of sustained economic growth. Before the appearance of the modern scientific attitude and of advances in basic scientific knowledge, no society could produce a continuing flow of new technology. It followed from this limitation that the bulk of men's economic activity was taken up in acquiring food. Typically, at least 75 per cent and often more of the working force in traditional societies was in agriculture.

History offers us a wide range of such societies. Some were relatively primitive tribes living within a narrow region, on a self-sufficient base, with tribal rather than territorial political and economic organization, and tenuously connected if at all with other tribes and regions. In parts of Africa and in some areas elsewhere we can still find such isolated and primitive forms of social, political, and economic organization.

Other traditional societies have been made up of loosely organized regions, with fairly elaborate structures of political and social organization and quite sophisticated agricultural

techniques, but weak or nonexistent central governments. Medieval Europe, for example, could be described in some such terms, as well as India before the arrival of the European colonial powers.

But some traditional societies were very substantial empires with quite powerful centralized governments, manipulating a corps of civil servants and a military establishment, capable of collecting taxes and maintaining public works over large areas, capable of conquering and administering other regions and of generating a framework for elaborate patterns of trade and even significant industrial development. The Roman and Mayan Empires were such elaborate traditional organizations, as were certain of the Chinese dynasties at the peak of their effectiveness and some of the Middle Eastern empires at various stages of history.

Nor were these societies all primitive intellectually. Some of them, such as the Greek and Chinese, developed philosophy and the arts to levels hardly since surpassed. Societies of the Near East developed the modern alphabet and the number tools on which modern achievements in mathematics are built. In traditional societies of the West there evolved the concept of monotheism, and then Christianity; in India, Buddhism.

The history of traditional societies, and notably of those that had reasonably strong centralized governments, was not static. In times of peace, more acreage was cultivated, trade expanded, the population increased; the government collected taxes efficiently, maintained the irrigation works, and enlarged the opportunities for commerce. The nation extended its boundaries and learned how to administer a large empire. Colonization of distant areas occurred. But then change would come to a halt, and governmental administration would begin to disintegrate; the society would break down. The immediate causes of collapse were various—population pressure, war, disintegration of central rule, and so on. But behind these varied events lay one common circumstance: the society had encountered a new condition to which it could not adapt. Old patterns of behavior persisted even though new circumstances required changed behavior, and the society ceased to function well enough to prevent disaster.

It followed from the preponderant role of agriculture that the ownership and control of land was a decisive factor in social prestige and, usually, in political influence. In some places the bulk of the land was owned by a relatively small number of nobles and the king, and worked by peasants who stood in a feudal, hierarchical relationship to the owners. This condition still exists, for example,
in parts of the Middle East. In other countries landownership was quite widely spread, as it was in China, resulting in an endless struggle by the peasants to acquire more land, to establish an economic position relatively independent of the luck of the harvests, and thus to rise in the society. In many of the African tribes, land was owned communally, with no concept of individual tenure and thus little incentive for systematic investment in improvements.

In traditional societies, face-to-face relationships were extremely important, as were the ties to family and clan. Men tended to be bound together and to be valued by one another in terms of such intimate connections rather than because of their ability to perform specific functional tasks. It was very rarely that the average person had dealings with anyone he did not know quite well. Social, political, and even economic relations with strangers were seen as neither necessary nor desirable. Hence human intercourse, which in modern societies would be guided by functional considerations of economic benefit, political advantage, technical exchange, and the like, were in traditional societies much more influenced by codes of friendship, family and tribal loyalty, and hierarchical status.

Although traditional societies sometimes provided a channel for able men of the lower economic classes to rise in power and prestige (often through the civil service and the military establishment), there was a tendency for people to assume that the status of their children and grandchildren would be similar to that of their parents and grandparents. A kind of long-run fatalism pervaded traditional societies despite the ebb and flow of family fortunes and despite the slow evolution of the society as a whole.

The cultural and religious life of traditional societies, and the values they elevated, varied widely. Generally, however, they formed a coherent pattern, giving men a reasonably orderly rationale for the relatively stable round of life they faced, at whatever level in the society they found themselves. They provided a set of relationships of men to one another and to the world about them which gave them a degree of security in facing their appointed destiny within the traditional structure.

The Disruption of Traditional Societies

The accepted Western characterization of the traditional societies as static is on the whole an accurate one; and the weight of historical evidence seems to support the view that in general it was the shock and continuing aftereffects of contact with more
advanced societies that first cracked and then broke up the traditional social structures of what, for want of a better term, we call the underdeveloped countries. The impact of the more advanced societies of the West has certainly been the most dramatic disruptive influence upon traditional societies. In some instances, indeed, it has been the sole influence, as, for example, throughout tropical Africa, where European nations moved in on extremely primitive traditional societies which had remained essentially unchanged for countless generations. Yet this is not the whole story. It would be wrong to conclude that there were no seeds of change, no potential for modernization, in the traditional societies themselves. There have been significant instances in which the effects of Western intrusion were sharply affected by the nature of changes which had already begun to have their impact on the traditional society. It is worth noting some of them before we turn to the consequences of the Western impact.

Disequilibrium within Traditional Societies

That change in traditional societies is not determined solely by the impact of the West is clear from the comparative history of India, Indonesia, China, and Japan. The English were well established in India and the Dutch in Indonesia by the middle of the sixteenth century, and channels for the introduction of Western skills and ideas were far more readily available than in China or Japan. Next in degree of contact with the West was China, where the powers established trading beachheads at the important ports and carried on trade with the interior of the country. Japan had the least contact of all, for it ejected Westerners during the first half of the seventeenth century, except for a tiny colony of Dutch traders who were suffered to remain at Deshima Bay at the far tip of the main island. What little contact there was with the West was deliberately permitted to flow through the tiny Deshima Bay funnel. Yet of the four countries mentioned, Japan gave increasing evidence of modernization between 1800 and 1850 and was undergoing rapid change by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, almost three quarters of a century before any of the others.

Clearly factors other than contact with the West were at work within some traditional societies to produce men, institutions, and attitudes conducive to change. Some of these factors are highly elusive, such as differences between traditional cultures themselves; some cultures simply appear to have been more amenable to change than others. Accidents of history and of personality have also played their part. Other factors, having to do with the dynamics of social evolution, can be somewhat more tangibly identified.
In some societies, for example, the requirements of conducting war led the central government to enlarge the military caste. The new members often desired changes whose purpose was to increase national power or improve the lot of the classes from which they were drawn--changes opposed by the traditional landowners. This was true, for example, of Prussia before 1793, Japan before 1868, China in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Turkey before 1914. War also increased the requirements for credit and trade, tending to elevate somewhat the status of moneylenders and of those who managed domestic and foreign commerce--men whose formal place in the traditional hierarchy was usually low. In those traditional societies which assumed imperial responsibility, the management of empire itself strengthened the role and status of the civil servant and the technician.

It appears that a traditional society turned the more readily to modernization if there was any articulate group of men in it with reason to be unhappy about their position. Feeling aggrieved, already questioning the values and attitudes of the traditional society, they were psychologically prepared to accept new ways of life as a means of proving their worth and gaining self-satisfaction, status, and prestige. Put another way, the traditional society, despite its surface of coherence and stability, was often marked by inner conflicts; and one of the effects of intrusion from without was often to permit those conflicts to take forms that contributed significantly to modernization.

It may have happened, for example, that after one traditional class gained power at the expense of another a sense of grievance led the displaced class to question the values, the morals, and the way of life of the leading group. In ancient times such social grievances led to armed rebellion, or to migration to a new country, or to a new religious movement, or sometimes to a relapse into apathy if nothing could be done about the trouble. In modern times, if the country has had contact with the West and with advanced technology, and the possibility exists of economic achievement through the adoption of new technology, the restless group may strike off in the new ways of life and lead the nation in economic progress.

A few historical examples may make this process clearer.

In England far more leaders of the world's first industrial revolution came from among the religious nonconformists than from any other single group, even though the nonconformists formed only seven or eight per cent of the population of England. Many other leaders came from the lowland Scots, who had come under the political and social domination of the English.
In Japan disaffected social groups led the way in modernization. In about 1600 one group of clans, the Tokugawa, gained dominance over the entire country and subjected other clans, the "outer clans," to political and social subordination. Under the Tokugawa a national peace was imposed; the warrior class, the Samurai, lost their traditional social position and also steadily declined in wealth. The move toward modernization, which fermented under the surface, led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa in 1868 and thereafter proceeded rapidly, led by Samurai and individuals from the outer clans.

In Colombia the Spanish conquerors inhabited three high valleys which are the sites of the four main present cities of Colombia. In two of these valleys they developed landed estates and became landed gentry or cattlemen. In the third, Antioquia, because the land was less suitable and because other activities were more attractive, they did not. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the historical literature of the time shows, the gentry of the other two valleys looked down on the Antioqueños because they too had not become gentry, and the Antioqueños resented this attitude. Today it is the Antioqueños who are spearheading economic and political modernization throughout Colombia.

In India successive waves of migration over several millennia have resulted in the existence of a number of social groups who even today are very conscious of their historical differences from each other. It is probably significant that much of the effective modern business activity to date in India has been initiated by several of the minority social groups--the Parsis, the Marwari, and others.

Thus social tensions may lead to the rejection of traditional attitudes by certain groups, who turn to new activities which may restore their prestige and sense of achievement. Indeed, it is virtually never the social group in control of a traditional society that leads the way to modernization. That group, which finds the traditional social order satisfactory, virtually always resists change, even if the society is threatened from without and change is necessary to resist that threat.

But this social and psychological dynamic need not, by itself, lead disaffected groups to engage in new sorts of economic activities. Modernization must first become a realistic alternative. Only when new ideas and ways of doing things are introduced from more advanced societies will the possibilities of economic change be perceived as real.
The Impact of More Advanced Societies

The initial impact of a comparatively modernized society on a traditional society most commonly took the form of, or was followed by, occupation and the setting up of colonial administrations, actions that had revolutionary effects on the traditional society in two ways.

First, in pursuit of its own interests (and often, too, in response to an impulse to spread the values and advantages of modern civilization) the colonial power executed specific policies which directly affected the economic, social, political, and cultural life of the traditional society. Ports, docks, roads, and, in some places, railroads were built. These were usually designed primarily for the economic or military advantage of the colonial power; but they had wider effects in creating national markets, commercializing agriculture, helping cities to grow, and bringing backward areas into contact with elements of modern life. Forms of central administration and centralized tax systems were usually set up. Some colonials were drawn into the economic and administrative activities necessary to execute the purposes of the colonial power. Some modern goods and services were diffused, altering the conception of the level of life that men could regard as attainable. To at least a few colonials the opportunity for a Western education was opened. Perhaps most important, the colonial power often introduced the traditional society to the Western tradition of law, to some version of those rules and procedures for the dispensation of justice which transcend and limit the powers of the individuals who exercise political authority.

In short, it was of the nature of the colonial experience that at every level of life it brought the traditional society into contact with some degree of modernization.

The character and extent of the contact with modernization varied with the concept of colonial rule that each power brought to its various colonies. In India, for example, the British made special efforts to train men for both the civil service and the army: the Moslems on the whole opted for military training, the Hindus for the civil service, reflecting in that choice underlying differences in the culture of the two groups in the Indian peninsula. In Burma, on the other hand, the British did relatively little to train either soldiers or civil servants. The French, in their empire, made great efforts to bring a thin top layer of the indigenous leaders as fully as possible into French cultural, intellectual, and political life. The Belgians in the Congo concentrated, for economic reasons,
on literacy and vocational training for the lower levels of the labor force and did nothing to prepare an elite for leadership. The Dutch in Indonesia and the Portuguese in East Africa by and large adopted policies designed to limit the extent and the pace of modernization.

But however colonial policy might vary, colonialism nevertheless had one universal direct effect: it disrupted the static traditional societies. In establishing their own control the colonial administrators destroyed the existing power structure. In varying degrees they cast aside the traditional political and administrative system, substituting their own. They often treated the traditional religion with scorn and profaned what had been held holy. They violated many customary and revered human and property rights by introducing Western ideas of law and contract which in the light of traditional morals often must have seemed as wrong to the indigenous people as the Soviet doctrine of the supremacy of the state over the individual seems to the West. In these and other ways the cohesion and integrity of the traditional social and political system were violated.

The second effect of colonialism was indirect but perhaps even more profound than the direct infusion of modern elements. As an increasing number of men in the colonial society became acquainted with the methods and ideas of the West, they reacted against the human and collective humiliation that inevitably accompanied colonial rule; and they sought independence. Some, it is true, were drawn imitatively toward the manners and mores of the colonial power (for example, colonials who were educated abroad or who had positions of privilege within colonial rule); and others found their positions strengthened by the techniques of colonial rule (for example, some of the African tribal chiefs and the Indian princes). But as time passed, a spirit of nationalism emerged, first among educated members of the colonial elite, then spreading to the urban populations, and finally reaching into the countryside.

Colonial rule was not, however, the only form of intrusion that helped unhinge traditional societies. The defeat of the traditional society in war against a more advanced power often played an important role. This was so, for example, in Germany after the Napoleonic occupation; in Russia after the Crimean War; in Japan after its imposed opening to trade by the West in the shadow of modern naval cannon; in Turkey after the First World War; in China after the defeats by the British in the 1840's and by the Japanese in the 1890's. The demonstration that the traditional form of organization was incapable of maintaining the physical integrity of the
nation tended to lower the prestige of the traditional rulers, their values, and their institutions, and it tended to strengthen the hand of those groups in the traditional society—soldiers, intellectuals, men of commerce, civil servants, lesser nobility—who for various, often differing reasons were already interested in making the social changes necessary to increase their own power and the strength and prestige of their society.

In sum, the frustration and sense of powerlessness which resulted from intrusion by the West and especially from colonial rule generated an intense, though often submerged, desire for increase in power, prestige, dignity, respect, equality. Sometimes the people seemed almost apathetic about their situation, adopting an attitude which persuaded many observers, including some colonial administrators themselves, that colonial peoples had no emotional depth, no interests beyond the immediate events of their daily lives, no concern about who their rulers were. But when there appeared even a trace of opportunity to express their basic frustrations and realize their desires, the apathy fast began to vanish. Sometimes, as in the Belgian Congo for instance, apathy was shaken off in a burst of violence.

In most colonial areas frustration and resentment came first to a small but important group well before national independence seemed in sight. Some individuals in the colonial society were able to advance themselves by education, seeking to acquire status which both in the traditional society and in the West merited respect. They became doctors, lawyers, scholars. But once they had gained the badge of learning, they found themselves still colonials, still in subordinate political and social positions, still treated as inferiors. Moreover, so many individuals turned to this channel in the hope of gaining the dignity and respect they sought, that some found it difficult to practice the skills they had gained. The result of these circumstances was personal bitterness and frustration.

The continued frustration of the educated colonial has often been attributed solely to the denial of opportunity and adequate scope for the exercise of his newly developed skills. One is frequently reminded of the problem of the "unemployed and underemployed intellectuals," and it is indeed in many countries a real problem. The modernizing societies suffer from a far too large and far too frequent gap between the skills and aspirations fostered by education and the available career opportunities. But other factors have also often been at work. Many of these educated men, for example, attained the badge of university education without achieving great professional skill in any field, which is one reason why they were often still treated as
subordinates without high status. In some cases, too, these individuals had become bitter and frustrated long before they received their education. Their interest in careers and professions was not always deep, and frustrations would not automatically have been relieved by excellent career opportunities. In short, despite their relatively high status, some educated men in the modernizing societies tend to remain bitter, suspicious, defensive life-long casualties of the tensions in the colonial society in which they were reared.

The Western example can cause other inner conflicts. After independence, the desire for power and dignity, combined with the recognition of industrialization as a symbol of the power of the West, often provides a powerful emotional stimulus to the desire for industrialization; but it does not inculcate a corresponding desire to live the kinds of lives, perform the kinds of functions, and maintain the kinds of relationships with other individuals that are necessary for industrialization. The fruits of industrialization are urgently desired; the social and psychological changes which go with it may still be unwelcome.

In the countryside, the influence of the West has in several ways stimulated an intense desire by the peasant for land reform. It is not merely that Western egalitarian ideas have led him to feel that he can have something that he has always wanted but thought hopelessly beyond his reach. Rather, in most traditional societies, where population growth was ordinarily extremely slow, there was likely to be no "land problem." Land was not something to be bought and sold. Land often passed from one generation to another of the peasant's family; though the head of the family did not own it, it was his to use, and the lord or chieftain no more felt free to take it from him than he felt able to sell it. Thus he felt secure in the "inherited use ownership" (as anthropologists term the relationship) of his own plot of land. But when Westerners, as in much of Asia, introduced ownership in fee simple, mortgages, and alienability of land, the peasant, after rejoicing in his new ability to obtain money on loan, found that he had lost the right to use his land and that the bottom had dropped out of his world.

Population growth brought land scarcity, it is true, in many traditional societies, a problem that was accentuated when modern medicine reduced death rates so that the traditional level of birth rates, which had previously barely exceeded death rates, brought rapid population increase. In such a situation the peasant would have found himself bereft of land (or without sufficient land) even without the introduction of Western ideas of contract and sale. In
such circumstances of land scarcity, as well as when in traditional societies lords used their economic or military power to levy extortionate taxes or to dispossess peasants of inherited use ownership, peasants revolts occurred. They have been a periodic feature of the history of traditional societies. The point to be made here is that, wherever for any reason landlessness or land scarcity has existed, the spread of egalitarian ideas from the West has given the peasant an increased feeling that something could be done about it and has intensified the demand for land reform. From the French Revolution, through the Taiping Rebellion in China and the Russian Revolution, down to the pressure for land reform in contemporary Egypt and Iran, this has been true.

Quite aside from the multiple impacts of colonialism and superior military power, contact with more advanced societies usually led to a spreading awareness of what modernization could do in terms of human welfare. Such contact demonstrated, for example, that public health could be improved, that food output could be increased, and that cheaper textiles could be provided to the peasant and the worker. In the twentieth century the intimacy of communications, including the fact that modern armies have been based in many of the traditional countries, has peculiarly heightened an awareness of the gap between modern and traditional standards of life. Any awareness of this kind, creating as it does a pressure for a rapid increase in popular welfare, undermines faith in the traditional society.

The contrast between the traditional and the modern economy was not solely, or perhaps even most significantly, a contrast in standards of living and levels of consumption. In traditional societies the individual's status and frequently his occupation were determined by inheritance and custom. But once the old society was no longer fully satisfying, he was ready to accept a new image of his social role; and the employment opportunities and the modes of life available in the new cities provided that image. For modern economic activity, whether colonial or indigenous, has inevitably taken people out of their conventional roles and put them in new situations both of work and of life which have greatly broadened their perception of the range of alternative activities in which they might engage. This increased mobility and widened perception of alternatives have markedly weakened the most stabilizing elements in traditional society.

The introduction of Western ideas has also had profound effects on traditional societies. Among the new ideas were the Western notions that all men stood equal before the law, that they should have
equal opportunity to develop their talents, and that policies should be determined and political leadership selected on a universal suffrage basis. In addition to encountering democratic concepts, many of the new intellectuals from the old societies have been exposed during their formative years in the West to Marxist and other socialist theories. These have often had a great appeal because they purport to explain the forces at work in societies in the process of modernization. The theory of the class struggle, Lenin's theory of imperialism, and Communist doctrine on the organization of revolutionary movements have gained considerable currency and influence, and have helped generate dissatisfaction with traditional attitudes and values. Although the traditional societies or those early in the modernization process did not necessarily desire to install modern democratic processes, the infusion of new ideas sometimes led to strong movements toward increased popular participation in the political process—a revolutionary violation of the customs of traditional rule.

So much for this backward look at the disruption of traditional societies which has preceded, accompanied, and been caused by the modernization process. Both disruption and the break-up of traditional societies continue, heightened and speeded up in our time by the shrinkage of distances and by the existence of the mass media and the instrumentalities of mass organization.

Resistance and Conflict in the Modernization Process

It is one thing for a traditional society to be moved toward change by internal factors or to experience the intrusion of modern elements which in favorable circumstances set in motion new dynamic trends. It is quite a different matter for such a society to achieve a working modern system which moves toward constructive objectives by increasingly democratic means. Before a modern society can be achieved—before the modern elements within a traditional society can become not only dominant but constructive—a succession of profound changes must take place; for any established society has deeply rooted characteristics which yield only reluctantly, with pain and the passage of time, and only to strong and persistent pressure for change.

Thus time is required for the social structure to be altered, for new political attitudes and institutions to be created and consolidated, for the creation of the skills and habits and institutions on which capital formation depends. Above all, time must pass for new generations to succeed one another, each finding the
environment, techniques, and goals of modernization a bit more familiar and acceptable.

Historical experience indicates that no society ever simply abandons its traditional culture. On the contrary, the old culture almost always leaves permanent and significant marks of continuity on the fully modernized society. Nevertheless, the traditional culture must undergo drastic alteration. It is thus of the very nature of the modernizing process that at every step of the way the impulses making for modernization are in active contention with powerful forces tending to retard and to frustrate the transformation of the traditional society into full constructive modernity. There is nothing which decrees that the forces of modernization will win eventual or automatic victory. The interplay between the new hopes and the old ways may yield bloody civil conflict susceptible to exploitation by external powers; there may be efforts to channel the modernization process into disruptive foreign adventures; the society's politics may be seized by dictators who exploit popular frustrations and the inevitable looseness of the transitional period for their own purposes.

In any case, there are three principal areas in which elements of resistance must be overcome if the modernization of a traditional society is to be carried through successfully: politics, economics, and social structure. The underlying requirement for change in these areas is the modernization of attitudes. Modernity is a style of life. The ensemble of behaviors that compose the modern style is given its coherence by a frame of mind—toward the here and hereafter, toward permanence and change, toward oneself and one's fellowmen. We shall undertake to characterize the modern perspective more fully later in this chapter.

Politically, the people must come to accept new forms for the organization of power based on the creation of a minimally effective national government. The balance of social and political power must shift from the village to the city, from the tasks and virtues of agricultural life to those of commerce, industry, and modern administration. The people must begin—in a process with many difficult stages—to judge politics and politicians in terms of policies rather than merely in terms of inherited status or personality; and, if the goal is democracy, they must develop forms for transferring power by registering consent. Much energy and attention must be devoted to overcoming residues of traditional political authority which cannot be harnessed constructively to the purposes of the new national government. Examples are the sects
in South Vietnam, the Indian princes, the Chinese war lords, the African tribal leaders. The new government must also develop a core of technically trained men capable of maintaining order, collecting taxes, and organizing the staff work required for the inevitably substantial role of government in the economy and in the educational process. If it is to survive, the new government must also demonstrate effective leadership in establishing programs to promote the new aspirations which modernization tends to instill in the minds of various groups of citizens. Means of communication must be developed between the government and its citizens to convey to them that the national goals being pursued are ones they would sanction.

Political development thus must contend with vested power derived from the traditional society, with a lack of trained men, with a low literacy rate and a lack of other facilities permitting persuasive mass communication, with loyalties limited largely to traditional groups rather than to the nation as a whole, and with the absence of a widespread sense that the new national government is an appropriate vehicle for furthering popular goals. In dealing with these problems many occasions will arise for frustration and backsliding, many ways in which political life may be diverted to sterile or disruptive goals. The Communist appeal to the underdeveloped areas is designed to exploit precisely these possibilities.

Economically, the society must achieve a situation where it regularly saves and productively invests a sufficient volume of its resources, and regularly adopts new ways of doing things. The growth of the national economy must begin to outpace population increase so that continuing economic growth can become a normal condition, a process which in itself involves every dimension of the society and many sectors of the economy.

Resistance to modernization may take the form of certain basic initial economic weaknesses. A very considerable expansion must take place in the number of modern men and institutions, as well as in physical capital, before sustained growth is possible at rates that substantially outstrip population increase. To achieve basic economic change, men must cease to regard the physical world as fixed. They must learn that it is capable of being understood and manipulated in terms of stable and logical rules which men can master. Above all, they must desire to use their energies in manipulating the physical world rather than regard such an activity as demeaning and distasteful. But such a change in attitude is not enough. Before a society's economy can grow regularly at a rate higher than its population increase, large numbers of men must be
trained in specialized techniques; and these men must learn to apply
systematically and progressively to the production of goods and ser-

Socially, men must transform the old culture in ways which
make it compatible with modern activities and institutions. The
face-to-face relations and warm, powerful family ties of a tradi-
tional society must give way to more impersonal systems of
evaluation in which men are judged by the way they perform spe-
cialized functions in the society. In their links to the nation, to
their professional colleagues, to their political parties, men must
find partial alternatives for the powerful, long-tested ties and sym-
bols of the traditional life centered on family, clan, and region. And
new hierarchies based on function must come to replace those rooted
in landownership and tradition.

The small elite groups who dominate the political process in
a traditional society are virtually certain to oppose change, for
change inevitably means reduction in their status. When other elite
groups capture power from them by either peaceful or violent means,
the new leaders will be of many minds as to the evolution of their
society. Some may seek to divert the national sentiment and the
energies of the new national government into external adventure in
hope of redressing old humiliations or exploiting newly perceived
opportunities for national aggrandizement. Some may strive pri-
marily to consolidate the power of the new central government as
against contending regional authorities. Others may be interested
primarily in seeing quickly installed the political and legal forms
of modern democracy; and still others--initially usually a minority
of the elite--may be anxious to get on with the concrete tasks of
economic and technical modernization of the economy.

The confusions and cross purposes which result from this
diffusion of objectives inevitably retard the process of moderni-
Zation. Men may be tempted to seek escape from the frustrations
of internal differences and to unite in aggressive attitudes or
action toward the outside world. Or they may be led to accept in
desperation the unity and discipline that Communist or other
totalitarian forms of social organization hold out to them.
Although the small Westernized and literate elites play a disproportionately powerful role in the early stages of the modernization process, the mass of citizens must also be brought gradually into the main stream of change. Each person must begin to assume new functions and new relations to the economic and political process. The magnitude of the change required is suggested by the fact that the transition to modernization usually begins with more than 75 per cent of the population living in the countryside and less than 10 per cent literate. The round of life is tied to the rhythm of the harvests and to the narrow local scene; to a traditional system of land tenure and the assumption that life for the children and grandchildren is likely to be much as it is and has been in living memory. Social life is built around a close family; traditional political and social relations, long sanctioned by custom, tend to be passively accepted. The government is likely to seem a remote and distant entity associated with extraction of taxes and arbitrary recruitment of sons for military service; and the concept of the nation may often hardly exist.

All this must alter if modernization is to succeed. There must be a radical shift in balance to urban life, literacy must increase, agricultural methods must change, and the markets must widen and become increasingly commercial. Land tenure arrangements are likely to require alteration. The idea must spread that the physical environment can be understood and controlled in ways that permit higher standards of welfare. The government must come to be identified with activities and objectives that conform to popular interests. If democracy is eventually to emerge, the citizen must come to accept the responsibilities as well as the power to determine who shall rule and what the direction of public policy shall be.

* * * *

By identifying the three principal areas in which the requirements for modernization may give rise to tensions and resistance, we have in effect defined social evolution in institutional terms. We have implied an approach to understanding the process of change in the underdeveloped countries based on characteristics which are given organized institutional expression in the social, economic, and political realms of life. But the more closely we examine our subject, the more evident it becomes that in the end we are talking not about institutions but people; that no division of the problem into parts permits escape from the fundamental proposition that the paramount requirement for the modernization of any society is that the people themselves must change. Our understanding of the process
of modernization in the underdeveloped countries, and in turn our understanding of the policy problems involved, must be informed by awareness of the ferment of individual thoughts and emotions at the core of any drastic change in a society. Here, in what might be called the realm of psychological change, the requirements for modernization give rise to tensions and resistance, to visible and invisible conflicts which are often the hardest for the outside world to comprehend and accept.

To begin with, the instinctive Western feeling that all individuals, or at least all educated individuals, in a traditional society exposed to the impact of modern life should spontaneously value the goals of modernization simply runs counter to the facts of both human nature and history. It is of course true that virtually all individuals everywhere want some of the fruits of modernization--more income for themselves, more power, dignity, respect, and recognition for their countries. But man has ever been ambivalent and irrationally eclectic in his acceptance of the new, and hostile toward innovation when it violates long familiar customs and personal habits of thought. This holds for the member of a traditional society confronted by the demands made on him if he is to reap the benefits of modernization--even if he recognizes those benefits.

Thus to an individual who has absorbed with his mother's milk the attitude that it is wrong to speak or even think freely until the duly honored elders and persons in superior positions have expressed their opinions, the concept of freedom of thought and expression may be an impossible one to accept. He knows that in due time he will become an elder and be entitled to the deference of action, speech, and thought which youth owes to age and experience; and it may be unthinkable that this natural progression to seniority and deference should be abandoned in favor of individual equality of expression. One of the most pervasive carry-over effects of the traditional society is the persistent tendency to inhibit individual initiative, a perpetuation of attitudes that resist innovation in any form.

For centuries in the traditional societies it has been important to the more elevated classes to think of themselves as different by nature from the menial classes. Since one main mark of the menial classes is that they work with their hands and with tools, a man of higher status feels like a menial if he works with or even directs work with tools or machines. It is difficult for him to discard such inherited attitudes even if he is aware of them and tries to overcome them. His distaste for industry is heightened by the fact that the business and commercial groups in such societies (for example, the Chinese
in Southeast Asia) are often groups who historically came from other countries and are still looked upon as outsiders.

At the same level of personal conduct, wherever life is economically precarious, as in traditional societies, it is common for all members of a group of relatives to share their income. The individual who gains extra income is obligated to share it with relatives who have less. Should he refuse to open opportunities for financial gain to his relatives because of what we in modern societies would term ethical obligations to his associates or to the public, he may be treated as a moral leper.

Thus the traditional guides to personal conduct become sources of inner conflict and resistance if the individual is to serve his society's needs for modernization. Even the educated man who sees the benefits of modern enterprises is deterred by custom from engaging in them because the practical problems of management are felt to be menial activities. Or, having accepted responsibility for a public enterprise, and understanding the modern criteria of skill and experience, he is still impelled by custom to use his position as a means of benefiting relatives and friends.

In short, the path to modernization opens up an almost limitless range of situations where the individual may be torn by the conflict of purpose in his mind and his emotions, a condition that creates obstacles to every aspect of social change. Such obstacles may be compounded by the high respect for traditional learning which marks many old societies; knowledge of ancient literature and philosophy is expected of every educated man, but study of the material world reflects menial interests and is thus sordid and uninteresting. Reverence for the ancient religion may be a further deterrent to change. One of the authors of this book remembers vividly the fear expressed by the fine old mother of a Burmese boy who had obtained a fellowship to study in the United States--the justifiable fear that in the midst of new experiences in the West he would lose his Buddhist piety. The case could be multiplied thousands, even millions, of times; it symbolizes the underlying loyalty to old values that makes modernization difficult.

The division of heart and purpose tends to be especially great in some ex-colonial societies, where the people as a whole may be diverted from constructive effort by emotions surviving from the past. The colonial administrators, by violating ancient family rights in land and other property, showing contempt for the indigenous religion, and treating the colonial people as an inferior race,
may have intensified the ambivalence in the attitude of the indigenous population toward the West. The colonials respected the power of the Westerner and imitated his manner of living, but at the same time they often resented his presence, hated his behavior, and were determined to eject him and what he stood for, including his business enterprises. Now, after gaining their independence, such people may cling to the old all the more compulsively because to abandon it would be to admit that the colonial administration was right, that they were an inferior people.

We must, then, accept the fact that no matter how passionately in one part of their beings men may want to see their societies and themselves enjoy the benefits of modernization, they are capable of sustaining in tolerable psychological order only a limited rate of change; and they may cling more tenaciously than even they are aware to elements in the traditional society as a source of security in a transitional situation where almost everything else about them is changing. Even within the literate elite in the changing societies, who may be quite skilled and may talk the language of modernization with fluency and apparent conviction, there is often latent conflict between the modes of action and the values that modernization requires and the ingrained habits and attachments of the traditional society.

We must approach the problems of the underdeveloped societies with the realization that the modernization process requires fundamental human attitudes to change in such ways as to make the efficient operation of a modern society not only possible but also psychologically congenial. We must be aware that, especially in the first generations of the transition, the commitment of men to the goal of modernization may be more apparent than real.

Some Factors in Social Change

In the early period of transition, when a society begins to break out of its traditional structure, the most powerful social class often consists of the men who own or control the land, a group likely to be deeply conservative in every respect. Feeling a deep attachment to the old ways of life, and sensing that social and technological change threatens their hegemony, they tend to resist all efforts to modernize. In Africa, where communal landholding by the tribe is common, such resistance is often identified less with distinctions of social class than with a widespread commitment to the tribal way of life as a whole.

Where landowners do exist as a substantial and powerful class,
their strategy has sometimes been to resist by partially adopting new ways; in such cases they have often retained some of their power as individuals while their power as a class was waning. Where landowners have resisted all efforts at modernization, the landed class and its members have generally gone down together. The basic shift to urban and industrial life, which is the core process of modernization, has always spelled the end of hegemony by landowners as a class. In tribal societies the transformation is not in the status of a landowning class but in that of tribal prerogatives as a whole.

A traditional society is also characterized by the absence of an indigenous middle class large enough or strong enough to challenge the landowners' power. In the early stages of transition, therefore, the decisive challenge to the landlords' supremacy generally comes not from any one social class but from a coalition, a group that varies considerably in specific composition from one country to another but whose leadership is almost invariably made up of men deeply affected by Western ways of thought and action.

In colonial countries those at the forefront of independence movements have often received a university education in the West, sometimes being trained for one of the professions, such as law or medicine. They may also have been introduced to Western patterns of thought and organization through military corps, administration, and industrial and trade union organizations. In countries without colonial histories, such as Turkey, leadership has sometimes been assumed by military officers whose sense of power combined with a strong sense of national pride created in them a desire to lead the way to modernity.

Whatever their particular background, those who lead the fight for independence, or in noncolonial societies the struggle to displace the landowning class, are likely to be more skilled in the political and military tasks of achieving power than in the arts of governing and modernizing a traditional society. Depending on the circumstances and problems of achieving independence, they may become skilled in communicating with and organizing peasants and workers for disruptive activity, in writing revolutionary tracts and editing revolutionary journals, or in conducting guerrilla warfare. Once independence or power is achieved, they often find it difficult to turn their minds and convert their skills to the tasks of modernization. As a result, the first generation of new leaders is often inadequately prepared by experience and training to deal with the problems confronting them when responsibility is attained. Thus
progress toward modernization is inevitably slow in the early transitional period. Groups within the governing elite are likely to contend in an erratic and unstable manner, with frequent shifts of power from one to another. Moreover, the elite groups tend to rally around individuals, the substance of whose programs may be ambiguous and unclear even to themselves. Political activity revolves around issues of power and personality rather than around alternative national policies.

Nevertheless, during this period certain dynamic forces are at work in the society which tend to move the social structure and the political debate into a new phase. First, contacts with more modern societies are likely to increase the number of persons trained in the West or otherwise introduced to modern ideas and skills. Second, the very responsibility of managing a national government, even if conducted without great skill and purpose, tends to enlarge the number of men with modern attitudes and commitments. Third, even if sustained economic growth is unlikely at this early stage, commercial activity is likely to increase, cities to grow, and some experiments in industrialization to be undertaken. Finally, because progress is slow and the high hopes and optimistic slogans that accompanied the arrival of independence (or the proclamation of a modern-style government) remain still largely unfulfilled, there is a dynamic created by the sense of frustration on the part of members of the younger generation of the Westernized elite.

A combination of such forces may bring into being a coalition determined to push forward with a more purposeful program of modernization. The balance of the social elements in such a coalition varies widely according to the initial structure of the traditional society and its experience during transition. In some instances, as in Turkey and Egypt, the coalition has contained a large percentage of men from the military; in others (for example, the Congress Party in India) the military has played no significant role. Almost invariably at some stage in the process, though not necessarily at the beginning, intellectuals and professionally trained men have been influential. Occasionally leaders of commerce and industry have played a prominent role, as did Birla in India. In a few places, particularly in Latin America, individual landowners have also played a constructive part, largely as a consequence of a partial shift in their investments out of agriculture and into the industrial sector of the economy. It is in general true that the social basis for the modernizing coalition has lain in the city and in the essentially urban skills of the elite, particularly the military and intellectual elite, who have adopted Western attitudes.
If this modernizing coalition meets with some success, and modernization actually begins to make a dent upon the society, the pace of social change steps up rapidly. New people begin to take over the shaping of public policy, people with the attitudes and technical skills needed to perform the manifold tasks of urbanization, industrialization, and monetization as well as the complex tasks produced by the rationalization of work and the secularization of beliefs.

In general, and with deference to the variety of specific forms that modernization has taken historically and in the contemporary scene, the central tendency of sociological change appears to be the multiplication of key social roles, in part new roles, in part adaptations of old ones. As life becomes more technically oriented, power and prestige shift away from the few dominant men in the traditional structure—the wealthy pasha, the wise priest, the village elder—toward men equipped to perform more specific functions in the modern division of labor. Professional and technical skills are required for the roles associated with the growth of cities and the spread of industries, the technical advances and monetization of agriculture, the growing dependence of public policy upon an informed and participant citizenry. The banker and the economist tend to replace the landowner and moneylender as sources of cash and managers of credit; the industrialist and manager replace the merchant and trader, the civil servant, the engineer, the agronomist, and others take over special functions that earlier were concentrated in village elders and other men of hereditary wealth or wisdom.

We shall deal particularly with three of the groups often found in the modernizing coalition: first, the military, which is playing a decisive role in many transitional societies today; second, the secular intelligentsia, the manipulators of symbols who shape the slogans and doctrines by which the new ways of life are rationalized and justified; third, the innovating entrepreneurs of many sorts who play a crucial role in modernization.

The Military

With the exception of most parts of Africa, substantial military groups having considerable political and social influence have played a significant role in the modernization process. The likely social origins of the military group in a transitional society, the nature of their profession, and the context in which they operate help explain their potential for leadership.
The top officer group was often traditionally from the landowning class and committed to the preservation of old privileges and social relationships. But lower officers sometimes came from other classes; their social status was not high, and they were consequently not so firmly committed to defend the old social order. Moreover, because the military has recently had to be expanded in many countries, officers have increasingly tended to come from less elite classes—even from craftsmen or peasant groups—and sometimes are dissatisfied with the old order.

In addition, a contemporary military organization is by nature a modern rather than a traditional structure. In concept at least, men are arrayed according to function and advanced according to skill and reliability in the execution of this function. They are judged by individual performance rather than by their connection with other persons, family group, or clan. While these objective norms have by no means been fully and promptly recognized in all the armies that have emerged in transitional societies, they have nevertheless exercised a powerful modernizing influence.

This influence has been strengthened by the care and resources often devoted by professionals from Western societies to the training of the military, and by traditional pride in military prowess, which has made it easy for restless individuals to find satisfaction in a military career. It is no accident that competent and distinguished military units have emerged in transitional societies well ahead of modern institutions in the civil service, politics, or the economy; for example, the Indian army, the Malay Regiments, the Philippine Scouts, the Arab Legion, the Gurkha Regiments, and the King’s Own African Rifles. As long as these forces were controlled by foreign powers they were naturally conservative—or at least their feelings of rebellion at colonial policies were suppressed. But once independence was achieved, the military could acquire only through the national government the equipment and the professional stature they sought. It is of the nature of the modern military profession to accept a concept like nationalism with all its implications for modernization.

Finally, the members of the officer corps are likely to face an easier set of problems in the transitional period than their civilian counterparts within the new leadership. They may have to undertake military operations either against the colonial power or against residual traditional elements, but where successful, these exercises arouse confidence in their strength. Aside from combat itself, their tasks are to acquire new equipment, to train men in
their use, and to maintain with reasonable efficiency the peacetime round of military life--inherently an easier job than to get political, social, and economic programs organized for the society as a whole. Thus it is possible for the army to develop a group of confident officers with modern attitudes and modern skills, operating within a reasonably orderly modern institution administered on relatively modern lines.

Supplementing these broad influences on the officer corps is the fact that those who are recruited into the army are given with their training a certain minimum technical education for modern life. Historically armies in transitional societies have been a vehicle for expanding literacy; and the handling of motor transport, guns, and other military equipment has tended to spread elements of basic training in industrial skills rather quickly through the army. The Burmese army, for example, in addition to the standard engineer corps and signal corps, has special chemical warfare and psychological warfare sections and even an historical and archaeological section. In all the new armies attempts have been made to introduce specialized training schools and advanced techniques of personnel and procurement. Inevitably, then, a certain number of officers and men are being trained in industrial skills more advanced than those common to the civilian economy.

It is by no means foreordained--as the history of the military in Latin America amply demonstrates--that their potentials for modernization will automatically and constructively harness the military to the modernization process. The military leadership may for long periods build and maintain their modern units in a vacuum, drawing important resources from the society but keeping aloof from its civilian problems and making little contribution to their solution. The officer corps may develop a hypernationalism and throw its inevitably substantial political weight toward external adventure, diverting the society from modernizing tasks. It may exploit its unity and high degree of organization to seize power but bring to power little insight and sympathy for the complex civil tasks of modernization. In some instances its political weight has been used to preserve the status of groups rooted in the traditional society who conceived it to be in their interest to forestall the course of modernization. Or, conversely, an officer corps born in revolution may, as in Cuba, seek irresponsibly to keep alive the perpetual excitement of a fighting horde rather than to preserve peace and order.

But history has also demonstrated numerous times, from
the Samurai and the Prussian army of the nineteenth century down through Ataturk and Magsaysay, that the military can indeed play a thoroughly constructive part in modernization.

A striking example is the evolution of the Turkish Republic. Although the military played an important role in founding the Republic, Ataturk succeeded in establishing a clear division between civil and military leadership. This distinction was successfully maintained for 35 years despite the continued importance of the military in many aspects of civilian life. The corps of officers who with Ataturk made the revolution and founded its republican institutions were obliged, like Ataturk himself, to resign their commissions when they took up posts of political authority; as a corollary, no officer who remained in uniform was permitted to be active in political life. This tradition survived until 1960, when significant failures in civil leadership and a strong tendency to revert to autocratic rule led the army to take over. The army has, however, thus far shown a restraint in its practices which reflects the impact of the Ataturk tradition. There is good reason to hope that its intervention will be transient and that the democratic process, including the principle of civilian supremacy, will in the end be strengthened.

The Turkish army recruits some 200,000 young civilians into its training program each year. These young men (and women) are often illiterate villagers, whose induction into the army represents their first sustained exposure to men in other parts of Turkey. They are taught to read and write, to handle tools and equipment; they are taught the fundamentals of personal hygiene and public health; they are taught the symbols and institutions of modern political life in a republic. As they complete their training and return to their villages, these young people become a permanent asset in the modernization of Turkey. They put their new knowledge to work; they teach other villagers at home some of what they have themselves learned; they remain "relay points" for information and opinion emanating from the modernized sector of Turkish society. Thus they speed the process of modernization and help to stabilize it.

In summary, then, the military—the one traditional social order likely to survive the process of social change—may be able to play a key role in promoting mobility while maintaining stability, in facilitating change while preventing chaos. Upon the efficiency with which the military sector can be made to perform this role may hinge the successful outcome of the transition in many societies.
While the military are strong in their capacity to manage violence, in their commitment to rational institutions based on functional criteria and efficient performance, and in their sense of nationhood as a supreme value, they are often weak in other skills and attitudes needed in a modernizing society. Consider, for example, the basic process of economic growth. Military men are not generally sophisticated economists, and their economic programs are likely to be inspirational rather than productive. In the Middle East, where military take-over has been virtually continuous over the past few decades, instances have multiplied in which new military regimes rapidly foundered on their own well-meant land reform programs. Virtually every new regime has made some more or less serious gesture in the direction of land reform which has won it popular plaudits for a time but which has failed to solve the basic problem of raising agricultural productivity.

Military elites are likely to make dangerous errors in framing and administering laws, instituting and operating schools, devising and sustaining a communication network, unless they are guided by people with professional knowledge and experience in these activities. Such people are the "secular intelligentsia"--the economists and engineers and agronomists, the lawyers and administrators, the doctors and public health officers, the deans and professors, the "communicators" who manage the flow of public news and views that no modernizing polity can do without. They are an "intelligentsia" because it is they who acquire and apply modern knowledge to the manifold tasks of running an urban, industrial, participant society efficiently. They are "secular" because their public roles and social functions are independent of, and usually hostile to, the sacred symbols and institutions of the traditional society.

Often their first problem as they emerge is to win preeminence over the "sacred" intelligentsia, who traditionally performed most of the legal and judicial, teaching and counseling, healing and helping, soothsaying and certifying functions that the secular intelligentsia now seek to perform. In societies moving toward a modern division of labor with increasing urbanization, industrialization, and participation, the new men of knowledge steadily gain strength. But there are continuous frustrations. The doctor is unhappy when people go to the shaman for medical therapy, the lawyer when people go to the shariya for adjudication, the teacher when people go to the imam for learning, the agriculturist when people...
go to their neighbor for weather forecasts, the communicator when people go to the village elder for guidance on moral judgment of public issues.

These frustrations mount as the number of modern specialists expands in an environment that remains highly traditionalized. The men of the secular intelligentsia become individually impatient and as a group extremist in their views of what must be done. They may form alliances of various sorts—-with each other, with foreign agents, even with "deviants" among the traditionalist sectors of landowners and sacred intelligentsia. But ultimately, if they are to make more than a quick splash, the secular intelligentsia ally themselves with the military sector, the bureaucracy, or the business elite.

The historical logic is clear. The other elites have the coercive power and organization needed to maintain stability; the secular intelligentsia have the knowledge needed to effect change. Military, bureaucratic, or business leadership alone usually has foundered because its perspective is too narrow to cope with the variety of problems that arise in modernizing societies; the secular intelligentsia alone usually have failed because their ideas outrun their capacity to develop institutions that are operational. Neither can manage the transition without the other, and so forms the "unholy alliance," which Western social scientists have described (and decried) since Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Lasswell.

The intelligentsia have sometimes been kept from playing a positive part in the process of modernization by becoming isolated and irresponsible critics of their society. Critics they will always be, for discontent is the price of imagination and knowledge. But discontent can also lead to nihilism and fruitless abstentionism. In developing countries it is particularly easy for this to happen. The intellectual knows about the modern world from his reading and study, or sometimes from travel, and he becomes attached to it. He easily becomes a man without roots in his own society. Many college-educated intellectuals do not know a single villager, would rather be unemployed than work in the stink of a mud-hutted rural community, have contempt for the idiocy of tradition. But this contempt is not the fruitful anger of righteous indignation. It is likely to be conflict-ridden guilt and ambivalence. The educated man may see deep inside himself residues of traditional values and attitudes which he is ashamed to admit and which he is afraid to expose to stimulation through participation in the rites of his own traditional culture. Too often the intelligentsia in underdeveloped
countries are for all these reasons simultaneously cut off from effective identification with their own people in the villages and from the responsible wielders of power. Such dual irresponsibility may find convenient expression in the shallow platitudes of Fabian socialism or neocommunism, for those doctrines preach modernization while at the same time reassuring their adherents that they are genuine members of the masses and opponents of the newly modernizing elites.

The avoidance of such ideological temptations is not easy. The development of a vigorous intelligentsia is a prerequisite of modernization. Universities, a press, and cultural institutions must be developed, but these are not enough to assure the intelligentsia a responsible attitude. The intelligentsia must be given a constructive image of their potential role. This may be done through the mystique of a democratic development plan. It can be facilitated by programs of international cooperation and intercourse among free intellectuals. It requires also that jobs in adequate numbers be made available for the mobilization of intellectual skills on the problems of development.

The Innovating Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs are not necessarily engaged in private enterprise. Among the imaginative promoters of new institutions in the West were many who carried the flag of sovereign authority. There were the buccaneers and explorers on the high seas and in new continents, searching for gold as agents of the king. There were the creators of semi-public exploring and development companies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the British and Dutch East India Companies. There were the builders of canals and railroads. When we talk of entrepreneurs we talk of such men as well as of the imaginative villager who buys a bus for himself to institute a hitherto unknown service, or of the private entrepreneur who raises business capital to build a factory to earn profits for himself. We are not prejudging the forms of entrepreneurship when we say that an aggressive entrepreneurial group, along with a responsible military, an effective bureaucracy, and a secular intelligentsia, is necessary for modernization.

Entrepreneurship is not something that is found in equal portions in all societies. The psychology of innovation has been discussed in the previous chapter. Without an environment that breeds a group of men with strong motivation for personal achievement and habits of hard work and economy, the process of
modernization may be long delayed. Entrepreneurs are found in different proportions also among sectors of a single society. In Colombia, for example, the bulk of the entrepreneurs have been found to come from a single valley where wealth could not be fruitfully invested in land. That fact, coupled with certain competitive needs of an otherwise disadvantaged leading strata of the population, produced historically a different pattern of motivations from that found elsewhere in the country. Ethnic minorities have often been the source of entrepreneurial innovators.

The innovating entrepreneur is by no means always in the saddle in a developing country. As a man who is ready to struggle for unconventional goals, he, like the intellectual, is likely to be discontented and to feel himself deprived. As an agent of change and as a man who most often gets his modernizing inspiration from association with alien sources, he is likely to be distrusted. He may find himself fighting regulations and restrictions. Still, the society with which he struggles may be on the road to modernization, despite his strictures and complaints, if it provides him with incentives and freedom to seek ways to reorganize and improve life. The sign of stagnation is not that the entrepreneur must struggle but that no one chooses this role.

The Peasants and Urban Workers

Our analysis thus far has focused on narrow elites--on men who acquire certain Western skills and are in a position to contend for power and to direct the course of events within their nation. We turn now to the evolution of attitudes and skills among the people as a whole and to their slow change from a passive to an active role in the modernization process.

Here again the course of events depends substantially on the kind of traditional structure that existed; on whether the society underwent a period of colonial tutelage and on the kind of colonial policy that was pursued; on the particular setting and impulses that led to the overthrow of the traditional society, colonial rule, or both. Without excessive distortion, however, we can draw a general picture of the changing horizons of the peasant and the urban worker as modernization proceeds.

In the traditional society and in the early stages of transition something like 75 per cent of the population live in rural areas and up to 90 per cent of the population may be illiterate. Mass media, if they exist at all, reach only a small number of people. There
are no institutions that permit genuine popular participation in the political process. The peasants are likely to appear apathetic, accepting their traditional lot, but their apathy may well conceal extremely complex feelings. They may harbor, for example, a deep hunger to own their own land or to see their children healthy, educated, and advanced, aspirations that find expression only when a realistic opportunity for change presents itself. On the other hand, as we have previously noted, they may simultaneously feel great reluctance to abandon the familiar way of life, which offers psychic security as well as a protection from some of the crushing burdens of poverty.

In the early period of transition, as urban activity increases, the attractions of the city draw men away from the countryside, even though urban life itself is often impoverished and demands an almost revolutionary shift in social and cultural adjustments. In the cities the unskilled worker is generally left on his own, but in the trades of higher skill, unions are organized at a relatively early stage of the modernization process. Literacy and technical training begin to spread. Thus fairly early in the transitional stage the cities often develop a quite modern way of life, standing as advanced enclaves in a society still predominantly rural and primitive.

The coming to power of the modernizing coalition has direct effects on both the urban worker and the peasant. Their political role begins to change, for the new leadership feels impelled to make a direct appeal to the mass of citizens. The legitimacy of the new leadership, which has often won out by revolution against the colonial power or the old order, rests in large measure on a real or pretended commitment to advance the interests of the people as a whole and to achieve for all the citizens of the nation the fruits of modernization. At a minimum, the modernizing coalition is likely to take steps to establish means of communication between the government and the people as a whole. This is the stage at which politicians are likely to take to the air waves and to encourage the creation of a popular press. Whatever the substantive accomplishments of the modernizing coalition in its early period of power, and however deep or shallow its commitment to furthering popular interests, its very existence will probably increase the demand for modernization and for an increasing degree of participation in the society's decisions.

This is a point of maximum danger for the developing society. The mass media, bringing news and views of the world to illiterates in their urban slums and remote villages, introduce a new element into the process of modernization. People learn for the first time
about the world outside their immediate environs, and their sense of life's possibilities begins to expand. We recall Nasser's statement: "Radio has changed everything... Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world."

One danger is that people will learn the fashions of popular participation long before the institutions of representative government are properly functioning. Then pseudo-participation takes command; that is, plebiscites that offer the form of public election without its substance, mob politics-of-the-street in which "popular will" can destroy people and property without constructing better public policy. When exposure to the mass media overstimulates a people to this point, the leadership is pressed to give radio propaganda primacy over political economy. While oratory resounds, development is likely to be shunted to the side and growth impeded. The result, for people led to impose demands which their transitional society cannot yet supply, may be a potentially explosive and spreading sense of frustration.

Whereas the West achieved a participant society as an outcome of the slow growth of physical, social, and psychic mobility over many centuries (the centuries our history textbooks now summarize as Age of Exploration, Renaissance, Reformation and Counter Reformation, Industrial Revolution, Rise of Democracy), the new societies seek to accomplish this sequence in decades. In their desire for rapid progress lies the danger that the effect of mass media will be to increase popular desires and demands faster than they can be satisfied by economic and social growth. Acute imbalances are likely to be built into the growth process by the government's desire to register rapidly those improvements that will be highly visible to the public eye, without due concern for the durability of these improvements. Health, welfare, and educational improvements--often made possible by foreign aid--are particularly prone to prove less durable than planned because the environing institutions needed to sustain them have not been adequately modernized. The common tendency of such improvements is to equip people for longer, healthier, more productive lives. People who live longer multiply every demand put upon a society--for food, clothing, shelter; for work and recreation; for adolescent opportunity and senescent security. People who acquire skills create new demands for opportunities to use them productively. Those who acquire mechanical skills demand machines to operate; those with professional training demand opportunities to practice their professions. If a society fails to supply these opportunities--to satisfy the demands posed by rising expectations--then it must face a "revolution of rising frustrations." In the decade ahead, the strategic question

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will be how to sustain the high expectations that have already been created in the modernizing world. In some cases, excessive expectations will have to be reduced or revised. In all cases, stable development will require a significant increase in the supply of both visible improvements and durable opportunities.

To analyze such dangers is easier than to prescribe ways of overcoming them. What the new governments must do is to create institutions through which individual citizens can begin to take part in the decisions of the community. Fully as important as plebiscites, representative assemblies, and other instruments of participation on the national scale—indeed probably a vital prerequisite for the successful operation of national institutions—are local organizations of many sorts which can engage people actively in matters of immediate concern to them, and enable them to see realistically the problems as well as the opportunities that modernization brings.

In the villages, community development and other programs for agricultural cooperation and reform; in the towns, trade unions and other organizations; in both town and country, institutions of local government which engage the interest and support of the people—such activities as these help to bridge the gap between government and people, help to introduce content into the forms of democracy which most of the underdeveloped societies have eagerly accepted.

In terms of social change the problems confronting the transitional societies which are led by modernizing coalitions are those posed by the very nature of democracy. Democracy is not adequately summed up in the formula of universal suffrage; the individual requires something more than a vote to guarantee that his interests will be taken into account in the society's decisions. A sound democracy depends heavily on the strength and number of the institutions that stand between the individual and the national government, defending his individual rights in the process of defending institutional interests. While the process of modernization creates some of the preconditions for democracy, its emergence is by no means foreordained. Democracy is a purposeful human achievement, not in any sense an automatic reflex of modernization.