ARMIES IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION*

by Lucian W. Pye

Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Now that the military has become the key decision-making element in at least eight of the Afro-Asian countries, we are confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of the military in the political development of the new states.

Lack of Knowledge or Doctrine

The trend of recent years toward increased authoritarian rule and army-dominated governments raises questions which seem only to emphasize the limitations of our knowledge. Is it true, as we have always supposed, that any encroachment of the military into civilian rule is a blow to liberal government and civil liberties? Or is it possible that military rule can, in fact, establish the necessary basis for the growth of effective representative institutions? Have events reached such a state in parts of Asia that we should welcome army rule as the least odious of possible developments and probably the only effective counterforce to communism? We seem to be confronted by two conflicting images of the politician in uniform. The first, derived largely from Latin America and the Balkans, is that of administrative incompetence, inaction, and authoritarian, if not reactionary, values. The second and more recent is that of a dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies that have been subverted by the "corrupt practices" of politicians. How is it possible to tell in any particular case whether army rule will lead to sterile authoritarianism or to vigorous development?

To answer such questions is to explore two relatively unknown and overlapping areas: Western scholarship has been peculiarly inattentive

to the sociology of armies, on the one hand, and to the processes of political development and nation-building, on the other. Only in recent years, as Professor William T. R. Fox observed, has the Western scholar's bias against the military been weakened to the point where he is prepared to go beyond the field of civil-military relations and recognize the entire range of national security problems as a respectable province of scholarship. Given the hesitation with which we have approached the study of the primary functions of armies it is not surprising that so little systematic thought has been given to the political sociology of armies and the roles that military institutions play in facilitating the processes of industrial and political development. It is hardly necessary to document the fact that we have limited knowledge about the nature of political development in transitional societies and the processes that produce the emerging political institutions. Without greater knowledge of these developments we lack perspective for viewing the rise of authoritarian practices and the emergence of military rule in transitional societies.

Our lack of knowledge about such important matters is probably less significant than the fact that we also lack an appropriate doctrine that, in lieu of tested knowledge, might serve to guide our policy. To put the matter bluntly, for all our commitment to democratic values, we do not know what is required for a society to move from a traditional and authoritarian basis to the establishment of democratic institutions and representative institutions.

When this problem has arisen in the past with respect to colonialism, our typical response has been anti-intellectual and antirational: colonial powers should relinquish their authority, and then an automatic and spontaneous emergence of democratic practices and institutions could be expected. Unfortunately, with the passing of colonialism we find we have little advice to give to the leaders of the newly emergent countries who are struggling to realize democratic ways. We have no doctrine to offer them, no strategies for action nor criteria of priorities, no sense of appropriate programs nor sets of hypotheses for explaining the paths to representative government. At best we have been able to piece together some concepts and considerations taken from embryonic theories of economic growth and have suggested that they might serve as guiding principles.

In contrast to our own bemusement, those interested in establishing other types of social and political systems—and most particularly, of
course, the Communists—have a clearer sense of design and of priorities to guide their efforts. More often than not we have found that instead of developmental concepts and strategic plans we can offer only statements about the nature of democratic values and our vision of end-goals of political development. By stressing ends rather than the means we have inadvertently tended to highlight the extent to which the newly emergent states have failed to realize in practice their aspirations. In so doing we have contributed to the growing feeling of insecurity common to most of the leaders of such countries. These are generally men who, despite their bold exteriors, are inwardly plagued with self-doubts and uncertainties about their ability to run a country. Without clear notions as to the stages that must be passed through if their transitional societies are to realize free institutions, these leaders are in danger of thinking that the gap between current performance and democratic ideals means that their peoples are doomed to failure.

Our lack of doctrine for building a tolerably free society is most conspicuous with respect to the proper role of authority in government. How should the machinery of state, usually inherited from an essentially authoritarian colonial regime, be employed to ensure political development? Can these essentially coercive instruments of the state, which in a democratic order are the servants of the popular will, be utilized to guide a tradition-bound people to democratic values and habits of thought? Or is the result of any such efforts, no matter how well intended, likely to be a drift toward what is essentially an authoritarian order decorated with democratic trimmings? It would seem that these questions might serve as an appropriate beginning for a search for both a doctrine of political tutelage and a better understanding of the role of the military in the process of political modernization.

An underlying assumption behind much of Western political thought is that political institutions are above all else the products of the dynamic forces peculiar to a particular society and thus reflect the distinctive values and the styles of action common to the society. It is acknowledged, of course, that once institutions are established they tend to become dynamic and hence influence the values and the expectations of the population. There is thus an assumption of a circularity of relationships or a state of equilibrium. The fundamental view, however, is still that the dynamics of the system lie within the society as a whole and that it is the institutions which must be responsive. Governmental institutions can display initiative, but fundamental change originates within the society.
When we turn to the newly emergent countries this model no longer seems appropriate. For in these societies the historical pattern has been the introduction of institutions from outside, with a minimum concession to the values and behavior of the people. These fundamentally authoritative structures have thus tended to be shaped according to foreign standards. Rather than responding to indigenous values they have often proved to be the dominant factor in stimulating further changes throughout the society.

These considerations suggest that it might be useful to organize our analysis of the political role of the army, first, with respect to the political implications of the army as a modern institution that has been somewhat artificially introduced into disorganized transitional societies; and second, with respect to the role that such an army can play in shaping attitudes toward modernity in other spheres of society. By such an approach we may hope to locate some of the critical factors for explaining why it is that the military has been a vigorous champion of progress and development in some countries and a retarding influence in others. We may also hope to gain a basis for judging the probable effectiveness of armies in promoting national development and eventually democratic practices.

The Army as a Modern Organization

In large measure the story of the underdeveloped countries is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving new objectives. This is the problem of establishing organizations that, as rationalized structures, are capable of relating means to ends. The history of much of the Western impact on traditional societies fits comfortably within this theme, for the businessman, planter, and miner, the colonial administrator, the missionary, and the educator each in his own way strives to fit modern organizations into tradition-bound societies. Similarly, the story of the nationalists and of the other Westernized leaders can be treated on essentially identical terms, for they too try to change the habits of their people by creating modern organizations.

Needless to say, there are not many bright spots in this history, and it is open to question as to who has been the more tragically heroic or comically futile: the Westerners struggling to establish their organizations in traditional societies, or the nationalist politician and the indigenous administrator endeavoring to create a semblance of order out of chaos. On balance, the attempts to establish military organizations seem to have been noticeably the most successful.
It would be wrong to underestimate the patient care that has gone into developing and training colonial armies, and in the newly independent countries the military have been treated relatively generously in the allocation of scarce resources. But in comparison to the efforts that have been expended in developing, say, civil administration and political parties, it still seems that modern armies are somewhat easier to create in transitional societies than are most other forms of modern social structures. The significant fact for our consideration is that the armies created by colonial administration and by the newly emergent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their societies. Viewed historically, some of these armies have been distinguished: the Indian Army, the Malay Regiments, the Philippine Scouts, the Arab Legion, the Gurkha Regiments, and the King's Own African Rifles, to mention only the more celebrated ones.

It would take us too far afield to explore the relative advantages military leaders have in seeking to establish armies in transitional societies. We need only note that there is a paradoxical relationship between ritualized and rationalized modes of behavior that may account for the ease with which people still close to a traditional order adapt themselves to military life. Viewed from one perspective, a military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for an industrialized and secularized enterprise. Yet from another point of view, the great stress placed on professionalism and the extremely explicit standards for individual behavior make the military appear to be a more sacred than secular institution. If discipline is needed to minimize random and unpredictable behavior, it is also consonant with all the demands that custom and ritual make in the most tradition-bound organization.

For these reasons, and for others related to the hierarchic nature of the organization, the division between traditional and rationally oriented behavior is not very great within armies. Indeed, in any army there is always a struggle going on between tradition and reason. Historically, during periods of little change in the state of military technology the tendency has been for the nonrational characteristics to become dominant. Given this inherent conflict in any military organization the question arises as to why the forces of custom and ritual do not readily dominate the armies of the newly emergent countries, and so cause them to oppose the forces of change. In societies where traditional habits of mind are still strong one might expect the military to be strongly conservative. Such was largely the
case in the West during the preindustrial period. By contrast, in most of the newly emergent countries armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national development.

This state of affairs is largely explained by the extent to which the armies in these countries have been influenced by contemporary Western military technology. In particular, nearly all of the new countries have taken the World War II type of army as their model. 5 In so doing they have undertaken to create a form of organization that is typical of and peculiar to the most highly industrialized civilization yet known. Indeed, modern armies are essentially industrial-type entities. Thus the armies of the new countries are instinct with the spirit of rapid technological development.

The fact that these new armies in preindustrial societies are modeled after industrial-based organizations has many implications for their political roles. One of their characteristics is particularly significant: the specialization that modern armies demand in skills and functions is only distantly related to the command of violence. There has generally been a tremendous increase in the number of officers assigned to staff functions as contrasted with line commands. As the armies have striven to approximate their ideal models they have had to establish all manner of specialized organizations and departments that require skills that are either in short supply or nonexistent in their societies. The Burmese Army, for example, in addition to its engineer and signal corps has special sections on chemical warfare, psychological warfare, and even a historical and archaeological section. All the new armies have attempted to introduce specialized training schools and advanced techniques of personnel management and procurement. Consequently, numbers of the more intelligent and ambitious officers have had to be trained in industrial skills more advanced than those common to the civilian economy.

The high proportion of officers assigned to staff functions means that large numbers of officers are forced to look outside their society for their models. The fact that army leaders, particularly the younger and more ambitious, generally come from those trained in staff positions means that they are extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and technological advancement. This kind of sensitivity bears little relationship to the command of physical violence and tests of human endurance—in short, to the martial spirit as we customarily think of it.
In consequence the officers often find that they are spiritually in tune with the intellectuals, students, and those other elements in society most anxious to become a part of the modern world. They may have little in common with the vast majority of the men they must command. In this respect the gap between the officer class and the troops, once largely a matter of social and economic class (as it still is to some degree), has now been widened by differences in the degree of acculturation to modern life.

It should be noted that these revolutionary changes in military life have significantly influenced the status of the military profession in different societies and hence have had an interesting effect on relative national power. Cultures that looked down on the military at an earlier stage of technology now accord high prestige to the same profession as it has raised its technology. For example, when armies depended entirely on human energy and animal power the Chinese placed the soldier near the bottom of the social hierarchy; with present levels of advanced military technology the soldier is now near the top of the social scale in both Communist and non-Communist China. The change has been more in the nature of the military profession than in basic Chinese cultural values. Conversely, peoples once considered "martial" may now show little interest in, or aptitude for, the new kind of soldiering.

Above all else, however, the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies.

It might seem that those occupying positions in other modern-type organizations in underdeveloped societies would also feel much the same need for change. To whatever extent this may be so, three distinctive features of armies seem to make them somewhat more dynamic in demanding changes.

First of all, armies by nature are rival institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other. All other organizations operate within the context of their own society; although their initial inspiration may have come from abroad, their
primary focus is on internal developments. The civil bureaucracy, for example, can, and indeed has to, deal with its domestic problems with little regard for what other bureaucracies in other countries are doing. The soldier, however, is constantly called upon to look abroad and to compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in his own society.

Second, armies for all their concern with rationality and becoming highly efficient machines are relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day-to-day basis. Armies are created for future contingencies, and in many underdeveloped countries these contingencies have never had to be faced. Even in countries such as Burma and Indonesia, where the army is forced to deal with internal security problems, the effects have been mainly to increase the resources available for building up the army according to the ideal model, with remarkably few concessions being made to practical needs. Other modernized organizations in underdeveloped societies have to cope with more immediate and day-to-day problems; hence they must constantly adjust themselves to local conditions. They cannot adhere as rigidly as armies can to their Western prototypes. Just as Western armies have often existed in a dream world of planning for types of wars that never occur, so armies of underdeveloped countries can devote themselves to becoming modernized and more "efficient" with little regard to immediate reality. Members of other modern-type organizations may desire to see social change in their society, but they are likely to be more conscious of the need to accommodate their ambitions to existing conditions.

Finally, armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are even expected to have ways of their own, including attitudes and judgments, that are remote if not completely apart from those of civilian life. Thus again armies of the newly emergent countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world. In consequence they are often unaware of the difficulties inherent in modernizing other segments of their society. Within their tradition all problems can be overcome if the right orders are given.

Armies as Modernizing Agents

So much for the army as one of the more modernized of the authoritative agencies of government in transitional societies.
When we consider it as a modernizing force for the whole of society, we move into a less clearly defined area where the number of relevant considerations becomes much greater and where we are likely to find greater differences from country to country. Indeed, we shall be able to deal only generally with the social and political aspects of military service and some of the more indirect influences of armies on civilian attitudes.

In all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension: the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas and practices. The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of this process, which involves the movement out of the particularistic relationships of traditional life and into the more impersonal and universalistic relationships of an industrialized society.

Army training is thus consistent with the direction taken by the basic process of acculturation in traditional societies. Within the army, however, the rate of acculturation is greatly accelerated. This fact contributes to the tendency of army officers to underestimate the difficulties of changing the civilian society.

Probably the most significant feature of the acculturation process as it takes place under the auspices of the army is that it provides a relatively high degree of psychological security. The experience of breaking from the known and relatively sheltered world of tradition and moving into the more unknown modern world is generally an extremely traumatic one. In contrast to the villager who is caught up in the process of being urbanized, the young army recruit from the village has the more sheltered, the more gradual introduction into the modern world. It is hardly necessary to point out the disturbing fact that the urbanization process as it has taken place in most Asian, African, and Latin-American societies has generally tended to produce a highly restless, insecure population. Those who have been forced off the land or attracted to the cities often find themselves in a psychologically threatening situation.
These are the people who tend to turn to extremist politics and to look for some form of social and personal security in political movements that demand their total commitment. In contrast, those who are exposed to a more technologically advanced way of life in the army find that they must make major adjustments, but that these adjustments are all treated explicitly and openly. In the army one can see what is likely to happen in terms of one's training and one's future. This is not the case in the city.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army often tends to be more thorough and of a broader scope than the urbanization process. In all the main Asian cities there are those who still follow many of the habits and practices of the village. They may live still within the orbit of their family and have only limited outside associations and contacts. These people have made some adjustment to the modern world, but they are likely to be faced with even more in the future, and thus they remain potential sources of political tension.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army tends to be focused on acquiring technical skills that are of particular value for economic development. Just as the army represents an industrialized organization, so must those who have been trained within it learn skills and habits of mind which would be of value in other industrial organizations. In the West, armies have played a very important role in providing technical training and even direct services in the process of industrial development. The German Army trained large numbers of noncommissioned officers who performed important functions as foremen in the German steel mills and in other industries. In the United States the Corps of Engineers, of course, played a central role in the whole development of the West; and, after the Civil War, army veterans provided considerable amounts of the skill and knowledge which, when combined with the influx of immigrants, provided a basis for much of our industrial development. In Latin America the Brazilian Army has played an important part in opening the interior, in promoting the natural sciences, and in protecting the Indian population. In Asia, too, we can see much the same story being enacted now. Before the war the compulsory training in the Japanese Army provided the whole society with increasing reservoirs of manpower which contributed directly to the development of an industrial society. Army veterans in India have played an important role
not only in lower-level industrial jobs, but also in managerial positions. In Malaya and the Philippines the army has been the main instrument for training people in operating and maintaining motor vehicles and other forms of machinery.

Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the army is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite relationship to a national community. In this sense the army experience tends to be a politicizing experience. Even if recruits are not given explicit training in political matters, they are likely to learn that events in their society are determined by human decisions and not just by chance and fate. Within the army the peasant may come to realize that much in life can be changed and that commands and wishes have consequences. Thus even aside from any formal training in patriotism the recruit is likely to achieve some awareness of the political dimensions of his society. It is therefore not surprising that in many of the newly emergent countries veterans have had appreciable political influence even after only limited military experience.

Armies in the newly emergent countries can thus provide a sense of citizenship and an appreciation of political action. In some cases this can lead to a more responsible nationalism. Indeed, the recruit may be impressed with the fact that he must make sacrifices to achieve the goals of nationalism and that the process of nation-building involves more than just the shouting of slogans. At the same time there is always the potential danger that the armies will become the center of hypernationalistic movements, as in the case of prewar Japan.

Because the army represents one of the most effective channels for upward social mobility, military-inspired nationalism often encompasses a host of personalized emotions and sentiments about civilian society. Invariably the men, and sometimes even the officers, come from extremely humble circumstances, and it is only within the army that they are first introduced to the possibility of systematically advancing themselves. In transitional societies, where people's station in life is still largely determined by birth and by chance opportunities, powerful reactions usually follow from placing peoples in a position where they can recognize a definite and predictable relationship between effort and reward. The practice of giving advancement on merit can encourage
people, first, to see the army as a just organization deserving of their loyalties, and then possibly, to demand that the same form of justice reign throughout their society.

Those who do move up to positions of greater respect and power through the army may often carry with them hostilities toward those with greater advantages and authority in civilian society. The tendency of the military to question whether the civilian elite achieved their station by merit adds another conflict to civil-military relations in most underdeveloped countries. More often than not the military show these feelings by seeking to make national loyalty and personal sacrifice the crucial test of national leadership.

The relationship between armies and civilian leaders varies, of course, according to the circumstances of historic development. For this reason a large part of this volume is devoted to case studies. Broadly speaking, however, it is helpful to distinguish three different general categories of such relationships.

There are first those patterns of development in which the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy. This situation is most likely to exist when the traditional political order, but not necessarily the traditional social order, has been violently disrupted and it becomes necessary to set up representative institutions before any of the other modern-type political organizations have been firmly established. The outstanding example of this pattern of development is modern China from the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the victory of the Communists. Indeed, it is possible to think of this period as one dominated by a constant struggle to escape from the grim circumstances that obtained when only military organizations survived the fall of the traditional systems. Hence the military became the only effective political entity. Thereafter nothing could be done without them, and yet the military could do little without effective civilian institutions. Comparable situations seem to exist at present in some Middle Eastern countries where Western influence brought a commitment to republican institutions but left the army as the only effective modern political structure in the entire society.

A second category includes those countries where the military, while formally espousing the development of democracy, actually
monopolizes the political arena and forces any emerging civilian elite to concentrate on economic and social activities. In many ways this arrangement is reminiscent of the Belgian variety of colonialism. At present, the most outstanding example of this form of rule is Thailand.

A third major category, which is probably the largest, consists of those countries in which the organization and structures essential to democratic government exist but have not been able to function effectively. The process of modernization has been retarded to such a point that the army, as the most modernized organization in the society, has assumed an administrative role and taken over control. In these cases there is a sense of failure in the country, and the military are viewed as possible saviors.

Before turning to our case studies, it is appropriate to note briefly some of the broader implications of the role of the armies in transitional countries—particularly in terms of international stability. The ways in which new societies are being created will have profound significance for the entire world. At the same time it is unrealistic to conclude that the army's role in the new countries is determined only by domestic developments. The nature of the contemporary international order and the focus of Western policies have had a profound influence on military institutions throughout the underdeveloped areas.

There has been a tendency in some quarters to regard the trend toward military rule as favorable to American policy interests. In particular, army rule has been welcomed as promising greater political stability and firmer policies against communism. Unfortunately, in the past we have generally been poor judges of leadership in the new countries. In fact, we have been so anxious to wish the new countries well that we have not been very realistic in appraising their national leadership. We have often placed faith in, and indeed lionized, men who are mediocre by any standard of measurement. The fault is more serious than just a misplaced sense of charitableness, for by refusing to employ realistic standards of judgment we encourage the lack of realism and even quackery in the political life of many of these countries.
In seeking a realistic estimate of the potential role of the military in the political development of particular countries it is also necessary to avoid being excessively influenced by ideological considerations which may be relevant only in advanced societies. We have in mind, in particular, the Western stereotype of the military as a foe of liberal values. This bias, for example, tends at present to take the form of seeing "military aid" as a threat to economic and political development and of assuming that only "economic aid" can make a positive contribution to such form of development. In some cases military aid has in fact made substantial contributions to road building, health facilities, communications networks and the like, all of which have directly facilitated economic growth. In other cases it has been equally clear that our military aid has seriously retarded economic development by diverting an excessive amount of the nation's energies into unproductive channels. The point is only that in our thinking about the newly emergent countries we must avoid stereotypes and expect many paradoxes.

If we are able to do so, we will be less surprised to note, for example, that it has been through the military that we have best been able to establish effective relations with the most strongly neutralist nations in Southeast Asia. With both Burma and Indonesia we have had considerable difficulties in almost every dimension of our relationships. Recently, however, it has appeared that we have been able to develop more genuine and straightforward relations with their military than with any other political element. Out of these relations have come further possibilities for cooperation. Thus, rather ironically, after the Burmese terminated our program of economic assistance to them, it was possible to reestablish such assistance only by first providing them with military aid. In this way confidence was reestablished and the stage set for their reacceptance of economic aid.

This particular example may, in fact, point up a most important consideration about armies in the new countries. For the various reasons which we have mentioned the army is often the most modernized public organization in an underdeveloped country, and as a consequence its leaders often feel more self-confident and are more able to deal frankly and cordially with representatives of industrialized countries. Military leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than civilian leaders because they themselves are more emotionally secure. This sense of security makes it possible for army leaders to look more realistically at their countries. All of these considerations make it
easier for the military leaders to accept the fact that their countries are weak and the West is strong without becoming emotionally disturbed or hostile toward the West. Since these leaders seem to have less need to avoid realities, they are in fact easier people with whom to deal and to carry on straightforward relations.

It is important, however, to note from the example that it is possible, and indeed it is essential, to expand a narrow relationship with the military into a much broader one. Military aid has had to become economic aid. Satisfactory relations with the military can become a dead end, just as military rule itself can become sterile if it does not lead to an interest in total national development.

This is only to say that while it may be possible to find in the armies of underdeveloped countries an element of stability, we should not confuse this with political stability for the entire society. The military may provide an opportunity and a basis for cooperation, but the objective must remain the development of stable representative institutions and practices. In planning for this objective it is essential to conceive of it as involving far more than just the efficient administration of public policies. It is necessary to keep in mind that in the past the West has come to these societies largely in the guise of administrators. This was the nature of colonialism, and we have tended to step into this role with our emphasis upon economic aid. In cooperating with the military we again are essentially strengthening this role of the administrator. In most underdeveloped countries there is at present a genuine need to improve the standards of public administration. In fact, unless such improvements take place they will be able to realize few of their national goals. However, there is a deeper problem, and this is the problem of developing effective relations between the administrators and the politicians. The disturbing fact is that we can with relative ease help people perform administrative roles, but we have not been particularly successful in devising ways of training people to the role of the democratic politician. In many respects this difficulty is the heart of the problem in our relations with the new countries.

This leads us to the conclusion that the military in the underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions. If the new countries are to become modern nation-states they will have to have a class of
competent administrators. They will also have to have responsible and skilled politicians. In cooperating with the military in these countries we should therefore recognize that they can contribute to only a limited part of national development. In particular, in assisting them to raise standards in the realm of public administration, we should also make certain that our assistance does not lead to a stifling of an even more basic aspect of political development: the growth of responsible and representative politicians.
INSURGENCY IN COMMUNIST THEORY

The four selections reprinted here comprise the most important Communist writings on the theory and tactics of insurrection and revolution. They go somewhat beyond the scope of this volume—into the tactics of guerrilla operations on one hand, and into full-scale revolutionary war on the other. Nonetheless, they serve admirably to reveal the seamless nature of Communist thought in which all ideas are interrelated and bound together by the all-encompassing doctrines of class struggle and dialectical materialism.

Khrushchev's famous report in January 1961 on the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties is significant primarily as signaling a new emphasis in Soviet policy on support of "wars of national liberation"—i.e., local revolutions against capitalist and colonial regimes—as the principal instrument of Communist expansion. The pronouncement has been generally regarded as implying Soviet acceptance, for the present, of the fact of nuclear stalemate and the danger of escalation in limited war. What constitutes a "war of liberation" is left conveniently vague, thus enabling the Kremlin to bestow this flattering appellation on any bush-league Communist putsch, putting it in the epic category of the Indochina War of 1945-54, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, and the long civil war leading to Communist seizure of power in China in 1949.

Lenin's essay on partisan warfare (number 8) was written in 1906 and describes the Russian Revolution of 1905-06, which in Communist folklore is seen as the precursor of the 1917 Revolution. Some of it must read quaintly to Communists now, since Lenin was seeking to convert the party faithful of his day to certain ideas—for example, the ruthless use of violence to gain power—which many then found repugnant but which are today unquestioned tenets of orthodox communism. Nevertheless, the essay depicts the long ancestry of Communist techniques of revolutionary violence, and vividly reflects the fanaticism and inflexible will of communism's greatest twentieth-century apostle.

Mao Tse-tung's notes on guerrilla warfare (number 9), written in 1937, ostensibly reflect the experience of the Chinese Communists in operations then under way against the Japanese. Undoubtedly, Mao also
had in mind the bitter phase of his long conflict with the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-shek, which had concluded with the famous "Long March" of the Red Army into northwestern China in 1934-35. The fragment reprinted here is not one of Mao's major works, and as a treatise on guerrilla tactics it is less important than the article by Giap (number 10), which follows. It serves, however, to show how this rather restricted topic fits into the larger ideological context of Communist doctrine as expounded by the foremost living Communist theoretician. Vo Nguyen Giap, the guiding spirit and military genius of the Viet Minh war against the French in Indochina, has become the leading exponent of doctrine on insurrection and revolutionary war in the Communist world. His article on guerrilla warfare, reprinted here, is not a manual on guerrilla tactics, but rather a description of the manner in which the Viet Minh revolution was organized and the political and social measures by which it was carried out.
In modern conditions the following categories of wars should be distinguished: World wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. This is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars.

Let us begin with the question of world wars. Communists are the most determined opponents of world wars, just as they are generally opponents of wars among states. These wars are needed only by imperialists to seize the territories of others, and to enslave and plunder other peoples. Before the formation of the world socialist camp the working class had no opportunity to make a determining impact on the solution of the question of whether there should or should not be world wars. In these conditions the best representatives of the working class raised the slogan of turning imperialist wars into civil wars, or to exploit the situation that had arisen to seize power.

This kind of situation arose during the World War I and was classically used by the Bolshevik Party and Lenin. In our times different conditions have developed. The world socialist camp is making an ever-growing impact, through its economic might and its armed forces, on the solution of problems of war and peace.

Of course, there also are among the imperialist countries acute contradictions and antagonisms, as well as the desire to profit at the expense of others who are weaker; yet imperialists now must keep an eye on the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp, and are afraid of starting wars among themselves. They are trying to play down their differences; they have set up military blocs in which they have involved many capitalist countries. Although these blocs are being torn by internal struggle, their members—as they themselves say—are united in their hatred of communism and, of course, by the nature and aspirations of imperialism.

In present conditions, the most probable wars are wars among capitalist and imperialist countries, and this too should not be ruled out.

Wars are chiefly prepared by imperialists against socialist countries, and in the first place against the Soviet Union as the most powerful of the socialist states. Imperialists would wish to undermine our might and thus

reestablish the former domination of monopolistic capital. The task is
to create impassable obstacles against the unleashing of wars by imper­
ialists. We possess increasing possibilities for placing obstacles in the
path of the warmongers. Consequently, we can forestall the outbreak of
a world war.

Of course, as yet we are unable to completely exclude the possi­


bility of wars, for the imperialist states exist. However, the unleashing
of wars has become a much more complicated business for the imperial­
ists than it was before the emergence of the mighty socialist camp. Im­
perialists can unleash a war, but they must think hard about the consequences.

I already said that even if the crazy Hitler had realized what a
devastating rout was in store for his bloody gamble and had seen that he
would have to commit suicide, he would have thought twice before starting
a war against the Soviet Union. Then there were but two socialist countries,
the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, and yet we routed the
aggressors, having also exploited the contradictions between imperialist
states.

The picture now is quite different: the socialist countries, which
represent a mighty force, now oppose the imperialist camp. It would be
a mistake to minimize the strength of the socialist camp and its influence
on the course of world events and thus on the solution of the question of
whether wars will take place. In conditions where a mighty socialist camp
exists, possessing powerful armed forces, the peoples, by mobilization of
all their forces for active struggle against the warmongering imperialists,
can indisputably prevent war and thus insure peaceful coexistence.

A word or two about local wars. A lot is being said nowadays in the
imperialist camp about local wars, and they are even making small-caliber
atomic weapons for use in such wars; a special theory of local wars has
been concocted. Is this fortuitous? Of course not. Certain imperialists
circles, fearing that world war might end in the complete collapse of
capitalism, are putting their money on unleashing local wars.

There have been local wars and they may occur again in the future,
but opportunities for imperialists to unleash these wars too are becoming
fewer and fewer. A small imperialist war, regardless of which imperial­
ist begins it, may grow into a world thermonuclear rocket war. We must
therefore combat both world wars and local wars.

As an example of a local war unleashed by the imperialists, we may
take the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. They wanted to
strangle Egypt and thus intimidate the Arab countries struggling for inde­
pendence, and also to frighten the other peoples of Asia and Africa. British
statesmen, including Eden, spoke quite openly of their desire to deal
summarily with Egypt when we were in London. We told them frankly: If you start a war, you will lose it; we will not remain neutral. When that war started, the United Nations formally condemned it, but this did not worry the aggressors and they went on with their dirty deed and even thought they had almost achieved their ends. The Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp came to the defense of Egypt. The Soviet Government's stark warning to Eden and Guy Mdllet stopped the war. The local war, the venture in Egypt, failed miserably.

This was in 1956, when the balance of power between the countries of socialism and the countries of imperialism was not the same as it is today. We were not as mighty then as we are today. In addition, the rulers of Britain, France, and Israel reckoned on being able to utilize the difficulties which had arisen in Hungary and Poland. Spokesmen of imperialist states were whispering into our ears: You have your difficulties in Hungary, we have ours in Egypt; therefore do not interfere in our affairs. Yet we gave a due reply to these whisperers. We did not shut our eyes to their bandit deeds. We interfered and stopped their aggression. Here is an example of how a local war started by the imperialist was stopped as a result of the interference by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp.

I have already said that local wars are also not excluded in the future. Therefore, our task is to be always on guard, mobilizing both the forces of the socialist camp and the peoples of the world, all the peace-loving forces, for prevention of aggressive wars. If the peoples of all countries are united and mobilized, if they wage a tireless struggle, uniting their efforts both inside each country and on a world scale, wars can be averted.

Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people, which is already in its seventh year, serve as the latest examples of such wars. These wars began as an uprising by the colonial peoples against their oppressors and changed into guerrilla warfare. Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, including armed struggle.

How is it that the U.S. imperialists, while desirous of helping the French colonialists in every way, decided against direct intervention in the war in Vietnam? They did not intervene because they knew that if they did help France with armed forces, Vietnam would get relevant aid from China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, which could lead to a world war. The outcome of the war is known. North Vietnam was victorious.
At present, a similar war is taking place in Algeria. What kind of war is it? It is the uprising of the Arab people in Algeria against French colonizers. It is being conducted in the form of a partisan war. The imperialists in the United States and Britain render assistance to their French allies with arms. Moreover, they have allowed France, a participant in NATO, to transfer its troops from Europe for the struggle against the Algerian people.

The Algerian people, too, receive assistance from neighboring and other countries that sympathize with their peace-loving aspirations. But it is a liberation war of a people for its independence, it is a sacred war. We recognize such wars, we help and will help the peoples striving for their independence.

Or let us take Cuba's example. A war took place there too. But it also started as an uprising against the internal tyrannical regime supported by U.S. imperialism. Batista was a protege of the United States. The latter rendered active assistance to him. However, the United States did not interfere in that war directly with its armed forces. The Cuban people, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, have won.

Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can. But these are wars which are national uprisings. In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one. These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, since in these uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.

The Communists regard it their sacred duty to make full use of all possibilities created for the peoples by the present era to curb the bellicose forces of imperialism, to prevent a new war.

The present international Communist and workers movement has attained such might and organization that it poses for itself the practical task of delivering mankind from the calamities of a new war. The statement of the conference says: The Communists see their historical mission not only in abolition of exploitation and poverty all over the world and in excluding forever the possibility of any war in the life of human society, but in delivering mankind in the current era from the nightmare of a new world war. The Communist parties in all countries will devote all their strength and energy to the realization of this great historic mission.
Liquidation of colonialism and ways for the further development of countries which have liberated themselves:

Comrades, the peoples which achieved national independence have become a new and powerful force in the struggle for peace and social progress. The national liberation movement deals more and more blows against imperialism, helps consolidation of peace, contributes to speeding mankind's development along the path of social progress. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now the most important centers of revolutionary struggle against imperialism. In the postwar period about 40 countries won national independence. Almost 1.5 billion people have wrenched themselves out of colonial slavery.

The conference has correctly pointed out that the crumbling of the system of colonial slavery under the pressure of the national liberation movement is the second phenomenon of historic importance after the formation of the world system of socialism.

New remarkable pages are opening in the history of mankind. It is easy to imagine what majestic deeds these peoples will perform after they completely evict the imperialists from their countries, when they feel that they are masters of their own fate.

This vastly multiplies the progressive forces of mankind. For example take Asia, this ancient cradle of civilization. What inexhaustible strength lies hidden in the peoples of this continent! And will the Arab people with their heroic traditions, and all the peoples of the Middle East, which have already freed or are freeing themselves from political and economic dependence on imperialism, play any lesser role in the solution of tasks now facing mankind?

A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoples of Africa. Dozens of states in north and central Africa have already achieved independence. The south of Africa is seething and there is no doubt that the fascist prisons in the Union of South Africa will collapse, that Rhodesia, Uganda, and other parts of Africa will become free.

The forces of the national liberation movement are greatly increasing owing to the fact that one more front of active struggle against American imperialism has been formed in recent years. Latin America has become this front. Until recently that vast continent was identified by one concept: America. This concept greatly expressed its substance: Latin America was bound hand and foot by Yankee imperialism.
By their struggle, the Latin American peoples are showing that the American continent is not an appendage of the United States. Latin America is reminiscent of an active volcano: the lava of the liberation struggle has swept away dictatorial regimes in a number of Latin American countries.

The whole world has heard the thunder of the heroic Cuban revolution. The Cuban revolution is not only repelling the onslaught of the imperialists; it is going deeper and broader, marking a new, higher stage of the national liberation struggle, with people coming to power, with the people themselves becoming masters of their own wealth, solidarity with revolutionary Cuba is the duty not only of the people of Latin America; it is also the duty of the socialist countries, of the entire international communist movement, the proletariat of all areas of the world.

The national liberation movement is an anti-imperialist movement. With the collapse of the colonial system, imperialism has become considerably weaker. Vast territories, tremendous masses of people, have already ceased or are ceasing to serve as its reserve, a source of cheap raw material and cannon fodder. Asian, African, and Latin American countries, with the support of the socialist states and all international progressive forces, are more and more often defeating the imperialist powers and coalitions.

We gladly welcomed in Moscow the participants of the conference from the fraternal communist parties of countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, stalwart fighters for the independence and free development of peoples. Now communist parties are functioning in nearly 50 countries of these continents. This has broadened the sphere of influence of the communist movement, given it a truly worldwide character.

V. I. Lenin, speaking in 1919 at the Second All-Russian Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, said: If the Russian Bolsheviks succeeded in making a breach in the old imperialism, to take upon themselves the extraordinarily difficult but extraordinarily noble task of creating new revolutionary ways, then you--representatives of the working masses of the East--are faced with still a greater and newer task.

Lenin saw this task in awakening the revolutionary activity, independent action, and organization of the working masses irrespective of the level at which they are in applying communist teaching to the specific conditions in their countries, merging in the common struggle with proletarians of other countries.
When Lenin put forward this task, it had not yet been executed in practice anywhere, and the way it could be executed in concrete form could not be learned from any book. Now the communist parties of the countries struggling for national independence, or those that have already attained it, exist under immeasurably more favorable conditions, for there is the gigantic experience of the application of the theory of Marxism–Leninism in the conditions of countries and areas which had been doomed by capitalism to backwardness for ages to come. This experience, amassed by the world communist movement is a rich treasure house for all communists. The correct application of this experience, the correct determination of which policy should be pursued, naturally can be done only by the actual party functioning in the given country.

These parties have concentrated their attention on what is most important: how to approach their own peoples correctly, to convince the broadest masses that their best future is indissolubly connected with the struggles against imperialism and reactionary internal forces, and also how to strengthen international solidarity between socialist states and the communist advance guard of the world to toilers. The renovation of the world on the principles of freedom, democracy, and socialism in which we are participating is a great historic process in which various revolutionary and democratic movements unite and work in concert under the determining influence of socialist revolutions.

The successes of the national liberation movement are to a great extent conditioned by the victories of socialism and, in their turn, strengthen the international positions of socialism in the struggle against imperialism. The policy of the communist parties and socialist states aimed at strengthening the close union with the peoples struggling for their independence or those who have already achieved it, is based on this truly Leninist understanding of these historical processes.

Bourgeois and revisionist politicians allege that the development of the national liberation movement is independent of the working class struggle for socialism, independent of the socialist states' support, that it is the colonizers who grant freedom to the peoples of former colonial countries. Such inventions are launched to isolate the young independent states from the socialist camp, to prove that on the international stage they should, allegedly, play the part of some kind of third force and not oppose imperialism.

Is it necessary to mention that such reasoning is downright charlatanism? It is a historical fact that before the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution nations were not able to break the shackles of colonialism. History has proved that without the establishment of socialism, if only in a part of the world, there could have been no question of the abolition of colonialism. The imperialist powers, primarily the United
States, are exerting every effort to attach to their own system the countries which have freed themselves from the yoke of colonialism, and thus to strengthen the position of world capitalism by providing it—as the bourgeois ideologists say—with new blood, to rejuvenate and consolidate it.

If one faces facts, it cannot be ignored that the imperialists possess strong economic inducements for influencing the liberated countries. They are still able to enmesh certain politically independent countries in the net of economic dependence. Now, when the establishment of overt colonial regimes is impossible, the imperialists resort to camouflaged forms of enslaving and looting the liberated countries.

At the same time the colonial powers maintain internal reactionary forces everywhere in the liberated countries. They attempt to implant puppet dictatorial regimes and draw these countries into aggressive blocs. Although the sharpest divergencies are observed among the imperialist states, they often act jointly against the national liberation movement. But if all the factors influencing the fate of the peoples who have thrown off colonialism are taken into consideration, the conclusion is that the trends of social progress opposed to imperialism will eventually prevail. However, these questions are settled in the acute struggle within each country.

The conference statement contains important clauses concerning basic questions of development of the national liberation struggle, whose tasks the communist parties are striving to carry out. Their position in regard to various classes and social groups are also noted there.

Expressing the unity of views of the Marxist-Leninist parties, the statement directs maximum utilization of the revolutionary capabilities of the various classes and social strata, drawing into the struggle against imperialism all, even inconsistent, wavering, unsteady allies. Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be a bad thing if they did not take advantage of new opportunities that arose and found new methods and forms providing the best way to achievement of the ends in view.

Particular note should be taken of the idea in the statement concerning formation of national democracies. The statement describes the basic features of this state and the tasks it is called on to carry out.

It is important to stress that with the immense variety of conditions in countries whose peoples have risen to independent, historic creative work, various forms of settling problems of social progress cannot fail to arise. The correct application of Marxist-Leninist theory in countries which have freed themselves consists indeed in seeking forms for uniting the whole national (word indistinct) while taking account of the special features of the economic, political, and cultural life of the peoples, in
insuring the leading role of the working class in the national front, and in the struggle for resolute extermination of the roots of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism, for clearing the roots of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism, for clearing the way for an eventual movement toward socialism.

At present, when imperialist reaction is trying to foist a policy of anticommunism on the young, independent states, a truthful explanation of communist views and aims becomes particularly significant. Communists generally support democratic measures taken by national governments. At the same time, communists explain to the masses that these measures are not socialist ones.

To no one are the hopes of the peoples bursting the fetters of colonialism as dear and as comprehensible as to the working people of the socialist countries, to the communists of the whole world. Our very world outlook and the interests of working mankind, for which we fight, urge us to do everything we can so that the peoples follow the right road to progress and the efflorescence of their material and spiritual forces. By our policy we must strengthen the confidence of the peoples in the socialist countries.

The assistance of the USSR and other socialist states to countries which have won their independence pursues a single goal: To contribute to the strengthening of the position of those countries in the struggle against imperialism, to the development of their national economies, and to the improvement of the living conditions of their peoples. Engels, noting the immense interest of the working class and of the leading countries in making colonial countries independent at the earliest possible date, wrote that only one thing was beyond all doubt: The victorious proletariat cannot enforce happiness upon other people without undermining its own victory.

The international duty of the victorious working class is to help the peoples of economically underdeveloped countries to completely break the fetters of colonial enslavement and to give them all-round support in their struggle against imperialism and for self-determination and independent development.

It does not follow from this, however, that the socialist help does not influence the prospects of the further development of countries which have won their freedom.

The Soviet Union has been and remains a sincere friend of colonial peoples and has always stood guard over their interests and aspirations to independence. We will continue to strengthen and develop economic and cultural cooperation with countries which have entered the party of independent existence.
The Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. As a result of acute political struggle around this proposal, which seethed not only in the United Nations but outside it, the General Assembly adopted the declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The main conclusion of the Soviet declaration, the necessity of a speedy and final liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, was on the whole reflected in the decision passed by the United Nations. This was a great victory for the progressive forces and for all socialist states which firmly and consistently defend the cause of the freedom and independent national development of peoples.

It is necessary to stress that in the solution of this problem at the U.N. General Assembly colonizers were isolated by socialist and neutralist countries, countries which take the stand for the liquidation of colonial system. Even some of the countries which belong to aggressive blocs, for instance, Norway and Denmark, voted for the liquidation of the colonial system. The colonizers were left among a miserable handful of nine countries which abstained from voting. This is highly characteristic, as it shows to the whole world who stands for the liquidation of the colonial system and what the so-called free countries uphold.

Is it not significant that among those who abstained were representatives of such countries as the United States, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and others? Despite being doomed to fail, colonialism still has quite a considerable strength of resistance and will cause much harm to many peoples. Around it there gathers all that is obsolete and reactionary. Colonialism is the direct or indirect cause of many conflicts threatening mankind with a new war.

Colonialism, which more than once has led to bloodshed, still is fraught with the danger of war. Now and again it manifests itself in the outbreaks of vicious madness, which is eloquently proved by the bloody events in Algeria, the Congo, and Laos. It still grips in its tenacious claws tens of millions of people. Not all the peoples who won state independence enjoy its benefits, since in the economies of their countries foreign monopolies continue their domination.

To demolish these last remnants of the colonial system of imperialism, to protect the peoples that are gaining independence from encroachment by colonial powers, and to help these peoples in the implementation of their liberation ideals--therein the peoples of the socialist countries and communists and progressive people of the world see their duty.
LENIN ON PARTISAN WARFARE *

The question of partisan actions has aroused great interest within the party and among the workers. We have mentioned this topic repeatedly before. Our present intention is to redeem our promise and summarize our position on this subject.

Let us start from the beginning. What are the basic questions every Marxist must ask when he analyzes the problem of the types of struggle? First of all, unlike primitive forms of socialism, Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method. It recognizes the possibility that struggle may assume the most variegated forms. For that matter, Marxism does not "invent" those forms of struggle. It merely organizes the tactics of strife and renders them suitable for general use. It also renders the revolutionary classes conscious of the forms of the clashes which emerge spontaneously from the activities of the movement. Marxism rejects all abstract thinking and doctrinaire prescriptions about types of struggle. It calls for a careful study of the mass struggle which actually is taking place. As the movement develops, as the consciousness of the masses grows, and as the economic and political crises are becoming more intense, ever new and different methods of defense and attack will be used in the conflict. Hence, Marxism never will reject any particular combat method, let alone reject it forever. Marxism does not limit itself to those types of struggle which, at a given moment, are both practical and traditional. It holds that, due to changes in social conditions, new forms of battle will arise inevitably, although no one can foresee what the character of these future encounters will be. In this field, if we may say so, Marxism is learning from the practice of the masses. It is far from claiming that it should teach the masses tactics elaborated in the abstract by strategists of the pen. We know, as Kautsky stated when he was analyzing the different forms of social revolution, that the coming crisis will present us with new and unpredictable forms of action.

Second, Marxism asks that the various types of struggle be analyzed within their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside of its historical and concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectic materialism. At various junctures of the economic evolution, and depending upon changing political, national, cultural, social and other conditions, differing types of struggle may become important and even predominant. As a result of those sociological transformations, secondary and subordinate forms of action may change their significance. To try and answer positively or negatively the question of whether a certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying the concrete conditions confronting a given movement at a precise point of its development, would mean a complete negation of Marxism.

Those are the two basic concepts which must serve as our guide. The soundness of this approach has been confirmed by numerous examples from the history of Western European Marxism. At present, European socialists regard parliamentarism and trade unionism as their main method of struggle. Previously, they favored the armed uprising. Contrary to the opinion of liberal-bourgeois politicians like the Russian Cadets and the Bessaglavtsi, the European socialists are perfectly willing to favor the uprising again should the situation change in the future.

During the 1870's, social democrats rejected the idea that the general strike could be used as a panacea tactic and as a nonpolitical method suitable for the immediate overthrow of the bourgeoisie. But after the experience of 1905, the social democrats fully recognized the political mass strike as a means which, under certain conditions, could become necessary. Similarly, during the 1840's the social democrats recognized the utility of barricades. By the end of the nineteenth century, conditions had changed and the socialists rejected the barricades as unsuitable. However, after the experience of the Moscow rising, which, in Kautsky's words, demonstrated new tactics of barricade fighting, they were willing to revise their position and again acknowledged the usefulness of barricades.

After this exposition of general Marxist doctrine, we want to discuss the Russian revolution. Let us consider the historical development of the various action types to which the revolution gave rise. First, there occurred economic strikes by the workers (1896-1900), then political demonstrations by workers and students (1901-1902), peasant unrest (1902), subsequently the beginnings of
political mass strikes variously connected with demonstrations (Rostov 1902, strikes during summer of 1903, the affair of January 22, 1905), political general strike with local barricade fighting (October 1905), mass barricade battles waged by large numbers of revolutionaries, as well as armed uprising (December 1905), peaceful parliamentary struggle (April-July 1906), local military uprisings (June 1905-June 1906), and local peasant uprisings (fall 1905-fall 1906).

Such was the development of the struggle before the autumn of 1906. Absolutism opposed these types of struggle with Black Hundreds pogroms. These pogroms were initiated in spring 1903 at Kishinev and ended with the Siedliec pogrom in 1906. During this period, the organizing of Black Hundreds pogroms and the tormenting of Jews, students, revolutionaries and class-conscious workers continued unabated and steadily increased in ferocity. Mob violence was paired with military violence perpetrated by reactionary troops. Artillery was used on villages and cities. Punitive expeditions were dispatched, and all over the railroads there were moving trains crowded with political prisoners.

This, then, has been the general background of the situation. From this background there has emerged the phenomenon of armed struggle. Our paper is devoted to the study and evaluation of this new occurrence. Although merely a secondary and incidental part of the whole, armed struggle has been pushed into the foreground. What is armed struggle? What are its forms and its causes? When did it originate? What has been the frequency of its occurrence? What is its significance for the general course of the revolution? What is its connection with the proletarian class struggle organized and waged by social democracy? After having described the general background of the problem, we shall now address ourselves to these questions.

Armed struggle is waged by small groups and individuals, some of whom are members of revolutionary parties. In certain regions of Russia, however, the majority of the partisans are not affiliated with any revolutionary organization. Armed struggle aims at two different objectives which must be distinguished sharply from one another. The first objective is to kill individuals such as high officials and lower-ranking members of the police and army. The second objective is to confiscate money from the government as well as from private persons. Portions of the captured money are used for party purposes, other portions for arms and the preparation of the rising, and the rest for the sustenance of persons engaging in the struggle described by us. The money seized in the great expropriations (more than 200,000 rubles in the Caucasus and 875,000 rubles in
Moscow) was allocated to the revolutionary parties primarily. Smaller expropriations were used mainly, and sometimes exclusively, for the livelihood of the "expropriators." This type of struggle came into widespread use during 1906, after the December uprising in Moscow. The aggravation of the political crisis to the point of armed insurrection, and especially the ever-growing pauperization, famine and unemployment in villages and cities, were among the most potent causes leading to the emergence of armed combat. The declassed elements of the population, the Lumpenproletariat and anarchist groups, chose this struggle as the main and even only form of the social war. Autocracy answered with the tactics of martial law, conscription of younger military classes, Black Hundreds pogroms (Siedliec) and court martials.

III

Armed struggle often is considered to be anarchism, Blanquism, old-style terrorism and, at any rate, an activity perpetrated by isolated individuals out of touch with the masses. The acts of armed struggle are judged to demoralize the workers. Allegedly they divorce broad strata of the population from the toilers, disorganize the revolutionary movement and hurt the revolutionary cause. Examples supporting this type of evaluation are drawn easily from the daily press. But how good are these examples? Let us look at one case. Partisan struggle reached its greatest popularity in the Lettish districts. On August 21 and September 25, 1906, the newspaper Novoye Vremya complained bitterly about the activities of the Lettish socialists. The Lettish Social Democratic Party, a branch of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Russia, disclosed a list of police agents. This disclosure was inserted in the party newspaper (circulation: 30,000) and was accompanied by the comment that it was the duty of every honest person to help bring about the liquidation of those spies. The police collaborators were "enemies of the revolution," their property was declared liable to seizure and they themselves were designated for execution. The social democrats have instructed the population to contribute money to the party, but against stamped receipts only. In the latest budget, there was listed among the party's annual receipts totalling 48,000 rubles an item of 5,600 rubles expropriated by the Libau organization for the purchase of weapons. Of course, Novoye Vremya is outraged by such "revolutionary legislation," and by this "terror regime."

No one would dare call those actions by the Lettish social democrats anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism. Why? Simply because the armed struggle clearly is interrelated with the uprising which
took place in December. Such uprisings are bound to recur. If Russia is considered as a whole, then this relationship between armed struggle and armed uprisings is not so clearly noticeable, but it does exist. After all, there is no question but that "partisan" struggle reached its greatest popularity after the December rising. Those actions are related not only to the economic crisis but also to the political crisis. Traditional Russian terrorism was the work of plotting intellectuals. Now, workers or unemployed persons who are members of combat groups usually are leading this struggle. People who like to generalize according to abstract patterns easily may think of anarchism or Blanquism. In the face of an insurrectionist situation as it clearly existed in the Lettish area, such phrases learned by rote obviously are meaningless.

The Lettish example demonstrates that the usual method of analyzing partisan action without regard to the status of the uprising is completely wrong, unscientific and unhistorical. The concrete situation must be taken into consideration. The characteristics of the transition periods between large uprisings must be taken into account. The types of struggle which, in a given period, are becoming inevitable should not be criticized with a few clichés such as anarchism, plunder and Lumpen-proletariat, as is customary among Cadets and the Novoye Vremya crowd.

It is said that partisan actions disorganize our work. Let us see to what extent this evaluation is justified, especially with respect to the period after December 1905 and to the areas under martial law and suffering from Black Hundreds pogroms. What is it that disorganizes the movement in such an area more: the lack of resistance or the lack of a well organized partisan struggle? Compare the situation in Central Russia with that of the Western border regions, such as Poland and Livonia. There is no doubt that in the Western provinces partisan struggles occur far more frequently and have reached a higher stage of development. Contrariwise, there is no doubt that in Central Russia the revolutionary movement in general, and the social democratic movement in particular, is far more disorganized than in the West. Certainly we would not think of concluding that because of the partisan struggle the Polish and Lettish social democratic movement has suffered from disorganization less than the movement in Central Russia. No. The point is merely that the partisan struggle is not responsible for the disorganization of the Russian social democratic workers movement which occurred during 1906.
In this connection, frequent reference has been made to the peculiarities of national conditions. Such arguments disclose the weakness of the customary objections to partisan struggle. If it is a matter of national conditions, then obviously it is not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism, but something else is involved: general Russian or even specifically Russian sins. Analyze this "something else" more concretely, gentlemen! You will find that national oppression or national antagonisms explain nothing. These conditions always were present in the Western border regions, yet partisan actions have occurred only in a special historical period. There are many regions where national oppression and antagonisms have been rampant, and yet no partisan struggles are taking place. The fact is that sometimes partisan struggles develop in the absence of any national oppression. A concrete analysis of this question would show that it is not national oppression but the development of the uprising which is decisive. Partisan struggle is an unavoidable form of action at a time when the mass movement has matured to the point of insurrection and when the intervals between the "big battles" of the civil war are becoming shorter.

The movement has not been disorganized by partisan struggles but by the weakness of the party, which does not know how to take those actions into its own hands. Consequently, the indictments against partisan warfare, so customary among us Russians, go together with secret, accidental and unorganized partisan actions which, indeed, do disorganize the party. If we do not understand the historical conditions of partisan warfare, then we shall be unable to eliminate its darker sides. In spite of everything, partisan operations occur because they are created by powerful economic and political causes. Since we are unable to get rid of those causes, we are unable to prevent this type of struggle. Our complaints about partisan warfare are nothing but complaints about the weakness of our party which is incapable of organizing the uprisings.

What we said about disorganization also applies to demoralization. Partisan struggle as such does not produce demoralization, which results rather from disorganization, undisciplined armed actions and from lack of party leadership. Demoralization, which unquestionably has set in, cannot be overcome by disapproving and rejecting the concept of partisan struggle. Such censures are by no means sufficient to prevent events which result from profound economic and political causes. It could be objected that, while we may not have the capability of suppressing abnormal and demoralizing happenings, no purpose would be served if the party were to use anomalous and demoralizing tactics. Such a non-Marxist objection would be of a purely
liberal-bourgeois character. No Marxist should consider partisan warfare, which is just one of the forms of civil war, as abnormal and demoralizing. Marxists favor class struggle and not social peace. In periods of grave economic and political crisis, the class struggle develops into civil war—that is, into an armed struggle between two parts of the people. In such periods, every Marxist is obliged to endorse the cause of civil war. From the Marxist point of view, moral condemnations of civil war are entirely unacceptable.

In situations of civil war, a combat party is the ideal type of a proletarian party. This is indisputable. We admit that one may try to prove, and perhaps may be able to prove, the inadvisability of this or that type of struggle at this or that juncture of the civil war. From the point of view of military expediency, criticism of the various forms of civil war certainly is justified. We agree that the decisive voice in such questions belongs to those experienced socialist leaders who are familiar with the practical conditions in each locality. But, in the name of Marxist principles, we must insist that civil war be analyzed seriously and that shopworn phrases such as anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism not be thrown into the debate. Senseless partisan actions, such as were indulged in by this or that organization of the PPS in this or that situation, should not be abused for a scare argument against socialist participation in partisan warfare.

One must accept assertions that partisan warfare disorganizes the socialist movement with skepticism. Every new form of struggle which involves new dangers and new sacrifices inevitably will "disorganize" organizations unprepared for the new tactics. Our old study groups became disorganized when agitational methods were adopted. Later on, our party committees were disorganized when the party took to demonstrations. In every war, new tactics carry a degree of disorganization into the battle ranks. Yet this is not argument against fighting a war. It merely follows that one must learn how to wage war. That is all there is to it.

When I meet social democrats who proudly and self-righteously declare, "we are no anarchists, no thieves, no robbers, we are above such violent forms of struggle," we reject partisan warfare, "then I ask myself: "Do these people understand what they are talking about?" Violent incidents and armed clashes between the Black Hundreds government and the people are happening all over the country. This is inevitable at the present stage of revolution. The population reacts to the attacks by Black Hundreds troopers with armed coups de main and ambushes. Because they are spontaneous
and unorganized, these counter-attacks may assume inexpedient and evil forms. I understand quite well that, due to weakness and lack of preparation by our organization, the party may refrain from assuming, at given places and times, the leadership of such spontaneous actions. I understand that this question must be decided by local practitioners and that the strengthening of weak and unprepared party organizations is not an easy task. But if a social democratic theoretician or writer fails to be saddened by such lack of preparedness and, on the contrary, displays proud self-satisfaction, and conceitedly and enthusiastically repeats slogans on anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism which he memorized in his early youth, then I consider this to be a degradation of the world's most revolutionary doctrine.

It is asserted that partisan actions lower the class-conscious proletariat to the level of drunkards and bums. This is correct. But from this follows only that the party of the proletariat never should consider partisan warfare to be its only or even its chief means of struggle. This particular technique must be integrated with other tactics and be in harmony with the most important methods of combat. Partisan warfare should be ennobled by the enlightening and organizing influence of socialism. Without this last condition, all--clearly all--means of struggle will move the proletariat [which lives] within a bourgeois society close to various non-proletarian strata, whether they stand higher or lower [in social rank].

If they are allowed to develop spontaneously, such techniques will lose their effectiveness and their original form and will become prostituted. Strikes which are left to take a spontaneous course degenerate into "alliances," i.e. agreements between business and labor against the consumer. Parliament becomes a brothel where gangs of bourgeois politicians are bargaining, wholesale and retail, about "people's freedom," "liberalism," "democracy," republicanism, anti-clericalism, socialism and other brands of popular commodities. Newspapers turn into cheap procurers and into tools corrupting the masses and flattering the lowest mob instincts, etc. The socialists know of no universally applicable combat method which would separate the proletariat, as though by a Chinese wall, from those classes of the people which [socially] are situated slightly higher or slightly lower. Socialists use different means at different periods. Those means are chosen in strict accordance with ideological and organizational conditions the nature of which must be determined accurately [by the Marxian dialectic method].

The bolsheviks have been accused frequently of an unthinking party-oriented [and positive] attitude toward partisan actions. It
seems necessary, therefore, to reiterate that the particular bolshevik faction\textsuperscript{21} which approved partisan warfare defined in its draft \textsuperscript{of a social democratic party resolution}/the conditions under which armed struggle would be permissible: "Expropriations" of private property are entirely forbidden. "Expropriations" of government property are not recommended, but are permitted provided they are accomplished under party control and provided the captured money is used for the purposes of the uprising. Terrorist partisan acts against representatives of the violent regime and of active Black Hundreds groups are recommended\textsuperscript{22} but are subject to the following restrictions: (1) the popular mood must be taken into account; (2) local conditions under which the workers movement is operating must be considered; (3) care must be taken that no proletarian forces are wasted unnecessarily. The only practical difference between the resolution accepted by the unification congress of the Social Democratic Party\textsuperscript{23} and our draft resolution is that in the former "expropriations" of government property were entirely forbidden.

IV

The Russian revolution differs from bourgeois revolutions in Europe in that it displays an immense variety in the methods of struggle. Kautsky predicted this in 1902, at least to a point, when he said that the coming revolution (and he added: perhaps with the exception of Russia) will not be so much a struggle of the people against the government as a struggle of one part of the people against the other. In Russia we witnessed a broader development of the second kind of struggle than during the bourgeois revolutions in the West. The enemies of our revolution have but few followers among the people, but as the fight develops the opponents are getting better and better organized and are gaining support from reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie. Thus, it is natural and unavoidable that in such periods, in a period of political general strikes, the uprising cannot assume the traditional form of a single blow, limited to a very short time and a very small area.\textsuperscript{24} Under such circumstances, it is natural and unavoidable that the uprising assumes the higher and more complicated form of a protracted civil war enmeshing the entire country--that is, the form of armed struggle by one part of the people against the other. Such a war must be conceived as a series of a few big battles, separated by comparatively long intervals, and a large number of small engagements which take place during these interim periods. If this is so--and it undoubtedly is so--then the task of social democracy is to create organizations most suitable to leading the masses both in the big battles and, so
far as practical, in the smaller actions. At a time when the class struggle is developing into civil war, social democrats must consider it their task not only to participate in this civil war, but must play the leading role in this conflict. The Social Democratic Party must educate and prepare its organizations in such a way that they will become true belligerents who will not fail to exploit opportunities through which the strengths of the opponent can be sapped.

Unquestionably, this is a difficult task. It cannot be accomplished at once. Similarly, as an entire people is transforming itself in the course of civil war and is learning from the struggle, so our organizations, if they are to fulfill their mission, must be educated and reorganized on the basis of experience.

We do not presume at all to impose on comrades who are carrying on with their practical work any theoretical ideas about tactics, let alone to decide from the vantage point of a desk what role this or that form of partisan struggle should assume during the civil war in Russia. We shall not confuse particular political orientations within the social democratic movement with specific partisan actions. But we consider it our task to provide a correct theoretical evaluation of the new forms of struggle which life has created. Our business is to fight pitilessly against the clichés and prejudices which are hindering the class-conscious workers from posing a new and difficult question in the right manner and hence from solving it correctly.