MAO ON GUERRILLA WARFARE*

What is Guerrilla Warfare?

In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in a war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution, said: "A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable." We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages for the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semicolonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only those who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character.
On the other hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: "Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations." There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: "Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people" (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well educated in revolutionary technique, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counterpropaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders will gradually overcome the lack of discipline, which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.
Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say: "This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds and bandits" (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. "This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism," said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare. *

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there

* Presumably, Mao refers here to the essay that has been translated into English under the title "Partisan Warfare." See Orbis, II (Summer, 1958), No. 2, 194-208. --S.B.G.
can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds in China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower, and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that "the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people." Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.
Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely "class" type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: "When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners" (Civil War in Russia).* The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: "Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war." Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare, said: "As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress, and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization." Again: "It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract

* Presumably, Mao refers here to Lessons of Civil War, by S. I. Gusev; first published in 1918 by the Staff Armed Forces, Ukraine; revised in 1921 and published by GIZ, Moscow; reprinted in 1958 by the Military Publishing House, Moscow. --S. B. G.
formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods.

If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, "the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function." Jen Ch'i Shan writes: "In olden days, guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today." These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations

The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms "front" and "rear"; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many; as individual combat units, they may vary in
size from the smallest, of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order, and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare, particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must coordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must cooperate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of cooperation of many units.

When we discuss the terms "front" and "rear," it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations
(except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile* march of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in the enemy's rear. On occasion, however, Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to strike an enemy in motion, and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection, the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities, these orthodox units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, they not only were able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.

Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas,

* It has been estimated that the Reds actually marched about 6,000 miles. See Introduction, Chapter II. --S.B.G.
they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a
giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make
themselves as unendurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils,
and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that
their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is
for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of
constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla opera­
tions, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm
between the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear
under certain conditions, and this fact must be appreciated if we
wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we
consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse
guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox war, we
fall into this error: We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and
minimize that of the regular armies. If we agree with Change Tso
Hua, who says, "Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy
of a people seeking to emancipate itself," or with Kao Kang, who
believes that "Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for
an oppressed people," we are exaggerating the importance of guer­
rilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do
not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations into their
proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not
only would those who oppose us take advantage of our varying opinions
to turn them to their own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would
be led to assume responsibilities they could not successfully dis­
charge and that should properly be carried out by orthodox forces.
In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of coordinating
activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only
strategy were actually applied, the regular forces would be weakened,
we would be divided in purpose, and guerrilla hostilities would decline.
If we say, "Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas," and
do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular
armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result
the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that
guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities
can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If
we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning
to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize
the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, "Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations." This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.

A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: "Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favorable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations."

To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards
of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical
counterattack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it
would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However,
the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form
must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot arrive at
the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote
guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox
operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our
war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as
conducted by orthodox forces.

The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare

In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should
have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the
political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means
that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at
a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that
are the life of both the guerrilla armies and of revolutionary war-
fare.

First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination
of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism.
Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not
feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a
guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present
conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the tempta-
tions of the enemy or be overcome with discouragements. In a
war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must
be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in
their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that
enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese
imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers
fight without conviction and lose their determination.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to
inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness
awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems
used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who
are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The
Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled System of National Or-
ganization for War, which should be widely distributed throughout
guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

It is to be hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are fighting today for the emancipation of the Chinese is a part of the war for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.

A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a
discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of a self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.

A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and propaganda must be encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerrilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things, but there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war. Thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups, a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.

There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as "The Three Rules and the Eight Remarks," which we list here:
Rules:
1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.*
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.

* In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds. — S.B.G.
Viet-Nam is one of the oldest countries in Southeast Asia. Stretching like an immense "S" along the edge of the Pacific, it includes Bac Bo, or North Viet-Nam, which, with the Red River delta, is a region rich in agricultural and industrial possibilities; Nam Bo, or South Viet-Nam, a vast alluvial plain furrowed by the arms of the Mekong and especially favorable to agriculture; and Trung Bo, or Central Viet-Nam, a long, narrow belt of land joining them. To describe the shape of their country, the Vietnamese like to recall an image familiar to them--that of a shoulder pole with a basket of paddy at each end.

Viet-Nam extends over nearly 330,000 square kilometers on which lives a population of approximately 30 million. During their many thousand years of history, the Vietnamese people have always been able to maintain an heroic tradition of struggle against foreign aggression. During the 13th century, in particular, they succeeded in thwarting domination by the whole of feudal China.

The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was a just war. Its aim was to win back the independence and unity of the country, to bring land to the peasants, and to defend the achievements of the August Revolution. That is why it was, first and foremost, a people's war. To educate, mobilize, organize, and arm the whole people in order that they might take part in the resistance was the crucial task.

The enemy of the Vietnamese nation was aggressive imperialism, which had to be overthrown. But the latter having long since joined up with the feudal landlords, the anti-imperialist struggle definitely could not be separated from anti-feudal action. On the other hand,
in a backward colonial country such as ours, where the peasant's make up the majority of the population, a people's war is essentially a peasant's war under the leadership of the working class. Owing to this fact, a general mobilization of the whole people is neither more nor less than mobilization of the rural masses. The problem of land is of decisive importance. The Vietnamese war of liberation was essentially a national democratic revolution carried out under military form. It had a two-fold fundamental task: the overthrowing of imperialism and the defeat of the feudal landlord class. The anti-imperialist struggle was primary.

N. Vietnamese Army Weak

A backward colonial country which had only just risen up to proclaim its independence and install people's power, Viet-Nam had only recently developed armed forces. They were equipped with still mediocre arms and had no combat experience. The enemy, on the other hand, was an imperialist power which had retained a fairly considerable economic and military potential despite the recent German occupation. She had benefited, moreover, from the active support of the United States. The balance of forces decidedly showed up our weaknesses against the enemy's strength.

The Vietnamese people's war therefore, had to be hard and long-lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory. Conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to adopt a strategy of long-term resistance in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy. It was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into one great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.

At an early stage, our Party was able to discern the true characteristics of the war. By proceeding from these premises during the whole of hostilities and under particularly difficult conditions, the Party solved all the problems of the resistance. This judicious leadership led us to victory.

Our strategy was, as we have stressed, to wage a long-lasting battle. A war of this type, generally speaking, entails several phases. In principle, starting from a stage of contention, the war
goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general
counter-offensive. The way it is carried on can be subtle and
complex, depending on the particular conditions obtaining on both
sides during the course of operations. Only a long-term war
could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards,
to overcome our material handicap, and to transform our weakness
into strength. To maintain and increase our forces was the principle
to which we adhered. We contented ourselves with attacking when
success was certain, refusing to give battle likely to incur losses
to us, or to engage in hazardous actions. We had to build up our
strength during the actual course of fighting.

Guerrilla War Fit Situation

The form of fighting had to be completely adapted to the situation.
We had to raise our fighting spirit to the maximum and rely on the
heroism of our troops to overcome the enemy's material superiority.
In the main, especially at the outset, we had to resort to guerrilla
fighting. In the Vietnamese theater of operations, this method carried
off great victories. It could be used in the mountains as well as in the
delta; it could be waged with good or mediocre material, even with­
out arms, and was to enable us eventually to equip ourselves at the
cost of the enemy. Wherever the Expeditionary Corps went, the
entire population took part in the fighting. Every commune had its
fortified village. Every district had its regional troops fighting
under command of local branches of the Party, in liaison with the
regular forces, in order to wear down and annihilate the enemy.

Thereafter, with the development of our forces, guerrilla war
changed into mobile warfare (though still strongly marked by guer­
rilla tactics) which afterwards became the basic form of operations
on the main front, the northern front. In this process of develop­
ment, our army constantly grew and passed from the stage of en­
gagements involving a section or company, to fairly large-scale
campaigns bringing into action several divisions. Gradually, the
army's equipment improved, mainly through seizure of arms
from the French and American imperialists.

From a military point of view, the war proved that an inadequately
equipped army, fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strat­
egy and tactics, conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism.

In the management of a war economy in an agriculturally back­
ward country undertaking a long-term resistance, the problem of
building bases in rear areas arises. The raising and defense of production, and the development of agriculture, were problems of great importance for supplying the front as well as for progressive improvement of the people's living conditions. The matter of manufacturing arms was not one which could be set aside.

In the building of rural bases and the reinforcement of rear areas, for giving impetus to the resistance, the agrarian policy of the Party played a determining role. Therein lay the anti-feudal task of the revolution. In a colony where the national question is essentially the peasant question, consolidation of the resistance forces was possible only by solution of the agrarian problem.

The August Revolution overthrew the feudal state. Reduction of land rents and rates of interest, decreed by people's power, bestowed on the peasants their first material advantages. Land monopolized by the imperialists and traitors was confiscated and shared out. Communal land and rice fields were most equitably distributed. From 1953, deeming it necessary to promote the accomplishment of anti-feudal tasks, the Party decided to achieve agrarian reform even during the course of the resistance war. Despite the errors which blemished accomplishment of this reform, it was a correct policy crowned with success. It resulted in real material advantages for the peasants and brought to the army and the people a new breath of enthusiasm.

Thanks to this new agrarian policy the life of the people, during the hardest conditions of the war, generally improved, not only in the vast free zones of the North, but even in the guerrilla bases in South Viet-Nam.

Rural Resistance Bases

The Vietnamese war brought out the importance of building resistance bases in the countryside and emphasized the close and indissoluble relationship between the anti-imperialist revolution and the anti-feudal revolution.

From a political point of view, the question of unity among the people and the mobilization of all their energies was of paramount importance. It was the national united front against the imperialists and their lackeys, the Vietnamese traitors.
In Viet-Nam, our Party carried off a great success in its policy of Front. As early as WW II, the Party formed the League for the Independence of Viet-Nam. During the early years of the war of resistance, we postponed the application of agrarian revolution, limiting our program to the reduction of land rents and interest rates, which enabled us to neutralize part of the landlord class and to rally around us the most patriotic of them.

From the early days of the August Revolution, the policy of broad front adopted by the Party neutralized the wavering elements among the landlord class and limited acts of sabotage by partisans of the Viet-Nam Quoc-Dan-Dang (nationalist party).

Thereafter, in the course of the war, when agrarian reform had become an urgent necessity, our Party made a differentiation within the landlord class by providing different treatment for each type of landlord according to his political attitude toward liquidation of feudal appropriation of land.

The policy of unity among nationalities adopted by the National United Front also achieved great success, and the program of unity with the various religious circles attained good results.

The National United Front was to be a vast assembly of all the forces capable of being united, neutralizing all those which could be neutralized, dividing all those it was possible to divide. The object of this was to direct the spearhead at the chief enemy of the revolution, invading imperialism. The Front was to be an alliance between workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. In Viet-Nam, an alliance between workers and peasants was backed by a dazzling history and firm traditions. The party of the working class had been the only political party to fight resolutely in all circumstances for national dependence. It was the first to put forward the slogan, "land to the tillers," and to struggle determinedly for its realization. However, in the early years of the resistance, underestimation of the importance of the peasant question hindered us from giving all the necessary attention to the worker-peasant alliance. This error was subsequently set right, especially from the moment when the Party decided, by means of accomplishing agrarian reform, to make the peasants the real masters of the countryside.
The war of liberation proved that, in the face of an enemy as powerful as he is cruel, victory is possible only by uniting the whole people under a firm and wide national front based on the worker-peasant alliance.

To bring victory, it was not enough to have a correct strategic guiding principle. An appropriate guiding principle of fighting was also necessary in order to carry out the strategy. In general, ours was a guerrilla war moving gradually to regular or mobile war combined with partial entrenched camp warfare. Basically, we had grasped that general law—hence, we were successful. However, we did not thoroughly grasp it from the beginning, only after being tested and tempered in the practice of war.

In the resistance war, guerrilla activity played an extremely important role. Guerrilla war is the form of fighting of the masses of a weak and badly equipped country who stand up against an aggressive army with better equipment and techniques. This is the way of fighting a revolution. Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over modern weapons, avoiding the enemy when he is the stronger and attacking him when he is the weaker. Now scattering, now regrouping, now wearing out, now exterminating the enemy, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back at him, thus undermining his spirit and exhausting his forces. In addition to scattering in order to wear out the enemy, it is necessary to regroup big armed forces in favorable situations to achieve supremacy in attack at a given point and time to annihilate the enemy. Successes in many small fights added together gradually wear out the enemy manpower, while little by little strengthening our forces. The main goal of the fighting must be destruction of enemy manpower. Our own manpower should not be exhausted from trying to keep or occupy land.

Guerrilla war was obviously in full keeping with the characteristics of our resistance war. In the early period, regular wasn't possible. When the war started in South Viet-Nam, our plan was to wage guerrilla warfare and in practice, guerrilla war took shape. But when the nationwide war broke out, the policy of mainly waging
guerrilla warfare was not clearly set forth. At the beginning of autumn-winter 1947, the Party Central Committee decreed launching and extending guerrilla activities over all the occupied areas. One part of our main force was divided into independent companies, operating separately, which penetrated deep into the enemy's rear area to carry out propaganda assignments among the people, to defend our bases, and to intensify guerrilla activity. The policy of using independent companies concurrently with concentrated battalions was very successful. As guerrilla activities were intensified and widely extended, many enemy rear areas were turned into our front lines.

To cope with our expanding guerrilla activities, great efforts were made by the enemy to launch repeated mopping-up operations with ever bigger forces. The aim of these operations was to annihilate our guerrilla units, destroy our political bases and crops, and plunder our property. The enemy hoped to crush our resistance forces and "pacify" his rear. That is why mopping-up operations and counter mopping-up operations became the chief form of guerrilla war in the enemy's rear. Through the counter mopping-up operations, our people brought to the utmost their endurance of hardships and heroic fighting spirit, creating extremely rich forms of fighting. To maintain and extend guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear our Party cleverly combined the coordination of political and economic struggle with armed struggle. The Party strove hard to avail itself of favorable opportunities to push the people into the armed struggle, develop our forces, annihilate and wear out the enemy forces, turn temporarily occupied zones into guerrilla zones or the latter into our bases. When meeting a difficult situation, our Party cleverly switched the movement in good time to preserve our forces and safeguard our bases. Guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear were the highest expression of the iron will and courageous spirit of our people, and at the same time were proof of the talented leadership of the Party.

From the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare causes many difficulties and losses to the enemy and wears him out. To annihilate enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has to change gradually to mobile warfare. Through guerrilla activities, our troops were gradually formed, fighting first with small units, then with bigger ones, moving from scattered fighting to more concentrated fighting. Guerrilla warfare gradually developed to mobile warfare—a form of fighting in which principles of regular warfare gradually appear but still bear a guerrilla character.
Mobile warfare is fighting with concentrated troops of the regular army. In this type war, relatively big forces are grouped and operated on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed, advancing deeply, then withdrawing swiftly. Such fighting is characterized by extreme dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in face of new situations.

Regular Warfare Expanded

As the Resistance War went on, the strategic role of mobile warfare became more important with every passing day. Its task was to annihilate a bigger and bigger number of the enemy in order to develop our own strength. The task of guerrilla warfare was to wear out and destroy the enemy's reserves. Therefore, mobile war and guerrilla war went side by side. Only by annihilating the enemy's manpower could we smash his big offensives, safeguard our bases and rear areas, and win the initiative. By wiping out more and more enemy, by liberating larger and larger localities one after the other, we could eventually destroy the whole enemy force and liberate our country.

In 1947, with the plan of operating companies separately and massing battalions, we began to move to more concentrated fighting, then to mobile warfare. In 1948, we made relatively large ambush and surprise attacks with one or several battalions. In 1949, we launched small campaigns not only in the North but also on other battlefronts. From 1950, we began to launch campaigns on an ever larger scale, enabling mobile warfare to play the main part on the northern battlefield, while entrenched camp warfare was on the upgrade. This fact was clearly manifest in the great Dien Bien Phu campaign.

Guerrilla and Regular Coordination

Once mobile warfare appeared on the battlefront of guerrilla war, there must be close and correct coordination between the two. This is another general law in the conduct of war. On the one hand, guerrilla warfare had to be extended to make full use of the new favorable conditions brought about by mobile warfare. On the other hand, mobile warfare had to be accelerated to annihilate large enemy forces, and concurrently to create new favorable conditions for further extension of guerrilla war. In the course of the development of mobile warfare, owing to the enemy's situation and ours on the battlefields,
entrenched camp warfare gradually came into being. It became part and parcel of mobile warfare, kept developing, and occupied a more and more important position.

The conduct of the war must maintain a correct ratio between the fighting forms. At the beginning, we had to stick to guerrilla warfare and extend it. Passing to a new stage, as mobile warfare made its appearance, we had to hold firm the coordination between the two forms, the chief one being guerrilla warfare. Mobile warfare was of lesser importance but was on the upgrade. Then came a new and higher stage. Mobile warfare moved to the main position, at first on only one battlefield, then on a widening scope. During this time, guerrilla warfare was extended but, unlike mobile warfare, it fell back to a lesser but still important position.

Maintaining Balance

On some battlefronts we met with difficulties because we were not determined to advance from guerrilla to mobile war. On others, rashness in speeding up mobile warfare had a bad influence on guerrilla activity, and therefore mobile warfare also had trouble. In general, however, the correct ratio of emphasis was maintained. The Hoa Binh campaign was typical of coordination between guerrilla and mobile warfare units on the northern battlefront. The Dien Bien Phu campaign and the winter-spring 1953-1954 campaign were also successful models of coordination.

Owing to the enemy's situation and ours, there appeared a system of free zones interlaced with enemy-controlled areas, intersecting and encircling each other. In enemy-controlled areas, there were also guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases. These zones and bases expanded as the war progressed, while enemy-occupied areas narrowed.

The strategy of long-term war and the principle of expansion from guerrilla to regular war were successful. Such were the basic strategy and tactics of the people's war in a small and backward agricultural country under the leadership of our Party.
PART IV

THE WEAPONS AND TARGETS OF INSURGENCY

The doctrines of insurrection and revolutionary war embodied in the selections contained in Part III must be viewed in the larger context of policies and programs aimed at bringing the underdeveloped areas of the world within the Communist sphere of influence. In the first selection of this part of the anthology (number 11), the noted American expert on Soviet strategy and military affairs, Raymond L. Garthoff, analyzes the role of unconventional warfare in Communist strategy for seizing power in emerging nations.

Since the mid-fifties, however, the Communist bloc has placed growing reliance on the skillful manipulation of trade and economic assistance in selected areas where it can compete on favorable terms with the much larger aid and trade programs of the United States and the Western world. Communist trade and aid in underdeveloped societies serve two somewhat contradictory purposes. On the one hand, they contribute to the economic strength and stability of the countries they serve. In the process this tends to strengthen the regimes in power, many of which are bourgeois, capitalist, and conservative, making them less vulnerable to a Communist-inspired coup or insurrection. On the other hand, the strong tide of anti-Western sentiment running in virtually all these countries, including even those where the ruling groups are pro-Western, provides an easy entree for Communist influence through the introduction of Communist technicians, consultants, engineers, experts, propagandists, and other agents. Moreover, the Communists usually manipulate trade and aid with a view to strengthening precisely those groups and classes which might later provide fertile soil for a pro-Communist insurrection.

In the second selection in this group, "Ruble Diplomacy in Underdeveloped Areas" (number 12), Milton Kovner, a leading student of Soviet economic policies, analyzes the purposes and character of the Soviet trade and aid programs. Number 13, "Psychological Aspects of the Bloc Economic Offensive in Less Developed Countries," by Doris S. Whitnack, State Department expert on the Sino-Soviet bloc's international economic activities, examines in greater detail the psychological and political payoffs the Communists seek in these countries.
Since Communists look on any emerging society, both by doctrinal preference and for practical purposes, as a disorderly complex of groups and classes competing for economic dominance, they naturally attempt to appeal directly to the particular interests, attitudes, and psychology of each group. In many emerging societies, for example, ethnic minorities oppressed by the ruling regimes are particularly susceptible to Communist influence. The Communist Pathet Lao, to select a conspicuous case, has recruited much of its strength from non-Lao tribesmen. On the other hand, the Meo tribes in Laos and some of the mountain peoples in South Viet Nam have been important bulwarks of anti-Communist strength.

The last three selections in this part of the anthology examine the psychology and practical appeal of Communism to some of the more significant groups and classes in the emerging societies. Morris Watnick's article, "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples" (number 14), advances the interesting thesis that communism addresses itself primarily to the intelligentsia in these countries, as the potential leaders of any revolutionary movement, more than to the discontented peasantry. "Communism's Appeal to Youth" (number 15), describing the worldwide character of Communist-organized and sponsored youth movements, has a special relevance to the emerging nations where youth, chiefly in student organizations, plays a commanding political role. Finally, the characteristics peculiar to labor unions in transitional societies and the nature of Communist activities among workingmen are examined by George C. Lodge, former Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, in "Labor's Role in Newly Developing Countries" (number 16).
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN COMMUNIST STRATEGY*

By Raymond L. Garthoff

Unconventional warfare has become all too conventional, even if it is not yet adequately understood. It is paradoxical that the coming of mighty engines of war that literally extend war "out of this world" and threaten violence measured in megadeaths should, in fact, lend strength to the resurgence of a kind of hostilities marked by poisoned bamboo spears, bazooka ambushes and civil war. In a recent article in these pages, the nature and dimensions of the problem have been thoughtfully analyzed.¹ In the present discussion, I should like to focus attention on a series of 12 propositions derived from study of Communist theory and practice regarding the seizure of power by unconventional warfare.

Our starting point should be the fundamental role that internal war and unconventional warfare play in general Communist world strategy. On that foundation, we can examine Communist views on the expediency of waging unconventional warfare under various conditions, and on operational strategies likely to be used in cases where it is deemed feasible and desirable. Finally, it will be useful to take a closer look at guerrilla warfare in particular as a technique, in past and future Communist practice, for waging internal war. Thus we shall move from looking at unconventional war in Communist doctrine to looking at Communist doctrine on unconventional warfare.

II

Very simply, "internal," "unconventional," "irregular"--"class"--war is of the essence of Marxist-Leninist theory, hence at least theoretically at the base of Communist strategy. We became so accustomed to Stalin's reliance on the Red Army and the Soviet intelligence services as the most conspicuous elements of force in international politics that it takes a moment to place in focus the older--and newer--more fundamental Communist reliance on maneuvering and manipulating power on an indigenous political fulcrum. This is my first proposition.


151
Unconventional warfare--our very use of this expression jars one by its contrast to the Marxist-Leninist conception of the conventional nature of internal warfare--may assume various forms, depending on the concrete situation, its opportunities and constraints. Although in other areas the Communists may resort to rigid design or overcentralized planning, when it comes to the application of force they show an acute awareness of the wide range of kinds of unconventional warfare available to them. This is the second proposition I would raise. To rephrase the point: Communists are flexible in waging varied forms of internal war, and irregular warfare is but one of the means.

Not all activity of Soviet, Chinese or indigenous Communists should be considered a form of internal war--though one can define the term broadly enough to encompass most of it. But the Communist leaders do assign a major role to active civil violence at a certain stage of development of the class conflict. For such countries as the United States, that stage may be seen only very dimly--or perhaps merely assumed--in a vague and distant future. But in volatile and unstable societies emerging from colonial rule or undergoing modernization without adequate tools for the job, internal war is expected to have a future--if it is not already present. Thus my third proposition is that the Communists expect, plan and wage internal war as the final stage of class struggle leading to the seizure of power. Internal unconventional war is above all revolutionary war.

III

Bolshevism arose as a revolutionary movement with international pretensions; its fundamental outlook was hostile to the existing international order. None the less, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to wage revolutionary war beyond the borders of the old Russian Empire, in the period from 1918 to 1923, Soviet leaders began to recognize the need to be more selective in choosing the time and place to conduct revolutionary war. Also, as the years went by, they directed their energies increasingly to internal matters. The building of "socialism in one country" marked an indefinite extension of the original compromise by which the Soviet Union proposed to coexist with the outside world. The avowed revolutionary ends have continued unchanged, but means have become increasingly important in themselves. As occasions arose calling for sacrifice either by the Soviet State or by the forces of the Revolution abroad, Moscow's decision has invariably been at
the expense of the latter. The subordination to Moscow of Communist Parties everywhere meant that the suitability of local internal war was defined in terms of the prevailing foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. And as a consequence, for over two decades Communist "internal war" boasted few campaigns and no victories. Only in China did an active revolutionary war even stay alive, and it did so by liberating itself from Moscow's strategic direction.

World War II brought new opportunities for building undergrounds and waging partisan warfare in many countries occupied by an alien invader. Local Communists (as well as other resistance elements), aided by the Allies, established strong forces in several countries. The Soviets themselves built up sizable guerrilla forces on their own German-occupied territory. At the close of the war, the Yugoslav and Albanian partisans were able to seize power with little opposition. The Chinese Communists were also immeasurably aided by the course and outcome of the war.

In the early postwar period, the sudden shift in the balance of power in areas on the Soviet periphery, and the not accidental projection of the Red Army into many of these areas, led to new opportunities for expansion of Communist rule by various means including internal war. Where Soviet occupation was prolonged, political and subversive techniques were used effectively to establish puppet Communist régimes. But beyond the shadow of the Soviet Army the story was quite different. A wave of attempts at subversion, rebellion and revolution struck in 1948-1949. Success in Czechoslovakia by subversive coup was not matched in Finland, and not even tried in France and Italy. In China, the Communists—against Stalin's advice—pushed on to take all continental China. But the revolutionary guerrilla campaigns in Greece, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia ended in failure; only in Viet Nam did such a campaign drag on to an important partial victory in 1954. Causes of failure varied, but one important general one was that the balance of power in the world had become stabilized anew.

In the current phase, since about 1960, there has been a new wave of Communist guerrilla efforts in Laos and South Viet Nam, a failure in the Congo, and a seizure from within of the successful guerrilla movement in Cuba. Similar efforts to take over other native, non-Communist rebel forces, for example in Angola and Colombia, are at present under way.
In summing up this brief historical review, we reach a fourth proposition: One of the key conditions for resort to revolutionary war, in Communist eyes, is the general world situation (as well as the local situation). And as a related fifth proposition: While the general strategic balance of terror today increases the dangers to the Communist bloc of resorting to direct aggression and creating Soviet-Western military confrontations, it reduces the risks involved in indirect, unconventional war.

IV

Communist strategies for waging revolutionary warfare place a high premium on the political content and context of a campaign. Some strategies, beyond the purview of this article, involve exclusively political action. Others involve infiltration and subversion, where the political vulnerability of the opponent is of cardinal importance. Subversion (which should be distinguished from agitation, propaganda, trouble-making and other overt or underground Communist activities) can be either a substitute for a revolutionary war or a complementary tactic in it, but in general it has not proven nearly as versatile a Communist tool as many of us tend to think. Subversion is usually directed against existing governments, but it may be directed against indigenous revolutionary movements, as in the Cuban case. Infiltration and subversion, political isolation and manipulation, and economic penetration all ultimately should—in the Communist strategy—lay the groundwork for the seizure of power either by coup d'état or by revolutionary war.

As my sixth proposition, I would advance the hypothesis that the Soviet leaders generally prefer the use of subversion, or other non-violent means, to the use of guerrilla war, because the seizure of power by indigenous revolutionary forces tends to make local Communist rulers too independent of Moscow's control. The only countries other than Russia where local Communist forces fought and won their own victories are China, Yugoslavia, Albania and Viet Nam (with Cuba as a quasi-fifth). All, with the uncertain exception of North Viet Nam, are today serious problems for the Soviet Union.

The Chinese—absorbed by their own internal problems and struggles with the Russians, smarting over the frustrations of continuing irredentist claims, and "on the make"—have not developed the qualms or subtle calculations which mark the Soviet attitude toward the means of extending Communist power. Maoism as an
export item has done well in Indochina; a number of other Communist Parties—especially, but not only, in Asia—are turning to China in the course of the growing division within the Communist movement. The Soviet leaders do not, of course, turn their backs on the theory or even the practice of national-liberation revolutionary war. None the less, my seventh proposition—companion to the sixth—is that the Chinese Communists are likely in the future to be the guiding spirit in most Communist revolutionary guerrilla wars.

In further support of this conclusion, I offer as my eighth proposition that Soviet experience in 1941-44 (and 1918-20) is not really relevant to the current problems of Communist revolutionary war. In Russia, guerrilla warfare was supplementary and distinctly subordinate to the actions of regular armies; it was national rather than class, and defensive rather than offensive in character. Communist revolutionaries today are aware of this inapplicability of the Soviet experience. Che Guevara states, early in his book "La Guerra de Guerrillas," that:

"For the proper analysis of guerrilla warfare, it should be noted that there are two different types: first, the guerrillas supplement the effort of a large regular army as in the case of the Ukrainian guerrillas; second, an armed group is fighting against an established government. We are not interested in the first type. We are interested only in the type where an armed group is carrying on a fight against an established colonial (or other) power."2

While Mao in the 1930s paid tribute to the Russian experience and to the theoretical contributions of Lenin and Stalin, he stressed that they could not simply be transferred to the Chinese scene because, as he put it, "there are a great number of conditions special to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army." The "laws of war and military directives in the Soviet Union embody the special characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army of the Soviet Union; if we copy them and apply them mechanically and allow no change whatsoever, it will also be like whittling down our feet to fit the shoes, and we shall be defeated."3 (A curious figure of speech, by the way, suggesting that the Russians couldn't fill the shoes of the Chinese.) Indeed, Mao had won leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in a bitter contest over the very issue of independence from Moscow. He therefore insisted that the Chinese experience in revolutionary war included important features and even "laws" of its own. This, it should be noted, also carries implications for the transferability of Mao's thought and Chinese experience to other countries.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has brought to the surface significant differences in the current Chinese and Russian approaches to revolutionary war. The Soviets have explicitly granted priority to the task of prevention of "war," for which the Chinese have attacked them. Under the pressure of polemical controversy with the Chinese Communists, the Soviets have refined their own conceptions and have been led to distinguish three different "categories" of war: world war, limited or local wars, and "national liberation wars and popular uprisings." Recognizing the disastrous consequences of general nuclear war, and the risk of such war in direct Western-Communist confrontation in limited wars, they oppose local as well as world wars. The Chinese are not wholly insensitive to the dangers of nuclear war, but they stress the "inevitability" of local wars in contrast to Soviet emphasis on "averting" them. The Soviets as well as the Chinese of course favor internal "wars of national liberation," so long as they are against the West. The divergence between them arises from the fact that the Soviets are more cautious than the Chinese in evaluating the risks that they believe the Communist bloc should assume in overt support of revolutionary wars.

In the most explicit and authoritative Soviet pronouncement on revolutionary war, Khrushchev declared, in 1961: "Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible, but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, including armed struggle." But it is clear from Soviet discourse and action that, while they surely favor such wars in principle and do support them in some concrete cases, this support is not unqualified or universal.

It would be incorrect to write off Soviet influence, interest and impact on Communist revolutionary war and warfare. Many well-developed techniques of Communist conspiracy are useful in this kind of activity. The Soviets have substantial relevant assets, and they have not forsown all violence. None the less, for guidance on the tactics and operations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, and for direct support, the Soviets do not have the experience, the doctrine, the cadres or the missionary zeal of the Chinese Communists.
The leading Communist theoretician of guerrilla warfare is Mao Tse-tung; the other two most influential writers are the Vietnamese General Giap and Che Guevara of Cuba. Without summarizing the development of Mao's doctrine on guerrilla warfare, nor reviewing in detail the Chinese Communist and Vietnamese experience, we should note some of the key political aspects of Communist doctrine for waging guerrilla warfare, and also some of the key related military tactics.

Almost all Mao's writings on military matters date from the period 1936-38. But in 1929, in one of his earliest pieces, he succinctly stated the political purpose of irregular, internal war: "When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence." One of the best known of Mao's dicta is the statement, "Every Communist must grasp the truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'" It is instructive to note the context of this statement, as it is not that usually assumed and ascribed in Western commentary. The gist of Mao's thought was that it was necessary in a revolutionary class war to implant and cultivate in the masses of the people awareness that they could, with gun in hand, seize power. Naturally, the Communist Party would lead them in this effort and harvest the result. But the idea was not simply that with military might one could take power; it was that the very process of revolutionary mass warfare could give invaluable political impetus to the military effort. This, then, is my ninth proposition: the Communists see revolutionary war not only as a means, expedient under some conditions, to seize power, but also as a means of building political support which will sustain power.

General Giap, in his recently published "People's War, People's Army," stresses that guerrilla war is waged for people, not for territory. Space is often traded for time, and time used for political advance. The "high ground" of most importance is popular support, or at least popular non-support of the incumbent authority. Mao considered this as cardinal. As he put it, "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people." This is probably true, with the important qualifications that the political
objectives must appear to coincide with the aspirations of the people—even if they do not—and that the people compare the revolutionaries with the incumbent régime on the basis of both their own experience and the net image that propaganda and information from all sides convey. Finally, apart from "aspirations," the popular reaction is strongly influenced by expectations as to who is winning.

Mao, Giap and Guevara all stress the importance of exemplary conduct in relations with the population. Mao, especially, warned against excessive or indiscriminate repressive measures. Ten years ago Giap repeated this Maoist doctrine, but gave attention also to a minor-key Maoist theme recommending selective terror against local representatives of the incumbent régime in order to destroy its control. In South Viet Nam, the Communist-led Viet Cong have in recent years turned to systematic selective terror against local government officials on a large scale. They seek by this means to intimidate those who could organize opposition to their activities, and to paralyze the existing administration of the countryside at its very base.

Turning now to the military tactics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, my tenth proposition is that the Communists have no "secret" doctrinal formula for success, but they do have considerable experience and a basically sound theoretical expression of their doctrine for waging guerrilla warfare. It is very difficult to summarize usefully the many relevant tactical concepts, especially those in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, but also those of Che Guevara. In 1942, the Soviets prepared a manual on partisan operations, and in 1944 added a chapter on the subject to their regular army "Field Regulations." But except for doctrine on combined and supporting operations for regular war, these are strictly technical and of little relevance to Communist guerrillas in other countries. Incidentally, Mao's chief military writings, and Guevara's, have only recently appeared in Russian translation.

Mao proceeds from the premise that "The principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy is the basis of all military principles." Measures to achieve flexibility and adaptability include dispersion and temporary concentration to achieve local superiority for sharp attacks before shifting to another point of pressure. The enemy is thus forced to disperse and is kept off balance. Guerrilla campaigns must be carefully planned and purposeful in terms of a broad strategic design, and yet susceptible to alteration in order to meet changed conditions. Bases should not be established if it involves pitched battles and position warfare to defend them. Surprise,
speed, secrecy, deception, initiative and reliable intelligence are all at high premium. Guerrillas, said Mao, should be "as cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits." Mobility, maneuverability, ability to melt into inaccessible terrain or into the peaceful population are important qualities in an effective force. I have already discussed morale and rapport with the population. Other necessary characteristics are discipline, ingenuity, Spartan living, ability to live off the land without excessive requisitions, and substantial reliance on captured arms and equipment.

Mao's concept of "protracted war" is now widely, if not always well, known. He advanced the thesis in order to explain the particular situation in China in the 1930s (though on occasion he also did assume a wider applicability), when neither the government forces nor the guerrillas were strong enough to annihilate the other. A protracted period was necessary to shift the balance to the revolutionaries.

The eleventh proposition: Guerrilla warfare, in Communist strategy, is only a stage in the growth of the revolution in a particular country. Usually it must be succeeded by regular civil war before power can be grasped. Mao categorically stated that "guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare." "In the course of the prolonged, ruthless war," he explained, "guerrilla warfare should not remain its old self but must develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: supporting regular warfare and transforming itself into regular warfare." Guevara likewise holds that "guerrilla combat is a phase of warfare that cannot of itself attain complete victory; it is important to remember that guerrilla fighting is only a beginning or preparation for conventional warfare."

In conclusion, I would note as my twelfth and final proposition: The future role of revolutionary guerrilla war in Communist strategy is probably more dependent on local opportunity than on anything else. The politico-military premises of Communist—chiefly Chinese—thought on revolutionary warfare is basically sound, as is their tactical doctrine for such operations. The most vulnerable point, then, is the local societies and polities which may be threatened. This is not a novel idea, but if our analysis of Communist thought and action brings us back to this point, we have at least discovered that there are no short cuts for either side—no basic flaws in the Communist approach, but also no secret weapon in their arsenal.
RUBLE DIPLOMACY IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS*

By Milton Kovner

Soviet interest in the underdeveloped areas of the world is a curious blend of Tsarist inheritance and Communist revolutionary mission. The legacy of Imperial Russian ambitions to secure control of the Eastern Mediterranean and to guarantee sympathetic, or at worst neutralist, states on its southern border is undoubtedly still present in Soviet strategic thinking. So too is the Communist conviction voiced almost forty years ago that "in the coming decisive battles of the world revolution . . . the colonial peoples will perhaps play a much greater role than we expect." But it is the challenge of the recent Soviet economic offensive in these areas rather than traditional imperialist or Communist designs which is potentially the most dangerous to the West because its motives are less understood and its goals less apparent.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to make explicit some of the political determinants of current Soviet economic policy toward underdeveloped areas within the context of the existing global competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Soviet Policy Toward the National Bourgeoisie

The Prewar Period. From the outset, Communist strategists have been faced with three important ideological issues in regard to underdeveloped areas: (1) what should their attitude be toward the national bourgeoisie in the East; (2) will the success of world Communism be dependent on the triumph of Communism in the East; and (3) will it be possible for the East to skip the capitalist state of development and pass directly from a precapitalist to a socialist mode of production. It was largely at the congresses of the Communist International that the theoretical positions which even today guide Communist policy toward the area were crystallized, and it would perhaps be instructive to review them briefly.

Comintern policy regarding the underdeveloped countries may be roughly categorized into the following periods: (1) from 1919 to 1920, when the Comintern considered the East only as an auxiliary in the imminently expected revolution in the West; (2) from 1920 to 1928 when the Comintern, having suffered defeat in the West, turned its attention to the East and urged full cooperation with the revolutionary nationalists there; (3) from 1928 to 1935 when the Comintern, as a result of the volte face of the Kuomintang and in spite of the absence of any immediate revolutionary prospects in the West, entered a phase of ultra-leftism in its policy toward the colonial countries; and (4) after 1935 when in light of the menace to the U.S.S.R. posed by the Axis powers, the Comintern once again urged a "united front" with all anti-fascist groups including the national bourgeoisie in the colonies.

(1) The Second Congress of the Comintern, 1920: With the prospect of immediate revolution in the West still uncertain, Lenin's position on the colonial question at the Second Congress essentially provided for two possibilities: if the West should turn socialist at once, then the newly emergent Soviet republics would be able to guide the colonial and backward peoples toward socialism without their having to pass through the torment of a capitalist phase of development:

If the revolutionary victorious proletariat carry on systematic propaganda among these people [i.e., backward colonial people], and if the Soviet governments come to their assistance with every means at their disposal, then it would not be correct to suppose that the capitalist stage of development is inevitable for the backward nationalities.

In all colonies and backward countries, we must not only form independent cadres of fighters and party organizations, we must not only carry on propaganda for the organization of peasant soviets, and try to adapt them to pre-capitalist conditions in these countries. The Communist International must also outline and theoretically explain the thesis that, with the help of the proletariat in the more advanced countries, the backward countries can proceed to a soviet regime, and by definite stages of development, to communism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development.3/

If, on the other hand, revolution in the West did not occur in the near future, then Lenin's second alternative, that of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie of the colonies in an anti-imperialist and democratic, if not a revolutionary and socialist, struggle would have to be chosen. "The Communist International," declared Lenin, "must be ready to establish temporary relations and even unions with the revolutionary movements in the colonies and backward countries." The Comintern could cooperate with
such movements for national independence. But where this was necessary there must be no ideological confusion. The Communist International must not amalgamate with it. It must "preserve the independent character of the proletarian movement, even though it still be in the embryonic stage." 44

The theses of M. N. Roy, an Indian representative at the Congress and a high ranking member of the Communist International, did not essentially contradict those of Lenin. But they were markedly different in emphasis. He questioned Lenin's contention that the Communist International should make temporary alliance with the bourgeois elements in the colonies. To Roy, there was scarcely any community of interest between the Communists and the nationalist movements aiming at the establishment of a bourgeois order. While he admitted that "the revolution in the colonies is not going to be a communist revolution in its first stages" and that "to overthrow foreign capitalism... it would be profitable to make use of the cooperation of the bourgeois national revolutionary elements," he argued that, from the outset, the leadership of the revolution in the colonies should be assumed by a Communist vanguard and that the "foremost and immediate task is to form Communist parties which will organize the peasants and workers and lead them to the revolution and to the establishment of Soviet republics." 45

The result of the congress was nominally a compromise; in fact, however, the theses of Lenin became the accepted basis of bolshevik theory and practice in the national and colonial question. The Congress concluded that "... Communists should support the bourgeois movements of liberation in the colonies only if these are really revolutionary, when those who represent these movements would not oppose us in our efforts to educate and organize the... masses... in the revolutionary spirit. When this is impossible, the Communists must oppose the reformist bourgeoisie." 46

(2) From the Second to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, 1920-1928: It was only after the much heralded—and generally abortive—Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku in the fall of 1920 that the Comintern, foreseeing no immediate end to the "stabilization of capitalism" already perceived by the second congress, began to give up its hope for an imminent revolution in the West and for the consequent immediate sovietization of the East. The tactical retreat necessitated by the delay in the European revolution which in Russia took the form of the N. E. P., in the East consisted of the adoption of the second alternative implied in Lenin's theses of 1920—that of support for all Eastern governments and political movements which showed a tendency to fight for the independence of their country from Western influence. Convinced that "the prospect of a prolonged struggle against world imperialism demands the mobilization of all revolutionary elements," the fourth congress of the Comintern affirmed:
"Aware that the will of a nation for political independence under varying historical conditions can be expressed by the most diverse groups, the Communist International supports all national-revolutionary movements against imperialism." 7

The fifth congress of the Comintern which met in June and July 1924, continued the line of its predecessors i.e., of a tactical alliance with the bourgeois nationalists. In a resolution which was included in the Theses of the Congress the Comintern urged full "support to the movements of all oppressed nationalities directed against imperialism . . . bearing in mind that these movements represent one of the most important phases of that great movement of liberation which alone can lead to the victory of the revolution, not only on a European, but on a world scale." 8

Thus, having been frustrated in the West by external circumstances which they defined as a temporary "stabilization of capitalism," and still convinced that "super profit gained in the colonies is the mainstay of modern capitalism and so long as the latter is not deprived of this source of super-profit, it will not be easy for the European working class to overthrow the capitalist order," the bolsheviks turned to the colonies in the hope of kindling national revolutions there and thus dealing an indirect blow at world capitalism. As the Communist forces in the West were driven back by the tide of rising conservatism, the outbreak of revolution in the East became an increasingly desirable goal. Communist Russia appeared to follow the tactical tradition of its Tsarist predecessor--foiled in the West, it turned its attention to the East while awaiting a more propitious occasion to resume its Western expansion. 9

(3) The Sixth Congress of the Comintern, 1928: At the sixth congress of the Comintern in 1928, a new modification of Communist policy toward the colonial countries was undertaken. The Chinese debacle had had profound repercussions; in light of Chiang-Kai-Shek's "betrayal" in 1927, all nationalist movements were viewed as potential enemies and traitors. Collaboration with the "national-bourgeoisie" was now banned; even cooperation with its left wing ("national-reformism") was forbidden. These movements were now pictured as wanting national independence only because it corresponded to their own selfish interests. But once independence was achieved, their fear of social revolution would lead them to regard Communism as their main enemy, abandon the revolution and surrender to imperialism. A radical change in the situation in the East, it was maintained, could be accomplished only through an agrarian revolution--which the native bourgeoisie could not carry out because their own interests were involved. "There is no salvation for them [the colonial peoples], declared the sixth congress, "except through alliance with the revolutionary proletariat, and through the victory of the world proletariat revolution over world imperialism." 10
A year before Stalin affirmed: "It was formerly the 'accepted'
idea that the only method of liberating the oppressed nations is the method
of bourgeois nationalism. . . . This legend must now be regarded as
disproved. One of the most important results of the October revolution
is that it dealt this legend a mortal blow, having demonstrated in practice
the possibility and expediency of the proletarian, international method of
liberating the oppressed nations as being the only correct method. . . .
The existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the
prototype of the future amalgamation of the working people of all countries
in a single world economic system, cannot but serve as direct proof of
this."12/  

A second doctrinal innovation, which perhaps reflected the growing
"bolshevization" of the Comintern and the increasing identification of the
interests of world revolution with those of the Soviet Union, concerned
the possibility of backward areas skipping the capitalist stage of develop­
ment and progressing from the feudal or semi-feudal phase directly to
that of socialism. Lenin had stated at the second congress that the colonial
countries could bypass the capitalist stage and use immediate Soviet
methods only if the proletarian revolution took place first in the West.
However, the sixth congress declared in its Theses that "in the epoch . . .
in which the dictatorship of the proletariat is already established in the
U.S.S.R. and is a factor of world significance, the liberation movements
in the colonial and semi-colonial countries . . . may lead to their socialist
development—withstanding the immaturity of social relationships in these
countries taken by themselves—provided they receive the assistance and
support of the proletarian dictatorship and of the international proletarian
movement generally."13/  

By 1928 the immediate post-revolutionary Marxist contention that
the bolshevik revolt in Russia was the somewhat fortuitous first step of a
world revolutionary process whose epicenter, indeed whose very salvation,
lay in Western Europe, had begun to give way to what has since been termed
an "Eastern orientation" in Soviet Communist thinking. As one observer
describes it:

The epicenter of world revolutionary equalment was
transferred from the industrialized West, where Marx's own
Marxism had placed it, to the backward, agrarian and colonial,
but increasingly rebellious East. The world revolutionary
process came to be conceived of not as an all-European prole­
tarian revolution on Marx's model, but as a long drawn out
revolt of the colonial East against European hegemony on the
model of the revolution in semi-Asiatic peasant Russia. 14/
The Soviet Union had in effect substituted itself in place of the West in relation to the underdeveloped and colonial countries. Lenin's original theory, according to which the construction of socialism in the West was a prerequisite for socialism in the colonies, was thus amended to state that the construction of socialism in one country, the U.S.S.R., was sufficient prerequisite for the same development in the East.

(4) The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, 1935: The importance attributed to the colonial countries in Communist strategy for world revolution was somewhat lessened with the developments in Europe. With Hitler's advent to power, Moscow was compelled to make a drastic revision of its policy throughout the world, and with it the line in the East was modified too. This change in emphasis was clearly manifest in the decisions of the seventh congress of the Comintern which met in 1935. In Europe the hostility toward all other political groups, especially the Social Democrats (hitherto termed "social fascists") was now replaced with an appeal to the "United People's Front" in opposition to Nazi Germany. The sectarian and radical Communist policy toward the East was also replaced by a "liberal" and popular front line; a decision to this effect was incorporated into the Theses of the Seventh Congress which stated in part:

In the colonial and semi-colonial countries the most important task facing the Communist is that of establishing and Anti-Imperialist People Front. For this purpose it is necessary to draw the widest masses into the National Liberation movement against growing imperialist exploitation, against cruel enslavement, for the driving out of the imperialists, for the independence of the country; to take an active part in the mass anti-imperialist movements headed by the national reformists and strive to bring about joint action with the national revolutionary and national reformist organizations, on the basis of a definite anti-imperialist platform.¹⁵/

The problem of the colonial countries was henceforth given very little attention and it was apparent that the main concern of the Comintern was protection of the U.S.S.R. against a possible attack by the Axis countries. As one observer has noted, the decade that began in 1935 was a completely barren one as far as the study of the contemporary East was concerned. With the exception of a few geographic and economic surveys, for example, not a single book was published on current affairs in the Middle East.¹⁶/

The Postwar Period. The Second World War brought with it a tactical suspension of outward Communist hostility toward the free world. But that this was merely a transitory phenomenon in Soviet foreign policy was evident once the danger to the U.S.S.R. had passed. In his "victory"
speech in February 1946, Stalin not only reiterated his faith in the familiar thesis of "capitalist encirclement" but reaffirmed the historical continuity of the struggle between the two camps:

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War was a casual occurrence or the result of mistakes of any particular statesmen. . . . Actually, the war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. . . . The fact, that the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism, that group of capitalist countries which considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets usually making attempts to alter the situation and repartition the 'spheres of influence' in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them.17/

In June of the same year Eugene Varga warned that "the fact that the Soviet Union and the greatly shaken capitalist countries showed themselves to be in one powerful camp, ranged against the fascist aggressors, showed that the struggle of two systems within the democratic [i.e. the anti-fascist] camp was temporarily alleviated, suspended, but this of course does not mean the end of the struggle." 18/

It was left to party theoretician Andre Zhdanov in a speech to the conference that established the Cominform in September 1947, to definitely crystallize the Soviet view of the postwar alignment of political forces and, incidentally, to provide the doctrinal framework for the ensuing "cold war." Zhdanov left nothing to implication; he reaffirmed the class struggle, the contradictions of capitalism, and the conflict between the two camps:

A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become the two major trends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-fascist policy. . . . Accordingly the new expansionist and reactionary policy of the United States envisages a struggle against the U.S.S.R.

The rigidities of Stalinist foreign policy during the first postwar decade also prevented a more realistic appreciation of the rapidly developing situation in underdeveloped areas. Not merely the growth of political influence but the extension of military control seemed to be the generally operative aim of Soviet foreign policy. The creation of a satellite empire
in Europe, the Soviet-inspired efforts against Turkey, Greece and Persian Azerbaijan in the Near East, and the encouragement of militant tactics on the part of local Communist parties in Asia, all reflected this postwar aggressive orientation of Soviet international policy.

By the end of 1948 Communist-inspired rebellions in Azerbaijan, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma had proved abortive. Moscow, now preoccupied with problems of its own economic reconstruction and with the economic and political consolidation of Eastern Europe, showed little active interest in the underdeveloped areas. Stalin steadfastly refused to admit the existence of a "third force," an "uncommitted country" or a "neutral" in the East-West conflict. He could not recognize the revolutionary implications of the newly won independence of former colonial areas in Africa, Asia and the Middle East and branded such freedom fictitious; satisfied with merely "formal independence," bourgeois-nationalist leaders were regarded as traitors to the national interests of their respective countries and could expect no support from the U.S.S.R. During the period 1948-1953 the Communist attitude toward underdeveloped areas differed little from the ultra-leftism of the early thirties.

With the death of Stalin, and a growing awareness by the new Soviet leadership that the destructive propensities of nuclear war made military ventures less effective as an instrument of foreign policy, the Soviet challenge to the West shifted from one of overt military aggression to a vaguely formulated and ill-defined "economic competition." With this change in tactics the "East" was "re-discovered" as a significant factor in the global struggle against capitalism. In terms reminiscent of Roy's theses in 1920, the future course of newly independent underdeveloped countries was regarded as "one of the central problems of modern times" and "the tempo of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale was [declared] dependent on it to a large extent." 20/ Faced with unfavorable prospects for conquest in Europe, and already having been frustrated in its reliance upon force and subversion to extend its control over backward areas, Moscow now viewed these nations on the fringe of Europe--virtually all of whom had emerged from colonial rule with an abundant legacy of anti-western sentiment--as the most fruitful field for economic and political penetration.

For the ideologists the change in attitude involved a retreat from insistence upon "no collaboration" with the nationalist leaders in the East to an acceptance of the fact that between the two poles of imperialism and anti-imperialism there was a "neutralist zone" in which the national bourgeoisie could play an "historically useful" role. This new modification in the Soviet attitude toward the national bourgeoisie was rationalized by one Soviet ideologist as follows:

168
Anti-imperialist activity might be led by parties and groups very far removed not only from the working class but even from the working population in general. These parties and groupings might set themselves, and actually do set themselves, as history shows, very limited aims. At times they tend to compromise with the imperialists. And yet for the Marxist-Leninist what is important is not so much the subjective tendency of the anti-imperialist action of this or that political grouping, party or even individual, as the objective consequences of these actions and their real historical importance.

Thus in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism in underdeveloped areas, "the national bourgeoisie is still capable of playing a revolutionary role, of upholding democratic principles." The writer hastens to add, however, that this support does not signify any "merging of the working class with the national bourgeoisie, any rejection by the working class of an independent political line, or its revolutionary programme."21/

A measure of the change of Soviet outlook is provided by Moscow's volt face toward Egypt. When the Naguib-Nasser regime came to power in July 1952, it was at first denounced as madly reactionary, cruel, anti-democratic and terrorist. After the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser was commended for having contributed a "great deal to the success of Bandung, supporting the principle of peaceful coexistence."22/

The case of Burma is not dissimilar. In 1953 in an article on "Machinations of Right-Wing Socialist Agents of Imperialism in Asia" published in Pravda, the Burmese Socialist Party in power was accused of having "installed their agents in the workers organizations, trying to direct the strike movement into the channels of peaceful settlement, organizing repressions against the working classes, striving to split its unity and endeavouring to suppress the movement of peasants who demand the confiscation of the land of landlords."

Three years later the same Socialist Party was hailed by the same paper as "... the fervent champion of Burmese independence."23/

The change in the Soviet attitude was even more pronounced in the case of India. Early in 1952 the Indian Congress was called a "Government of national betrayal." Three years later, during a tour of Soviet Asia, Bulganin praised Nehru as a man "... whose name is closely associated with the struggle of the peoples for peace and for the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence."24/