The machinery of government for handling the problems of counterinsurgency involves a great part of the total security structure. While certain aspects of counterinsurgency are subject to special organizational arrangements, the planning and execution of programs in this field form an integral part of overall national security policy.

Counterinsurgency is the concern of both the nonmilitary and military side of government. Among the nonmilitary agencies which play important roles are the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Agency for International Development (AID), and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The State Department's interest arises from the effect of potential or actual insurgency on the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives. CIA is responsible for national intelligence which may expose actual or potential insurrections, and for some forms of planning to deal with such situations. AID is concerned with economic assistance, both as a preventive and an instrument of government policy in counterinsurgency operations, including support of internal security measures and police. USIA's involvement stems mainly from its informational programs and support of U.S. foreign policy. In special situations many other agencies of government may have an important role to play though they are not automatically or necessarily involved.

The focal point within the government for policy and planning coordination in the field of counterinsurgency is the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) which was established in January 1962. This group includes the President's representative who serves as Chairman, the Attorney General, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Administrator of AID, the Director of USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This

* Adapted from a lecture by Lt. Col. Donald S. Bussey, USA, at the Army War College on 19 June 1962.
organization meets weekly on Thursday afternoon at the White House. Each member has staff support from within his own agency. Probably the most important function of the Special Group is establishing an awareness of the problems presented by insurgent movements and insuring the optimum use of available resources in preparing plans to prevent or defeat these movements in various parts of the world. It also has the responsibility for establishing broad policy, and insuring unified and integrated programs upon the part of government agencies concerned with the subject.

At the OSD level the staff elements mainly concerned with counter-insurgency are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. The Assistant for International Security Affairs controls the military assistance program, a key instrument in counter-insurgency operations. In addition, he provides the basic staff support to the Defense member of the Special Group, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Assistant for Special Operations is actively concerned in a wide range of activities, most of which have counterinsurgency implications.

From the standpoint of operations, the key Defense functions in counterinsurgency are exercised through the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense through the Unified Commands. Where military assistance is involved, the MAAG's also play a major role but the chain of command remains the same in order to coordinate the planning of operations and programming of military assistance.

On the JCS level a highly important new office is that of the Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA). Besides a deputy, executive officer and secretariat, this office is divided into three divisions.

The functions of SACSA are comprehensive and include staff support to the Chairman of the JCS as a member of the Special Group; analysis of policies, proposals and programs prepared outside of JCS; development and review of plans and programs; concern with joint doctrine and research; and coordination with other departments and agencies. While all the functions of SACSA are normal to the Joint Staff the transfer of these functions to a Special Assistant is an indication both of the importance presently accorded counterinsurgency and of a desire to avoid possible bureaucratic inertia.
Among the individual military services the Army has been the one historically most concerned with counterinsurgency. Since the Korean War particularly, there has been recognition of unconventional or special warfare. With the recent growth of emphasis in this field the Army, like the JCS, has named a Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare Activities.

The Special Assistant is also the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Special Operations. He has under him two directorates: Civil Affairs and Civil Defense, and Special Warfare. The latter is divided into 4 divisions: (1) Doctrinal Activities, (2) Materiel Activities, (3) Plans and Policies, and (4) Regional Activities. The Special Warfare Directorate handles unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and counterinsurgency. The Special Assistant, in his role with the Chief of Staff, is charged with monitoring the adequacy of U.S. preparations for cold war operations, to include doctrine and training literature, curricula of Army schools, training and orientation, personnel qualifications, intelligence and counterintelligence, materiel, and intra-Army coordination. The needed staff support for carrying out these functions is available in the Special Warfare Directorate.

During the recent Army reorganization one innovation was the establishment of a Remote Area Conflict Office (RACO) whose mission is that of hastening and coordinating all aspects of combat development relating to special warfare, counterinsurgency operations conducted by indigenous forces supported by the United States, and counterinsurgency operations conducted by U.S. forces. With the activation of the Combat Development Command RACO became a part of that organization, and was redesignated the Special Doctrine and Equipment Group.

In addition to these recently activated offices it should be noted that the entire Army staff is involved in various aspects of special warfare. To facilitate coordination the Special Assistant has an informal committee for special warfare activities consisting of representatives of comptroller, personnel, operations, logistics, research and development, intelligence, information, civil affairs, military history, and reserve components.
The U.S. Navy, like the Army, has a number of built-in capabilities for countering insurgency. Over a period of years it has assisted friendly foreign countries in combating subversive movements. Many of the Navy's General Purpose Forces deployed throughout the world are subject to being called upon for counterinsurgency operations. These include (a) amphibious forces which can provide "beach jumper" units, land SEAL teams, underwater demolition teams, Marine reconnaissance units, and Marine helicopters for indigenous troop and supply support; (b) attack carrier air groups which can provide reconnaissance, close air support missions or land dropping of personnel for infiltration or covert operations; and (c) submarines which can land personnel for intelligence and other types of missions.

Because of the inherent flexibility of its General Purpose Forces the Navy has not considered it necessary to establish separate elements to carry out counterinsurgency operations. It has, however, provided special training for personnel in this field in order to provide a quick response to possible requirements for training indigenous forces. It has also engaged in close and continuous study of all aspects and requirements for such operations. A Cold War Advisory Panel within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and parallel organizations within the Fleets as well as a CNO Unconventional Activities Committee have been established to develop concepts, techniques, and methods of value in this field. A Watercraft Panel, set up in July 1961, is currently examining types of small craft for guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare.

The Marine Corps has largely followed the example of the Navy so far as counterinsurgency is concerned. Responsibilities for carrying out the objectives of the national program have been assigned to the existing staff and command structure but no new staff section has been established to deal with the problem. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is presently the focal point for the Marine Corps on all counterinsurgency matters.
The Air Force, in organizing to handle counterinsurgency, has adopted the concept that existing Air Staff organization and staff agencies should take action in intra-Air Force and intra-Air Staff counterinsurgency matters. All staff sections discharge those responsibilities for counterinsurgency actions which are inherent in their assigned functional responsibilities. By this concept there is coordination and integration of counterinsurgency activities with other USAF plans and programs and a distribution of counterinsurgency knowledge and know-how throughout the Air Staff.

The Director of Plans is the single point of contact within the Air Staff for all non-USAF agencies. All counterinsurgency matters flowing into or out of the Air Staff to or from Non-USAF agencies are routed through the Director of Plans. The Cold War Division of the Office of Deputy Director of Plans for Policy is the focal point within the Directorate of Plans for counterinsurgency matters.

In recognition of the growing importance of this field and in response to the increased counterinsurgency workload, two new divisions have been established in the Air Staff. The DCS/Operations established a Counterinsurgency Division in January 1962 within the Directorate of Operations. This division is responsible for all counterinsurgency operational matters including such items as initiating action for planning and programming forces and equipment and developing counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics. The DCS/Research and Technology established the Limited War Division as the Air Staff focal point for dealing with counterinsurgency research and development matters. In addition, action has been initiated by DCS/Systems and Logistics to establish a counterinsurgency staff unit within the Logistics Plans Division.
U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

SEC/ARMY

CHIEF OF STAFF

DCSOPS

ADCOPS (SO)

DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL WARFARE

Doctrinal Activities Division
Materiel Activities Division
Plans and Policies Division
Regional Activities Division
U.S. NAVY ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

- CNO
  - OP-92
    - VICE CNO
    - OP-94 (Communications)
  - OP-01 (Personnel)
  - OP-04 (Logistics)
  - OP-03 (Operations)
  - OP-05 (Air)
  - OP-06 (Plans and Policy)
  - OP-07 (R and D)

- CENTRAL POINT
  - OF CONTACT
    - Reports consolidated training and readiness
    - Analyzes overall requirements and capabilities
    - Maintains liaison with CI agencies

- AID
- USIA
- JCS
- CIA
- AIR FORCE
- ARMY
- DOD
- MARINES
- ARPA
THE ORCHESTRATION OF A COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM

By U. Alexis Johnson

...Our basic national policy calls for the development of a community of free and independent nations, each evolving according to its own individual character and at its own pace. To protect less-developed societies from the threat to their growth posed by Communist subversion and insurgency, we are seeking better to plan and orchestrate the whole range of military, political, economic and social measures devised to assist the governments of the less-developed world to protect themselves. In this connection we must always remember that the primary responsibility for a country's internal security is that of its own government; we can only be of real assistance to governments that have the will and capacity to help themselves, for no matter how great the magnitude of our effort, it is still that of an outsider.

The main elements of our approach to this problem consist of four principal requirements, each of which embraces a wide spectrum of specific actions and measures:

First a political and economic appraisal—a searching and comprehensive analysis of the points of strength and vulnerability in the societies of the less-developed world so that we may see them in their totality as living human complexes. Only in this way can we suggest practical remedies. This means looking through a society rather than only at its outward forms; it means addressing ourselves systematically to the problem of when and how a developing society may be in danger.

Next is the development of measures designed to strengthen the vulnerable points of the society under attack and to remove or at least ameliorate those grievances and causes of popular discontent which the Communists exploit.

Third is the development of effective police and military capabilities in friendly countries to maintain internal security, to protect the populace from intimidation and violence, and to suppress subversive insurgency wherever found so that a society may develop in an orderly manner. This embraces our whole military assistance effort and the equally important public safety program of AID to strengthen and improve local police forces and constabularies.

Finally there is the mobilization of the local government's resources, effectively employed through political, economic and psychological measures, to support the military and internal security capabilities.

To implement these measures and make them successful requires a utilization of resources and an orchestration of effort to which many branches of our Government can contribute. Each element of an Embassy Country Team has a function to perform in assisting the local government to defend itself.

In most cases, the United States effort abroad will consist primarily of advice, assistance, and the training of local civilian administrators and police, paramilitary and military forces to improve the domestic internal defense capabilities. Because of the peculiar nature of internal warfare, its deterrence and suppression require a blend of military and non-military countermeasures and corrective actions. In a very real sense there is no line of demarcation between military and non-military measures.

Our civilian agencies have primary responsibility for formulating plans and programs designed to assist in dealing with the basic causes of unrest, to cope with those threats which have not attained military proportions, and to deal with the non-military aspects of those threats which have attained military proportions. The Defense Department and military services have the primary responsibility of contributing to the military aspects of assisting in the internal defense of friendly nations. The interrelationship of all these aspects is so intimate and, of course, so closely related to our overall foreign policy problems and objectives, as to require careful direction and coordination by the Department of State. We in the Department of State are very conscious of the responsibility which this totality of effort imposes on us.

In the field, the President has made it clear that he looks to the Ambassador fully to assume leadership and responsibility for an integrated and coordinated program of assistance and cooperation in internal defense. It is also the Ambassador's responsibility and that of the field personnel of the Department of State to try to develop a proper understanding of the factors behind any dissidence and unrest in the countries to which they are accredited. In this area, the service attachés also have an important role. Equally important, of course, is the perspective and judgment which we in Washington are able to bring to bear in evaluating the information furnished to us by the field.

With respect to our cooperation in strengthening the military and internal security capabilities of these countries we must utilize our military assistance program to assist in developing the military establishments of
these countries into effective instruments for coping with the real threat that may confront them. A country threatened by imminent or even potential insurgency cannot afford to perpetuate obsolete, though perhaps traditional, forms of military organization. In many areas local governments are confronted with the problem of breaking up conscript armies, organized along bulky regimental and divisional lines, into small units armed with modern light equipment which are capable of suppressing bandits and insurgents in remote and inaccessible areas. This is not an easy task because these changes strike at the root of long-established conventions, even at the promotion system. It is also important that the military establishments of these countries not be regarded or used as instruments of oppression. The search for civic-action projects must be carried out in such areas as road and school construction, sanitation, flood control, and communications to develop the unused potential of local military forces and bind them more closely to the population.

Great importance is also attached to the improvement of the internal security capability of local police and constabulary forces. These, of course, constitute the first line of defense against subversion, political violence and even insurgency. An effective police force, trained in public service concepts and employing modern technology, should be able to contain popular disorders without the excessive use of violence and also cope with conspiracy and subversion. Obviously the police and military assistance programs in any one country must be most closely coordinated as each must support the other. The successful British operations in Kenya and Malaya were essentially police actions, even though the units on occasion employed military tactics.

With respect to other programs, those of the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency are particularly important. In critical areas AID administers such civilian internal defense assistance programs as the police programs, the installation of village alarm and communications systems, the furnishing of emergency economic assistance to areas under attack, and the provision of technical assistance and guidance in such fields as transportation and sanitation. These specific measures are accomplished within the over-all AID program for cooperating in the development of economic and social conditions of sufficient strength and vitality to sustain a country's government and institutions. As the coordinator of both military and economic assistance, AID in Washington also exercises the important function of coordinating U.S. economic assistance and military civic action projects in critical areas within countries which are likely targets of Communist subversion and infiltration. This involves AID in the important task of establishing or rearranging priorities, for our resources are limited, and frequently urgent requirements of an internal defense nature must override a carefully worked out economic development plan.
The USIA plays an extremely important role in the internal defense effort by furnishing equipment and technical assistance to the local government in the field of public information and internal communications. One of the primary problems in less-developed countries is to achieve mutual understanding and a community of interest between the government and the populace, especially those living in outlying areas. In some regions, the dissemination of public information programs over the government radio, and the distribution of receiving sets to remote villages, may be the only effective way of countering Communist propaganda. In some critical areas this technical assistance function outweighs in importance USIA's traditional function as the arm of the United States public information activity.

We now come to the most sensitive area of all, which is the mobilization of effort by the local government and its adoption of measures aimed at eradicating or at least minimizing the grievances and causes of unrest being exploited by the Communists. Here we leave the relatively safe confines of military and economic assistance and enter the delicate province of a country's internal affairs. To bring about some degree of social, economic and political justice, or at the very least to ameliorate the worst causes of discontent and redress the most flagrant inequities, will invariably require positive action by the local government. In some cases only radical reforms will obtain the necessary results. Yet the measures we advocate may strike at the very foundations of these aspects of a country's social structure and domestic economy on which rests the basis of the government's control.

It is therefore our duty and responsibility within the formal limits imposed by diplomatic propriety, to persuade a government under actual or imminent threat of subversion or insurgency to take remedial measures before it is too late. This calls for the utmost skills of our profession for it is always a difficult task and sometimes an impossible one.

It is obvious that to exercise proper direction and control over U. S. programs as complex and diverse as those that I have described, each administered by a separate department or agency of the Federal Government, requires tight coordination both at home and in the field. It is the task of the Ambassador, working in close collaboration with the MAAG Chief, the USOM Director, and the Public Affairs Officer and all other elements of his Mission, to provide such coordination.
In Washington we have the additional task of coordinating our pro-
grams in many different countries, as well as departmental programs
within a particular country. Here we continually face the problem of
establishing priorities in money, material, and manpower, for our re-
sources are limited.

Despite the hazards and difficulties of dealing with such complex
problems, we have one great advantage which the Communists lack. In
virtually every country of the earth we are working in a voluntary and
willing partnership with governments and societies anxious to preserve
their independence and to live at peace in a world community based on
respect for the integrity of the individual. We cannot believe that such
ideals can be less attractive than the totalitarian images projected by
the advocates of a collectivist order.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE *

The Case for Logistics

In these popular emissions on guerrilla warfare a curious thing will be noted: practically all of the welter of words is devoted to the colorful and exciting combat or tactical side. Little or nothing has appeared in print or over the airwaves on the duller, less romantic, obverse side of the guerrilla coin: supply and logistics. This is not a new phenomenon.

Yet, from the very beginning of the military art many of its most knowing practitioners have recognized the vital importance of logistics. From the precepts of Sun Tzu, more than two thousand years ago, through the recognition accorded by such later great captains as Alexander, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and others, the indispensibility of logistics for victory in war has been unquestionably established. And in more recent conventional-war history, it must not be forgotten that American materiel and supply turned out to be the conclusive determinants in the winning of World Wars I and II.

More to the immediate point, guerrilla warfare that both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev apparently believe will be the coming thing during the next decade of logistics bids fair to become the same kind of deciding factor it proved to be in both World Wars. This is backed by the experienced judgment of such renowned present-day masters of the guerrilla art as Mao Tsetung and Che Guevara. The writings of both acknowledge and emphasize the decisiveness of the logistical role in guerrilla operations. In view of what happened in China and Cuba, these two should know whereof they speak.

Today, we are waging an undeclared but very real war in South Vietnam. We have irrevocably committed ourselves to the underwriting of a Vietnamese victory over the Viet Cong Communists, in order to save all Southeast Asia from a series of Red guerrilla takeovers sponsored and supported by Russia and Red China. Mounting evidence now indicates that logistics will once more prove to be decisive.

In logistics lies our one and only advantage over the Red guerrillas. In every other area, military and nonmilitary, they have a natural and inherent advantage over us. Logistics—as exemplified in the application to it of our technological supremacy, our genius for things mechanical, and our technical expertise and creativeness in improvising fast and effective answers for any logistical requirement—constitutes the American edge. There is now a growing American conviction that this edge definitely will win for our side in Vietnam. The prospect still is for a long and hard struggle.

Much remains to be done in the materiel and supply areas, and much, also, to be undone. The American Military Assistance Command is now busy retraining the close to 200,000-man Vitenamese Army from the conventional-war training of the past, to the entirely different guerrilla combat requirements of today and the future. In the same way, conversion from the classic logistics of conventional war to the decidedly "un-classic" ones of guerrilla warfare is a continuing "must." From the actual documented experiences of our pilot model or prototype logistical system now being tested in Vietnam come important recommendations and suggestions for further revision or adaptation of current supply organization, practices, procedures, and research.

The purpose of this article is to try to be of some help in these vastly difficult problem areas by focusing attention upon them and stimulating thinking in their direction. Examination of these logistical categories has therefore been made to show us where we now stand, and to show us where we now should be standing.

There is probably no better place to begin this scrutiny than in a review of the ways and means of supply employed in the Greek, Indochinese, and Cuban guerrilla operations following World War II. There are valuable lessons to be learned from each of them.

The Historical Experience

Even a cursory glance at post-World War II guerrilla campaigns is likely to prove startling in its revelation of the fundamental differences between guerrilla logistics and logistics for conventional war. One is inclined to feel that the distance between the two is so great that it cannot be spanned, and that, in Kipling's phrase, "never the twain shall meet."
Consider, for example, the tremendous differences between the nature and scope of conventional and unconventional logistics systems. Regular armies engaged in conventional war require vast and complicated logistical support organizations and the inherent problems make rear bases and secure supply lines essential.

Guerrillas on the other hand, have no such requirements. Their usual tactic is to carry out ambushes and small-scale attacks, after which they disperse and vanish. Typical operations require no more than a simple, highly mobile, 10- or 15-man unit needing only the barest essentials in supplies and equipment. Mao Tse-tung has said that the primary field of activity for guerrillas is the enemy's rear. "They themselves have no rear," he succinctly adds.

This is easily understandable. The very nature of guerrilla warfare and its purposes preclude, in the beginning, anything but the most elementary logistical support. The kind of combat operations the guerrillas engage in simply cannot be successful if the operations are tied to immobile and permanent administrative support elements. When this does occur, as it did in Greece in the latter phases of the guerrilla war there, the guerrillas immediately lose their peculiar and unique advantage—mobility.

In contrast to the basic differences between unconventional and conventional logistics, examination of a few of the better known guerrilla wars that have occurred since the end of World War II shows that all of them are essentially alike in their logistical patterns; they all show similar requirements, difficulties, operational methods, and necessity for living off the land. Above all, every guerrilla war reveals an ever-present and vital need for outside support from a friendly sponsoring government, or from sympathetic groups and organizations in foreign nations. There are, of course, variations in details, but these merely reflect the differences of the environments in which the actions took place.

The Guerrilla's Personal Creed: Austerity and Lightness

No matter who he is, where he is, or what his cause is, a guerrilla's immediate needs must be austere in nature and light in weight. This was true in Greece, in Indochina, and in Cuba; it is equally a fact today in South Vietnam.
Che Guevara, one of the leading strategists and logisticians of the Cuban revolution, has written what amounts to a "Guerrilla's Handbook." In it he lists in detail what is necessary for a guerrilla to carry besides his weapon and ammunition, in "his house on his back": a hammock, a blanket, personal canned food for reserve, special greases to care for his rifle, a water flask, general purpose medicines, tobacco, matches, and soap. Guevara goes on to say, "The life of a guerrilla fighter teaches safeguarding energy to carry the knapsack from one place to another and rejects everything which is not essential." Guevara further lists books, pencils, papers, and a sewing kit—only then adding, as a sort of afterthought, that if there is any space left in the knapsack it should be filled with food.

The Greek guerrilla operated with the same bare essentials. He was inured to hardship and his basic requirements were sharply limited. He subsisted mainly on a diet of bread, milk, cheese, lamb, and goat. Reports show that he had to make do without such ordinarily necessary items as salt, sugar, coffee, and tobacco. These were either entirely unobtainable or difficult to secure, and in consequence more than a few of the men suffered from their lack.

Equipment of the Greek guerrilla very much resembled that of the Cuban guerrilla—blankets, knives or bayonets, and firearms. As in Cuba, medical supplies were of major importance, and in the aggregate constituted no mean quantity.

In Indochina, during the 1945-54 war with France, the Vietminh guerrilla presented the same familiar picture. His daily ration consisted mostly of a handful of rice, a hunk of salted fish, and a lump of brown sugar. His clothing requirements were negligible, and at best comprised two thin cotton uniforms, a grey one for day, a black one for night. In his "house on his back" he carried ammunition for his arm, a hammock, and two yards of plastic waterproofed sheeting.

The above examples offer a startling contrast to the requirements of the average U.S. soldier in conventional combat. For the latter, 37 pounds of supply are needed daily—6 pounds of rations, 6 pounds of equipment, 5 pounds of fuel and oil, and 20 pounds of ammunition.

Where and How the Guerrilla Got His Supplies

Previous experiences in guerrilla warfare show that there are two principal sources of supply support for a guerrilla campaign. Generally, the local regions are relied upon for foodstuffs, clothing, and various other mundane items of equipment. For the bulk of the
war-making tools, however--arms, ammunition, communications equipment, and usually medical supplies--an outside sponsoring power is essential.

Even though the Cuban revolution at the beginning received outside support from several interested sources, a large portion of its supply came from Cuba itself. Many of Castro's followers were men in touch with the soil, who knew how to live off the fruits of that soil. At the same time, they exercised extreme care to insure that the local populace, which also had to live from the produce of that soil or starve, was not deprived of its share.

Thus, the Cuban guerrilla made it a rule always to pay for goods taken from a "friend" and to exert every effort to retain him as one. Maintenance of good relations with the farmers was particularly emphasized, for the farmers and associated friends were the guerrillas' only local supply sources.

Slowly, as more and more areas were cleared, farms were established to produce chickens, eggs, and livestock. The livestock was slaughtered and the meat preserved. The hides obtained in this way led to an elementary tanning industry which supplied the leather for the always necessary and recurring item of shoes. Salt, too, was vital, and near the sea, Castro set up salt drying basins to supply his troops.

The Cuban guerrilla leaders showed acute awareness of the importance of equality and equity in the dividing up of supplies among the men, regardless of the recipient's rank. Che Guevara makes a strong point of this factor in guerrilla warfare, especially when the items involved are in short supply. In the furnishing of food, for example, Che notes that even when distribution was taking place on a regularly recurring basis, the men were always "sensitive to justice and measured all rations in a critical spirit."

For particularly scarce items, such as cigarettes and tobacco, there was little or no "playing of favorites," and distribution had to be meticulously equitable. Responsibility for this division was almost always lodged with trusted individuals who were usually part of the guerrilla headquarters.

The Communist-supported Greek guerrillas likewise lived extensively off the land. Those operating over the thousands of square miles in the south and central portions of Greece obtained a high
proportion of their supplies locally. Normal procedure in the securing of food was to requisition it ruthlessly from the peasants living in the guerrilla-controlled areas. In addition, the Communist guerrillas obtained much in the way of foodstuffs, especially meat, by conducting sweeping raids upon villages and towns, during which they drove off whole flocks of sheep and goats.

It is axiomatic that no guerrilla uprising can succeed without the friendly support, or at least passive acquiescence, of the indigenous population. The ruthless supply practices of the communists in Greece incurred the enmity of the local elements and encouraged their resistance. This, in turn, proved an important factor in the ultimate expulsion of the Communist guerrillas from Greece. This Greek lesson was well learned by the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, who later applied it successfully in the Cuban uprising.

In items other than food, the Greek communists obtained much of their supply, including weapons, ammunition, and clothing, by raids on Greek Army and local gendarmerie stores. Here, laxness in supply discipline on the part of the Greek Army often permitted the Communists to make away with quantities of ammunition. An even more lucrative source was provided by the armed civilians, who, when confronted with strong guerrilla "persuasion," generally surrendered their arms and ammunition with pitiful alacrity.

In the beginning of the war in Indochina, before the Chinese Reds stepped in with their massive POL, munitions, and other aid to the Vietminh, local procurement was also the major source of foodstuffs, arms, and equipment for the latter. While the Vietminh had fallen heir to some Japanese equipment left over from the Japanese surrender in World War II, they depended primarily upon local production to carry them through the period during which their guerrilla and small regular army units were the only Vietminh operating elements.

Supply Trains and the "Do-it-Yourself" Principle

Past guerrilla history shows that as an uprising begins to succeed and progress, both the guerrilla operation and organization tend to grow and expand correspondingly. The need for outside aid increases, and with increased external support the supply logistical system becomes relatively more complex. In Cuba, to take one example, the Castroites ultimately had to organize regular
supply lines to transport supplies from their coastal receiving bases to the interior operating areas. All methods of transport were utilized—mechanical, animal, and human. Throughout the countryside the Cuban guerrillas maintained a series of houses, barns, and other innocuous-appearing structures as terminal or way stations where the supplies were hidden during the day, awaiting darkness for further spiriting away to their final destination.

In Greece, in spite of the large amounts of needed items obtained locally, it was not possible to satisfy all the requirements of the Communist insurgents by this method. Reliance also had to be placed upon supply from across the northern borders, particularly from Yugoslavia and Albania.

Those items essential to guerrilla operations which could not be procured locally, amounted to about 2 pounds a day per man. This added up to around 75 animal loads daily for the approximately 5,000 guerrillas operating in the lower half of Greece. It became necessary for the guerrillas to organize, route, and protect their primitive supply train moving from the northern base areas.

The difficulties of these southern and central guerrillas were greatest when the Greek Army was actively engaged against them. They were often forced to abandon stores that they couldn't retain while under attack. During 1949, the continuing counter-guerrilla pressure of the Greek Army so reduced the effectiveness of the communist supply system to south and central Greece, that it was rendered incapable of meeting even the minimum requirements of the guerrilla elements operating there.

Guerrilla forces operating in the northern regions of Greece had a much simpler time of it. Thrace and Macedonia contained rich agricultural lands; for the Communists, the taking of foodstuffs from these areas was very easy. Other classes of supply were procured and distributed so readily from across the border that foodstuffs were almost the only items for which local procurement was continued.

Roads leading from Yugoslavia and Albania not only were good enough to accommodate pack animals, but animal-drawn carts as well, and in a few favorable instances motor vehicles were able to negotiate them. This, plus the protection afforded by the fortified areas just south of the borders, gave the guerrillas almost unhindered freedom in the use of their supply routes.
Transportation problems in Indochina substantially followed the same pattern as the ones in southern and central Greece. They were acute enough to prove worrisome for the Vietminh to the end of the war. To overcome their distribution difficulties, the Vietminh organized labor forces of local inhabitants, which provided transport by coolie and whatever other means were available. These forces were organized into 15-man groups with three groups comprising a transport section and three sections forming a transport company. To insure tight control of these companies the Vietminh permitted only certain designated units and high headquarters to call upon their services.

Though the Vietminh supply and transport system was an example of elemental organization and primitive use of manpower, it did produce the kind of incredible effectiveness that always confounds the conventional military mind conditioned to the jeep, 2-1/2 ton, and halftrack. The Vietminh system, of course, required an exorbitant number of human pack animals. It has been estimated that one of their divisions, even in a relatively small and uncomplicated operation, needed almost 40,000 coolies to transport its minimum requirements. (If this 40,000 figure seems inordinately high it must be remembered that the bearers also had to carry their own food and other supplies when on the march.)

The porters could move cross-country in a way that the French, permanently wedded to their mechanical transport, could not. Moreover, these well-hidden supply columns of the guerrillas were practically invulnerable to air attack.

Vietminh logistics experts established a table of just what could be expected of their transportation system. Over relatively easy terrain, one coolie could do 15.5 miles a day or 12.4 miles a night carrying 55 pounds of rice or 33 to 44 pounds of arms. In rough going, the figures were reduced to 9 miles per day and 7.5 miles per night, carrying 28.6 pounds of rice or 22 to 33 pounds of arms. Buffalo carts were calculated to have a payload capacity of 770 pounds and a progress rate of 7.5 miles per day, while horse-drawn carts were able to haul 473 pounds over a daily stretch of 12.4 miles.

Such figures not only grimly remind one of Korea, but take one back almost to Genghis Khan. But they are more than intimidating examples of the kind of supply performance that in the Red-dominated areas of Asia can continue to be squeezed from human bondage today.
As indicated, the impressiveness of the individual capabilities becomes compounded from the military viewpoint because of the consistent ability of the Reds to apply to the individual figures constant multipliers running as high as the 40,000 bearers cited for logistical support of a single Viet Minh division. The American edge in supply and logistics represented by our technological supremacy, mechanical genius, and technical "expertise"—in addition to our vastly preponderant materiel resources—assuredly will now have to be ground to a razor sharpness greater than ever before. In the past several months, in the areas of supply/logistical planning, organization, and operations, much of this sharpening process has already taken place.

The Current Doctrine

As the preceding historical experiences in guerrilla warfare indicate, just as much planning, thought, and effort must be devoted to the logistical side of such unconventional combat as to the tactical one.

Guerrilla warfare is no child's play, romantic as the term may sound. It is a stealthy, silent, savage form of fighting. If the United States is to become as proficient in it as its fore-ordained role of sponsor requires, it will have to concentrate on adequate and accurate supply planning to a greater extent than evidence indicates it has up to now.

What Has to be Thought Of and Why

While guerrilla forces can be expected to obtain a portion of their logistical needs from local sources, there is a definite requirement for outside support in the form of specialized and technical items, and necessary logistic services which are not readily available within the local area of the guerrilla operation. Often, too, it will be necessary to provide essential items to certain segments of the civilian population. This will be true in such cases as victims of a resistance force attack, isolated centers of population, or with groups that have been relocated and concentrated for reasons of security. Providing this support raises many new problems for the sponsoring power.

Since there normally exists no experience data for the varying environments in which unconventional operations can be expected to occur, supply planning becomes more difficult. New consumption factors must be established. Basic loads must be modified. Stockage levels must be adjusted to meet local requirements.
Often a "double standard" will have to be applied in supply planning. This is due to the many differences usually found in the physical characteristics and cultural backgrounds of the indigenous forces, as compared with U. S. forces.

In many instances, items of equipment existing in the U. S. supply system will have to be modified to enable their physical use by the indigenous forces. The necessity for giving careful consideration to this factor has been well illustrated recently in Vietnam. Pioneer tools supplied by the United States have proved either too heavy for the average Vietnamese male adult, or too cumbersome and awkward for him to use. He cannot use the shovels because the handles are too long; he cannot swing the axes because of their weight. The levers and controls on heavy items of equipment, such as road graders, cannot be reached without undue effort by the slightly built Vietnamese. Their arms just are not long enough. Simple and obvious as such matters seem, for that very reason they are apt to be overlooked.

Planning must also consider the cultural environment, taboos, superstitions, ancient and firmly entrenched traditions, and the like. Howls of anguish and rage would arise from any attempt to supply a beleaguered and hungry Hindu settlement with canned roast beef, or a Moslem one with canned pork.

Anything that will reduce logistical support requirements, without reducing the combat effectiveness of the guerrilla fighter, should be pushed for development. Some examples are the need for articles serving multiple purposes; items which are compact, light in weight, and capable of withstanding unlimited unprotected storage; equipment requiring little, and preferably no, maintenance; and items needing no training before use.

Ways and Means of Materiel Delivery

Regions in which guerrilla forces operate are usually far removed from U. S. logistical installations. This distance, combined with difficult terrain, undeveloped road and rail nets, and lack of communications can raise many problems in transportation particularly when delivery needs to remain undetected. Within the area of operations, transportation usually must be met by whatever means are available there.

His own legs are the principal means of locomotion for the individual guerrilla, particularly in the initial stages of the operation. To move supplies, human bearers are used extensively, as are
indigenous beasts of burden. In areas with developed waterways, or navigable rivers and coast lines, the use of barges, rafts, sampans, and junks are advantageous.

Too often motor transport is of little use because of the terrain. The Greek Army ran into this difficulty. While under most favorable circumstances some motor vehicles could be used, these had little value in the mountainous country to which the guerrillas withdrew to nullify the Army's advantages in mechanized means of transport. When the Greek Army did follow the guerrilla, it was forced to change over to pack animals as soon as it hit the mountains.

While there were many causes for the French defeat in Indochina, both military and nonmilitary, one of the principal military ones was their inability to shake themselves free from the shackles of conventional logistics. Trackless jungle is simply no terrain for the movement of either materiel or men by truck.

Ho Chi Minh's success against the French was largely attributed to this inability of their motorized forces to move in the jungle. As guerrilla experts have often pointed out, there is a lot of difference between a small number of guerrillas trotting through the jungle with only their arms and a small bag of rice slung around each man's neck, and the same number of men sitting in a personnel carrier that isn't going anywhere because there isn't anywhere for it to go.

When terrain does permit motorized transportation, POL supply becomes an overriding deterrent; at the best it is difficult to obtain, at the worst it is simply not available.

Packaged Kits

All of the standard supplies and equipment delivered to the operational area are packaged in one-man portable loads of fifty pounds. The packages contain balanced items, such as a weapon and its ammunition; in effect, they are complete kits for immediate use. The weight limit of fifty pounds is important because it enables the removal of the supplies from a reception site by carrying parties, if no other means of transport are available. This is more often the case than not. To manage the load the packages are equipped with carrying straps or mounted on pack boards. Each package is waterproof, which allows outdoor storage.

Each package contains instructions written in the appropriate language, which are simply worded and well illustrated. An
inventory list is also added to aid in the identification of lost or damaged items. Finally, the pack is marked with luminous tape or paint, which permits the contents to be identified without the package being opened.

Coded Cataloging

In order to insure accuracy, and maintain communications transmission security, a coded catalog supply system has been developed. The system breaks down the items into general types of supply: chemical, demolition and mines, medical, weapons and ammunition, quartermaster, signal, and special. The system then uses a brevity code in which a single item or several associated items are identified by a code word. It enables the ordering of the entire unit or any single associated individual item. For example, the code name MARY JANE is given to a Quartermaster supply "unit" designated as clothing and equipment--40 personnel. The entire "unit" weighs 840 pounds and is assembled in 20 packages, each of which weighs 42 pounds. Code numbers are used to identify the specific items.

Belt-Lines and Fire Alarms

To reduce the impact of expected loss during infiltration and subsequent operations, as well as to augment the guerrilla with equipment he cannot carry initially, scheduled resupply by plane or helicopter is standard procedure. Such resupply is scheduled for delivery soon after the operation has started and is prearranged as to time, site for delivery, and composition. Unless the plan is canceled or altered, this automatic delivery continues indefinitely.

The frequency of resupply is restricted until there is reasonable assurance that the operational area will not be compromised by the plane or helicopter flights. During the initial period, one resupply mission per thirty days, for each committed guerrilla element, is the pattern. As the situation becomes stabilized, the frequency rate increases.

Emergency resupply is scheduled when communications from the operating guerrillas are interrupted for a predetermined period of time. The delivery site is known in advance, because it is always chosen and reported by the guerrilla detachment after it has infiltrated and begun operations. The contents of emergency resupply packages are usually limited to communication and survival items.
The operational and administrative focal point for guerrilla activities within a U. S. Theater of Operation is the Special Forces Operational Base. This base is responsible for preparing operational detachments for deployment into guerrilla warfare areas, and, after deployment, directing, administering, and supporting the guerrilla forces. The logistical responsibilities of the base are carried out by a logistical support element that coordinates the logistical support for all elements of the Base and the guerrilla warfare operational areas.

The Special Forces Operational Base conducts a continuing review of requirements. It provides a limited short term storage until the supplies are packaged and shipped to the delivery agency.

Aerial delivery packaging is accomplished under the supervision of aerial supply units assigned to the base, which utilize civilian labor if possible. The shipping of supplies, due to the packaging requirement, is also a normal responsibility of the Special Forces Operations Base. When a packaging facility is located at the departure point, however, the supplies are delivered directly from the communications zone depots to the departure installation, bypassing the base.

Supply Within the Operational Area

We have seen how the Special Forces Operational Base, one of the two primary sources of logistical support of guerrilla forces, should operate. Now, let us have a look at the activities of the second primary source--the operational area itself. It is expected that this source will provide the bulk of the support required by the area command. This includes local transportation, care of sick and wounded, various services, and those items of supply demanded for day-to-day existence, such as food, clothing, and shelter. During the course of operations, the area may even be able to provide limited arms and equipment as a result of raids on enemy bases or caches.

Each guerrilla unit is assigned a defined portion of the operational area, from which the unit receives logistical support. This subordinate area is usually satellited on an auxiliary region and receives direct logistical support from the auxiliary unit within that portion of the operational area.
Auxiliary units are composed of local civilians residing in the villages, towns, and rural areas. Unlike the guerrilla units the auxiliaries are not expected to move; they thus provide a stable support for the mobile guerrilla forces throughout the operational area. Since the auxiliary forces are self-sufficient and live at home, they are the natural and logical answer to the establishment of a local logistical system. They provide transportation and porters for the movement of supplies and equipment and often care for the sick and wounded. They establish and secure caches, collect food, clothing, and other items through a controlled system of barter, contribution, or levy. On occasion, the essential services required by the guerrillas, such as clothing and shoe repair, are also provided by the auxiliaries.

There are many methods, of course, for procuring supplies and equipment within the operational area. It must be emphasized, however, that any procurement program developed without regard to the needs of the civilian population is doomed. Hence, in dealing with the local civilians, the requirements for guerrilla supplies must always be reconciled with the vital needs of the civilians, if their cooperation and support is to continue.

Capturing supplies from the enemy is a fine way to avoid alienating the local civilians, but this, unhappily, is not a constant and reliable source. It should not be overlooked, however, that when guerrilla forces are able to conduct successful raids and ambushes against installations and convoys, they not only are able to satisfy many of their own logistical needs, but at the same time they reap the bonus of denying these same supplies to the enemy.

The success of the Castro guerrilla movement in Cuba proves that when most of the guerrillas' logistical support come directly from the local population, an equitable system of procurement pays off handsomely. Based on the ability of each family or group to contribute needed items, a levy or tax system can be established, and operated by the auxiliary units. As the earlier historical experiences in guerrilla supply show, it is a cardinal principle of guerrilla operations that the friendship of the indigenous population must not only be secured, but once secured, must be retained by every possible means.

While not always desirable, bartering, in some instances, might be mutually beneficial. Exchange of critical items, such as medical supplies, for food, clothing, or services might be necessary.
Purchase as a supplement to the levy system may be required to procure highly critical items or services. But there is always the danger that the resultant large amounts of currency introduced into the economy may have an undesirable and disrupting effect.

Confiscation is resorted to only in cases where there is refusal to cooperate or outright collaboration with the enemy. This method of procurement must be carefully controlled to prevent it from turning into indiscriminate looting.

The area command must be prepared to operate for extended periods of time without external resupply. The uncertainties of the weather and enemy action prevent timetable receipt of supplies from the sponsoring power. This necessitates caching supplies for later use. Since guerrilla units cannot retain excess supplies without decreasing combat effectiveness, this excess is cached in isolated locations, carefully hidden to prevent discovery. Such locations might be in forests, cemeteries, lakes, and other out-of-the-way and difficult to detect places. Wherever the caches are located, care should be taken to insure that the surplus equipment and materiel will be readily accessible and convenient for the guerrillas to reach and remove. If dispersal of these caches throughout the entire operational area can be managed, this will facilitate the operational flexibility which lies at the heart of any successful guerrilla operation.

Having examined the formal doctrine for logistical support of unconventional warfare, two things about it as yet unsaid, should be borne in mind. First, the amount of official doctrinal literature that is now available is discouragingly small and inadequate. It consists entirely of slender portions of two field manuals: FM 31-15, "Operations Against Irregular Forces," May 1961 and FM 31-21, "Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations," September 1961.

The second point to keep in mind is that these manuals are not logistical treatises on unconventional warfare, per se, that can be employed exclusively and entirely as such, without the need for consideration of complicating external factors. They are, in fact, manuals on unconventional warfare in support of conventional warfare—somewhat like a mustang and a percheron hitched together. For a successful continuing program of guerrilla warfare, the mustang must be unhitched from his massive and unwieldy companion.
This being so, the logistics experience and knowledge being acquired daily in South Vietnam from the Communist Viet Cong operations, and from our own as the sponsoring power in support of the legitimate Ngo government, may provide an illuminating contrast.

The Vietnam Pilot Model

The current strategy of the Viet Cong Communists differs little from the strategy the Viet Minh employed in their successful war with France. The Viet Cong depends upon sympathetic local support in South Vietnam and outside sponsorship from North Vietnam, which, in turn, receives the support of Red China and the Soviet Union. This is the classical guerrilla warfare formula.

Opposing the Viet Cong, and trying to prevent a Red takeover of South Vietnam, is the legitimate Ngo Government and its almost 200,000-man Army. For years this force has been supplied, equipped, and trained by the U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups in accordance with the classic concepts of conventional warfare.

Now this is being changed rapidly. As the outside sponsor of the Vietnamese government—in the same sense that Russia and Communist China are the Viet Cong's sponsors through North Vietnam—we have replaced our advisory group with a new Military Assistance Command, under General Paul D. Harkins.

On the sound theory that to fight a guerrilla successfully one must be a guerrilla, General Harkins has been assigned the job of retraining the Vietnamese Army to the concepts, tactics, and logistics of guerrilla warfare, as well as acting—somewhat euphemistically—in an "advisory" capacity to the Vietnamese on the conduct of their anti-guerrilla operations.

For these, as well as other reasons, the logistical problems of the Viet Cong and our Military Assistance Command stand in sharp contrast.

Viet Cong Logistics

Supply problems of the Viet Cong show marked similarity to those experienced by the Vietminh. The Communists still appear to lack a single supply route capable of handling massive quantities of materiel and arms from the north. The series of paths and trails running north and south through the mountains, the famed Ho Chi
Minh Trail, remain in much the same condition and are still inadequate for continuous heavy shipments.

The sea route from North Vietnam to the south is a possible supply line for bringing in heavy items, but examination of captured items reveals that the Viet Cong have not been using this method extensively, since the captured articles, for the most part, are crude, homemade affairs, or of French and American make. In the event they should resort to this route they would run into difficulty for the U. S. Navy is patrolling these waters.

It is evident that for weapons, ammunition, scarce medical supplies, and the greatly coveted communications equipment, the Viet Cong guerrillas depend heavily on surprise raids on the better equipped and relatively modernized South Vietnamese Army. In fact, much evidence points to entire Communist actions being planned with that sole objective in mind.

As for food and other noncombat items, the Viet Cong guerrilla is living off the land and the local peasants. This is a relatively dependable source of support since there are numerous areas in South Vietnam where the population is in active support of the Viet Cong and more than hostile to the Government and its officials.

The situation is analogous to the one that existed in Malaya following World War II. Relocating entire villages and communities to centralized locations which could be lightly fortified and protected was one way the British solved the problem there. They instituted a stringent food rationing system in their attempt to cut the Communist guerrilla off from his supply source. In badly infested areas the British went so far as to establish central kitchens and communal dining areas in this starve-out-the-guerrilla strategy. It was a successful move in Malaya and contributed materially toward defeating the enemy.

The strategic hamlets we are experimenting with in Vietnam today are based on this British plan. It is a drastic measure though and makes exorbitant manpower demands, as it takes men to enforce regulations, search abodes for surplus foods and caches, intercept smugglers, and keep up a constant patrol. But in Malaya it was worth it and there is every reason to expect it will prove to have similar value in Vietnam.
On the other hand, there are other areas in South Vietnam where the local support for the Viet Cong guerrillas is not so dependable or easily obtained—the Mekong Delta Plaine des Joncs zone, for example. Here the guerrillas are finding it necessary to resort to raids on farms and villages. This is hardly likely to engender friendship and cooperation on the part of the local villages and peasants.

In some places the Viet Cong is having to grow its own produce. It has been reported that some of the bands of guerrillas operating here have their own herds of water buffalo, which move with them. When it comes time to eat, they slaughter two or three and feed the troops.

As of this writing, there are reports that supply by air-drop from North North Vietnam is being stepped up, which could indicate that the Communists are preparing for new mass assaults, using supply techniques which proved so successful for them in Laos.

Unidentified aircraft, in groups up to five, have appeared at night over Piekhu and Kontum provinces. The Montagnards, hill people living in the remote valleys and on the hillsides of the high plateaus, have reported to missionaries regular and numerous air-drops in recent months. It can be assumed also that cadres are being parachuted to Viet Cong bands hiding in secure bases in the nearby, but formidable, mountains. American intelligence in Vietnam has not been able to get confirmation of these flights, but the Vietnamese officials feel certain that the air-drops have been going on with mounting tempo for a nine-month period.

The New American Approach

Our currently stepped-up military aid to the Vietnamese government forces seems to reflect, at last, the knowledge that to equip indigenous forces to the point where they mirror our own spanking conventional combat units does little more than stimulate local pride and pander to doctrinaire military thinking. We seem to have finally taken to heart the advice offered by Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, in a speech at the U. S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on November 1, 1961. At that time General Lansdale pleaded:
"Dare to win this conflict . . . falling back into safe and comfortable bureaucratic conformity with the past can only help the enemy. We still have our General Braddock types who want to do it yesterday's way. We must convince them that it will take enlightened progress to succeed in this great conflict which has its own unique rules."

It would appear that "they" have been convinced, and have accepted the fact that it takes a guerrilla to catch a guerrilla.

This does not mean to suggest that past military assistance to Communist threatened countries has been entirely ineffective. But it does mean that for the most part such aid has been confined to conventional military assistance programs administered by conventional military assistance advisory groups. The program has attempted to aid in the development of indigenous capabilities and has been successful in many areas.

In South Vietnam, for example, under the guidance of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, the Vietnamese established an Army clothing manufacturing plant which provides nearly all the uniform item requirements for the South Vietnam Army. Indeed, the MAP and MAAG programs have accomplished a great deal, but today it is not enough.

Today, the U. S. is committed to helping the Vietnam government develop, organize, equip, and train the troops of that country, in the conduct of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency operations. To this end the military aid has been greatly intensified. Tremendous quantities of specialized weapons, materiel suited to the South Vietnamese environment, and equipment compatible with the Vietnamese soldier, are being shipped into Vietnam to bolster and modernize its Army.

New shipments of gear are arriving at an ever-accelerating rate. American cargo ships are delivering tons of military trucks, jeeps, and small arms for the village militia, and submachine guns and communications and maintenance equipment for the Vietnamese rangers. POL is being brought in by civilian contractor tanker ships, moved inland by tanker trucks, and then stored in 55-gallon drums.
And here at home and elsewhere, we are intensifying and accelerating the training of our own special forces in guerrilla warfare operations in order to train, in turn, the Vietnamese Army and turn them into the hard and tough guerrillas they must be if they are to be successful in their struggle with the Communist Viet Cong.

As Defense Secretary McNamara told the Senate Committee on Armed Services in January of this year, "We have made a good start on building up the specialized forces required to cope with covert military aggression, guerrilla warfare, etc., and we are pressing forward with the development of the specialized equipment and weapons required by such a force."

Today's Items and Tomorrow's

As evidence of the accuracy of his statement, funds for the research and development of the specialized items he referred to were increased in FY 1962 to $20.5 million and are expected to jump by an approximate 55 percent in FY 1963.

One of the main areas of interest in this program is concerned with weapons that are both light and silent. A deadly nylon miniature rocket, slightly larger than a toothpick is in the mill. This is something one would expect to find more in Dick Tracy than in a military supply system. All types of silencers for the various guns are being developed. Even devices similar to the zip guns, used so effectively in the gang wars of our own big city streets, are being studied. The Special Forces School at Fort Bragg teaches methods of making an expedient zip gun out of such simple articles as springs, metal pipe, and tenpenny nails.

Specialized demolitions and explosives that can be disguised as innocuous and harmless household articles, such as soap, or a can of lard, are coming off the drawing boards.

Miniature and compact communications equipment, capable of being hidden in coolie baskets and other innocent-appearing hiding places are being developed.

Two interesting chemical items have been developed and are being tried out in actual combat situations. One is an experimental defoliant, intended to strip the leaves from the jungle foliage that provides such excellent cover for the Viet Cong. Such a defoliant will aid tremendously in stopping ambushes.
The other chemical item has a comic strip ring to it also. This item is a hand grenade filled with a fluorescent powder, visible only under an infrared device. During an attack or raid on the part of a guerrilla band it can be thrown into their midst. The powder adheres to their clothing and exposed portions of skin. It is not noticeable and takes days to wear off.

Later, after the band of guerrillas has dispersed and melted into the community, a team with the infrared device makes a thorough search of the area. The team is able to pick out participants in the raid or attack, including ring leaders and key men of the Viet Cong.

Another interesting item is designed to support psychological warfare activities. It is a specialized typewriter which will print propaganda leaflets in the Asiatic languages.

The development of lightweight jungle hammocks has a high priority. This was the item Che Guevara emphasized so strongly, explaining that a guerrilla could always find two trees to sling it between, thereby getting a few hours of probably much needed and precious sleep, high and dry. Another guerrilla item, the knapsack, or "the house on his back," has already been designed. It is extremely lightweight, having an aluminum frame, and is durable.

With Southeast Asia particularly in mind, a new jungle uniform has been devised. The hat is broad-brimmed, and equipped with a nylon netting to protect the face from the vicious and persistent insects. The cotton poplin paratrooper uniform is reminiscent of the World War II design with its slant pockets and the trousers tucked into the boots.

The present jungle boots were designed and developed from actual experience data and requirements from operations in Southeast Asia as well as from the jungle fighting experiences of World War II. These new boots are constructed of thick rubber soles, molded to a lightweight nylon cloth top; no leather is used since it rots quickly in jungles. Molding the soles and heels directly to the uppers has virtually eliminated the necessity for sole repair, a minor but troublesome matter mentioned in all guerrilla writings.

Much more important, the soles of these boots have steel mesh liners built into them to block the penetration of the devilish poisoned spikes and sharpened bamboo spears, used by the Viet Cong guerrillas on the paths and trails to their defensive positions. To help solve the
problem of wet feet, the boots have drainage holes at the sole level. This enables the men to slosh through swamps, and after a 30-minute or so walk on dry land, find their feet reasonably dry.

With the technical aid of military advisors, the Vietnamese Army is developing a field ration suitable for its own soldiers. It will consist mostly of canned fish and rice.

Officers recently returned from Vietnam have reported increased requirements for conventional items already in our supply system. A few such items mentioned are barbed wire, concrete, search lights, and sentry dogs. This small listing speaks eloquently of the type of warfare being waged today in South Vietnam.

Jungle St. Bernard

Conventional supply procedures necessarily are being modified drastically in Vietnam. Because roads are poor or nonexistent, there can be no conventional convoy system. Where they do exist, and are trafficable, there is always the rightly feared guerrilla ambush. The problems in resupplying operating patrols, defensive outposts, and isolated and besieged units are very real, but they are being solved to a considerable extent by that "St. Bernard of the Jungle," the helicopter.

While much has been written of the helicopter's use in combat—surprise strike attacks in attempts to surround bands of guerrillas located through the patrols—little has been heard of the helicopter's use for supply purposes. The logistical value of the helicopter is just as great as its tactical value.

Employment of the helicopter for supply purposes was first tried by the British in Malaya. Confronted by conditions and circumstances similar to those in Vietnam, they experimented with the "chopper" and found it a highly satisfactory solution. We seem to have profited well from their experience, for the United States Army has, operating in Vietnam today, three or more beefed-up helicopter companies performing in a highly effective and competent fashion. In otherwise inaccessible terrain they are dropping and landing vitally needed supplies; they are rescuing and evacuating trapped and wounded detachments; and they are ferrying fighting troops to join battle with the Viet Cong, once the latter have been flushed by the patrols or located through intelligence.
If any proof were needed of the usefulness and versatility of these ungainly "whirlybirds" it could be found easily in South Vietnam.

The "chopper" does have one large disadvantage which must always be considered. It is a noisy bird, and noise can easily compromise an otherwise completely secret operation by giving the Viet Cong sufficient advance notice to make their getaway. This is why patrols on a mission of search cannot expect resupply until they have completed their mission, and this could run anywhere from five to thirty days. They are stripped to the barest essentials. Their rations are minimal. Austerity must be their watchword and to survive they have to be extremely capable of living by their wits.

It is in this area that a supply missile might provide the answer to the noisy helicopter. The "Lobber" concept of delivery of minimum essential supplies to isolated units without enemy interference, regardless of weather or terrain conditions, seems to have anticipated guerrilla warfare operations by many years.

The "Lobber" is the brainchild of Lt. General Andrew T. McNamara, formerly The Quartermaster General, and now Director of the vast Defense Supply Agency. General McNamara conceived the idea for the Lobber as a result of his experience with the First Army in Europe during World War II when the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, was beleaguered by the Germans, on a hill around Mortain.

General McNamara recalled the unusual improvisation of the 230th Field Artillery Battalion--joined later by the 732nd Tank Battalion and the 113th Field Artillery Battalion--in firing shell cases (normally employed for propaganda leaflets) filled with bandages, adhesive tape, morphine, and other medical supplies. While this was not the only instance of this kind of a supply shoot to troops surrounded by the enemy, it was a rare example because it was one that was successful.

Such a missile, with its own rocket power, and parachute retardation device, could provide fast, simple, and effective delivery to guerrilla patrols with minimum danger of revealing their area of operation to the enemy. In the stepped-up anti-guerrilla action in Vietnam today, an operational supply missile would indeed represent a "long leap forward" to borrow a phrase from the Chinese Reds--who, incidentally, do not seem to be doing much "leaping" these days.
The Guerrillas Are Coming

There is little doubt but that we can solve the logistical problems inherent in unconventional warfare. We have the advantage of being able to study past failures and successes. We have access to carefully documented advice from victorious guerrilla leaders, and we have a proving ground in Vietnam. This wealth of experience and knowledge to draw upon, combined with the ingenuity and resources of this country, should enable us to come up with a flexible, responsive, and practical logistical system that can be applied in any counter-insurgency or guerrilla warfare operation in any corner of the world.

Mao has stated unequivocally that anti-guerrilla warfare is impossible—that it cannot prevail because it is in essence a contradiction in terms. He seemingly has forgotten Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. And he may well be making the warrior's greatest mistake: underestimating the adversary—in this case the not unformidable United States of America.

Yet, the day may come when we may have to try and prove Mao's point. After all, it must be admitted that anti-guerrilla campaigns are essentially "holding operations." They are negative, not positive, actions, defensive rather than offensive ones.

As long as the Soviets and Red Chinese continue to follow their present policy of sponsoring and supporting Communist guerrilla or insurgency movements in all the peripheral areas of the globe, it is hard to see how such "anti" action alone can in the long run win against them. For what will it profit the free world, including ourselves, to push back the Communist menace in one place, if, like a squeezed amoeba, it immediately protrudes in another? The time may come when we will have to stop "holding" and do some "harassing," in true guerrilla-style, on our own. Ultimately we may have to show by support of guerrilla and insurgency movements ourselves that we agree with Mao's dictum that a guerrilla is a guerrilla, is a guerrilla—whether in South Vietnam or behind the iron and bamboo curtains.

But whether we continue to hold for a period, or go over to guerrilla offensives in the not too distant future, both Mao Tse-tung and Premier Khrushchev should take heed: in all the soft spots where they are challenging the free world the word is seeping through: "the guerrillas are coming." American guerrillas. Both tactical and logistical ones. To stay. To win.
COUNTERINSURGENCY THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE*

My remarks today are intended to give you an understanding of the role of the Military Assistance Programs conducted by the Department of Defense in countering Communist-inspired, supported or exploited insurgent movements.

The basic objectives of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) --which are as constant as the means are variable--are all encompassed in its single, changeless purpose: "to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States." The practical means by which military assistance serves that purpose is a program designed to enhance the contribution of our free world allies to the common defense posture which undergirds both our own and the collective security of more than 60 sovereign nations. By providing those allies with equipment and training necessary to fill the gap between what they can do for themselves and what must be done to protect our mutual interests, the Military Assistance Program helps to create and maintain that military strength on the worldwide frontiers of freedom which gives us both a first chance and a second choice in responding to attempted Communist aggression.

The importance of that military strength to our own national security was emphasized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

I look upon military assistance to our allies as adding strength and depth to the military posture of the United States. It enables our allies to organize, train and equip units which enhance the capability of the free world to meet the challenge of Communist aggression and subversion. No amount of money spent on our forces could give the United States a comparable asset of trained, well equipped forces familiar with the terrain, and in a suitable position for immediate resistance to local aggression.

To give you some idea of how we deal with the problem of what military assistance can and should do, and of what it should consist, let me explain how we have grouped recipient countries into three categories which, although not precise or mutually exclusive, do provide a key to the problem.

In the first category, which might be called the single-threat countries, belong the underdeveloped areas of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. Although these nations are not contiguous to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Communist words and actions have shown some of them to be targets for indirect or internal aggression—the now familiar pattern of penetration, infiltration, subversion, dissidence and guerrilla warfare. The primary requirement in these areas is for economic and social progress and the establishment of stable governments which recognize the need for a better life for their peoples. While economic aid programs contribute directly to this development—sometimes referred to as "nation building"—a minimum amount of military assistance is also of importance in some cases to strengthen the internal security forces. It is clearly desirable that such forces have the means to cope with indirect aggression and maintain a climate of confidence and stability prerequisite to economic and social progress. Accordingly, in the event that our military assistance is requested, the United States would be prepared to consider seriously programs involving primarily the provision of small arms, transportation, communications and training consistent with the secondary role which the United States expects to play in military assistance to former colonies and to other nations as well.

In the second category, which we refer to as the double-threat countries, belong those nations contiguous to or uncomfortably near the Communist Bloc which confront a direct threat from without as well as an indirect threat from within. Such nations—and Viet-Nam is, of course, a striking example—must have major armed forces in order to provide a deterrent against a really massive external attack. Mr. Khrushchev may have said that what he called local wars were unlikely, but the fact remains that he and the Communist Chinese particularly have major forces poised all along the frontiers of the free world. If we do not keep up an adequate defense in these strategically vulnerable areas, the temptation to attack might again become irresistible as it did in Korea; hence, the inescapable need to maintain sizable effective combat-ready forces in the double-threat countries, and the related
requirement for substantial military assistance. Our problem with respect to such countries involves two major issues. One is the balance of our economic and military assistance programs which, to some extent, compete with each other both for dollars in Washington and for local currency in the country itself. The second issue is the problem of emphasis within MAP. Are we adequately providing for the internal security? Are we, as some critics have charged, over-stressing quantitative strength and conventional organization at the expense of sorely needed counter-guerrilla capability?

The answers to these questions vary not only from country to country, but also with changes in the international situation. The only thing that does not change is our continuous effort, by constant review of all pertinent factors, to find the best answer in each individual case---the answer which will provide the greatest possible increment to the common defense posture and collective security of the free world.

The third category of recipient countries, those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is a special case because of the continuing and direct threat posed by Soviet military power. This is, however, primarily a threat of overt action by regular military forces, on a massive scale, rather than of insurrection or even, given the internal political stability of our European allies, of subversion. Our military assistance programs in Europe, now confined largely to Greece and Turkey, are therefore not directly relevant to the problem of countering Communist-inspired insurgency.

All of the three categories I have mentioned include countries with which we have bilateral mutual security arrangements, and many of these countries are also associated with us in regional defense organizations. Both types of alliance are essential to the strength and solidarity of the free world's common defense posture, and each serves a specific purpose. The bilateral structure, however, is basic to what we are trying to do under the Military Assistance Program because the United States is the hub of the entire collective security system. In order to promote the basic objectives of MAP, we have entered into bilateral arrangements with almost all of the nations on the periphery of the Communist Bloc. These bilateral arrangements might be compared to the spokes of the wheel, leading directly from the United States at the hub to a single allied country, to the defense of which we are separately committed, and for which there is an individual military assistance program carefully tailored to its specific requirements and deficiencies. To carry our metaphor one step further, we might
visualize the rim of the wheel as being composed of the interlocking
and sometimes overlapping regional defense organizations—NATO,
CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS and the OAS—with the United States still at
the hub as the only nation associated with all.

The fact that we participate in the free world collective security
system on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis is significant in that
it gives us more flexibility and independence in responding to Communist
moves on the Cold War stage. Just as the bilateral structure is basic to
our MAP effort, regional defense organizations play a unique role in the
collective security system by encouraging nations of a particular area to
cooperate in furthering their mutual interests.

Military Civic Action and Training Assistance

In each recipient country our military assistance program naturally
takes the form best suited to the specific security needs of that country.
In the present context, I would like to discuss two categories of military
aid which have assumed particular importance in combating the threat
of Communist-inspired insurgency—the military portion of the Civic
Action Program, and training in counterinsurgent action.

The Civic Action Program is currently being given renewed em­
phasis as an instrument of foreign policy peculiarly adapted to promoting
the objectives of the Decade of Development called for by the President.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which almost entirely replaced the
old Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, encourages the use of
military forces in less developed countries for construction of public
works and other activities helpful to economic development. For obvious
reasons, civic action programs vary according to category of countries
just as military assistance programs do; and in countries with major
forces, this type of activity is limited. All in all, civic action programs
identifiable as such in the total Military Assistance Program for next
year will not account for more than $10 to $15 million. It is especially
important, therefore, that civic action projects be encouraged where
they are most needed and will have the greatest possible total impact.

In some countries, for example, additional efforts can be made to
utilize engineer units and air transport squadrons, the capabilities of
which are very effective and can be put to good use without detracting to
any substantial degree from their military mission. We have been
working on arrangements whereby MAP will fund the support of the unit and its equipment while AID pays the cost of actual construction of a road or a school, or the medicines for a medical program—whatever it may be. It must be borne in mind, however, that in these double-threat type countries, there is a limit to the number of major force elements which can safely be engaged in such projects. Civic action can and will make a contribution by increasing confidence in, and the prestige of indigenous forces as they are seen promoting economic progress; but it must not be assumed that they are being converted to engineer units permanently committed to construction and public works. Their primary and principal mission is and will remain the defense of the country and its people against both internal and external aggression.

The highest civic action component will be in our programs for Latin America and Africa where development is a high priority requirement. One of the outstanding projects undertaken to date is that engaged in by a Peruvian engineer battalion which is MAP supported. After obtaining some excellent construction equipment, this battalion undertook to build a major road up to the Indian territories. This is an effective outfit; a well-trained outfit; a good military outfit, by all accounts; and it has done a magnificent job. A similar, but much enlarged program is being undertaken in Ecuador. As a good example of what Wall Street would call "leverage" operation, a very small number of Americans go down and train 100 Ecuadorians as an engineer company, and they in turn supervise a job in which 10,000 civilian employees can be engaged. It gives them experience, and it also greatly increases their standing with the local population. It is altogether a totally effective kind of operation.

It is the kind of operation which, because it is so well adapted to the needs of underdeveloped countries, will be undertaken in Latin America and also in Africa where some of our programs, notably in Senegal, are almost wholly oriented toward the civic action concept. We are assisting in the organization, equipping and training of one of two Battalions of engineers in Senegal which will be given military training in the normal sense, and will have an internal security mission, but which will also be engaged in airfield construction and building a major road connection between Dakar and the inland—both projects vital to the development of the entire country. Civic action in situations such as those I have cited is of major importance as an instrument of United States military and foreign policy with respect to the security and development of those new and old nations of the southern hemisphere upon whose destinies may well depend the final outcome of the Cold War.
My last area of discussion concerns training, one of the most important and most interesting phases of the program, particularly as it applies to coping with insurgent activities.

I believe there is one cardinal fact about the anatomy of insurgency which, if clearly understood, makes the fundamentals of counter-insurgency operations much easier to grasp. It is that insurgent forces—guerrillas—depend for their existence on a local population which is sympathetic to the insurgent movement—which wants to see it succeed. When the guerrilla ceases to enjoy the sympathy and support of the local population, he is ripe for annihilation.

Obviously then, military effort directed against guerrillas cannot alone persuade a local population to support a government which is inept, corrupt or unjust; and it follows that military effort alone will never be completely successful in winning a war against insurgency. Because the military effort of underdeveloped nations is supported primarily by military assistance from the United States, it also follows that military assistance can be fully effective only if it is a part of a coordinated military, economic, political and psychological package. All of these programs must have a common objective, must be directed at all levels of the nation's population and must be undertaken on a national scale. The concept that economic and political reforms can wait upon military victory has been proved unrealistic. It is equally unrealistic to direct the total effort toward creating a better nation many years in the future. Insurgents live today, fight today, for today's world; they seduce their countrymen with the promise of pie-in-the-sky tomorrow! If we are successfully to counter the insurgent challenge and temptation, the United States Country Team must work in close coordination to come up with programs which will have a prompt and obviously favorable impact on the total situation.

The training problem in each country is unique and must be examined with a view to the particular factors which can influence its success in that country. Where insurrection has not actually broken out, the objective is to promote greater stabilization; and, as already suggested, Civic Action Programs by military forces constitute one of the powerful tools available to the local government to meet this objective. Mobile training teams consisting of specially qualified United States military and civilian personnel are proving highly effective in assisting the under-developed nations to plan and execute civic action programs.
Once insurrection has broken out, the situation changes dramatically. Many of our concepts and much of our equipment, designed for warfare in the more classic sense, have proved ill adapted to combating insurgency. We have to relearn and perfect the tactics of the ambush; of fighting in small independent groups in jungles, swamps, rice paddies, and over mountains. Different command organizations which afford flexibility in control and logistics are sometimes required. Some say we are still learning; I like to think we merely must remember. The basic concepts and tactics are already ours—we need only reapply the superb methods of Indian fighting, scouting, commando attack and the like. We will need different equipment, directly related to the task; new light radios with adequate range in jungles; small, light rifles; light equipment throughout. (The Thai, the Laotians, the Vietnamese are small people. Heavy loads are out of the question for them.)

Experience indicates that one of the most critical requirements in counterinsurgency operations is good intelligence which can be passed to a central point over a good communications system. This in turn creates the need for adequate intelligence training directed toward problems peculiar to insurgent operations, and communications training directed toward equipment which has been found effective for these purposes.

The skills and capabilities which our Special Forces personnel have developed can be imparted to indigenous units only with the closest kind of collaboration. Members of United States training teams must live at headquarters of their counterparts in the indigenous forces and with small combat units if their best efforts are to produce the best possible results. This becomes more imperative still where the military organization we are working with is less developed and more primitive.

The Unified Commands are responsible for finding solutions to these and related problems. They continually review requirements and submit recommendations for changes in equipment and training. In order that we may react promptly to such requirements as they develop, we shall have to fund counterinsurgency programs from lump sums of money set aside for this purpose. We must be able to react in overcoming or forestalling insurrection as quickly as we would in an all-out shooting war. In either case, time is of the essence.

Successful counterinsurgency training calls for finesse and diplomacy. The objective is an indigenous force properly trained to combat insurgency and supplied with appropriate equipment which they
know how--and are willing--to use. This force must also be aware of its importance to its government and its people in the maintenance of internal security, civic action and nation building. It must ultimately be capable of training its own replacements, and should develop the ability to withstand assault in a conventional war, at the side of its allies, should this ever become necessary.

The Military Assistance Program is making a significant contribution in support of these objectives. In so doing, MAP once again demonstrates the versatility and flexibility with which it has--for fifteen crucial and challenging years--responded to the proliferating Communist threat.
CIVIC ACTION*

The United States Army's Civic Action program is an important part of the nation's counterinsurgency effort. It is aimed at developing, by example, a close relationship between the armed forces and ordinary citizens of the free nations being assisted by the United States. Only by creating a strong bond between the army and the people in these countries can an effective weapon against Communist insurgency be forged.

Much of the strength of Communist guerrilla forces has been due to their success in winning the support of the local population. By linking their aims with those of the people, by beguilement, or by coercion, they have obtained food, shelter, and often recruits for their operations. In contrast, the ability of government troops to defeat guerrilla movements has often been a direct result of their ability to keep the people from helping the guerrillas. This is not an easy task, for the local inhabitants often regard government forces as intruders, and a stolen chicken or a carelessly driven jeep only increases their distrust and antipathy.

Where the villagers are hostile, or even if they are only indifferent, they at worst give direct support to the guerrillas and at best withhold information of ambushes or attacks. Where the people are willing to help the army, the guerrillas are not only without direct assistance but government forces are frequently provided with excellent combat intelligence on guerrilla activities, units, arms caches, and agents.

The first need for the army, therefore, is to achieve a close and trusting relationship with the people, and to persuade the local inhabitants that they are all fighting a common enemy. The role of Civic Action is to make the soldier a brother of the people as well as their protector, to demonstrate a close kinship that will pay off in terms of direct support against the guerrillas.

Civic Action can range from basic military courtesy and discipline to large-scale, formal aid projects. It can be a simple act of politeness to civilians by troops manning a roadblock; it can be a job of construction too large for the local people themselves to undertake.

* This introductory material is adapted from a lecture by Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), before the Counter-Guerrilla School, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 24 February 1961.
The United States Army has attempted to imbue the armed forces of many emerging nations with the concept and spirit of the Civic Action program, to teach local forces to work with their people and thus gain their respect and friendship. Much of the American effort in this direction has been in the category of "teaching by example." American Mobile Training Teams, some as small as one or two individuals, are at work in many areas of the Free World, helping to build roads, to heal the sick, to instruct teachers, to improve sanitation, to increase crop production, and, in a myriad of other ways, to gain the friendship and support of the local inhabitants.

What is the mission of an American military man who is stationed in a native village during a counterinsurgency campaign? In the fall of 1961, Lt. Col. John T. Little, U. S. A., was commanding a Mobile Training Team of Army Special Forces working with the Royal Laotian army. Taking a number of standing guides and combining them with the lessons learned in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, he wrote out a set of instructions for Civil Action. While they were written to meet conditions in Laos, their application is actually much broader. They are included here, just as Colonel Little wrote them, as a vivid example of the role of Civic Action in the United States counterinsurgency program.