SUBJECT: Civil Assistance

TO: Commanders
All Field Training Teams
White Star Mobile Training Team
Military Assistance Advisory Group to Laos

1. In an insurgency condition, the guerrilla is dependent on a sympathetic population. Counter-guerrilla operations must, therefore, have as one objective winning the population's cooperation and denying the enemy their sympathy. This can be done by psychological operations in many forms.

2. An imaginative program of village assistance properly backed in the military and civil authorities is one form of psychological operation which will contribute significantly toward this objective and achievement of U. S. goals in Laos.

3. The attached outline for a civil assistance program which can realistically be applied by operational detachments is forwarded for team use in establishing a positive civil relations program. The ideas expressed have been field tested and are practical. Use them as a guide for your actions in this field. Start at once.

4. You are not in competition with other U. S. agencies; USIS\(^1\) and USOM\(^2\); you are the spearhead of these activities and a focal point for injection of these activities until Laos civil assistance teams are trained and in use. Your primary mission is training and operations with FAR\(^3\); this is secondary to that mission but has an important impact on it.

5. Those teams operating from villages in which USIS and USOM representatives are not permanently represented are expected to initiate action in this field and keep this headquarters informed of progress.

s/ John T. Little

JOHN T. LITTLE
Lt. Col., Inf.
commanding

\(^{1}\) Incl Lt. Col., Inf.

Outline of a Civil Assistance Program

317
OUTLINE OF A CIVIL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. Actions prior to commencement of civil assistance program in Lao villages.

   a. Become acquainted with key members of the district. These include:

      (1) The Chao Muong - political boss of the district (has absolute authority over villagers).
      (2) The High District Judge and his staff - this official is second in authority to Chao Muong.
      (3) The Chief Buddhist (Bonze) of the district.
      (4) The Police Captain and his staff.
      (5) The Village Headmen.
      (6) The Schoolmaster and School Teachers.
      (7) Leading business men including shop owners and restaurant owners.

   b. Gather background data on key personnel of district to include:

      (1) Nationality.
      (2) Date and place of birth.
      (3) Education and Religion.
      (4) Knowledge of foreign languages.
      (5) Special skills or abilities.
      (6) Military service.
      (7) Travel background.
      (8) Past activities in government.
      (9) Present job and salary.
      (10) Details of family - how many wives and children.
      (11) Character and personality - is he honest, is he loyal, is he a doer and not just a talker, does he have initiative, drive, imagination?
      (12) Is he pro-FAR, pro-American, pro-French?

   c. Gathering this information will be a continuing process. Record it and pass it on to the succeeding team.

2. Recommend activities for civil assistance program.

   a. Medical Support: Have team medic assist village doctor in sick call. If there is no doctor, team medic should run sick call himself. Team medic will visit all villages in area and make occasional visits to remote villages out of the area. From among the more intelligent of the young villagers the team medic should choose an assistant
aidman with the object of training him to eventually become the village doctor. The village should be persuaded to build a hospital with the theme, "this will be for your village and your people. If the people want continued team medical support tell them to build a hospital." Note: Doctors are paid by government so team need not worry about depriving village doctor of livelihood.

b. Aid to Education: By the team encouraging and helping the children the parents can be made aware of the importance of education. School supplies to be furnished include blackboards, chalk, erasers, pencils, pencil sharpeners, writing paper, tablets, multiplication tables, rulers, books, globes, atlases, charts on anatomy, chemistry, physics and biology and nature subjects. Get the material in front of the children. Teach the schoolmaster to be responsible and accountable for the equipment--to take the books up at the end of the semester and reissue them at the beginning of the term. Use the school aid program as a lever to get the village to repair and expand the school. Require the village to send all their children to school. This can be done through the Chao Muong. The children must be taught the world is not flat, that Laos is not the only country, that America is a powerful friend and what the Communists are.

c. Sanitation: This field offers the greatest possibilities for achievement and improvement. Persuade the people to police the streets, cut the grass, burn and bury the rubbish, rake under the houses. Encourage village authorities to destroy homeless, vicious and unwanted dogs. Start a DDT program. Teach the natives how to use the sprayers and mix the solution. Put rat poison in village placing it high enough to be unreachable by children and chickens. Start a war on bed bugs. Use oil to stamp out mosquito breeding areas. Put the villagers on chloroquin. In the dry season have family latrines dug. Instruct natives on covering waste. Get villagers to dig wells for drinking water. Instruct families on fly control--distribute swatters. Action should be taken to prevent livestock from over running living areas. Work all projects through the Chao Muong. When he issues the order the people will take action.

d. Aid to Agriculture: Get assistance from USOM. To start program persuade a few farmers to try crop rotation, proper spacing, fertilizing and spraying. This is a long-range project taking patience, time and skillful persuasion. A Lao farmer puts all his earnings into his crop and he is very hesitant about making experiments. But once he has been shown the results of this new method of rice growing he will be an eager participant. In many areas the irrigation system could be improved, small streams could be dammed, etc.
e. Transportation Improvement: All roads in Laos need improvement. Get villagers to build bridges, repair washouts, fill holes, make detours. Use whatever labor is available whether it is three men or three hundred men. Have village construct an airfield. Sell Chao Muong on the advantages in trade and business. Have villagers construct flat-bottom boats to haul goods on the rivers.

f. Children's Playground: This represents an opportunity to influence, educate, and take part in raising children for a better Laos. Stock the playground with swings, teeter-totters, sliding boards, monkey bars, parallel bars. Set up volley ball, basket ball, soccer, baseball and just plain ordinary tag ball. Set up relay races, obstacle races and jumping contests. Teach them sportsmanship, teamwork, how to win and how to lose. Teach them fair play and get them in top physical condition. To help all this the team captain could write to his favorite town in the United States informing them that the Lao village where the team is stationed wants to be a sister city with them and learn about the American way of life. Through civic organizations in the US town many items for the children could be obtained such as clothes, candy, toys and educational games.

g. Special Tools: Through USOM try to borrow, lease or directly obtain a circular saw. All lumber is cut by hand. This takes hours of time and delays the building program. In addition to the saw, obtain fuel, lubricant, extra blades and maintenance instructions. Also a chain saw is ideal for clearing land.

h. Market Place: If the market place is in a typically rotten condition, interest the Chao Muong in building a new one. Get it centrally located for the people. If you furnish tin for the roof you can demand that they clean the market up after each day's use.

i. Movies: You can obtain a generator and projector from USIS and show Lao and American movies. There are many excellent propaganda movies in the USIS warehouses. Show American films also—particularly those with a simple direct theme showing us at our best. (e.g., war pictures, cowboy pictures, adventure pictures and light comedies. Avoid films which degrade us or are extremely sophisticated and complex.) The villagers love to watch American films even when they cannot understand a word. A portable PA speaker which would enable the interpreter to give the general plot line would be a big asset when showing US films.

j. Electric lights: Interest the Chao Muong in trying to start a light plant if one is not in operation. Possibly the better-off citizens can be persuaded to pool their money to finance the operation particularly if they can see how they can make a profit in the future. Get USOM help on this one.
k. Local Restaurants and Markets: Try to get the local bars and restaurants to clean up their kitchens and their premises and dispose of their food waste in sanitary fashion. This can be handled through the Chao Muong. Do not patronize below-standard places. If it is a small town try to interest the local people in building new buildings and attracting more people and more business.

1. As a final word on these recommended activities remember that any program you undertake will be secondary to your mission of training FAR. The time for project planning and team participation is at night and during off duty time. Before starting any work see the people at USOM and USIS and find out what kind of support they can actually give you. These civic projects will take up many hours but they will be hours well spent in the achievement of the United States objectives of building a greater and stronger free Laos.

3. Tips on conduct of a civil assistance program.

a. Upon arrival in the village pay a courtesy call on the Chao Muong. Do not talk shop on the first meeting, just make friends.

b. Deal directly with the Chao Muong. Do not work through his subordinates. Always work through one man— the chief.

c. Make a statement on graft. Let the Chao Muong know that under no circumstances will you tolerate graft and if you detect it all aid will stop. If corruption starts the villagers will tell you. You do not need to search for it.

d. Do not stockpile supplies— get them distributed promptly. You must have a system of control. Make the Chao Muong sign for everything you give him and see that he signs out the equipment to his subordinates. Since it is impossible for everyone to have a pick, shovel, grub hoe and axe, the tools should be issued from a central point on a loan basis. When a farmer finishes with a piece of equipment he returns it to the village chief. The chief must be taught how to run this system.

e. Always make the villagers share the work load. Let them know that all these projects are village projects not US help for the helpless. Once you do one project all by yourself the villagers will forever after expect this from your team. Do not give them something for nothing. For example a good approach could be "I will try to get a tin roof for this school house if you will build the school and furnish all the other materials and labor."
f. Try to present your ideas to the Chao Muong in such a fashion as to make him think it was his idea in the first place. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you approach him with an idea let him have a night to think about it. But the next day be sure to gently push him toward a decision.

g. Do not start anything you cannot fully support. Never promise anything. Remember you can be moved out at a moment's notice. Have all the material on hand before you start any project. Check it out with your superiors before you begin.

h. Initially your weapon is talk. It must be interesting, arousing, intelligent. You are a master salesman for the United States. Some pitfalls for newcomers; drinking too much at social functions (keep your mind clear for business), getting involved with the native women (creates jealousy and hate and makes you a set up for anti-US propaganda), being arrogant, sarcastic or belittling in your conversation (these people are hypersensitive and proud and you will come to a dead end if they dislike you). Some positive tips are: avoid anything that reminds the people of French control. For example the French required that every man in the village contribute one day's work or a couple of pieces of lumber to each building project. The Lao do not even like to talk about it. Maintain the proper team attitude of good natured willingness and endless patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be tactful, be tolerant. Show exceptional kindness to the children and the very old. Be courteous, be relaxed and do not be in a hurry.

i. Do not worry if they do things differently from what you propose. If they achieve the end result that is all that counts.

j. For success on this mission observe the native customs. For example when you are visiting a different village inform the villagers that you are coming so that the people can assemble. The district headman (the Chao Muong) always makes a political speech on these occasions. Never force your way into a village where the broken branches across the trail indicate a closed celebration. Follow the native custom of removing your footgear when going into a village house. Learn the customs of your region.

k. Make sure the United States gets credit for all U.S. items distributed. If possible equipment should be stamped with a U.S. flag. When the Chao Muong makes a speech to the citizenry about the tools and supplies they are to receive make sure he tells the villagers that the equipment comes from America.
1. Do not give away U. S. items for nothing. For example if you give picks demand they dig a well or ditch the streets. If you give school supplies, make them either build a school or repair the old one.

4. In conclusion: The sky is the limit in what you can achieve. You cannot make a new Laos in one day but it only takes one day to start. Now is the time to start beating the enemy at his own game--the winning of men's minds, emotions and loyalty to the concept of freedom, justice, individual human rights, equality of opportunity and a higher living standard.
THE ROLE OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY*

The Agency for International Development (AID), successor to the International Cooperation Administration, was established in 1961 as an agency within the Department of State to emphasize long-range solutions to the problems of underdevelopment and instability as the "underprivileged" countries undergo modernization. Along with other government agencies, AID has been orienting its organization, plans, and programs to the more immediate problems of Communist subversion in the less-developed world. AID's concern is with any threat to the existence of a constituted government. Its purview is not confined to active insurrection, but embraces also situations in which instability and the pressure of change have established an environment conducive to disorder and revolt. Underlying the Agency's efforts is the assumption that nations with self-sustaining economies and stable governments will have both the will and the strength to resist Communist pressures and subversion.

The AID Administrator holds a major responsibility in the direction of counterinsurgency. The Secretary of State has delegated to him the responsibility for review and coordination of all foreign assistance programs. In this role, he not only directs the economic aid programs of AID, but also insures that both the military and nonmilitary components of the U.S. foreign assistance programs conform to global aid and foreign policy guidance from the President and the Department of State. In addition to these responsibilities, the AID Administrator represents the Agency on the Special Group-Counterinsurgency constituted by the President in January 1962 to insure adequate programs, priority, and unity of effort in counterinsurgency.

Upon the AID Administrator rests the direct responsibility for carrying out the Agency's role in counterinsurgency. He has delegated this charge to the Deputy Administrator for Operations. A Special Assistant for Internal Defense, directly responsible to the Deputy Administrator,

* Adapted from material prepared by the Agency for International Development.
supervises the day-to-day matters of operation and coordination. At the Washington level AID officials work with representatives of other departments and agencies under the chairmanship of the State Department. Abroad the AID organization functions within the structure of the country team. Organization and authority have been delineated to permit synchronization of the entire range of AID programs with the needs of counterinsurgency.

Public Safety

AID has three counterinsurgency programs: a public safety program*; a civic action program; ** and a community development program. The public safety program is not a new activity. The United States has aided the Philippine Constabulary for decades, the Iranian Gendarmerie since the end of the war, and the police of a number of nations under the technical assistance program during the fifties. Both CIA and DOD were involved in similar programs during this period. In 1954, at the direction of the NSC, the International Cooperation Administration assumed the major role in an increased effort to strengthen internal security forces throughout the Free World. Applied to four countries in fiscal 1955, the program was extended to 21 countries in fiscal 1958 and to 38 countries in fiscal 1962. In the latter year the program cost approximately $15 million, was staffed with about 150 police advisors, and affected police forces totaling a million men.

Though the statistics would appear to indicate considerable attention, the fact is that after 1955, the Public Safety program suffered from comparative neglect. With increased concentration on economic development, existing police programs were cut back or eliminated; and new programs could not be justified under the criteria of social and economic development. The new emphasis on internal security objectives should imbue the program with new life.

The program seeks to increase the effectiveness of civil police organizations and their special forces in coping with riots and other forms of violence, conspiracy, and subversion, and to eliminate duplication and conflict between civil police and military forces. The President has

* See also selection number 24.
** See also selection number 22.
adopted a report on public safety worldwide, submitted by an Interdepartmental Committee on Police Programs created under the auspices of the Special Group-Counterinsurgency. This report establishes a new priority for police programs within the context of internal security and within the criteria employed in the country internal defense plan.

Current AID operations reflect the new emphasis on this program. In the absence of insurrection, the police are seen as the most sensitive point of contact between the government and the people. They are close to the focal points of unrest and are more acceptable than the military as keepers of order over long periods of time. As part of this upgrading of the public safety program, AID was instrumental in the establishment of the Inter-American Police Academy. Located in the Panama Canal Zone, the Academy opened its doors in July 1962 to its first class of 63 students. The school will provide training for police officers from the Latin American states, and will supplement the training which has been provided in the United States. The Special Group-Counterinsurgency has approved the school's curriculum, and additional general and specialized classes are planned in fiscal 1963. In addition to this schooling, AID will continue to provide training for 300 students in the United States and for 150 in a third country annually.

Civic Action

The second counterinsurgency program, civic action, encourages the use of host country military forces and equipment on projects which contribute to social and economic development. The United States has supported such activities for nearly a decade where political considerations warranted it, as in the case of the Philippines and Korea. Policy directives and legislation since 1959 have given greater emphasis to this program. The primary aim is to improve the relations between the military and the civilian population. In many nations the military forces have engendered enmity by pursuing the preservation of their status and power at the expense of civilian needs. This is notably true in Latin America. Where instability and latent insurgency stem from the failure of the governments to be responsive to the needs of the citizens, the military often pose a major obstacle to improved government-citizen rapport.
Civic action projects seek to facilitate an identification of governmental programs with the aspirations of the people. Various civic action projects are being carried out throughout the world. These include disaster relief and evacuation, medical services, medical evacuation from the rural areas, weather information, navigational aids, ship repair services, and community development projects. The construction of highways and feeder roads to link urban and rural areas is a major effort. This project is proving particularly successful in blending various objectives; it meets the people's "felt needs," increases military logistic capability, and promotes the market structure necessary for rapid economic growth. Civic action programs have assumed new significance and are supported by increased funding. New programs have been installed in 12 countries in fiscal 1962, and were to be extended to 14 additional countries in the following year.

Community Development

The third counterinsurgency program under AID is community development. As the name suggests, the program contributes directly to the development of modern social institutions. Typically in the underdeveloped world the more traditionally-oriented rural sector has been alienated from the more modern urban sector. As a result, the rural masses have been largely neglected. This is a particularly serious problem in Latin America where rural discontent has resulted in large migrations to the urban areas. There the peasants find not the increased standards of living that they desire, but a situation of severe unemployment. The result has been a rapid growth of the most stark slums and the emergence of a volatile political element readily susceptible to insurgency.

The community development program seeks to establish the two-way channels of communication and responsibility between the rural sector and the government. It acts through self-help programs to elicit from the villagers an appreciation of social and economic development efforts, to foster in them a political allegiance to the government, and create self-sustaining communities with a sense of political and social responsibility. This approach recognizes that the minds of men are the ultimate and decisive targets of the protagonists of insurgency. It acknowledges that society itself is at war, and that the resources, motives, and targets of this struggle are found almost wholly within the local population.
Community development projects vary widely in character. The projects themselves are less important than the spirit in which they are carried out. The essence of the program is that it is "with the people," not "for the people." The successful village-level worker never arrives at the village with a predetermined plan, but rather puts upon the village leadership the responsibility for choosing the projects and arranging for the use of the village resources. The host government, in conjunction with the U.S. AID mission, provides the resources that the people themselves cannot supply. In this way the people in the existing or newly created villages have a sense of full participation in the modernization process.

AID has initiated a rather unique community development effort in Southeast Asia. Labelled the "Strategic Hamlet" program, it is applied to villages in the throes of active guerrilla operations. The guerrillas have used both propaganda and terror to obtain from the people the food, supplies, and information that they need. The Strategic Hamlet is a village which has been equipped to prevent this exploitation as well as to further the economic development of the population. The DOD and AID share the funding of "village packages" which include such items as agricultural implements, medical supplies, pyrotechnic pistols and other small arms, fence posts, barbed wire, and village alarm systems. In addition, AID is providing radios and transceivers to the villagers. Along with the other AID counterinsurgency operations, this program is expected to have an important bearing on the course of events in South Vietnam.

Conclusion

The AID counterinsurgency programs are faced with a challenge that is genuinely awesome and with problems of extreme complexity. The Agency will continue to have to make decisions between long range goals and short range considerations, always bearing in mind that while the problems are old, the planning emphasis and funding priorities have changed radically. On the basis of the record so far, there is room for cautious optimism.
The maintenance of law and order and internal security is an essential element of any counterinsurgency program. Instability breeds insurgency, and only where the local law enforcement authorities are able to preserve the rule of law and protect the rights of citizens can they hope to abort potential insurgent movements before they have a chance to develop.

In countries of the less developed world, the police constitute a first line of defense against potential insurrections and sometimes, as in Malaya, bear the major responsibility for combating an actual insurrection.

Communist-led or exploited insurrections normally begin within the lower levels of society, both in the countryside and among the city masses. The policeman is important in both areas, but his value is especially great in the countryside. Here troops of the central government engaged in counterinsurgency activities often have difficulty eliciting the support of the people. Infrequently and sometimes unwelcome strangers, they usually arrive in numbers, stay only a short time—often "requisitioning" supplies and labor—and then move on, leaving a residue of ill will. The policeman, however, is usually stationed in the same village or hamlet for several years at a time. He is on familiar terms with the local inhabitants and understands their needs and problems. Trusted by the people as one of them, he can readily obtain needed intelligence at the grassroots level. He becomes in a sense a paternal object of identification with the central government.

Program Objectives

The Public Safety Program of the Agency for International Development, a part of the U. S. State Department, attempts to strengthen the capabilities of civil police in less developed countries to establish and maintain law, order, and internal security. Its basic purpose is to ensure a climate conducive to sound economic, social, and political development, but it has as a corollary a significant counterinsurgent function in its activities aimed at the maintenance of public order.

* Prepared with the collaboration of the Agency for International Development.
To achieve these goals the program seeks the development of well-trained, honest civil police forces dedicated to the belief that police operations are a public service and a public trust. It is designed to support the institutions, the training and research that will encourage this spirit of public dedication and be reflected in increased public confidence. Police forces in underdeveloped areas need assistance in administration, training, and operational techniques, and particularly require greater mobility and better communications. To meet these needs, the AID Public Safety Program provides training, technical assistance and advice, and some requisite equipment.

The first projects were undertaken in 1955, when three Far Eastern nations suffering from lawlessness and unrest asked for and received United States assistance. From this beginning, the program rapidly developed until today there are Public Safety projects in 25 countries throughout the Free World, and officers from these and 18 other countries have received training in the United States.

The AID provides assistance in a wide range of Public Safety functions, including concepts and methods of crime prevention and detection; criminal and internal security investigations; establishment and use of scientific crime laboratories; traffic control and patrol; communications; records and identification systems; customs, immigration, and border control; firearms training; control of riots and large public gatherings; and, in some instances, the development of counterguerrilla capabilities of those forces with constabulary (paramilitary) units.

Problems

The Public Safety project in each country is unique in that it is geared to the country's stage of development, the competency of its civil police force, and other internal conditions. In some areas, only primitive notions of police science and service prevail, and improvement must start with fundamentals. In some former colonial states, the police forces lack experienced command personnel just as experienced managers are scarce in other fields. The forces must be staffed and reorganized and their policies adjusted to meet the changed emphasis and current needs. In other countries repressive military-type police forces must be converted into civil police forces oriented toward the public interest.
In still other areas, the changing economy has resulted in weakening tribal and family controls, thereby increasing police responsibilities and the need for improved law enforcement techniques. In like manner, where a country has a history of trained and disciplined police forces, there is still a need for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of modern concepts and procedures. Other problems, such as lack of equipment, illiteracy, inadequate personnel policies, including nepotism, insufficient funds, the increase of internal security responsibilities, and the absence of a tradition of police work as a public service—all combine to make the Public Safety program more difficult to carry out.

Before a project is undertaken, therefore, qualified American police specialists will make a survey to determine a country's particular needs in the light of U. S. capabilities to assist. Thus, if a local police force is found to be at minimal levels in terms of recruitment, management, training, and operation, a program of police administration and training at the basic level would be more appropriate than one emphasizing highly technical police specialties. Again, if the internal conditions of a country are seriously disturbed, less attention would be paid to Public Safety refinements, and the bulk of training focused on areas of more immediate concern, such as counterguerrilla and riot control techniques, security investigations, and border control.

Training

The heart of the Public Safety Program is the training afforded police officers of the participating countries, for training at all levels is perhaps the greatest need of these nations. The AID provides this training within the host countries, in the United States, and in other countries where suitable facilities exist.

At the present time there are some 165 U. S. public safety technicians stationed in 26 countries. These men have had extensive experience with federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agencies, supplemented by special training in the techniques of rendering public safety technical assistance. They are assigned at the request of the host governments to work with local public safety officials and their technical knowledge and experience are adapted to the needs of the local forces. Primarily, U. S. assistance consists of training advice on such matters as faculty staffing, curricula, teaching methods, technical instruction aids, sources of lecture material, and training school facilities. In some instances
the AID technicians actually conduct specific courses, but the bulk of the actual training is done by local training staffs. The AID technicians also provide technical advice and serve as consultants or advisers in suggesting means by which the local forces can improve their efficiency and effectiveness and better cope with the police and security problems of the individual countries.

To complement this effort, selected police officers from the participating countries receive specialty or advanced training in the United States (including Hawaii and Puerto Rico). To date, some 1500 officers have undergone this training and returned to participate in their home training programs. Programming of this training is administered principally by the International Association of Chiefs of Police under contract with the AID. This professional, nonprofit organization (with its headquarters and Training Division in Washington, D.C.) arranges for the visiting police officers to study or observe U.S. techniques and operations in two ways. The visiting officers may receive classroom instruction at American universities that teach police science or at government or other police training schools. They also undergo on-the-job training with Federal, State, and local law enforcement or related agencies. The cooperating U.S. police provide their services to the AID on a voluntary basis at no charge, and through their generosity help to strengthen the ties of friendship between their departments and those of the visiting officers.

In some instances the training of police officers is conducted in third countries to take advantage of monetary savings and similarities of language, culture, and police problems. Thus, some officers of Southeast Asian countries have received training in the Philippines and some from Africa have been trained in Italy.

Equipment Aid

The AID also furnishes a minimum amount of essential civil police equipment to participating countries. This is primarily transportation, communication, and scientific equipment. In all cases this equipment is provided only after U.S. technicians carefully determine a country's need for this equipment and its ability to use it effectively. The AID encourages local governments and police forces to utilize their own resources for the purchase of equipment whenever possible.
Given the disorganized and rudimentary state of police administration in many underdeveloped areas, the contributions of the AID Public Safety Program to the quality of local police forces have been significant. While this is sometimes difficult to measure in absolute terms, a number of examples may be cited to illustrate the advances made since the inception of the AID program.

First, and most obviously, the quality of police administration has improved in several areas. Organization structures have been simplified and areas of responsibility better defined. The concepts of careful planning and programing have been introduced and accepted. In Indonesia, for example, a "think" committee has been formed to develop a more efficient system of organization and administration. This has resulted in a sweeping reorganization of national headquarters and the development of an "Inspector General" system. In the Philippines, a reorganization of the district provincial offices of the National Bureau of Investigation has brought about more effective enforcement at less cost and has provided training and specialized services to local autonomous police organizations. In Cambodia, a reorganization has unified several heretofore independent law enforcement groups. In Iran, an Advisory and Planning Bureau is now engaged in policy planning and programing within the National Police and other organizational reforms have also been implemented.

The AID training programs have effectively raised the level of civil police training and improved the methods of instruction in a number of countries. Modern police academies have been set up in Korea and Vietnam. An integrated and ambitious police educational system has been established in Indonesia. A police training academy has been completed in Cambodia, and similar institutions have been organized or expanded and modernized in Greece, Iran, Laos, Turkey, Liberia, and El Salvador. Many hundreds of local police are receiving training at home, in the United States, or in third countries.

Police communications, generally quite weak in underdeveloped areas, have been improved and modernized in a number of countries. Communications centers have been established or expanded in Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines. In Laos and Greece, the AID technicians are training radio operators and are supervising
the installation and use of equipment. In Iran, radio communica-
tions now link police headquarters in Teheran with stations in 17
principal cities. Similar developments in other areas are equally
advanced.

Police mobility, vital to the operation of any police organization,
has been improved in almost every country participating in the Public
Safety Program. The AID has provided equipment ranging from gear
for pack horses in Laos to heavy duty 4-wheel drive vehicles in Libya,
patrol aircraft in Tunisia and Indonesia, bicycles in Afghanistan, trucks
and jeeps in Iran, and other automotive equipment, and even boats in
many other countries. In addition, the AID has provided training in
vehicle operation and maintenance, and central maintenance facilities
have been established in Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

One very important aspect of the AID technical assistance has
been the development of traffic programs in many of the underde-
veloped nations. The rapid increase in vehicular traffic in these
countries has made effective traffic management a hard necessity
that bears on both economic development and the movement of mili-
tary (and paramilitary) personnel and supplies. Urban streets and
secondary and feeder roads are already inadequate to carry the
heavier traffic. New improved highways are able to meet this need,
but their use by oxcarts, bicycles, and other slow moving or cumber-
some vehicles has caused serious traffic flow problems. Not only
does this type of traffic reduce vehicle speeds to that of the slowest
oxcart, but it also greatly increases the danger of accident and injury.
All of these factors have real meaning in counterinsurgency, where
rapid mobility of men, equipment, and supplies is of prime importance
in finding and fighting an elusive enemy.

To meet these needs, the AID traffic programs are underway
in many countries, including Greece, Liberia, Korea, Turkey, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. A modern uniform
traffic code has been established in Iran, supplemented by the modern-
ization of driver licensing procedures and the organization of school
safety patrols. Accident investigation cars now operate effectively
in Guatemala and a national traffic code, modern traffic accident
reports, and uniform reporting procedures were initiated in Ethiopia.
A nationwide traffic and public safety program has been established
in Korea.
The importance of police public relations is being emphasized in the training programs of all countries where a police program is in operation. In Greece, Korea, Liberia, Iran and elsewhere educational publicity and other media have been employed to increase public respect for the police and cooperation in their efforts. Growing public support of police activities has resulted in more effective police work in many areas.

The Public Safety Program has introduced modern investigative techniques for handling criminal and internal security cases in many underdeveloped areas. Identification and records systems as well as scientific crime laboratories have been developed or improved. In almost every country involved, the AID technicians have provided training in the techniques of criminal and security investigations. Crime laboratories have been developed or expanded in Thailand, Turkey, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Iran, and Guatemala. Advances in records management have been scored in many countries, including the establishment in Iran of a fingerprint bureau of over a million prints.

The AID technicians have also given advice in other special and important aspects of police work. In Iran, a Public Safety technician assisted local authorities in narcotics enforcement and control. An AID criminologist in Ceylon worked closely with the police and other interested groups in studying the factors that had made for a high incidence of crime, particularly violent crime, in that country.

An additional benefit of the Public Safety Program has been, of course, the growing pro-Western orientation of police forces in many underdeveloped areas. The day-to-day association of the AID advisers with the officers and men of the participating police forces and the orientation received by foreign students in the United States have materially strengthened the bonds of friendship and trust. In many instances, U. S.-trained officers now hold important positions of command and staff in their national police forces. Their pro-Western orientation is of vital importance to the Free World.

Control of Civil Disturbances

One of the AID's most significant contributions to the internal security of many underdeveloped countries has been in furnishing training for the effective control of riots and civil disturbances.
Disorderly crowds, unruly demonstrations, and other political disorders are prime targets for exploitation by Communist agitators and agents. By instigating or exploiting a properly timed and executed civil disturbance, the Communists can obtain a political benefit far beyond anything they could achieve with their own frequently limited strength. The effectiveness of the student riots in Japan—in a strength greater than anything the Communists themselves could have mustered—in aborting President Eisenhower’s scheduled visit to that country is a prime example of Communist exploitation of an uncontrolled mob.

In almost every country in the world, the police are responsible for controlling and breaking up unruly crowds, riots, and other disorders or disturbances. In Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Iran, and several Latin American nations, the AID has provided extensive training for the assumption of these responsibilities. Much of this has been on-the-job training, with the AID technicians working in the field with the local police. Some training has been provided in the United States by contract with the International Association of Police Chiefs. Still further instruction has been furnished by allowing trainees to work with riot squads of several American metropolitan police forces.

The AID antiriot training emphasizes civil— as opposed to military-type tactics in the handling of civil disturbances, making use of nonviolent rather than physical means. American instructors stress the importance of stopping a riot before it begins, rather than waiting until it reaches a point when only overwhelming force can bring it to a halt. The AID training, therefore, underlines the need for proper intelligence, gathered far in advance of possible trouble, that will provide the local police with an understanding of the motivations, leadership, and intentions of the rioters. Such an understanding will frequently enable the police to break up a disturbance before it is well underway or to devise the proper tactics to prevent such disorders from getting out of hand.

If, however, it should be necessary to employ force to disperse an unruly mob, the AID stresses the necessity of handling the situation without killing or seriously injuring any of the participants. Should deaths occur, these provide the Communists with ready-made martyrs to police brutality, and the AID training has therefore emphasized the dangers of exerting undue physical violence. As a result of this approach, police in a number of Latin American countries have been able to handle successfully serious riot conditions without incurring the fatalities that were all too common in the past.
Conclusion

The value of the AID Public Safety Program in combating insurgent movements in underdeveloped areas is thus of significant proportions. At relatively small expense to the United States, it serves to strengthen the nonmilitary defenses of the Free World. In promoting internal stability and respect for law and order, it has a vital part in insuring the success of the U. S. counterinsurgency program.
REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION *

By George A. Kelly

While Anglo-Saxon observers are unquestionably more familiar with the intricacies of the discussion that has taken place since 1954 (the year of the "massive retaliation" doctrine) regarding the prospects and conditions of nuclear war, there has been no less spirited debate in France over the nature of a very different kind of conflict.

To qualify this type of war which has so seized the imagination of French military analysts, the comprehensive title of la guerre révolutionnaire has been given. It is construed as a function--perhaps the most serious one--of the "protracted conflict" described by Mao Tse-tung, and its alleged aim is nothing less than the undermining of the Capitalist camp through indirect, but, nevertheless, decisive military action. Continuing unabated for a long enough period of time, this subtle and steady revolutionary gestation could so weaken the West that any ultimate resort to nuclear war would become unnecessary.

La guerre révolutionnaire, consequently, whatever its manifestations, is a manipulation of the policy centers of Moscow and Peking. It is itself total war on a limited scale, because it utilizes propagandistic appeal to whole populations and all economic, social, and political levers it can avail itself of. Wherever it erupts, it is one and indivisible, because the unitary aim of weakening the West is nowhere sacrificed. It is always conducted under a certain cloud of political ambiguity and generally is attached firmly to one or another nationalist or independence movement, thereby avoiding, in each instance the provocation to general war in which the major powers might confront one another. There is little doubt in French military circles that this type of conflict exists--and exists permanently as a condition of global Marxist aggrandizement--and that it is

*Reprinted from Military Review, October 1960. George A. Kelly is associated with the Harvard University Center for International Affairs.
doing irreparable damage to the position of the West and to the survival of "traditional Western values."

The only real point of dispute is the extent to which this phenomenon is actually controlled by the leaders of communism, whether they can indeed unleash la guerre révolutionnaire in widely scattered parts of the world at will or whether they have merely known how to attach their claims with great realism and sagacity to a broader "systemic" revolution which is basically not the prerogative of any ideology.\(^1\) In either case, the effect is damaging and does not alter the fundamental perspective of the problem. If it is exaggerated to claim that all instances of la guerre révolutionnaire are directly inspired by the Soviet Union or Communist China, it is, nevertheless, clear—according to Claude Delmas, one of the best-balanced writers on the subject—that "the principles of the achievement of a national struggle of revolutionary character for the conquest of power were codified in the Marxist doctrine."

Commandant Jacques Hogard, another expert, maintains that if the long arm of the Kremlin is not evident in the first stage of a revolutionary crisis, it is bound to assert its presence in the second. The unlimited aspirations of Communist aggression are, therefore, the backdrop against which the nature of la guerre révolutionnaire must be understood.

**Revolutionary Operations**

Commentators emphasize that the Communist revolutionary conspiracy is like an iceberg, its great mass being hidden below the surface, from which isolated promontories appear to sprout. To win or lose a single battle or campaign does not in itself amount to an integral achievement; but success or failure in a series of conflicts can set in motion a trend either, respectively, toward containment of the menace or toward disordered retreat in the face of it. Seen in this light, Czechoslovakia, Indochina (Vietnam), Suez, Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq were lost battles. Greece, Iran, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaya were, in their time victories gained, albeit defensive ones. Algeria is seen as the critical turning point in this catalogue of revolutionary operations.

To the theorists of la guerre révolutionnaire, the French National Liberation Movement (FLN) is equivalent to communism and the pacification of the territory is nothing less than the "defense of the Occident." Internal political problems aside, it is by this very
simple standard that the characteristic attitudes of the French Army
must be measured. Algeria is, above all, a war of the flank whose
object is Western Europe itself, cradle of the "traditional values" on
which French military writers unceasingly insist.

Jean Planchais, military correspondent for Le Monde, describes
this attitude vividly:

"General Callies, inspector general of the armed forces in North
Africa, scarcely ever moves about without a world map where he has
drawn a large black arrow, which, issuing from the depths of Red
Asia, pushes its point as far as the Maghreb. To him this is the best
analysis of the Algerian situation."

Grand Strategy

It would be dangerous to reject the capital importance which the
French have attached to the concept of la guerre révolutionnaire,
however extreme some of the interpretations seem to be. But we
must recognize some very precise psychological conditions that make
this analysis highly compatible with national needs of morale and
prestige. A decade and a half of non-possession of nuclear arma-
ment in a world where its minatory power appeared omnipotent en-
gendered in the French Army both a measure of chagrin and a
requirement for formulating doctrines of grand strategy in which
the emphasis would not be on the technical perfection of weapons or
on statistical measurements of power.

The growing assumption of the "balance of terror" argued that
as military potential approached the conceivable limits of destructive-
ness there was correspondingly less chance that the weapons of total
cataclysm would ever be used, but rather that military activity would
be carried on by less direct means. Whereas this likelihood led the
nuclear powers to seek alternatives in the investigation of "limited
wars" which would be essentially modifications of classical conflicts
implying either the use or nonuse of nuclear arms, the French turned
their attention to a much more restrictive, yet more total, phenomenon
which their allies had sometimes mistakenly identified as "brush fire
war" and furthermore given little concentrated study to.

La guerre révolutionnaire claimed its essence from the cele-
brated maxim of Clausewitz and opposed itself not to total nuclear
war but to total peace. For peace in the generally accepted sense
and *la guerre révolutionnaire* could be, and demonstrably were, simultaneous and by no means exclusive. The tactics revealed by the enemy in the writings of his theoreticians (Lenin, Trotsky, Mao) and in the two colonial wars the French had fought in Indochina and Algeria enabled the planners to postulate theories for the novel kind of war they had perceived.

**No Ultimate Weapon**

The paradox of modern war so successfully posed by the theory of *la guerre révolutionnaire* was further abetted by French military sensitivities. If war was polyvalent (a favorite word of M. Bourges-Maunoury while he held the portfolio of national defense in the Guy Mollet cabinet), then there was no ultimate weapon: both the knife and the tactical nuclear bomb might have their uses. If nuclear war was massively impersonal, the conditions of *la guerre révolutionnaire* imposed the primacy of the individual in the conduct of operations.

The resourcefulness of small units became paramount, and this fact had the tendency to restore to war some of the glamor so essential to the morale of many who engage in combat. It became a compliment to the French soldier and his military organization to proclaim this function of initiative as a specific national aptitude. Thus, as a result of the Indochinese and Algerian conflicts, it was alleged—again far from falsely—that the French among Western armies had the greatest experience and most adequate indoctrination for the new type of combat. As Colonel Némo wrote in the *Revue de Défense Nationale*:

"The French Army is practically the only one to have encountered communism in action in a vast land war of style and amplitude previously unknown. It can, therefore, open broadly the debate on the form of future war."

The doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire* was, it would appear, the result both of objective analysis of combat experience and of institutional self-appeasement. It would be incorrect, however, to suppose that the subjective arguments were of a nature to destroy the thesis as a whole. Again, it seems just to say that only the limits of the thesis are in question.
Military Conquest

La guerre révolutionnaire recognizes that military conquest of the enemy will be difficult and indeed prohibitive. If the adversary is bold enough to undertake a battle with regularly constituted fighting units and is beaten by the "forces of order," he still has the possibility of retiring to the maquis and reverting to continuous guerrilla activity, provided that his conviction in the war remains staunch. This was the precise case of General Giap of the Vietminh, beaten in Tonkin in 1951 in a regular engagement by the army of De Lattre. Customarily, a revolutionary army seeks a major military encounter only when it is sure of its numerical, technical, and strategic superiority in a given circumstance (for example, Dien Bien Phu). Until this time arrives the objective will be to drain the morale of the "pacification forces" through interminable raids, ambushes, skirmishes, reprisals, and a steady stream of carefully controlled propaganda.

Civilian Support

One particular condition is absolutely essential for the waging of revolutionary war: the support of the surrounding civilian masses. The revolutionary soldier must be able to disguise himself—sometimes in groups of regimental strength—among the population and reemerge when the time is ripe. He must be, as Mao Tse-tung puts it, like "the fish in water." Mao also writes that "revolutionary war is the war of the popular masses; it cannot be waged except... by enlisting their support." Therefore, it is to this "mass" that the counterrevolutionary army must likewise address itself: first, by the interdiction of the enemy's grasp over the indigenous population through both force and persuasion; second, by rallying the sentiments of the people to the cause of the "forces of order."

The mass, according to the most systematic theorists, is inert; it blows as the wind blows. Consequently, it becomes a question of employing a spectrum of means in the most advantageous manner if the allegiance of the mass is to be obtained. "Cette masse est à prendre," declares Colonel Charles Lacheroy, former chief of the Psychological Action Service of the Ministry of Defense. "Comment la prend-on?" For it is elementary and undisputed in la guerre révolutionnaire that the first step is that of forming a base for revolutionary activity.
The axiom cuts both ways, because it is equally essential to the "forces of order" that their base of operations should be protected and a core of sympathy created among the surrounding inhabitants. With absolute military decision unavailable, the struggle becomes one for the allegiance and control of the population. This lesson has been analyzed frequently in the light of modern experience: where Ho Chi Minh succeeded brilliantly in extending his sway through the creation of popular support, Markos, the Greek Communist, failed in 1947 because of casual and ineffective methods of political indoctrination among the masses.

It becomes evident that if la guerre révolutionnaire is sometimes a war of terror and torture (as the experiences of Algeria have abundantly shown), it is also a conflict of persuasion, manipulation, and compulsion. If there is nothing strikingly novel about the circumstance—for history is studded with the effects of illustrious persuasion—the scientification of the techniques employed is at least a significant innovation. This is, perhaps, the most confused and interesting aspect of la guerre révolutionnaire, and the one which we shall proceed to examine.

Psychological Weapons

The psychological weapon has been used in warfare since time immemorial, but never have its manipulators been so conscious of their activity as such as in this present "century of total war." The role of Communist "agitprop" and the function of the Hitlerian mass spectacles, hate campaigns, and "blood and soil" motifs are too well-known to require comment here. Today, propaganda technique and subsidiary uses of mass psychology may be at the total service of an aggressive ideology, one which either holds the formal levers of command in a nation-state or aspires to do so through subversion.

The French, more than any other Western nation, have experienced this pertinent factor in combat. The incessant psychological warfare of intense ideological character waged by the Vietminh against their own troops, the population of the country, the French Expeditionary Force, and the people of neighboring states easily convinced certain French officers that the Communist contagion could not be checked unless determined steps were taken to adopt some of these same methods in the West. The shattering experiences suffered in the prisoner of war camps of Ho Chi Minh furnished a final complement to the more indirect techniques of visual and audial propaganda.
An essential ingredient of la guerre révolutionnaire was the unprincipled use of psychological warfare. Increasingly, influential spokesmen in the French services, humiliated and smarting from the defeat of 1954, began to demand immediate action through improved methods of troop education and the establishment of psychological warfare services that could enable French forces to meet the revolutionary challenge on its own terms wherever it might break out in the future.

With regard to the psychological aspects of modern war, French military theorists divide the range of action into two components which they label respectively la guerre psychologique and l'action psychologique. Normally, the two terms would convey the dichotomy of "propaganda" as opposed to "information," but it is quite evident that these have become confused and that propaganda is paramount in both instances. La guerre psychologique comprises those elements of propaganda, psychological riposte, and demonstration which are specifically directed toward the forces of the enemy and designed to undermine his will to resist. In this sense it corresponds roughly with what the U.S. Army terms "tactical" or "strategic" operations in its Psywar doctrine.

L'action psychologique, on the other hand, embraces those efforts which either contribute to the morale and allegiance of the indigenous populations or to the fighting will of the "forces of order" themselves. This would recall a blend, in American military terms, of troop information and education and the aspect of Psywar known as "consolidation operations."²

It is not difficult to see that in a fluid campaign such as the Algerian where small forces are individually engaged in combat and where the enemy fighter and the civilian, in conformity with the "fish in water" principle of la guerre révolutionnaire, are frequently indistinguishable, the two jurisdictions have a tendency and a temptation to overlap. Nevertheless, the distinction is clearly drawn in the significant instruction to the armed forces signed by the (then) Minister of the Armies, M. Pierre Guillaumat, on 28 July 1959, the ostensible purpose of which was to curb many of the independent and deep-rooted abuses of the psychological arm that the Algerian war and its surrounding political milieu had produced.³
Inasmuch as the province of la guerre psychologique is, at least in theory, fairly closely confined to those techniques familiar to the American military services (loudspeaker and leaflet operations, radio broadcasting operations, and special interrogation of prisoners), attention shall be devoted more exclusively to those elements comprehended in the term l'action psychologique, the direction of information and propaganda toward friendly or at least neutral targets.

Political Indoctrination

The origins of the pressure for a doctrine of psychological action in the French services were assuredly both theoretical and visceral. We have already spoken at some length of the theoretical in connection with la guerre révolutionnaire. Now we must briefly evoke the experience of Indochina on the human and emotional scale. In the compounds of the Vietminh the prisoners experienced constant political indoctrination, including compulsory study groups, lectures, and classes on Marxist texts. "Political progress" was encouraged through systems of rewards and punishments, creation of fear, doubt, and apprehension among the subjects, enforced autocriticism, and the whole battery of psychological manipulation which we collectively call "brain washing."

This novel and debilitating process left deep scars on the returning officers. If it did not make many Communists, it did make a group of embittered professional soldiers who reserved whatever anger they could not muster for the Vietminh to the system, the politicians and the insouciant civilian population of France in general—in short, the whole complex of democratic organization that had defended them and itself so badly against a little-understood menace. Liberal democracy stood, in a sense, condemned as ineffectual. "One will never insist enough on this point: propaganda directed from the base of a mild-mannered democracy loses nine-tenths of its chances, while on the contrary it achieves its maximum efficiency from the base of a clean, hard organization of parallel hierarchies," fumed Colonel Lacheroy, himself a former inmate of the Vietminh. Although this article does not touch upon the intense political ramifications of the action psychologique movement, it is appropriate to point out that variations of Lacheroy's attitude were instrumental in the unwillingness of the French services to defend the waning prerogatives of the Fourth Republic in May 1958.
Generally speaking, the mode of thinking in 1954-56, when *l'action psychologique* was germinating, was the following: when the adversary is unscrupulous, what is fair is what works. And what works can be admired, even if the one who has delivered the hard lesson inspires nothing but hate. This was to lead a number of French officers to the detailed examination of the methods employed by the Vietminh in the Indochina War as well as to the study of a number of central Communist and psychological texts which provided both a justification and a methodology of the type of warfare they were proposing. The anguish of the Indochina defeat gave rise to serious questioning of democratic military doctrine. In a lecture given at Nice on 20 July 1957, Lacheroy exclaimed:

"In Indochina, as in China, as in Korea, as elsewhere, we observe that the strongest seems to be beaten by the weakest. Why? Because the norms we used for weighing our opposing forces, those traditional norms, are dead. We have to face up to a novel form of warfare, novel in its accomplishments and novel in its achievements."

Many of the officers who came back from Vietminh prison camps found themselves posted to the faculties of the war colleges and to the higher staffs in their quality as participants in the most recent war. Others "prepared certificates in psychology and sociology." They shared and compared experiences. A clarion article by the brilliant and dogmatic General Lionel Chassin, who had been De Lattre's air deputy in Indochina, served as a rallying point for the discontented. He wrote:

"It is time for the army to cease being the grande muette. The time has come for the Free World, unless it wishes to die a violent death, to apply certain of its adversary's methods. And one of these methods--probably the most important resides in the ideological role which, behind the Iron Curtain, has been assigned to the military forces."

In March and April 1955 the review Hommes et Mondes furnished an operational sketch of proposals related to the Chassin criticism. Written under the collective nom de plume of "Milites," the article began with a section entitled "L'Armée en Marge de la Nation." Positive means for encouraging a common understanding of aims between the army and the French metropolitan population were urged. A later section called for the revitalization of the traditional values of the nation through educational reform, with a particular target being the younger citizens. The army, said the article, would be
prepared to "give the citizens a 'moral armature' against an aggression which would be not only material but psychological . . . show him how to fight effectively on both the material and psychological planes."6

Army-Youth Committee

Partly as a result of the "Milites" study, an Army-Youth committee, establish by the government in 1953, was revitalized under the presidency of General Jacques Faure. At a meeting of representatives of this group held at Chamonix in February 1956, Faure urged his young listeners to seek a "precise inventory" of national myths and to weigh "their emotional density." At the same time an ambitious troop information program was instituted at all echelons, making use of much psychological material in its presentation and particularly directed toward anti-Communist indoctrination. Thus the primary steps were taken in accordance with the doctrine of la guerre révolutionnaire to protect the base, "protéger les arrières."

In the meantime the military analysts addressed themselves to the matter of technique itself. Some of the extremists unquestionably would have preferred to see a more authoritarian line of political command proceeding from the highest government sources in Paris. This would have inhibited daily vacillations of policy and eased the task of imposing the new methods which had had such a startling fund of potency in the hands of Ho Chi Minh. Others, while endorsing the reorientation of psychological warfare to meet the needs of combating the enemy in Algeria, were more content to work within the traditional structures provided by modern democratic convention.

In any case, from 1956 on the fledgling Psychological Action Service (SAPI), which now had its own command channels and which furnished an officer to all military staffs (5ème bureau), found itself--owing to the exigencies of the Algerian conflict--with considerable local license and autonomy, ample funds, and a constant ability to multiply its activities in what normally would be construed as the civilian sphere. A directive on the subject of the aims of the war by the Resident Minister for Algeria, M. Robert Lacoste, published in June 1956, did much to regularize and legitimize the new concept of warfare which was increasingly thrown into the breach as the volume of the rebellion mounted.
Natural Laws

An intellectual substratum, sometimes misused or misconstrued, governed the French practice of psychological action, or at least was often used to justify it scientifically. It was believed—and indeed the belief is shared by many psychologists—that there were rules, almost amounting to natural laws, which could be discovered pertaining to the imposition of obedience on amorphous crowds, such as the Islamic peoples of North Africa. The works of Lenin and Trotsky were combed for all points relating to crowd behavior, and the unsystematic science behind the nefarious art of Hitler and Goebbels was studied. Other pioneer, and often native, crowd sociologists, such as Gustave Le Bon, hinted at laws and techniques that were introduced helter-skelter into the arsenal.

Probably the most influential maître de pensée was the Russian émigré psychologist Serge Tchakhotine, a disciple of Pavlov, who maintained in his book, The Rape of Crowds by Political Propaganda, that crowds could indeed be manipulated by clever oratory and skillful demonstrations through the induction of "conditioned reflexes." Tchakhotine, who, although himself a Marxist, had absorbed much of the Hitlerian method from residence in late-Weimar Germany, set great store in the mounting of mass demonstrations, use of symbols (Swastika, goosestep, and Roman salute); military music, crowd-leader dialogue, and other rhetorical and psychological tricks. More than a little of the Tchakhotinian style can be detected in some of the performances at the Algiers Forum in the days following the 13 May 1958 coup d'état, and directives of the psychological action services from this period clearly reveal the debt.

Although tentative efforts had been made in Indochina from 1952 on (under the auspices of a joint Franco-Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Branch headed by a Vietnamese official Nguyen Huu Long) to riposte against the Vietminh with their own methods, the first systematic use of the new techniques by a Western army was in the Algerian fighting. Three of four newly organized loudspeaker and leaflet companies (Compagnies de Haut-Parleurs et Tracts), formed on the American model, carried anti-FLN propaganda, entertainment, and educational material throughout the ravaged countryside in massive "consolidation operations." At the same time, the SAPI itself, through command directives and through the army's regular weekly publication Le Bled (which attained a circulation of 350,000), concentrated its efforts on keeping morale and will to fight at a high
pitch, counterattacking against "defeatist" propaganda from the métropole, and launching concerted campaigns aiming particularly at the conversion of the urban Moslem populations of the large centers.

A third, and most effective, type of action psychologique was performed by the SAS (Section Administrative Spécialisée) and SAU (Section Administrative Urbaine) officers, numbering more than 500, who had been given their missions in 1955 and 1957, respectively. The former in the countryside, the latter in the cities, these men had no direct hierarchical connection with the cinquièmes bureaux, but it often happened in the smaller units that a single officer received both staff designations. The task was to work directly with the indigenous populations in the immediate zone of operations, helping to establish schools, giving sanitary and agricultural advice, distributing food, assisting resettlement, and, of course, winning native allegiances both actively and passively for l'Algérie française.

The terrorist campaigns of the FLN waged in 1955-56 had been extremely effective in depriving the "forces of order" of indigenous support, and it fell upon the shoulders of the SAS and SAU to deny this support to the enemy both through a variety of humane acts and the exercise of positive military control in the "spoiled" areas. A day-by-day account of these operations is furnished in the well-known Nous Avons Pacifié Tazalt, by Jean-Yves Alquier, a reserve lieutenant of the SAS.

Unquestionably, this experiment in civil-military relations bore much good fruit and some bad. It is, perhaps, the most extensive example of "consolidation operations" in the history of Western armies. It would, however, be mistaken to assign its entire origin to the new doctrine of l'action psychologique, for in many respects it resembles and conforms with the pattern of colonial relationship recommended by Marshal Lyautey, especially in his essay "Du Rôle Colonial de l'Armée," written over 50 years ago.

New Techniques

Two aspects of the new doctrine which, however, owe little or nothing to French colonial tradition and have been of paramount importance in the conduct of the Algerian campaign are the techniques of relocation of populations and political reeducation. Usually, especially in the case of rural populations, the two operations are
combined. It had been noticed that the relatively static role of village populations in Vietnam had worked to the advantage of the enemy. It had given him the opportunity to choose his targets like sitting ducks, unlimited means for subversion and infiltration (pourrissement), and a possibility of establishing his bases far to the rear of the outposts of the French Expeditionary Force.

In Cambodia, however, a mass resettlement of rural populations (about 600,000), made possible by the greater availability of arable land and the less emphatic association of the Khmers with their village community, had had the effect of snatching a malleable and easily terrorized population out of the enemy grasp, while the pacification could be pursued in earnest in the vacated territory. The enemy, no longer able to rely on levies and extortions from the intimidated villagers, was forced to fall back on his regular bases. In the meantime, the uprooted people were resettled in stockaded villages suited for autodefense, erected by military labor, and kept under close surveillance by the "forces of order." Often the facilities of the new habitations were much improved.

Because of the regular rectangular layout imposed in the reconstruction for reasons of internal security, the technique became known as quadrillage ("gridding"). Quadrillage also implied that spheres of authority in the area could be well-delineated. This produced, we may say guardedly, a measure of military control and guidance previously unexperienced in both city and country; at the same time it notably improved conditions of hygiene, diet, medication, and the general standard of living. The dislocated natives often became, in effect, wards of the army. 

Political Indoctrination

The program of resettling the population has been carried out at high speed in Algeria, a country topographically favorable for the operation. It is estimated that between a million and a half and two million Moslem Algerians have changed their residence under these conditions. As soon as they are regrouped in the new villages, it is current practice to grant them a liberal amount of political indoctrination according to the precepts of l'action psychologique. The themes of intégration and social evolution are steadily applied, confidence in General de Gaulle as a kind of totemistic figure is reinforced, and the lies and treachery of the FLN are exposed and condemned. What the effects of this massive undertaking will finally be is difficult to
predict, but we may say that it has promoted the "pacification" of numerous sectors of the country despite the opposition of a stubborn and resourceful enemy, himself highly skilled in the practice of la guerre révolutionnaire.

Another undoubted success of l'action psychologique was the pacification of the Casbah of Algiers by Colonels Godard and Trinquier at the end of 1957 and beginning of 1958. Here, there was no question of relocating populations in an area honeycombed with FLN agents that were able to control the section through threats of terror and exemplary reprisals. Colonel Godard himself broke the enemy network by penetrating it in disguise and uncovering its operations. The ratissage that followed was neither lovely nor particularly humane, but the show of force had the effect of liberating the bulk of the people from the silent terror. Thereupon, the troops of the SAU proceeded to carry out the same kind of "consolidation operations" commented on elsewhere.

The events of the forum and the referendum of 1958, on the other hand, even if they do, in part, suggest the atmosphere of Tchakhotine, owe their success to much more "traditional" methods and to the personal prestige of General de Gaulle. It is appropriate also to remark that the General, himself a master of psychological action, has never taken a very kindly view of the new techniques, feeling them to be an abuse of the normal activities of the armed services. Consequently, it is not surprising that a more serious check has been placed on l'action psychologique in Algeria since 1958 than ever existed under the last four governments of the Fourth Republic. In the meantime, the controlled use of psychological methods for achieving military and political aims has become an approved part of French military doctrine, as has the concept of la guerre révolutionnaire.

Conclusions

It should be noted that these phenomena have attracted a great deal of attention in the French press, most of it unfavorable. I do not propose to judge this point. The excesses which the exponents of l'action psychologique on occasion permit themselves are quite obvious and need not be spelled out in an article which strives to avoid the polemical. The outstanding question appears to be this: How is it practical and morally defensible that "Western, Christian, and Mediterranean values" can be defended through recourse to the
methods of the very enemy that is seeking to destroy these values? Is there a judicious balance? Where precisely can the line be drawn? Maurice Mégret, a distinguished writer on military topics, construes l'action psychologique as an "infantile malady of information." But perhaps the case is not quite so simple. Certain psychological warfare officers have unquestionably been carried away by the possibilities of the new role they have staked out for themselves. "Call me a Fascist if you like," said Colonel Trinquier in an interview in 1958, "but we must make the people easy to manage; everyone's acts must be controlled."9

The association of certain 5ème bureau officers with the leaders of the Algiers rebellion of January 1960 has been widely noted, leading to the suppression of the SAPI in Algeria and to the indictment of its zonal chief. "Intoxication" is the word the political scientist Maurice Duverger uses to describe this attitude. "What good does it do to fight in the name of a cause if one denies and destroys that which he justifies? . . . It is not a matter of replacing one 'intoxication' (the Communist) with another but simply of putting an end to all intoxication."10

No other Western army has reached the point of crisis implicit in the French hesitation about psychological action. Perhaps this is due to the fact that our formal and political institutions are sounder and less subject to crisis. But it is also because we have not experienced the same bitter lessons, in length and intensity, of la guerre révolutionnaire. There may assuredly come a time when it will be necessary to fight such a war, not simply on our own territory or on that of a "modern" nation. Therefore, the French experience and its contingent problems are worth the most carefully detailed scrutiny by our qualified military experts.