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2. Conference on Political Modernization, Social Science Research Council, Committee on Comparative Politics, Dobbs Ferry, June 8-12, 1959.

3. It is significant that the most common weaknesses of civil bureaucracies in the new countries—like exaggerating the importance of procedure to the point of ritualizing the route, and the lack of initiative and of a pragmatic and experimental outlook—are not as serious drawbacks to smooth functioning of military establishment. On the contrary, the very qualities that have hobbled civil administration in these countries have given strength and rigidity to their military establishments.

4. The classic discussion of the spirit of militarism as contrasted with the rational military mind is Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession, New York, 1937.

5. World War II was in itself a decisive event in the birth of many of these countries and, of course, the availability of large quantities of surplus equipment and arms made it realistic to aspire to a modernized army. American military aid has contributed to making the military the most modernized element in not only recipient countries, but also in neighboring countries which have felt the need to keep up with technological advances.

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1. The term "partisan war" or "partisan actions" is a euphemism. It does not mean "guerrilla war" in the modern sense but stands for terrorism, holdups and robberies. So-called "expropriations" of money were directed against banks, taxation agencies, post offices, customs houses, railroad stations and similar establishments where large sums of cash were likely to be stored. However, small firms, such as bakeries and village shops, as well as affluent individuals, also were victimized. In many instances, the "expropriations" were planned by professional "fingermen" and executed by expert robbers. Terror was practiced on policemen, soldiers and officials, both in cities and in the rural areas. Operations in the cities were conducted by small "combat groups"; forays in the countryside were sometimes executed by large armed bands which, under the convenient guise of "partisan warfare," made looting and pillaging a profitable profession. Originally, the social democrats had rejected terrorism, which was a major modus operandi of the social revolutionaries. During 1905 and 1906, however, the incidence of terror increased greatly and the bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party supported it wholeheartedly. In fact, a large percentage of the bombs used in "partisan warfare" was fabricated in a secret bolshevik laboratory run by Leonid B. Krassin. Most mensheviks were opposed both to terror and "expropriations," but it is interesting that G. V. Plekhanov, the founder of Russian Marxism, favored them, at least for a time. The Russian socialists who opposed terrorism argued that "European means of struggle" be used. They feared that terrorism was harming the reputation of the social democrats and worried about the fact that many, if not most, of the "expropriations" were perpetrated by criminal elements, for purposes of their own personal enrichment.

In reading Lenin's discourse, it should be remembered that, in practical terms, he was advocating an alliance between revolution and crime: Lenin did, in fact, enter into agreements with criminal elements during the partisan warfare period. Later, during World War I, he even recommended a notorious highwayman to the Germans for sabotage operations. (The man received pay but did not commit any acts of sabotage.)

While Lenin was penning his treatise on "partisan war," the terrorist phase of the first Russian revolution was reaching its peak. In October 1905 alone, 121 terror acts, 47 clashes between revolutionaries and the police, and 362 expropriations were
reported. While it is impossible to draw up exact statistics of the total terror campaign, there is no question that it cost the lives of more than 5,000 policemen and officials. Several millions of rubles were "expropriated" by criminal and revolutionary elements.

2. The terms, "types" or "forms of struggle," and their variations, such as "combat tactics" and "methods of battle," all of which sound awkward in English, denote a key concept in communist conflict doctrine. The term "struggle" is a short notation for "class struggle." Lenin contends that the tactics and techniques of the class struggle must be altered as situations and conditions change. Socialists should have no dogmatic attachment to one particular type of tactic or a particular weapon but should employ those procedures and means which, singly or in combination, are expedient and effective. The point is important since American policy-makers often assume that the communists are wedded to one particular "type of struggle" and that the communists, once they begin to apply one specific method, will continue to do so. Such an interpretation of bolshevik theory can be reconciled neither with the writings nor the actions of international communism.

3. Lenin alludes here to one of Friedrich Engels' last publications in which, to the chagrin of the radicals, he discussed the difficulties of an armed uprising against a government armed with modern weapons. Engels went so far as to question the usefulness of that revolutionary symbol, the barricade. Lenin also alludes to the gradual shift which at that time was taking place in practically all European socialist parties toward forsaking revolution in favor of evolutionary methods.

4. This refers to a weekly magazine entitled Bes Zaglavia (Without Title), of which sixteen issues were published between February and May 1906 by S. N. Prokopovich, E. D. Kuskova and others. The editors of this magazine were moderate socialists who believed in democracy. They were friendly to the objectives of the left wing of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets).

5. Lenin refers to the mass strike movement which began in August 1905 and in October culminated in one of the most complete general strikes of history. It was this strike movement, and particularly the railroad strike, which forced the Russian government
to proclaim the so-called "October Manifesto" by which a semi-constitutional regime (Max Weber described it as "sham constitutionalism") was promulgated. Incidentally, these strikes neither were called nor run by the socialist leaders but by the liberal-bourgeois parties, especially the Cadets. Lenin's wording suggests that he was completely aware of this historical fact which, however, he was loath to admit in writing. Lenin and other revolutionaries did not return to Russia until an amnesty, late in October 1905, made it safe for them to do so. Only after the middle-of-the-road parties, whose outstanding demands were met by the "October Manifesto," withdrew from the revolution, did the socialists assume leadership of the revolutionary movement.

6. Alexander Helphand, better known as "Parvus," discussed this vexing problem of barricades as early as 1897--that is, two years after Engels had expressed his doubts. "Parvus" pointed out that barricades, while perhaps no longer militarily useful, could serve as rallying points for the aroused and fighting masses. He considered barricades as a predominantly psychological device suitable for bringing the masses into the streets. Obviously, Lenin, who feared "Parvus" as an intellectually superior competitor, did not want to give him credit for this correct prediction, nor did he want to acknowledge that he now adopted "Parvus'" interpretation of barricade tactics.

7. The "affair of January 22, 1905" is better known as "Bloody Sunday." Lenin's undramatic description of this event, which was the tragic overture to the revolution of 1905, probably is due to the fact that neither the social democrats nor the bolshevik faction played any significant role in it. The revolution had started without their assistance. The leading revolutionary figure of Bloody Sunday was Father George Gapon, who originally had been involved in "police socialism" and was cooperating with the social revolutionaries in initiating the revolution.

8. The "Black Hundreds" were combat groups set up by parties of the extreme right in order to fight the revolutionaries. They might be considered the ancestors of the Nazi SA and SS, though their organization was not as strong and their membership fluctuated greatly. The Black Hundreds were openly tolerated by the Tsarist police; there is, in fact, the strong possibility that the police itself secretly created these forces. The Black Hundreds rarely, if ever, succeeded in fighting the revolutionaries directly. They were used for anti-semitic pogroms, mostly in poor Jewish districts. The pogroms
were launched in the hope that counter-terror ultimately would in-
timidate the revolutionaries. (It may be added that, according to
the official version, the pogroms were "spontaneous.") This hope
was based on the mistaken notion, prevalent within the Russian
government and the police, that the revolutionary movement was
largely the creation of Jewish international circles on whose
financial and political support it depended. The assumption was that,
if the Jews in Russia were made to pay for the crimes of the revolu-
tionaries, the Jewish world leaders, in order to save their coreligionists,
would call off the revolution. The frequency and violence of the pogroms
have been over-rated, and the utility of this anti-revolutionary tactic
was very much debated within the Russian government. When it be-
came apparent that pogroms were totally ineffective in halting the
revolution, the Black Hundreds gradually fell into disuse. Their
very existence, however, provided the revolutionaries with excel-
lent arguments for their own terror operations.

From 1906 onward, under the premiership of P. A. Stolypin,
the Revolutionary movement was incapacitated by systematic arrests
of revolutionaries, summary executions, exiling to Siberia, and
punitive expeditions against partisan bands.

9. The term "armed struggle" is another expression for "par-
tisan action." Lenin had in mind violent actions executed by small
groups for secondary objectives such as terrorism and robbery.
The term does not denote armed uprising.

10. According to the official legend, the bolsheviks are opposed
to terrorism. Lenin's article should dispel any false notions about
the bolshevik attitude to political assassinations. Lenin makes it
perfectly clear that a true bolshevik never can be against terrorism
as a matter of principle: he should oppose terror only if and when
murder is inexpedient and ineffective. The bolshevik, by the same
token, should favor political assassinations whenever they promise
to advance the communist cause.

11. Thus Lenin admitted that many of the so-called "expropri-
ations" were simply robberies. While Lenin did not openly advocate
robberies as a convenient source of income for professional revolu-
tionaries, the "expediency" which he championed was broad enough
to include such use of "expropriations."
12. According to the Lenin Institute, Lenin was describing an expropriation which took place on March 26, 1906 at Dushet, near Tiflis, and which was carried out by six men disguised as soldiers of the 263rd Infantry Regiment. The Lenin Institute stated that 315,000 rubles were expropriated. If Lenin's party treasury received only the 200,000 rubles to which he was referring, then 115,000 rubles must have remained in the hands of the "expropriators." Souvarine commented that the robbers were socialist-federalists (that is, they belonged to one of the many splinter groups of the Social Revolutionary Party) and that the bolsheviks got hold of this money "by ruse" (op. cit., p. 91). In other words, true to their Marxian philosophy, they expropriated the expropriators. Note that the action of Dushet was not the expropriation in which Stalin participated. Stalin earned his laurels as a bank robber on 26 June, 1907, in Tiflis. In the course of that raid, no less than ten bombs were thrown and 431,000 rubles (or $170,000) seized. The Moscow expropriation was carried out on March 20, 1906, by twenty armed men who attacked a bank, disarmed four guards and took 875,000 rubles, just as Lenin indicated in the text. For a useful discussion of some of these events, the reader is referred to Alexandre Spiridovich, Histoire de Terrorisme Russe (Paris: Payot, 1930).

13. Novoye Vremya was a leading conservative paper. During 1906, the Lettish revolutionary movement was very well organized and registered some of the more notable successes of the first Russian revolution. The Baltic provinces were the scene of a great deal of partisan action in the modern sense, which it took Russian military forces considerable time to suppress. Socialist ideology contributed only mildly to the Lettish movement's strength: nationalist feelings were a more significant factor. This is one of the first instances of the socialist-nationalist "amalgam" in guerrilla war.

14. Lenin wanted to imply that the partisan actions usually were carried out by authentic "proletarians." There is no evidence to support this statement. The "plotting intellectuals" continued to play a dominant role, and peasants were at least as important in this struggle as workers.

15. This is a reference to the Cadet Party led by P. N. Milyukov.

16. While Lenin's analysis is accurate, he did underrate the importance of the national question during the first Russian revolution. Subsequently he assigned a far higher value to nationalism as a revolutionary factor.
17. Lenin was referring to the Polish Socialist Party of which Joseph Pilsudski was the most prominent leader. It is significant that Pilsudski personally led one of the most daring expropriation attacks on a Polish post office himself. Lenin never participated in any of the partisan actions which he was advocating so fervently.

18. This obtuse sentence is of significance only to firm believers in the Marxian doctrine. Lenin wanted to say that some types of struggle would bring the proletariat closer to the middle classes, while others would lead it into closer relationships with the Lumpen-proletariat and, possibly, with the very poor peasants. His point was that the socialist ideology would preserve the pure class character of the proletarian movement, regardless of the means of struggle employed by it.

19. Lenin presumably meant that if the party loses control over operations, other social forces may be able to exploit the proletarian movement for their purposes.

20. The following paragraph was written by Lenin as a footnote to his article. We have inserted it into the main text to enhance clarity.

21. Not all the bolsheviks were in favor of partisan action.

22. This amounts to Lenin recommending terrorism.

23. Lenin was referring to the resolution adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party at Stockholm during April and May 1906. The difference between Lenin's views and that of the majority of the "unification congress" was considerably greater than indicated here, but Lenin at that time found it necessary to keep his peace with the party, especially since he was not certain of the wholehearted support of his bolsheviks. The Stockholm resolution opposed theft, the expropriation of private funds and of bank accounts, forced contributions, the destruction of public buildings, and railroad sabotage. Lenin succeeded in convincing the congress that it should allow the confiscation of government funds, provided expropriation could be carried out by a revolutionary organization and on its orders. The congress also approved terrorist actions in cases of self-defense.

In September 1906, the Moscow Bolshevik Party Committee issued a resolution which came out far more radically in favor of
partisan war. It proclaimed "offensive tactics" to be the only useful tactics. The party was called upon to organize partisan war in cities and villages against the government. The party was to liquidate the most active representatives of the government and to seize money and arms. The resolution suggested that the population at large be invited to support the partisan war. Lenin was in favor of this more radical policy. This article in its entirety is essentially a polemic against the softer resolution of the Stockholm congress.

24. This important sentence refers to uprisings in capital cities. Many revolutionaries believed that the seizure of power could be accomplished by a sudden one-thrust insurrection against the seat of government. Lenin's remark foreshadows the development of Mao Tse-tung's operational doctrine and basically enlarges the concept of uprising into that of civil or guerrilla war.

25. This unclear sentence presumably means that it is wrong to confuse tactics with ideology. Factions of the socialist movement, distinguished from other factions largely by ideological differences, usually had a preference for specific forms of struggle. Conversely, a group specializing in one particular type of combat might be inclined to a correlated ideological orientation. Lenin suggested that the tactics of the revolutionary movement be discussed on their own merit and that ideological questions be discussed in ideological terms.

26. Commenting on Lenin's assertion that the party instead of teaching the masses, is being schooled by them, and that partisan war emerged spontaneously as a riposte to actions by the Black Hundreds, the army and the police, Souvarine said that Lenin's point could be summarized in this fashion: "All that is spontaneous is necessary." This is a paraphrase of a statement by Hegel, all too frequently quoted by Marxists: "All that is real is reasonable." Note the value which Lenin ascribed to spontaneity—a value quite at variance with the subsequent development of the "Leninist-Stalinst doctrine," which claimed to be opposed to spontaneity and placed instead the highest value on organization.

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1. Franklin Lindsay, "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Affairs, January 1962, p. 264-274.


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12. Ruble Diplomacy in Underdeveloped Areas.


2. The "East" is used here in the Soviet geo-political sense to mean "the countries of Asia and Africa which have long been the object of colonial expansion and which for a long time had or still have the status of colonies or semi-colonies. . . there are two Easts: the countries of the East where the power of the bourgeoisie is no more and where imperialist oppression has been overthrown; and countries of the East where capitalism still rules, where imperialist oppression has retained its strength and where it is still necessary to fight for independence, driving out the imperialists." The Large Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. IX, 2nd ed., 1951, quoted in A. R. C. Bolton, Soviet Middle Studies: An Analysis and Bibliography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), I, pp. 1, 2.


4. Theses and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, Moscow, 1920, p. 71.

5. Ibid., pp. 74-75.


8. Ibid., p. 272.

9. Theses and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, p. 72.


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20. Mirovai Ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshennia, No. 8.

21. E. M. Zhukov, "The October Revolution and the Rise of the National-Liberation Movement," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 9 (1957), pp. 39-44. As Walter Laqueur points out, the arguments drawn from the prevalence of feudal elements in the East and the necessity of eliminating them, had also been known to Lenin and Stalin. They, however, had reached very different political conclusions, namely, that the "national bourgeoisie" were unwilling to eradicate the 'feudal remnants' and were more afraid of the native proletariat than of foreign imperialism.
"If the latter-day experts took a more charitable view of the 'national bourgeoisie' in the East, it was the result of their recognition of new political rather than new economic trends." Walter Z. Laqueur, "The National Bourgeoisie, A Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East," International Affairs, XXXV, No. 3 (July 1959), p. 328.


30. Douglas C. Dillon, "The Challenge of Soviet Economic Expansion," Department of State Bulletin (May 25, 1959) p. 762. Soviet propagandists have, quite understandably, vigorously rejected this "two-stage" theory, maintaining the "the purpose of that bogus theory is, first, to stir up trouble between the Arab and socialist countries, and, second, to incite the Arabs against the Communists. ... Either the Arabs, with the support of the socialist countries, win the battle for economic emancipation and in that case the question of their full national liberation will be solved once for all, or, influenced by the "two stage theory," fall into the imperialist trap and come under imperialist tutelage," E. Maximov, "Evil Theory," New Times No. 42 (October, 1959), pp. 15-17.

31. This was made quite explicit by Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress when he declared: "We do not conceal the fact that we and some leaders of the U.A.R. have different views in the ideological field, but in
questions of struggle against imperialism, in the matter of strengthening the political and economic independence of the countries which have freed themselves from colonialism, in the struggle against the danger of war, our positions coincide with the positions of those same leaders. Difference in ideological views must not hinder the development of friendly relations between our countries, and the cause of the common struggle against imperialism."


33. Theses and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, p. 75.

34. Program of the Communist International, p. 58.

35. In this connection Stalin rhetorically asked: Have not "the imperialists always looked upon the East as the basis of their prosperity? Have not the inestimable natural resources (cotton, oil, gold, coal, ores) of the East been an 'apple of discord' between the imperialists of all countries? . . . But it is not only the wealth of the East that the imperialists need. They also need the 'obedient' manpower which abounds in the colonies and semi-colonies of the East. . . . That is why they call the Eastern countries their 'inexhaustible' reserve. It is the task of Communism to . . . deprive world imperialism of its 'most reliable' rear and 'inexhaustible' reserve. Without this, the definite triumph of socialism, complete victory over imperialism, is unthinkable." Stalin, "Don't Forget the East," Works, IV, pp. 174-176.


38. Quoted in Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 195.

39. Quoted in ibid., p. 264.

40. The U. S. S. R. imported from the East; rice, dried fruit, wool, cotton, live animals, hides, other products of livestock breeding, furs, raw silk, and similar non-industrial commodities. It exported to the East
cotton and linen materials, thread, sugar, paper, galoshes, oil products, iron, steel, and agricultural machinery; after the completion of the Five-Year Plan it also exported machinery and equipment for industrial plants, electrical appliances, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and various other finished industrial articles. Torgovye, otnosheniia SSSR so stranami vostoka, (Moskva: V/O "Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga," 1938), p. 15.


42. Baykov, op. cit., p. 67.


44. As applied by the U.S.S.R. to its own activities, the term "technical assistance" means the rendering of assistance by Soviet technicians in connection with the assembly of equipment which the contracting government has bought from the Soviet Union. The term is also applied to the training of technicians in the U.S.S.R. for compensation from a contracting government, usually in conjunction with the sale of Soviet equipment. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Soviet Technical Assistance, Staff Study No. 7, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 1.


47. Middle East Economist and Financial Service, XIV, No. 3 (March, 1960), p. 35.


49. Khrushchev made a valiant, if somewhat unconvincing, effort to establish an economic basis for Soviet-UAR trade when he stated on the occasion of President Nasser's visit to the U.S.S.R. in May 1958:
"What are the Arab countries rich in? . . . Oil figures largely in the external economic and trade relations of the Arab countries. But nature has not been unkind to our country in this respect. We also have unlimited oil reserves. The Arab countries are blessed with plenty of sunshine, and favorable climatic conditions enable them to grow cotton. . . . We, too, have unlimited possibilities for growing cotton and we grow it in large quantities in our fields. What else do the Arab countries have? They grow bananas and dates, for instance. We have none of these. To please those who are partial to bananas and dates we can buy them, by agreement, from the United Arab Republic . . . ." Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 379-380.

50. Quoted in Scott, loc. cit., p. 36.

51. Quoted in Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 195.


55. Torgovie otnoshenia SSSR so stranami vostoka, p. 15.


58. Statutes and Theses of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, p. 74.


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14. The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples.

1. For typical discussions see Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Socialdemokratie (Vienna, 1907), pp. 494-97 et passim; Rudolf Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (Vienna, 1910; Berlin, 1947), p. 441.

2. For an excellent analysis of the economic impact of the West on the rural economies of Southeast Asia, where the results are most clearly apparent today, see Erich Jacoby, Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia (New York, 1949).

3. Bauer (op. cit., pp. 262-63) has given the classic formulation of this relationship in his analysis of the problem of national conflicts in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire which showed some formal resemblance to the situation in the backward regions today. The resemblance was superficial, however, since the lines of conflict were far less clearly drawn in Austria-Hungary, especially as regards professional and intellectual groups.

4. It is noteworthy that variations of both types of Communist propaganda have also been attempted in western Europe in the last three years. The Marshall Plan, for example, has been presented to Europeans as an attempt on the part of the United States to impose its political rule over the Continent and to throttle its industries, without, however, carrying the conviction it enjoys in Asia.


8. See statement of Ho Chi Minh's newly constituted Laodong party, which "pledges itself to follow the heroic example of the Communist party of China, to learn the Mao Tse-tung concept which has been leading the peoples of China and Asia on the road to independence and democracy" (Viet-Nam News Agency, English Morse to Southeast Asia, March 21, 1951). Likewise, the ruling body of the Indian Communist party fell into line with the general trend by declaring its adherence to Mao's strategy (Crossroads /Bombay/, March 10, 1950).

9. Failure to appreciate the true direction of the Communist appeal in these areas frequently causes some observers to commit the mistake of minimizing its effectiveness. Thus, Mr. Richard Deverall, the AF of L representative in these areas and an otherwise very perceptive student of the subject, ventures the opinion that Communist propaganda in these areas is mere "rubbish" because it is for the most part couched in terms which hold no interest for the masses, having meaning only for intellectuals (see his "Helping Asia's Workers," American Federationist, September, 1951, p. 16). Mr. Deverall's account of the nature of Communist propaganda is quite accurate, but, if the thesis presented above is a valid estimate of the current situation in Asia, he has not drawn the conclusion which follows from the evidence.

10. In most backward areas the tie to the countryside is still apparent in the tendency of laborers engaged in industry and mining periodically to drift back to the village (W. E. Moore, "Primitives and Peasants in Industry," Social Research, XV, No. 1 (March, 1948), 49-63). See also the observations of Soetan Sjahrir in his Out of Exile, trans. C. Wolf (New York, 1949), pp. 74-75, concerning the mental outlook of the masses in these regions. This fact was not lost on the leaders of the Communist movement. In the 1928 resolution on colonial strategy the Sixth Comintern Congress noted that the proletariat "still have one foot in the village," a fact which it recognized as a barrier to the development of proletarian class consciousness (see International Press Correspondence /Vienna/, VIII, No. 38 (December 12, 1928), 1670).


15. "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-colonies; Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International" (adopted September 1, 1928), International Press Correspondence, VIII, No. 88 (December 12, 1928), 1670.

16. Though cognizant of the role of the intellectuals in the Chinese party, Benjamin Schwartz's illuminating study, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, 1951), falls short of an appreciation of its significance by focusing attention on a purely strategic problem--Mao's peasant-oriented movement--and concluding from this that Mao's ideology represents a radical break with classical Leninism.


18. Mao Tse-tung's excursion into an instrumentalist approach to Marxian philosophy is one manifestation (see his "On Practice," Political Affairs [organ of the United States Communist party], April, 1951, pp. 28-42).

19. People's War (organ of the CPI) (Bombay), June 13, 1943.


22. Ibid., pp. 80-82.


25. This is all the more true of large sections of Southeast Asia, where the land problem is not identical with the structure of ownership distribution and where no direct correlation prevails between tenancy and poverty. In large sections of this region the problem arises largely from the primitive credit and marketing facilities rather than from concentration of land titles.

26. Communist leaders are not loath to recognize that this cleavage exists between the immediate interests of the masses and the party's long range perspectives (see Liu Shao-chi, "On the Party," *Political Affairs*, October, 1950, p. 88).

27. The document from which this passage is taken is contained in a Malaya Communist party publication titled *How To Look After the Interests of the Masses* ("Emancipation Series," No. 5), published secretly by the Freedom Press in Malaya, December 15, 1949, and made public after its seizure by the local authorities. Another document titled "Resolution To Strengthen Party Character" reaffirms the doctrine of democratic centralism against the more "extremist democratic" demands of some of the members. For an expression of the same standpoint regarding the relation between the party and the masses from a Chinese source see Liu Shao-chi, "On the Party."

28. An otherwise excellent discussion by Miss Barbara Ward verges on this error, especially in its opening remarks. See her article in the *New York Times Magazine*, March 25, 1951.
29. For the text of Lenin's remarks see Selected Works, X, 239-40.

30. "Theses on National and Colonial Questions." See also the speech of Zinoviev at the Congress of Eastern Peoples held in Baku, 1920 (I. S'zed Narodov Vostoka September 1-8, 1920, Baku, Stenograficheskii Otchet /Petrograd, 1920/).


32. Except in Kiangsi and Fukien in the late 1920's and later discontinued. Similarly, the radical confiscatory program of 1946-49 was abandoned with the Communist's final accession to power.


34. Mao Tse-tung, On the Present Situation and Our Tasks (East China Liberation Publishers, 1946); see also remarks of Liu Shao-chi in People's China, July 16, 1950.


36. Wu Min, "Industry of People's China Grows," For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! November 17, 1950, p. 4. This outright nationalistic appeal to the interests of domestic business groups is also plainly apparent in the latest draft program of the Indian Communist party (see For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! May 11, 1951, p. 3).


38. Viet-Nam News Agency in English Morse to Southeast Asia, April 12, 1951.
39. Viet-Nam News Agency in English Morse to Southeast Asia, March 18 and April 10, 1951.


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22. Civic Action.

1. United States Information Service.


3. Force Armée du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces) [Lao].

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25. Revolutionary War and Psychological Action.

1. See the recent American work Protracted Conflict, by Robert Strausz-Hupé, et al., New York, 1959, which analyzes this situation with exemplary insight.


4. Le Monde, 4 August 1954. A "parallel hierarchy" denotes the omnipresent party organization in a totalitarian state, always seconding and "paralleling" the regular state administrative apparatus.


7. Governor General Jacques Soustelle signed the decree creating these organisms on 26 September 1955, thereby reviving the old idea of "Arab bureaus," which dated as far back as a hundred years to the time of Marshal Bugeaud. See Building the New Algeria--Role of the Specialized Administrative Sections, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, September 1957.


10. Ibid., 18-19, October 1959.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following books and articles, in addition to those already cited, are suggested for further reading in the areas represented by the foregoing selections. For purposes of serious research, the interested reader is referred to the bibliographies listed at the end.

General


Economic Growth and Development


The Modernization Process: Political, Psychological, and Social Aspects.


Aid and Trade

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. 


Communist Penetration and Foreign Economic Policy


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Area Studies


American University, Washington, D.C., Special Operations Research Office. *Special Warfare Area Handbooks series (by area)*.


Military Aspects of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency


**Bibliographies**


Other Service School Anthologies


