UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS
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PART I

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific will come to order.

Today we begin a series of public hearings on the U.S. policy toward Asia. Subsequent to the completion of the open sessions, the subcommittee, in executive session, will take testimony from executive branch witnesses. Through these hearings, we hope to obtain information from independent non-Government sources on Asia as a whole on its current problems and future trends, as well as the views of our knowledgeable private citizens on our own national policies aimed at that area. The information developed in the course of these hearings we hope will prove valuable to the committee in making decisions which it will be called upon to make in the difficult times ahead.

In order to obtain information concerning Asia and U.S. interests there we have invited to testify before the subcommittee within the next 3 to 4 weeks some of the outstanding experts on this subject. Our first four witnesses will cover various aspects of Communist China's military, political, and economic policies today and in the immediate years ahead.

We are indeed privileged to have with us today Dr. Howard L. Boorman, director, research project on “Men and Politics in Modern China,” Columbia University; Dr. Ralph L. Powell, professor of Far Eastern studies, School of International Service, American University; Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith II, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), an authority on Communist China’s military power and potential; and Dr. Robert F. Dernberger, assistant professor of economics, University of Chicago.

The witnesses have submitted summary statements which are before the members. They will each make a short oral statement of their views which should be limited to 5, and not more than 10 minutes.

For the benefit of the witnesses and others, let me say the subcommittee operates under a 5-minute rule. Each member in turn, is allowed 5 minutes to question the witnesses. After all members present have had the opportunity to question the witnesses, additional questions will be permitted.

We will begin with Dr. Boorman. You may proceed, sir.
Dr. Boorman, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. As a taxpaying voter in the State of Massachusetts, I should also like to commend the committee on its enterprise and prudence in confronting the large questions of policy involved in Asia. The question of Communist China is a problem in national understanding and national policy which the United States will confront for some years ahead.

I should like to read a preliminary statement on the Chinese Communist political system.

The period 1950-65 witnessed both a violent transference of power and property and an unprecedented process of social change in mainland China. The top command at Peiping has created a unified China (except for Taiwan), a new form of government, and a stable (though not rigid) order in Chinese society.

As of January 1966 the major political goals are: (a) domestic: radical social reorganization to attain national modernization in the shortest possible time; and (b) international: radical realignment of the international system to readjust the status quo in world politics and to make Communist China a major world nuclear power.

The Chinese Communist political system is a single-party dictatorship, dominated by a Communist elite which holds a virtual monopoly of real power over the government and the military forces. The party apparatus is relatively exempt from social control (though not influence), and within it decisionmaking is strictly centralized in accordance with the conventional Leninist principle of “democratic centralism.” Unlike the U.S. system, the Chinese political system is characterized by complex intertwining of legislative, executive, and judicial functions, all under the ultimate domination of the Communist Party. The precise extent of consent and coercion in the system is difficult to determine from outside China, but significant groups in the Chinese population do support the present government for patriotic, though not necessarily Marxist, reasons.

Despite the varying influences of geographical, economic, and international factors, policy at Peiping is determined by a compact group of experienced political leaders who are nationalists as well as Communists. The nucleus of power is located in the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, now composed of 17 members and 6 alternates, and dominated in turn by a standing committee of seven Politbureau members. The present Chairman of the Party is Mao Tse-tung; the two senior Vice Chairmen are Liu Shao-chi, the Chief of State, and Chou En-lai, the Premier of the Government. Other prominent members of the power elite include Lin Piao, Minister of National Defense, and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, the General Secretary (or executive officer) of the party structure. The passing of Mao Tse-tung, who was 72 in December 1965, is not likely to affect either the cohesion or the doctrine of the top command during the next few years. Although the decisionmaking process is not as effortless as Peiping’s self-serving English-language news releases indicate, the party veterans are nevertheless bound by years of association.
before gaining national power, by common political doctrine, by shared goals, and by a strong sense of cultural unity, as Chinese.

Peiping's political decisions are implemented through the Communist Party structure. This structure—a pyramid of bureaus, committees, and branches extending throughout the mainland of China—forms the most efficient system of political organization that China has known in the 20th century. The basic tool of control, found in every organized group in China today, is the Communist Party committee or branch, through which Peiping dominates both social and personal life in a manner unparalleled in either the Soviet Union or any other Communist nation. The Chinese Communist Party organization, now estimated to number 17-18 million members, is the largest Communist Party in the world. A merit organization, it constitutes in important respects the actual Government of Communist China. Despite major economic problems and widespread poverty (endemic in China for centuries), the present political system is stable; the likelihood of widespread revolt, exceedingly slim.

Viewed against the background of civil war, political chaos, and currency instability found in China during the first half of this century, the accomplishments of the Communist system constitute major gains for China as a nation. Provided the top leaders maintain a reasonably realistic relationship between their expressed political goals and the (generally unexpressed) aspirations of significant groups in the population, the present political system will contribute substantially to the national power of Communist China during the 1966-70 period.

At the same time, for reasons both quantitative and qualitative, that system is not likely to be a meaningful model for other late-developing nations either in Asia or elsewhere. In this sense, Communist China, like traditional China, remains the great outsider.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Zabelski. Thank you, sir.

(The following biography of Dr. Boorman was submitted for the record:)

Biographical Sketch of Dr. Howard L. Boorman

Director of the research project on "Men and Politics in Modern China," School of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York City.

Personal Background

Born September 11, 1920, at Chicago, Ill. B.A. University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1941. Graduate study, Yale University, 1946-47. Military service, ensign-lieutenant, USNR, 1943-46; duty as Japanese language officer at Washington, Pearl Harbor, Guam, and with 1st Marine Division, Tientsin, China. Presidential Unit Citation.

Professional Experience

HONORS AND ACTIVITIES

Rockefeller Public Service Award, 1954–55. Visiting scholar, University Center in Virginia, 1963. Sometime guest lecturer at the National War College, Department of State, National Defence College (Canada), Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, and many academic institutions.

PUBLICATIONS

(a) Books

(b) Editor

(c) Articles and book chapters
"Peking in World Politics." Pacific Affairs, 34.3, Fall 1961.
(Columbia University, 635 West 115th Street, New York City, February 1966.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Powell.
STATEMENT OF DR. RALPH L. POWELL, PROFESSOR OF FAR EASTERN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Dr. Powell, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege to be invited to testify before this distinguished committee on a problem of vital concern to our national interests and our national security. In order to avoid repetition before the committee, General Griffith and I have divided the military field. In our initial statements, General Griffith will cover conventional military capabilities and the concept of "wars of national liberation," or "peoples' wars." I will devote my initial remarks to the field of nuclear developments and nuclear doctrine.

Communist China is not a superpower, but it is a major military power. It has very large conventional forces, supported by a massive militia reserve. Furthermore, since October 1964, Peiping has carried out two sophisticated atomic weapons tests. Communist China is placing the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability. As a result of these developments, specialists have upgraded their estimates of Chinese capabilities in the atomic field. A number of competent officials and scientists believe that not later than the end of this decade, that is by 1970, Peiping will have developed the hydrogen bomb and will have a limited capability to deliver nuclear warheads by medium-range missiles. By 1975 Communist China may have made an initial deployment of ICBM's, intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of striking the United States. This is a grim prospect.

Nevertheless, at the present time the greatest military weakness of Communist China is the fact that she still lacks an atomic capability or a nuclear deterrent. Hence the leaders of Communist China have sought to develop a nonatomic defense against a possible nuclear attack. This defensive doctrine maintains that China cannot be defeated by nuclear strikes, even if these are accompanied by bacteriological and chemical warfare. The leaders maintain that an invasion must follow and they claim that an invasion can be defeated by a protracted "people's war."

The defensive doctrine is based on the utilization of China's vast terrain, its massive population, and its dispersed industries. Emphasis is placed on vigilance, on self-reliance, and on strengthening both military defenses and political indoctrination. It is claimed that an invasion can be successfully opposed by a defense in depth, a defense employing the dispersed regular forces and a massive militia mobilized under the concept of "Everyone a soldier." It is said that this military conflict will be supported by an indoctrinated and aroused Chinese public.

Since the Chinese Communists are great sloganeers, it is maintained that the enemy will be "bogged down in endless battles" and "drowned in a hostile human sea." In fact, Peiping has literally dared the United States to attack with ground forces in case of war. The Chinese hope that in case of war they will be able to employ their strong suit, which is their massive conventional forces and their even larger militia.
Obviously in this era of multimegaton bombs, the Chinese doctrine of a nonnuclear defense against a possible nuclear attack is of dubious validity. The question is, Why do they still maintain this doctrine? They do it out of necessity. Since they do not have a nuclear deterrent, they have no alternative but to develop the best possible conventional and revolutionary defense against a possible nuclear attack. They hope that their expressed determination to fight a protracted "people's war" will serve as a form of deterrent. They attempt to convince their enemies that an attempt to conquer China would be too costly. However, they may also believe that world public opinion and the continuing risk of eventual Soviet intervention would prevent the United States from employing its atomic arsenal if we were forced into a war with Communist China.

Turning to their own concepts of the employment of atomic weapons, the Chinese Communists have not yet developed what we would call a full-fledged nuclear doctrine. In actual practice, all they have done is issue a series of statements regarding atomic war. Many of these statements are propagandistic and some of them are contradictory. Also, it is very interesting to note that since they began their own atomic testing, the Chinese Communists have actually said less regarding their own development of nuclear weapons and less regarding a doctrine of atomic war than they did before they began their testing program. I assume that one reason is that they do not want to encourage preemptive strikes against their atomic installations. Furthermore, they do not want, unnecessarily, to alienate world public opinion.

Regarding their attitude and views toward nuclear war, the Chinese Communist leaders state that they do not underestimate the terrible effects of nuclear weapons. Yet, recently, they have again been disparaging atomic bombs. They still maintain that men are more important in war than any weapons. They have admitted that thermonuclear war could destroy one-third to one-half of the people of the world. Yet, they maintain that to say that nuclear war would destroy mankind is "absurd." They hold that world war III might totally destroy imperialism and hence capitalism, but they say it would not destroy communism, which would actually expand.

Communist China has pledged that it would never be the first to use atomic arms. And yet Peiping has also said that its own development of nuclear weapons is a "great encouragement to revolutionary peoples," and raises the morale of revolutionaries. Furthermore the Chinese Communist leaders still maintain that atomic bombs are "paper tigers," for they cannot be employed in "wars of liberation" or insurrections, and they cannot be "lightly" employed in any warfare.

Yet, despite their calling atomic weapons "paper tigers," the actions of the Chinese Communists are more cautious than their vitriolic propaganda would indicate. The military doctrines of Communist China are characterized by an element of prudence, as well as by aggressiveness.

Thank you.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Dr. Powell.

(The following biography of Dr. Powell has been submitted for the record.)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

Biographical Sketch of Dr. Ralph L. Powell

Dr. Ralph L. Powell, professor of Far Eastern studies, School of International Service, the American University, was born January 31, 1917, in Salt Lake City, Utah. He attended the University of Southern Idaho (1938) and received the B.A. (1940) from the University of California (Phi Beta Kappa, Levi Strauss scholar, highest honors); certificate (1946), California College in China; the M.A. (1950) and the Ph. D. (1953), Harvard University (John Harvard fellow).

Dr. Powell was an officer, U.S. Marine Corps, 1941-48, and served as a Chinese language specialist. During his military service he was assistant division intelligence officer, 1st Marine Division; commanding officer, Sea School, San Diego, Calif., 1941; officer in charge, Officers Training Detachment, Princeton University, 1943-44; and senior reporting officer, Office of the Naval Attaché, China, 1946-47. He was retired for wounds in 1948.

Dr. Powell was a lecturer and assistant professor of Far Eastern history at Princeton University (1950-54) and a professor of the National War College (1954-56 and 1958-61). He served from 1956 to 1958 as counselor of embassy for public affairs and director of USIS, Taipei, Taiwan. He is currently professor of Far Eastern studies and chairman of the overseas representation program, School of International Service, the American University. Dr. Powell is a consultant to the Research Analysis Corp. and to the Department of State. He is also a member of the Board of Consultants of the National War College.

He is author of "The Rise of Military Power 1895-1912" (1955); "Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China" (1963), and "The Chinese Red Army, 1927-63: An Annotated Bibliography" (in collaboration with E. J. M. Rhodes, et al. 1964). He also contributes articles to professional journals.

Mr. Zablocki. General Griffith, please.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH II, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED)

General Griffith. First, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and the members of your committee for asking me to appear here today. It is a great compliment to be asked to meet with you.

I contributed an article to the January 1965 issue of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Communist China's capacity to make war. I would make no substantial modification to what I said in that article.

Possibly it has escaped the committee's attention that three of your four panelists today are marines. We have, however, agreed among ourselves not to conduct any Marine Corps propaganda on this occasion.

I shall devote a minute or two to a hurried survey of Communist China's military power as it may be expressed in conventional terms.

First, the force structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—which includes Communist China's ground, air, and naval forces—is in a chronic state of imbalance which it will take a major technical, organizational and industrial effort, and many years—in my opinion, at least a decade—to rectify.

This imbalance is particularly evident in categories of her air force, navy, air defense, armored force, airborne and amphibious troops, in her general technical capacities, or perhaps more precisely, the lack of them, and in her as yet primitive logistic capabilities.

Except by the use of ground forces—predominantly infantry—in immediately peripheral areas, China lacks the conventional means to influence events.

China has the ability to inundate the Himalayan border states of Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan. She can, I think, maintain her position
and locally improve it, in the Aksai Chin. If she wishes, she could, I am sure, take over the area south of the McMahon line known as the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), to the line of the Brahmaputra. Here she could use her limited airborne capabilities to good effect. I believe she could conduct these operations simultaneously, and successfully.

But she could not long support conventional operations in NEFA. Anything she might do there would necessarily be limited in terms of both space and time by logistic constraints.

If she finds it necessary or desirable to chastise the Indians again, she can do so, and I do not believe she would be restrained by American or Soviet displeasure, or promises of aid to India.

I, for one, do not believe that China will commit conventional formations to South Vietnam. Advisers and technicians, arms, logistical help of all sorts, including engineers, of course. This is to be anticipated on an ascending scale.

Let me interpolate here that perhaps the members of the committee saw the New York Times article yesterday which gave China credit for deploying Mig 21 aircraft in North Vietnam.

Let me turn briefly to the thesis of national liberation wars enunciated in a systematic way by Defense Minister Lin Piao on September 2, 1965. Lin said nothing really new. Peiping, as you are aware, has been pushing this strategy for some time. Essentially, it is no more than Mao Tse-tung's theory of protracted agrarian-based revolutionary war, which the Chinese Communists hope to project to a larger stage. They naturally have great confidence in this strategy. After all, it worked well for them in China, and they are convinced it will work elsewhere in the context of what they call "oppressed, semi-colonial" societies.

This strategy directly reflects China's realization that (at present at least) she is impotent to influence events in any other way.

It makes a virtue of necessity, and on paper looks good. It seems to promise large gains for a small investment, and at little risk. It is in accord with the ancient Chinese precept which calls for the use of barbarians to control barbarians. It avoids direct confrontation with the United States. At the same time it is designed to keep us busy running about from place to place, to engage our energies, impair our national morale and will, weaken our alliances, and damage our economy.

But how realistic is it? Do the African and South American nations—cast in the role of "storm centers of world revolution" by Peiping—relish this prospect? Why should they? They wish to realize their own destinies without manipulation by aliens who plan to use them as instruments.

It appears to me that Lin Piao's militant and provocative declaration is not going to make new friends for China.

Finally, I am not unduly alarmed by this thesis. I think it is unrealistic and that it will not work. In fact, I think Lin Piao unwittingly gave us a weapon which, if we handle it properly, can be used with telling effect to reveal Communist China as an enemy of international peace, a creator of tension, and a promoter of chaos.

Although we can possibly discuss the rationale which underlies Chinese Communist strategy in more detail later, I would like to mention Mao's "paper tiger" thesis here in the interest of clarifying
possible misapprehension of its nature. This “paper tiger” thesis is often cited to support the view that the Chinese do not appreciate the destructive power of modern arms and that they are going to be reckless.

Well, I can only say that if Mao and his colleagues were reckless, they would not be where they are today. This thesis is neither new nor has anything to do with questions of absolute or relative material power. As early as 1940 in his essay on new democracy, Mao compared capitalism and communism. “Capitalism,” he said then, and I quote, “has reached the stage of decay and death,” whereas communism was “sweeping the world with a momentum of a landslide and the power of a thunderbolt.” He compared the ideological and social systems of capitalism to a person “on the brink of death sinking fast like the sun setting beyond the western hills.” Mao is a poet, incidentally.

I am sure you are all aware of that. On November 6, 1957, Mao, speaking at a Moscow meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., said—

the socialist system will replace the capitalist system in the end. This is an objective law independent of human will.

In his famous interview with Anna Louise Strong in August 1946, Mao used the term “paper tiger” for the first time. The context was—

The atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people—of course the atomic bomb is a weapon of mass destruction, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons. All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance they are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful.

Now from this flows Mao’s corollary:

Strategically (that is to say over the long period), we should slight all enemies and tactically we should take full account of all enemies.

He went on—

We must slight the enemy as a whole, but take full account of him as far as any concrete question is concerned.

I may repeat, so far as each and every concrete question is concerned, to take full account of the enemy.

Strategically, we slight the eating of a meal. We can finish the meal, but when actually eating, we do it a mouthful at a time. It would be impossible for you to swallow the entire feast at a single mouthful.

He called this the one-by-one solution and added “in military literature, it is called ‘smack the enemy one by one’.” I don’t need to labor the relevance of this to Lin Piao’s thesis on wars of national liberation.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, General Griffith.

(The following biography of General Griffith has been submitted for the record:)

Biographical Sketch of Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith II

General Griffith, former Marine Corps officer who speaks Chinese, is also considered one of the authorities on Communist China’s military power and potential. He was formerly associated with the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City. He has just completed a book to be published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations dealing with Communist Chinese military potential. He is the translator of “Sun Tzu—The Art of War,” a Fourth Century B.C. Chinese

Mr. Zablocki. Dr. Dernberger.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT F. DERNBERGER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Dr. Dernberger. I would like to express my appreciation for the privilege of appearing before the subcommittee. Inasmuch as the invitation specified a time limit of 5 to 10 minutes, my statement has been limited to a short summary of Communist China's economic development policy. I hope during the discussion period to answer your specific questions concerning the state of the economy.

I have been a student of the economy of Communist China for the past 10 years, engaged in basic research on various problems. A thorough knowledge of developments in that economy during the past decade, while helpful, does not permit one to analyze present economic conditions in Communist China or predict developments over the next decade with certainty. The flow of quantitative information coming out of Communist China was stopped abruptly following the agricultural crises in 1959. At the same time, the Chinese Communists ceased to seriously discuss plans for the future and turned their attention to the more immediate problem of economic recovery. Nonetheless, I believe an examination of Chinese Communist economic policy in the past is a valid means of determining their most probable action in the future.

By the end of 1955, the Chinese Communists had every reason to be satisfied with their accomplishments. With the exception of agriculture and handicrafts, all major sectors of the domestic economy had been socialized. Among other accomplishments, the domestic economy had been reconstructed in the short span of 3 years and the rampant inflation had been halted in less than 1 year after the Chinese Communists had come to power. During the first 3 years of the first 5-year-plan period, national income, agricultural production, the industrial production of consumers' goods, and industrial production of producers' goods increased rapidly. Even after the upward biases in these official statistics are removed, with the possible exception of agricultural production, the estimated rates of growth remain very high.

These satisfactory developments in the early 1950's were directly related to Communist China's ability to import necessary military equipment and producer's goods from the Soviet Union and Communist countries in Eastern Europe. More important, the import of these items had not been limited to China's capacity to export, but had been financed, in part, by foreign loans and credits. By the end of 1955, however, the loans and credits from the Soviet Union were running out. Faced with the problem of the change in direction of capital flows and the need to reduce imports, the Chinese Communists chose two seemingly simple solutions. To increase the rate of growth in agriculture, that sector was completely socialized in 1956. In their desire to maintain a high rate of growth of industrial production, the Chinese Communists increased basic construction investment by approximately 60 percent. The required export
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surplus for loan repayments, the large increase in investment, and Communist China’s growing aid program all served to increase drastically the pressure on the domestic sources of investment funds in 1956. Realized internal receipts in the budget increased by only 16 percent and a large budget deficit led to a large expansion of currency in circulation, and severe bottlenecks and inflationary pressures. Having risen to power during a period of rampant inflation and well aware of its adverse effects on the economy and the political stability of the Government, the Chinese Communists adopted a policy of retrenchment in 1957. Declines in investment and imports, especially imports of machinery and equipment from the Soviet Union, resulted in a much lower rate of growth.

In the first 5-year plan, the pattern of economic development adopted by the Chinese Communists placed great emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry. Given the low level of domestic productive capacity and the shortage of technicians, the experiences of 1950-57 had clearly demonstrated three valuable lessons to the Chinese Communists. First, high rates of growth in domestic industrial production were possible as long as foreign loans and credits were available. Second, without foreign loans and credits, high rates of growth of domestic industrial production were accompanied by excessive pressure on the internal sources of investment funds, leading to severe bottlenecks and inflationary pressures. Third, without foreign loans and credits, a noninflationary rate of investment resulted in a low rate of growth.

Was there a fourth possibility? The developments in 1958 and early 1959 can be understood as an attempt by the Chinese Communists to provide a positive answer to this question. The three important developments during this period were the decision for greater decentralization of industry in November of 1957, the drive for greater native technological innovation embodied in the slogan “walking on two legs,” and the commune movement in 1958. In other words, their answer was to utilize investment possibilities offered by what economists term “disguised unemployment” of labor in agriculture, but what really amounted to an attempt to utilize “disguised unemployment” of all resources in all sectors. A necessary corollary of this attempt was a change in technology, i.e., the change in emphasis from large-scale, modern, industrial projects to native industries, so that increases in production did not rely on large investment expenditures by the Central Government or on large imports of machinery and equipment from abroad. This interpretation of the events in 1958 and early 1959 is supported by the timing and the nature of the policies adopted by the Chinese Communists in their attempt to achieve a high rate of growth.

The commune movement failed due to excessive centralization of decision-making in agriculture, the elimination of private plots that were an important source of income for the peasant and fertilizer for the socialist sector, the payment of money wages and material supplies that were divorced from actual work performed, the overestimate made of the available workers who were not contributing to production and who were taken away to work in native factories and on large-scale irrigation projects, the long hours of work required of those who remained at work in the fields, and the unfavorable weather conditions. The Chinese Communists reacted very quickly to the agri-
cultural crisis by moving workers back to agricultural production, decentralizing decisionmaking to the lower-level production units, restoring the relationship between earnings and work performed, restoring the private plot to the peasant and allowing him to sell his output from that plot at rural fairs, and giving agricultural inputs priority in industrial production and investment. Most economists, I believe, would agree they have successfully restored agricultural production to its precommune movement level and this conclusion is borne out by the available nonquantitative evidence.

Nonetheless, I do not mean to infer that the Chinese Communists have abandoned the longrun goals of a rapid rate of growth with special emphasis on heavy industry. The Chinese Communists are still unable to produce a wide range of heavy and technical industrial machinery and they consider the lack of self-sufficiency as a major obstacle to their economic development effort. Furthermore, agricultural and light industrial production still accounts for a larger share of their national output than does heavy industrial production; another fact considered by the Chinese Communists as an indication of their low level of economic development. Therefore, I am confident that the new 5-year plan they hope to introduce this year, while it may contain slightly less relative investment in heavy industry due to the existence of excess capacity in that sector following the agricultural crisis, will be much the same as the 2 previous 5-year plans. If they have learned their lesson, however, the Chinese Communists are aware that the success of the new 5-year plan will depend upon their ability to achieve the minimum required increases in agriculture. Their own experience and current developments throughout the Communist bloc indicate that the Chinese Communists may find it very difficult to secure these minimum required increases.

(The following biography of Dr. Dernberger has been submitted for the record:)

CURRICULUM VITAE OF DR. ROBERT FRANKLIN DERNBERGER

Name: Robert Franklin Dernberger.

Present position and address: assistant professor, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.


Travel and languages: Speaks and reads Chinese Mandarin. Interpreter-translator with U.S. Army in Korea and Japan, 1952-53. Resident of Hong Kong for 7 months in 1962, doing basic research.

Teaching and research positions and experience: research assistant, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 1956-58 (research project on Communist China's economy); research associate, Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, 1962-65 (research project on Communist China's economy); and assistant professor of economics and the social sciences, University of Chicago, 1963— (offer courses on economic theory and China's modern economy and history).

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen.

It is not the intent of the subcommittee to encourage debate among our witnesses. However, if a panelist wants to comment on a question posed by a member of the subcommittee, we will be happy to hear his views.

Professor Boorman, you state that the leadership of the Chinese political system will not lose its cohesiveness or radical fervor after the passing of Mao Tse-tung. Mao himself has complained on several occasions that he does not find the same dedication in the younger generation that exists in his own generation. Do you believe this is true, and if so, what eventual effect might this have on the Chinese system? Is there a possibility of a revisionist movement growing there?

Dr. BOORMAN. That is a good point. A few years ago when Edgar Snow was in China, he had an interview with Chou En-lai, as I recall. The question came up as to who was running China. Chou came up with the observation there were roughly 800 people now or in the near future who control the basic decisions in Communist China. This group essentially is the group that survived the years of the Long March and the struggle for power in the countryside. We now have a new generation coming up, a large number of younger people who have not experienced the struggle for power. This development over time is likely to lead to a change in the political structure. I would estimate that if we look at the next few years, 1966–70, the party veterans are still going to be very much in control of the situation. If we look to the 1970–80 period, it is likely that the top command will still be held by veterans of the revolution, the sergeants and captains, with a growing mixture of the younger people, even some scientists, or what the Communists define as intellectuals.

If we take a long look forward to the 1980’s, I would estimate that, as in the Soviet Union, you would see the emergence of a fair number of people who are chemical engineers and also members of the Central Committee. There will be a gradual meshing of the scientific elite and the political elite. This may happen in China, but my guess is that this development is still a number of years and possibly decades ahead.

Their official propaganda does stress the necessity for the young people to buckle down to the tasks at hand as their elders have done. I think we should be careful about accepting the Chinese Communist propaganda at face value, even as we might be cautious about accepting the public statements of J. Edgar Hoover as to the decadence of American youth today. It is difficult to know what they mean for their own consumption, and what for foreign consumption. I think the likelihood is that the situation will be stable in the next few years.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You do agree that there is a class of technocrats, engineers, scientists, intellectuals?

Dr. BOORMAN. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Certainly their voice will have some effect and will be heard in political circles in the not too distant future that you refer to.

Dr. BOORMAN. If we look at the composition of the top command, the Politburo and the Central Committee, these people are still not
in evidence. Two cases in point: One, the man who leads the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Peiping, a French-trained scientist, who did join the Chinese Communist Party in 1958. He is not a member of the Central Committee and may not be for some years ahead.

The other man I would mention here is a scientist who was for many years in the United States, one of the chief men at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology. He is now in Peiping and is doubtless concerned with their missile program. He joined the Communist Party in 1958. It is unlikely in my view that these people are heard at the top level in the decisionmaking process. They are, in short, still regarded as scientific experts. They are quite a way from the top level of political authority in the party.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you believe that within the Chinese hierarchy there are forces that want reconciliation with the Soviet Union?

Dr. BOORMAN. I think there may be disagreements. The problem is that we have no real data on the meetings of the Political Bureau in Peiping where these topics are actually discussed. Therefore all of our estimates have to be made from the outside on the basis of exceedingly slim information.

We do not, in my view, possess the hard data to estimate who is on which side of the Sino-Soviet conflict today.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Among the 800 Chinese that you mentioned as those who will be making future decisions, there may be differences of opinion. Do you believe there are policies which the United States might pursue which could stimulate the forces of moderation within China if there are such forces?

Dr. BOORMAN. This is a big one, sir. I think I would take this line with respect to the very fundamental question of the political doctrine of the people in authority at Peiping. There is the concept of defining the major enemy. This major enemy could be a foreign enemy; the Japanese during the 1937-45 invasion, for example. At the present time the United States is cast in this role. For them to come down off it, so to speak, and say it is possible to sort of develop amicable relations even with a major enemy represents such a fundamental change in their whole political outlook that I would consider it unlikely.

This is not to say there is no policy that the United States might follow that might ameliorate the situation. Traditional diplomacy is concerned with the reconciliation of the divergent views of nations. The Chinese Communists have their security arrangements in Asia as do we. The task is to see if our different interests can be adjusted.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. BROOMFIELD? Mr. BROOMFIELD. I wondered if anyone of you gentlemen could comment as to the recent failures in the new African underdeveloped countries, why the Chinese have been failing?

Dr. POWELL. General Griffith pointed out that in their revolutionary doctrine, particularly in the treatise by Marshal Lin Piao in early September, the Chinese Communists called for revolutions in all of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Yet, take the African continent as an example. The current leadership of the newly independent African States are more sophisticated than Peiping apparently thought they were going to be. When Peiping speaks of a wave of revolutions developing in Africa, that wave and those revolu-
tions can only take place at the expense of the present leadership of the newly independent African States. The leaders of Africa are aware of this fact. The best example that we have had of this situation was Chou En-lai's visit to Africa in June. He was expressing what was the official foreign policy line, namely, that there was a wave of revolution developing in Africa. His host, President Nyerere, was fairly polite in his reply, stating in substance that, "We like to be friendly to both sides and not want to take sides in the cold war dispute." However old President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, who is a revolutionary in his own name, was more blunt. President Kenyatta's reaction was "We have already had our revolution and we don't need any more revolutions, either from the right or left."

I believe that Communist China's promotion of revolutions has been one of the major factors that led in recent months to expelling three Chinese Communist Embassies from African States. Still, there is also another realistic consideration involved in Chinese setbacks in Africa. To a considerable degree Communist China can only offer revolutions to the underdeveloped areas of the world. Not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, can offer extensive aid, technical assistance, and so forth. This has led the Chinese Communists to make some very unkind remarks about people who put bread in front of revolution, but bread and aid are factors, sir.

Mr. Broomfield. Dr. Derberger, if you would comment on the fact that the Red Chinese failed to deliver the promised rice to Castro?

Dr. DERBERGER. Apparently the Chinese Communists are having some difficulty with Castro. As you undoubtedly know, they signed an agreement to buy a great deal of sugar from Cuba and I have often wondered what they could possibly do with all this sugar. During the agricultural crisis in China the Russians gave the Chinese one gift, and that was more sugar which the Russians were also buying from Cuba.

On the question of delivery of the rice to Cuba, as you may know, the Chinese have an agreement to deliver rice to Ceylon in exchange for rubber which they do need, an agreement that has worked out profitably for them. They also have had great trouble delivering the promised rice to Ceylon, actually buying rice from Burma to deliver to Ceylon. I would presume the failure to deliver rice to Cuba is a case of just not having the rice to deliver.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Rather than any real split in the relations between the two countries?

Dr. DERBERGER. I am very sure that the Chinese Communists are disappointed over Castro's stand in their split with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were backing Castro to the hilt in his argument with Khrushchev. As has been said Khrushchev held all the aces in that argument and Castro went to Moscow and received aid for supporting the Russians. To the best of my knowledge, however, the Chinese still support Castro and the Cuban revolution.

Dr. Boorman. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on this line of discussion. I think it is important to recall that when the Chinese came forward with a major statement of doctrine such as Marshal Lin Piao's of September last, it is difficult to distinguish between the statement as a framework for doctrine on the one hand and as a program for practical action on the other. So far as I know the Chinese Communists have never said that Communist China is likely in the near
future to be a superpower as the United States and the Soviet Union are.

As Mr. Powell suggested, they are very limited as to actual military equipment, grain, or even technical assistance that they can deliver. They are also quite insistent on the point, which we sometimes misinterpret, that a revolution by their definition—if it is going to succeed in any area—must be an indigenous revolution. It must be staffed, organized, indoctrinated, and led by local people. This is a key point that we sometimes overlook in our preoccupation with their general statements as to communism throughout the world.

General Griffth. A general comment along that line, Mr. Chairman, is that the Chinese in this revolutionary doctrine, although the United States is said to be, repeatedly said to be, in pronouncements from Peiping, "public enemy No. 1," "world enemy No. 1," we don’t find communism, per se, stressed so much. It is revolution and it is anti-American revolution that these people are interested in primarily. They would latch on to the most extreme right-wing Fascist, I am sure, in Latin America if he were sufficiently anti-American.

Although I am certainly not an expert on Latin America, I feel this to be true. Perhaps my colleagues here will disagree. I feel it is anti-Americanism primarily because we exemplify to them and have ever since their Japanese war, the "imperialists" of the world. It is us they are after.

Dr. Dernberger. I would like to add a comment. I don’t think it is an ideological question or that we are the imperialists and they are Communists, but we are the major threat in Asia to the Chinese Communists. To look at their history you would think they would be mad at many European countries, but in 1949 they turned on the United States because the threat was no longer Britain or France, but the United States.

I would agree that they would latch on to any revolution that is anti-American.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. McDowell?

Mr. McDowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will address a question in three parts to the panel and hope they all might have an opportunity to comment. Do you believe that it is the Red Chinese Government’s policy to export communism and to promote wars of liberation for the purpose of, first, gaining leadership in the Communist world vis-a-vis Russia; second, to prove the theory that communism cannot exist side by side with Western democracy; or third, to gain both of these objectives and thus prove to the United States that we must ultimately get out of Asia?

Dr. Powell. Well, sir, I believe that in the long run they seek both. Also, the actions and statements of the Chinese Communist regime would indicate that its leaders are both Communists and Chinese. They are motivated by both their ideology and national interests. I really doubt that they usually attempt to separate these two motivations. In many respects the two factors mutually promote each other. This is particularly true in Asia.

Speaking of the export of revolution, I would like to comment on the statements of my two old friends, who are beside me here. It is true that Marxist-Leninists have maintained that revolution cannot be exported, but in the tactics of Lenin and Mao it is considered to be perfectly valid to nourish the seeds of growing revolution. It is
part of their tactics to organize Communist Parties abroad, as the
Soviet Union originally helped to organize the Chinese Communist
Party. It is considered proper to train foreign revolutionaries, cadres,
propagandists, and guerrilla warfare specialists in Communist China
and then reexport them to their native countries. Furthermore the
Chinese Communists have on many occasions maintained that their
revolution and Mao’s revolutionary doctrine is an appropriate model
or prototype for insurrections in all the underdeveloped areas of the
world—Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Hence, they export the
ingredients of revolution, including weapons, even though they may
not technically export revolution itself. They have recently said
that their doctrine was valid in the past, is in the present, and will
continue to be in the future. Therefore, although technically they are
not exporting revolution, they are exporting revolutionary doctrine
to seedbeds that have already been made fertile by local conditions
of poverty, backwardness, or other internal problems.

General GRIFFITH. I would like to address myself to the third part
of Mr. McDowell’s question, if I might, which relates to their purpose
to get us out of Asia. The answer to that is “Certainly that is one
of their purposes.” They realize this will take them a long time to do
and it will be a stage-by-stage operation.

But this I think they view as essential. I think if we can put our­selves in Peiping and look around as the members of the Politburo
do, we might see the picture they see. They see American power in
Japan, in South Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan, growing
in South Vietnam. They see us as an ally of India.

They see SEATO down there. Admittedly SEATO is moribund at
the moment. Nevertheless SEATO symbolizes to them a hostile
presence. And then the view isn’t much more reassuring when they
look back over their shoulders and see that bunch of “revisionists”
sitting along 4,000 miles of frontier. I honestly believe we have to
understand, or attempt to understand, that Peiping has reason for
apprehension. We might sit here in Washington and say: “Well, this
isn’t justified apprehension. We are not threatening anybody.” We
can say that, but of course the Communists don’t believe that. I
think we have to put ourselves in their shoes and try to be realistic
about this. I go back to what Mr. McDowell asked in question No.3.
Yes; they definitely hope someday to push us out of Asia, and extend
the area of their influence into southeast Asia and ultimately to edge
us out of Japan. I don’t mean physically, but to edge our influence
out of Japan. Naturally they want to take back Taiwan. They
would like to edge us out of the Philippines.

This, sir, is going to take a long, long time, but after all it took them
a long, long time to get from south China to where they are today.

Mr. McDowell. Do you think then in reference to the second
part of my question that they do believe that they cannot exist, there
cannot be peaceful coexistence with the United States or in fact with
anybody?

General GRIFFITH. I would rather pass that one on to Howard
Boorman, sir. I do believe that Mao Tse-tung and some of the old­timers are firmly convinced of this. They are firmly convinced that
they cannot exist side by side with us except on a tactical basis.
After all, Mao did sign up, you know, in the united front with Chiang
Kai-shek whom he hated probably worse than he does us. They can
exist tactically but in the long-term view they can't. This is what the "old guard" would feel, I guess.

Dr. Boorman. A number of points deserve underlining. To the top command at Peiping it must be remembered that the military structure in Communist China is always and at all times under the control of the party. The top command of the organization as far as I know is the military affairs committee of the party in China. As they look around the world, General Griffith suggests they do see themselves tactically surrounded—the Soviets on the northern frontier, the United States on their eastern and southern flanks. One of their purposes, I believe, is to break this encirclement. I believe your summary was well put.

I think they feel this line projects Mao as the major spokesman of international communism in the 1960's. He has outlived Stalin and Khrushchev as a political figure: he is still around and defining doctrine in the mid-1960's. At the same time, with respect to the problem of coexistence with the Western World, I think they do have a certain realism in Peiping. They would say, as a matter of principle perhaps, that in the long run coexistence with the capitalist world is impractical. In the near future, however, I think they recognize that the United States is not likely to disappear as a force in world politics. They might argue that, to the extent that we commit American resources around the world we are undermining the essential growth prospects of our domestic economic programs. This could lead to other problems and tensions in the United States. They could argue this way. Your third point: if they can gain these objectives over time and also drive the United States out of Asia, they would then have accomplished a major strategic objective. I would say that that would be a long-term prospect, indeed. I think they are realistic about things not changing in the next fiscal year.

Mr. McDowell. Would you therefore conclude, as you have suggested, that this is a long-term objective that they have, that we should be prepared to have an equally long-term objective, not to be summarily dismissed from this part of the world?

Dr. Boorman. This is coming around to be a discussion about foreign policy, both by the Chinese Communists and the United States, which I gather was not supposed to be the focus of this afternoon's hearings. One might as well confront it. My own view is that we have here a situation where there are obviously differing and contending national interests involved, both those of Communist China, on the one hand, and those of the United States, on the other. I could make some estimates regarding the nature and framework of Peiping's policy objectives. The problem of the U.S. national interest is something that you ladies and gentlemen are certainly familiar with.

Mr. Zablocki. Governor Thomson.

Mr. Thomson. I gathered, General, from your comments that the Chinese policy of one by one and the wars of liberation would give some support to the American policy of the domino theory, that you agree that China if they succeed in gobbling up one area will then go after another one even if it takes a long period of time. That is your position?

General Griffith. Mr. Thomson, would you kindly define what you mean by "gobbling up"? Because I am not sure what you mean.
Mr. Thomson. I am just thinking if they take one area, you mentioned some of the areas adjacent to India, if they take Nepal and then take another area, you said they could do that militarily.

General Griffith. I said they could do this militarily. I didn't have in mind actual Chinese physical occupation necessarily of these countries. As long as the Chinese can get somebody else to do their fighting for them they are going to do this. They have done this for the last 2,000 years. It suits the Chinese very well to have the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese fight for them. It would suit the Chinese very well, too, to have anti-American type of revolutions in African countries because here the Africans are getting killed or hurt anyway, and the Chinese are not, and the Chinese are going to support these various revolutions, these various anti-American operations, I am sure, wherever they can. But I don't think that the Chinese are going to conventionally take over, say, Thailand. They have enough trouble at home without having about 40 million Thai on their hands. That is why I don't think they would in conventional terms actually occupy the country or "gobble it up." They want to get a government in the border states of the Himalaya eventually that—governments that are anti-Indian and are inclined to China, over whom China can exercise a degree of benevolent control, if you will. There would always be the "iron fist" in the "velvet glove," of course. China has the capability, however, in conventional terms, to move right in and take over those three little Himalayan states. The question is, does she want to do this? She is probably playing a long-term thing here. She hopes that she can influence them as she has North Vietnam. Of course, we haven't come to the end of the Chinese-Pakistani arrangement yet. We don't know if there are any secret codicils to this treaty. We don't know what the arrangements are between China and Pakistan. Perhaps your committee does. I certainly don't. I do think they are going to do everything possible to extend their influence in what they conceive to be the Chinese culture area and the area in which they feel that they have legitimacy; that is, that would include the areas I mentioned previously.

Mr. Thomson. Is one of the principal reasons for the animosity and the anti-Americanism the fact that we are supporting the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan?

General Griffith. I would say so. We made our enmity to the Chinese Communists perfectly clear when we supported Chiang Kai-shek between 1946 and 1949. That is when we actually became No. 1 enemy. A great many very favorable mentions of America have since been excised from Mao Tse-tung's works. In the originals, back in the 1940's and 1930's, Mao made many favorable references to America fighting for freedom but you can't find any of them now in his published works.

Mr. Thomson. Thank you.

Dr. Powell. In terms of the attitudes and views of Communist China regarding the United States, I believe that there are really several factors involved. In the first place, as has been pointed out, we are the major physical or military obstacle to the achievement of Peking's objectives in Asia. It is not original with me, for it has often been said, that theologies and major ideologies have a Satan of some form. We are the ideological Satan of the Chinese Communist.
for we are the leaders of the non-Communist world. Third, we are also used as a whipping boy for internal problems of Communist China. We are portrayed as the enemy in order to build up nationalism, to encourage the people to work harder, to make sacrifices internally, and to pull their belts in tighter. This is one reason why internally the party constantly repeats the charge that the United States is aggressive and is preparing to attack China. I believe that these three factors are all pertinent in making us the No. 1 enemy of the Communists of China. For these reasons and, at least, under the present leadership the Chinese Communists are an implacable enemy. It has been said that if we did not exist as "the enemy" they would have to invent us.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman. General, in your statement I see two recurring things. One, China lacks the conventional means to influence events, and on your second page she is impotent to influence events in any place. Is not China today influencing events on the center stage in Vietnam?

General Griffith. This was in the context of military terms. She poses no military threat to the United States, no serious military threat to the United States. I am certain she is influencing events in North Vietnam. In fact, I think maybe if Ho Chi Minh were left to himself we could have gotten to the table by this time, as is the President's desire. As long as Peking is there back of Ho, what is happening in South Vietnam suits their book right down to the ground. So you are correct. She is influencing events in that area.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Is not the same situation prevailing in Korea, where we still have a great many troops on the line?

General Griffith. I don't know. Again, you have a great deal of information I haven't got. I would say that we don't apprehend, from what I have read, we don't apprehend any problem from Communist China in North Korea. I believe she can keep the North Koreans busy infiltrating South Korea. I am sure they are doing that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The very fact that there must be an army maintained of perhaps a half million troops there and we still have several divisions there, is that not also influencing events there that would lead me to the next question: Within her own means, as you feel are quite limited, is China not very seriously influencing events in southeast Asia?

General Griffith. Yes, she is. Perhaps I didn't use the correct terminology. I was viewing this in a strictly military context of her ability to operate military power as flexibly as we can. We have the means to do this. We have the airborne forces, the planes. We have the amphibious troops and lift. We have all sorts of technical means that the Communist Chinese have not yet developed. We have a very flexible type of airpower. Actually, I had that in mind, the more narrow context. She is influencing events in Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. With the narrow options that are at the disposal of China, China is in a great way forcing us to play the game with limited options also.

General Griffith. She has not committed anything as far as we know. She has made no serious commitment to North Korea. We can't prove there are any Chinese in North Korea. At least, I can't.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I don't know that there are any Chinese in North Korea. The truce does depend on the full commitment of China in
North Korea. The line is still there, the demarcation line and the troops are still in the holes. The trenches are there. No one quite knows what to do, including North Korea, because evidently China still plays a major role there. In view of these two propositions that are presently causing all kinds of problems, would you gentlemen like to comment on Mr. Lippmann's apparent conclusion that we have no business in Asia, and the inevitable choice that will finally remain, that China will dominate the entire southeast Asia? And that we ought to get out while the getting is good? Basically, I think that is what Mr. Lippmann keeps writing about. He did again today. Would you care to comment on that?

Dr. Boorman. We will start from the right, and I will jump in on this one. First of all I would submit, sir, if one looks at it from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the opposition in Peiping—which the military man on our side has to do—they regard the Korean theater and the Vietnam theater as areas of direct national security interest. This has been true not only in recent years but throughout a couple of thousand years of Chinese history. Korea and Vietnam are the areas where the Western Powers have tangled with them most directly in the last 20 years. To go back to the lines of discussion we started on as to whether indeed the Chinese Communists actually plan to take over areas either in the Far East or elsewhere in the world, I think we need to take a hard look at this proposition. I don't feel the Chinese have any intention of occupying and administering extensive areas of Asia under present conditions. Military occupation of limited areas on China's border might be a realistic thing from their standpoint. But they have never intended to take over India or Thailand, for example, as Chinese Communist colonies. One of the reasons for their posture in Asia is that they are well aware of what happened to the International Communist movement, which you gentlemen covered in the hearings of this subcommittee in 1965. What used to be an international bloc has turned into a medley of contending political forces. If this has happened in the past, the Chinese assume that it could happen in the future. Let's assume, for example, that we had 94 Communist parties around the world taking orders from Peiping, is there any reason to believe that these countries will always continue to take orders from Peiping and not turn against the Chinese as the Chinese turned against the Soviet Communist Party leadership? American strategic interest must be defined by the White House, I would think. Lippmann I haven't been reading regularly. If I were forced to offer an amateur estimate of the range of America's strategic interests, Vietnam is about the last place I would select. Cuba is a different case, and people around the world would much more easily understand an American commitment in the Cuban situation.

Mr. Gallagher. Of course we can't start with a clean slate.

Dr. Boorman. We are committed in Vietnam, and there is no possibility of an easy solution in that theater as far as I can see.

Dr. Powell. Dr. Boorman mentioned amateurs. I have a great deal of respect for a certain distinguished columnist as a specialist on European and American affairs. However, it does appear to me that there have been many amateurs on Asian affairs who have suddenly become specialists in the last few months. I would maintain that at the present time and historically the United States has had
very deep interests in the Far East. The peoples of Asia include more than a third of the population of the world. The region is a strategic area in terms of resources. Japan alone is vital to the strategic balance of power. Furthermore, we have mutual defense treaties with, or commitments to most of the non-Communist countries of Asia. In the case of some of them, with whom we do not have defense commitments, we do have deep sympathies; India, for example. We have broad and deep interests and commitments in Asia. With regard to the second part of your question, I do not think that Communist China will inevitably dominate Asia. I do not believe that this is any more inevitable than the Communists' claim that communism is scientific and will inevitably be victorious throughout the world. In fact, it appears that both we and Peiping would agree that one of the major factors involved in whether or not China will inevitably dominate Asia will be the policies and actions of the United States of America.

Mr. Gallager. Would you care to comment on the present policies along that line?

Dr. Powell. I would prefer to remain in a field in which I can claim somewhat greater expertise, sir. It might be interesting to you if I made some comments regarding what the Chinese Communists say about Vietnam. For example, Premier Chou En-lai has recently referred to the Vietnam conflict as a “shining example for the revolutionary peoples of the whole world.” The Peiping press has called it a “focal point of struggle.” The conflict in Vietnam is said to have enriched the theories of “people’s war.” This means that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese are given credit for actually enriching the “glorious” military thought of Mao Tse-tung regarding revolutionary wars. Coming from Peiping this is quite a compliment. The Chinese Communists have indicated that they consider the Vietnam war to be a focus in the sense of being a testing ground for both their current concepts of “people’s war” and the U.S. doctrine of counter insurrectionary warfare. They apparently sincerely believe that if what they call “people’s war” is successful in Vietnam, this will act to encourage revolutionaries in other areas. For example, this was apparent from Lin Piao’s famous treatise of September 1965.

Mr. Gallager. Isn’t this “toenail to toenail” with Khrushchev’s statement of the noninevitability of war and peaceful coexistence?

Dr. Powell. The Chinese Communists maintain that thermonuclear wars are not inevitable. Yet, they have said that what we call limited wars and what they call “people’s wars” or “wars of liberation”—revolutions—are inevitable. They say these will be inevitable so long as “capitalism and imperialism exist.”

Mr. Zablocki. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. Bolton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I say anything I want to thank the chairman most earnestly for these hearings that he has set up. Of all things, we know so little about China. We used to know quite a good deal more. We made the Boxer Rebellion money available to them for education here. We found we laughed at the same jokes and enjoyed the same stories. When our men went over there to fight with them they came back thinking well of the Chinese. Then unfortunately we let the dust settle and a few things happened and we formed on the wrong side of the aisle. I am a woman, and I would like to know a few things. As I understand the
situation in China today, girl babies do not get drowned any more; is that so?

Dr. Boorman. That is right.

Mrs. Bolton. Is that because they are on the other side of the aisle on our population explosion ideas, that they want all the people they can get, even women? I would think it would be quite a serious thing in the Asian world. I was interested to learn that a new method of providing food is being worked at, dividing everything up into its small parts and then taking so much protein, so much carbohydrate, and so forth, and mixing it up, then feeding it to everyone. How horrible. But it would feed people and farmers would grow more of everything and it would be divided up that way and shipped. But what I would like to ask you quite seriously, have any of you seen the Canadian pictures of China, educational pictures? I saw some of them with great sorrow. All they were teaching those children was "hate America." It was put into every form of their lives, their dancing, their singing, their studies—"hate America." Such a pity after all that we might have had.

Are we going to be able to do anything to counteract some of this or is it getting to be so ingrained in the upcoming generations that it will literally split the world apart?

Dr. Boorman. Mrs. Bolton, I would like to comment briefly if I may. With respect to the "hate the U.S." program, which as you properly suggest is one of the more disagreeable dimensions of life in China today, you do see films relating to the political indoctrination programs which begin at an early age and normally pose the U.S. Government as an enemy not only to China but also to all the peoples of the world. This is a part of the larger political program of the Chinese Communists, designed partly to build up nationalism within China, partly to focus attention on the United States as the principal enemy outside China. I would only submit that it is possible for national views to change over time. I think of the Second World War in this context. I came back from the war in the Pacific believing that the United States believed that Japan had been a terrible enemy. We fought the Japanese through the Pacific. Many people had been killed. I found that by 1946 there was a considerable awakening interest in this country in things Japanese. People coming back from Japan reported that the Japanese were interesting and diligent people. In 1966, the Japanese are virtually the greatest discovery since sliced bread in this country. I don't think one should take the cataclysmic view that everything is gone in China. I think there are alternative possibilities that may appear in the political programs in the future.

One brief comment on the role of women. The emancipation of female energy in China has been one of the major social dimensions of the changes that have taken place in the last 15 years. Formerly Chinese women were virtually owned by their husbands. Now they have legal and economic rights, and at the end of any given week a woman may bring home more work points than her husband. What this means in family relations I can't estimate. The marriage law of 1950 provides that husband and wife should love each other, one of the few legal stipulations that I know of relating to this matter. The point is in the present political structure. Chinese women do participate in many, many ways in the Government. When you get to the top command, however, you do not find the ladies. The party veterans
who compose the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party are all male. This is still a male preserve.

General Griffith. I would like to comment briefly on both questions in response to your remark about the “hate America” campaigns. I, too, saw some film. I haven’t seen the Canadian film, I saw 3 or 4 hours of some 30 or 40 taken by French photographers. I noticed the same thing you did. I found this very upsetting. I spent 5 years in China. I love the Chinese. I think they are a great people. It is their misfortune today to be subjected to this Government. It upsets us. It makes us sad so that they are conducting this frightful “hate America” campaign. I don’t know that there is anything possible we can do about this except to say if we ever do ameliorate the situation between us that in China the party can turn that off just like they turn off a hose. The next day everybody will be loving Americans. We saw this in Russia. We saw this in the Nazi-Soviet pact, if you will remember that. One day Hitler was the worst of devils to Communist parties all over the world and the next day he was a dear, dear friend.

Your second question. I would say it is the fate of those who have opposed any successful revolution to be cast in the role of Satan by the victors, just as the Tories were in our Revolution. I don’t think there is anything strange in this. We opposed the Communists in China. We assisted Chiang Kai-shek and therefore we have, in Communist eyes, to take the blame for this. That is part of history.

Mrs. Bolton. Dr. Dernberger, I was wondering about the effect of this so-called emancipation of women on the whole economic picture. Are they really contributing intelligently at all or what?

Dr. Dernberger. I think the importance of women to the regime can be seen just by stating that the marriage law was the first law they passed after coming to power. Primarily, their immediate reaction upon gaining power was eliminating the landlord class, which won the support of the peasants, freeing the women and giving much greater opportunity to the young than they had in the past. These three groups—the peasants, the women, and the youth were a great source of support for the Communists. Women in China today are, to the best of my knowledge, completely equal. They are engineers. They are doctors. Their position in China is much the same as in Russia. It is probably true that their opportunities in the political structure are not as great. Most important, of course, is their economic independence.

Mrs. Bolton. They do keep their wages, don’t they?

Dr. Dernberger. Unless the Communists can get them to deposit it in the savings banks.

Mrs. Bolton. The husband doesn’t get any?

Dr. Dernberger. That is right, at least, not from his wife’s employer.

Dr. Powell. Mrs. Bolton, it is not only in Communist China that the status of the gentle sex has been improving in Asia. Fortunately, this is true throughout the Asian Continent. The most striking example that we have, of course, is the election of a distinguished lady to the premiership of India.

Mrs. Bolton. I think it is very interesting that we come into our own in such strange ways and in such odd places.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Griffith, in your statement you state that the force structure of the People's Liberation Army is in a chronic state of imbalance which will take major organizational and industrial effort for many years, and in "my opinion," at least a decade to rectify. Would you care to comment on the purge in 1959 of the Defense Minister Peng, the top military leaders, and the officer corps? Was this a major factor in this imbalance?

General Griffith. Just a word about the purge. I think Howard Boorman knows more about the purge than I do. The purge of the then Defense Minister, who was a famous old fighter who had been with the party ever since 1927, commanded the Chinese volunteers in Korea, and his handpicked chief of staff, this purge I believe we now seem to feel had nothing to do with the question of "professionalism" or "guerrillaism" or whatever in the army as some American analysts thought. I had always thought that it had to do with a very much more important aspect of China's relations and specifically her great power relationship with Russia. Apparently whether Peng Teh-huai made a move in 1958 to actually have Mao displaced still isn't clear. But apparently he did.

Mr. Murphy. Was this the first opposition indicated against Mao?

General Griffith. Not the first, sir. The first was actually in 1953, when they got rid of Kao Kang—you might even call him the Satrap of Manchuria. Kao Kang combined within himself supreme administrative, political, and military power in Manchuria. Kao Kang formed a strong clique and there was every evidence that he was going to take over Manchuria. The party got the word on this and broke it up. Kao Kang was executed or committed suicide, nobody knows. They put out the word that he committed suicide. The Chinese, of course, as you know, have a long, long history of regional problems, regional dictators arise and take over a portion of the country—

Mr. Murphy. I understand all that. I only have so much time, sir.

General Griffith. Peng Teh-huai—to finish off the question of the purge—I think he was attempting to oust Mao Tse-tung from control of the party. The party got the word, and Lin Piao and other senior officers stood behind Mao, and that was the end of Kao Kang.

Mr. Murphy. Was he charged in the conspiracy with Mr. Khru­shev?

General Griffith. Yes; I think that is probably true.

Mr. Murphy. That purge of the officer corps, the elite, as in the case of Stalin, did it go to great depths?

General Griffith. Yes; not with Stalin's brutality and severity, of course. I don't think the Chinese want to do things that way. It certainly did. Any man with Peng Teh-huai's background would have had a very large following in the army. I believe all but one or two regional commanders were dismissed from their posts sometime after this, sometime after Peng Teh-huai's dismissal. I would say it ran through the army and that there were probably hundreds of senior officers who lost their jobs. I believe this is only normal, in that kind of setup.
Mr. Murphy. Then that would affect their military potential with the loss of these officers? At least the National Chinese staff believed so.

General Griffith. It undoubtedly impaired their military potential. Still, Stalin's decimation of the Russian officer corps did not wreck it as Hitler thought it would. I don't believe that this had more than a temporary effect on the capabilities of the PLA. After all, nobody is indispensable, and there were probably a lot of young officers, followers of Lin Piao, who were glad to see Peng Te-huai go.

Mr. Murphy. Dr. Dernberger, would you say China has recovered from the failure of the great leap forward program in the late 1950's?

Dr. Dernberger. To the extent that their production is probably back to a level slightly higher than '57 but still lower than '58. On the other hand, they have added quite a few people to their population in the meantime. During the recent recovery years, they have also diversified their industry and expanded the machine-building industry. The machinery industry now has eight departments, five of which are apparently military industries. As against the situation in 1957-58, they are now capable of producing a great many more types of machines and equipment and types of metals that are required, especially those required for the armaments industry.

I expect in the new 5-year plan they will once again try and achieve a very high rate of growth and will begin with greater capabilities than they have in the past. I don't believe they will have to rely on the Russians or foreigners to the extent they did in the past.

Mr. Murphy. Are they on about the same level?

Dr. Dernberger. In total output, but that output is much more diversified. They are now capable for the first time of building complete, modern plants and equipping them with Chinese machinery. The first such plant was a valve plant for the petroleum industry. However, they still will require outside technicians for certain technical industries, especially the chemical industry, fertilizer industry, and the plastics industry.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Boorman. May I expand a bit. I think there is a significant difference that attaches to the label "purge" in the Soviet situation and the Chinese Communist situation. I suspect that many more Communists in the Soviet Union were put out of business with a pistol in the back of their neck in the 1930's. We don't actually know where Peng Te-huai is. He still is occasionally carried on the list of the Political Bureau. The Chinese Communists do things in somewhat different fashion. I think when we use the label "purge" we have to be careful not to compare it with the great Soviet purge of the 1930's.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The purpose of the hearings is to develop information about China. I want to ask a general question of the panel about the reliability and the accuracy of the sources of information on China. I would like to hear you comment generally on this. And then perhaps a remark or two about the status of the Chinese studies within this Nation.

How many people are working in this area? How many real experts do we have in this country on China?

Dr. Dernberger. Perhaps I could start off because I deal with quantitative data most of the time. There is great suspicion in this
country of the quality of information we receive from Communist China. It is a very difficult question to answer. Russian studies in this country went through a period of approximately 20 years trying to assert their usefulness, using data that was available. I do hope that those of us who are students of China won't have to take another 20 years to acquire the same acceptance of our work. The problem, of course, is how accurate is our information. I don't think there is any serious question that they lie. Any serious student in this area should be able to tell a lie from honest reporting. Of course, there are occasions when they do lie. For example, you can read reports given on May Day or on the anniversary of the People's Republic and you will find all sorts of inflated statistics, or you can read a report to the People's Congress in 1960 when they were projecting tremendous rates of increase. These can be considered as examples of actual falsehoods. On the other hand, I know of no serious studies on the economy where they have turned up evidence of deliberate false information. But this doesn't say anything about the accuracy of the information. The latter is a very difficult problem. My best answer to that question would be that China is no different than any other underdeveloped country, except probably the problem in Communist China is worse. They only started their statistical bureau in 1953. They have a huge country with many people and economic activities and their statistics were in fairly bad shape. Even more harmful was their practice of not adopting sample surveys but adopting the technique of selected surveys. The local cadre when asked what the yield of grain was going to be in his area would select his own sample. This practice got them into trouble during the great leap forward.

Nonetheless, if you read carefully what they are reporting, I believe you get what they believe to be the best available information and the information they themselves use. I think the biggest argument to show that they were not lying is that in 1959 and 1960 they simply stopped publishing additional economic information. If one were to argue that they do lie in their published reports, the massive job of compiling two sets of books and making them consistent would really be a tremendous tribute to their ability. Finally, the Chinese Communists are too busy with the problems of economic development to waste time publishing a separate set of information for enemy consumption.

Dr. Powell. Our knowledge of China and our sources vary greatly by fields. For example, in the fields in which I am particularly interested—military doctrine and political-military relationships—there is a great deal of material. The Chinese Communists frequently express their views and at times even air their problems. Sometimes this material is propagandistic, but it provides us with a great deal of data in these fields. Then the task is to evaluate the material and sort out the truth from the propaganda. It does vary a great deal by fields as to the amount of material that we obtain and the validity of the data.

Dr. Boorman. Two brief comments with respect to sources and the state of the art here. The central fact I think is that the use of Chinese Communist materials is a highly specialized craft requiring very substantial investment in training, language study, knowledge of the data, et cetera. It is a terribly demanding field to work in
because often the key problem is what the Chinese Communists do not say. This frankly you have to get by instinct and experience. This leads me to a general comment on the state of the study of contemporary China in this country, a field which has moved rapidly indeed in the last 10 years. Many new fields of study have developed: law, for example. Now there are specialists in Chinese Communist law. There is, however, a notable shortage of individuals who have had experience on the mainland of China with the Chinese people. The older American specialists, for many reasons, are out of the act now. This situation means the human dimension of the Chinese Communist problem is often lost sight of by those who work at the problem solely on the basis of printed data. This is one of the key factors that I know of over the last 15 years—the lack of contact with the human dimension of the Chinese situation.

General GRIFFITH. I would like to add, Mr. Hamilton, something to Howard Boorman's last remark. About 6 years ago I attended a conference at Cambridge University and it happened the man who was occupying the suite next door was the head of the Soviet Russian Chinese studies program. He and I got pretty clubby a couple of nights over a couple of drinks. He spoke beautiful Chinese and perfect English. Theirs—the Russian—is a regulated program, regulated by the state, in which they were then educating over 10,000 in the Chinese studies program. Out of this whole program he was expecting to produce about 150 doctorates a year in Chinese. I don't propose that the U.S. Government should tell kids where to go or what to study. I just cite these figures for comparative purposes.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many do we produce?

General GRIFFITH. I can't tell you. I think Howard Boorman can tell you. I would say in Chinese studies I doubt if it is more than 100. I wouldn't know.

Dr. Boorman. I don't have the figures. I must say that even if you look at Chinese studies as a whole in the United States, you would not have that large a group. And of course many of these people would be writing theses on the Han dynasty. On contemporary China it is a much smaller group we are training.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me change to another area, if I may. You mentioned, Dr. Boorman, in one of your sentences, the aspirations of significant groups within China. Could you identify these groups for us briefly and do you see any sources of opposition to the regime?

Dr. Boorman. By significant groups one means the party, the Government, the military forces, and to a certain extent the peasants. This definition is of course including a large mass of the Chinese people. The key groups I suppose would be the military forces and the Communist Party. If the Communist top command can keep the support of these groups—this is equal to the population of one of the smaller countries of the world, certainly—they will be successful. The sources of tension and friction in the society are certainly there. Any of us who have had experience in bureaucracies know there are frictions. Certain frictions arise in terms of priorities. Are we going to invest in industry, agriculture, or national defense? These are problems that confront you people all the time. Relations with non-Chinese groups, with minority groups, is another problem. There is a racial problem of sorts in China, though a small one in the total population. The population of China is 94-percent Chinese, about
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6-percent non-Chinese minority groups. The Mongols, for example, don’t love the Chinese. Another problem relates to the age groups in the population. The older people in the society are not that much in love with the regime because they are more sophisticated, used to different things, and less attuned to revolutionary idealism, let us say. All these are points of friction in the regime. My guess would be that the Communists will be successful in maintaining control. In the 1966–70 period, the regime will be stable. There is no likelihood of widespread revolt.

Dr. Powell. I might make a few comments regarding military relationships; that is, relationships between the party and the armed forces. We know from the now declassified Bulletin of Activities papers—the secret journal of the political department of the armed forces—that with the collapse of the great leap in 1959–61 the party was actually worried about morale in the armed forces. This did not appear to signify any major fear of a revolt. However, the party was worried about morale and the effect that the collapse of the leap and deprivations among the people were having on the morale of the armed forces. Also, the party leaders were disturbed by growing professionalism in the officers corps, by resentment against total party domination over the armed forces, by opposition to massive indoctrination at the expense of military training, etc. Since that time the party has carried on very, very extensive and repeated indoctrination campaigns within the armed services. There have been indications that in recent years the party leaders have been more satisfied. For example, in 1964 a major campaign called on all elements of society to learn from the military. This indicates that the party thought the control mechanisms and political conditions within the armed forces were better than those in other elements of society. Otherwise the leaders would not have portrayed the armed services as a model for other elements of society.

Nevertheless, recently there have again been statements from the party’s senior military leaders which indicate that they are not fully satisfied with conditions in the armed forces. One of the major indications of this was that in May of this year, the party totally abolished ranks, insignia, and distinctions of rank in the armed services. They went back to the system in existence prior to 1955, when there were technically no ranks. Now again it is comrade division commander rather than general. It is believed that the principal objective in this reversion was an attempt to maintain, or actually to regain, the elan and the comradery that existed between officers and men during the period of revolutionary wars. The party is now trying, and in the long run probably unsuccessfully, to maintain a revolutionary elan and esprit de corps in a very large conventional, conscript army which for years has been on garrison duty. I would hazard a guess that in the long run the party is fighting a losing battle.

One of the funniest campaigns that was carried out, in an attempt to prevent rank consciousness and regain comradery, was called “officers to the ranks.” Officers, including general officers, returned for a period to the ranks. Some generals were even doing KP duty and sentry duty. This must have been delightful for the privates, but I doubt that the generals were as wildly enthusiastic.

Mr. Zablocki. I detect among our panelists agreement on the issue that in the view of Red China their greatest enemy is the United
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States, and therefore, they are determined to eliminate our presence in the Far East. Also, because the Chinese hold these views, peaceful coexistence with the United States is unlikely. Since today's hearings are on the internal conditions in China today and in the decade ahead, I ask these questions as the devil's advocate. It has been said that in order to ameliorate the situation between the United States and China, steps would have to be taken to lessen tensions. Would Red China be any less aggressive if the United States would withdraw its opposition, for example, to its admission to the United Nations; made concessions in southeast Asia; or invited trade relations with China?

General Griffith. First, Mr. Chairman, I think we rather delude ourselves that China is particularly interested in getting into the United Nations on our terms, as she will not enter the United Nations, in my opinion, and I back that up with numerous statements made by Lin Piao, Ch'en I, and other authoritative figures, except and until what she calls "the Chiang Kai-shek bandits" are thrown out. Those are the terms she uses. She might be voted into the United Nations, but unless that vote carried with it a prior eviction of the Nationalists, I think it would be a safe bet she will not come into the United Nations.

I don't know whether these panelists agree.

Dr. Dernberger. Chou En-lai has added another stipulation. They will not enter until the U.N. renounces its declaration that branded China an aggressor. I don't think they are really that concerned. In reading their newspapers I get the impression that they really do not desire to join the U.N. that much. It is a very embarrassing problem for us and they would just as soon leave it that way.

General Griffith. They are not all that hot to get in. I would agree with that. Nor do I think they are particularly interested in American recognition. A lot of Americans seem to think this is a great and precious gift. Maybe it is, but the Chinese Communists don't see it that way.

Mr. Zablocki. May I restate my question: What would the panelists suggest as some of the steps the United States could take which might affect the attitude and the internal conditions of Communist China?

Dr. Boorman. My view is that there isn't much we can do from the outside that would influence the internal situation in China that much. These people are very senior in experience. They have been fighting a revolution throughout their adult lives. Some have been Communists for 40 years. Their experience has much molded their outlook.

Their experience with the U.S. Government has not been a happy one for the last 25 years. Why? We have supported their major domestic enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, and we continue to do so. If it happened next Tuesday morning that Taiwan should disappear, I would think there would still be a strong lingering distrust of the United States and of the motives of the United States. Since the 1944-46 period, we have consistently—with some exceptions—backed their major Chinese opponents.

I don't think there is anything very drastic that can be done in U.S. policy that will change things immediately. The U.N. question that has been referred to is a marginal one, I think, in terms of their
major objectives. It is embarrassing to us, and they like to have us embarrassed. U.S. commitments do exist in the Far East. We have treaties. These are not easily changed. I suppose the main problem we have to debate as a nation—and that you Congressmen have to debate—is what American interests are in the Far Eastern theater. I haven't read Mr. Lippmann's writing recently. Mr. Reston has suggested in the New York Times that our preoccupation in recent weeks has naturally been with the demanding problems of the war in Vietnam.

As a nation, we have not confronted the larger question, the major problem that is going to confront us for 10 years or more ahead, the problem of Communist China. I don't think anything we are going to do is going to change their attitude very much. They may feel like kicking us in the teeth regardless of what we do.

Dr. Powell. Unfortunately, I have to be as pessimistic as my colleagues. I hope that I do not misquote him, but I believe Secretary Rusk has said that in our repeated negotiations with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw, they maintain that no other issue can be settled until the United States gives up its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws the 7th Fleet. No other lesser issues can be settled first.

Furthermore, as a people, we and our Western allies are not ideologically inclined. Perhaps we have not been since the 18th century. Hence, we sometimes tend to underestimate the ideological convictions and motivations of other peoples. All of us on this panel have been reading Chinese Communist output for many years. The Chinese Communist leaders long ago convinced me that they are what they claim to be, sincere Marxist-Leninists-Maoists. I take this into consideration and believe, as my colleagues do, that at least under the present leadership, there are no major and realistic actions that we could take that would ameliorate the views and policies of Communist China regarding the United States.

General Griffith. I couldn't add anything to what Professor Powell and Dr. Boorman have said. I agree with them.

Dr. Dennebeger. I view the major problem as a decision of whether or not we want to be a major Asian power, although we are not geographically in Asia. If we do desire to be an Asian power there is no easy way out. We can't expect membership in the U.N. to buy off the Chinese.

Mr. Zablocki. Opponents of our present foreign policy in Asia are using the argument that if only we would change, the Communist Chinese would change. It appears that you experts feel that nothing we may do will change the Communist Chinese very much.

General Griffith, on page 2 you said "I for one do not believe that China will commit conventional formations to South Vietnam."

Suppose the United States escalated the war in Vietnam along the lines being suggested by some, by bombing the industrial complexes, the port of Hanoi, the Mig sites and other airfields in North Vietnam and even dams and dikes of the Red River Delta; do you still think that Red China would refuse to commit forces?

General Griffith. I think she would commit antiaircraft forces, antiaircraft missiles she could get or has, this type of thing. As long as the North Vietnamese Army is intact, in being, it is well trained, it is a tough army, it hasn't been committed yet, I don't think the
Chinese would commit conventional ground formations. I don't know how many divisions the North Vietnamese sent down there, hard-core divisions. I have heard from three to five.

I am not privy to this type of information, so I don't know. Until Ho Chi Minh gets himself in an awful bind, and the Chinese don't anticipate he will, I see no reason for them to commit forces down there except supporting forces, technical troops, this sort of thing. Yes, they will commit those probably. But otherwise, as they see it, they are obviously winning the war, otherwise why are we sending all sorts of people all over the world to try to make peace? We wouldn't be sending Mr. Harriman and Mr. Goldberg and everybody else around if we thought we were winning the war.

That is the way the Chinese would look at this, at least, so I think.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. General, do you believe that other states in the area also look at our overtures for peace in Vietnam in this way?

General GRIFFITH. I wouldn't be surprised that is the way the Japanese looked at it anyway. I believe these people have an Oriental cast of mind. They approach problems in a different way than we do.

I would have thought, if I were sitting in Peiping, I would think "Well, if Mr. Johnson really wants to make peace, we wouldn't be hearing anything about this in the press and on the radio. This would all be done sub rosa."

This I should presume is their reaction.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you think that they consider our peaceful overtures as resulting from internal pressures by demonstrations and criticisms in the United States of our activities in Vietnam?

General GRIFFITH. No, sir. I think they are realistic enough, when they are sitting around in the Military Affairs Committee and on the Politburo, to realize these demonstrations don't mean an awful lot. For propaganda purposes, of course, they are absolutely wonderful material for the Chinese press.

I think these men are quite capable of taking a very realistic view of the situation. They know we are a very powerful nation. They read the papers. They listen to broadcasts. I think they realize the Nation as a whole is behind the President. At the council table, I don't think they pay too much attention to these demonstrations. Who can tell? They might be deluded, too, but I wouldn't think so on that score.

Dr. BOORMAN. I think they are quite realistic about the demonstrations in the United States. They don't feel that they are having a major effect on U.S. policy. They have only to look at the current U.S. budget to get some measure of the nature and range of our capabilities.

I just would like to mention one other factor that I think is relevant. One general problem in estimating the situation out there is that no American Government in this century has ever before confronted a Chinese Government on the mainland which had its sleeves rolled up and was fairly independent and self-confident about what it was doing. We don't really have any base line for estimating these people very well. This is one of the real complications. This is a general problem that affects everyone working in the field professionally and those working on policy matters.

Another problem is that the people in Peiping obviously don't like and greatly distrust the U.S. power elite. We naturally feel that since
some of our best friends are members of the American Establishment, there must be something wrong with the Chinese Communist elite.

The problem is that they are applying, not our criteria but their own. The Chinese Communist leaders have been shaped by a different range of experience, namely that they fought a revolutionary war during all their adult life and that they have now gained a position of power. They estimate things from their standpoint, and their standpoint is often very different indeed from that which we would estimate as reasonable and sensible in the Far East.

Mr. McDowell. Would you make a comparison of the progress in China today with Russia during her same period? In other words, practically the first 20 years?

Dr. Boorman. In the sphere of political control, the Chinese Communists went much farther much faster. They organized control of the country in short order as compared to the Soviets who continued to fight a civil war in the early 1920's. The Chinese Communists who took control in 1949 had been in the business, had been administering areas and confronting practical problems in the countryside for over 10 years before they took power. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917, their leaders had been living abroad in Switzerland or London. They had to learn. In the economic sphere I have no competency for estimating. The Chinese Communists, of course, started from a different relationship between the population and resources of the country than the Russians did. So I don't know what the comparative figures would show, if you can make comparisons. China is still a poor country. Russia, relatively speaking, is a country much better endowed with natural resources in relation to population.

Mr. McDowell. Isn't there some feeling they have made greater accomplishments in their industrial complex?

Dr. Dernberger. Than the Russians? Yes, I think they have. They had the Russians to draw upon in assisting them to do this however. The Russians did hire some Western technicians to help them but not on a scale with the Russian technical aid to China. Nonetheless, to the Chinese, the comparison between the first 20 years in Russia and the first 20 years in China is not the most meaningful one. I think the valid comparison is with Asia. A damaging comparison to the Chinese would, of course, be the example of Japan. Japan, one might say, followed the Western path of development. The problem is that other countries don't seem to he able to do this. The Chinese hope that they are telling the people in Asia we can do it and are doing it. With the exception of the great leap forward, a serious disaster and embarrassment to the Chinese, they have met with a great deal of success.

Dr. Powell. I would like to go back to the extremely important question that the chairman asked a few minutes ago. Under what circumstances would Communist China intervene in Vietnam? If we put ourselves into the shoes and the background of the Chinese Communist leaders we can understand why they still feel the war in Vietnam is going quite well from their standpoint. The United States is involved on an increasing scale and recently in its military statements Peiping has stressed the concept of overextending the United States. We are being forced to expend more troops and more wealth and are receiving more casualties. All of this Peiping looks
upon as advantageous. Remember that Mao's military doctrine is essentially based on the concept of a protracted war, a war of attrition. It does not call for an all-out struggle to gain a quick victory. A basic thesis of this doctrine of protracted war is the assumption that indoctrinated and disciplined revolutionaries will have more patience, more perseverance, more willingness to fight a protracted war than will their "decadent enemies." The Chinese Communists maintain that this is true in Vietnam. However, they have also recently spelled out in more detail a rationalization or explanation for not massively intervening in "wars of liberation." They say that China, as she grows more powerful, will give increasing aid and support to revolutions. Also, they promise "spiritual atomic bombs," but they do not promise to send Chinese troops abroad to support "people's wars" or "wars of liberation." It is maintained that all revolutions must be won primarily by the people of the country involved. Foreign aid and assistance can be valuable. Yet, it is declared that even a "socialist state"—that is, a Communist state—cannot essentially win a victory for a foreign people. The people must primarily win victory for themselves.

This provide a rationalization and an explanation for Communist China's not directly intervening in Vietnam. This concept is also related to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviets accusing the Chinese, and vice versa, of not doing enough to support the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The Chinese rationalization is, in part, a defense against Moscow's charges. But, we should make a very careful distinction between this rationalization for not massively intervening to support "wars of liberalization" and the willingness of the Chinese Communists, as demonstrated in Korea, to defend their own borders and their basic national and party interests. Remember that in the Korean war they massively intervened when U.S. and U.N. troops approached their Manchurian frontiers. I assume that their approach to the Vietnam situation would be quite similar. There is a costly protracted war going on there in which the United States is deeply involved. That situation serves Peiping's interests and promotes its policy of attempting to overextend the United States, but the situation would change drastically if the war escalated to the point where it threatened the vital interests of Communist China. If the United States were to overthrow the Communist regime in North Vietnam and, especially, if U.S. Armed Forces were to approach the southern borders of Communist China I would expect the Chinese to react violently. It may be fair and accurate to say that Peiping is willing to fight to the last Vietnamese, or even the last foreign revolutionary, but it would be dangerous to assume that Communist China will not fight to preserve its own vital interests.

General Griffith. I will use an old Chinese chestnut here. Several weeks before they intervened in Korea there was a speech made in China in which was used the old Chinese saying, "When the lips are gone, the teeth are cold, when the gates are crashed the halls are imperiled." We haven't got to the "lips" of Peiping yet in Vietnam. We haven't "crashed the gates" but maybe if we "crash the gates" there we will get the same reaction we got when we crashed into North Korea. That is a guess. I don't know.

Mr. Thomson. I would like to ask Professor Dernberger about the last two lines on his statement where he says the new 5-year plan will
successfully depend upon the Chinese Communists' ability to achieve the minimum required increases in agriculture and to acquire foreign loans or credits. Where are they going to get these foreign loans and credits and where will they get the fertilizer and other things needed for agriculture?

Dr. Dernberger. The required minimum increases in agriculture and the foreign loans is based upon my assumption that they will adopt a third 5-year plan which was similar to the former 5-year plan. If the third 5-year plan will build upon their previous experience, agriculture, light industry, downgrading heavy industry, then perhaps their need for foreign loans and large increases in agricultural output would be the same. I am assuming they will attempt to launch a high rate of industrial growth, in view of their now military needs which requires heavy industrial output. Therefore, their ability to secure increases in agricultural output will be their weakest point, the weakest point in any Communist system. As to foreign loans, they have already approached Western businessmen, ideologically their worst enemy, and the Western businessmen are very desirous of receiving these orders. Agreements have already been signed by Western businessmen to build seven plants in China. The Western government has stepped in and prevented some of these orders from being carried out. For example, the Japanese Government refused to allow their Export-Import Bank to furnish credit for building a plant in China, but the company itself is very desirous of building this plant on credit. I believe it is from these Western and Japanese businessmen, they will get the needed credit if they will get it anywhere. I am sure they won't get it from the Russians. Furthermore, I don't think they desire to get it from the Russians.

Mr. Zablocki. There is a great deal of controversy about the population of China. Some experts say it will reach 1 billion by 1970. Others dispute that. What is your opinion?

Dr. Dernberger. I don't know when it will reach a billion, but I am sure it will some day. By projecting present rates of increase you can determine a date. Let me just say that I am quite sure the Chinese view their population as an asset. They aren't just saying this because they failed in their birth-control program. Rather, China is the power it is today because of its population. We are here discussing China because they have over 700 million people. This huge population does present them with problems. At times, they have taken steps toward reducing the birth rate, but these programs have not been successful. They have been successful, however, in maintaining daily calorie intake at about 1,900 calories today. This, in turn, has put a severe strain on their foreign exchange. Last year, they imported 6½ million tons of good grain. When their population becomes enough of a problem I am sure they will do something about it. They will not stand by and let the population grow and swamp all their efforts. I don't view, and I am sure they don't view, the problem as that serious yet. I think it is within their capabilities to reduce the rate of growth in population, although it will take much harsher measures than they have used so far. But they will use those measures if they have to. Finally, when I say they will have 1 billion people sometime in the future I also assume they will be able to feed them. This ability will depend on increased yields through already known methods of irrigation and the application of fertilizers.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you believe that Red China will reach self-sufficiency in the near future with their present rate of population growth?

DR. DERNBERGER. They don't like to use that word. They like to call it "self-dependency." In this regard, they like to compare themselves with the United States, and look for the day when they will be able to produce all they need but will still engage in trade of manufactured and consumer's goods. After all, the United States is the world's largest trader, but is self-dependent on her own economy, and can produce most of what she needs. The Chinese might have trouble producing rubber, but they can produce synthetic rubbers. They have the raw materials for producing plastic. In fact, rubber was the only commodity where the embargo could have been effective. But Ceylon, of course, was not a member of the U.N. at that time and signed an agreement with the Chinese assuring them of a supply of rubber. They desire self-dependency and I believe it is well within the realm of possibility they will achieve it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Many of our questions today have explored the attitude of Red China toward the United States and toward countries friendly to the United States in the area. We haven't yet discussed Red China's attitude toward the Soviet Union except in brief reference to the Sino-Soviet conflict. Therefore, gentlemen, can we take 5 or 10 minutes more to pose a few questions concerning this relationship?

Some people see the Aksai Chin Highway as a logistics base for the Chinese forces in theSinkiang Peiping Province. What is your opinion?

General GRIFFITH. When that highway was started the Chinese and Soviets were on quite good terms. The highway was in existence, as I remember it, for about 2 years before the Indians found out it was there. At least until they made the fact public that they knew it was there. I had the idea that this highway was built primarily to help them in their problems in Tibet. I don't see why it would be a great threat to the Soviet Union. I wouldn't anticipate the Soviet has any very serious strategic problems with China in remote central Asia. I don't believe they have the logistic capability to pose a threat to Russia.

I can't conceive, certainly, for the foreseeable future anything more than a low-level border clash, a few shots fired back and forth between border guards. I can't conceive of any serious engagement between the Soviet Union and the Chinese in those areas. I think there will be border crossings and be trouble, all sorts of local incidents, but nothing serious.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. General, you mentioned the Lin Piao document. Do you think the Chinese meant to include the Soviet Union among those industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere which they claim ultimately will be crushed by the emerging countries?

General GRIFFITH. That is a good question. I think the Chinese would very much like to get back some of the territories that they claim they were robbed of by czarist Russia. This amounts to quite a bit of space. It is rich in timber and materials. Some of the areas which were taken from the Chinese by the treaties of the 19th century. I can't conceive that China would get very serious about this, not at least for a long time. I wouldn't think she includes the Soviet Union
in what she calls "the second intermediate zone." I think the Soviet Union in Chinese eyes still has a place apart. This is partly emotional and partly practical. As far as I understand by Chinese definitions "the second intermediate zone" includes the United States, Oceania, by which I presume she means the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand—she never makes this clear—and the countries of Western Europe and Japan.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is it true that Red China does have a military force in Sinkiang Province?

General GRIFFITH. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What, in your judgment, is the reason for having that force there? Is it for border warfare?

General GRIFFITH. I don't think so. In the last few years there have been quite some goings on out there. The Soviets, according to the Chinese, the Soviets actually encouraged about 50,000 or 60,000 indigenous people, the tribesmen, the Uzbeks, people who live out there, to cross over into the Soviet Union. The Chinese have blamed the Soviet Union for carrying on propaganda in Chinese central Asia. I think sending troops to Sinkiang, as that is where some of her atomic operations are going on, might be a perfectly normal thing to expect them to do. In the light of the unrest that is historic, this whole area has been one in which tribes are ebbing and flowing, they are crossing borders. They didn't use to pay any attention to borders. It isn't settled in the sense that China is settled. It is sort of like the American wild West was in the old days. I don't think it is too unusual that they would have a half dozen divisions out in that area. I would think it would just be normally prudent.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you think there is anything to the rumor that the Chinese were fearful that if the Soviet Union had concluded that they couldn't keep China in line they would have destroyed the nuclear plants near the border?

General GRIFFITH. I think you would have to present the President of the U.S.S.R. with that one, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. POWELL. Since their seizure of power in 1949 the Chinese Communists have maintained considerable military forces in Sinkiang Province. Evidence indicates that these units have had two primary missions. In the first place they are used as a large labor corps to carry out economic construction projects for the regime. Second, they have been used to maintain security and put down revolts among the minority peoples of this frontier area. In the once-secret Bulletin of Activities papers it was admitted that there had been revolts, but it was claimed that by 1961 these had been largely crushed. However, it was stated that there were still some hard-core guerrillas operating in Sinkiang. The minorities of Sinkiang, traditionally nomadic peoples, very naturally resent the influx of Chinese in a deliberate migration policy. I would assume that now the Chinese armed forces in Sinkiang have three major missions— labor service, internal security, and defense against unfriendly Soviet actions. In early 1961 the military affairs committee of the party issued a directive to the border commanders requiring them to continue the gradual fortifications of the southwestern and northwestern frontiers. Reference to the southwestern frontiers dealt with the Indian borders, but
when the committee spoke of the northwestern frontiers they could only mean the Soviet boundaries.

General Griffith. When the Chinese exploded their first atomic device, the first official statement thanked the scientists and workers. With the second one they thanked the scientists, workers, and the Peoples Liberation Army. That is apropos of what the doctor said. The Peoples Liberation Party undoubtedly contributed a large amount of support to the Chinese nuclear program.

Mr. Zablocki. Did they include any expression of gratitude to the Soviet Union for their efforts and early support and assistance to the project?

General Griffith. It seems to me all the statements connected with the Soviet Union in the last 3 or 4 years have been vilification. In fact, they accused the Soviet Union of having perfidiously torn up and destroyed hundreds of thousands of blueprints and withdrawn hundreds and thousands of technicians before their terms had expired, and so forth.

Mr. Zablocki. During the Sino-Soviet hearings, last year, Dr. Richard Lowenthal said the Soviets had massed troops along the Sinkiang border just prior to the first Chinese atomic explosion. He speculated that the Chinese were afraid that the Soviets might have been contemplating military action to forestall their atomic test. Do you know anything about that?

General Griffith. Dr. Lowenthal is a far greater authority than I am. I have great respect for his opinion. I would like to know where he got the material on which he based that statement.

Mr. Zablocki. That is the reason the question was asked today. We thought you might have some information on that particular point.

General Griffith. There are certainly some questions that just cannot be answered, even, I should think, by the CIA or the Department of Defense, and they would like to know the answers. I think troop movements in central Asia must remain a matter of speculation, even as far as many of those agencies are concerned.

Dr. Boorman. I would like to confirm General Griffith's prudent observation regarding the necessity for caution in estimating the movement of troops in central Asia. The road between Tibet and Sinkiang related primarily to Tibet, in my view. Since any supply road has two ends, if you assume it was built primarily to supply units in Sinkiang, then you would have to assume that there was military material in Tibet that they wanted to move there. I rather think Tibet was the focus of that operation.

As to the Sino-Soviet confrontation in the military sphere, I think the top command in Peiping realizes that the Soviet Union is far stronger than China in both conventional and nuclear capabilities. They begin with this assumption.

Dr. Powell. It is a long ways over the desert from the Soviet border to Lop Nor in Sinkiang, where our Government has announced the Chinese Communists exploded their first atomic device. I would certainly assume, from a geographic standpoint, that if the Soviet Union had any intention of destroying the Chinese Communist's budding nuclear capability, they would have used their vastly superior
air or missile forces to do it, rather than attempting to invade with land forces across the deserts of Sinkiang.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, you have contributed much to our understanding of Communist China's internal conditions today, and in the decade ahead. Thank you very much.

The committee will resume the hearings tomorrow afternoon at 2 p.m. Tomorrow's hearings will be concentrated on the external relations of Red China today and in the decade ahead.

(Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, January 26, 1966, at 2 p.m.)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building. Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific will come to order, please.

As I announced yesterday, under the rules of the House of Representatives, photographs and tape recordings may not be made while the hearing is in session.

Today's meeting is the second in a series of public hearings on United States policy toward Asia. These hearings are designed to obtain information largely from independent, non-Government sources on Asia, its current problems and future trends, as well as on U.S. policies aimed at that area.

Yesterday's session was devoted to a discussion of internal conditions in Communist China today and in the decade ahead. Today, we have four more outstanding experts who will discuss the external relations of Communist China today, and in the decade ahead.

We are indeed privileged to have with us Dr. A. Doak Barnett, of Columbia University, New York; Dr. Alexander Eckstein, of the Department of Far Eastern Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Dr. John M. H. Lindbeck, associate director of the East Asian Research Center and a research fellow in contemporary Chinese studies at Harvard University; and Mr. O. Edmund Clubb, former Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State.

The witnesses have supplied summary statements which are before the members. They will make short oral statements of their views which should be limited to 5 and not more than 10 minutes.

For the benefit of the witnesses and others here present, let me say the subcommittee operates under a 5-minute rule, during which each member is allowed, in turn, 5 minutes to question the witnesses. After all members present have had their opportunity to question the witnesses, they will be permitted to ask additional questions if they so desire.

We will begin with Dr. Barnett. You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. A. DOAK BARNETT, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dr. Barnett. Mr. Chairman, there are just a few simple points I would like to make in this brief introductory statement, and, hopefully, we may discuss some of them later. First of all, the Chinese
Communists are clearly determined to achieve major power status and to promote as best they can the spread of communism.

This is really not surprising—both in view of China's past, its long and distinguished history, and the fact that Peiping's present leaders are first-generation revolutionary leaders. Chinese policies may change from relatively moderate to relatively militant ones. Peiping may make some gains and take some losses. Its strategy and politics may shift. But it will have ambitious long-term goals for the foreseeable future.

Secondly, however, despite the present ideological dogmatism and the militancy of Peiping's leaders, in general the record of their policies to date indicates a fairly high degree of realism and pragmatism in concrete situations. They are aware of their material and military limitations, and they have generally attempted to minimize the risk of major conflict. This does not mean, though, that they can be expected to avoid conflict at all costs. If and when they conclude that vital interests of China itself, as they see them, are threatened, they are likely to stand up and fight—even at great risk and great cost.

The recent emphasis in China on preparation for war is ominous and disturbing. But it is subject to differing interpretations. My own estimate is that the Chinese are still not inclined to provoke a major conflict, but that they may well, and probably do, fear that escalation of the Vietnam war could result in a larger conflict that would involve direct clashes between China and the United States.

As is well known, the Chinese Communists are now at odds with, and openly challenge, the Soviet Union as well as the United States, because of serious clashes of national interest, as well as ideological differences. However, I believe that the Chinese continue to wish, if possible, to avoid major military conflict with either of the superpowers and feel that they can best try to challenge the United States and Soviet Union by attempting to undermine or weaken their positions and influence in other areas of the world, in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe. Consequently, current Chinese policies really focus on these other areas.

Peiping views the world between the United States and the Soviet Union with several differing perspectives, I think, and its policies are actually less consistent and clear cut than is sometimes assumed. In fact, I would say their policies are very mixed, indeed.

Among the Communist parties throughout the world, it now competes openly and bitterly against Soviet influence and tries to assert Chinese leadership. It has had some success in Asia, and the Communist movement has been divided and basically changed in recent years. But the Chinese have not been able to establish any unified control over the Communist world movement or even over any very large and significant portion of it.

Toward the underdeveloped areas of the world, including Asia, Peiping calls for so-called "people's war" and what it labels the "encirclement of the cities of the world" (meaning North America and Western Europe) by the so-called "rural areas of the world" (meaning Asia, Africa, and Latin America). It has discovered, however, that the appeal of its slogans is not universal and that most underdeveloped nations are as wary of manipulation by the Chinese Communists as by anyone else.

In practice, Peiping recognizes that it cannot really promote violence everywhere, so it has focused on a few areas. Elsewhere, it has
attempted to woo many nonrevolutionary and non-Communist countries and groups, even in the underdeveloped world, countries as varied as Pakistan, Nepal, and Cambodia.

Moreover, despite their theories of "people's war" waged by the underdeveloped world against advanced areas of the world, the Chinese Communists have, for economic and other practical reasons, tried very hard in recent years to increase trade and other contacts with many of the advanced countries, including some in Western Europe, Japan, and Commonwealth countries such as Canada and Australia. Peiping has attempted to rationalize this by saying that these countries belong to what it calls an "intermediate zone," which it hopes somehow to detach from and mobilize against the United States. But the real explanation, I think, is the fact that in practical terms the Chinese need trade and contacts with these countries.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese Communists' main interests are really in Asia, rather than in distant Latin American countries and Africa, despite the fact that the latter figure largely in their propaganda. Broadly speaking, I would say that their current policies in Asia seek to weaken the ties of Japan with the United States, in the hope of eventually detaching the Japanese from their American alliance; to exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities wherever they exist in southeast Asia; and to divide and weaken the subcontinent of south Asia. Even in these areas, its policies are mixed, however, and involve threatening pressures and subversion in some areas but attempts at attraction and collaboration and encouragement of voluntary accommodation in others.

Despite the complicated mix of current Chinese policies, clearly Peiping's overall current strategy and posture are very militant—and they have been since late 1957, in contrast to the relative moderation of the so-called Bandung period just before 1957. However, I think that it is important to realize that the Chinese Communists have shifted their basic posture and strategy in the past, and could do so again, without any abandonment of long-term goals.

I would not say that there are any real signs that they are now about to do so. But I do think there are a number of factors which make it conceivable that at least some Chinese leaders might feel compelled to reexamine policies in the future.

Among these factors I would list the following. In recent months the Chinese Communists have experienced a number of very serious setbacks in their foreign policies, including the failure of the Algiers Conference, on which they had placed great hopes, and the radical changes in Indonesia, resulting in a serious deterioration of Sino-Indonesian relations. These developments must raise questions in the minds of people in Peiping. The American commitments and involvement in Vietnam have doubtless altered their view of the possibilities of rapid success in southeast Asia and must also, therefore, raise questions in Peiping. There is no doubt in my mind that their present overall militant posture, which creates tensions with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States, has involved and still involves real economic costs for the Chinese; it has probably slowed their domestic economic growth. This too, I think, may raise questions in the minds of at least some people in Peiping. Recent trends in some Communist parties, including those in both North Korea and North Vietnam, which have tried increasingly to balance Soviet and
Chinese influence, may suggest to at least some Chinese leaders that there are obstacles to the effective mobilization of even these countries in Peiping's effort to gain full support for current Chinese policies. Finally, because the top leadership in Communist China is aging—many of the leaders are already aged—the prospect is for a major and, I would say, historic change of leadership in China before very long. I am convinced that this will introduce a transitional period that could be fairly fluid, and will create a situation that might well lead some Chinese leaders to raise serious questions about their current policies and to reappraise at least some of these policies. Thank you.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Dr. Barnett.

Before calling on Dr. Eckstein, I would like to commend our witnesses for coming before this subcommittee and to express our deep gratitude and appreciation. I know what trouble you have taken to come here. I have to be in New York later this afternoon and will have to depart before we finish. I want to apologize to the committee members and to the panelists for having to leave, but the storm outside makes it necessary for me to go by train.

I want to thank you gentlemen very much.

(The biography of Dr. Barnett is as follows:)

CURRICULUM VITAE OF DR. A. DOAK BARNETT

I. CURRENT ACTIVITIES (1963-64)

A. Columbia University: professor of government, department of public law and government, faculty of political science, faculty of international affairs; chairman, Communist China Studies Committee, East Asian Institute; Acting Director and Member, Executive Committee, East Asian Institute; member, Administrative Board, Research Institute on Communist Affairs; member, University Seminar on Modern East Asia; China; member, International Seminar on International Communism; and member, Faculty Study Committee on the Social Science of Science.

Courses and Seminars: Government G4471x, Political Institutions of China; Government, G4871y, Chinese Foreign Policy; Political Science G9591x-G9592y, seminar, Studies in the History, Government, International Relations, Economy and Industrialization of China and Japan; Government-History G9585x-G9586y, seminar, the Communist Orbit: Russia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe; and Government G9072x, seminar, the Far Eastern Relations of the United States.

B. Other: Member, Joint Committee on Contemporary China, Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies; member, Executive Committee, Liaison Committee on Contemporary China Studies; member, Steering Committee, Project on the United States and China in World Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations; former member, Board of Directors, Association for Asian Studies; former member, Committee on the Economy of China, Social Science Research Council; member, Board of Governors, Institute of Current World Affairs; member, American Political Science Association, chairman of APSA Conference on Communist Studies; member, Corporation of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia; fellow member, Hudson Institute; member, Board of Trustees, Shanghai American School; and member, Board of Advisory and Contributing Editors, Journal of International Affairs.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Born: Shanghai, China, October 8, 1921. Residence in China until 1936.
B. Education: B.A. 1942, Yale University, International Relations, Phi Beta Kappa, "Philosophical Orations" (summa cum laude); M.A. 1947, Yale University, International Relations. (Also certificate from Yale Institute of Far Eastern Languages.)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

50, 1962-53, and 1954-55; consultant, Economic Cooperation Administration, in Washington, D.C., 1950-51; consol, Public Affairs Officer, Evaluation Officer, Foreign Service Reserve, American Consulate-General, in Hong Kong, 1951-52; associate, American Universities field staff, in Hong Kong and other Asian areas, 1953-55; head of Department of Foreign Area Studies, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, in Washington, D.C., 1956-57; field researcher, for Louis Harris & Associates, and the Maxwell School of Syracuse University, in Asia, Middle East, and Eastern Europe, 1957; consultant, National Planning Association, in Washington, D.C., 1957-58; research fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, in New York, N.Y., 1958-59; program associate, international training and research program, the Ford Foundation, in New York and Asia, 1959-61; and associate professor, Columbia University, in New York, N.Y., 1961 to present.

Publications

A. BOOKS AND BOOKLETS


B. CHAPTER OF BOOKS


C. ARTICLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKLETS AND PAMPHLETS

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