and solidity are our objectives. Asian alinement to itself without dependency on American or Soviet guarantees should be the design to seek in Asia. It could counterbalance even a powerful China. A friendly workable association between the Asian states and China should be the target of foreign policy, even though it seems farfetched now.

The interposition of solidified Asian states will help deter Chinese seepage and persuade the Chinese eventually to live with their Asian neighbors peacefully. This will balance emergent Chinese power as the world moves toward something we might call a global cluster system. We should also be seeking a world goal of interdependent clusters: the Atlantic, the Slavic, the African, and the Asian, united by common institutions and international technology within the United Nations.

Our new objective could be called a policy of convergence with China after its containment, and with Asia beyond its solidification. The dynamic performance of independent, healthy, cohesive Asian states associated in their own system is the best way to stabilize Asia with China.

China, the United States, and the Asian states could then negotiate a convergence of interests in a new equilibrium of Asian order. This would require workable means of communication, desensitized lines of limit and zones of insulation against military and political crossing, guarantees of respect and non-interference, economic trading and development areas, a new "law of community" and confederation along functional lines, and means for supervision and enforcement for the contractual obligations undertaken by treaties of convergence. If this policy were put into effect by both China and the United States with the mandate and participation of the Asian states, then China could and should become a member of the United Nations, accountable for its pledges.

Right now, Vietnam and southeast Asia are the zone of impact. To meet this immediate crisis I have long suggested, as an official with responsibility and as a private citizen speaking for myself, that this great nation get behind a liberal strategy to change the entire political context there by:

1. Rural resurgency.
2. Nationalism with reform.
3. A peace corridor.
5. An international treaty for developing and guaranteeing the Mekong River watershed.

Rural resurgency is the key to our riddle in southeast Asia. It is more dynamic than "pacification" or "reconstruction" because it stresses the human factors, the motives, and urges of the millions of rural people. Unless something sparks them out of apathy or despair, the task is hopeless. Here the Honolulu Declaration is milestone, but even that initiative needs to go further to generate the villagers' resurgency. The solution is simple to state but hard to do. The self-starter is village initiative, village choice, village leadership for the local community—not for a cause, a nation, or a strategy. Successful rural resurgency can be 90 percent spiritual morale and only 10 percent material rewards. All the aid in health, education, and agriculture will miss the point without the vital spark. It must start up from the bottom, "upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam" as the Honolulu Declaration so well put it, and not from the top down. This is the vital distinction: rural people and government are not together in much of southeast Asia. They are "insiders" and "outsiders" caught in a wide gap of intellectual, social, and political separation, suspicion, and hostility. Just putting officials, police, and technicians into villages Asia is not nearly enough. In fact, it may inspire the wrong revolution. The mentalities of urban and rural people are miles apart. We need joint action to bring them together to put the decision voice in the village and the helping hand in the government, not the other way round or even both the voice and the hand in Saigon or Bangkok. And this will take a long time. We must stay with a strategy of rural resurgency for years. It will be difficult in wartime but not impossible. It is a task for political leadership. I hope that the Congress will vigorously support rural resurgency and the Vietnamese, American, and other efforts now underway in southeast Asia. The rural programs of the Thai Government deserve full support and sensitive evolution. They have a chance to ward off "aggression by seepage," with enlightened central leadership of a new kind.

Nationalism with reform is the twin of rural resurgency. It requires a national administration and a cohesive nationalist movement, dedicated to pushing all kinds of reforms against corruption, landlordism, and warlordism, and for social justice, land security, economic opportunity, and protection against violence. A new kind of "political man"—the student and educated young worker—should
be trained to do away with the old "government gap" between urban and rural people, and go out to serve the people and the nation. This is beginning in Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam especially requires a united nationalist movement to fuse its political fragments.

A "peace corridor" is needed across Vietnam and Laos to the China-Burma border to separate and guarantee both sides in this dangerous crossroads of conflict. This could be the initial step in the policy of convergence beyond containment. In military terms, allied military resources—the regrettable but essential element of power—should concentrate on creating a defensive and defendable "chokeoff zone" across the Lao-Vietnamese mountain frontier at and diagonally above the 17th parallel. This would reduce the "break in the water line," so to speak, which is flooding Vietnam, Laos, and even Thailand by degrees. Once a military line of limit or "hold-fast zone" was established, at least on a mobile, preemptive basis, diplomacy could go to work. An Asian peace force could man the corridor as the President of India has suggested in one formula. Then a new Geneva Conference could incorporate the military status quo, based on the realities of power and geography, into a new treaty.

In that case, a new agreement on Vietnam's peace and unity should be our specific diplomatic objective, not a return to 1954 or the "essentials" of that agreement. Its military provisions are elementary standard items to be updated and incorporated in any negotiated true: military ceasefire, disengagement, regroupment, and prohibitions. But the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, as they affect Vietnam, remain a contradictory and confusing hedgepodge and paradox. In that sense they are obsolete, misleading, and dangerous. We need to begin thinking through the political, social, and economic provisions of a new approach for reconciling divisions among the Vietnamese themselves and for pledging international guarantees. This should aim at the practical integration of Vietnam within itself by careful stages—and with its neighbors to create a new political context in southeast Asia.

The north-south division of Vietnam, which has a long and unfortunate history, should be healed and not perpetuated. But the attempt to bring about the forceful unification of Vietnam by military conquest and revolution by murder will only serve to deepen the divisions of the long-suffering Vietnamese. There is too much dissunity in South Vietnam now. Our task is to begin consulting with ourselves and others on an agenda for Vietnam's peace and unity. Perhaps a national commission should be organized with panels of experts on Vietnam, few as there are in our "knowledge and scholar gap," to sketch out the headings for a Vietnam Peace Conference when conditions permit negotiations. Such an agenda could include (a) exchanges between north and south; (b) political consultations and Vietnamese-style political processes to determine political amalgamation in the south and what form a unified nation Vietnam could become, when, and how—without time limits or other conditions; (c) the international demilitarization and guarantee of all Vietnam; and (d) accords between both Vietnams or one Vietnam and its neighbors as well as association with the United Nations on a basis of full membership.

A new conference and treaty on southeast Asia could be the best, if now impractical, way to obtain the pacification and stabilization of the Vietnam crisis for both South and North Vietnam—or a single confederated Vietnam. This would promote its peace and unity within a regional framework. In some ways the development of the societies, economies, and resources of the Mekong Valley watershed offers exciting possibilities for "growing" a new transnational community and structure. Such an evolution could perhaps lead to restraints, supports, and guarantees from China, the United States, and other powers for this Mekong community.

This could be a better form of guaranteed and supported stabilization than the standard proposals for European-style "neutralization" which have a long and unfortunate history in southeast Asia. Some regional community under international treaties could relieve SEATO which is compromised anyway by its own dissunity. A bilateral treaty with Thailand, or an American trilateral guarantee for the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, if mutually agreed upon, could complement the Mekong institutional development.

Finally, we need to think about blending our style and organization much more with Asian patterns of thought and behavior than we have yet. Lower visibility, smaller organizations, compact teams, countryside contacts, long tenure, and knowable expertise, competence, approaches, personal bonds—slow pacing, sincerity with friendliness—these are some of the changes in style to improve our dealings with Asians and get off our collision course.
As for the organization of our systems I have suggested four steps:

1. Integrated missions abroad under a fully empowered executive—the Ambassador.

2. A “Manhattan project” to mobilize American brainpower and specialized knowledge to promote rural renaissance and counter “aggression by seepage” in Vietnam and southeast Asia, or elsewhere.

3. An “Asian Service Corps” in the U.S. Government for professionalism on Asia and long assignments there coupled with urgent and large-scale public and private support for closing our “knowledge gap” on Asia.

4. Private institutes backed by the Congress for encouraging young politicians, leaders in village action, lawyers, journalists, writers, artists, and managers from Asia’s new generation who could build their nations and a united Asia.

(The biography of Mr. Young follows:)

Biographical Background of Hon. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Ambassador Young has specialized in Asian affairs since he spent 18 months as a college student in China in 1935-36 and in Paris in 1937.

He got his A.B at Harvard College in 1939 where he specialized in Far Eastern languages and social science. He took a master’s degree from Harvard in international law and relations.

During World War II, he served in the U.S. Air Force as a combat intelligence officer with assignments in the Pacific Theater.

For 12 years after the war, he served in various Far Eastern positions with the U.S. Government in Washington. He was Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs for 3 years and then Director of Southeast Asian Affairs from 1954 to 1958. He attended the Japanese Peace Conference, served as Deputy U.S. representative at the Panninjon talks in 1953-54, went to the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina in 1954 and the summit conference in 1955. He was on the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1952-53 and 1956-57.

He spent 1958-60 as an executive with Standard Vacuum Oil Co., specializing in government relations and investment in new petrochemical facilities in Asia.

During 1961-63 he served as Ambassador to Thailand and U.S. representative on the SEATO Council in Bangkok. He attended the regional conferences of U.S. Ambassadors in New Delhi in 1961 and Manila in 1962. At the end of his assignment in Thailand, he was personally decorated by His Majesty, the King.

In 1964 he was the U.S. representative and chief of delegation to the annual session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Century Association in New York, and the Visiting Committee for East Asian Civilization of Harvard University; a trustee of the Harvard-Yenching Institute and the Asia Society; and a Columbia University Associate on South and Southeast Asia.

Mr. Young is president of the Asia Society in New York City, a private, philanthropic organization for promoting Asian-American understanding and cooperation in the arts and letters, education and current economic and political affairs.


Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Henderson.

Statement of William Henderson, Manager, International Government Relations, Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc.

Mr. Henderson. Mr. Chairman, I should begin by stating that I appear before your subcommittee in an individual capacity, and not as a spokesman for my employer, the Socony Mobil Oil Co.
In the time available to me, I shall, as requested, address myself primarily to a definition of American interest in southeast Asia. Unfortunately, traditional conceptions of national interest seem entirely inadequate to the case. We no longer have a territorial stake in southeast Asia; our only specifically territorial interest was liquidated when the Philippines attained independence in 1946. From the economic point of view, neither the volume of American trade with the area, nor the value of American investments in it, can possibly be construed as vital to this country, however important they undoubtedly are to the companies and individuals concerned. To be sure, southeast Asia is important as a source of certain foods and raw materials, such as rice, tin, rubber, and oil. But in a pinch, the United States and the Western World can do without them, as we did during most of World War II. Nor, in the most coldblooded terms, does the population of southeast Asia figure in the worldwide strategic balance. Indeed, the greatest importance of southeast Asia from the economic point of view is simply to deny its resources, in particular its rice surpluses, to exclusive Communist control.

Militarily, southeast Asia would appear to have little importance for the United States in the event of a general war, whether with the Soviet Union or Communist China, in which nuclear weapons were employed. On the other hand, military bases in and around southeast Asia obviously have much greater significance in contingencies related to limited aggression on the part of Communist China; or to the defense of one or another part of the region in the event of aggression by a neighboring southeast Asian country, or in the case of attempts at internal subversion.

The vital interest of the United States in southeast Asia is rather to contain the outward thrust of Communist power. I would emphasize the term, "Communist power," because what we have to deal with primarily in southeast Asia is the expansionist tendency of those Communist states which are involved in the politics of the region. It appears to be a characteristic of Communist regimes, especially during the earlier and more militant phases of their evolution, that within the limits of circumstance they strive to export revolution beyond their borders and to subvert the political systems of their non-Communist neighbors. This hypothesis is not dependent upon the notion of the world Communist movement as a monolithic, centrally directed conspiracy. However valid that concept may have been in the past, it clearly does not apply today. There are significant splits and differences among various Communist regimes, notably between Moscow and Peking, and these differences have become greatly accentuated in recent years. Nevertheless, it remains true that the political aims and direction of individual Communist states tend to converge upon a common goal; namely, the spread of Communist power.

On the record, this has certainly been the case with Peking and Hanoi. At the present stage of their development, both Communist China and North Vietnam appear committed to expansionist foreign policies. The evidence of Peking's aggressiveness, and of its political ambitions in Asia and elsewhere in the world, seem to me as plain as a pikestaff. The same is true of North Vietnam, although realistically its goals have been confined to the Indochinese Peninsula. Jointly they pose a critical challenge to the security of southeast Asia.
I believe it to be a vital interest of the United States to safeguard the security of that region: first, because the loss of southeast Asia or of any significant portion of it, would have far-reaching consequences on the credibility of American leadership in the free world, and on the confidence of our allies and others in the reliability of American protection; second, because over the long term the expansion of Communist power in southeast Asia, as elsewhere in the world, could eventually upset the global strategic balance and ultimately pose a challenge to the security of the United States itself; and third, because I fear that the United States could not long survive as a free and democratic society in an indefinitely expanding Communist world. The crisis in Vietnam involves no specific territorial, economic, or even military interest of the United States worth fighting for; rather, it is a symbolic test, the importance of which far transcends Vietnam and even southeast Asia.

I should like to comment briefly on four issues that have been much discussed in the current debate over Vietnam. First, the question is often raised whether, from a military point of view, South Vietnam is the best place to make a stand in southeast Asia. This is the familiar contention that we may be fighting the wrong war in the wrong place. While one can argue the point abstractly, as a matter of practical politics it comes far too late in the day. We have long since crossed the Rubicon in our commitment in South Vietnam. We are too heavily committed, our honor and prestige are too deeply involved, to consider seriously whether we would not be wiser to make our stand on some more favorable field. This is the war we are stuck with.

The second point concerns the relationship between the National Liberation Front (and its military arm, the Vietcong) in the south, and the Communist regime in North Vietnam. While the evidence seems persuasive to me that the National Liberation Front and the Vietcong are little more than creatures of Hanoi, and fully responsive to its overall policy guidance, I would submit that in some respects the question is irrelevant, and that it is often raised as a kind of "red herring." Whatever the precise relationship, everyone recognizes that if the Vietcong wins in the south, then all of Vietnam would be swiftly united under the Communist regime in Hanoi. In assessing the American interest in Vietnam, therefore, what really matters is the character of the Communist government in the north, and the objectives of its domestic and foreign policy.

Thirdly, I seriously question the wisdom of any proposal for ending the Vietnam war which involves a coalition government in Saigon, either as a preliminary to negotiations or as a basis for settlement of the war. The risk is simply too great. We must candidly recognize that Communist movements in the less developed countries—and this is certainly true of the National Liberation Front and the Vietcong in South Vietnam—often possess striking advantages over other political parties in the competition for political power. I have in mind the zeal and dedication of Communist cadres; their doctrinal sophistication, which is a source of great inner strength; their peculiar organizational talents; their capacity to harness the forces of modern nationalism; their systematic ruthlessness; their claims to exclusive political power; their ability to institutionalize power, once it has been achieved, in stable political dictatorships. If brought into a coalition govern-
ment, and given the chance to operate legally, the Communists would simply run rings around any competition presently visible in the South Vietnamese political arena. In my judgment, the end result would almost certainly be a gradual evisceration of the coalition and its ultimate replacement by an out-and-out Communist regime. This is not because the Vietnamese people are pro-Communist, but rather because the Communists would be much more skilled and ruthless in the strategy and tactics of political in-fighting, and more effective in organizing popular support, than any of the non-Communist parties.

The final point concerns the hypothesis that Ho Chi Minh, if he once succeeds in uniting North and South Vietnam under his leadership, would become "another Tito," and thereafter assume a key role in the containment of Chinese power. A basis for this hypothesis may be found in the mutual hostility and conflict that have characterized Sino-Vietnamese relations for centuries; in the long history of the Vietnamese Communist Party as an autonomous, self-reliant movement which won power on its own; and on the undoubted aspirations of Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues to remain independent of Chinese political control.

Nevertheless, I question whether the prospect of a "Titoist" Vietnam is so promising that we could afford to base policy upon it. Yugoslavia enjoyed a much more favorable geographic location on the frontiers of Western military and political power in Europe; and it did not have a common border with the Soviet Union. Vietnam, on the other hand, lies at the extreme periphery of Western power, and is geographically remote from the Soviet Union as well; while Communist China is its immediate neighbor to the north. One senses that Hanoi would have much less room for political maneuver, especially in face of the ruthlessness and determination of Communist China's leadership. Looked at another way, I would call attention to the fact that the dominant factions within the Hanoi government have, in recent years, closely identified themselves with Communist China, and warmly espoused Peiping's doctrines of worldwide revolutionary warfare and the role of violence as a catalyst of political change. Rather than a split with Peiping, it would seem much more likely to me—at least for a term of years—that a victorious Communist regime in Hanoi, having succeeded in driving out the Americans, would turn with renewed energy to the prosecution of revolutionary warfare against its near neighbors—Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. At best, the hypothesis of a "Titoist" Vietnam is an uncertain basis for the formulation of policy.

(The biography of Mr. Henderson follows:)

**Biography of William Henderson**

William Henderson was born in New York City in 1922. He was educated at Hamilton College (B.A., 1942) where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and Delta Sigma Rho; at the University of Colorado; and at Columbia University.

During World War II, Henderson served as a Japanese language officer, performing duties as interpreter, translator, and interrogator of prisoners of war in the Pacific theater of operations. At the present time he holds the rank of lieutenant commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve (retired).

In 1942 and again in 1946, Henderson was employed as an economist by the U.S. Office of Alien Property Custodian. He resigned this post in order to begin graduate study in international relations at Columbia University. From 1948 to 1949 he taught in the department of history and government at Adelphi College, Garden City, N.Y.; and from 1949 to 1953 he was a member of the
department of government at Barnard College, Columbia University, New York. At Barnard he taught international relations, and Far Eastern history and politics.

In 1952, Henderson joined the Council on Foreign Relations, one of the country’s leading centers for the study of foreign policy problems. At the time of his resignation early in 1962, he was associate executive director of the council. Henderson was also Far Eastern specialist on the council’s permanent staff, and in this capacity had responsibility for several council projects relating to the Far East and southeast Asia. Henderson has given particular study to the problems of government in underdeveloped countries.

In March 1962 Henderson joined the Socony Mobil Oil Co., one of the world’s largest international oil concerns, as its adviser on international affairs; in February 1965, he became manager, international government relations. Over the past decade, Henderson has written and lectured widely on various aspects of international relations and Far Eastern affairs. He is the author of two short books, and numerous articles and book reviews. He has recently edited, and contributed a chapter to, a volume on “Southeast Asia: Problems of U.S. Policy,” which was published in January 1964 by the M.I.T. Press.

Henderson is married and has two children.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Henderson, for your excellent statement.

Ambassador Young, you have emphasized regional cooperation, yet the picture as it looks here in Washington is one of regional distrust and suspicion. It appears to me that a large part of Asia is on a collision course with itself. The Cambodians dislike and can’t get along with the Thai or the Vietnamese; the Burmese are suspicious of the Thai; India and Pakistan have deep-seated differences—just to name a few. It would be ideal if our long-range Asian goal for an Asian system of states, including China, could be realized.

But to take the first step forward to the long mile we must attempt to find a common denominator in Asia. What factors in the area are strong enough to overcome the various differences among the Asian states?

Mr. YOUNG. That is putting the question right at the crux, Mr. Chairman. One factor in southeast Asia is economic. It may be recognized by the technical leaders of these governments that a joint or regional project will do more for their own country than would their own efforts alone, even with outside aid. The building of power, irrigation, and dams for the Mekong River itself of course is a major and very costly operation. It does require regional cooperation.

In education, that being one of the traditional goals of Asians for centuries, they may be more willing to subordinate their ancient feuds in order to work together for some educational institution, for example, a southeast Asian university for science and technology, or a southeast Asian institute for their own history, and their own cultural background, where Thais, Cambodians, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Indonesians, and Malays, would come together in an academic atmosphere and leave their feuds at home.

A third factor, Mr. Chairman, relates to this younger generation. These young men and women in Asia, now educated through college or high school, and many through universities, perhaps have less of the intensity of the feuding of the past in their psychologies and makeups than their fathers do.

We have noticed that when you put these engineers, statisticians, economists, scholars, doctors—professional people—together, their profession unites them, where nationalism divides them. I think there are bridges like this. You could add the transportation field.
and manufacturing as ways of finding bridges between two countries where they are contiguous or near enough together to make a common market.

I am talking here about modest building blocks for the long-range goal of a cohesive Asian system of states. This may take a generation or more. But I have a feeling that the time has come when some of these building blocks on a very tentative, modest, careful basis are beginning to emerge.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, would you describe the role you believe Japan and India might play in strengthening the nations of southeast Asia? Do you believe as some do that Japan and India acting in concert could be the counterweight to Red China and provide the area with sufficient security from Chinese aggression to permit the eventual U.S. withdrawal.

Mr. Young. I think that it is going way off into the future, Mr. Chairman, to envisage a combination of Japan and India which would permit the United States to withdraw or certainly substantially reduce its commitment and its resources to Asia.

However, Japan and India each have a role to play within the auspices of the United Nations or within an Asian framework, satisfactory to the smaller Asian states right now. The experience with the new Asian Development Bank is an example of how the roof can be built under which these different states can emerge.

The Japanese, of course, have the great economic power and potential as a modern technological state to offer the people in southeast Asia, and India too, in education and techniques of shifting from the old type of rice culture, the old peasant society, to a modern society.

The Japanese have a great deal to offer. India does too. On the other hand we should recognize that both Japan and India have certain major questions and problems of their own to solve, particularly India.

Furthermore, when we listen to the Asians answer your question, they will express certain cautions regarding relations with their big neighbors. There is a big neighbor or big power-small country kind of relationship which we Americans have to be very careful about in Asia.

We, being so large and powerful, don't really worry about this relationship except perhaps in terms of the Soviet Union and perhaps eventually Communist China. In Asia, relationships between the old and the young, between the powerful and the weak, big and small, are very important factors today. We have to work within that kind of framework.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to obtain both Mr. Henderson's and your views on this. A number of people and organizations, including the United States Chamber of Commerce, have recommended easing trade restrictions with Communist China. What is your view? Should we ease trade restrictions with Communist China?

Mr. Henderson. On the whole, I would myself favor easing all manner of political and economic restrictions in our relations with Communist China; but only provided that this relaxation is put in a proper political context, and is carried out with adequate political preparation. I don't expect a great deal would result from such a
relaxation. We are not going to convert China because we send newspapermen there, or because we sell them some goods.

On the other hand, I see nothing but gain coming from the relaxation of existing restrictions, provided this is done in such a way that it does not appear to be a political capitulation on the part of the United States. My own impression is that Communist China does not want such a relaxation, and that Peiping would only accept it if it were clothed in some kind of apparently humiliating American concession, and perhaps not even then. Until such time as it can be done on the basis of mutual give-and-take, without humiliating conditions set by Peiping, I'm afraid that—except for such minor things as permitting American newspapermen and scholars to travel in Communist China—we are still in for a long, cold winter in our relations with Communist China.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Young. I would agree with what Mr. Henderson has said and and belligerent party in Peiping for hurting their neighbors as well as peaceful trade with the Peoples Republic of China in terms of the commodities to be exchanged, then I certainly would favor it. One might start with just food for people. But when you extend that to commodities which would enhance the striking power of a militant and belligerent party in Peiping for hurting their neighbors as well as ourselves, then I think we have to slow up and look at this specifically. Perhaps we can't determine precisely that such and such equipment will enhance their striking power but if there is a reasonable doubt, in the legal sense of the term, then I would be in favor of not trading that particular commodity. I guess that is just about where the policy of the U.S. Congress and the Government is today.

If the Government in Peiping said, "we will trade with you if we can agree on something to trade on, whether it is toothpicks or wheat or something like that" the door is open. But if they said that they would like certain types of machine tools or technological kinds of things which would improve their striking capacity, even if it is only theoretical whether they intend to do it or not or whether we have evidence that they could convert such commodities into striking power, I would not be in favor of this at this stage until political conditions have matured before we went ahead with that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Young, you mentioned that Thailand could be the next target of the Communists. It is pretty well understood that this is true. When you were over there you started the accelerated rural development program, isn't that true?

Mr. Young. Yes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. How do you feel this project is going since that is a vital area?

Mr. Young. I am glad to see that it is continuing. I think it is a vital instrument of the Royal Government of Thailand for knitting the northeast together and with the rest of Thailand. Again, it is one of those programs which needs urgent action but which cannot accomplish results overnight. Asia moves fast and slowly at the same time. I have not been to Thailand for 2½ years. So I may be wrong in my appreciation of the current status of accelerated rural
development. I would hope that it is working well, but I am not sure that it has really sunk roots in yet.

Mr. Broomfield. I noticed that you mentioned that it was important to win the political battle as well as the military. I think this is another area which is often overlooked. We have our doves and we have our hawks but most of them have been talking on how extensive the bombing could be or if we should pull out altogether. I am glad to see you focus your statement on the political war. This is a real problem in South Vietnam. General Lansdale, who is in charge of the pacification program, is apparently having all kinds of problems over there, according to a lengthy article in a Washington paper in February. When a country like Vietnam has been at war for 20 years, how do you stimulate interest among the rural population for this rural resurgency program as you mentioned in your statement?

Mr. Young. I would admit right away that is is a difficult and complicated thing but I don't think it is impossible to spark political action in villages. I said the self-starter is in the village. Two things are needed. A man or woman in the village and a man or woman from the Government who can see eye to eye and who treat each other more or less as equals. That is easier to do in the United States. That doesn't work that way out in Asia. There is suspicion and hostility. The job of leadership, Vietnamese or Thai, is to find the Thai or the Vietnamese who has technical skill, who can go to a village and live in it, and who can be accepted and trusted by those villagers over a long period of time, whose mentality is with the village on an eyeball-to-eyeball level rather than looking down at them.

The second is the man in the village who has the will, desire, and incentive to do something with his village colleagues. This man must also have the support and trust of the villagers. He doesn't have to be 85, an elder or venerable "headman". He can be 25. He has to have some sort of dynamic quality. You don't find these two men, easily. But when you do, you multiply them, of course, by many others in village organizations of the villagers' choice. I am using that as the illustration of the problem. It is like finding a good quarterback for your team or a good runner. There is usually somebody available in the community who can do these jobs.

The assignment for people like my friend, General Lansdale, and Ambassador Lodge, is to leave no stone unturned, day in and day out, to help find this caliber of younger person. The students in Vietnam have an open door to the villages because they have education. The young people of Vietnam could be brought together, as I think they are in these rural reconstruction teams, to go out into and stay in the village, these 59-man groups, not only for health, education, and improvement but to generate this local initiative. And, there, I think the key must be stated over and over again: Whatever is done in the village, small or big, it has to be done by the genuine decision of the villagers themselves in their way. I don't mean taking a vote 15 or 18 for or against a project suggested by the Government, but a kind of consensus, when they get together in the communal house or in the temple and decide the thing they really want is a school and not something else. If the Government says, instead, we are going to build a health clinic, the people will not follow the Government. Their allegiance may even go to the Vietcong. It is this element of turning the voice, the political voice in these matters, over
to the villagers which is the crucial thing to do. You can't do that in 16,000 hamlets in Vietnam or 45,000 in Thailand, respectively. Maybe you can only do it 15 at a time. You have to start small and build it from there. This is where the Communist war is so effective because they can kill everybody as you work.

I think that is where I would start it. A systematic plan of a circle of hamlets and villages which become self-contained. It is too bad about the ones on the outside but if a circle of hamlets in these countries, a group of hamlets together, not one by one but where they are integrated, where new roads help several hamlets, where the primary schools, technical school at a little higher level, and the market help several villages. If you do all this in a group of villages with security around each one as well as security by the villagers themselves in this circle, then I think this disease of foreign armed subversion can be cured over a period of time.

Security is, of course, the key to this. You can't have protection without progress in this part of the world and you can't have progress without protection. The big battalions and divisions, while they may be needed for the hard core of North Vietnam and the Vietcong, do not answer the immediate problem of what to do at 3 o'clock in the morning when 10 guerrillas come into the village. There you must have the kind of instant defense that the Israelis were so able to man in their own area. Small groups, lightly armed, with no heavy equipment at all but with enough firepower, communications by radio or bicycle or even air flivvers; really a very different and highly unorthodox form of security. It is hard to persuade some of our military friends that instant small defense is a crucial matter in Vietnam and Thailand.

Mr. Broomefield, Mr. Henderson, I would like to ask you a question. As I understand your views the United States would have no vital strategic interest in Vietnam if the Communists were not trying to take it over. It is your view that the United States has a vital strategic interest in any area whether it be southeast Asia or Latin America if the Communists have been trying to take over a government and we have been asked for assistance?

Mr. Henderson, it would be my view that we should oppose an apparent Communist takeover, or an attempt at a Communist takeover, wherever it might occur. How one might oppose it would vary from time to time and place to place. I think it is much too hawkish to suggest that the United States ought to intervene militarily wherever there is a threat of a Communist takeover. It is difficult to say in advance of a given circumstance what we ought to do in that circumstance.

On principle, however, it would be my view that, wherever this contingency were likely to occur, we should use whatever means seem available to us at the time, taking into account our responsibilities everywhere in the world, in order to prevent it. This is the reason, it seems to me, that we are in Vietnam, not because it is a favorable place to be, not because it is a place where we have significant economic or strategic interests, but because it is a place where we can concentrate power in an effort to stop a contagion before it has spread too far. I realize that this is an assertion of almost unlimited American concern and responsibility for what goes on in every part of the world. But I think that, given the nature of the threat we are facing, the United States has no alternative but to assume that responsibility.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. There is a strong feeling throughout this country, however, over the possibility that our Government could become overcommitted. I wonder how many more "Vietnams" we could afford to have and support as we are presently doing in that area?

Mr. HENDERSON. That is true. One could hypothesize that we might be engaged in five "Vietnams" at the same time. But the fact is that we never have been. Fortunately they seem to occur one at a time. In any given crisis, one would have to look at the surrounding circumstances, our responsibilities elsewhere in the world and what we face in other corners of the globe. One cannot automatically say that we should intervene with force wherever this danger threatens. But I would argue that our predisposition ought to be to oppose it; to try to prevent it; and if it occurs, to try to reverse it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. McDowell.

Mr. McDowell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, you have in your very interesting statement made the remark that whether we like it or not it is a war that we are in and we are stuck with it. Is that your statement—I am sorry. I will address myself to Mr. Henderson. You made the statement that this is the war we are in and we are stuck with it. I would like to have you elaborate on this in your view as to why we are stuck with this war and to what extent do you feel our actions in the past have created conditions that have brought the war about. One of the difficulties I think today that we have is to understand why there is a war in Vietnam and why it is our concern.

Mr. HENDERSON. Condensing a great deal of history, in 1954 and 1955 the United States undertook to give material support and political backing to the independent Government of South Vietnam. This is a policy we have pursued continuously ever since. By the Manila Treaty, signed in September 1954, we committed ourselves—upon the request of its Government—to defend South Vietnam. Since that time we have reiterated over and over again our determination to preserve a free and independent Vietnam. One can argue, as I have tried to suggest in my statement, whether this was the place to make the commitment.

There are cogent arguments that it is militarily difficult to defend; that the political history of the country, and the peculiar evolution of its nationalist movement, created a very difficult situation; and so forth. Be that as it may, in the course of the last decade we have repeatedly, by word, by treaty, and by acts, committed ourselves to the defense of this country. We are now in the position that all the world recognizes that we have taken on this responsibility. Whether we like it or not, the responsibility is ours. If, at this late stage in the game, we were for whatever reason to withdraw from that responsibility, in my judgment it would be interpreted both as an indication of the unreliability of an American pledge of defense and of our incapacity to fight this kind of war when the going really gets rough. I said in my statement that the war in Vietnam is a symbolic test. It is the symbolism of it that seems so important to me. I do not underestimate the human importance of it to the people of South Vietnam. But it is the symbolic significance of the war that I would emphasize.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, could I just say a word about the phraseology that leads to the implication that we have something on
our hands which we really don't want, shouldn't be in, and it was a mistake in the beginning. Out of great respect for Mr. Henderson I would suggest that we are not stuck with the situation in southeast Asia in the sense that something has landed on our back that we really don't want and don't have a part of. I am not suggesting that we are happy about what is going on there, the killing, the suffering and the dislocation and all that. But I have noticed over the past year that there are often phrases like this which lead persons not familiar with Vietnam's history, which Mr. Henderson has outlined, to a kind of demoralization, what I call this collision with ourselves. Looking back, our policy, our objectives, and our strategic concept for southeast Asia have stood up over time. We have made mistakes there. I have made mistakes and anybody involved in South Vietnam has made mistakes because of unfamiliarity. Yet we have looked at southeast Asia as part of Asia and part of a global world. Vietnam happens to be the sort of crossroads, the entry-exit between the Chinese part of Asia and the Indian part of Asia. To get under that Himalayan mountain flank, Vietnam is a crucial theater just as the plains of Belgium and France were in terms of World War II and I, the old conventional kind of war, essential for that sort of strategy.

Today for this strategy of seepage of infiltration, rather than arms crossing borders, Vietnam is a very key area. It is the crucial area and so is southeast Asia. So we are doing the right thing, through economic, educational, medical as well as military aid, to support the non-Communist, nationalist revolution which is what it amounts to in these countries and in Vietnam, so that it doesn't turn out badly. I don't think we are stuck with that any more than I think we are stuck with living on this planet. It is the real challenge which I mean by this. We have something to work on, something to do there. It is very important.

Mr. McDowell. I want to say I associate myself with the remarks of both you gentlemen. I want to ask this question further: To what extent do you feel that the present conflict has been brought about by deliberate planning on the part of the Communist leadership in Peiping, that they have had their planning, it has been more or less deliberate, been cleverly and well planned and has had the objective of a major confrontation at least in Vietnam with the United States and with the objective of putting us in a position of either facing this conflict or of losing our influence in this part of the world.

Mr. Henderson. I would argue that the decision to renew the civil war in South Vietnam was a decision made in Hanoi, and not in Peiping. The Vietnamese Communist movement is one of the oldest Communist movements in Asia. It has a long and autonomous history; the Vietnamese Communists won power in the north on their own. Hanoi has not been, is not now, and I think is unlikely to become the puppet of anybody, at least for some time to come. The decision, it seems to me, was a decision made by the North Vietnamese themselves. They made it for a variety of reasons, but mostly because they felt the time was ripe to renew the civil war. I have no doubt that the decision was welcomed in Peiping, that it was and continues to be supported by Peiping, and that Peiping imagines that it is reaping a variety of benefits from this war in terms of its overriding conflict with the United States. But, with all respect, to suggest that there is some kind of master plan being manipulated by the men of the
politburo in Peiping oversimplifies the nature of the challenge that we face in southeast Asia and, indeed, all over the world. The idea of a monolithic Communist world movement may have been true during the heyday of Joseph Stalin. It is no longer true today. What we have to deal with, and it is infinitely more difficult to deal with, is a congeries of autonomous Communist movements. But the autonomous interests of all of them, it seems to me, still tend to converge upon the same objective; namely, the spread of Communist power and the subversion of non-Communist states. This is bad enough. It does not require in my mind any hypothesis of central direction or central planning to make communism a mortal threat to the security of this country.

Mr. McDowell. Care to comment on that side of the question?

Mr. Young. I think Mr. Henderson has covered that very well. Of course, it is awfully hard to tell what the actual relations and planning strategy are between Hanoi and Peiping. I can see where there might be a closer coordination of their forward plans in southeast Asia than is apparent from any public record. Obviously, as Mr. Henderson suggested, what Hanoi is doing fits into the intentions as well as the capabilities of the Chinese Peoples Republic to extend its political influence in Asia and to use, even exploit, the Vietnamese for political takeover of all of Vietnam which then would spill over into Laos, Cambodia, and probably Thailand.

Mr. Henderson. If I may add one comment, I think that the point in time when the question may become really crucial, the question that Mr. McDowell has put, might come if and when Hanoi were to seek to end the war on some kind of negotiated basis which seemed disadvantageous to themselves. I can then see the possibility of Peiping trying to assert power over Hanoi in order to keep the war going. But it does not yet appear to me that Hanoi is getting ready to do this.

Mr. McDowell. Beg your pardon, to what degree do you think Hanoi could be independent when they are so dependent upon China for the war materials they need to continue the war and even for additional food supplies?

Mr. Henderson. I think it is unlikely that Hanoi will attempt to disassociate itself from Peiping for a considerable number of years. I think Hanoi will operate in close harmony with the policies of Peiping, not least because Hanoi is itself an aggressive regime with very considerable ambitions on the Indochinese peninsula: in Laos, in Cambodia, and perhaps also in Thailand. In order to prosecute these aggressions, it will require the material and political support of Peiping in the future as it requires support today. This is different, however, from saying that Hanoi is merely the puppet of Peiping. What I am trying to suggest is that there is a congruence and parallelism in policy which does not necessarily imply subordination in policy formulation.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Henderson, I was interested in your reply about the relations between Hanoi and Peiping because I asked the Department of State a year or so ago about the evidence we had that Peiping initiated the Vietnamese war or that the Vietnamese war was a product of Peiping's designs. They responded by saying there was no evidence that it was their idea.

My own view is that the best justification for being in Vietnam is that we would like to help any people who would like to make their
own choices about the future. We could have applied that in Hungary, and we did in South Korea. The limiting factor is our ability to effectively aid people. We can't undertake to do everything. We have to make some judgments. I am not sure we have made the right judgment. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to refer, if I might, to what I regard as a rather central issue as to the whole organization of the U.S. Government. I assume in general you approve of the philosophy and approach of Lansdale from the references you make.

Mr. Young. Yes.

Mr. Fraser. He sees economic aid as an assist in support of what is essentially a political objective. When General Lansdale leaves Vietnam, where does he go to work, for what agency? What agency retains him on a permanent basis?

Mr. Young. I wish I knew. Perhaps he does, too. The crux of the problem is that there are people like General Lansdale and others who perhaps don't have the right home in this effort. How do we learn to keep this sort of professional skill in political-military situations, or, to use the Communist language, the war of liberation—but we should use our own language rather than theirs. This problem of the "home for skills" is what I was getting at when I used this phrase, the Manhattan project for Vietnam or Thailand. General Lansdale, and many other Americans with experience in southeast Asia, filter out of the scene once their tour of duty is over. In the organization of the U.S. Government we should give consideration to a new agency for them.

It will be provocative, Mr. Chairman, for we have lots of agencies in Washington but sometimes we may miss the point just because we are afraid of another agency or another series of letters. Yet, like the AEC for atomic energy or NASA for missiles and spacecraft, and ACDA for disarmament, perhaps we need an agency under the President which would be an action agency, not just a coordinating agency, for getting at this kind of political warfare at its inception in its political, economic, and military aspects. I understand this would be a difficult process, any kind of reorganization is difficult, but we really ought to think very hard to see if we could set up an enterprise in Washington and then in these countries which would get at the problems of "de-insurgency" before they arrive.

To answer your question, Mr. Broomfield, about more "Vietnams," what we ought to be thinking about is no more Vietnams anywhere. Thailand is one country where there is a real threat. They have been put on notice in guerrilla warfare this year. There is a lot more insurgency going on in northeast Thailand than when I was there. This is where the people who have had experience in the past 15 years in Greece, Malaysia, South America, the Philippines, and Vietnam should be brought in. No two country problems are alike but we are learning ways to correct the situation so that we can take preventive action beforehand. People like General Lansdale and others should be encouraged to come into this kind of enterprise if they are now in private life or if they are in the Government, so we can pool this brainpower.

Mr. Fraser. Do I understand from what you say you feel there is no agency in the United States that is directly involved in this aspect of our—

Mr. Young. I think every agency of the Government is involved in it.
Mr. Fraser. Going back to my question—
Mr. Young (continuing). But the total effort is fragmented and not centralized enough.
Mr. Fraser. To be centralized enough so they would want to hang on to a person like General Lansdale.
Mr. Young. That is right. Let's say a man in the economic mission in Vietnam has done very well in his professional skills as well as in dealing with the Vietnamese for 2 years. He then may be assigned to some other part of the world where he can use some skills but in an entirely different context. I know several in AID, and a number of Foreign Service Officers who are just the right ballplayers for this particular game. Yet once their tour of duty is over they go off somewhere else. I can't find—I may not know about it—but I can't find and I couldn't when I was in Thailand a joint effort on the part of the U.S. Government both legislatively and executive, because I think this would require your support, the endorsement of the Congress, not just funds, but the endorsement to pool these people together and keep them either on the same country problem or on a similar problem of insurgency or things of this nature. They are tricky things. You don't pick them up overnight then leave them and go off to building bridges. I don't see why we can't apply the same principal of consolidation of skills for a national objective and a vital national interest of preventing more "Vietnams" on the negative side and on the positive side to develop healthy, solvent and dynamic countries. Thailand has great potentialities to be a healthy dynamic country right on the border of China. There is no reason why over the long run Thailand and a strong China cannot live together. But if there is this softness and we don't have the people that can handle this kind of thing we are likely to miss out again there.
Mr. Fraser. This really comes to my central point. If I thought our Government were organizing so there was some agency, which accepted as its principal responsibility political modernization or rural development, which consists of work largely of a political nature, if central responsibility were assigned in Washington for this responsibility it is likely our success in Asia would be far greater than it is today. We have a major blind spot. The CIA does do sophisticated work in political development, but AID is moving into it laterally. They are getting more sophisticated and so is the Defense Department. Yet there is a lack of this kind of central thrust. There was a conference in Havana about 8 weeks ago of leftist or Communist Parties. There is nobody in the U.S. Government that worries about democratic parties around the world. It was once said that the only group in a developing nation that can't get any help from the United States is a starving political party with democratic values. If it has Marxist values it can get plenty of help from other sources. We have nobody in the United States that concerns itself about these problems, that looks at them, that identifies with the people in these countries on their terms, their point of view, who can work at the village level. If I thought our Government could interest itself adequately in these areas, I would have no problem about Vietnam. Now we don't have the capacity to help these people help themselves in a meaningful way. I didn't mean to make a speech. But you have come closer to stating what is a sensible rationale for our policy in Asia than anything I have seen. I compliment you on it. I think it is first rate. I only wish we had the imagination to make a go of it.
Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Fraser.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, since you both touched upon negotiations with the Communists over Vietnam, what is your opinion with respect to the suggestion heard recently that the United States recognize the National Liberation Front?

Mr. YOUNG. My answer is that this is not the time. Perhaps it never need be recognized as such. Possibly the NLF could be captured back or fragmented by some new and effective nationalist movement. I don't think we are dealing with a National Liberation Front except as an apparatus, as an instrument of the total Communist effort in Vietnam. There is another reason that concerns me very much more and that is what I think may be the politics of Vietnam, how decisions are arrived at. They are not arrived at by our electoral process. If we recognized the NLF in some form, especially as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people, we would have helped confer the mandate of power onto that group. In Vietnam it is mandated power which works. It is not elective power the way we do it here. The mandate seems to work through a combination of the social status, legitimate authority and the real power, military and political of the individual or organization. The NLF and Hanoi are trying to put those three things together for the National Liberation Front status, legitimacy, and power. Then people in Vietnam, all those tenants, the young people, the press, and everybody else, would say: "Well, this is the wave of the future. They have the mandate. Therefore they should be the boss and rule the Government."

I think any idea of coalition now or recognition of them would very much enhance this kind of Vietnamese way of looking at things, as to who is to be ruler, who is to have the will of heaven, to receive the mandate to govern, which single group. It is a kind of directed thing, even though the people at the bottom will accept it because it is the way of heaven, the way of the future, the way the thing will be. It is a complicated process. I don't pretend to understand it myself. I think it is a very crucial one. It is dangerous for us not to understand it or to deal with it just on the basis of our own American or Western concepts.

Mr. HENDERSON. I couldn't agree with that more. It seems to me that our policy is as it ought to be; namely, to aim at a free and independent and non-Communist South Vietnam. If we were to give any kind of recognition to the National Liberation Front we would, as Ambassador Young suggests, concede to them a psychological victory of the first magnitude. It would be read as a concession on the part of the United States away from a fundamental position of ours in this war. It would give the National Liberation Front a quasi-legal position, and also the right to make claims to territory, to the partition of South Vietnam. I don't think we ought to get ourselves into a posture where we have to concede anything to the National Liberation Front. No doubt if there were ever negotiations, the National Liberation Front would in fact be involved in them. But their status ought to be simply as an adjunct of the government of the north. They can attend the negotiations, as our Government has said, but they can only attend in the posture of a component part of the delegation from the north.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Some say the National Liberation Front is the only organization truly representative of the people in South Vietnam. Do you detect any great support for that organization?
Mr. Henderson. It seems to me the evidence is to a very consider­
able extent on the other side. These points have been made many times: the fact, for example, that no outstanding non-Communist political leader in the south has identified himself with the National Liberation Front. It seems to me that those who attribute to the NLF a representative character overlook entirely the extent to which coercion and terror and organizational skills enable a Communist movement to mobilize and manipulate popular acquiescence and assistance. I fail to see the evidence that the NLF can legitimately claim widespread popular support. It is true that we have only recently, on our side, begun to get the kind of support and intelligence from the countryside that the Communists have been getting for years. This, I would say, is a function very largely of a changing military situation. In my view, the best way to put it is to suggest that what the Vietnamese people want is to be left alone, the right not to be bothered by anybody. Faced with coercion, they will cooperate with the Communists. It seems to me that what the NLF has going for it is organization, dedication, a willingness to use coercion and terror; but what it has not got is the widespread support that some of its apologists try to pretend for it.

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, it does not have widespread support as far as most of us can find out, and certainly that is what our Govern­ment says after, I believe, exhaustive evaluations. But I would like to add one caution here. There is a vacuum in Vietnam and there has been for several years, 5 or 10 years, even. The Vietcong and the NLF have moved in to exploit that vacuum in at least two senses. One is grievance. There are legitimate grievances on the part of many of the villagers and many Vietnamese. The Vietcong and the Communists have cleverly exploited them for a lot of reasons Mr. Henderson has given. There is no reason why they necessarily or inevitably have to fill this vacuum. Others can do it better. The nationalist Vietnamese, with good politics, can preempt these griev­ances of land reform and social justice, of being pushed around, mistreated, and so forth. The other vacuum is the question of the unity of Vietnam, not its unification by some legal or political means, just the unity of the country. To the extent that Hanoi or the Vietcong can take over and be the carriers of that idea too, that “we,” the NLF, represent all of Vietnam, then they will have a certain amount of support. But these are not absolute things. This is in the field of political competition where better politics wins.

I would say this in the case of real grievances. With positive reforms, as well as the thought that eventually Vietnam has to be a unified nation, a nation with a sense of nationhood, the nationalists, the young nationalists and particularly the young people in Saigon, can get on this bandwagon and be the winners of it.

There is one further point here, Mr. Chairman. The north-south problem in Vietnam is a very old one. We are only 11 years with it but the history of Vietnam indicates to me that they have had this difficulty of differentiation and disunity for several hundred years. The tragedy of Vietnam, and one of our dilemmas, is that everything that has happened over these 300 or 400 years has seemed to create more of a differentiation, more of a northiness and more of a southiness, rather than help to overcome this problem.

Our fundamental broad problem in Vietnam in the long run is how the United States, through political, economic, and diplomatic means,
can help the Vietnamese over this hurdle of the north and south into some kind of cultural and political unity.

I don't mean forceful unification, but a peaceful amalgamation, a confederation or any other means they want. So instead of putting up a stainless steel wall and keeping it there forever along the 17th parallel, the Vietnamese in the north and the Vietnamese in the south know they are heading eventually toward a one nation, even if it takes two states or three states inside there for a while to do it.

Our negotiations should, whenever we get to them beyond the mechanics of the military cease-fire, center on the politics of the negotiation which Geneva didn't get at in 1954. The politics of negotiations are critical and complicated, the important crux of this whole thing.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, the Mekong River Basin development project is one area where these countries in southeast Asia can get together and work for their economic advantage. Are you aware of any other regional projects similar to the Mekong Basin development that can be initiated in the area?

Mr. Young. No; not in terms of resources. I think the Mekong River Basin is the only one in southeast Asia that brings countries together on a basis of water, power, and navigation. It is a ray of hope, and I see it as the nucleus of structure. But the Association of Asian States—Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—has been interested in developing joint projects of shipping, airways, manufacturing, cultural exchange.

There is an area on their part, if they have the projects that need foreign or outside technical assistance or outside capital, that we should get behind when they ask for it and do it. Perhaps the Asian Bank can encourage this sort of thing.

Mr. Zablocki. Has SEATO outlived its usefulness?

Mr. Young. SEATO?

Mr. Zablocki. Has SEATO outlived its usefulness? Also, can the Association of Asian States replace SEATO?

Mr. Young. The purposes of the two organizations, of course, are very different, and their timing in history are dissimilar. I do have a feeling that SEATO has a very limited purpose for those members who are willing to work in it now, and that of course excludes France—France is still a member, but an empty chair member of SEATO, and I don't see really any further reason for France to be a member of SEATO. But SEATO is a commitment on our part. It has a treaty and a constitutional basis for the United States to operate in a military sphere in the southeast Asian area. This is an important thing to continue for the time being.

The SEATO treaty of 1954 and the joint resolution of Congress of 1964, as well as other legal bases, is legal justification for our actions there. But as an organization for Asian cooperation, I haven't found that SEATO is the vehicle. It is more of a Westernized organization than it is an Asian.

Perhaps the Association of Asian States in economic and political cooperation can move into the sphere that SEATO was never able and will never be able to fit. With a certain amount of security, perhaps different forms of guarantees or commitments by the United States in the years ahead, such as a new bilateral treaty with Thailand or some form of support and guarantee for those three countries in case
of an attack and invasion, we could "Asianize" this political and security problem more than we have done in the past.

I don't feel that SEATO is an Asianizing instrument. It is a useful instrument for the United States, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. It helps in Vietnam under the protocol, but I would hope that we would be thinking beyond SEATO into the future.

Mr. Henderson. The Association of Southeast Asia has had a rather interesting history. It started a few years ago on a very minor key. And then, almost before it got underway, its development was interruptj by the wholly gratuitous break—gratuitous in that it was not over a significant issue—between the Philippines and Malaysia.

It is just now beginning to show signs of life again. ASA is an especially interesting organization because it is the only proposal for a southeast Asian regional organization made up solely of southeast Asian states which has shown any viability. Quite deliberately it has been kept on a minor key, an instrument for the use of technicians and middle-level government officials. ASA is not given to issuing grandiose communiques, and the like. Perhaps because of these things it does hold real promise, as Ambassador Young has said, especially in the economic and cultural fields.

I would suggest, however, that it would be a tragic mistake to burden it with security responsibilities. ASA just isn't ready for that. Neither the Philippines, Thailand, nor Malaysia is ready to organize nor is any other country in southeast Asia now prepared to join in a new security undertaking.

This leads me to a more general observation, and that is that, however much we may all hope for regional cooperation in southeast Asia, it is going to be a long time in coming in any really significant sense. This means, in my view, that the international responsibilities of the United States in southeast Asia, not only in the security field but in the economic field as well, are responsibilities we are going to have to carry for a long time to come. It will be many years before we can, for example, turn the problem of the security of southeast Asia over to the southeast Asians themselves. To speculate on the day when India and Japan will take on this responsibility for us is, it seems to me, even more an exercise in wishful thinking.

Mr. Young. I would certainly subscribe to those observations of Mr. Henderson about the necessity for our interest and commitment in Asia for a long time and also about the difficulties of any kind of major structures of Asian unity. But there are minor, smaller, less ambitious ways. This leads me to think that our concentration should be on the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong project, and perhaps this ASA where we are invited to.

But then we haven't really given enough thought, have we, in our discussions in the United States, to the various roles of the United Nations in southeast Asia. I made a study of that last summer. I was surprised to find a number of activities in which some part of the United Nations had been active, helpfully active, in southeast Asia over the last 20 years.

A lot of these activities were not world shaking, but again in the building block field, in technical assistance, economic cooperation, and even in trying to serve as a buffer between these countries which
you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that don't get along so well. For example there were the good offices of the United Nations, between Thailand and Cambodia and Cambodia and Vietnam and the U.N. Commission for Malaysia. I wonder in our search and our groping here in the United States for ways to go positive rather than negative in southeast Asia, if we shouldn't be encouraging and learning more about what the United Nations is doing and can do.

I am not talking about turning Vietnam over to the Security Council or the General Assembly, but about more encouragement along these bilateral lines between two countries where the role of the Secretary General is important, where the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East can do things in the economic field, and particularly in the good offices and mediation and other aspects where two or more of the Asian governments request it.

It has to be their mandate. This is a field in which the U.N. is pretty obscure and there has been a lot more going on there than we realize. There is not yet a kind of common law for U.N. involvement in southeast Asia, but there is a growing precedent for the responsibility and the cooperation of the United Nations in this part of the world which tends to knit it together rather than break it apart.

Mr. ZABLOcki. Mr. McDowell.

Mr. McDowell. Turning to another area, how do you evaluate the situation in Korea where both the Chinese and the Russians have apparently felt it was to their advantage and the disadvantage of the United States to refuse to enter into any serious negotiations to bring about a peaceful settlement, rather they are satisfied with the present status quo to continue and there is, I suppose, in the neighborhood of a million troops on both sides and the situation continues year after year.

Mr. Young. In Korea, Mr. McDowell?

Mr. McDowell. Yes.

Mr. Young. That is an interesting question. They have not had any other option, I don't think. A political negotiation in Korea, if there had been supervised elections in both North and South Korea under the United Nations, perhaps even under an international commission, which were fairly and effectively supervised, would have reduced the Communist Party to a minority by votes anyway in North and South Korea, because the majority of people in 1953 and 1954, by a large percentage, lived in the south and there is still a large number in the south.

So really from the Communist point of view there is nothing to negotiate unless they are willing to take their chances with a free election in North Korea.

I think the same applies to Vietnam too. We were told at that time by representatives from the Communist side that free elections the way we understand them were out of the question because only the guaranteed result would count. If the result could not be guaranteed, there was no point talking about it.

The issue in Vietnam is its political unification by an electoral process of various kinds. There is nothing as far as I recall—I may be oversimplifying this—certainly at the Geneva Political Conference on Korea, and at the same time we were talking about Indochina—to indicate that really free elections or plebiscites were possible. That was the sum and substance. Mr. Molotov made it clear, if not in the
conference rooms then elsewhere, that there were not going to be any free elections in Korea, East Germany, or Vietnam.

Then the other Communist representatives told us the same thing about North Vietnam in 1955 and 1956 when that issue came up.

Mr. McDowell. Do you think we are being entirely impractical when we say that we believe in Vietnam there can be free elections to settle the problems there?

Mr. Young. Yes, we are being impractical if we mean that the Communist Party or Communist group will participate in genuinely free elections, with secret ballot, democratic institutions, and effective supervision to protect any candidate, party, or voter.

I think that is a contradiction of terms in North Vietnam.

Mr. McDowell. It would be a switch on their part.

Mr. Young. It would change their whole doctrine.

Mr. Henderson. May I comment on the last point, as to whether we are impractical to espouse free elections as a means to settle the conflict in Vietnam. I can't believe that we do this for much more than public relations reasons at the present time. There is a great mystique throughout the world about free elections as a means of settling international disputes between ourselves and the Communists. I am sure the American Government realizes as well as anybody else that there is no present prospect for settling the Vietnamese conflict by free elections. On the other hand, it knows equally well that there is no prospect whatsoever that the Communists would allow free elections in the North at present. Hence this is an easy posture to take, because there is no prospect at all that we will be called on it.

I don't mean to imply here the remotest hypocrisy on the part of the American Government. The fault is not ours. I think our Government would be willing to carry out free elections, granted that they were really free, that there were ample opportunity on both sides to campaign, and so forth. But what is dead certain, on the record all around the world—Berlin, Germany, Korea—is that the Communists will not allow such elections. Hence ours is a relatively easy position to take.

With respect to Korea, I think Korea illustrates an interesting aspect of the problem we have to deal with in confronting the Communists everywhere in the world. It illustrates why I say that what we have to worry about in Asia is Communist power, not simply the power of highly nationalistic states. As we all know, the split between the Soviet Union and China could hardly be worse than at the present time. Now the North Korean Communist regime has had a desperate time trying to maneuver between the two sides. It has most of the time tended to aline itself with Peiping. My understanding is, and I am not expert in these matters, that it has recently been able to disengage from Peiping to some extent, to the point where it now has a little freedom of maneuver. Yet where the interests of China and North Korea and the Soviet Union all converge, and have always converged, is on policy with respect to South Korea. Despite the disputes and rivalries among themselves, all three from the beginning—throughout the whole period since 1945 up to today—are seeking the same thing and will continue to seek it; namely, to destroy the independence of South Korea and to transform it into a Communist territory.
You asked in your question, sir, how long this is going to go on? It has gone on since the end of World War II, 21 years. I think we should look upon South Korea as a permanent charge upon the security forces of the United States and our allies.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, in your statement you referred to a peace corridor across the 17th parallel. Is this the idea of putting a barrier across the 17th parallel and into Thailand?

Mr. Young. Not exactly, Mr. Fraser.

I don't think that would be practical just to extend the 17th parallel over to the Mekong River across Laos. It is a little more difficult to describe than that, although that proposal has the benefit of great simplicity and it is easy to put on a map.

I don't think it would work out in practice. In the first place, geography there runs north and south. The mountains are high peaked and the valleys are very narrow. They are very wooded. It is a tough place to be in.

What I am getting at is a choke point. This is where the infiltration from the north comes down into the south in a narrow series of valleys 20 or 30 miles across from the Laos-Vietnam frontier over into Laos where the hills shade off into the Mekong Valley.

All the regiments and battalions, equipment and cadres, a good deal anyway, have come through a sort of choke point, like a marshaling yard before fanning out. Every time I read of American marines or American soldiers running into these units with heavy casualties on both sides I keep asking myself why is it they are allowed to come down 300 miles from the north. Wouldn't it be better to look at the possibility of applying military resources on the ground and in the air in this small area despite the difficulties of geography, and make it much more difficult for this broken water main, so to speak, as I said in my paper, to flood all through the south and cause this tremendous destruction and this gigantic effort of seeking units out all over the place where they are all one when they come down. This seepage could not be sealed off entirely, but this could be reduced.

There are political problems. We are talking about two countries now, not just Vietnam. This may not be practical from a political point of view. What I had in mind in suggesting a "peace corridor," would be like a referee who would separate out the two combatant sides, the Chinese from the north and the rest of us in the south, an area where you would in effect demilitarize it once you established it as the line of limit where the power extended up to this point and not farther.

It would be defensive. From there an international agreement might be reached through a compromise. The Chinese could agree to it because it would be in their interest too, since it would protect their security in the south. They would not be able to move down into the south. The southward and northward movement would be stopped and this could be developed by treaty and guarantee.

But first you have to have the power on the ground before you can do that.

Mr. Fraser. Basically you are talking of an interdiction just south of the 17th parallel?
Mr. Young. Interdiction by whatever would be effective military means, on the ground, hit or run strikes, hot pursuit, mobile operations and reconnaissance as well as our air attacks and political operations within this area on the part of the people who live there, a maximum effort.

Mr. Fraser. I understood Highway 9, which runs from the sea over—

Mr. Young. Yes.

Mr. Fraser. Never reaches an elevation above 500 feet.

Mr. Young. It goes through the valleys that way.

Mr. Fraser. It goes in a southwesterly direction as it passes through Laos. That general strategy has always appealed to me. I understand it would take three to five divisions to do it.

Mr. Young. That was my thought too. But this is a hard thing for civilians to discuss. Route 13 farther north might have more effect. I was thinking also of something that would run diagonally up toward the area where Burma, China and Laos come together in a relatively uninhabited area, so that the area contiguous to China would be safe from their point of view. Any Chinese Government has to be concerned about its southern border. That is perfectly legitimate. I accept that.

On the other hand, this is not the area that should be used as a sanctuary for staging this kind of war by seepage into these small Asian countries. So we have to draw a line there and say this far and no farther.

We have that kind of line in the Formosan Straits. What we need is something like this if we can negotiate it by the use of power and diplomacy in southeast Asia.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Henderson, you referred to the posture of the United States on the question of free elections.

You said we almost have a mystique about this idea that these issues can be settled by election. I didn't understand the full implications of your statement other than I agree with you that the Communists don't accede to this kind of solution.

I wasn't clear what you felt should be the U.S. view in case they might. I got the impression that we might have to pull back, that the use of elections wasn't realistic in the kind of world we live in.

Mr. Henderson. I didn't mean to give the latter impression. When I say there is a mystique about free elections in the world as a means of settling international disputes, perhaps I am choosing my words incautiously. But many people do seem to argue that the only reason there has been a renewal of the Vietnamese war is that there were not free elections to unite the country in 1956.

The only truth in this is that the South would not accept rigged elections in the North, and therefore opposed the whole project. But since the Communists could not unite the country under their rule via rigged elections, they decided to try to do it by force.

There is an idea among some people that free elections are something which both the Communists and ourselves should be prepared to rely upon, to gamble on, and that there is some kind of mysterious obstacle which is never articulated that prevents us from getting together on what seems to be a perfectly obvious solution to such problems as Vietnam. The point I am trying to emphasize is that it is impossible to arrange truly free elections in a contest such as the war in Vietnam simply because the Communist side won't have them.
To come to the second point you raise, if the Communists should ever propose free elections in North and South, then it would seem to me that our Government should accept such a proposal with alacrity, but only provided we can obtain all of the safeguards in carrying out these elections that would be necessary to insure that the people on both sides had a free choice. By this I mean, for example, a lengthy period of preparation in which there would be freedom of movement for campaigning, and for all of the other features of free elections as we know them in the free world generally.

I am confident the Communists would never accede to this kind of an agreement. If they did, I would certainly be reasonably confident of the outcome.

Mr. Fraser. I appreciate your explanation which makes it quite clear. I have come to the view, perhaps naively, that the idea of using the ballot box and letting people have a voice in what happens to them, whether it be at the village, hamlet level or whatever, ought to become a primary focus of American policy around the world. This is consistent with the idea of self-determination, which I think is the most powerful force at work in the world, even in the Dominican Republic or Vietnam. I understand the Communists cannot stand the thought of free election. But it seems to me not to be just as a tactical device but a basic policy we ought to pursue as a main strand of the American position. It makes sense from so many points of view.

I gather President Wilson once had this viewpoint and somehow this was judged not to be in tune with the rest of the world. I think it is. If we would pursue this it would help be a part of what I think is missing, which is our ability to see peoples' problems as they see them and frame choices that are meaningful to them in their own environment.

Mr. Henderson. Many observers have pointed out—the idea is not new with me—that in fact we have had a kind of election in Vietnam, an election by foot rather than by ballot. And although this assertion is a little too glib to be entirely accurate, I think there is quite a lot in it. I refer to the facts that there was such a disproportionate movement of refugees in 1954 from the north to the south, rather than the other way; and that at the present time almost the entire movement of refugees is from the Vietcong areas to the non-Vietcong areas. Although one can find a whole lot of reasons for not being too sure that this is necessarily an indication of lack of support for the Communists, or of support for the Saigon Government, it is at least to some extent an indication of how people feel. But in my view it does indicate that what one would find out from elections is already apparent.

Mr. Fraser. For example, as I understand it the Diem regime abolished elections, I forget whether it was the district or village level, in 1956.

Mr. Henderson. Correct.

Mr. Fraser. It would seem to me at that time that if the United States had a little commitment—it all leads into this problem of trying to work with people on their own terms, it seems to me that the United States ought to have been more concerned about this. This is what I find lacking sometimes. I am not suggesting we turn these things around.
Mr. Henderson. I happened to be living in Vietnam in 1956. It was already quite clear then that the Diem government was moving toward the consolidation of a fairly thoroughgoing and a rather ineffective dictatorship. I once asked the American Ambassador of the period, Ambassador Reinhardt, why didn’t we prevent Diem from doing the shortsighted things he was doing and get him to do the things he ought to do. The answer was “Have you ever tried to get that man to follow advice?” I think there was a lot of wisdom to that. South Vietnam was never an American puppet, not in 1954 nor in 1956, and indeed never before Diem’s death in 1963. We don’t treat these people as puppets and we shouldn’t. But if we treat them as free and independent people, we can’t always get them to do the things that we want. This is a long-winded way of stating the obvious, that these problems are immensely difficult. There has to be much more than simply concern, and very often we are going to lose anyway.

Mr. Fraser. I agree with that.

Mr. Young. This is the dilemma of utter frustration for us. I was on the other end of the cables from Ambassador Reinhardt in what you are speaking of. The 1956 elections for the district and village councils and “mayors” came up. It was our feeling in Washington it would be wiser for the Government in Saigon to have continued some form of village elections; however, the Vietnamese did it in their political ways, rather than have each village headman appointed by the Provincial Governor or Saigon. We were caught on the one hand by not being able to say to Diem: “Have elections.” On the other hand, our large economic aid and to some extent our security involvement then in military assistance in South Vietnam was compromised by this failure of performance. Our aid in Vietnam would have been more effective, I believe in retrospect, if we had been able to impress upon Diem and his cohorts the necessity for some Vietnamese form of an electoral process in 1956 and 1957.

On the other hand, we were stopped by not being able to enforce it. We were caught in this dilemma. It is a tough one. And I may be baffled about what is the answer. I come out with the feeling that if we can, we should carefully examine the social and political conditions in which our assistance can be effective immediately and over the long run. Where we in our own judgment—and this should be a consultation between the executive and legislative branches—decide that this is a case of a particular condition where our aid, no matter how largely or how skillfully applied, cannot be effective, then we say, “We are very sorry. You are our friends but we can’t operate here.” This is a tough one because it sounds like strings and doing it our way.

This leads me back to your suggestion, Mr. Fraser. Perhaps what we do need is a thorough study of the Vietnamese political processes. I think right now it would help if the Congress or this committee could stimulate or encourage a study by experts and scholars of what is the Vietnamese political process for making decisions in the villages and provinces. Is it the ballot box, the communal house, the No. 1 man in the village who, when he says “Yes, we will do this” then everybody else says “All right”? I don’t think we know. One of the weaknesses of our whole problem of negotiations in Vietnam about the north and south is that we are using elections and ballot boxes and coalition
governments and other things which are Western when, perhaps, they
don't entirely apply there.
Perhaps there is another way for these people to decide what they
want when they want it. They have had elections in Vietnam. They
had provincial elections last May; 75 percent went out and voted for
local candidates of different kinds. What was the process there? Is
that something to build on? I would like to have us get together
some real experts, political scientists, and sociologists, who could
undertake consultations with the Vietnamese Government, let us
know where we are and not just talk about it. I think this would be
a real contribution to our dilemma in Vietnam.
Mr. Fraser. This sounds kind of like the Western system. I am
only going back to the idea, the deep conviction that I have that most
people, no matter where they are, in the mountains of Peru or where­
ever they are, having some ideas as to where their future lies, and
given the right kind of choices can make the choice. You don't
have to be smart or sophisticated or economically developed. This
is the heart of our interest. But we don't have people in this Govern­
ment concerning themselves with this and operating that way.
Mr. Young. The principle is one of choice.
Mr. Fraser. Yes. Whether they accede to a village elder becoming
their leader. That is their choice. I don't suggest Western values
imposed on them.
Mr. Young. The question of form and mechanics can be de­
termined in each country by those people.
Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, your suggestion is an excellent
one. However, I doubt whether a congressional committee would
have the time to go into it. We have difficulty fathoming our own
legislative process or organizing ourselves. I have two brief questions.
We have heard from prior testimony that Red China does not have any
expansionist desires for resources or area. I have no substance of
world commodity which both East and West have tried to protect and de­
velop is oil. It is my understanding that Indonesia may have rich,
and as yet, untapped oil reserves and that Communist China has been
anxious to have access to this supply.
Mr. Henderson, would you care to comment?
Mr. Henderson. Sir, I did not hear the name of the place that you
mentioned.
Mr. Zablocki. Indonesia.
Mr. Henderson. It certainly has very substantial oil reserves,
especially on the island of Sumatra. The known and suspected
reserves are very substantial indeed. I should point out, however,
that Communist China apparently also has very substantial, still
almost totally unexploited, oil reserves as well. Indeed, there are
those who say that China has the world's greatest untapped oil
resources, and that Peiping is now only beginning to exploit them.
There have been reports of very substantial discoveries in Manchuria.
I see no reason to doubt the accuracy of these reports, although they
are based on flimsy evidence. But if there is any accuracy in these
reports of substantial finds then it would seem to me that Peiping
would strive to develop its own oil resources at home, and that it
would not necessarily look to Indonesia as a source of oil. At the
present moment, moreover, Indonesian oil is not really suitable for
Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, the four steps you suggested for the United States to organize itself to improve our operations and position in Asia are excellent. President Johnson has just recently formed a high-level commission headed by Secretary Gardner to study education in the area. I sincerely hope there will be other commissions in other fields organized at a high level such as this. Is this a step in the right direction?

Mr. Young. I agree it is a step in the right direction from last year, following the Baltimore speech on Vietnam as well as on southeast Asia, the Asian Bank, the Honolulu Conference, and the declaration at Honolulu with their emphasis on rural reform and development from the bottom up in education, health, and welfare, but it is a step. There are steps beyond that. One of the steps to take at the right time is the bridging of these to bring them together so they have maximum effect, health, education, welfare, the controlling of inflation, etcetera. At the very basis of this is the political motivation that has to knit it together. I would think that the State Department is the logical place for bringing this together in some form for executive action, executive in the management sense, I don't mean executive action in the Presidential sense. If the President approves this, then it is a question of implementation, getting the action at the right time, pulling these efforts together. Maybe this is something that is 6 months or a year off. The emphasis though is still on the Vietnamese. It is the Vietnamese Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the provincial governors, and particularly the lower level, that count. How do they look at this? Do they have the same spark of fervor? Are they really nationalists at heart or are they just talking in symbols? Can they get out to the countryside and live and work with the people? This is what I tried to emphasize in the very beginning. How do you spark governments to do these things? These are men. How can we motivate them to do something in their country? This is tough. We have to not only have tact but we have to have this perception in depth as to the way they work and we must have the element of trust and confidence. I feel the Vietnamese or Thai, and people all over the world, will do much more with somebody they know and have worked with and have confidence in. It is a friend to a friend, even though a government representative. A new man has all the handicaps of unfamiliarity.

The lasting results come when you get somebody who has built up his personal relationship, an American captain who has a good relationship with the battalion commander and is not pulled out in 6 months. In the health field, if Mr. Gardner finds people who have a knack of dealing with the people, they should stay there. I think this is the missing ingredient.

Mr. Zablocki. Do you think our policy in Vietnam, contrary to what some charge, is a positive one?

Mr. Young. I think the President's policy in Vietnam and southeast Asia is very positive and constructive in a big way. I called his Baltimore address of 1965 a new, revolutionary chapter in our Asian policies. Few people seem to realize this. What concerns me is that there is some lack or gap in conveying this both within the United States as well as outside. Perhaps this is where we need efforts from
Washington out to our own people. Maybe there is a gap in that sense. It is hard to dramatize this. The administration and people in the executive branch are extremely busy. The men who handle Vietnam from the President's office on down are working 7 days a week and 15 hours a day and they don't have time to make speeches. I don't know that the Congress of the United States in principle favors this exposition in the United States. This is a premise that always bothers me. We spend millions of dollars telling the world about the United States, but what are we doing to expand our own knowledge in our own country of what we are doing in Asia?

Mr. Zablocki. Congress, as a matter of fact, has barred the Information Agency in the executive branch from telling the American people what we are doing. It can't use its funds for that purpose.

Mr. Young. We don't want propaganda. I agree. None of us wants that whether we are in the Government or out. Isn't there some formula that could provide, through some reliable auspices, a better information program, even if it is a discussion. I don't mean something that you take—just take it like pablum. You can discuss it, argue with it, disagree with it and there can be dissent, but where the full impact of what we are doing in these countries is borne out.

I didn't say at the beginning I was speaking on a personal basis, and I guess that has to go into the record.

Mr. Zablocki. Any further questions?

Mr. Fraser. I would just make this one comment. I think it was only 2 or 3 years ago the AID director in Vietnam wanted to pull out all the IVS personnel. After the Honolulu Conference they wanted to increase the number of IVS people by 1,000 in Vietnam. How the United States in 2 years can come 180° as to the mode of operation is astounding.

It seems to me this is a symptom of the fact that we are not targeted. We are moving toward the target now I believe. We need to get some of Congressman Zablocki's lieutenants out there and then we will begin to operate at the level of people and ideas.

Mr. Zablocki. Gentlemen, on behalf of the members of the subcommittee and myself, I want to thank you for the time you have given us.

Your views have made a most significant contribution to our better understanding of the problems in Asia.

We are grateful and appreciate your efforts and the time you have given to us.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:45 p.m. in room H-227, the Capitol, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific will continue with its hearings on China and United States policy toward China and Asia.

We are indeed privileged to have the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk, with us this afternoon. He is accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, the Honorable Douglas MacArthur II, and others.

The Secretary suggests in order to expedite matters that the statement be read and he will then be open for questions.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk, Mr. Chairman, during the last month and a half this distinguished committee and its corresponding members in the other House have heard testimony on Communist China from a number of prominent scholars and distinguished experts on Asia.

I welcome these hearings. For Communist China's policies and intentions, in all their aspects, need to be examined—and reexamined continually.

CHINA SPECIALISTS IN GOVERNMENT

The Department of State and other agencies of the Government do collect, study, and analyze continually with the greatest care all the information obtainable on Communist China in order to make—and, when the facts warrant, revise—judgments of Peiping's intentions and objectives. Highly trained Chinese language officers here in Washington and overseas—men who specialize in Chinese history and communism—are working full time analyzing and appraising Peiping's moves. Numerous private scholars, some of whom have appeared before this committee in recent weeks, are consulted by the Department of State. And there are, of course, many specialists on Communist China in other agencies of the Government. These capable individuals—in and out of Government—systematically interchange and cross-check their analyses and estimates to provide what I believe is the most complete and most accurate picture of Communist China, its leaders, and its policies, available to any non-Communist government in the world.
THREE CAVEATS

Before going further, I would like to enter three caveats:

First, the experts do not always agree, especially in their estimates of Chinese Communist intentions.

Second, the leaders we are discussing are both Chinese and Communist. Some of their words and acts can perhaps be best understood in terms of their beliefs and ambitions as Communists. They are deeply committed to a body of Communist doctrine developed by Mao Tse-tung. Still other words and acts may be consistent with both the Chinese and doctrinaire Communist factors.

We have faced a similar problem over the years with respect to the Soviet leadership. Some of their words and acts could be explained chiefly in terms of historic Russian imperial ambitions or Russian traits or practices. Others have been clearly attributable to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, or to interpretations of that doctrine by Stalin and more recent leaders. Some sovietologists put more emphasis on the traditional nationalist or imperial factors, others put more on the Marxist-Leninist factors. There is no way to determine the exact weight which ought to be given to each of these two influences.

Likewise, with regard to the Chinese Communists, there has been considerable disagreement over the respective dimensions of the two streams of influence: Chinese and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. Over the years some of the experts on China may not have appreciated adequately Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. Likewise, some of the experts on Chinese Communist doctrine may tend to underestimate the Chinese factors in the behavior and intentions of the Peiping regime.

The third caveat is this: Predicting what the Chinese Communists will do next may be even more hazardous than usual at this juncture. They themselves appear to be taking stock. We know that some high level talks have been going on and that they have called some of their Ambassadors back for consultation.

CHINESE COMMUNIST SETBACKS

We know—the whole world knows—that the Chinese Communists have suffered some severe setbacks internationally during the past 14 months. They were unable to persuade the Afro-Asians to accept their substantive views on the Second Bandung Conference. They have found themselves in difficulty in several African countries. Their diplomatic missions have been expelled from Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic. Their technicians have been expelled from Ghana. The Governments of Kenya and Tunisia have warned them against promoting revolution in Africa.

During the fighting between India and Pakistan, the Chinese Communists marched up hill and down again. They have been disappointed by the Tashkent agreement and the steps taken in accord with it. They were strongly opposed to the agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which was ratified by both countries. They have suffered a major setback in Indonesia—the Indonesian Communist Party has been decimated.
Generally, in their struggle with Moscow for leadership of the world Communist movement, the Chinese Communists appear to have lost ground. Even their relations with Castro’s Cuba have sunk to the level of mudslinging.

And, probably most important of all, Peiping sees the power of the United States committed in southeast Asia to repel an aggression supported—and actively promoted—by Peiping.

Will the Chinese Communist reaction to all these setbacks be a wild lashing out? Or will it be a sober decision to draw back and even to move toward peaceful coexistence?

We, of course, hope it will be the latter. But we cannot be sure what Peiping intends to do. We do not expect the worst but we must be prepared for it.

OUR RELATIONS WITH PEIPING

I will not try here today to review in detail the record of our relations with the Peiping regime. In the months after the Chinese Communist takeover in 1949 we watched to see whether the initial demonstration of intense hostility toward the United States and toward Americans who were still resident in China was momentary, or reflected a basic Peiping policy. Then came the aggression against the Republic of Korea, to which, at a second stage, the Chinese Communists committed large forces, thus coming into direct conflict with the United Nations and the United States.

We have searched year after year for some sign that Communist China was ready to renounce the use of force to resolve disputes. We have also searched for some indication that it was ready to abandon its premise that the United States is its prime enemy.

SINO-UNITED STATES AMBASSADORIAL TALKS

The Chinese Communist attitudes and actions have been hostile and rigid. But a democracy, such as ours, does not accept rigidity. It seeks solutions to problems, however intractable they may seem.

We have discussed various problems with the Chinese Communists at international conferences such as the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.

In 1955 we began with them a series of bilateral conversations at the level of Ambassadors, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw. It was our hope that by direct, systematic, communication we might be able to reduce the sharpness of the conflict between us. There now have been 129 of these meetings, the latest of which took place in Warsaw today.

These exchanges have ranged widely, covering many subjects affecting our two countries. At first there was a little progress in dealing with small specific issues, such as the release of Americans being held in Communist China. Although an understanding was reached in this limited area, Peiping refused to fulfill its commitment to release all the Americans.

I think it is accurate to say that no other non-Communist nation has had such extensive conversations with the Peiping regime as we have had. The problem is not lack of contact between Peiping and Washington. It is what, with contact, the Peiping regime itself says and does.
Although they have produced almost no tangible results, these conversations have served and still serve useful purposes. They permit us to clarify the numerous points of difference between us. They enable us to communicate in private during periods of crisis. They provide an opening through which, hopefully, light might one day penetrate. But the talks have, so far, given no evidence of a shift or easing in Peiping's hostility toward the United States and its bellicose doctrines of world revolution. Indeed, the Chinese Communists have consistently demanded, privately as well as publicly, that we let them have Taiwan. And when we say that we will not abandon the 12 or 13 million people on Taiwan, against their will, they say that, until we change our minds about that, no improvement in relations is possible.

Today we and Peiping are as far apart on matters of fundamental policy as we were 17 years ago.

THE BASIC ISSUES

In assessing Peiping's policies and actions, and the problems they present to American foreign policy and to the free peoples of the world, we must ask ourselves certain key questions:

What does Peiping want, and how does it pursue its objectives?

How successful has it been, and how successful is it likely to be in the future?

Is it on a collision course with the United States?

What are the prospects for change in its policies?

What policies should the United States adopt, or work toward, in dealing with Communist China?

WHAT DOES PEIPING WANT?

First, the Chinese Communist leaders seek to bring China on the world stage as a great power. They hold that China's history, size, and geographic position entitle it to great power status. They seek to overcome the humiliation of 150 years of economic, cultural, and political domination by outside powers.

Our concern is with the way they are pursuing their quest for power and influence in the world. And it is not only our concern but that of many other countries, including in recent years the Soviet Union.

Peiping is aware that it still lacks many of the attributes of great power status, and it chafes bitterly under this realization.

ARMING TO BECOME A "GREAT POWER"

The Chinese Communists are determined to rectify this situation. They already have one of the largest armies in the world. They are now developing nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. They are pouring a disproportionately large proportion of their industrial and scientific effort into military and military-related fields.

What is all this military power for? Some believe it to be for defensive purposes alone:

To erect a token "deterrent" nuclear capability against the United States or the U.S.S.R.;

To demonstrate symbolically that "China must be reckoned with";
To react to an imaginary, almost pathological, notion that the United States and other countries around its borders are seeking an opportunity to invade mainland China and destroy the Peiping regime.

But such weapons need not serve a defensive role. They can be used directly by Peiping to try to intimidate its neighbors, or in efforts to blackmail Asian countries into breaking defense alliances with the United States, or in an attempt to create a nuclear "balance" in Asia in which Peiping's potentially almost unlimited conventional forces might be used with increased effect.

These weapons can ultimately be employed to attack Peiping's Asian neighbors and, in time, even the United States or the Soviet Union. This would be mad and suicidal, as Peiping must know, despite cavalier statements that mainland China can survive nuclear war. Nevertheless, a potential nuclear capability, on top of enormous conventional forces, represents a new factor in the equilibrium of power in Asia that this country and its friends and allies cannot ignore.

Peiping's use of power is closely related to what I believe are its second and third objectives: dominance within Asia and leadership of the Communist world revolution, employing Maoist tactics. Peiping is striving to restore traditional Chinese influence or dominance in south, southeast, and east Asia. Its concept of influence is exclusive. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi reportedly told Prince Sihanouk recently that his country's "friendship" with Cambodia would be incompatible with Cambodian ties with the United States. Peiping has tried to alienate North Vietnam and North Korea from the Soviet Union. It has had uneven success in such maneuvers. But it has not abandoned this objective. Where Peiping is present, it seeks to exclude all others. And this is not only true in its relations with its neighbors, but in the Communist world as well.

DIRECT AGGRESSION

Peiping has not refrained from the use of force to pursue its objectives. Following Korea, there were Tibet and the attacks on the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits. There have been the attacks on India. It is true that, since Korea, Peiping has moved only against weaker foes and has carefully avoided situations which might bring it face to face with the United States. It has probed for weaknesses around its frontier but drawn back when the possibility of a wider conflict loomed.

While the massive and direct use of Chinese Communist troops in overt aggression cannot be ruled out, Peiping's behavior up to now suggests it would approach any such decision with caution.

If the costs and risks of a greater use of force were reduced by, for example, our unilateral withdrawal from the region, Peiping might well feel freer to use its power to intimidate or overwhelm a recalcitrant opponent or to aid directly insurgent forces.

MAO'S DOCTRINE OF WORLD REVOLUTION

As I have said, the Chinese Communist leaders are dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of world revolution. Last fall, Lin Piao, the Chinese Communist Minister of Defense, recapitulated in a long article Peiping's strategy of violence
for achieving Communist domination of the world. This strategy involves the mobilization of the underdeveloped areas of the world—which the Chinese Communists compare to the “rural areas”—against the industrialized or “urban” areas. It involves the relentless prosecution of what they call “people’s wars.” The final stage of all this violence is to be what they frankly describe as “wars of annihilation.”

It is true that this doctrine calls for revolution by the natives of each country. In that sense it may be considered a “do-it-yourself kit.” But Peiping is prepared to train and indoctrinate the leaders of these revolutions and to support them with funds, arms, and propaganda, as well as politically. It is even prepared to manufacture these revolutionary movements out of whole cloth.

Peiping has encouraged and assisted—with arms and other means—the aggressions of the North Vietnamese Communists in Laos and against South Vietnam. It has publicly declared its support for so-called national liberation forces in Thailand, and there are already terrorist attacks in the remote rural areas of northeast Thailand. There is talk in Peiping that Malaysia is next on the list. The basic tactics of these “wars of liberation” have been set forth by Mao and his disciples, including General Giap, the North Vietnamese Communist Minister of Defense. They progress from the undermining of independent governments and the economic and social fabrics of society by terror and assassination, through guerrilla warfare, to large scale military action.

Peiping has sought to promote Communist coups and “wars of liberation” against independent governments in Africa and Latin America as well as in Asia.

WORDS VERSUS ACTIONS

Some say we should ignore what the Chinese Communist leaders say and judge them only by what they do. It is true that they have been more cautious in action than in words—more cautious in what they do themselves than in what they have urged the Soviet Union to do. Undoubtedly, they recognize that their power is limited. They have shown, in many ways, that they have a healthy respect for the power of the United States.

But it does not follow that we should disregard the intentions and plans for the future which they have proclaimed. To do so would be to repeat the catastrophic miscalculation that so many people made about the ambitions of Hitler—and that many have made at various times in appraising the intentions of the Soviet leaders.

I have noted criticism of the so-called analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung. I am perfectly aware of the important differences between these two and the countries in which they have exercised power. The seizure of Manchuria by Japanese militarists, of Ethiopia by Mussolini, and of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia by Hitler, were laboratory experiments in the anatomy and physiology of aggression. How to deal with the phenomenon of aggression was the principal problem faced in drafting the United Nations Charter, and the answer was: collective action. We do ourselves no service by insisting that each source of aggression or each instance of aggression is unique. My own view is that we have learned a good deal about
this phenomenon and its potentiality for leading into catastrophe if the problem is not met in a timely fashion.

The bellicosity of the Chinese Communists has created problems within the Communist world as well as between Peiping and the non-Communist world.

Recently a leading official of a Communist state said to me that the most serious problem in the world today is how to get Peiping to move to a policy of "peaceful coexistence."

**CHINESE COMMUNIST FEAR OF ATTACK**

At times the Communist Chinese leaders seem to be obsessed with the notion that they are being threatened and encircled. We have told them both publicly and privately, and I believe have demonstrated in our actions in times of crisis and even under grave provocation, that we want no war with Communist China. The President restated this only last month in New York. We do not seek the overthrow by force of the Peiping regime; we do object to its attempt to overthrow other regimes by force.

How much Peiping's "fear" of the United States is genuine and how much it is artificially induced for domestic political purposes only the Chinese Communist leaders themselves know. I am convinced, however, that their desire to expel our influence and activity from the western Pacific and southeast Asia is not motivated by fears that we are threatening them.

I wish I could believe that Communist China seeks merely a guarantee of friendly states around its borders, as some commentators have suggested. If it was as simple as this, they would have only to abandon their policies which cause their neighbors to seek help from the United States.

The trouble is that Peiping's leaders want neighboring countries to accept subordination to Chinese power. They want them to become political and economic dependencies of Peiping. If the United States can be driven from Asia this goal will be in their grasp. The "influence," therefore, that Peiping's present leaders seek in Asia is indeed far reaching.

**DOMINANCE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT**

I had the privilege almost exactly a year ago of commenting at some length before this committee on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The essential nature of this conflict has not changed in this year. It has, if anything, intensified and widened. Its Russo-Chinese national aspects have become more conspicuous. Both sides have clearly given increased thought to the implications of a wider war in southeast Asia for their mutual treaty obligations. I don't know what the Soviets would actually do with respect to their treaty with Communist China, but Peiping does not seem to be counting on Soviet support.

**PEIPING'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SHARP COMMUNIST-U.S. POLARITY**

One of Peiping's most fundamental differences with Moscow centers on its desire to maintain the sharpest possible polarization between the Communist world and the United States. Peiping argues that
we are the "enemy of all the people in the world." Its national interests in Asia are served by maximizing Communist (and world) pressure on us and by attempting to "isolate" us. For this reason alone the Chinese would probably have opposed any Soviet attempts to reach understandings with us. In addition there are ideological and psychological reasons for Sino-Soviet rivalry:

The intense and deadly antagonisms that have always characterized schisms in the Marxist world;

Mao's belief that after Stalin's death the mantle of world Communist leadership should rightfully have passed to him and the Chinese Communist party;

Peiping's obsession, also held or professed by the leaders of the Soviet Union during the 30 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, with a fear of being threatened and encircled;

The mixture of the psychology of the veterans of the long march and Chinese traditional attitudes which has led Peiping's leaders to believe that through a combination of patience, struggle and "right thinking" all obstacles can be conquered; and

Peiping's professed belief that the Soviets are joining with the United States in keeping China in a position of inferiority and subordination.

All these have merged to give the Sino-Soviet dispute a flavor and an intensity which rival even the current Chinese Communist antagonism for the United States itself.

HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS PEIPING BEEN?

We can see that the Communist Chinese have set vast goals for themselves, both internally and externally. The disastrous results of the so-called great leap forward have forced them to acknowledge that it will take them generations to achieve their goals.

They have wrought considerable changes on the mainland of China. Perhaps their greatest feat has been to establish their complete political authority throughout the country. They have made some progress in industrialization, education, and public health—although at the expense of human freedom, originality, and creativity. But their efforts to improve agriculture and to mold the Chinese people into a uniform Marxist pattern have been far less successful.

The economic, political, and social problems still confronting the Chinese Communist leaders today are staggering.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Peiping's economic power will almost certainly increase over the coming years. But even with relatively effective birth control programs the population of mainland China may reach 1 billion by 1985.

Where is the food to come from? Where are the resources for investment to come from? Can the rapidly increasing military and economic costs of great power status be carried by Chinese society at the same time that other economic tasks vital to China's economic survival are carried out? I do not denigrate in the slightest native Chinese ingenuity and capacity for incredibly hard work when I suggest that the solutions to these problems are in the gravest doubt.
INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Even more important to Peiping's leaders than these economic problems, however, are the will and morale of their own people. The current leaders—Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and others—are an intensely committed group of men whose entire lives symbolize their willingness to postpone the satisfactions of the present for the promised glory of the future.

Every generation is suspicious that the youth of today is not what it was in the good old days. But this has become another obsession of Peiping's old men. Their domestic propaganda and their comments to visitors, as well as the reports of refugees, have all emphasized their distrust of the youth of the country. They fear that their grand designs and goals—both domestic and foreign—will not be pursued with zeal by the next generation.

I believe their concern may be both genuine and warranted. How pleased can young college graduates be to be sent off to rural China for years for ideological hardening? How attractive is it to the Chinese peasant and worker to be called on for years of sacrifice to bring revolution to Africa or Latin America? Will Chinese scientists accept the dogma that scientific truth can be found only in the pages of Mao Tse-tung's writings? How can professional Chinese Communist army officers and soldiers be persuaded that the words of Mao represent a "spiritual atomic bomb" more powerful than any material weapon?

I am unaware of any new revolution brewing on the Chinese mainland. I have no evidence that the current regime does not, in practical terms, control effectively all of mainland China. But there is evidence of a growing psychological weariness that in years to come could produce a significant shift in the policies of a new generation of leaders.

The dramatic succession of foreign policy failures during the last year, both in the Communist and non-Communist world, must be having some effect on the confidence of the people in the wisdom of their leaders and even on the leaders themselves.

CHANGE, A SLOW PROCESS

I do not predict any quick changes in China. Nor are there simple solutions. Peiping's present state of mind is a combination of aggressive arrogance and obsessions of its own making. There are doubtless many reasons, cultural, historical, political, for this state of mind. Psychologists have struggled for years in an effort to characterize what is a normal personality. The definition of what a normal state personality might be is beyond my abilities. I would be inclined, however, to advance the view that a country whose behavior is as violent, irascible, unyielding, and hostile as that of Communist China is led by leaders whose view of the world and of life itself is unreal. It is said that we have isolated them. But to me they have isolated themselves—both in the non-Communist and Communist world.

We have little hope of changing the outlook of these leaders. They are products of their entire lives. They seem to be immune to agreement or persuasion by anyone, including their own allies.
It is of no help in formulating policy to describe Peiping's behavior as neurotic. Its present policies pose grave and immediate problems for the United States and other countries. These must be dealt with now. The weapons and advisers that Peiping exports to promote and assist insurrections in other countries cannot be met by psychoanalysis.

At the present time there is a need for a counterweight of real power to Chinese Communist pressures. This has had to be supplied primarily by the United States and our allies.

We should be under no illusion that by yielding to Peiping's bellicose demands today we would in some way ease the path toward peace in Asia. If Peiping reaps success from its current policies, not only its present leaders, but those who follow, will be emboldened to continue them. This is the path to increased tension, and even greater dangers to world peace in the years ahead.

CHA as a Great Power

We expect China to become some day a great world power. Communist China is a major Asian power today. In the ordinary course of events, a peaceful China would be expected to have close relations—political, cultural, and economic— with the countries around its borders and with the United States.

It is no part of the policy of the United States to block the peaceful attainment of these objectives.

More than any other Western people, we have had close and warm ties with the Chinese people. We opposed the staking out of spheres of influence in China. We used our share of the Boxer indemnity to establish scholarships for Chinese students in the United States. We welcomed the revolution of Sun Yat Sen. We took the lead in relinquishing Western extra-territorial privileges in China. We refused to recognize the puppet regime established by Japan in Manchuria. And it was our refusal to accept or endorse, even by implication, Japan's imperial conquests and further designs in China that made it impossible for us to achieve a *modus vivendi* with Japan in 1940–41.

We look forward hopefully—and confidently—to a time in the future when the government of mainland China will permit the restoration of the historic ties of friendship between the people of mainland China and ourselves.

Elements of Future Policy

What should be the main elements in our policy toward Communist China?

We must take care to do nothing which encourages Peiping—or anyone else—to believe that it can reap gains from its aggressive actions and designs. It is just as essential to "contain" Communist aggression in Asia as it was, and is, to "contain" Communist aggression in Europe.

At the same time, we must continue to make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its belief that force is the best way to resolve disputes and gives up its violent strategy of world revolution, we would welcome an era of good relations.
More specifically, I believe, there should be 10 elements in our policy.

First, we must remain firm in our determination to help those allied nations which seek our help to resist the direct or indirect use or threat of force against their territory by Peking.

Second, we must continue to assist the countries of Asia in building broadly based effective governments, devoted to progressive economic and social policies, which can better withstand Asian Communist pressures and maintain the security of their people.

Third, we must honor our commitments to the Republic of China and to the people on Taiwan who do not want to live under communism. We will continue to assist in their defense and to try to persuade the Chinese Communists to join with us in renouncing the use of force in the area of Taiwan.

Fourth, we will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations or its agencies. So long as Peking follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for membership, and the United States opposes its membership.

It is worth recalling that the Chinese Communists have set forth some interesting conditions which must be fulfilled before they are even willing to consider membership:

- The United Nations resolution of 1950 condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea must be rescinded;
- There must be a new United Nations resolution condemning U.S. “aggression”;
- The United Nations must be reorganized;
- The Republic of China must be expelled;
- All other “imperialist puppets” must be expelled. One can only ask whether the Chinese Communists seriously want membership, or whether they mean to destroy the United Nations.

We believe the United Nations must approach this issue with the utmost caution and deliberation.

Fifth, we should continue our efforts to reassure Peking that the United States does not intend to attack mainland China. There are, of course, risks of war with China. This was true in 1950. It was true in the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955 and 1958. It was true in the Chinese Communist drive into Indian territory in 1962. It is true today in Vietnam. But we do not want war. We do not intend to provoke war. There is no fatal inevitability of war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists have, as I have already said, acted with caution when they foresaw a collision with the United States. We have acted with restraint and care in the past and we are doing so today. I hope that they will realize this and guide their actions accordingly.

Sixth, we must keep firmly in our minds that there is nothing eternal about the policies and attitudes of Communist China. We must avoid assuming the existence of an unending and inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China.

Seventh, when it can be done without jeopardizing other U.S. interests, we should continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial contacts between Communist China and ourselves—contacts which may gradually assist in altering Peking’s picture of the United States.
In this connection, we have gradually expanded the categories of American citizens who may travel to Communist China. American libraries may freely purchase Chinese Communist publications. American citizens may send and receive mail from the mainland. We have in the past indicated that if the Chinese themselves were interested in purchasing grain we would consider such sales. We have indicated our willingness to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to come to the United States. We are prepared to permit American universities to invite Chinese Communist scientists to visit their institutions.

We do not expect that for the time being the Chinese Communists will seize upon these avenues of contact or exchange. All the evidence suggests Peiping wishes to remain isolated from the United States. But we believe it is in our interests that such channels be opened and kept open. We believe contact and communication are not incompatible with a firm policy of containment.

Eighth, we should keep open our direct diplomatic contacts with Peiping in Warsaw. While these meetings frequently provide merely an opportunity for a reiteration of known positions, they play a role in enabling each side to communicate information and attitudes in times of crisis. It is our hope that they might at some time become the channel for a more fruitful dialog.

Ninth, we are prepared to sit down with Peiping and other countries to discuss the critical problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Peiping has rejected all suggestions and invitations to join in such talks. It has attacked the test ban treaty. It has advocated the further spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear countries. It is an urgent task of all countries to persuade Peiping to change its stand.

Tenth, we must continue to explore and analyze all available information on Communist China and keep our own policies up to date. We have said, in successive administrations, that when Peiping abandons the aggressive use of force and shows that it is not irrevocably hostile to the United States, then expanded contacts and improved relations may become possible. This continues to be our position.

These, I believe, are the essential ingredients of a sound policy in regard to Communist China.

I believe that they serve the interests not only of the United States and of the free world as a whole—but of the Chinese people. We have always known of the pragmatic genius of the Chinese people, and we can see evidence of it even today. The practices and doctrines of the present Peiping regime are yielding poor returns to the Chinese people. I believe that the Chinese people, no less their neighbors and the American people, crave the opportunity to move toward the enduring goals of mankind: a better life, safety, freedom, human dignity, and peace.

(The further proceedings of the subcommittee have been deleted for security reasons.)

(The subcommittee thereupon adjourned at 5:05 p.m., until 2 p.m., Thursday, March 17, 1966.)
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those kind words. It is always a pleasure to appear before this group.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have been on a trip in the area for the last 3 weeks. I haven't, therefore, had the opportunity to go through the transcripts of your past hearings in the detail I should have liked. I haven't come with a new statement of my own, which I thought would not be necessary, particularly as you have had a long statement yesterday by the Secretary of State.

I would call your attention to a speech on this subject which I delivered in Pomona, Calif., on February 12, last, which deals with a great many aspects of the situation. If you wish, I will supply it—it is before you—I will supply it for the record. It deals with many aspects of this situation.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Without objection your speech will be included at this point in the record.

THE UNITED STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINA

(By William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs)

Communist China is without doubt the most serious and perplexing problem that confronts our foreign policy today. Peking's foreign policy objectives, and the tactics it employs to achieve these objectives, sharply focus for us the issues of
war and peace in Asia and the freedom and lives of millions of people, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

The key questions we must ask at the outset are: What are our objectives, in Asia and in the world as a whole? what are Communist China's objectives? and what kind of policy is best for the United States in the light of those basic assessments?

And, viewed in this light, the unfortunate fact is that the kind of world that we seek and the kind of world our Asian friends seek is totally antithetical to the kind of Asia and the kind of world that Communist China seeks. What we seek is a situation where small as well as large nations are able to develop as free and independent countries, secure from outside aggression or subversion. We look toward their economic, political, and social development and growth; we hope their development will be in the direction of increasingly democratic institutions, but we recognize that these nations must develop as they themselves see fit, in accordance with their own traditions and customs. Their rate of progress, we believe, will vary according to individual situations, but progress will inevitably take place and toward goals which are deeply rooted in individual aspirations.

In harsh conflict with these objectives is any situation in which a single nation or combination of nations sets out to control others in the region or to exercise political domination over other nations in the area or any major part of it.

Our objectives are consistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and, I believe, with the aspirations of the peoples and the governments of the area and of the nations in contiguous and other areas that share with us a concern for what happens in Asia in this and in the next generation. We believe, too, that our objectives accord with the whole tide of history at the present time. They are not abstract principles. They are the bedrock of our policy throughout the world. Governed by what the nations themselves wish to do and by practical factors, what we seek is to assist the nations that are trying to preserve their independence, trying to develop themselves, and, therefore, necessarily trying to resist forces working in the contrary direction.

CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

There is today in Communist China a government whose leadership is dedicated to the promotion of communism by violent revolution.

The present leaders in Peking also seek to restore China to its past position of grandeur and influence. Many of Peking's leaders today, now grown old, are proud and arrogant, convinced that they have been responsible for a resurgence of Chinese power. The China of old exercised a degree of control over Asia that waxed and waned according to the power of the ruling emperor. Under strong rulers this meant a type of overlordship, sometimes benign but frequently otherwise, over the countries around its borders. And the restoration of that image and controlling influence is certainly a part of Communist China's foreign policy today.

In the 1930's Mao Tse-tung called attention to areas controlled by China under the Manchu Empire but since removed from Chinese control: Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Pescadores, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Annam, and Outer Mongolia. In more recent years, Chinese Communist leaders have added to that list parts of Soviet central Asia and eastern Siberia. I think we can take this as valid evidence of Peking's Asian ambitions. As Prof. Oliver Edmund Chubb, in his "Twentieth Century China," says: "The urge to revolutionary empire is fortified by the feeling drilled into all Chinese since the beginning of the Republic that all territory ever included in the vast Manchu Empire rightfully belongs to China."

In addition to these historically rooted aspirations, the present leadership is inspired by a Communist ideology still in a highly militant and aggressive phase. This phase is ideologically akin to that in the Soviet Union in the 1920's or early 1930's. It coincides, however, with a situation in which the opportunities for expansion are, or appear to Peking, more akin to those available to the Soviet Union at a much later phase in its ideological development—in 1945 and the immediate postwar years. This Communist element includes the advocacy of change through revolution and violence throughout the world and, particularly in China's neighboring areas—not revolution seeking the fruition of the national goals of the people of these areas, but revolution supplied or stimulated from outside and based on a preconceived pattern of historical development.
Their vision of this Communist mission extends to countries far from China—including, as we all clearly have seen, Africa and even Latin America. Peking’s plans for carrying out its objectives have been delineated in a series of pronouncements issued by its leaders, one of the latest and most widely publicized having been that issued last September by Marshal Lin Piao, top military leader in Communist China, in which Lin Piao offered Chinese Communist experience in the war against Japan as a lesson to be emulated by the less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their pursuit of “revolution.”

As you know, the Lin Piao article draws an elaborate analogy based upon the domestic experience of Mao and his cohorts in taking over China: the organization of the rural areas against the urban ones. It extends that analogy to the thesis that the less developed areas of the world are all in the rural category which will be mobilized in order to destroy “the cities”; that is to say, all the Western, more advanced centers—ourselves, of course, at the head.

I mention this article because it is a clear and comprehensive indication that there has not taken place any moderating, but if anything a solidifying at least at this stage, of this virulent revolutionary policy that is central to our discussion of Communist China. And, of course, we have seen it in action over and over again.

THE CHINESE THREAT IN ASIA

I shall not speak at length of the problems created by Communist Chinese policy in Africa and Latin America. The recent reaction even of Castro suggests that Latin America is reacting adversely to the heavyhandedness of these policies. In Africa, too, there is every sign that the new nations of the area, themselves carrying out nationalist revolutions of their own design, know full well what is meant when Chou En-lai, for example, referred last June to Africa being ripe for a second stage of revolution. The new leaders of Africa have shown no desire to be Kerenskys.

But it is in Asia itself that the major thrust of Communist Chinese policy is felt and must be countered by their neighbors. It is sometimes argued that the ambitions of Communist China in the areas contiguous to it do not mean outright control; and it can certainly be argued that they are tactically cautious in pursuing these ambitions. They have not wished to seek a confrontation of military power with us, and in any situation that would be likely to lead to wider conflict they are tactically cautious. But in looking at the extent of their ambitions one cannot, I think, simply take the historical picture of tributary governments that would be tolerated as long as they did roughly what China wished. That indeed was the historic pattern in many periods when powerful governments ruled in the mainland of China. It is also, perhaps, the pattern one might draw abstractly from the desire any major power might feel not to have hostile military power based in areas adjacent to it. Those two logics—historical Chinese logic and “great power” logic—might appear to point to something less than total political domination as the Chinese Communist objective around their borders. And yet we must recognize, I think, because of the Communist element in the thinking and practice of the leaders of Peking today, that there is another factor that raises strong doubts whether their ambitions are in fact this modest. We have seen, for example, in the contrast between what the Soviets have done in Eastern Europe and the behavior of predecessor Russian regimes, that there is a Communist logic that does insist on total control, that will not tolerate anything other than the imposition of the full Communist totalitarian system. The experience of Soviet control in Eastern Europe suggests that this same kind of Communist logic does and would apply to the behavior of Communist China.

That it would be further strongly suggested by the way that the Communist Chinese regime has treated Tibet. The fact that Tibet was within the historic limits of Chinese suzerainty does not explain why Communist China has virtually obliterated the culture of Tibet in seizing control of it. One cannot rationalize this on grounds of history or of the need of a great power not to have hostile forces adjacent to it. So I suggest that we must give great weight to the probability that the ambitions of Communist China do extend, not necessarily to the degree of obliteration of the local culture that we have seen in Tibet, but at least to a fairly total form of domination and control in areas contiguous to it.

What, then, would be the consequences if Communist China were to achieve the kind of domination it seeks? Here again one is tempted to look for analogy to Eastern Europe, where there is a growing will to pursue national and independent policies and to adopt domestic policies that differ sharply from the original
Communist model. Yet it has taken 20 years of virtual subjugation for the nations of Eastern Europe to move this far, and their nationalism, traditions of independence, and capabilities for independent development were in general far more highly developed than those of the smaller nations on China's borders. To accept mainland Chinese domination in Asia would be to look forward to conditions of external domination and probably totalitarian control, not merely for 20 years but quite possibly for generations.

Moreover, the spread of Chinese domination would inevitably create its own dynamic and in the end threaten even the most securely based and largest nations within the area of that threat, such as India and Japan. One does not need to subscribe to any pat “domino” formula to know from the history of the last generation—and indeed from all history—that the spread of domination feeds on itself, kindling its own fires within the dominant country and progressively weakening the will and capability of others to resist.

**Past Mistakes and Their Relevance to Present**

This is what we are dealing with. We can all think, as we look back at the history of China, of errors that we as a Nation have made and that other nations of the West have made—errors in justice and conduct in our relationships with China. We should search our souls on these and set our objectives and our principles to avoid repeating them ever again. In Asia, at least, the colonial era is for all significant purposes at an end.

But to say that the West itself bears a measure of historical responsibility for the strength of the feelings of Communist China does not deal with the present problem any more than discussion of the inequities of Versailles dealt with the ambitions of Hitlerite Germany. Whatever the historic blame may be, we have to deal with the present fact of a Chinese Communist Government whose attitudes are very deeply rooted in China's national history and ambitions to revive its past greatness, and in an extremely virulent Communist ideology.

In the words of a recent article by Prof. [John K.J Fairbank:]

“We are up against a dynamic opponent whose strident anti-Americanism will not soon die away. It comes from China's long background of feeling superior to all outsiders and expecting a supreme position in the world, which we seem to thwart.”

**Tactics and Strategy**

I would like to emphasize that up to this point I have been speaking of the basic objectives of Peking's policy. To describe these objectives as deeply expansionist is by no means to paint the picture of another Hitler, building a vast military machine with the aim of conquest by conventional warfare on a timetable backed at some point, in the Chinese case, by a nuclear capability.

This has not been the historical Chinese way, and there is every reason to believe that it is not their present preference. Chinese are patient and think in long historical terms. Military force is important and they would like to think that their nuclear capability may at some point be useful in backing the picture of an overwhelmingly strong China whose will must be accepted. But the doctrinal statements of Lin Piao and others speak rather in terms of what they call people's war, which plainly means the instigation and support of movements that can be represented as local movements, designed to subvert and overthrow existing governments and replace them by regimes responsive to Peking's will.

This is what we are seeing today in Thailand in the form of a so-called Thai patriotic front established and supported from mainland China. This is the direct form of Communist Chinese tactic that must be met. A variant tactic was reflected in the Communist Chinese role in support of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) in Indonesia.

But equally important to Peking is its encouragement and support of the parallel efforts of the other Communist Asian regimes in North Korea and North Vietnam. What is now happening in Vietnam is basically the result of Hanoi's own ambitions and efforts. Peking might wish eventually to dominate North Vietnam or a unified Vietnam under Hanoi's initial control. But if this were resisted by the Vietnamese in the classic historical pattern of relations between the two areas Peking would still gain enormously from the success of Hanoi's effort, which would clear the way for Peking to expand and extend the kind of action it is undertaking on its own in Thailand. It takes no vivid imagination to visualize what Peking would do in Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma if Hanoi were to succeed in Vietnam and Peking itself succeed in Thailand.
This, then, is the preferred Communist Chinese tactic and strategy. Ideas are a part of it, although Communist China's image as a successful model of social and political organization is hardly as attractive today as it may have been before the disastrous mistakes of the "great leap forward" and the uneven progress of the years since. Few Asians today think of the Communist Chinese structure as a model, although individual ideas such as land reform and attacks on "feudal" social structures are a part of Peking's tactical efforts.

But essentially we are dealing here not with the power of ideas but with the power of subversive organization, perhaps the one field in which Communist China has shown real innovation and skill. In mainland southeast Asia, as today in South Vietnam, what we could expect to see as the spearhead of the subversive effort would be terrorism, selective assassination, guerrilla action, and finally, if it were required, conventional military forces largely recruited by the tactics of the earlier phases.

These tactics might be varied if Communist China were to decide again to threaten India directly. There the element of conventional forces would play a greater part but would still be backed and reinforced by major political efforts to disrupt the cohesion and strength of India.

OUR BASIC POLICIES

I repeat, we must look at things and deal with them as they are if we are to hope for change. Our basic policy must include, as major elements, two interrelated efforts: to assist the free nations of the area, as they may desire, to preserve their security; and to help them, again in accordance with their own wishes, to improve their political, economic, and social conditions. The latter is an effort that I am sure we would be making even if there were no security threat.

These two fundamental elements of our policy have much in common with the policies that we and our NATO allies pursued so successfully in the areas threatened by the Soviet Union after the war. And surely there is, to a very high degree, a valid parallel between the situation we continue to face vis-à-vis Communist China and that we faced with the Soviet Union after the war. We have dealt with the Soviet Union fundamentally by assisting in the restoration of the power and strength of Europe so that Soviet ambitions were successfully checked. Since 1955, although Soviet ambitions remain, we have seen a trend toward moderation in Soviet policy and a turning inward by the Soviets to their domestic problems.

There are, of course, myriad differences between the situation in Asia and that in Europe in terms of sophistication of economic and political bases, the stability of the societies, and the unity of national cultures. But basic to our policy in respect to Communist China, as in the case of our policy toward the Soviet Union, must be our determination to meet with firmness the external pressure of the Communist Chinese. Again, in Professor Fairbank's words: "We have little alternative but to stand up to Peking's grandiose demands."

So the effort to assist in preserving security is fundamental to our policy. It is reflected in our treaty commitments—bilateral with Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines; multilateral (but individually binding) through the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty) treaties, and extending to South Vietnam through a protocol to the SEATO treaty.

Necessarily, our security effort and commitments have a major military element, for the threat of military action is direct in relation to Korea and the Republic of China and lurks in the background of the Communist Chinese threat to southeast Asia, as it does for India. The day may come when other nations in the area can join in assuming more of this burden, but the simple fact is that today there cannot be an effective deterrent military force, and thus a balance of power, around China's frontiers without major and direct military contributions by the United States.

But even in the security area the effort is far from merely a military one. Local military forces should wherever possible be adequate, so that an external attack would have to take on large proportions immediately identifiable as aggression. But at least as basic to the preservation of the independence of the nations of Asia is their capacity to insure law and order and to deal with subversion, and this in turn relates to the whole nature of their political structures and to their social and economic progress. So in the end what is done under the heading of "security" merges almost indistinguishably into what is done under the heading of development.
And so, at one time or another, we had assistance relationships with all of
the non-Communist countries of Asia. Today three of these—Burma, Cambodia,
and Indonesia—have chosen to follow paths that involve little or no assistance
from us. And there are nations such as Japan, and more recently the Republic
of China, which have made such economic progress that they no longer need our
direct help. Malaysia and Singapore are other special cases, which look for
historical and practical reasons to Britain and the Commonwealth.

So the pattern is varied. In a very few instances we supply major assistance to
conventional military forces. In others, such as Thailand, the emphasis is as
great or greater on nonmilitary measures to better the lot of the people and thus
to strengthen the fabric of the nation. And throughout the area, even where we are
no longer giving direct economic assistance, we have joined in supporting the
increasing efforts of the World Bank and private lenders to pitch in on the eco­
nomic side, and more recently the profoundly important regional economic
developments represented by the formation of the Asian Development Bank and
the growing, though still embryonic, effort to provide an effective framework,
through the United Nations, for assistance in the Mekong Basin and on a regional
basis to southeast Asia.

All of these efforts are linked together. They represent the kind of activity
which, as I have said, we would be supporting in large part in any case irrespective
of the threat of Communist China and the other Communist nations. What
they should do, over time, is to help build in Asia nations which are standing on
their own feet, responding to the needs of their peoples, and capable of standing
up to the kind of tactics and strategy employed by Communist China, backed
where necessary and in accordance with our treaty commitments by the assurance
that, if external attack in any form should ever take place, the United States and
others would come to their help.

This is the essence of what we are trying to do. Containment, yes, but con­
tainment carried out by actions that run clear across the board. And contain­
ment in the last analysis that depends upon the performance of the Asian nations
themselves. As one looks back over the short historical span of the last 15 years,
one can surely see throughout the area tremendous progress where security has
been maintained. Even though present difficulties are formidable, the nations
of Asia have great capacity, and there is much reason for encouragement at the
long-term prospect.

UNITED STATES-CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS

This brings me to the whole question of how we deal specifically with Com­
munist China. Let me briefly review and analyze some of the things we have
done or might do.

As far as contacts through diplomatic channels are concerned, we have had 128
meetings at the ambassadorial level with Peking's representatives, first in Geneva
and now Warsaw. I think it is fair to say that we have had the longest and
most direct dialog of any major Western nation with Communist China.

I am bound to say at the same time, however, that the dialog so far has not
been very productive and founders on the fundamental issue of Peking's demand
for Taiwan and by its stated conviction that the United States is by historical
necessity Peking's prime antagonist on the world scene. But it is fair to say that
it is more of a dialog than we could expect to have if we were ever to recognize
Communist China, if the experience of Western diplomats in Peking is representa­
tive. And it is an opportunity to try directly to make them understand that we
have no hostile designs on mainland China or its leaders but that we fully intend
to maintain our commitments to defend our friends and allies against Communist
aggression and that the United States seeks peace, freedom, and stability for the
countries of Asia.

In addition to these direct contacts, we have, of course, been prepared to deal
with Communist China in multilateral forums where its interests are directly
involved. This was true of the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1961-62, and
have made clear our willingness to participate in a Geneva-conference type of
format to resolve the present Vietnam problem or to have Communist China
appear at the United Nations if Hanoi or Peking were ever ready to let the United
Nations deal with the Vietnam issue.

And there is the possibility that Peking may at some point be prepared to
participate usefully in multilateral discussions on disarmament. We have always
said that we would envisage such participation if workable arrangements appeared
to be in prospect, although I am bound to add that Peking's attitude, particularly since its nuclear tests, has given no ground for supposing that she is prepared to enter disarmament discussions with any constructive position.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION AT THE U.N.

Some nations at the U.N. hope that Communist China's seating would have a moderating effect on its policies. They advance the thesis that, not being included in the U.N., Peking feels rejected and acts with considerably less restraint than if it were a member with a member's obligations.

We respect those who hold this view, but we cannot agree with it. It seems to us a rationalistic view that ignores the deep-seated historic and ideologic reasons for Peking's current attitudes. Nor does this theory—the 'neuraxis' theory if you will—explain Peking's behavior toward other Communist nations or its behavior in Afro-Asian groupings to which Communist China has been fully welcomed. I return again to Professor Fairbank's description of China's 'long background of feeling superior to all outsiders and expecting a supreme position in the world.' Surely this, alongside ideologic differences, lies at the root of the Sino-Soviet split, of Communist China's disruptive behavior in Afro-Asian groupings, and of the heavyhandedness of Communist China's policy from Indonesia to Burundi.

Moreover, we must consider Peking's price for entering the U.N. On September 29, 1965, Chen Yi, the Chinese Communist Premier, made the following demands:

1. The expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N.
2. The complete reorganization of the U.N.
3. The withdrawal of the General Assembly resolution condemning Peking as an aggressor in the Korean conflict.
4. The branding of the United States as an aggressor in that conflict.

These are obviously unacceptable conditions.

The Republic of China, for example, is one of the original signatories of the United Nations Charter and has lived up to its obligations as a U.N. member in good faith. More than 13 million people live on the Island of Taiwan. This is a larger population than that of 83 members of the United Nations. The United States for many years has had close and friendly relations with the Republic of China, and since 1954 we have been bound by treaty to join with it in the defense of Taiwan. It would be unthinkable and morally wrong to expel the Government of the Republic of China from the U.N. to meet this demand of Peking's.

One must also consider the attitude of Communist China toward conflict, not only where its own interests are directly concerned but even in cases where they are not. Had Communist China been in the United Nations, could there have been a cease-fire resolution on the India-Pakistan conflict in September and could Secretary General U Thant have received any mandate to bring that conflict to a halt? Peking's critical comment on the Tashkent proceedings is a clear answer. We are dealing with a nation that, at least as far as we can now see, will attempt as a matter of principle to put a monkey wrench into every peacemaking effort which may be made in the world.

Finally, there is the psychological factor: whether the admission to the U.N. of a nation that is dedicated to violent revolution and currently supporting North Vietnam's aggression against South Vietnam and threatening India in seeking to exacerbate and extend the Indo-Pakistan conflict would, in fact, not encourage Peking's thinking on the right track while deeply discouraging other nations which are resisting Peking's pressures and seeking to maintain their own independence.

It continues, therefore, to be U.S. policy to support the position of the Republic of China in the U.N. For our part, we will also continue to oppose the admission of Communist China.

BILATERAL CONTACTS

Now I should like to talk briefly on the subject of unofficial contacts with Peking, stressing above all one point which has not been sufficiently emphasized: Many people do not realize that it is Communist China which has prevented any movement toward bilateral contacts. The United States over the past several years has tried to promote a variety of contacts, but the Chinese have kept the door tightly barred.

Since 1958, for example, we have validated passports of over 80 representatives of newspapers and other media for travel to Communist China. Only two have been admitted. We have tried unsuccessfully to arrange with the Chinese either
a formal or an informal exchange of newsmen, and more recently we have indicated to them our willingness unilaterally and without reciprocity to see Communist Chinese newsmen enter the United States.

In addition, we have a short time ago amended our travel regulations to permit doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine to travel to Communist China. We shall see, but so far the response has been negative. We have discussed with various scientific and other organizations their interests in arranging people-to-people exchanges with the Chinese. We have encouraged the exchange of publications between various universities and institutions in the United States with Peking. There is a free flow of mail to and from Communist China. All of these efforts have been consistent with our worldwide concern for a freedom of information and for the exchange of knowledge and views in humanitarian fields. Yet they have been consistently rejected by Communist China. If there were a possibility that such contacts might over time develop a broader understanding of the rest of the world in Communist China, it is they, not we, who reject this possibility.

TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Let me now say a few words about trade.
We have not opposed the trade of other nations with Communist China except insofar as there is a strongly built-up pattern of control in the area of strategic commodities. We have expressed our concerns to other nations from time to time, recognizing that their trade policies were their own decision but raising questions of their vulnerability to possible pressures from Peking in their over-involvement in trading patterns.

As for the possibilities of our trade, every time the subject is seriously mentioned in this country, it is shot down immediately in Peking. In 1961, for example, when food supplies in mainland China were very short, President Kennedy made it quite clear that we would take under consideration a Chinese Communist request to purchase grain. The Chinese Communist response was to denounce the President and to reject any possibility of trade, not only in grain but in other commodities with the United States.

CONCLUSION

These are samples of what we are up against. We are Peking's great enemy because our power is a crucial element in the total balance of power and in the resistance by Asian states to Chinese Communist expansionist designs in Asia. That is the really controlling fact, not sentiment, not whatever wrongs may have been done in the past, but the very simple fact and the very fundamental conflict between their aims and objectives and the kinds of aims that we have—above all, our support for the right of the nations of Asia to be free and independent and govern themselves according to their own wishes.

All of us must hope that this picture will change. Mainland China is, of course, a great power in the world historically. How it will develop economically and in other respects remains to be seen. I myself think that they will have considerable problems that will tend over time to absorb them if their external ambitions and desires are checked. There are those who argue that mainland China's great size and population, its historical and cultural links with the areas around its borders, and its economic potential make inevitable the growth of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia. Those who advance this fatalistic theory discount the aspirations of the peoples in the area, their ability, and the effectiveness of U.S. aid, and they ignore the historical trends of our time.

In sum, I repeat that the problem must be considered basically in the same way we did that of the Soviet Union. We must, on the one hand seek to entice Peking's ambitions and build up the free nations of Asia and of contiguous areas; on the other hand, while maintaining firm resistance to their expansionist ambitions, we can, over time, open the possibility of increased contacts with Communist China, weighing very carefully any steps we take in this general area lest we impair the essential first aim of our policy, including our clear commitments.

It is unlikely that the present leaders, who have become doctrinaire and dogmatic, can be expected to change, but they in due course will be replaced with a more open-minded new generation of leaders. It is our hope that these men will see with clearer eyes and better vision that China's best interest lies in pursuing a peaceful course.