Mr. Bundy. I might just call your attention to the summation at the close, the next-to-the-last paragraph, in which I summed up two essential points, that we would look at the problem of Communist China in a basic fashion in the same way we faced the problem of the Soviet Union, that is:

We must, on the one hand, seek to curtail Peking's ambitions and build up the free nations of Asia and of contiguous areas; on the other hand, while maintaining a firm resistance to their expansionist ambitions, we can, over time, open the possibility of increased contacts with Communist China, weighing very carefully any steps we take in these general areas, lest we impair the essential first aim of our policy, including our clear commitments.

I think that bears on some expressions that have been used recently, using the terms "containment" and "isolation," which I think are useful, but do not fully describe a rather sophisticated total approach, the balance between the two and so on, which I think is critical in going into it.

I might also call attention to one or two other aspects of my paper in which, for example, I have tried to spell out that containment is not an exclusively military operation, that if one looks at it broadly, it embraces the whole pattern of activities—

Mr. Murphy. What page is that, please?

Mr. Bundy. This is the part on pages 5 and 6, Congressman Murphy, in which I have gone into the whole range of activities, many of which, as I have said here, we should undoubtedly be doing in any case, as the countries of Asia wished us to, that is to say, assistance, trade cooperation, regional projects of the kind that are now really beginning to take wing in southeast Asia and Asia as a whole, the whole complex of social, economic, and political activity; the ways in which we as a nation are asked to and can assist these nations in an effective and useful fashion.

All of this can be considered under the heading of containment, although, as I have made quite clear, I think we should be doing a great deal of this in any event, even if there were not the security threats in the area.

I might also call attention to one or two lesser points, simply because I have noted in my hasty perusal that they have arisen in your hearings.

The question is sometimes raised whether China's expansionist designs are really by proxy. It has been said that the Lin Piao article of last September represented a do-it-yourself kit. I would say that this is true wherever local forces exist that can be built up and supported as a local movement. But I call attention to the reference in my speech—this is on page 4—to the rather direct Communist Chinese role that we have seen today in support of the "Thai patriotic front." I happened to have just returned from Thailand, and to hear about it on the spot is to be reminded forcibly that this is without question a Communist Chinese operation. It has not been possible for the Communists to get any major group of dissidents within Thailand [security deletion]. There is no significant group of dissidents that is prepared to adopt the Chinese Communist view. Accordingly, the Chinese Communists have created this "Thai Patriotic Front" from Thai elements living in China.

They are apparently using extensively agents trained in schools in China in a large number of schools that are now teaching the
Thai language and subversive techniques. These agents are being introduced into Thailand by devious means, drawing in some cases on people in northeast Thailand for help.

It is a very much "made in China" product that we are seeing there and not a proxy operation in any sense.

Perhaps I might also call attention to the statement in my speech about the Communist Chinese role in support of the PKI in Indonesia. I don't want to comment in these hearings in any detail on the complex and still not wholly clear events in Indonesia last September 30 and October 1, but I would say that it is abundantly clear that Communist China was very fully engaged in supplying arms and providing all sorts of support to the PKI, and that the PKI in turn was deeply involved in the coup of September 30.

I have seen statements suggesting the contrary in these hearings, and I would like to say that the evidence released by the Indonesians, while not, as I say, clear in all particulars, does point very clearly to the involvement of certain leaders in Indonesia and does point very clearly to the involvement of the PKI in some fashion in that coup.

Perhaps the most clear evidence of that was the immediate endorsement of the coup by the official PKI newspaper in Djakarta. So I think one can say that while Communist China may not have been consulted on the precise date of that move, it had visualized this kind of action and to that extent was involved.

Mr. Murphy. Was that under the direction of Peiping?

Mr. Bundy. I don't necessarily say that, Congressman Murphy. I say the Communist Chinese had supplied arms by covert methods to the PKI and to its branches over an extended period, and had envisaged very much this kind of action if and when it became necessary. I am not sure that Communist China was involved in the selection of this date or this move or indeed that the PKI top leadership was involved at the outset. There obviously were members of the PKI and people associated with the PKI who were involved.

It was inescapably a PKI action.

Mr. Murphy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. During the course of the hearings various witnesses analyzed Communist China's foreign policies and related them to the U.S. policy in Asia. Several of these witnesses advocated that there should be a change in United States policy toward China.

One witness, Dr. Roger Hilsman, maintained that our present policy was on a collision course with China.

Mr. Secretary, I think that in trying to deal with China, we must understand with whom we are dealing and just what their motives are.

I think one of the most succinct summaries the subcommittee has had was made by Mr. Charles Taylor, one of our earlier witnesses. Let me repeat the five points that he outlined as the main goals of Red China's foreign policy and ask you to comment on them.

I quote:

(1) To have the U.S. military forces removed from the Asian mainland and nearby waters, and severely to curtail U.S. political and economic influence in Asia.
(2) To regain for China in time what Peiping regards as its lost territories such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and parts of southeast Asia, which of course, would include what is referred to as the Indochina peninsula.

Mr. Murphy. And maritime provinces.

Mr. Zablocki (continuing).

(3) To establish some form of political and economic domination over southeast Asia.

(4) To inspire and support revolutionary movements throughout the developing world of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to discredit Soviet theories of peaceful coexistence.

(5) To gain for China in time what Peiping regards as its lost territories such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and parts of southeast Asia, which of course, would include what is referred to as the Indochina peninsula.

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but a role which includes these additional elements of regaining what they call lost territories, dominating southeast Asia, and excluding others from these roles. What they seek is not simply the kind of status that they might be entitled to as a result of their size, but something far more.

I think, basically, Mr. Chairman, I agree with that statement of their objectives. [Security deletion.]

As to the question about being on a “collision course” with Communist China, it seems to me that in a very real sense we were on a so-called collision course with the Soviet Union for a considerable period of time—for a decade after the war—in the sense that their objectives were opposite to those of the United States and of the other independent nations threatened by the Soviet Union. There were risks and confrontations. War has so far been avoided, I think, by firmness where firmness is required, and it is usually required where there is a direct threat.

If one stands firm and there is a realistic view, as there seems to be in Communist China, of the perils to them of any large-scale military confrontation with us, I do not see any fatalistic inevitability of an outright large-scale military conflict with them. However, it is difficult to assess the chances, because they depend on whether at some point there might be irrationality in Peiping’s view. But at any rate, I cannot say, as some witnesses before this committee have tended to put it, that there is anything more inevitable about collision with China than there was in the case of the Soviet Union or any more than where our views conflict today with those of the Soviet Union and others.

Mr. Zablocki. Considering that Red China’s present foreign policy goals and objectives are extremely militant, do you foresee any change developing, especially since it has had so many setbacks in its foreign policies recently?

Mr. Bundy. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Zablocki. Do you detect any sort of a revisionist movement in Communist China?

Mr. Bundy. There is no evidence of, no discernable evidence of what could be described as a revisionist movement. From time to time it has been surmised that individuals in the Chinese Communist leadership may be more disposed to a realistic view. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Bundy. At the present time, disregarding at the moment which individuals might be associated with any desire to revise policy, our analysis of their public statements would indicate that there is indeed concern over the sharp series of setbacks they have had in the past year. [Security deletion.]

Most notably there was a statement in November that there were bound to be, I believe the phrase was, “great upheavals,” as one pursued these policies. There have been a series of discussions following this.

As I read their most recent statements, I understand Peiping as saying that these difficulties are to be expected but that Peiping’s basic line is correct, and its leaders will continue to carry it out. That isn’t to say that there may not be tactical revisions but as of now I would say that we would read the overall policy as being “stick to your guns even if you do have an occasional reverse.”
Mr. ZABLOCKI. There are those who suggest and advise that the United States make some accommodation with Communist China. They fear there will be a miscalculation, which will result in a confrontation with Red China. Is it advisable for the United States to make any accommodations with Red China and if so to what extent?

Mr. BUNDY. [Security deletion.] It would be vastly more dangerous to accommodate by yielding to any of these ambitions and expansionist designs of Communist China; this would much more likely lead to misunderstanding.

At the present time I see no basis for anything that could be described as an accommodation that didn’t involve abandonment of commitments or yielding to the ambitions that they have. So I would say that in the territorial plane at any rate, I see no basis for any such action on our part.

If by accommodation you mean holding open the possibility of establishing contacts which are sufficiently broad to make it clear to them that they can in fact have contact if they want, that I think we should do. Accommodation in the sense of agreeing to anything that gives them what they are after in the form of expansionist designs I think would be a great mistake.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Several witnesses suggested that as a minimum Peking should be offered a seat in the United Nations, knowing they would not accept?

Mr. BUNDY. I think that involves a great many factors. [Security deletion.] I refer to [security deletion] the kind of conditions that Peking has quite clearly laid down for entry into the U.N., the fundamental importance for the United Nations as well as for the United States of the continued presence of the Republic of China in the United Nations. The Republic of China with a population greater than that of 83 of the existing nations of the United Nations has a valid claim to membership, and it is quite clear among other things that Peking would insist on the expulsion of the Republic of China.

Further, in addition to the basic question of whether a power pursuing policies such as those adopted by Communist China could be expected to live up to United Nations obligations is the question of whether its admission would not in fact be at variance with the whole purpose of the enterprise.

You have the practical question [security deletion] whether Communist China, if admitted, would seek by a series of moves and possibly by conditions demanded in the cause of seeking membership to disrupt the Organization. You also must face in such concrete cases as the hostilities between India and Pakistan last fall, if it were ever in a position to do so, whether Peking would block any peacekeeping action by the U.N.

I think the sum and substance of it is that this is a question that involves these central factors, and therefore, [security deletion] has to be approached with great caution. This, I think, is pretty well understood by most nations in New York and by people who have looked hard at the situation. Our position is that we would not favor the admission of Peiping under any circumstances foreseeable at the moment.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Let me make it quite clear, my questions are designed for the purpose of obtaining full and complete answers for
They are not in any way intended to indicate that I agree with the ideas or that I support the view covered by the questions.

Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I know you have been discussing the United Nations. On page 7 you give the four articles that Peiping has demanded for their entrance. What would happen if the United Nations voted China into the United Nations? Do you think they would accept?

Mr. BUNDY. I don’t think they would accept in any circumstances without the expulsion of the Republic of China, Mr. Whalley. My own belief is that they would insist on other conditions along the lines that Ch’ en Yi has laid out and even possibly some beyond that he has laid out. They would bargain in effect for a total capitulation on the part of the United Nations, and particularly what they would see as a humiliating defeat for us. You may know that the condition that Mr. Ch’ en Yi stated as the complete reorganization of the U.N. has been stated in other contexts as the exclusion of all “imperialist puppets.” I think we can well imagine that Peiping would seek to apply that standard of membership to nations that have had the courage to stand up for themselves in a great many areas of the world. In short, it is a U.N. modeled after their desires that they are after. Whether or not in the last analysis they would adhere to all conditions they have specified, I would say with absolute confidence, they would insist on the expulsion of the Republic of China.

Mrs. BOLTON. I would like to know if China has shown the slightest inclination to be invited to join.

Mr. BUNDY. Certainly not on any evidence available to us, Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. I was wondering if I had missed it. What in heaven’s name—then why is it the constant subject of discussion? I think it is too stupid for words.

Excuse me, Mr. Whalley.

Mr. BUNDY. The question comes up in many arguments. I don’t need to summarize those. I think the committee is familiar with them. It is a matter in many people’s minds and we take it seriously. We do not see, because of the factors that I have outlined, that it is a wise thing to consider at the present time.

Mrs. BOLTON. Would you consider it even if they didn’t ask, eventually?

Mr. BUNDY. That is really a hypothetical question, Mrs. Bolton. It involves so many other factors, the kind of policies they were pursuing, whether they were prepared to abandon the conditions they have outlined, matters of that sort. I can’t see that far ahead: I don’t think any of those conditions are likely in the future.

Mr. WHALLEY. Who are the principal sponsors of Red China into the United Nations?

Mr. BUNDY. Last fall, I think, 11 nations joined in sponsoring the resolution that would have seated Peiping and expelled the Republic of China. The leading nations, as I recall, were Cambodia, Algeria, and Albania; I don’t know who the others were, but I will supply them for the record.

(The information follows:)
Mr. Whalley. How about Russia?
Mr. Bundy. They were not a sponsoring nation last fall. They did vote in favor both on substance and on the important question.
Mr. Whalley. Wouldn't it be embarrassing to those sponsoring nations if they did vote them in and then they found that China wouldn't accept?
Mr. Bundy. Yes; I suppose it would. Our information is that some of the nations in the sponsoring role were not sure that Peiping would accept and were troubled by the announcement by Peiping of other conditions. The resolution did call for the expulsion of the Republic of China, which, as I say, is certainly the most fundamental of their conditions.
Mr. Whalley. Isn't the vote getting closer all the time?
Mr. Bundy. The vote last fall was 47 to 47 on the substance of a substitute resolution. On the question of whether it was an important question and thus required a two-thirds vote, the vote was 66 to 49.
I omit the abstentions in both cases. So the important question decision of the 1961 General Assembly was reaffirmed last fall. This was a substantially closer vote on both counts than the previous vote, than the vote in 1963.
Mr. Whalley. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Bundy, a point of information. Can you explain to me the difference between a regular province of China and the five autonomous provinces?
Mr. Bundy. I am afraid I would have to turn to Mr. Jacobson.

STATEMENT OF HARALD JACOBSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ASIAN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Jacobson. The difference between the autonomous and regular provinces? The regular provinces mostly follow old provincial lines and are located in east China, including Manchuria, and are largely populated by Han Chinese. There are certain areas in China which were populated by predominantly minority peoples, such as Inner Mongolia, which in historical times has been populated mostly by Mongols or Sinkiang Province, where Turks have been predominant, and Tibet. To provide what the Communists call a special status for the minority peoples in these areas they created the so-called autonomous areas. Accordingly there are now the Inner Mongolian autonomous area, the Sinkiang autonomous area, and Tibet autonomous areas. Yunnan Province, which is the southwest province of China, has a large category of minority peoples such as Burmese, Thai, Laotians. For these they have created certain autonomous areas within the province. Each of the autonomous---
Mr. Murphy. And Kwangsi.
Mr. Jacobson. Yes, Kwangsi has a large number of mountain tribes and has been designated an autonomous area to provide what the Chinese Communists regard as special consideration for these minority peoples.
Mr. Murphy. Wasn't it from Kwangsi that they started the long march?
Mr. Jacobson. That is Kiangsi, which is farther east. Kwangsi was a province—

Mr. Murphy. I said Kwangsi. What is the province between Kwangsi and Yunnan?

Mr. Jacobson. Kwangsi and Yunnan are adjoining provinces.

Mr. Murphy. Wasn’t the long march started from there?

Mr. Jacobson. It started in Kiangsi. This is the area where the long march started. Kwangsi is this province here. The long march went like this and up—

Mr. Murphy. It went to East Tibet and then went north.

Mr. Bundy. Yes. Just to exhibit some knowledge in this area, I had an interesting discussion in Taipei in my recent visit on the nature of the campaign of Kiangsi—which drove the Communists out and started the long march. The Republic of China people saw considerable similarity of the Kiangsi campaign to the campaign in Vietnam.

They had done a military analysis of it when I was there.

Mr. Murphy. Wasn’t it at that time that Mao Tse-tung became the real leader, after he advocated the breakthrough and then moved westwardly?

Mr. Jacobson. That is right. Mao Tse-tung built safe-haven areas in Kiangsi Province while the orthodox Communist Party leaders were working in Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and other cities, trying to organize the proletariat. The latter were driven out of the cities in the early thirties. These included Liu Shao-ch’i and Chou En-lai who fled to join Mao. The Nationalists then launched a series of campaigns, referred to already by Mr. Bundy and drove the Communists out of Kiangsi. When they moved out through here—

Mr. Murphy. They surrounded them, didn’t they?

Mr. Jacobson. They carried out five anti-Communist campaigns.

Mr. Murphy. I understand Mao Tse-tung differed with the other leaders. They wanted to stand up to the national army and Mao did not and the Communists were defeated. They were surrounded in Kiangsi and they had to break out.

Mr. Jacobson. I think that the real difference at this point was the question as to whether they should move up to an area where they would be adjacent to Soviet territory so they could get Soviet assistance or whether they should stay clearly within the China area.

Mao Tse-tung advocated the latter. The Communist leaders had a very hot session here at Tsun-yi in Kweichow Province and in which Mao Tse-tung’s view won out. That was 1935 and he has been the dominant figure in the movement since that time. There were in fact two of these debates that you refer to, Mr. Murphy, between Mao and the orthodox group. One was in the twenties when Mao advocated moving to the rural area and organizing the peasants while the Comintern-oriented leadership insisted that the Communists concentrate their efforts on organizing the proletariat in the cities. Mao was dismissed three times from the Politburo during this period. The second debate was the conflict which was resolved in Mao’s favor and which resulted in the establishing the center of activities in and around Yenan rather than adjacent to the Soviet.

Mr. Murphy. Was Stalin in contact with both the Nationalists and the Communists?
Mr. Bundy. At the close of the war, Congressman, is that the period you are speaking of?

Mr. Murphy. What I am trying to determine is, as I understand it, the Communists took their orders from Moscow. When Mao started moving south, Stalin wanted him to withdraw and go north. He disregarded his orders from Moscow and proceeded south, and Mao pushed the Nationalists off the mainland to Taiwan.

Mr. Bundy. My belief would be that he, in fact, was not under Moscow's control during any part of this period.

Mr. Murphy. Any part?

Mr. Bundy. Mr. Jacobson seems to agree.

Mr. Jacobson. This is one of the sources of the present differences between Peiping and Moscow. Mao feels that every time there has been a crucial disagreement between him and the Comintern his position proved to be right, and Moscow's position on each occasion was wrong.

In the postwar period Moscow did not believe, Stalin did not believe, that the Chinese Communists were sufficiently strong, sufficiently well organized, or well equipped to win the war. But the Communists did win. Moscow was taken by surprise in 1949; they were unprepared for the victory of the Communists on the mainland.

Mr. Murphy. When did Chiang Kai-shek break with Moscow?

Mr. Jacobson. Do you have reference to the 1927 break?

Mr. Bundy. They did make the Sino-Soviet Treaty which was a treaty with Chiang, in 1945. So there was that form of contact, but it was a decided rivalry relationship. They reached this treaty which was subsequently abrogated on both sides.

Mr. Murphy. What is Ho Chi Minh's status now? Is he really the leader of North Vietnam, or is he merely a figurehead and do the Chinese Communists run the show in Hanoi?

Mr. Bundy. Congressman, this is a very interesting question. [Security deletion] Ho Chi Minh plays a leading part in putting his name on pronouncements. He does on occasion, we all know, receive visitors and the pronouncements he makes have the ring of authority. One can see in his pronouncements on ideological matters a tendency to play a middle ground, not to go in the direction of what is generally considered the pro-Chinese group identified with Le Duan, the secretary of the Lao Dong Communist Party, and not, on the other hand, to be clearly identified with what is sometimes said to be the Moscow wing, identified with Pham Van Dong and General Giap.

Historically it is supposed his own sympathies would run somewhat more to Moscow. It is believed he had some unpleasant experiences during his stay in China, which may contribute to feelings in that regard.

What I am saying is that we really don't know the answer. There is some evidence to suggest that his role of true leadership has declined and he is used as a figurehead, and as an important symbol of the removal of the French and all the other factors as the leading, well-known figure throughout Vietnam, which is the case.

Therefore, he must be kept at all costs. Whether he is in fact an individual power in the decisionmaking is a matter for speculation.
Mr. Murphy. The question first came up at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin episode, the question of whether he was in power or not. I believe that was the first time that question was raised.

Mr. Bundy. I think there have been periods when it was not clear that he was in evidence a great deal. This has led to speculation. But he invariably has been seen and seen in prominent roles after that. I wouldn't read too much into that.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you.

Mr. Zablocki. Governor Thomson.

Mr. Thomson. Mr. Bundy, the other day we saw a film that was produced by an Australian writer of scenes in China. Many of them were parades and celebrations, but they showed scenes of the marketplace where the shelves were lined and filled with produce of apparently a wide variety, people pretty well dressed, the streets were clean, children were clean and happy, smiling, and you would get the impression from that that the Chinese were pretty well off, almost prospering.

We had a report which was statistical, based on their agricultural production and the slide back from the great leap forward, and you would get the impression from that that China was at a subsistence level, that while there wasn't malnutrition, there wasn't any great surplus or excess.

Maybe the statistics are the most accurate. Maybe these pictures were more or less propaganda. But in your opinion, is there any critical shortage in China that would weaken them in the event of a military adventure?

Mr. Bundy. Governor, on that I would say the statistics are nearly as reliable as we can get them. I think that is now reasonably reliable.

As to the film, I haven't seen it, but I would surmise that the lady in question, like all foreigners who visit Communist China, was shown areas where the most favorable things could be exhibited. As to whether the food situation would be critical in the event of a military adventure, I would certainly think they would have grave difficulties in some areas.

If you had disruptions in the military situation, distribution would probably break down and you would probably have very serious problems. These would be a serious inhibiting factor in certain types of military action.

I think one has to reconcile always, as was the case in Korea, certainly, and as has been the case whenever they have deployed military force and, as was the case in the period of real food shortage, 1960 to 1962, that the military forces and the political apparatus would receive an overriding priority, so that the actual inhibiting effect on military actions would not be very great.

You could have disruption within the country and over time that might have an effect, and it might be serious. In terms of what they would get to their forces, I think they could probably continue to do the job [security deletion].

Mr. Thomson. Could I turn to an irrelevant subject here? Perhaps it shouldn't be on the record.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Thomson. Thank you very much.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. With reference to the film that the subcommittee saw, I ought to point out that the episodes were filmed in October and November, in the fall, when the harvest is plentiful which might in part account for bountiful markets.

You may also recall that Miss Roper said that they had some difficulty filming some of the slums; however, she did get an opportunity to photograph some of the poorer areas.

Although the films were mostly candid shots, they were nearly all in Peiping and Shanghai where most foreigners are allowed to travel. Therefore, it was quite evident she filmed only what she was able to see or what they permitted her to see which were the better areas of China.

Isn't it true that the severe shortages are usually in early months of the year, from February through May?

Mr. BUNDY. That is true in China as in many other countries with that kind of crop cycle. I don't mean to suggest that the picture is one of destitution and misery in the country, but I think it is, as Governor Thomson describes, one basically of a subsistence level and one with no margin. That means certain areas, and particularly in the spring of the year, suffer hardship at least on a local basis.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I think one point that Miss Roper, tried in my opinion, to bring to our attention, is that people are people all over the world, and the people of Red China, as distinguished from the regime, are basically friendly to the people of the United States. She thinks we should not take the same attitude toward them as we would toward Mao Tse-tung and the other leaders of the regime.

Mr. BUNDY. I think that is basic, Mr. Chairman. I think we would all subscribe to it. [Security deletion.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. BUNDY. Congressman, I think one can say with assurance that the present leadership, the present solid group of leaders is so imbued with the very doctrinaire Communist view and strong sense of what they have accomplished that as long as they are on the scene it will not be changed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does that include the present leadership of China as we know it? For example, the other day [security deletion] we had before us a chart of 15 or 20 of the top leadership of Communist China. It was said that there was very little hope that in this group of men, their views would moderate or change.

Mr. BUNDY. I think it would include that group taken as a whole. I can't say that there are not perhaps one or two exceptions, but taken as a group, that is the conclusion you would reach.

As to what would happen in the future, we have little information on the underlying and subjective attitudes of the men who might be called the second generation. I myself believe that after Mao passes from the scene the leadership will in the first instance be drawn from his generation, and then it may drop down 5 years or so to men who also adhere to the same ideas, what one might call the one and a half generation, and then it will depend on the surviving individuals.
Not for a decade or so perhaps are you likely to see a true second generation of leaders.

What the attitudes of those leaders will be we have very little evidence to go on at this time. It may be a mistake to think of this beyond the initial negative conclusion that the present generation will not change in its views. It may be much more a matter of objective circumstances that will in time bring about a change, rather than the age levels of the leaders.

That really is what happened in the case of Soviet Russia, where, I think, there is no doubt that Stalin's successors, many of them at least, were at least as dedicated to the most doctrinaire and extreme Communist views as Stalin himself. There was a long struggle for power, of course, in 2 or 3 years after Stalin left. What emerged I think was that men who might have been themselves just as doctrinaire were faced with a set of circumstances, and were at least not so totally prejudiced that they were unprepared to adapt to those circumstances.

It is that kind of thing that might happen in the end in Communist China. I think it would be a bold man who would predict when, and really the short answer to your question is that we don't have any clear evidence on the attitudes of this second generation that must inevitably come into power at some point.

There is a perfectly reasonable thesis that they will be more obdurate, having been more ignorant over a longer period and so on. On the other hand, the Soviet experience would at least suggest by reason of their being somewhat younger that they might be more amenable to what they would call objective circumstances that would change them; i.e., possibilities and needs and demands for economic progress at home, and hopefully diminished opportunities for expansion overseas.

If one could bring about those two, then you might see change.

Mr. Hamilton, I would like to go back to Mr. Murphy's question if I may, with regard to the influence of Peiping on Hanoi.

You have a statement in your speech that what is now happening in Vietnam is basically the result of Hanoi's own ambitions and efforts. I am not sure how to interpret your remarks that you made a few minutes earlier. Do you think now [security deletion] that Peiping's influence is increasing, or is your judgment one of just not being sure at this point?

Mr. Bundy. I was not in my earlier remarks referring to the relative influence of Peiping and Moscow, except to say there is a rather clear hypothesis that certain individuals are more inclined in the hard Peiping direction, as opposed to others who are more inclined in a possibly more moderate and Moscow-oriented direction.

As of today I would say that Soviet influence has grown considerably in the last 18 months. [Security deletion.]

I would say, if I had to guess, that Peiping probably has somewhat the greater influence, that Le Duan was probably the most powerful individual in realistic power terms. In the last analysis, I believe, neither Peiping nor Moscow is in a position to dictate to Hanoi; Hanoi is capable of making ultimate decisions on its own.

Mr. Hamilton, I have the feeling in reading your speech and in the Secretary's remarks yesterday that there is a kind of frustration in try-
ing to break through in contacts to China. That is, we have tried many things unsuccessfully. I am speaking now with reference to your remarks about bilateral private contacts. Do we have a real frustration as to how we get through to these people, how we reach them?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think so. I certainly wouldn't describe my own emotion as one of frustration. It is a fact. It is a fact that they don't want contacts at the present time on any significant scale.

I must say that even if such contacts were to take place on a much extended scale, I think our influence would be quite limited for a substantial period of time. Nevertheless, I think it is important to keep open the possibility and to make clear to them that it is they, not we, who are barring the way for contacts. Frankly, I think there are certain groups in their society, scientists would be one, who, by the nature of their professions and from what one can gather from the occasional criticisms of these groups by the regime, are less ideologically inclined and more independent in their thought. This would be natural for intellectuals. Over time these might be really useful.

I think the impact of contacts probably would not be great in any circumstances for some time to come. This fact doesn't suggest, however, that it isn't worth leaving the possibility open for this.

Mr. Hamilton. Finally, Mr. Chairman, if you would, I would like you to comment on your view of the militancy or aggressiveness of Communist China. Specifically with regard to Vietnam. What would it take on our part to get them into the battle in substantial numbers?

Mr. Bundy. I think they have almost said themselves to third countries that they would be very sensitive indeed to any attack on China's own territory. I think one can assume they would respond quite drastically to that.

I would believe myself that they would be extremely sensitive if they came to the belief that our actions against North Vietnam were in fact aimed at toppling the regime or conquering the country. That is a subjective judgment on their part.

It depends on a total picture of what our actions amount to in their minds. It has to do with the kind of actions we take, the pace of those actions, with the relationship of these actions to a valid military objective in relation to the struggle within South Vietnam—the cutting off of supplies, and other related matters. All of these things are constantly being judged by them.

Mr. Hamilton. Thank you.

Mr. Zablocki. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. Bolton. I am interested in so much of what you have said, Mr. Bundy. I won't let my questions jump around too much, but going back over our history with the Communists, it seems to me that it has been very evident that whenever we have stood firm on anything the Communists have retired, beginning way back in Azerbaijan, and you have a clear history of that.

The Chinese are supposed to have quite a few troops on their southern border, on the edges of it. But that is a long way from their
food supply. It is several hundred miles, isn’t it? How do they work this?

Mr. Bundy. It would be that distance from their major sources, but one comes up again with what it is to supply a military force which is a very small fraction of the Chinese people. I wouldn’t reckon they would have impassable difficulties in supplying forces with food.

Mrs. Bolton. The food might be something that they would take off the country, anyway.

What about the equipment and all that? It is a long way. Have they railroads coming down there? What are their supply routes?

Mr. Bundy. At the present time they do not have a good north-south railroad system running to the borders of Laos and North Vietnam. They have the rail line running into Hanoi from the northeast. This has been interdicted, and could be interdicted to the point that they would have difficulty in using the railroads. They have however, an extensive road system, although most of it is primitive.

Of course, they have demonstrated in Korea a capacity to move by simply men carrying loads. All told, Mrs. Bolton, on a theoretical military analysis one would reckon they could still support very formidable forces. I am not enough of a military expert, but I think you have had testimony from others who are. The Chinese Communists could support a very considerable number of divisions in a theoretical attack. This would, however, be a very difficult situation from a military standpoint. [Security deletion.]

Mrs. Bolton. In all probability they are not too eager to come to military grips with us in any way?

Mr. Bundy. I don’t think they are, Mrs. Bolton. I think their own behavior right along really has indicated that they are very cautious in approaching the prospect of any confrontation of this type and scale.

Mrs. Bolton. It would seem that way to me. Though I find I am disagreed with a good many times. Then in the matter of the whole Chinese prospect, as well as humanity, I don’t know whether you have ever seen Stoddard’s “Decline of the West”?

Mr. Bundy. I have seen it—

Mrs. Bolton. When you were a child?

Mr. Bundy. In the family bookshelves, but I have never read it.

Mrs. Bolton. I have read it several times, that and several other things, that the different races have an opportunity to see what they can do in the world, and as far as we are concerned, we haven’t done too well.

We haven’t been but a few hundred years really in any place of power, of influence, and we haven’t influenced very well. We seem to have had nothing but trouble with us, with all the other nations.

If China is going to have her turn again—she has had it years back—if she is going to have the opportunity, it might give strength to the feeling of the Chinese, “We can wait.” They are in no hurry ever. They wait until they can watch us, and they see where we are weak, and then they don’t run into us where we think we might stand up, and perhaps they are really gaining on us all the time.

Mr. Bundy. That is an interesting thesis, Mrs. Bolton. The book I have read most recently with a comparable scope to the one you
cite is a book with exactly the opposite title called "The Rise of the West," by Professor McNeil at Chicago.

I commend it to you as a fascinating book, whether one agrees with all its conclusions or not.

Mrs. Bolton. Or whether you do with Stoddard.

Mr. Bundy. McNeil's conclusion is that, although the era of Western political control, of colonial control, if you will, of wide areas of the world is clearly at an end, the influence of the West in the whole realm of technology and all that goes with it, which is a vast cultural influence, is still on the rise, and likely to continue to be for considerable period of time.

I myself feel that the China that emerges over the next generation or two is bound in any event for technological reasons alone to be a very different China than the China of the past.

Certain differences and ways of looking at things will, of course, persist, but it will change a lot.

I wouldn't sell the Western influence short for one moment, looking ahead for a very long period of time. All of us would see things that we could do to make our own society a great deal better. We can see things with which we are unhappy in our own system. We work on these. But to suppose that we are not going to have enormous influence in the areas of the world, and indirectly, regardless of the present degree of contact, on Communist China; that, I think, is quite erroneous.

Mrs. Bolton. Perhaps there are a good many people who are troubled over the fact that, "yes, we have had tremendous progress in all material things, but what about our morals? What about our standard of living?" What does that mean to our young?"

Of course, for myself, I am rather proud of the young people. I think those who make all the noise are perhaps still in the minority and that the others are magnificent because they have to meet many real temptations we never dreamed of and they have to meet them every day.

If we can take hold of that and get some of the strength, moral strength, I think that then we would be—we would have a strength that would be absolutely invincible no matter what the Communists say or do. We don't seem to be going in that direction.

Mr. Bundy. This is a difficult one to judge. Like you, I feel there is tremendous vitality in our young people. As I count my nephews and nieces in distant quarters of the world speaking more languages than I ever came close to when I was in college, I think we might be much more on the rise than we give ourselves credit for in our critical moments. There is a great deal to be concerned about.

Mrs. Bolton. They say if we only would have this inner strength which is greater than any other when it is really put to the test.

I want to ask you something else. One hears still the Diem situation, and one begins to hear "If only Diem were still here," that he did better things there than anybody else and how foolish we were to get him out. Is there any reality to anything of that kind?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mrs. Bolton. It is good to have you say that. Very interesting.

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mrs. Bolton. We helped it along, too.
Mr. Thomson. Would the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. Bolton. Yes.

Mr. Thomson. Did you talk to General Harkins on that September trip?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Thomson. General Harkins told us in his opinion they could win the war with Diem in power and as far as he knew there was no one in the wings or seen anywhere that would be as effective as Diem.

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Thomson. Why did we go so far? You said we were more or less passive, that we stood aside. The truth is, is it not, that our Government told a certain group in Saigon, namely the generals, that if they succeeded in the coup we would support them?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Thomson. Was anything more needed?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. What role did the Hilsman message play in the fall of Diem?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. Is that the cause for the generals to come and ask us what our position would be if they took over?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Thomson. What was that date?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. In the eight changes of government, how often was a similar question asked of us; that is, if somebody else took over, what would we do?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. You just returned from there. Was there any question in the minds of some of those other than the inner circle with Prime Minister Ky, who have asked a similar question at the present time?

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. We are taking up your time, Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. Bolton. I think I am quite through.

Mr. Zablocki. Before we continue with further questions, I would like to ask Mr. Murphy if he would like to move to have the memorandum of the Committee of One Million and its publication concerning the National Republic of China inserted in the record on the date that we heard former Assistant Secretary Robertson.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a pamphlet that is issued by the Committee of One Million. It is an anti-Communist—

Mr. Zablocki. Do you want that as part of the record, if you so move it and ask unanimous consent?

Mr. Murphy. I ask unanimous consent it be included in the record.

Mr. Zablocki. If there is no objection, it will be inserted at the point where former Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson testified.

(The memorandum referred to appears on pp. 431-445.)

Mr. Murphy. At that point.

Mr. Zablocki. If there is no objection we will insert in the record the views of Dr. Edward Teller, a resolution on China adopted by the General Board of Christian Social Concern of the Methodist Church,
the views and a report by Mrs Anna Chennault, and others who may later request that their views by placed in the record. Without objection it will be so ordered.

(The statement referred to may be found in the appendix.)

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Bundy, I know our hearing is on China, and we don't want to prolong it too long. However, you have been recently in certain countries in the Far East area. Just this noon I met with several Japanese parliamentarians, Mr. Ishida and Mr. Nakasone, members of the Japanese Parliament. They were not in the same group but both posed this question: In view of the fact that the United States has had a number—over 120—discussions with Red China in Warsaw and prior to that in Geneva——

Mr. Bundy. 129.

Mr. Zablocki (continuing). They wanted to know what would be the view of the United States if the Japanese had informal dialog or embassy contacts with Red China similar to the United States Warsaw contacts? Did you have that question posed to you?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know if we have had it posed to us directly, Mr. Chairman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. They further stated that there is growing pressure within Japan for Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations and recognition.

Mr. Bundy. I think that is true. I would not say at the present time it is growing at anything like the rate it seemed to be a year or two ago. The pressure seems to be under control. I think there has been a contributing factor or two there, that trade has grown [security deletion], but the Government has held the line against Government financing. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. They are very sensitive about the lack of appreciation of their difficulty, their inability to make a contribution in Vietnam and to the extent that they are contributing we are not fully recognizing or giving them credit.

They have medical teams, engineers, noncombatant——

Mr. Murphy. Is that Japanese?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. How can they help us in Vietnam?

Mr. Zablocki. It would be a political problem.

Mr. Murphy. According to their constitution.

Mr. Bundy. I don't think they can send military forces under the constitution. As a matter of very deep-seated feelings in Japanese policy, irrespective of their attitude, I think they simply are not now in a mood to send forces [security deletion] things of that sort.

Mrs. Bolton. How about medical?

Mr. Bundy. They could and are doing medical. They have contributed significant amounts of economic aid and technicians. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. I realize the problem. They are sensitive, that they would not want too much publicity in their own country and yet want an understanding on our part that they are doing something.

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. In no small way he played a significant part in that.

Mr. Bundy. [Security deletion.]

Mr. Zablocki. What can you tell us about the Baguio Conference?
I was at Clark Air Force Base, and saw one Ambassador after the other coming through on their way to Baguio. I offered to carry Ambassador Sullivan's bag. I would have liked to have participated in those meetings.

Mr. Bundy. We will have to give that one thought. It was a working meeting. We worked three evenings in a row.

Mr. Zablocki. I am not questioning the fact that it was a working meeting.

Mr. Bundy. It was a raw discussion with overwhelming emphasis on the regional factors. We submitted papers on the individual countries and let that stand on the briefs and then talked on from there.

Ambassador Lodge talked at length on Vietnam. Admiral Sharp was there to talk on the whole military situation. We talked about some problems that will come to the committee in due course in the foreign aid bill, and so on. Ambassador Thompson was there because we reached a point where it is useful to get the full expedition of the Soviet toward these problems.

We had observers from India and Pakistan. While none of us think they come into the power equation in the short term, they are part of the total picture of what Communist China is doing and other nations are doing about it. We had certain conclusions that I think may interest the committee.

The general feeling I would say was that things in the area were considerably healthier than last year, that our firmness in Vietnam was perhaps the leading cause, but quite frankly the developments in Indonesia were not a too distant second. [Security deletion.]

These ambassadors all know it is going to take a long time irrespective of whether Vietnam was settled now or next year—which it is unlikely to be—that we have a long-term problem of getting these nations to the point where they stand sufficiently on their own feet. [Security deletion.]

At any rate the whole building up of a structure that will have enough viability, enough appeal to the people, the enlisting of the whole basic nationalist urge, which some of your witnesses have spoken of, all of this is a long job and requires our military presence and help for a long time to come.

It doesn't mean vast outlays of money, trade policies, and things of that sort. In one way or another we are just involved in this picture. It couldn't be otherwise, I think. There is this recurrent fear that we may not be with it to stay. [Security deletion.]

This is a fear, that something we might take as simply an expression here of personal opinion, reverberates. I need not refer to any individuals in that connection. The fact is that whenever it is said it has a far higher play out there and a more disruptive effect than a real student of our policies would assign in terms of its weight here.

That is a very major point that emerged in the conclusions of the ambassadors, Mr. Chairman. I reported it as the closest thing you could get on a regional consensus affecting our policy. When you hear people say we are being so firm in Asia we can afford to take additional steps of a very demonstrative nature on this Pacific problem of a Communist China, you do not get away from damage
to their confidence in you and all that goes with it, which in some cases is political stability, which is the capacity to get on with their own problems.

The big change from a year ago is that whereas there was real doubt that we were firm even in the short term, there is that confidence now by and large pretty universally. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ZABLOKCI. You have a great man in Ambassador Porter.

Mr. BUNDY. I agree with you on that, Mr. Chairman. [Security deletion.]

Mr. ZABLOKCI. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, you are always most informative.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
A. STATEMENT OF MRS. ANNA CHENNAULT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

My name is Mrs. Anna Chennault. I am the widow of Lt. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault who led the Flying Tigers and the U.S. 14th Air Force in the Pacific Theater during World War II. I am a citizen of the United States. For the last 20 years I have worked as a journalist, writer, and lecturer. I am president of the Gen. Claire Lee Chennault Foundation. The purpose of this foundation is to help Asian students from the free nations to have a better understanding and knowledge of America. I am also the president of the Chinese Refugee Relief, a private organization formed with the approval of the late President Kennedy to help Chinese refugees escaping from Red China.

At the end of the Second World War my late husband, General Chennault, returned to China to form a commercial airline to help war-torn China establish much-needed air communication to carry out projects of relief and rehabilitation. I worked closely with my husband in Asia until his death in 1958. The airline, Civil Air Transport, which he organized is still operating in the Far East and southeast Asia and I keep up my connections with many of the free Asian countries and their peoples.

Although my home and office are in Washington, I am required to take trips to Asia to keep myself informed. I have, only last month, returned from a trip to the Far East and southeast Asia. It was my third trip in the last 12 months. Within that period I have visited Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Nationalist China, Japan, and other countries, and have interviewed directly the heads of states of Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Korea.

At the invitation of Chairman Zablocki, I offer this report to the committee on the situation in Asia as a whole as I see it and the problems and challenges for every American to face today and tomorrow. The sacrifices we make today, we make for the safety of our children's tomorrow.

The tomorrow of the free world is being determined in Asia today. What my husband vainly predicted 10 years ago is now recognized everywhere—we will never be through putting out brush fires on the periphery until we have brought under control the central fire in China. Our real trouble is not in Hanoi and Haiphong, but in Peking. During my tours in the Far East and southeast Asia I had the impression that Red China is not only threatening all Asia with a physical hydrogen bomb, but also with a spiritual bomb—a racial conflict and an anti-American atmosphere. She is laboring mightily to create an "Asia for the Asian" attitude. Its proliferation and manipulation creates riots, demonstrations, strikes, murder, fear, and suspicion. Red China's tactic is to isolate the advanced countries by brutal terrorist conquest of underdeveloped areas, while holding America away from defending these countries by unreasoning fear of touching off our bombs until China's own are ready.

Until this last year, we have watched almost mesmerized while Chinese Communist imperialism—a Chinese energy where we threw away a once Chinese friend—spread its influence throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

What the Western alliance seriously needs at this critical time is a practical policy for dealing with the Red Chinese in a period of great transition in world affairs. What is most impressive about the so-called great debate we have been treated to lately is that the music goes around and around and comes out nowhere. There is a cry to communicate while admittedly there is no way to communicate—not even an available language. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the Communist Chinese always hang up the phone. There is a cry to negotiate unconditionally without answering the practical questions—with whom, when, where, and over what? There is a pacifistic urge to throw ourselves on the mercy of the Chinese Communists to be decent like us in some indefinite future. At the
same time every knowledgeable expert admits that for the practical future the
domestic political needs of the Chinese Communists, not only of Mao's generation
but their successors, require the threat of war by the West as a cement to hold
their authoritarian regime together.

The practical answer is to keep friends believing we are their friends and make
them strong for their value as our friends, rather than pretend to hope to convert
enemies.

We must also remember that many nations in Asia right now are not ready for
our kind of democracy, our kind of participation in self-government. Self-deter-
mination of people can be practiced only in a land of plenty, and plenty depends
on order and security. The important thing for us to do is to have on our side
governments which with order and security can hold their nations together.

As I listen to the preachments of appeasing Communist China, I could only
think, with all respect to the purity of their motives, of Shelly's "ineffec-tual
angel fluttering in the void its luminous wings in vain." The men who know that
Vietnam is Munich and that yielding is Gotterdammerung are the practical men
with their feet on the ground.

The people in Asia today have to prefer first things first.
The first thing they need is order and protection to keep the Communist power
out.

The second thing they need is an increased production of food for a better
standard of living.
The third thing they need is education to be able to take advantage of tech-
nology to learn about the outside world and provide for democracy when they
are not racked by disease and lacking of energy because of malnutrition.

When they have accomplished certain knowledge of self-government we can
talk about freedom and democracy and about individual and political freedom
which presupposed all those first three essentials. With Red Chinese imperialism
rampant, frothing at the mouth and waving its new bomb, what all Asian coun-
tries need is not participation in a political party, but an effective and responsible
government which can protect the country from its enemies and maintain peace
and stabilization within so that the first things first can be achieved.

In a country like South Vietnam the urgent problems are nationalism and
livelihood, problems hard for us even to understand because we take them for
granted. Military victory and the security that comes from it is the foundation
of economical and political stability, out of which nationalism and livelihood can
rise. Our hesitation to use military power to achieve these minimum political
objectives at critical times is what has tolerated and even created the new Com-
munist power in Asia which we at last recognize.

I am always amazed at Americans demanding what we call democracy in
Vietnam as the price of our help on these fundamental needs in what has now
become the keystone of all Asia. I assume the sincerity of these democratic
demands at the same time I know that practically they are a form of aid and
comfort to the enemy.

The so-called intellectuals who put forward these demands are intellectuals
who somehow forgot to learn that democracy in the first instance has to be a
result of security even though later on democracy is a guarantee of security for
neighbors just as totalitarianism is the guarantee of insecurity for neighbors.
They forgot also that there is no such thing as democracy as we define it not only
in Asia but anywhere else in the world outside of Great Britain—not even in
dictated France. They forget also that even in the United States when our
security is threatened we have a practiced totalitarianism in the power we give
the President as Commander in Chief.

The one all important fact about all of Asia in the psychotic state of Chinese
communism today is the insecurity of everyone else.

Today South Vietnam is the proving ground on the one hand of the success of
the Communist desire for world domination and on the other of our capacity to
begin to bring to what is left of independence in Asia a military security upon
which our own future security is based.

As I have said the sacrifices we are making today are to purchase our own
tomorrows. For in a world in which you can reach Saigon by air in 1 day the
outcome of this struggle in Vietnam will decide the fate not only of Asia but of
the United States. Not without reason Red China regards the United States as
her chief enemy because as President Johnson said, we are guardians of the gate
because there is no one else. If once we withdrew from Asia all the non-Com-
munists would feel the impact, even Australia which by her participation in the
South Vietnam war clearly indicates the immediacy of her concern. Whether the Chinese Communist regime will succeed in its nuclear blackmail against the world every Asian knows depends on the effectiveness of the United States nuclear umbrellas over them. Even Asian neutralism is possible only so long as the United States and whatever allies we have are willing to bear a portion of the burden of the defense of Asian freedom.

To an Asian these simple truths are clear as crystal. For that reason the degree to which they will struggle in their own behalf is dependent upon their confidence that we see the truth as clearly as they see it. They know that there is no surer way to invite aggression than to succumb to philosophical discussion about unrealities. This is the way centuries ago the Christian world lost Constantinople.

The Asians understandably are puzzled by the kind of talk they hear in the American Congress and the kind of exhibitions they see on the American streets at the same time our fighting men are performing with such bravery and competence in war. If they could be sure which represents our true conviction we would be having an easier time in Asia today. From the possibly simple-minded Asian point of view, once in a war and once having taken on the stakes of prestige and moral position that the United States has taken on, there is nothing for us to do but win the war and do the talking afterwards. That they could understand.

To back up a firm purpose on our part in Asia there are great assets—assets that I have seen as I have traveled in my last three trips from Malaya to Korea. There is a passionate desire for freedom in Asian countries, a passionate desire that clearly understands that the United States is the only hope to establish a peaceful world to bring justice and freedom from now on. If they were once sure of assurance that we would stick it out and not leave those who have placed their trust in us to the mercy of the Communists if we withdraw—we would be surprised with the resoluteness of the willingness of these people to fight for themselves.

Let us not overlook how much of the gains that people will sacrifice for a last chance at freedom; 1 million refugees escaping from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, 4 million North Koreans fleeing to South Korea; 14,000 actual Red Chinese prisoners of war choosing to go to Taiwan; and 2 million forgotten Tibetans standing up against Red Chinese soldiers with bare hands. That is, we still have much hope in Asia if Asia dares to hope consistently in us. In a continent which technology passed by and which has never known peace since the colonial powers came to it 150 years ago it will take concrete achievement by the United States to capitalize on this hope.

As I have said before, freedom and democracy in a nation is essential for the security of its neighbors. In this world we are now all neighbors. It is in the interest of our own security—our own tomorrows—to see that the world is finally organized as a mutual respecting federation of free peoples rather than through the ruthless domination of master states enslaving others.

Considering also the resources of Asia it is critically important to the future security of our children that Asia develops our way rather than the Chinese Communist way. Not only our security but our affluence and our own standard of living depend upon the world's being organized on a peaceful basis. To the Chinese Communist with nothing to lose there is everything to gain in keeping Asia disorganized and on a war basis except on the terms of accepting Communist domination.

In this struggle for an organized peace there are battles we simply cannot avoid because they are thrust upon us. The more critical of these now is to prevent the Chinese Communists from organizing the rich and vast land mass of southeast Asia under their totalitarian whip and then turn their organized slave power against us and the other free people of the world as they did in mainland China. It is the geography of China that makes this unhappy land so desperately important to the future of Asia. China with its central position is undoubtedly the key to the Pacific. A China following the leadership of Chinese who understand and like America is a guarantee of the security of our tomorrows. But a China organized as it is today under the leadership of Communist Chinese who hate and envy America is the surest guarantee of the insecurity of our tomorrows.

THE ASIAN LEADERS

(By Anna Chennault)

During my recent trips to the Far East and southeast Asia it was my privilege to interview the four strongest and most progressive leaders of free Asia today—President Park of Korea; President Marcos of the Philippines; General Ky of
Vietnam; and President Chiang Kai-shek of free China. The first three are all young men in their early forties or even thirties; President Chiang Kai-shek has wisely provided the administrative training for men in the same age brackets who already hold important posts in the Taiwan Government.

All four men enjoy the help of beautiful, accomplished wives who have traveled and studied extensively in the West. These wives have in common a strong, articulate sense of social progress and of the need to preserve liberty by lifting the educational and living standards of the masses.

In spite of the geographical distances that separated their countries, all four of these leaders have similar backgrounds in experience. All have been soldiers at one time or other and as such have had to fight the subversive infiltration of communism within their own countries. All have a very realistic understanding of the dangers of Communist intrigue. All realize the persistence of Communist ambitions to ultimately enslave all Asia. All recognize that because of the Communist persistence there can be no letdown in the fight for freedom; no appeasement.

All four leaders told me the same thing. The No. 1 need of free Asia today is a united political front and solid core military effort of the free Asians for cooperative defense against Communist aggression. SEATO has not provided the strength and unity required. With its present membership SEATO is, at best, limited to being a sounding board and discussion table for divided viewpoints.

All four leaders frankly agreed that what is needed beyond SEATO is an organization similar to NATO that can make its unified power felt both throughout Asia and in the U.N.

Ironically, the chief obstacle to such an organization at the moment is not Communist influence but Western apathy. Such an organization would require strong Western support, both psychological encouragement and physical support. During the past 18 months, Taiwan has won through to its goal of solid economic security and self-support. In 1963, President Chiang Kai-shek was able to announce that no further direct economic aid would be required. This is the kind of improvement we like to encourage. But Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam will require extensive and understanding economic development and planning for some years. Help and advice will be particularly needed at the basic levels of land reform, creation of home industries and small farms, education, buildup of efficient government administration, and gradual suffrage for the masses and emancipation of women.

It is perhaps in the two latter categories that Western understanding is most needed. For centuries, these countries have been governed by feudal rule. In many areas, the masses are still impoverished to a point of bare survival. It will take time to build pools of young, modern administrators, and time to educate peasants to assume the responsibility of suffrage and effective self-government. It is going to take even more time to lift Asia's women out of acquiescence in the subservient semislave status they have accepted in the past. The attempt to democratize these areas cannot be expected to produce results overnight. It has taken the United States, starting from its base of political freedom in British ideas, 175 years to achieve its present state of progress and liberalism.

It is a sanitized thought for those who demand super-American democracy and political tolerance in these Asiatic nations to remember that there is nothing even approaching Anglo-Saxon political democracy anywhere else in the world including Europe. Nations which do not have such a base need encouragement and tolerance in their valiant attempt to establish free democracies in less than a generation. Above everything, they need understanding and encouragement in their most formidable fight, that of defending freedom against Communist enslavement.

The following suggestions were given by the Asian leaders and their peoples:
1. A more united front for all free Asian countries.
2. A more active participation for all free nations on the Vietnam war.
3. For a long-range program, a more concrete and economical program to make all these countries self-efficient.
4. A psychological warfare to make these people believe we are their friends and make them strong enough to be our friends.

1. President Chiang Kai-shek of China

The last time my late husband General Chennault met with President Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan I was with him. It was a cold night of 1958. My husband suffering from lung cancer had come to say goodby to his longtime friend. Presi-
dent Chiang said to my husband: "You must get well, we have work to do." Then he turned to me: "Now, you take good care of him. I look forward to seeing both of you when you return."

My husband died of cancer a few months later in the United States.

I have returned to Taipei to see President and Madame Chiang many times since General Chennault's death. I have seen Taiwan moving toward higher goals, and its success on land reform program.

Free China has learned its bitter lesson and she is now moving forward. For instance, Taiwan no longer requires foreign aid since 1965. The Taiwan economy is now secure and self-sustaining. Last year the country enjoyed a favorable trade balance of $36 million. Manufactures are flourishing, and private American capital is being invested in various enterprises opening new economic potential.

Recent events in the Far East and southeast Asia have proved Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to be the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the continent of Asia. Free China today under his leadership has progressed more than any other nations in Asia who faces Communist destruction.

President Chiang is the man who has been the leader of China for almost half a century. He has seen China in her finest hour, as she fought off the challenge of foreign conquest; he has seen her in her darkest hour, as mainland China passed into Communist rule. This towering figure of Chiang Kai-shek has moved out importantly into the world stage in 1936 after the Communist's managed Shan coup d'état when China's struggle for freedom merged with world events.

President Chiang's personality has been inseparable from the stirring events of our era. For the last 30 years before and after World War II this man has been a controversial figure, sometimes abused and misrepresented by his foes and their sympathizers and misunderstood by many of his own best wishers.

Madame Chiang has been her husband's inspiration ever since they were married in 1927.

She is a remarkable woman in our time and excellent speaker both in Chinese and English.

The ordeal was inevitable for a man whose vision was so far ahead of his time. Today, the free world appears to be catching up with him.

It is now generally recognized that President Chiang was the one soldier and statesman who as long ago as 1927 recognized the danger and objective of international communism, and took all possible measures to meet it. While the others were in the long trance of appeasement, he was never fooled.

We have seen this man against the backdrop of many situations and problems. We have seen him meet them with rare political, deep intuitive wisdom. He has been wrong, but history will record that he has been right oftener than his contemporaries.

President Chiang Kai-shek has said: "It is my earnest hope that the bitter lesson China has learned may prove instructive to countries and governments and especially those in Asia which now face the threat of communism."

It is on the is land of Taiwan that President Chiang has given his tacit pledge to return to the mainland of China. In view of the increasing Communist threat to the free world, the day may not be far away when a greater number of the Asiatic nations will begin to feel the need for collective security.

Chiang Kai-shek is truly a friend of the United States. The future promises a closer drawing together of free China and America.

II. PRESIDENT MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES

I met President Marcos at the Malacanang palace. And I asked him to tell me about his country and himself.

Ferdinand Edralin Marcos once told his public school teacher-mother that one day he would be the President of his nation, and at the age of 48, his destiny fulfilled, Marcos was elected as the sixth President of the Republic of the Philippines.

His state-of-the-nation message was the shortest ever made (53 minutes) by a Filipino President, and had a sober tone. The legislators, both nationalists and liberal, applauded him 12 times.

Looking fit in barong Tagalog, sitting in front of a desk fit for the President, Marcos looked at ease despite the loss of 13 pounds since winning the presidency.

In his address before the first regular session of the sixth Congress, President Marcos set forth six goals for his administration. He called them the grand design for greatness.

First is to strengthen the agricultural sector. Self-sufficiency in the production of food, especially rice, must be attained in the shortest possible time.
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA

Listed as No. 2 goal by the President is the rehabilitation of ailing essential industries. As remedies, he said the administration would ease credits, stabilize exchange rates, maintain adequate international reserves and extend tariff protection to domestic industries.

For his third objective, Mr. Marcos wanted a solid physical base to support planned and sustained economic growth. This would include the construction of better roads, bridges, better electric power, water service, etc. An educational system which could tap the potentials and vitality of human resources is his fourth goal.

He also mentioned the maximum protection to the workingman through labor law, and finally to raise the efficiency of public health services to a level which should meet the minimum requirements of their people.

When asked about Philippine's policy toward Vietnam, the President said, "We have a vital stake in the survival of the Republic of Vietnam, and we shall continue to assist that nation to the best of our ability. At the same time, we shall support any reasonable move for a negotiated peace in Vietnam."

On their relation with the United States, Mr. Marcos said: "We are convinced the United States would want nothing better than to see the Philippines prosper in dignity and freedom."

He also said that the situation in regard to American bases in the Philippines has improved through mutually agreed modifications of some of the terms of the military bases agreements, and that some points that remain to pose as irritants would be clarified or modified.

The field of foreign relations is not new to President Marcos. As senator, he took part in the treaty-ratifying functions of the Senate and participated in many foreign policy debates. He was a delegate to the U.N. General Assembly in 1954, 1961, and 1962.

President Marcos is married to Imelda Romualdez, a young beauty blessed with good looks, persuasive manner, and intelligence. I spent an hour talking to the Philippines' first lady at the presidential palace. I found her with an unassertive confidence, and great sense of humor. She is a warm and interesting person, and happily in love with her husband.

When they moved into their new home, the three Marcos children complained that they had moved too far away from their friends.

Those who recall with delight how young first ladies in other countries give an accent of culture even to social life in their capitals, and thus imparted a new dimension to the world of politics, look forward eagerly to the new regime in Malacanang, under young Mrs. Marcos, herself an artist, singer and scholar, so committed to the finer things in life. She is truly a great beauty of our time.

She came into the President's office while Marcos was talking to me. After greeting me she went over to her husband and helped him to straighten his collar. Their hands touched, they smiled to each other. In that brief moment, without words, one knew these two persons are deeply in love with each other. And now these two charming young people are working together to give the Philippines a much needed new dedication and hope.

III. PRESIDENT PARK OF KOREA

The winter snow had begun to melt along the Han River when I saw President Park at the Blue Palace.

Korea today is staunchly allied with the United States. It is in many ways the most admirable and encouraging of our Far Eastern allies.

President Park Chung Hee was born on September 30, 1917, in the North Kyungsang Province of Korea. He is the youngest of six children of a farm family. He and President Marcos of the Philippines are the same age, in fact, Marcos also was born in the month of September. They both graduated from college at the top of their class.

President Park's government has moved a long way since his victory in the Presidential election in 1963. He has taken three bold major steps to improve Korea's position and to make things easier for the United States:

1. The Korea-Japan Treaty in Tokyo on June 22, 1965, ending a long negotiation and normalizing the diplomatic relation between the two countries.

2. A 5-year program for Korea paying more attention to Korea's agricultural resources, embodying a realistic attitude toward the development of the Korean economy according to its pressing consumer needs. For years Korea has been struggling on an uphill road, a country cut off from the superior natural resources of Communist-conquered Northern Korea—a country living under an armistice,
not a peace; a country carrying the economic burden of the fifth largest army in the world. Such going has been slow and arduous, but Korea is moving upward. It has made substantial progress toward economic self-sufficiency. With this new 5-year plan it moves into a new phase.

3. South Korean troop contribution to South Vietnam: 20,000 Koreans to South Vietnam were the first solid response from any country to U.S. appeals for more flags in Vietnam. It was also the first time in the country's 4,000-year history that Korean troops have been voluntarily involved in operations overseas.

Critics of the Government wonder where it may lead, pointing out that Korea herself is still directly menaced by some 400,000 Communist troops north of the 38th parallel. However, the common reaction has been enthusiastic. As Prime Minister II Kwon Chung said to me: "We are proud to be in a position to give help instead of asking for it."

The departure of Korean troops for Vietnam also served to dramatize the similar interests of these two Communist-menaced countries that cannot fail to impress a traveler in the Far East.

In some ways, as the Koreans put it, the situations in Vietnam and Korea are similar. Both are divided countries. Both are subjected to intense pressures from the Communist north. But Korea has found its way to successful resistance; Vietnam is still trying.

As President Park had said to me: "We are certain that the support of the Korean people has contributed much to the morale of the South Vietnamese, for we suffer the same tragedy of south-north division."

"Freedom and peace are not given but won; aggression is not to be avoided but faced and challenged. It is for this reason we send our youth into the battlefields of Vietnam."

President Park's successful state visit to Germany in 1964 was followed by his visit to the United States in May 1965, and his visit to Southeast Asia and Free China in February 1966.

His right-hand man and good friend, II Kwon Chung, has been Prime Minister since 1964. Mrs. Park, a schoolteacher, is a charming lady who was his staunch supporter and stay during years of difficulty and is now his true lieutenant in his place of powers.

IV. GENERAL KY OF SOUTH VIETNAM

General Ky is one of the most charming young leaders I have ever met. You can't help but like him even if you are not entirely in agreement with him.

In May of this year, Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky will complete one year as Premier of South Vietnam. For Vietnam, that's quite a record. When Ky first took office, the general feeling was: "Let's see how long he will last." But Ky has survived with growing pains and all.

When I first met Ky at his office in Saigon he impressed me as an earnest and hard worker trying his best to do his job under the thunder of gun and the complexities of a new formed government. Only when we talked about aviation did he relax, and I believe he spoke the truth when he remarked to me: "I am a leader for my country at war; when peace should come, I want to go back to flying."

And flying he still enjoys, in fact I saw him arriving at work flying his private helicopter. Long before he became Premier, General Ky as air force chief had established himself as a major military figure important in Saigon's coup and politics. He learned fast, and in May 1965 when Dr. Phan Huy Quat's civilian cabinet collapsed, Ky was asked by Quat to take over. It was a peaceful transition of power since the death of President Diem and Ky with youthful Nguyen Van Thieu (42), Directory Chairman and Chief of State, have governed their broken country with firm hands.

Ky said to me: "We are at war, and at the same time try to start by eliminating political and social defects. We have much to do, to bring peace and justice to our people."

Today this impatient and ambitious young man has matured. With his dashing flair, mustached charm, and a touch of frankness, Ky has become a national hero much admired by the Vietnamese public who really need some kind of hero to pull the people together to win the war.

The Catholics and the Buddhist leaders are quieter now. I visited the powerful Buddhist leader, Thich Tri Quang, at his guarded and secluded temple which no outsider is able to locate. Without doubt, he will continue to be a key figure of Vietnam's future, having tackled the controversy of public life, the excitement of politics, he and his lieutenants will not be satisfied taking the back seats. The Catholic leader is Archbishop Nguyen Van Ben. My visit with him was
arranged by a Vietnamese woman professor. As Ky had said to the newsmen in Taiwan: "My job as Premier is a delicate matter, we try to keep things balanced."

As for Dr. Phan Huy Quat, a moderate, a scholar, and a physician—what is he doing now? His advice is sought by many, but he spends some of his time raising orchids. He said to me: "Maybe my idea of a democratic government is a bit too advanced for my people, but I hope in due time, with a firmer position of U.S. participation to bring peace to my country, with a more stabilized government, my people will engage my services again."

Ky's second wife Mai was an air hostess. They have five children. With long working hours, Ky laughingly said to me: "My wife complains we hardly get to see each other."

Ky declared to his people, "we are a government of the poor and the oppressed. We will continue our fight against oppression and poverty."

The night before I left Saigon, I was invited by Mr. Richard McCarthy, our USIA Deputy Director to Vietnam, to attend a meeting to hear some of the local talents. The following song was sung by Steve Addiss and Phan Duy, of Saigon. It's a sad song, and tells the story of the simple people in war.

"RAIN ON THE LEAVES"

"The rain on the leaves
Is the tears of joy of the girl
Whose boy returns from the war.

"The rain on the leaves
Is the bitter tears
When the mother hears her son is no more.

"The rain on the leaves
Is a heart's distress and
A loneliness life passes by.

"The rain on the leaves
Is a last caress and
A tenderness before a loved one dies."
B. STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS,

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific,
Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: Thank you for your suggestion to express my views concerning Chinese nuclear potentialities and the steps that we might take to meet the situation.

Security measures in the Communist countries are effective. Therefore, it is particularly hard to evaluate the technological situation in these countries and to predict the future course of their military preparedness. It is clear, however, that the Chinese are putting the greatest emphasis on scientific and technological developments and that they are most anxious to exploit these developments for the purpose of increasing their military power. It is my opinion that within the next 10 years, possibly even within the next 5 years, the Chinese will possess a considerable number of hydrogen bombs and that they also will have the means to deliver these explosives by rockets over a distance at least a couple of thousand miles with an accuracy of a few miles. My guess is not based on any detailed information but rather on an estimate of the difficulty of the job and the ability of the Chinese to put together an excellent technological team of a moderate size. While my statement is obviously not more than a guess, it would seem to me clearly necessary to be prepared for the possibility that this guess may turn out to be correct.

The consequences of the developments outlined in the previous paragraph would be the following:

(1) The Chinese could terrorize that part of Asia which lies south of their borders. In particular, they could bring enormous pressure to bear on the Free Chinese Republic.

(2) The Chinese could not threaten the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviets claim that they possess a missile defense and I believe that such missile defense is indeed feasible against a relatively unsophisticated missile force of moderate size such as the Chinese may possess in the next 10 or 20 years.

(3) The Chinese could blackmail any other country by threatening to use rockets on ships at sea. According to the present state of affairs the United States would not be immune from such a threat.

In a situation where our Allies and the uncommitted countries on the Asian Continent are in dire need of help, it is particularly disturbing to see a threat develop against which the Russians are immune but the United States is not. In this situation either the Chinese or the Russians are apt to profit and we together with the free world are practically certain to lose.

A second closely related worry is due to the fact that the Chinese nuclear explosions stimulate efforts in other countries to develop nuclear explosives. In part, such efforts will be induced by the feeling that defense against China is possible only by means of nuclear armament. In part, the Chinese success encourages work in less-developed countries by proving that a very high degree of technological development is not necessary in order to acquire nuclear explosives.

For all these reasons action by our Government is both necessary and urgent. One course of action would be to bomb the Chinese nuclear plants. This has been advocated by a great variety of people both in this country and abroad. It is remarkable that the advocates of this course include people of strongly differing political views. It happens to be my view that this course is mistaken.

The reasons are the following:

(1) Bombing of China would set a most dangerous precedent. In the not too distant future this precedent could be used by the Russians to justify similar actions such as wiping out French nuclear installations. To open another door for international violence is an act which we must avoid as long as any alternative remains to protect peace and to insure our survival.
(2) The demolition of Chinese installations would not be an effective measure. The Chinese could rebuild their plants in complete secrecy. Our action would thus buy no more than a few years of time. With a delay of maybe 3 or 4 years we would face the same danger as before and we shall be less aware of this danger than we are at the present moment.

(3) The anti-American propaganda in China as it exists today is based on a fabric of ridiculous falsehoods. These falsehoods are of course effectively spread by propaganda backed up with the power of a totalitarian state. The permanent effect on the minds of the people of such propaganda is however of doubtful long-lasting reason for hatred. In the course of decades we will have to come to an agreement with the Chinese people. The present psychological situation does not exclude, in my opinion, the possibility of such an agreement. An attack by the United States on China will, however, make it very much more difficult to resolve our differences in the long run.

All of these arguments could be brushed aside if bombing China would be the only possibility to stop the present dangerous trend. Fortunately, there are a number of other effective steps which we could take. These are the following:

(1) We could and should build a missile defense system to protect our country. In this manner we could wipe out an advantage that the Russians probably possess at the present moment. It is extremely hard to decide whether such missile defense will effectively protect us against a massive and sophisticated attack from Russia. It is very likely that this missile defense system will reduce the effect of a Chinese attack to tolerable proportions. Since our retaliation against China would be of a truly devastating nature in case we were to be attacked first, it seems quite clear that a missile defense system will essentially rid us of the impact of Chinese blackmail.

(2) It may well be necessary to extend missile defense to allied countries so as to protect them from Chinese missiles. Such protection would be in fact most helpful in unifying the free world. At the same time a difficult question arises due to the fact that missile defense requires defensive nuclear explosives which the defended country should be authorized to fire without delay. It seems possible, however, to install sophisticated but reliable equipment which will exclude the possibility of detonating these defensive missiles anywhere outside the national borders of the country which is to be defended. While a plan of this kind will meet with opposition, it seems to me much more easily justified on both moral and practical grounds than the preventive bombing of China. It is certainly more justified than a do-nothing attitude which may deliver the neighbors of China to domination by Mao Tse-tung or his successor.

(3) One might consider locating in the countries bordering on China appropriate tactical nuclear weapons for defense against massive armed attack. These weapons should be so equipped as to render them unusable outside the national boundaries of the country that is to be defended. Such a measure would obviate the independent development of nuclear explosives by the neighbors of China.

The fact that the detonation of such weapons would be a responsibility of the defensive forces sitting on their own territory would furnish very considerable guarantee against misuse of these weapons. Even so, it will be difficult to obtain agreement to proceed with such a plan.

(4) A measure that could be potentially effective and less difficult to introduce than the one mentioned under item (3) above would be a cooperative effort to supervise Communist moves from satellites. The brunt of the effort would have to be carried by the United States. However, other countries could play an important auxiliary role. The effort expended by each participant would help to tighten the bonds of cooperation which are likely to become significant in times of danger. Toned warning of danger will contribute to stability.

If we place the defensive phases of preparedness on a broad international basis we greatly increase the chances of united and effective resistance to Chinese aggression. Thus in the long run we may prevent aggression and bring about a situation which is right for negotiations leading to dependable agreement. The fact that agreement with the Chinese looks most unlikely at the present time should not diminish our efforts eventually to arrive at a stable solution. The time required may be no longer than 20 years. It seems, however, necessary to show firmness and unity if such an agreement is to become acceptable to the rules of China.
It is my opinion that the dangers presented by the Chinese developments are great. But if we respond to these dangers in a proper manner, the end result may be an earlier emergence of a world order which could guarantee peace and freedom.

Sincerely yours,

Edward Teller.

C. Resolution on China and the United Nations adopted by the General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church, Annual Meeting, Louisville, Ky., October 20, 1965

The General Board of Christian Social Concerns of the Methodist Church believes that the continued absence of the government of mainland China (People's Republic of China) from the councils of the United Nations and other international gatherings such as disarmament conferences presents a serious obstacle to the peaceful consideration and possible resolution of many important conflicts. If the United Nations is to be a truly worldwide organization to make progress in the field of disarmament, and to increase its effectiveness in achieving and maintaining peace, its membership and deliberations must include the government which controls the destiny of 700 million people and which is obviously one of the world's great powers.

Because we believe these considerations are of overriding importance, we urge the Government of the United States to withdraw its opposition to the seating of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China in the United Nations. At the same time, we believe the United Nations should seek to safeguard the security and provide for the self-determination of the people of Taiwan through some form of United Nations protection.

In proposing this course of action, we have no illusions that the problem of representation of China and Taiwan in the United Nations will be solved easily or quickly. However, the modification of the U.S. position on this matter that we propose should facilitate the consideration of constructive alternatives to the present impasse. We deplore the continued efforts of certain elements in the United States to obscure the facts respecting the situation in the Far East and prevent constructive discussion concerning U.S. policy.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID administration of $415 million, of which $275 million are intended for South Vietnam. Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings, as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in southeast Asia. For my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today we are facing another ordeal in southeast Asia which again is costing us both lives and treasure. South Vietnam is a long way from the United States and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand, and so far as possible agree, on our mission and purpose in that faraway land.

Why are we in Vietnam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply interwoven with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live. The situation we face in southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to discuss these problems with the committee this morning—to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the Government, or even to the Government itself. The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time. The President, his Cabinet colleagues and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this Nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Vietnam? They cannot be seen clearly in terms of southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.
This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Vietnam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term "Communist aggression." It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying crisis of this postwar period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world. Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into an international order that in its broad outlines is still with us today.

That charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to live their lives without fear of force and threat, and entitled to work out their disputes by peaceful means. But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a "world revolution," a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the charter of the United Nations. There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their "world revolution" and to its support through what they call wars of liberation.

So what we face in Vietnam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world. That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now. Like so many of our problems today the struggle in South Vietnam stems from the disruption of two world wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken the nations actively engaged in the fighting but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile, the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of a time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world. The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red Army.

To check this tide the United States provided the Marshall plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO. As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far East that had been formed out of colonial empires. The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor. Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem which they still face.

The first test in Asia came in Korea when the United Nations forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union. It stopped the Chinese Army that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean Peninsula.

We fought the Korean war, which like the struggle in Vietnam, occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overcoming one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.
Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan and through the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the Nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts: a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom of Laos, and Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the north and a non-Communist Vietnamese Government in the south.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the U.S. Government under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called northern tier of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad Pact which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization. The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

In order to give support to the nations of southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodied in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance, the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they so requested.

South Vietnam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Viet Minh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.”

Under Secretary Smith’s statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that “each party recognizes that an armed attack in the area of any member of this alliance would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Vietnam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated “to act to meet the common danger” without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this commitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee’s report states:

"The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions."

Following this committee’s recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer dissenting. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO Treaty has been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Vietnam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to
President Diem offering "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." In 1957, President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to "the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam" and stated:

"Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability."

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render."

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the U.S. declaration made at the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

These then are the commitments we have taken to protect South Vietnam as a part of protecting our own "peace and security." We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Vietnam has, under the language of the SEATO Treaty, been the victim of "aggression by means of armed attack."

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an "armed attack," cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communists have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called wars of national liberation to cloak their aggressions in ambiguity.

A war of national liberation, in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam is very clear. Let me review the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that in agreeing to the 1954 Accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The south seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese—so-called "Huepas," having seen the true face of communism—fled south after the 1954 Accords. The north moreover had concealed resources in the south. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists living with the Viet Minh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the south, to hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. Those efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful. Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime South Vietnam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Vietnam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Vietnam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion of South Vietnam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva Conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Vietnam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the south. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnaped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnaped 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,500 military and security personnel.
In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Vietnam—held its third party congress in Hanoi. That congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Vietnam. Three months thereafter, the national liberation front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in 1960 the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Vietnam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered to North at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Vietnam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The legal committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

"There is evidence to show that arms munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the objective of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the south.

"There is evidence that the PAVN, (i.e., the North Vietnamese Army) has allowed the zone in the north to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south."

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Vietnam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the south. In 1962, 15,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Vietnam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Vietnam.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of southerners who had gone north. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the south have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese Army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the south.

I have reviewed these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because, it seems to me, they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Vietnam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own involvement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Vietnam has arisen over a failure to understand the nature of the conflict.

For if the war in South Vietnam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Vietnam. But the evidence is overwhelming that it is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Vietnam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Vietnam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

These contentions seem to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the status quo. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly—as has been frequently pointed out—the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world, Moscow and Peiping, is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well; and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western Alliance. They have taken place
because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western Alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking—and the Communist states living under its shadow—must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept.

For unlike the Communists we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson’s initiatives at the Honolulu Conference—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

In meeting our commitments in South Vietnam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Vietnam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Vietnam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world.

It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement in South Vietnam or anywhere in southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Vietnam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Vietnam should have the right and the opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat.

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the south, peace would come in almost a matter of hours. When that occurred the people of North Vietnam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Vietnam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted—not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations—in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. We have heard the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless we accept their four points. Yet, the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Vietnam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva Conference or enlist the good offices of the Conference Cochairmen or take the problem to the United Nations or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations. Well, we have done all of these things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Vietnam, but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued.
We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted more than 37 days. And again with no response.

Certainly, we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of 14 points:

1. The Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome “negotiations without preconditions” as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi’s four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least $1 billion;
13. The President has said “The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don’t think that would be an insurmountable problem”;
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Vietnam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law. This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

Both Hanoi and Peiping have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi’s program, the words that they have used have differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the “sole basis” for negotiations, sometimes “the most correct basis.” But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for “recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity.” This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Vietnam, “in strict conformity with the Geneva agreements.”

The United States has made clear that we too are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accord by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Vietnam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these too we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.
The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the north and south that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

It is the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that "the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the national liberation front."

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the program of the national liberation front but to explore somewhat further the character of the front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the front itself. Both Hanoi and Peking have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the national liberation front as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the national liberation front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Vietnam is an indigenous revolt. The front is, as the facts make clear, an invention of the Communist Party of North Vietnam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the south.

As I have noted earlier, the front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1949, soon after North Vietnam's military leader, General Giap, announced: "The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country." The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the north or in the south. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Vietnam adhered to the front or to its policies. While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the front's indigenous origins by creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised Party members that "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam unified from north to south under the Central Executive Committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho * * *. During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose."

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role in the front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Vietcong committee for the south went even farther, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Vietnam."

In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the national liberation front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the national liberation front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of the people of South Vietnam since our acceptance of the front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settlement on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Vietnam into the control of the Communist north.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasoning attitude with regard to the front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points, 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group"—and that, of course, includes the front along with other groups.
To the extent that the front has any validity as a representative of a
group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the liberation front
should, as the President has said, not prove "an insurmountable problem."

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own
substantive position—that the front represents the hopes and aspirations of the
South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called
program of the national liberation front, as it was announced from Hanoi on
January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February
11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist
intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in
Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the govern­
ment in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to
which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend
to negotiate:

1. The South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;
2. Second, that the liberation front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted
   as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;
3. Third, that South Vietnam be put under the control of a coalition government
   formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government
   would be excluded.

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which
are at the heart of the problem and at the heart of U.S. policy in South Vietnam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed
   attack by North Vietnam against South Vietnam.
2. The United States has commitments to assist South Vietnam to repel this
   aggression.
3. Our commitments to South Vietnam were not taken in isolation but are a
   part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.
4. The issue in southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear
   that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.
5. No nation is more interested in peace in southeast Asia or elsewhere than is
   the United States. If the armed attack against South Vietnam is brought to an
   end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion,
or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace will be
   overlooked.