LEGISLATION ON THE INDOCHINA WAR

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Gallagher: The subcommittee will be in order.

I want to welcome you here this afternoon as the subcommittee continues its hearings into bills and resolutions relating to the war in Indochina. These hearings received a measure of fresh relevance by the action of the Senate yesterday in passing the first amendment for the withdrawal of all forces from Indochina, subject only to the prior release of all U.S. prisoners of war. The fact that that historic event occurred on the same day as the House of Representatives opened its first full-scale investigation into the Indochina war shows, in my judgment, that the Congress of the United States can no longer be regarded as a silent partner in foreign policy.

This, of course, does not mean that our subcommittee intends to vote out a withdrawal resolution tomorrow. I personally learned much from the testimony of my colleagues yesterday and, as I said in my opening statement then, we do want to hear all views about American policy in that troubled and tragic region of the world and take action on the matters before us.

The subcommittee’s first witness today to begin our second session in the subcommittee’s consideration on the approximately 70 bills and resolutions relating to the war in Indochina is Congressman John Dow. Mr. Dow is a Democrat of New York. Mr. Dow has long been critical of American policy toward Vietnam and is the author of H.R. 8955 which calls for an immediate cease-fire.

I want to apologize for delaying you yesterday, Congressman Dow. We are delighted to have you with us. You have been consistent in your opposition to the war in the past and we welcome you to the subcommittee this afternoon.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DOW, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for your postponement of my testimony until this time and I should like to say that you don’t owe me any apology whatsoever.

(45)
I think it is wonderful that you are having these hearings and I want to be among the first to make my humble contribution.

It is very heartening for those of us who took the early stand in opposition to the American involvement in Vietnam to enjoy this landmark opportunity of appearing before your distinguished Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Let me draw your attention to the bill, H.R. 8955, which I and 11 cosponsors have introduced. So far as I know, this is the only bill now before the House which calls for an immediate cease-fire—that is, within 48 hours—to be followed by an expeditious withdrawal of American forces from all of Southeast Asia.

Allow me to say a word about the advantage of establishing a cease-fire in advance of a withdrawal of troops. This course is one that is advocated by neutralist groups in Vietnam, such as the Unified Buddhist Church. Recent disclosures by the New York Times show very clearly that American leadership has held a consistently dim view of neutralist thinking in Vietnam. Since, however, most other thinking about Vietnam has proved to be illusory, perhaps now is a good time to examine neutralist views a little more closely.

As they see it, the special merit of a cease-fire as a prelude to withdrawal is the fact that it might be arranged to involve the Saigon regime as well as our own, and hopefully the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. Buddhist and other thinkers in Vietnam point out that the Saigon forces are fighting in a lackadaisical fashion because of their disenchantment with their role as a cat's-paw for the United States. This offers a golden opportunity to involve them in a cease-fire.

A cease-fire would leave all Vietnamese factions more nearly under the influence of public opinion in South Vietnam. Everyone knows that public opinion generally in South Vietnam desires an end to the fighting.

I cannot let an occasion such as this go by without reiterating the atrocious evils of America's involvement in Vietnam and also its shabby quality which is manifest in so many ways. One of the evils I refer to is the free-fire zones which are an admitted feature of our military policy. I cannot believe that any other nation in modern times has openly admitted and executed a policy of firing artillery at will into a populated countryside.

Our bombing from 60,000 feet has caused uncounted deaths of men, women and children who are not combatants. Our use of napalm fire, with burning too hideous to contemplate, must be condemned, especially when it is carried out by the representatives of a sophisticated civilization against innocent people who have barely emerged from a tribal society. The use of defoliants, too, burning not military stores but the granary crops of the civilian population, is still another violation of usage under the laws of war.

Then there are the minor shabbinesses that disgust those of us who believe in the nobility of American tradition. We note the conviction of military officials for corruption at the PX stores. Also, we note the report—and General Ridgway has mentioned this matter—the officers in Vietnam have a 50 percent ratio for earning valor medals whereas the lowly draftees in the jungle show a medal ratio of only 10 percent. We hear of soldiers broadcasting the military news, who
gave up their jobs because they wouldn't be party to perversion of facts. Finally, we now learn that something like a fifth of our men are addicted to drugs, the worst kind of drugs. Obviously this manifests their wish to escape from a war and a situation so thoroughly degrading to a nation such as ours and to themselves as human beings.

Finally, we should review the hypocrisy and self-delusion at the highest levels in our civilian and military leadership that led us into this frightful war and seems to be keeping us in it still. For example, I allude to the myth that we are fighting Communist aggression. History will never charge those Vietnamese who came from the north into South Vietnam in the early sixties—many of them were born in the south—with committing aggression, while at the same time saying our American forces coming 10,000 miles from home were not aggressors. All the fine print in the treaties cannot obscure the common justice and fairness that history will have to recognize.

Consider our rationalizations about the Geneva Conventions, the SEATO Treaty, and other supposed commitments that have been applied as justification for our incursions in Southeast Asia. It should be noted that the repeal by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution at the end of last year specifically set aside the invocation of the SEATO Treaty as a justification of our Vietnam involvement. Moreover, the SEATO Treaty, which was itself a contradiction to the intent of the Geneva Convention, did not require us to take any specific action. It was the woeful judgment of our leadership that caused us to take the wrongful actions that we did.

While I have castigated the evil and the shabbiness of our Vietnam performance, I would never for one moment degrade the courage and sacrifice by 45,000 American dead and 200,000 wounded American boys. They were true in all respects to the task laid before them. We can only hope that their sacrifice will have taught us better, so that we do not make the same mistake again. For the problem in Vietnam is the problem of a people spurred on in the revolution of rising expectations. They cannot be crushed or defeated. The struggle and the problem is the same in scores of other underdeveloped nations. We would be well advised to take the lesson of Vietnam to heart, so that we do not elsewhere repeat our hideous mistake again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Congressman Dow.

Congressman Dow, one thing has always interested me about the American response in Vietnam. No matter how inept or wrong spokesmen for various administrations have been in predicting military success, this sorry record is only equalled by the failure of opponents of the administrations to predict the response of the other side to any peace initiatives.

I therefore ask you, in your opinion, what should give us confidence now that no matter what we do or if we should now have a cease-fire or a resolution to withdraw at a date certain, what confidence do we find that the other side may find it interesting enough to do something on their part. Would they finally see the light at the end of the tunnel, or would they plug up that light yet again?

Mr. DOW. Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak for other peace advocates but I don't think I myself have ever asserted that the other side would offer a counterproposal or react in any agreeable fashion to our efforts to end the war. I think the position that I represent and probably some
others, is that we have made a terrible mistake here—we have done vast damage to Vietnam, we have injured our own economy in the most serious fashion, to say nothing of the cost and loss of life and that really we have to look at this as an error that must be corrected by ourselves.

I myself don't put much credence in negotiations. I would say that we owe it to the Vietnamese people whom we have beaten so badly, apparently so badly, and to our own people to get out under our own steam. To be frank with you, Mr. Chairman, it is a little bit shameful for me and for most of us. I think, to be watching this great Nation year after year, month after month, waiting for a tiny little group like Hanoi to drop a handkerchief or give us some sign or do something nice so that we can correct the course of our own destiny. It seems to me that this country is great enough to handle its own destiny, and when we are on the wrong path so far as we are concerned, for goodness sake let's change the path irrespective of what kind of reactions that little country over there might choose to apply.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I quite agree with you in the effect on our own country, and in what our own responsibilities are.

I asked that question because on page 2 you say, "This offers a golden opportunity to involve them in a cease-fire, and disclose the fact that Buddhist and other thinkers in Vietnam point out the lackadaisical fashion in which the war is conducted.

That, of course, was one of the primary objections to Mr. Diem. Have we not been involved with Buddhist factions and others in Saigon that they may be neutralist enough to find a political accommodation with the other side which also has a vital interest in South Vietnam? Of course we learned that did not happen. In fact, neutralist participation in the governments following Diem did not create the balance required for national support. I just wonder whether or not we have learned any lessons at all.

Mr. Dow. It is very clear, Mr. Chairman, at least in these New York Times revelations and several other places, they say that our top officials talking among themselves said we must avoid neutralist connections and accepting neutralist views because this only leads us down into the hands of the Communists. That is about what they said. So we have doubtless been a party, you might say, to the arm's length treatment of Buddhist thinking, neutralist thinking in South Vietnam, and it is pretty hard for us now to recapture that connection if we would like to. I sincerely hope we can.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would hope that we could recapture that, if it ever really existed. Of course, that was the obvious and paramount thinking in the decisions to no longer support Mr. Diem. We decided to involve Buddhist thinking which was proved more resentful of the government, which was part of the positive effect with regards to the escalation of the U.S. commitment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. WOLFF.

Mr. GALLAGHER, Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. I have no questions of Mr. Dow, although I'm very happy to see him here. He has opposed our participation in the war and perhaps the latest revelations that have come from the Times lend great credibility to the incredibility that existed prior to this time.
Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Wolff.
Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Mailliard.
Mr. Mailliard. No questions.
Mr. Gallagher. Mr. du Pont.
Mr. du Pont. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your interest in getting us disengaged in Vietnam. I refer to H.R. 8955 which I presume you want us to report out and take action on. One of the things that concerns me here is that the legislation would seem to eliminate all U.S. military aid to all the countries listed. I wonder why you oppose military aid, for example.

Mr. Dow. Well, I feel myself that part of our great mistake in Vietnam was becoming involved militarily in that part of the world. Whoever possesses that part of the world is in no position to do us any damage and we are in a part of the world where, as I said in my statement, the revolution of rising expectations is occurring in every nation, and for that reason I think that we should keep out of it and let them evolve their own evolution or revolution or whatever it is they want.

By our providing military aid or military presence there we tend to align ourselves with the status quo and try to sit on the lid. That is our big trouble, we are trying to sit on a lid here all over Southeast Asia when there is a tremendous hydrostatic pressure building up from the grassroots that just puts us in competition. So why should we want to have military aid provided for those countries? It is inconceivable to me. I think it is an extension of America's role as a world policeman far beyond what is called for as a matter of our needs.

Mr. du Pont. I can understand your inclusion of Thailand, for example, inclusion in terms of the military operations that are being conducted from the air bases in Thailand against South Vietnam—but are you suggesting that we should not give military aid quite aside from the Vietnam conflict to any nation? Would this extend to nations in South America, in Europe, and in the Middle East that want our assistance to repel aggression from the outside?

Mr. Dow. Well, I think that every case is different, Mr. du Pont. One of our troubles in this foreign policy generally and in Vietnam is that we make generalizations that we intend to do this and we intend to do that. I think every case is different. Now in the case of Southeast Asia we have this situation: That we have got a ring of bases around China. Starting with our big base in Thailand we have one at Cam Ranh Bay, we have them in Taiwan, we have them in Korea, we have them in Japan, we have them in the Philippines—a ring of bases around China.

And it seems to me that it is inevitable that as China develops that we are going to have trouble with her because she is going to want to shake off this iron chain. To me the advantage of our having those bases is not worth the incitement of enmity in China that it creates, and if we ever have a confrontation it will not be so much because China is aggressive as because they want to shake off what they think is around their neck and amongst those chains I include the air base in Thailand.

Mr. Wolff. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. du Pont. Let me make one comment and I will yield.
I think that I worry about your legislation because of the broad scope, and I don't think I agree with you that military aid exclusive of the Vietnam problem should be abandoned all over the world. I
think it is very important—maybe we disagree again here—that the United States not have ad hoc foreign policy, that we have a rational thread that runs through our foreign policy to all nations.

I appreciate your comments and your testimony.

Mr. Wolff, I thank the gentleman.

I just read from a statement of the permanent mission in Thailand to the United Nations, the release issued on May 7, 1970, "Thailand did not ask the United States to send its Armed Forces to be on our territory."

This should be part of the record, the fact that Thailand did not request the assistance of the United States but we requested them to accept our forces.

Mr. de Pont. Would the gentleman yield in turn?

Mr. Wolff, Yes.

Mr. de Pont, Mr. Wolff, I think what you say is correct but I think it puts a gloss on the situation that is not quite accurate. In regard to bases in Thailand for operations in Vietnam, large air bases, I think you are correct. But Thailand has requested other military support under the MAP program consistently and we supply it.

Mr. Wolff, I agree with the gentleman so far as I support the assistance to Thailand. However, just for the purpose of the record I felt it was important to indicate, I think, that this is a statement made directly by the Times issue and it indicates, I think, that although they ask the question, assistance in the form of military procurement assistance, they did not request any people be sent there.

Mr. Gallagher. You may respond to that, Mr. Dow, although I am not sure it has anything to do with your testimony.

Mr. Dow. In a sense I think it reinforces the point I was making and I thank my colleague from New York for those kind words. I think that any military bases that we have in that part of the world are a liability; they are like a thorn in the Asiatic body politic that will continue to fester until they are cleaned out, and it seems to me an utter futility for us to be involved in that part of the world in a military way.

Mr. Gallagher. Have you not left out one base in Pakistan, a dandy little military presence which has contributed so much to humanity?

Thank you.

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gallagher. Just a minute, sir.

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I could not be here to listen to the witness that gave testimony so I am not in a position to question the points he raised. However, I do want to compliment my very able and distinguished colleague from New York on his testimony and I am sure he made very valuable contributions to the dialog.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Halpern. I realize that you have sentiments perhaps not exactly like mine in detail but you are known as one who has raised serious questions about the war which I believe is helping us to speedily arrive at a peace, and I want to thank you for your part in that effort.

Mr. Halpern. Thank you.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you very much, Mr. Dow; we appreciate it.
Our next witness is a colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman John Buchanan, a Republican of Alabama. Congressman Buchanan has been an eloquent spokesman for his constituents since he came to the Congress in 1964 and has been a valued member of our committee.

You are regarded very highly by us all. I understand you have no prepared statement, Mr. Buchanan, so if you will give your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BUCHANAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly hope that the performance lives up to your very gracious billing.

Since I have no prepared statement, for which I apologize to the subcommittee, I would appreciate your permission to revise and extend my remarks.

Mr. Gallagher. Yes.

Mr. Buchanan. First, Mr. Chairman, I would commend you and the members of the subcommittee for your pursuit of this subject, the holding of these hearings and your consideration of the resolutions which are before you. It was my privilege to serve on your subcommittee for some 4 years and, as a member of the full committee, it has been my privilege to listen concerning Southeast Asia, to make a couple of trips to Vietnam, to come in contact with many officials of that country in both the legislative and executive branches, and I appreciate very much this opportunity to make an input into your hearing.

Mr. Chairman, there appear to be a good many people who take it for granted at this point in history that the involvement of the United States in Vietnam and perhaps even Southeast Asia is immoral and wrong. Much has been made of a poll which allegedly shows that some 71 percent of all Americans now consider our involvement in Vietnam militarily to be a mistake.

That same poll reveals some other things which have not been emphasized and which modify somewhat even what that poll showed to be the American attitude. But there was a poll taken at the same time which I would ask permission to be included in the record at this point. A Princeton poll. I have in my hand a news report concerning it and the report itself which showed somewhat different attitudes on the part of the American people than those revealed by the Gallup poll, to which much reference has been made in connection with the American people's attitude on this subject.

This poll shows 72 percent of the people "support President Nixon in his plan to end the war in Southeast Asia" and some other things. I would ask unanimous consent to include this poll in the record at this point.

Mr. Gallagher. Without objection.

(The poll follows.)
PULL-OUT POLL MISLEADING

The recent highly publicized and widely misinterpreted national opinion poll—showing that 73 percent of all Americans wanted a Congressional vote to bring home all U.S. troops from Vietnam before the end of this year—turns out to be false in its implications and grossly misleading.

The belief that the American people want out of Vietnam by December 31, 1971, regardless of consequences, is a myth. This is clearly shown in the attached report of a national survey taken May 1-2.

Here are some of the results of that survey:
1. By an overwhelming margin of 72 percent to 18 percent, the American people "support President Nixon in his plan to end the war in Southeast Asia."
2. Support for the proposed Congressional plan for pulling out all U.S. troops by December 31 almost evaporates—when the American people are confronted with the possible consequences such as jeopardy to our POW's or a Communist take-over.
3. Well over half the American people oppose a December 31, 1971 deadline for withdrawal, if that withdrawal means a Communist take-over of South Vietnam.
4. By almost seven to one, Americans oppose any year-end withdrawal that threatens the lives or safety of American prisoners of war.
5. The earlier poll is misleading and has been grossly misinterpreted, because, while the American people will support almost any plan that promises an end to the war—they clearly will support no plan that either endangers our prisoners, or threatens a Communist take-over.

DO THE PEOPLE REALLY FAVOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM?

The Public seems willing to endorse any plan that promises to bring all U.S. troops home from Vietnam soon—but not if it endangers our POW's or threatens a Communist take-over, according to the latest survey conducted by Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, N.J.

Seventy two percent of the public say they support President Nixon in his plan to end the war in Southeast Asia, compared to 18% who do not support his plan and 10% who have no opinion. At the same time, 68% of those polled would approve their Congressman voting for a proposal requiring the U.S. Government to bring home all U.S. troops before the end of this year; 20% opposed this move and 12% have no opinion.

However, when various possible consequences of quick withdrawal are tested, the public is against withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the end of 1971 if it means a Communist take-over of South Vietnam. When asked if they would favor withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the end of the year if it meant a Communist take-over of South Vietnam, 31% said no, 20% said yes, and 16% had no opinion.

Eleven percent of those polled would favor such withdrawal and 14% had no opinion.

The results of this survey were obtained by nationwide telephone interviews conducted among 1,026 persons age 18 and over during the period May 1 and 2. Following are the actual questions asked and their results:
1. "Do you support President Nixon in his plan to end the war in Southeast Asia?"
   - Yes ___________________________________________ 72
   - No ___________________________________________ 18
   - No opinion _____________________________________ 10

2. "A proposal has been made in Congress to require the U.S. Government to bring home all U.S. troops before the end of this year. Would you like to have your Congressman vote for or against this proposal?"
Yes ____________________________________________________________ 68
No ___________________________________________________________________ 29
No opinion____________________________________________________________ 12

3. "Would you favor withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the end of 1971 even if it
meant a Communist takeover of South Vietnam?"
Yes ____________________________________________________________ 29
No ___________________________________________________________________ 55
No opinion____________________________________________________________ 18

4. "Would you favor withdrawal of all United States troops by the end of
1971 even if it threatened the lives or safety of United States POW's held by
North Vietnam?"
Yes ____________________________________________________________ 11
No ___________________________________________________________________ 75
No opinion____________________________________________________________ 14

Mr. BUCHANAN. It may be that those who had responsibility for
the decisions that were made which led us into a rather massive mili-
tary involvement in Southeast Asia, which was the case when the
present administration came into office—it may be those decisions
were in error, but, in my judgment, if this is the case, they were
mistakes made in good faith by men seeking to do right by this country
and its people.

Perhaps the domino theory is invalid and incorrect. Perhaps there
could have been the turnaround in Indonesia, the protection of some
hope for freedom and self-determination in the rest of Southeast Asia.
Perhaps such governments as the Republic of Korea and the Republic
of China could have stood firm whether or not we involved ourselves
in Vietnam. But if these judgments concerning the accuracy of the
domino theory were involved, they were at least made in good faith
by men who love this country and were trying to follow the right
policies in my judgment.

I think before we judge too much about the morality of our involve-
ment we ought to take a little look at the nature of the Communist
forces in Indochina and I would recommend highly to the subcommit-
tee the books of Dr. Tom Dooley, a very distinguished Navy doctor
and later Catholic self-styled medical missionary in that part of the
world and some of his testimony concerning the nature of the Com-
munist forces in Indochina, the absolute brutality and inhumanity of
their methods.

I recall a single incident of a school in which the teacher made a
remark critical of the Communists and a short while later they were
visited by Communist forces. The teacher's tongue was pulled out by
a pair of piers and then severed from his body. One of the students
was chosen at random and a sharp implement, I think a chopstick,
was driven through one ear and out the other as an example to the
rest of the students of what happens to people who listen to remarks
that are critical of the Communists.

I think the subcommittee might consider what happened at Hue in
1968 in the massacre of some 5,000 people when the Communist forces
thought they had taken over that city for good. I would call to the
attention of the subcommittee the testimony of one of the Government
experts in the Defense Department, Douglas Pike, and his estimation
of the number of people who would now lose their lives should the
Communists take over South Vietnam. He estimated some 3 million.
In the example of Hue, first the people who had opposed the Com-
munist forces were put to death and then, in typical Communist
fashion some larger groups were, by classification exterminated. These were people who would not fit in with the new revolutionary society. And then finally witnesses were put to death in the hope that the story would not be told.
I would ask unanimous consent for his article to be included in the record at this point.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection.
(The article follows:)

[From the Congressional Record, May 21, 1970]

VC WOULD LIQUIDATE 3 MILLION IF IT WON, U. S. EXPERT CONTENDS

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

SAIGON, May 14.—One of the U. S. government's leading experts on the Vietcong has written a paper predicting that "if the Communists win decisively in South Vietnam, all political opposition, actual or potential would be systematically eliminated."

The author of the paper is Douglas Pike, who has written two books on the Vietnamese Communists and is now a United States Information Service officer in Tokyo. He wrote "The Vietcong Strategy of Terror," a 125-page monograph earlier this year. The U. S. mission here plans to release it soon.

Pike's work seems to be a rejoinder to those who have mocked suggestions that the Communists would wipe out thousands of their opponents if they took over South Vietnam. Pike says that if the Communists win the war here decisively ("and the key word is decisively," he writes), the result will be "a night of the long knives" to wipe out all conceivable dissidents—perhaps 3 million persons.

Pike contends the massacre would go on in secret, after all foreigners had been expelled from Vietnam. "The world would call it peace," Pike writes.

He cites a list of 13 categories of citizens who would be murdered, saying such a list of categories is often found in captured documents. Pike notes a statement by Col. Tran Van Duc, one of the highest-ranking Communists ever to defect to the Saigon regime, that "there are 3 million South Vietnamese on the blood debt list."

Pike's predictions are the most dramatic aspect of his paper. Most of it is devoted to an analysis of the Vietcong's present and past uses of terror. A major section analyzes the 1968 Massacres at Hue.

"It would not be worth while nor is it the purpose of this monograph to produce a word picture of Vietnamese Communists as fiendish fanatics with blood dripping from their hands," Pike writes. Rather, he says, he wants to describe how the Vietcong use and justify terror as a crucial part of their war strategy.

"If there still be any at this late date who regard them as friendly agrarian reformers," Pike writes, "nothing here (in his paper) could possibly change that view."

Current Vietcong doctrine, Pike contends, calls for terror for three purposes: to diminish the allies' forces, to maintain or boost Communist morale, and to scare and disorient the populace. He says the enemy seems to be moving more and more toward a terrorist strategy as part of a new kind of protracted war.

(Official government terrorist statistics show a sharp increase in kidnappings, assassinations and other terrorism in recent months.)

In central Vietnam, Pike writes, Vietcong units are given terrorist quotas to fulfill. As an example, he cites intelligence information that special Vietcong squads in parts of two provinces were told to "annihilate" 277 persons during the first half of 1968.

In the most detailed analysis of the killings at Hue yet published, Pike writes that "despite contrary appearances, virtually no Communist killing was due to rage, frustration or panic during the Communist withdrawal" from Hue, which the Vietcong held for 24 days in February 1968.

"Such explanations are often heard," Pike continues, "but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, to trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable in the Communist mind."
According to Pike's analysis of the Hue massacres, the Communists changed their minds twice after seizing the city on Jan. 31. At first, Pike writes—he claims, captured documents show this—the Vietcong expected to hold Hue for just seven days.

During that first phase, Pike says, the Vietcong purposefully executed "key individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus..." After they held on more than seven days, Pike's theory continues, the Communists decided they would be able to stay in Hue indefinitely. Prisoners, rat-tellers, and intercepted messages at the time confirm this, according to Pike.

In this euphoric mood, he writes, the Communists set out to reconstruct Hue society, eliminating not just specific individuals, but whole categories of citizens whose existence would hinder creation of a new revolutionary society. Perhaps 2,000 of the estimated 5,800 persons killed at Hue were slain during this second phase, Pike suggested.

Eventually, Pike continues, the battle turned against the Communists in Hue, and they realized they would have to abandon the city. This realization led to phase three, Pike writes: "elimination of witnesses." The entire underground Vietcong structure in Hue had probably revealed itself by this time, and now had to protect itself by eliminating many who could later turn them in to government authorities, Pike theorizes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. However immoral or moral our role may have been in this situation, I think it is inescapable that the forces with which we are confronted are forces marked by an inhumanity and a barbarity that to the American people would have to be most repugnant. I would point out that if one can challenge whether or not North Vietnam is guilty of aggression against South Vietnam, it would seem quite clear in Cambodia and Laos that there has been definite Communist aggression from North Vietnam.

Whether or not, however, our judgments were right in years past, whether or not America should have become involved at all in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, whether or not we should have had massive American troop involvement, whether they should have followed limited war, no-win, rather than MacArthur-like all-out, military policies aimed at military victory—whether these things should have taken place at this point become in my judgment secondary questions. When this administration came into power we were involved in Southeast Asia. We did, in fact, have over a half million soldiers there. We were committed to certain policies and there were already many thousands of casualties. The problem then became how honorably, rationally, can we extract ourselves from the situation in which as a matter of historic fact—historic fact for which the present administration had no responsibility whatsoever—we were already immersed. How shall we withdraw ourselves from this situation and arrive at a condition of normalcy and of peace?

Now, I say this not in a partisan way. I would commend this subcommittee for its historic bipartisan position and thus far the bipartisan stand it has taken on this question during the present administration. I want only to say as a matter of fact that this administration had responsibility only for what has happened since early 1969, and at that point we were already deeply involved.

Now, what has happened since then? President Nixon has indicated we are moving from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation as a basic foreign policy thrust. He has a few months after he came into office come forward with what has come to be called the Nixon doctrine in which he has said we will seek to avoid involve-
ment such as in Korea and Vietnam, American combat involvement in Asia.

He has said we will seek in the future to lower our profile while providing a nuclear umbrella and military and economic assistance where we have commitments or where we consider nations vital to our own security. We will seek to avoid combat involvement and substitute economic and military assistance for this in the future. We will lower our profile and become a partner in Asia and not a dominating force.

In Vietnam he has implemented his plan of Vietnamization and phased withdrawal. One can get conflicting reports about how Vietnamization is going but I have one in my hand from June 14, 1971, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense which I assume has been sent to the offices of all Members but which I would ask unanimous consent to be included in the record at this point which paints a picture of success of the Vietnamization program.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection.

(The report follows:)

**Progress in Vietnamization**

There are three distinct phases to Vietnamization:

The first phase consists of turning over to South Vietnam the ground combat responsibility against VC/NVA forces. Completion of Phase I is expected by this summer, although American ground combat forces will remain in a security role to protect US forces as Phase II progresses.

The second phase consists of developing within South Vietnam the air, naval, artillery, logistics and other support capabilities necessary to maintain effective independent security. Phase II has been in process concurrently with Phase I, but it will take longer to complete because of the complex training involved.

The third phase will consist of reducing the American presence to a military advisory mission, together with whatever small security forces are needed to protect this mission. Further reductions of our assistance and advisory presence will then continue, under the Nixon Doctrine, as South Vietnam continues to grow in national strength and self-reliance, until no more US military presence is required.

**Vietnamization is contributing to the continuing development of the nation**

Military operations have contributed to increased security in the countryside.

Results of security are visible in two ways:

1. Increased GVN presence in the countryside.
2. Improvements in the life of the people.

Military activities continue to be Vietnamized:

- Majority of US ground units have been withdrawn or have entirely vacated approximately 75% of the operational areas in which they were originally deployed.
- Major US fixed base facilities have been turned over to RVNAF by May 1971.
- Attack sorties by USAF in SVN decreased 46% between 1st Qtr CY 69 and 1st Qtr CY 71.
- VNADF attack sorties increased 65% during same period.
- Currently, 55% reduction in overall troop strength: 549,000 to 247,200.
- 66% reduction in overall US troop strength as of 1 Dec 71.

**Pacification programs continue during Vietnamization**

Regional Forces have increased 48% since June 1968 and have relieved ARVN for combat duties.

Popular Forces increased 71% since June 1968:

- Organized and trained by platoons under operational control of village chiefs.
- Over 85% of platoons now fully trained, equipped with modern radios and armed with M-16 rifles. Platoons will be recycled through training phase as all are completed.
Over 50% of all PF engagements with enemy units are now at night. Large Peoples Self Defense Force being formed for village/hamlet security. Ultimately, over 25% of nation’s population will be in PSDF.

National Police being expanded for two roles:
- Pacification (Field Forces, Special Police, Marine Police)
- National Development (Uniformed Police) now over 70,000 in June 1968 to 114,067 May 1971.

Uniformed Police now assigned to 75% of all villages. Bulk of police increases in 1971 will be at village and hamlet levels.

All of above military and paramilitary measures contribute to visibility of GVN presence in the countryside and provide security for other activities which improve the environment in the countryside.

Increased security provides impetus for greater national development

Local government activity continues to increase at lower levels.

Special administrative training has been provided to over 40,000 village officials.

Approximately 75% of the 267,500 acres of land redistributed to the people during the past two years has been turned over during the past 12 months.

Industrial production index, after dropping 30% in 1968 because of Tet, has rebounded to 15% above the pre-Tet figure.

Increases in farm products grown and marketed.

New rice strains provide 150% increased yields (5 metric tons/hectare compared to 2 of locals).

Net increase last season was 132,000 metric tons above previous season. Estimate for this season is for net increase of 900,000 MT.

Over 500,000 acres now planted with new rice compared with 304,000 last season and 110,000 in 1969.

Upgraded and more secure lines of communications aid both military operations and economic growth

2,472 miles of the 3,684 mile National and inter-Provincial highway system is being upgraded. 87% complete.

25,000 meters of bridging being restored or repaired. 60% complete.

Of the total road network of 12,500 miles, 72.4% is secure.

74.5% of all waterways and canals are secure.

Security of railway system has increased from 27% to 64% since July 1969.

(approximately 58% of railroads are secure)

Health facilities (civilian sector)

Approximately:
- 1,800 physicians
- 230 dentists

Equates to approximately one physician (Vietnamese) for each ten thousand people.

Over 20,000,000 immunizations (smallpox, cholera and plague) were given during past year. (20% increase from previous year.)

Clinical laboratories now available in 44 provinces.

Medical training for Vietnamese (in-country) should provide 25% increase in output of graduates within two years.

191 physicians and 33 dentists graduated from the University of Saigon medical training in 1970.

1,400 military medical personnel have been released from the Armed Forces for use in the Civil Sector.

Education for all school age children is now a foreseeable goal

Over 2,500,000 school age children now enrolled in schools. (85% of estimated total.)

Enrollment in secondary schools increased 22% during past school year. Number of secondary school teachers increased 20%.

Over 45,000 students now enrolled in the five Universities and five Normal schools.
Mr. Buchanan. Now before this administration came into power, what the Vietnamese people had already achieved was remarkable, accurately measured, in the creation of a republic in which the government is based upon a constitution drafted by representatives of the people and ratified by the people which establishes a tripartite system of government providing for elected legislative and executive branches and an independent judiciary, which they now have.

If we are to properly measure what they have been able to accomplish in the many elections that have been held on the local level despite the Communist atrocities which have been repeated and repeated, if we are to properly evaluate what they have done in their economic reforms and land reform, we must look at this history of Vietnam as very much a subject people for so long. We must look at the inexperience in self-government and the lack of leadership left by the French there. We must also look, I think, at America in the 1780's and not in the 1970's, and compare in this way where they stand.

In light of this, I think it is a remarkable achievement already that this republic has made in the beginning, the infancy, at best, the adolescence, of a government that is at least somewhere democratic and at least is not as totalitarian or as oppressive as that of any Communist government in the world, including that in North Vietnam.

If, in fact, the President is committed—and I think that the DOD report and other reports make it clear that we are committed—to a clear policy of withdrawal, one that is already well underway; more than half the force is gone now, many more forces will be gone by the year's end, and all eventually will be scheduled to be removed. This administration has a phased withdrawal policy, and in light of this fact and of the Nixon doctrine and of the new effort of this administration toward the achievement of an era of negotiation, I would respectfully advise the committee to take great caution in reporting out any of the bills which have been offered or any action which you may take.

Now, were there no withdrawal policy in progress, were there no hope within Vietnam for the self-determination which alone the President has prescribed as a condition of peace, were the situation unchanged, perhaps some action would be in order by this committee. Mr. Chairman, I would very simply make this word of advice to the committee. In a recent issue of Psychology Today, the cover article, the cover title, had these words: "Don't just do something," Buddha said, "stand there."

"Don't just do something," Buddha said, "stand there."

Mr. Chairman, there are people in the Congress and out of it, clamoring for some dramatic action by the Congress, but I would point out that the one person most decisive toward leading us to peace is the President, and he has a plan, and it is in progress, and it is working. I would therefore say to this committee, I would hope you would resist the temptation to do something, anything, to indicate your concern which I know you feel, your desire for our getting out of this situation which we have found ourselves in, which I am sure is there.

I would strongly urge that perhaps the policy which might best bring the generation of peace which the President seeks, which this committee might take, is to follow the historic bipartisan policy of our committee, and to take no action which might threaten what is now being done, indeed to resist the temptation simply to do something
and rather to stand there—stand in support of the President who is seeking to lead us to peace, stand in support of the policies that are working, and take no action which might threaten or hamper or limit those policies.

So, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of balancing the record, and I apologize for the time I have taken, I strongly urge this great committee, showing the wisdom of the American people which placed the members of this distinguished subcommittee in the Congress in the first place, to simply stand there in support of an administration which is giving leadership that is worthy to be followed.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Buchanan, especially on that last paragraph.

I want to thank you for making a fine presentation and highlighting many of the points that must be remembered in any consideration of the tragedy in which we are involved. It is always well to be reminded that most people castigate only the American position.

Congressman, the statement which you improvised certainly shows why you are such a successful and respected member of the clergy. Therefore, I would direct my questions to you somewhat along those lines. They relate to your theological knowledge and to the knowledge of the attitude of your own people, your constituents. They refer to the basic morality of what the United States has tried to do in Indochina, indeed in many parts of the world. Whether or not Vietnam has been a total American failure, history of course will decide that.

We are interested in the present and how to get out. Do you see a continuing role of what we have traditionally called the American moral influence in foreign affairs or has that been washed out, in your opinion, in the need to protect the American interests?

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Chairman, in the first place I think the world is more critical of us than perhaps of the Soviet Union or many other countries because the world expects more of us than from any other nation, and I have heard this in talks with Asians and other people from around the world. I think many people have been concerned for many reasons about our policies in Vietnam but I think the world recognizes that in essence we have sought no territory, we have sought no colonial empire, we are not trying really to dominate other peoples. That charge has been raised but it is on its face, I think, invalid.

What we have cared about historically in the Marshall plan in Europe involving ourselves in Europe in World War II and before and what we have cared about in Asia is freedom and self-determination for other peoples. We have been guilty of benign hypocrisy in my judgment in these and in other actions we have taken in explaining things in terms of our national interest when our real interest as a people has been in helping other people to be free or to know a better way of life.

I think as one of our foreign visitors once said, “America is great because she is good.” I think that this is still recognized in many places in the world and it is still true of our Nation. In Vietnam itself may I say, Mr. Chairman, all war is ugly and evil and immoral and wrong and I would not challenge that statement but it is a complex and not a simple moral choice where one believes he has a commitment to a weaker neighbor which neighbor is attacked by an aggressive force
which may injure or destroy that neighbor where we have the force 
and the power to come to his assistance.

In our judgment and belief we have a commitment to do so. Even 
though I may have no right to defend myself against an attack as a 
Christian I have, perhaps, as many Christians have believed through­
out Christian history, an obligation where my neighbor or his helpless 
child is attacked to come to their defense. And given this difference it 
is a complex moral question.

So if our involvement is in fact immoral and wrong, it is that all 
war are immoral and wrong. But perhaps the judgment has been too 
quickly made that when we have come as we believe, to fulfill a com­
mmitment and have come to the rescue of a helpless neighbor that in our 
judgment is being attacked by a very vicious force, that this is in 
its immorality rather than moral and responsible and right.

Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. Broomfield. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join with you and 
commend our colleague. He is a great Member of the House with 
dedication and sincerity—this cannot be questioned.

During the questions and in the course of the last few days on the 
floor there have been many suggestions about how best to get out of 
Vietnam. Some have advocated that if we get out right away our 
prisoners of war will be released automatically from North Vietnam. 
How do you feel about that? Do you trust the Communists?

Mr. Buchanan. The Communists, as the gentleman well knows, look 
upon negotiations in the first place as another battlefield. I wish we 
could understand that as a country and certainly as a government. 
There has been such a clamor to get them to the negotiating table. Well, 
that is a new battlefield where they try to win battles they have not 
been able to win militarily.

No, I think they will use cynically our prisoners of war as a weapon, 
as a pawn, in any way they can for as long as they can and will try 
to get us to give them all the things they most want while still leaving 
it to be negotiated or to their virtue that our prisoners of war be re­
turned. If we fall into this trap, I think we will be acting against their 
wellfare rather than on behalf of it.

Mr. Broomfield. How long do you think we ought to continue to 
support South Vietnam with residual forces?

Mr. Buchanan. In my judgment we will not have to have residual 
forces in South Vietnam for such an extended period of time as has 
been true, for example, in Korea—at least we have left them, whether 
we have or not, for this length of time. I will point out, if it comes 
to that, if you look at the strength and the vitality of the Republic of 
Korea over against the level of forces which we have left there and 
how much better that is for us and for the world than a Communist 
South Korea under the irrational Government of North Korea, if you 
had that choice to make I would say the residual force has been much 
the lesser of evils or no evil at all. I don't think that is going to have 
to be the case in Vietnam but if some small residual military force 
has to be left for some time, then I would say it would be a good 
investment.

Mr. Broomfield. Should the North release or at least agree to release 
our prisoners, do you feel we could got out right away?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, unfortunately there is a psychological thing that is very difficult here. In my judgment it would be a mistake to disregard all other interests and say we will give you everything in exchange for the prisoners. Now that may sound like a hard statement but after all we do have a responsibility to the thousands who have died and to the many others who have fought and been wounded there in addition to the prisoners of war.

In my judgment while we should make every effort to obtain their release and insist upon that release and obtain it, I think there is more than this that is involved there. I personally think that by the time the North Vietnamese release the prisoners of war the South Vietnamese will be in a position where we could withdraw. But I think that there are other factors that we must take into consideration, including that basic right of self-determination and the fulfillment of the step by step Vietnamization program which has thus far succeeded. I may be a minority of one.

Mr. Gallagher. Let me say this, Congressman Buchanan. We have been studying many of these resolutions with various conditions attached to them and one depicts a date of withdrawal based on the turning over of prisoners. I think that is very noble and something that we all desire. I firmly believe that this subcommittee would vote it out immediately if the war could end on a withdrawal at a fixed date and the prisoners were turned over.

I think you have put your finger on the pulse of the prisoner issue. They will be a pawn until the last results the other side may want are extracted. I personally do not believe that prisoners of war will be turned over until we hand them President Thieu's head on the last M-16 that will be in Vietnam. So I think it is a tragedy for the dependents and relatives of the POW's that false hopes have been raised.

Anybody who thinks out the problem knows that this is the greatest power that they hold and will hold against the United States to bring down a government or to impose any other condition that they want. So that gets confused in it and troubles this subcommittee in its work in trying to find the right way to proceed with these resolutions. So I thank you very much.

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you.

Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. Wolff. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with my colleagues in complimenting our colleague's sincerity of deep moral convictions that he has displayed all of the time that I have witnessed his activities here in the Congress.

I feel that I must balance a statement that was made by you. You have offered a statement by Dr. Dooley into the record, and at this point I would like to enter into the record a statement by the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame University. I would like to quote that for a moment, if I may.

Mr. Gallagher. Do you have a Buddhist?

Mr. Wolff. He stated:

- - our original involvement there was a mistake. Now more than 40,000 American lives later, and after 250,000 wounded Americans, and about 120 billion dollars of expenditures on death and destruction, most of us are willing to concede that what we have won, if anything of real substance, is not
worth the expenditure of so many lives and so much of our resources that might have been more humanly and more fruitfully expended elsewhere at home and abroad.

He goes on by saying that:

Whatever one says about the silent majority, I take it as a fact of life that most young people—those who bear the actual burden of being wounded and dying—do not see America's brightest future identified with this military adventure. One great need of this nation today is for unity of purpose, clear priority of values, lofty vision regarding where we might go together. Vietnam runs counter to all of these present desires. It has divided the nation—those favoring the Vietnam war being mainly those who have had and will have no part in the suffering and the dying—an easy option. It has drained our young life, in death and mutilation; it has wasted resources desperately needed in our nation and around the world for much more serious problems ** **

I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter this into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gallagher. Yes, without objection.

(The statement follows:)


There has probably been no moment in modern history when our country has been more divided regarding its priorities and policy than at present. The reason for our assembly today is the most recent of a long and lugubrious series of decisions regarding the involvement of our country in Vietnam. I am reasonably sure that I speak for most of you in judging that our original involvement there was a mistake. Now more than 40,000 ended American lives later, and after 250,000 wounded Americans, and about 125 billion dollars of expenditure on death and destruction, most of us are willing to concede that what we have won, if anything of real substance, is not worth the expenditure of so many lives and so much of our resources that might have been more humanly and more fruitfully expended elsewhere at home and abroad. It is easy to judge the past, through Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Curiously, it was our Army-General President Eisenhower who refused initially to get involved. Since then, we have under three subsequent Presidents edged into the quicksand and consistently sunk deeper.

I cheered when President Johnson declared an end to the bombing and opened up the Paris talks. I cheered again when President Nixon announced the withdrawal of our soldiers. I had hoped that the time schedule would be quicker, but at least this was a beginning and I took it that we were committed, as a Nation, to end this fruitless war.

Then came last week's decision to take yet another step into the quicksand. I have carefully read and reread the President's statement and recognize both his sincerity and his courage in deciding as he did. I do not agree with him, although he knows more about all this than I do and he has the responsibility of decision. Let me tell you why I do not agree.

Whatever one says about the silent majority, I take it as a fact of life that most young people—those who bear the actual burden of being wounded and of dying—do not see America's brightest future identified with this military adventure. One great need of this nation today is for unity of purpose, clear priority of values, lofty vision regarding where we might go together. Vietnam runs counter to all of these present desires. It has divided the nation—those favoring the Vietnam war being mainly those who have had and will have no part in the suffering and the dying—an easy option. It has drained our young life, in death and mutilation; it has wasted resources desperately needed in our nation and around the world for much more serious problems; it has cast us as a nation in the character of a pariah, supported in our aims by almost no one of importance in the world's opinion. We have paid for irresponsibility, but they merit no other title.

I cringe to seem to malign our dead—may God rest them and console their families. At least their full sacrifice of life has demonstrated to us that never again must we engage in such a senseless endeavor. If only this has resulted, we
all may thank them for their enormous contribution to our education as a nation and to the saving of many thousands of future lives.

Regarding our war prisoners, we can only commit ourselves, at whatever cost, to their safe return. We owe them nothing less than our complete dedication to their return as long-suffering and long-forgotten heroes.

What do we do now? I suspect that most of you, like myself, have already indulged yourselves in revulsion and anger at the announcement that we are now widening, rather than narrowing, the war, even while recognizing that the North Vietnamese widened it first. I have tried to understand the recurrent military logic that the war must be widened to be narrowed, but, with all the good will in the world, I fail to follow a logic that has grown more barren, more illogical, more contradictory, and more self-defeating in promising victory through defeat. In fact, the very terms victory and defeat have become a triumph of unreason. Military logic reached its high point when we were told of Vietnamese villages and villagers: We had to destroy them to free them.

As one lone American citizen speaking only for himself, I would rather be honest in admitting that this whole endeavor has been a nightmare and a travesty of what we stand for as a nation (My ini, for example, was the nadir)—however innocently and naively it was conceived as it began. There comes a time in life when moral righteousness is more important than easy victory. Evil may be, and often is, completely victorious, but does one stand tall in such a victory?

All of us want to be loyal and patriotic—but we also want to be morally clean in the process. No one of us enjoys being ambiguously or doubtfully moral and right and just, however powerful we may be as a nation. Our real power and strength bear on spiritual values, justice, and honor. If our national conscience bothers us, we must stop, look, and ponder our future.

For all of you who are young, this pause comes with special poignancy. No one of you wants to be a coward, a traitor, or an ungenerous American. But if I read your conscience aright, neither do any of you want to be a partner to what you honestly conceive to be evil, unjust, or just plain wrong or idiotic.

What do you do? I have no inflammatory rhetoric to offer you. I must tell you honestly that violence here at home is the worst possible reaction to the violence you abhor in Southeast Asia. I must tell you that if the world is to be better than it presently is, you must prepare yourselves, intellectually, morally, and spiritually, to help make it better. Striking classes as some universities are doing, in the sense of cutting off your education, is the worst thing you could do at this time, since your education and your growth in competence are what the world needs most. If the leadership of the future is going to be better than the leadership of the past and present. Good leaders were never born of self-indulgence, or self-pity either.

This may seem rather undramatic advice to a generation that seeks instant answers to horribly complicated situations. As one of your elders, may I suggest that together we state our uncompromising revulsion to the course of this war and all current wars. May we commit ourselves with all the energy, talent, and dedication at our command to the cause of peace, with the hope and conviction that, as a nation, we stand ready to undertake whatever sacrifice and whatever creative initiative that peace requires of us right now.

If you want to put this conviction into words, may I suggest the following statement that I would be proud to sign with you and transmit to our President:

DECLARATION

As Americans, proud of our national traditions and committed to the best ideals of our country, we declare that we see these traditions and ideals best realized by not continuing our military operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

1. We favor the withdrawal of our military forces at the earliest moment and the designation by the Congress of an ultimate date for complete withdrawal.

2. We favor the most serious efforts to repatriate our American prisoners of war at whatever cost. The nation should recognize its deep debt to them and their families for their continued suffering.

3. We favor the use of our persons and our financial resources to rebuild a new and hopeful society in Vietnam and all of Indo-China that has known nothing but war for so many years.
4. We suggest that the people of this whole area must ultimately make their own effort to achieve the kind of society that they want; that whatever the good will of our past and future efforts, it is the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians themselves who will create the conditions for peace and a better society, something that no force of arms or military imperialism from North or South, East or West, has yet created.

5. Most fundamentally, may we state our deep convictions that our national priorities today are not military, but human. Our nation is unnecessarily and bitterly divided on issues at home and abroad. If the war abroad can be quickly and effectively defused, then we can be united at home in our dedication to justice, to equality of opportunity, and to renewing the quality of American life—a task that will require our best personal efforts and even more of our financial resources than those squandered by us in recent years on a largely frustrating and fruitless venture.

6. Lastly, we realize that the above points would sound like empty rhetoric if we did not stand ready—as we do—to commit our persons, our talents, our honor, and our futures to help work for a better America and a better world in a peaceful and non-violent manner.

Mr. WOLFF. I would like to go on and ask the gentleman a question. In his remarks he stated that the President in effect was winding down the war. We have suffered fewer deaths since the President has engaged in his policy and yet the number of deaths since the new administration has come in has been increasing totally on all sides rather than being reduced.

We find ourselves no longer in Vietnam, we find ourselves in an Indochina war. We now have Laos, Cambodia. No less an authority than Mr. Rogers said that the incursion into Cambodia has given new influence to Communist China. Now are we fighting for what we sought, to win the people away from the influence of the Communists, or are we pushing them further into their hands?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, of course the gentleman certainly is entitled to his judgment as much as I to mine, but my judgment is that the Communists were unchallenged in Cambodia and the supply lines that run through Laos have never been challenged and we have accomplished some things militarily. I feel there are some in Vietnam and Cambodia that feel we have accomplished something for them in our hit-and-run enterprise into Cambodia.

The only reason there was not a wider war in Indochina, we had not done anything on the other side. The Communists have been there all the while and virtually taken over a good part of Cambodia and repeatedly made incursions into Laos so that certain clear military objectives which enhance the Vietnamization program and the withdrawal of our forces were achieved. These things in my judgment—

Mr. WOLFF. On that score is it true or is it not true that a greater portion of both Cambodia and Laos are today in the hands of the enemy than they were before the war?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, the Laos thing though has gone back and forth for years. I would only say that the Cambodians have shown a will to resist and at least the Communists who are unchallenged in Cambodia have now been challenged and it is much less clear that they can maintain a much more challenged route into Cambodia in the future. Our aim, as has been repeatedly stated, was primarily the enhancement of the Vietnamization and phased withdrawal program in Vietnam in our Cambodian and Laotian ventures. It seems to me that purpose has been served.

The gentleman mentioned casualties. I would like to point out that our American fatalities have dropped dramatically as has our troop
strength and as our combat role shrinks this trend will increase and fewer and fewer American lives will be lost in the months ahead. I am just certain that will be the case.

Mr. WOLFF. Some of the atrocities have been committed by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. And I would say as well that we have to consider the fact that while we are winding down the war we seem to be winding up the casualties on both sides.

Mr. BUCHANAN. One must keep in mind the estimated 3 million whom the Communists would liquidate, exterminate, if they succeed in taking over.

When we succeed, however, in our disengagement, as in my judgment we are succeeding, as we proceed with that disengagement, which in my judgment we clearly are, then it is my profound hope that the casualties can greatly decline all over.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. du Pont.

Mr. du Pont. Mr. Buchanan, before you get your briefcase put away, you must think my questions are going to be easy.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I know yours will be too difficult with all the papers in my possession.

Mr. du Pont. I have one of the hard questions. You commented earlier in your testimony about getting aid to the people of various nations and once the war in South Vietnam is ended, or at least once the U.S. participation in it is ended, I for one favor continuing military and economic aid. In South Vietnam, Saigon and countries all over the world—Brazil and Greece just to name a few obvious ones—we have this terrible problem of aid that we have given not getting to the people. It seems to get blocked in various layers of officialdom, corruption, and heavens knows what.

Have you any comments or any suggestions as to how to deal with this problem? We should somehow be more responsive in getting our aid down to the people. That is a wonderful concept but in practical terms have you any suggestions?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is very difficult to achieve. In any given country you have to deal with that country's government and it is almost unavoidable. The gentleman has laid his finger on a primary problem of foreign assistance which seems almost beyond solution. I would say, however, that the present government of the Republic of Vietnam is more responsive to the people as illustrated by the land reform and various other programs than any government that people has had for many years and hence there is some hope it will continue to be more so in the future.

There are forces for reform within the country, in the Congress of that country, for example. There are members very concerned about every kind of corruption and pressing for reforms and improvements and reactions which would make that government even more responsive to the people, and I think the corrective is there within the system.

Mr. du Pont. Well, keep thinking on that. Mr. Buchanan, because we need some help.

Thank you.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallagher. Our next witness is Congressman Howard W. Robison, Republican of New York. Congressman Robison has introduced House Joint Resolution 462 which calls for irreversible withdrawals until all American Armed Forces have left Indochina.

During his many years in the Congress, Mr. Robison has gained a reputation as one of our most thoughtful colleagues and I am sure the members of this subcommittee will learn a great deal from the testimony today.

We are pleased to welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD W. ROBISON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Robison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those extremely kind words.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, your action in holding public hearings this week on the question of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is most welcome, and I am exceedingly grateful for this opportunity.

I have served in the Congress for 14 years now. All of us, I am sure, take great pride in such service. It is a rare privilege we share: To be members of what is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, legislative bodies in the world. During my years here, I have sought to uphold that tradition; perhaps I have not done so with distinction, but every word and action has been dictated with that thought in mind.

Thus, it is with a troubled heart that I confess my keen sense of disappointment—approaching now a sense of shame—that this great Congress has been unable, since our action so many light-years ago now on the ill-fated "Tonkin Gulf resolution," to express itself in any positive fashion on one of the most important issues of our time, the war in Vietnam.

I know the Constitution is, at best, fuzzy in defining our responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs. We cannot here settle that long-standing debate. Nevertheless, nearly every constitutional scholar has claimed that what was intended by the framers of that document—and that what has evolved over the years—is a sharing of responsibility.

It is time, way past time, we accepted our sharing responsibility: not by invading the clear prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief; and not by attempting to dictate to him through in this instance mandated withdrawal deadlines or whatever in such a way as to tie the hand of the only person who, under present circumstances, can negotiate for us as satisfactorily as possible a conclusion of this war; but rather, instead, by searching among ourselves for a consensus—difficult and painstaking a task though that might be—as to what our national policy with respect to Vietnam and former Indochina ought to be in the months and years immediately ahead.

Perhaps such a consensus would have been impossible 2 or 3 years ago. At that time there were many who still believed that with a few more bombs, a few more troops, and a few more billions of dollars we could score a "victory"—a victory made, produced and directed in the United States. There are few such visions today, either in Congress or in the administration. What we all seek now is the most responsible way to end our involvement in this war. What the administration
apparently seeks is the continuation of a strong non-Communist South Vietnamese Government and the withdrawal of all or almost all of our troops.

What the more outspoken congressional critics of the war apparently seek is the end of our support for what they term an inherently unrepresentative government, and the immediate withdrawal of all our troops. What many “moderate” congressional leaders seek is a cease-fire, an atmosphere conducive to serious negotiating efforts in Paris, an exchange of prisoners of war, and the withdrawal of all our troops.

Lest we forget, this is a far narrower range of options than that which existed 3 short years ago. Then, as you will recall, the choice of options still included a heavy expansion of our ground troop commitment. Some still talked of a million-man American army in Vietnam. Some still talked of mining Haiphong harbor and carrying out a land invasion of the North. Some still whispered about introducing tactical nuclear weapons. We do not continue to consider such options now; and it is very much to the credit of this administration that, no matter what divergent viewpoints remain among the American people, the range of divergent viewpoints has thus narrowed so considerably.

This fact does not guarantee that we will leave Southeast Asia a united country; as a matter of fact, the odds are still weighted against that. But it does mean that we may leave Southeast Asia still talking with one another—and this is no mean achievement. And, again, insofar as the present administration has made this possible, it deserves our thanks and appreciation.

But doubts remain. Since agreeing on the shape of the negotiating table, the negotiators at Paris have agreed on nothing save the time periods in which to accuse the other side of bad faith and duplicity. The North Vietnamese have appeared intransigent, but our negotiating stance has hardly been “squishy-soft” either. In Vietnam itself, troops continue to come home, for which we are grateful, but no final withdrawal date has yet been announced and rumors of a large “residual force” float around Washington with regularity.

Meanwhile, the bombing continues—with reports indicating that 700 tons of bombs were dropped on infiltration routes below the demilitarized zone during last week alone—the American support of such as Thai mercenaries is apparently increased. Elections are soon forthcoming in the South, and we have pledged total neutrality, but President Thieu appears to be very much in the driver’s seat. Coherent opposition to him has failed to develop, and that is not our fault of course, but then again one well-known political opponent of his sits in jail and a new election law seems to damage any chance Vice President Ky might have to qualify for the general election.

These doubts are reflected in the mail I receive every week from my district, and I am sure that I am not unique in this respect. I am sure that this subcommittee agrees that our major consideration should be how to resolve these public doubts. This is no time for aggrieved swipes at the present administration; our overinvolvement in Southeast Asia has been very much a bipartisan affair. It may have occurred under a Democratic administration but it had widespread Republican sup-
port. In the same vein, some of the strongest proponents of the present administration's strategy in winding down the war have been Democrats.

No, flogging out against someone or some political party is not at all needed. What is needed is good sound congressional advice to the President. There is no governmental body more sensitive to the people than the House of Representatives; we are on the firing line every 2 years and that fact teaches us to listen to the people. They are telling us now, at least in my judgment, that they want our policy defined; they want to see our goals from this point forward set forth in clear and unequivocal language; and they want us to expedite our withdrawal as much as possible.

Some months ago I introduced a joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 462, which calls for U.S. troop withdrawals from Indochina to be continued, on an irreversible basis, until all U.S. Armed Forces were withdrawn from Indochina. The resolution also states that it is the "sense of Congress" that all U.S. servicemen in Indochina be withdrawn from ground combat activities on or before June 1, 1971, and that all troops should be withdrawn as soon after that date as practicable.

This resolution, although differently phrased, is similar to the one I introduced last year, House Concurrent Resolution 756. The purpose of both efforts was to encourage an "end-the-war" consensus in the Congress. Obviously the passage of time since the introduction of House Joint Resolution 462 requires that its present wording be reworked, and there are several other resolutions pending before your subcommittee which present other interesting possibilities. The exact wording of the resolution is not paramount, nor is it at all important who receives credit for initiating the successful effort. What is important is that this subcommittee, and subsequently the full Committee on Foreign Affairs, carefully weigh all the proposals before it and then report to the House a resolution which would codify that policy which a majority of the Congress feel should be followed by the current administration.

I would like to outline the elements which might well be present in any such effort, and will leave the exact wording to the experts who sit on this subcommittee. What should we say to this administration that would be helpful and purposeful, both to it and to the American people?

Well, first, I think we should reaffirm that our withdrawal program is an irreversible one. No matter what happens in South Vietnam, I do not believe the American people will again support any increase in American ground troop support for the South Vietnamese Government. A reversal of administration policy in this respect is unacceptable, and Congress should say so.

Second, we should define as the end goal of our present policy the total withdrawal of American troops. There are strong arguments that can be advanced for various levels of logistical support after we withdraw and perhaps it is best if these questions are left unanswered in the present effort since consensus would be terribly difficult to find on such an issue. But I think we can find consensus around the proposition that a large residual force of say 50,000 troops is unacceptable.
The situation in Vietnam is not amenable to a Korea-type solution for a number of reasons that I will go into if you wish.

There is also considerable controversy about whether we should provide air support for the South Vietnamese troops after our withdrawal, perhaps from bases in Thailand. Personally, I feel that some such support may be in order, although I would like to see an end to the saturation bombing raids we continue to conduct. Widespread bombing is of only marginal value in cutting the enemy's supplies, and in the process hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed, injured or uprooted from their homes. Close support missions, however, might still be required by the South Vietnamese Government for at least the next 2 or 3 years. However, it might also be well if this consideration was left for another day, if no consensus is possible. What we should instead concentrate on now are those elements upon which we can agree.

Third, we should make it clear that our withdrawal is not dependent upon the continued success of the Thieu-Ky regime. Our troops are surely not positioned in South Vietnam for President Thieu's convenience and their presence should not be prolonged merely to assist him in either his reelection or the administration of his nation's government.

Fourth, during these last stages of our withdrawal, we must leave the President some negotiating room and encourage him to use it. At the very least, a cease-fire and an agreement for the release of prisoners of war should be negotiated. I made this same point last week when I offered an amendment to the Nidzi-Whalen amendment to the military procurement bill, which would have conditioned an April 30, 1972, withdrawal date on the establishment of both a cease-fire and a release of prisoners before that date.

Some have criticized such an approach by charging that it only muddies the water and leaves the President so much discretion that the congressional action becomes relatively meaningless. But they ignore the fact that our mere withdrawal, without any negotiated agreement on anything, would do precious little to set the forces in motion for an end to the bloodshed and strife. If other longtime critics of the war do not understand this, former Senator Eugene McCarthy does, for he has noted that our mere unilateral withdrawal would invite chaos in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It was his point, as well, that congressional action mandating a date certain for withdrawal without any conditions whatsoever, would be an abdication of our responsibility for the combined military, political, and economic problems we have helped to create in Southeast Asia.

So I think we must negotiate. But we must also do so quickly, since it is also the case, unfortunately enough, that our bargaining power dwindles away with each passing month, as our troops continue to come out. It is time, in other words, for the President to do some serious negotiating with Hanoi, and it is our responsibility here in Congress to help guide the President in that direction. Setting a date certain for U.S. withdrawal, with certain conditions to be negotiated, is probably the way to move things off dead center; and I would hope that any resolution would convey that rather clearly to the President.

I know it takes two to negotiate, even as it "takes two to tango"; yet, in either exercise, one participant has to lead. And if, up to now, the
President has been reluctant to so lead by virtue of his uncertainty over the congressional and public reaction to any such forward movement on his part, it seems to me that this subcommittee has an excellent chance to reassure him.

One final point. We have no time to spare in taking some sort of action. The hour is already late for a congressional statement on the longest war in our Nation’s history. It is, in my opinion, imperative that we take action as soon as possible, for at least two reasons. First, I have the impression that the administration has an open mind on some of the policies I have referred to here today, and that officials in the administration might welcome a cogen statement of congressional sentiment. Second, the American people will be relieved if we can clearly establish our policy in Southeast Asia before the onset of the next presidential election. I say this because I think we all recognize that it is not in our Nation’s best interests that there be another acrimonious, partisan exchange between presidential candidates about the war in Indochina.

We ought to settle our national policy now. The level of dialog about Southeast Asia in the final months of the 1968 campaign was, as you will recall, uninspiring, to say the least. The war has been too costly, both in terms of human lives and in domestic unity, for anyone to take advantage of the sad situation for parochial political advantage—and I refer to Republicans, Democrats, and third parties as well. If we wait until 1972 to hammer out the final, tough decisions relating to our withdrawal, we only invite further disunity.

Therefore, I wish this subcommittee well in its work. It has an important and urgent task; but if you report a cogent, sensible resolution to the House, you will have performed a significant service to the American people.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you very much, Congressman Robison, for an extremely well-reasoned and finely presented statement.

I was interested in your statements on page 2, which reflected what I tried to convey in my opening statement yesterday. You said that the range of options and the range of viewpoints about Indochina has narrowed considerably. I think we have many areas of agreement on Vietnam policy. Because you have one of the Nation’s outstanding colleges, Cornell University, in your district, and because of your long and responsible representation here in the Congress, I wonder if you could speculate as to why, at a time when viewpoints are now within a narrow range, the passions seem to be increasing.

Mr. Robison. I am not sure they are. In fact, I would question whether or not that was so, quite vigorously. The campus at Cornell has been at least quiet, if your earlier reference to young people was relative to what Congress might or might not do to bring this war to an end as early as possible an end. I think to a certain extent that is because they have more or less given up; they have given up on the Congress of the United States as being one body that finds itself incapable of agreeing within itself, or of finding the broad-base consensus on which to say anything with respect to this war.

The debate on “McGovern-Hatfield” and “Nedzi-Whalen” were not the spirited debates that one would have anticipated would have been held a year or so ago. I must say that surprises me somewhat, too, but
I think we could change that situation around now by acting, by finding that consensus that I think is within our reach.

As probably indicated by yesterday's action in the Senate on the "Mansfield substitute," for the latest so-called end-the-war amendment over there, I think there may be the same sort of consensus on the House side. I think many people on the House side would welcome a policy statement of that sort, wherein the House could join with the Senate in an effort to work out comparable language, or at least iron out the differences that might exist between the approach the Senate has now taken, temporarily at least, and that which your subcommittee might propose.

Mr. GALLAGHER. On page 5 of your statement, you say, and I quote:

I have the impression that the Administration has an open mind on some of the policies I have referred to here today, and that officials in the Administration might welcome a cogent statement of congressional sentiment.

If it would not be violating any confidences, what gives you that impression, and what are the specific policies upon which the administration would welcome our sentiments?

Mr. Robison. Well, Mr. Chairman, part of the impression comes from conversations I have had with fairly high-ranking people in the administration, who have given me at least this as a personal understanding, and I would rather not, with your permission, go further into that question than I have.

I think we also have to consider the President's position at the moment. It is difficult, of course, to look into anyone else's mind and try to determine exactly what his goals, or his ambitions, or his problems and his thoughts are, but it does seem to me that he has been waiting to a certain extent to see how things might develop, not only in Saigon but in this country of ours, and that he is waiting for some guidance, and I rather believe that he would welcome some such guidance from the Congress.

Now, certainly, as you said in your opening remarks and as I touched upon in my statement that was prepared yesterday, the action of the Senate, it seems to me, is aimed in the direction of encouraging the President to understand what the people are saying through their Representatives in Congress. To the best of my ability, what I have suggested to you today, and what is the thrust of my resolution, is what my people—although, of course, they speak in a divided voice—or at least what a majority of my people are saying to me.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That certainly is a point of feeling that this subcommittee welcomes.

Congressman Robison, as I understand it, your resolution is a sense of Congress resolution that affirms the trends for withdrawal to be continued but it does not fix a date. What would be the earliest possible date to retain flexibility?

Mr. Robison. I find words that I used last year coming back at me, and I used them again this year.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Everybody's words do.

Mr. Robison. I know, but I find them specifically coming back in the "Mansfield amendment" yesterday which uses the same phrase: the "earliest practicable date." There is nothing very magic about that. I have listened to the debate, as you have, both on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment on our side of the Capitol and on McGovern-Hatfield in
the Senate, and I think it was Senator McGovern, himself, who said the other day the setting of a date is not so important, or the date itself is not so important, as the fact that we lay down as a matter of policy, or attempt to do so at least, the idea that our withdrawal from Vietnam will proceed on an irreversible basis until all of our forces have been withdrawn.

I think this is more important than trying to set a special date, year, or even December 31, 1971, or April 30, 1972, or July 1 of next year, or even December 31, 1972, although I think that is far too long. Quite frankly, when I offered my amendment last week to Nedzi-Whalen and picked out the April 30 date, it was on the premise, as Secretary Laird has supposedly said a number of times, that 9 months would be needed, or about 6 months, to carry out in an orderly fashion the logistical problems of an actual withdrawal, and this is where the 9 months in my case came from.

Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. Broomfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to congratulate the gentleman for a very, very fine statement. In fact, I find that I agree with most of the things you have included in your statement.

You put a great deal of emphasis on the prisoners of war. Would you elaborate on that. Do you feel that it is essential in any resolution that we pass that it provide for the release of the American prisoners of war?

Mr. Robison. Congressman Broomfield, in trying to respond again I would go back to what I believe is the attitude of the people I try to represent. On that issue, I think they would not wish to see us merely withdraw on a unilateral basis, leaving the question of the prisoners of war up to the mercies—and the not so tender mercies, as Congressman Buchanan suggested—of the other side.

I think, at the very least, that this is a negotiable item, and that we should encourage the President to approach the question of a final withdrawal date but contingent on what the other side is willing to do relative to the prisoners of war, first in their actual release and, secondly. I think it is important to encourage the President to also try, in that renewed effort at negotiations, to bring about a cease-fire in the area of the current conflict. I say this because, while we cannot guarantee in the long-range future what might happen to those people over there, nor guarantee for them under present circumstances that they will have peace, at least we ought to give both sides the breathing spell that a cease-fire would produce, and an opportunity to begin to work out their own difficulties between themselves, perhaps.

When I was in Vietnam last year, just a year from now as a matter of fact, with the committee that the House sent over under Congressman Montgomery’s chairmanship, I talked with many people in Saigon in the political side of their government, a good many of whom were opponents of President Thieu and the present regime, and they, interestingly enough—you may not have heard this approach before—said to me a number of times, “We understand why you are Vietnamizing the war, the shooting part thereof, in that you have done all you can for us in the military standpoint, but why don’t you Vietnamize the peace, too?”
I asked them what they meant by that question, and they said, "Well, you cannot find peace for us, you cannot negotiate, in a lasting fashion at least, the differences between those of us from the South and those from the North in Vietnam, and we will have to settle these differences among ourselves."

So, I think a cease-fire is important as an element in our policy to produce an atmosphere and a climate within which all this might have a chance of working out.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Robison, I, too, want to congratulate you on your statement. Although I was not here for all of it, I, too, share your frustration in trying to come up with a solution to this war. I recently returned from Vietnam where I wrote a report on the aspects of this war and America's experience with something similar to it, drug addiction. All I can say is that the time is now and we should get out.

I, too, talked to leaders of the South Vietnamese Government, and to the present government's opponents. The consensus is that we should have been out 2 or 3 years ago. We fulfilled our role and we built our forces to 1,100,000. We have given them supplies, we have given them breathing spells. I think our obligations under any treaty have been fulfilled. I think our moral obligations have been fulfilled.

I can only think back when John Kennedy was President, I was not even thinking about running for Congress at the time. He mentioned this fact, "What it boils down to is that these people at some point in time take their obligations themselves and fight their own war." I think that time has come. It has, in fact, gone by.

Again I compliment you on your statement here today. The young people in this country have looked to us in Congress. As you say, the reason for their political apathy today is the fact that they are not experiencing or seeing any leadership emanate from the Congress, and I agree with you.

Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. Robison. Thank you very much. I would like to congratulate you and Mr. Steele in return for the work you have done on this aspect of this conflict, and it does give me at least an added reason for feeling that it is time to bring this war to a conclusion.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Halpern.

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the outset, I certainly want to compliment our very able and distinguished colleague from New York. I am greatly impressed, as I have been since I first came to this House, with his sincerity and his capability and awareness. I am particularly cognizant of his complete dedication to the cause of peace. I want to compliment him on his very enlightening testimony and the initiative he has shown and for joining in the dialogue of this subcommittee during these very important hearings.

I, too, have recently returned from Vietnam where I met with the representatives of our Government and the leaders of the Vietnamese Government. I, too, engaged in a very extensive fact finding probe of the narcotic situation there. Certainly it is horrendous to me that that
problem is probably as far reaching and as dangerous and as much a threat to this country as any of the other implications of this war.

I believe there are men who are over there who are under a much greater danger of becoming addicts and ruining their lives and imposing threats to every community in this Nation than they are of being shot. This is a horrible conclusion but it is a realistic one that we have to face and is a blatant example of why we should get out of Vietnam over and above the multitude of reasons which have been pointed out by witness after witness before this subcommittee and by countless others throughout this Nation.

Now I missed some of your testimony, I did have a chance while here to go through it and I do have some questions relative to its content.

Now you stated that should we be unable here in Congress to reach a consensus on whether or not the United States should provide air support for the South Vietnamese forces after our withdrawal we could leave this consideration for another day, but isn't this one of those final, tough decisions that you said must be hammered out before 1972? If so, why should we wait for another date to resolve this dispute?

Mr. Ronson. Well, I would say to my good friend and colleague from New York, that I have been here long enough to believe, as I am sure he believes, that legislation is still the art of the possible. I notice the Mansfield amendment does not attempt to address itself to those kinds of questions. I have stated as my own attitude here that I would be willing, in line with the principles of the Nixon doctrine, to see some continuing air support given by our Nation to South Vietnam if Congress wants to in the future. If we have the kind of a regime still going on in Saigon that we wish to support, then we should support it at least indirectly. But I try now, Brother Halpern, to see if we can crank that sort of a question in on the House side in hope that it might be compatible with what the Senate has now done, to my mind complicates the matter so much that we will never be able to do it.

Mr. Halpern. You appear to be in support of the administration's objective about the continuance of support, yet you also appear to be rather disenchanted, to say the least, with the Thieu-Ky regime. You do not seem to feel that the upcoming elections will be what they should be. Now how do you reconcile your lack of enthusiasm with the present government with the administration policy that does not, by setting a definite date for withdrawal, force the Vietnamese Government to take steps to aid the South Vietnamese citizens?

Mr. Ronson. Either my colleague misunderstood my statement or I did not write it as clearly as I should have. My reference to the administration's ambition, or that of the President, is my own understanding of what the President has said: That we must stay there, first, until there is some resolution of the prisoner of war issue, and secondly, until there is some sound chance, or safe chance, or whatever the proper words are, that the Government in South Vietnam can continue on its own and withstand whatever aggression still is thrust against it from the North.

I would agree with my friend here, Mr. Murphy, that if the South Vietnamese cannot now stand against continued aggression from the North, with some logistical help from us, and possibly some supple-
mentary close-air support if that is necessary, they never will be able to. I think the President on this matter has indicated, now and then, that these two issues relative to the prisoners of war and the ability of the South Vietnamese Government to stand on its own, are separable items. The first is a matter of fact; we either get our prisoners or we do not. The second is a matter of judgment, and it is my judgment that the time to leave South Vietnam is now.

Mr. Halpern. The points you mention for inclusion in your resolution are, I think, goals that few could disagree with—that total withdrawal should be our goal, that withdrawal should be irreversible, et cetera. Would not the passage of this resolution express sentiment of which the President is well aware while papering over the very real differences that do exist in Congress over the means to achieve the ultimate goal of withdrawal?

Mr. Ronson. Of course, but I am trying to be a realist. What can we actually accomplish? What are we trying to get Congress to say on this is the most we can get Congress to say. Again, as Senator Mansfield said, the Senate, at least, has on a number of occasions indicated its unwillingness to force a withdrawal date on the President by a cutoff of funds or whatever. Absent that willingness then, what do we do? Do we remain silent, or do we attempt, as the Senate has attempted, to hammer out at least the framework for a national policy statement relative to our withdrawal from this war?

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to state because mention has been made here about a withdrawal date. A very, very revealing fact that I think is very pertinent to these hearings is that in my recent interview with Vice President Ky he stated, incidentally, that he favors a withdrawal date for U.S. withdrawal of U.S. troops, a fixed date.

Mr. Gallagher. That is what, a change of heart?

Mr. Halpern. I have not heard about the change of heart.

He has said more recently that he would suggest some time in 1972. He didn’t indicate how late in 1972, but he did favor when I spoke to him and that was not much more than 2 months ago—that he favors a disengagement date and he gave two reasons, Mr. Chairman, and he said this without qualification: that it will finally bring the South Vietnamese people to the realization that the United States is not going to be there indefinitely and that they must buckle down immediately to sustain their own national security and that they must develop a determined will for their own survival.

The other reason he gave was that it will help to bring the American people together once again.

Now, Mr. Robison, my distinguished colleague—I should say Brother Robison in acknowledgment of his reference to me because I have such deep affinity and love for our witness, Mr. Chairman.

You say that a withdrawal date will not bring about the release of American prisoners. You were quite explicit in a general surprise. Now what would be wrong if the withdrawal date that is recommended by the President was contingent upon an agreement to release the prisoners of war?

Mr. Ronson. Absolutely nothing, although you might find a bit of a distinction and an argument between some of us as to whether there should be merely such an agreement, or an agreement then followed by
an actual release of prisoners, before we then make the withdrawal
date terminal.

Mr. HALPERN. Well, you would not object then.

Mr. ROBISON. Not at all.

Mr. HALPERN. Well, isn't it similar to some of the proposals pending
either on this committee or the other body?

Mr. ROBISON. Yes; it is.

Mr. HALPERN. Then you would favor that?

Mr. ROBISON. Yes; it is quite like the amendment I offered to Nedzi-
Whalen which didn't get much attention, but at least I tried.

Mr. HALPERN. I may add, Mr. Chairman, as you may be aware, that
I conferred with both representatives of the South Vietnamese and
the North Vietnamese in Paris recently, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government and the DRV, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. I
conferred with them for a total of 8 hours, 4 hours with the DRV
and 4 hours 15 minutes with the Vietnamese. I saw this readiness to
meet with me a part of their calculated policy, knowing that I would
obviously be in contact with our Government's negotiating team, our
State Department, and our President. I saw this move as a signal
of their willingness to talk, to clarify doubts as to the prisoner of
war issue. I saw this as a sign of flexibility, as a means of communicating
with us out of the context of the diplomatic strategy of official table
talks. It certainly opens the door and is worth probing.

I am not naive and I certainly did not accept all the party line
rhetoric that they expressed during our lengthy talks. As a matter of
fact, the meetings were anything but love feasts. I played the role of
the devil's advocate and even called them stupid; that if they released
the prisoners of war it would be the smartest thing they could do, and
it would show real evidence of good faith.

We can only accept their assurances of good faith at face value, and
these are the same assurances that have been expressed to some of the
other members of this committee. Their statements to us have been
widely publicized and I cannot conceive of them risking world opinion
by going back on their word, particularly after they went so much
out of their way to emphasize their position.

Now I took complete notes at these meetings and I read back every
word to them. It was not a question of interpreting what they said
after the fact, the statements were literally dictated by the Communist
side. I turned over the full transcript to our representatives at the
Paris talks and to the State Department and to the White House.

I would like, Mr. Chairman, if I may, to include in the record
transcripts of these interviews that I had with both the DRV and
with the North Vietnamese.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Without objection, so ordered.

(The transcripts follow):

STATEMENT BY MEMBER OF DRV DELEGATION AND DRV PRESS SPOKESMAN NGUYEN
THANH LE TO CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN

Now—I'll be brief, simple, and realistic in my responses to your questions.
So far we have heard from various people who have raised the same opinions and
questions you expressed. This includes President Nixon who went so far as to
label the Vietnamese as barbaric as far as the prisoners of war are concerned.

It isn't difficult to give answers to the questions you raised. However, we find
it necessary to look into the background of the problem. Any impartial person
would say the United States has interfered in Viet-Nam affairs since 1948-1949. You probably will remember since October 4, 1950, a military mission of advisors were set up in Saigon. And some 60% of war expenditures of the French were financed by the United States.

It is not true that when Mr. Nixon says the presence of American troops in Viet-Nam was in response to an appeal of the Saigon government. This is definitely not true for it dates back to the French occupation. Even at that time the late President Kennedy, then Senator Kennedy, said we share the same bed as the French colonialists in Viet-Nam.

If the question is raised why is an American serviceman captured in Viet-Nam, that doesn't mean we have gone to the United States to get him. It is the reverse. That's why we say when Mr. Nixon says that the Vietnamese are the most barbaric nation in the world today that such statements by Mr. Nixon are stupid. Not only do the Vietnamese say that but many Americans say the same thing. The crimes committed by Americans are among the most barbaric in history. I don't know if you read the article in the Herald Tribune today but it describes an American officer's statement. He stated that an order was given by an American general to massacre a hospital in South Viet-Nam by shelling it. And when a wounded combatant in South Viet-Nam was in the hands of American troops the American general asked to withhold treatment in order to explore his mind and then leave him to his death. These are only a few and tiny examples. We have a long history of being a cultured people, a civilized people. All the Vietnamese people follow the guiding principles of humanitarianism, fidelity, faithfulness, courtesy, intelligence, and confidence. The first guiding principle for the Vietnamese is humanitarianism. You know that during thousands of years we have been victims of aggression and each time we were victims of foreign aggressors.

We also captured servicemen during these periods of resistance and always treated them well. During the 13th century, the 14th century, and the 15th century when our country was invaded by the Mongolians and Chinese feudalists we captured hundreds of thousands of their men. But every time we have had a specific policy as far as the treatment of the prisoners of war were concerned and as soon as war would be over we would release them. We even provided the transportation.

Now, from 1945-1954 we resisted French aggression and there were great numbers of prisoners of war. You may remember that during Dien Bien Phu we captured tens of thousands of men but we released them right after signing the Geneva Agreements. There never was the slightest problem. General De Castries has declared he received very good treatment. The same thing was said by a great number of French officers and French soldiers. Anyone who puts himself in our place—victims of bombings and strafings by those who came over to North Viet-Nam to destroy schools, hospitals and dykes—in spite of these crimes the pilots we captured receive only good treatment, fair treatment once they were captured. Let us say as another example, our food rations. Any food ration of a captured pilot would be much better than that of the Vietnamese people. You may remember an American colonel who was released. He said he received good treatment and he corroborated that his food was better than the Vietnamese. I can cite many other examples. For instance, in Viet-Nam we have no heating systems, but in wintertime every Vietnamese gets one blanket, but every captured pilot gets two. One of the captured pilots is a Commander McCain, the son of Admiral McCain. His father is the one who ordered the bombing of North Viet-Nam yet when his son was captured inside Hanoi he was treated very well. His arm was broken and despite his contention that it would be no use to try to save him, that he was going to die, yet he got the very best of medical care and our doctors saved his life.

We think that there are many foreign visitors and journalists who came to see these captured pilots with their own eyes who would attest to their good treatment. This has been reported in the Herald Tribune. The same thing has been reported in the Baltimore Sun and the Los Angeles Times.

As for the name lists of the pilots, we have no interest in holding out any other names than those we released. We released the entire list based on the humanitarian and the guiding spirits of the Vietnamese people which I mentioned to you. Now as everyone knows, as soon as the war is over, as soon as an agreement is signed, this question of release of the prisoners is automatically solved. It was the same as with the French at Geneva. What is different from the general understanding about the war in the past, in order to show the good will of the Vietnamese people, the PRG in Paris has put forth their ten point...
initiative. If the United States would announce its intention to withdraw its troops by June 1971, then all parties will discuss the question of release of prisoners. If President Nixon accepted that proposal there would be no need for this discussion now and all parties would be repatriated. But Mr. Nixon refused this proposal by insisting on not setting a date. Suppose President Nixon accepted the date limit of June 30, 1971—and it has been confirmed by an American general that to transport an American division takes five hours. Say there are ten American divisions, that would mean it would take fifty hours. Even if you were to multiply this by another ten that would be 500 hours. Therefore, there is plenty of time to bring back American troops by that date. Another aspect of the discussion is proposing on not setting a date. Suppose President Nixon feels he cannot accept the June 30 date period but there is plenty of time to bring back American troops by that date. Another aspect of the discussion is proposing another reasonable date and the parties can discuss that to come to a solution. Here again this shows the flexibility and good will of the Vietnamese. But to my understanding it is the desire of President Nixon not to end the war but to continue and to prolong it. Moreover, he shows no concern at all as to the fate of the prisoners of war nor does he show a concern for American servicemen who are fighting.

Then in 1954 when the Geneva Agreements were signed the United States refused to accept them. I just mention this to make clear that we must abide by the truth. Now if there is a war taking place in Viet-Nam, it is not because the Vietnamese have sent troops to attack the United States. Conversely, the United States has sent troops to attack Viet-Nam. We have to say it again, the United States has conducted the most barbarous war in history against the Vietnamese people. So far over eleven million tons of bombs and shells were dropped in Viet-Nam. Some 60,000 tons of toxic chemicals have been used and the highest act of barbarism has been perpetrated. American troops are killing civilians. They have cut off the ears of Vietnamese patriots. They have cut their legs. Everyone knows about My Lai. No one could have imagined such a degree of human destruction. That is the plain truth. That is why we say any impartial person who has the courage to look into the truth will realize this reality. That is why if he—President Nixon—is really concerned for lives he would set a date because the more he continues the war, the more there will be servicemen killed, the more there will be captured. If he really wants to see the men returned home safely he would do that. Moreover, in his recent statements of April 7 and April 16 he went so far as to put more conditions as to not stop the war. He said as long as a single prisoner is left, American troops will not withdraw. That only means he paves the way for more GIs to be captured. He also said as long as the Saigon administration has not the power to defend itself, American troops will not withdraw. That is absurd. That can only mean continued U.S. perpetuation of American occupation. This is not the real way to show concern for GIs. This is why for our part we do not see any problem at all if only Mr. Nixon would set the date for withdrawal of troops. Just as we said, in the past there was no problem when we ended the war with the French.

Now I come to the second question as to why we did not talk to the Saigon administration. Mr. Nixon has said that it should be left to the Vietnamese people to decide their own destiny. I'll be very frank and straightforward about this. First of all we say that that statement is not true. Not only the Nixon Administration, but the former administration has said that they respect self-determination for the South Vietnamese people. Everyone knows, even during our resistance against the French, that Richard Nixon on many occasions came over—eight times in fact—to encourage the French during that war. He even came to Hanoi. He even went to the front to see how the French fought. Was it because he really wants to see the men returned home safely he would do that. Moreover, in his recent statements of April 7 and April 16 he went so far as to put more conditions as to not stop the war. He said as long as a single prisoner is left, American troops will not withdraw. That only means he paves the way for more GIs to be captured. He also said as long as the Saigon administration has not the power to defend itself, American troops will not withdraw. That is absurd. That can only mean continued U.S. perpetuation of American occupation. This is not the real way to show concern for GIs. This is why for our part we do not see any problem at all if only Mr. Nixon would set the date for withdrawal of troops. Just as we said, in the past there was no problem when we ended the war with the French.

When Nixon said on April 16 he would not withdraw all American troops from Viet-Nam as long as the Saigon administration cannot stand by itself that was nothing but direct interfering in the internal affairs of the country. If a question is being asked, “What is the present Thieu-Ky Administration in Saigon?” the answer is that everyone in that administration was set up by the Americans. Also everyone knows that Thieu, Ky, and Khiem were mercenaries in the French
army, and everyone can remember Ky's remarks about Hitler. What is Thieu? This man keeps saying there is no other way to defeat communism than a military victory. He says there is no other way but to get rid of neutrals. How can there be any possibility of unity or a coalition with anyone as long as they are there.

Everyone remembers the 1967 elections in Saigon when there was a candidate Duong on the opposite side. He opposed them and as a result he was put in jail. He is still in jail. Thieu is putting everyone in prison who opposes him—monks, Buddhists, even Catholic priests. Just a few days ago two Catholic priests were jailed. Even invalids—veterans who demand improvements in their lives have been oppressed and jailed by Thieu. All of this means that the present Thieu/Ky/Khiem regime is dictatorial, warlike, and a fascist regime. This is why the proposal by the PRG stipulated that only those three be excluded from the present Saigon government. You say the United States is not in a position of displacing a government, of deposing a government. We say the present Saigon administration was set up by the American administration. It is being financed, fed, and supplied by the United States. I don't know if you can remember what was stated once by President Kennedy. But we remember it very well. He said that the present Saigon administration is an offspring, an adopted child of the United States.

I wonder if you know Senator Mansfield. Well, you may also remember that he said since the Saigon administration is the tail of the dog, the tail cannot wag the dog. Only the dog can wag the tail. Also, in September of 1968—to be more precise, December 16, 1968—Ky came to Paris and declared that he considers Henry Cabot Lodge as his father. This is why we think it was really the idea of the United States to respect the right of self-determination. The United States would refuse to support three persons—three dictators. As for the proposal in the eight-point solution offered by the PRG at the Paris talks, it has been very clearly declared that the PRG stands ready to discuss with the Saigon administration—with the exception of these three persons—anyone in that administration who stands for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. I can give you an example. The four-party conference started on November 6, 1968. It was because of the stubborn attitude of the American representative and the Saigon administration that only the discussions on the form of the table took two and a half months.

(I interjected that their side certainly was deeply involved in that discussion and certainly contributed to any prolongation. He answered that they proposed a round table. This was opposed with the proposition that the round table be cut in two or that there be a demarcation line in the middle of the green. This was absurd and indicated at the beginning a lack of good will.)

The obstacle to the success of the conference has been the difficulties created by Mr. Nixon, Mr. Thieu, Mr. Ky and Mr. Khiem. The first proposal as a basis for negotiations was offered by the PRG—the ten-point solution. Then there was the eight-point peace initiative calling for U.S. withdrawl by June 30, 1971. Also the discussion of release of prisoners and setting up of a provisional government was proposed. Just because of the basic reality in South Viet-Nam—on the one hand you have the Saigon administration and on the other the PRG. You still have another force not participating in either of these two governments. Because of this reality, the PRG offers a provisional coalition government covering all three factions indicating the good will and flexibility of the PRG. There is also an attitude on the part of the PRG to offer an honorable way out for the United States—by the United States offering to disengage in Viet-Nam. The present Saigon administration keeps opposing a coalition government. So far the Saigon administration has rejected any initiative concerning coalition or any national reconciliation.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN AND NGUYEN THANH LE, DRV DELEGATION

Mr. Halpern. In your remarks to me you say that you've been accused of being barbaric by the U.S. administration on the prisoner issue. You vow that is not so. Wouldn't it be the obvious thing, the simplest thing, to allow inspections to verify your claim of very good treatment.

Mr. Le. It has been verified by many that we have been giving very good treatment to the captive pilots and the best medical care to the sick and wounded.

Mr. Halpern. The Geneva Convention which you signed and which you seem
to know so well calls for inspections on treatment of prisoners of war. You certainly are violating the principle by refusing to allow a verification of your claims of good treatment by international inspection. The very least you can do is release of the sick and wounded. If it were not for Nixon's bad intentions there would be no prisoner problem.

Mr. LE. You talk about our side not negotiating the release of the sick and wounded. If it were not for Nixon's bad intentions there would be no prisoner problem.

Mr. HALPERN. But it would be in keeping with the principles of the Geneva Convention that there be inspections by a third party or international team.

Mr. LE. We were signatories to the Geneva Protocols. In full keeping with them we apply very good treatment to American pilots. The problem now is the security of the pilots and our own people. We must discontinue the visits.

Mr. HALPERN. You say you provided a list of the prisoners. We have cause to believe there have been more captured and that you have not given complete identification. You have not agreed to impartial inspection. You say they are treated very well. Yet you will not allow verification of this by neutral parties.

Mr. LE. We did give you an accurate list. We did start to release men. But now we take protective reaction against attacks by your aircraft and rescue missions, and President Nixon has threatened that as long as there is one prisoner of war left, he would not withdraw.

Mr. HALPERN. Well, if you want the U.S. to withdraw, wouldn't it be the obvious thing—the smartest thing—the right thing—to release the prisoners under the repatriation proposals? Wouldn't it be the right thing at least to update and complete the released lists? Wouldn't it be the right thing to allow inspection teams to verify the treatment you claim is so good? Wouldn't it be the right thing to remove the sick and wounded for internment in a neutral country?

You have told me in your remarks that you would talk about release of prisoners once peace is negotiated. You say on the signing of peace, prisoners would be released as soon as a solution is reached. But quite different from that principle was the proposal of the PRG who said the release would occur provided President Nixon declared a fixed date. Is your position the same as the PRG on this issue?

Mr. LE. Our position is to support the PRG.

Mr. HALPERN. But to be more specific. The PRG tells me it will enter discussions on the release of all its prisoners once an appropriate fixed date is set. You said to me earlier you'd talk about release of prisoners only after peace is negotiated. There seems to be a difference here. Could you clarify it for me?

Mr. LE. We would include the pilots captured in North Viet-Nam as part of this.

Mr. HALPERN. Let me be sure I understand this. And I emphasize that the PRG—and I repeated to them their own words only today and I repeat it here. They told me they will discuss the release of all prisoners of war once an appropriate date is set. They explained when they say discussions they mean ways and procedures for the actual release. Do you mean the same thing?

Mr. LE. Of course, we mean it, providing an appropriate deadline is set. Then all parties to the problem would discuss the procedures. Once this is done, it is our intention to release all captives—not only the wounded and sick—but all, so they can return safely and directly home.

Mr. HALPERN. Then I take it that it is your intention to release prisoners if there was agreement on a fixed date. And it is not your intention to then give consideration only after a peace is signed. You agree you would release them after a date is set and immediately discuss the procedures.

Mr. LE. Yes. We have no intention of holding them. We'll even give them transportation. In fact, they can bring home flowers from Viet-Nam.

Mr. HALPERN. You say you cannot allow verification of treatment because of security reasons. Does this mean you couldn't trust an international inspection made up of representatives of neutral countries?

Mr. LE. In regard to this and to your statements about verification of treatment, there were visitors. If I wanted to, I could cite many instances. The Canadian General is not a communist. You also remember that famous operation to release prisoners. Nixon and Laird have said there would be others. Because of the security of servicemen we cannot allow others. The statements by Nixon and Laird have made other visits impossible. It is because of these threats.
Mr. HALPERN. You talk about the security aspect as the reason for not releasing prisoners, and not allowing inspection teams to verify treatment conditions. Why don't you release them and eliminate the security aspect all together. At least you can allow inspections and release the sick and wounded to a neutral country.

Mr. LE. If you don't mind, the United States doesn't take into account any international law. The Geneva Accords of 1954 call for unity, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam. Also the Geneva agreements forbid the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign military personnel, weapons, war materials. But the United States has taken no account.

Mr. HALPERN. In your remarks you talk about the eventual release of prisoners. I talk also of the treatment of prisoners right now. What I'm talking about is not negotiable, but what you should be doing as a matter of course. Why, and I ask in the name of humanity, do you not accept our proposals? I believe your attitudes on the handling of the prisoners issue is just plain stupid. There would be a lot more support for a disengagement if the American people knew that the agreement on conditions was two-sided—not a situation where we must do this or that, and then you'll discuss the situation.

Mr. LE. We cannot do so because of the security. We must repeat that during 1968-1969 we have released nine of the pilots. But instead of taking this as a goodwill attitude by the Vietnamese, Mr. Nixon turned it into a campaign of slander and distortion against us.

Mr. HALPERN. The cause of peace would be enhanced if your side showed compassion on the prisoner of war issue. You would gain more trust by showing your good faith on this issue.

Mr. LE. I assume you are sentimental. We deem you understand we've been victims of many wars of aggression causing pain to millions of Vietnamese families and we deem it that American people should show compassion for Vietnamese families.

Mr. HALPERN. You talk about the feelings for peace in the United States. You mention demonstration. Of course Americans want peace, but that doesn't mean it must be purely on your terms. Let me assure you the American people are completely united on the prisoner of war issue. That is why if you were smart you'd be willing to fulfill what is not only in accord with the Geneva Convention but recognized international practice and allow a third party—an international inspection—to verify your claims of humane treatment. You would allow the internment of the sick and wounded to a neutral country. You would supply us with continuing complete lists of prisoners.

Mr. LE. Let me assure you they are treated well—very well. People have seen this: it has been certified and reported in your press. You call take our word for the good treatment.

Mr. HALPERN. Can I go to visit the captive pilots and see this for myself?

Mr. LE. I said earlier many people have verified the good treatment and good care and this has been written in the press throughout the world, including the American press. But for the security reasons I mentioned we must refrain from visits.

Mr. HALPERN. I find it impossible to accept that reasoning on a subject of basic humanity, not to mention the principles of the Geneva Convention and international practice. As a first step, the American administration has proposed a repatriation of all prisoners or their internment in a neutral country. I fervently ask that you reconsider your policy and agree to this.

You mention support in the United States for disengagement. By supporting proposals for disengagement, it certainly doesn't mean agreement with all your positions. But the advocates would like to take seriously your assurances of intentions to negotiate a just and lasting peace. I appeal to you for a more enlightened, more compassionate and humanitarian policy—in keeping with your earlier remarks to me about Vietnamese ideals—on the captive pilots. Your present policy has greatly damaged your posture and is jeopardizing support for the peace effort.

Mr. LE. There is absolutely no problem, provided a date is set. Meanwhile we give our word we are giving the best treatment.

Mr. HALPERN. It is impossible for me to understand why you refuse to sit down and negotiate for peace here in Paris. You say you will not talk to the representatives of the Saigon regime. You know who they were when you accepted to join these talks. They're the same people. If you're serious about wanting peace, then why not sit down and get these talks moving. Then use as a basis of negotiations your concept of what the Saigon government should be. In other words, you'd
say “Okay we'll talk,” and then give your terms regarding the personnel of a proposed new government. Mr. Le. We join with the PRG in our position that we will talk to anyone in the Saigon administration other than Thieu, Ky and Khiem . . . anyone who believes in democracy, peace, neutrality and independence. And the proposal for a new government in South Viet-Nam by the PRG was meant to reach national accord—harmony. So the problem is clear. Who wants peace; who wants war; who wants union; who does not. I am trying to be very frank with you.

STATEMENT BY PRG DEPUTY SPOKESMAN NGUYEN VAN TIEN TO CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN

I would like to give you our point of view. The United States has sent expeditionary troops to South Viet-Nam to wage a war of aggression. In order to end the war the United States must—

1. End aggression;
2. Withdraw all its forces as soon as possible and the sooner the better;
3. Let South Viet-Nam run its internal affairs without interruption;
4. In so doing not only would the war end, but also favorable conditions would be created for friendly bonds between the people of the United States and South Viet-Nam.

As a matter of fact—and this is another problem—in launching the war of aggression against South Viet-Nam, the United States has installed their puppet administration and is using it as an instrument to carry out its war of aggression. This is an old trick resorted to by all kinds of aggressors. So, in order to end the war and restore peace, the United States must withdraw its support of this administration and let the people of South Viet-Nam settle internal affairs. The Saigon administration, headed by Thieu/Ky/Khiem, is a corrupt, rotten, dictatorial, warlike administration which is hated by the South Vietnamese people who are struggling to demand the replacement of that administration by another administration which would be broadly representative—an administration that is democratic and stands for peace, independence and neutrality. It is unreasonable of the United States to waste untold lives of young Americans and to make many Americans get wounded as well as to waste billions of U.S. dollars to support such rotten and dictatorial administration.

By refusing to withdraw its support to this clique the Nixon Administration has shown that it is not willing to solve peacefully the South Viet-Nam problem. Instead, it is clinging to its scheme of using this clique to continue the war under the form of the Vietnamization program.

In our eight point peace initiative and our three point statement on the question of a cease-fire, we have stated clearly that since the United States has waged a war of aggression it must end this aggression and withdraw all its forces from South Viet-Nam. In September of 1970 in our eight point initiative and in December of 1970 in our three point statement on the cease-fire, we stated that if the Nixon Administration declares it will withdraw all its forces from South Viet-Nam by June 30, 1971, then a cease-fire will be immediately implemented between the U.S. forces and South Viet-Nam's People's Liberation Armed Forces. And our side would take measures to assure safety for American troops who are withdrawing or preparing to withdraw and at the same time the parties would enter immediately into talks on the question of the release of the captured military men.

Since then, until now, the Nixon Administration has refused to declare the withdrawal of all forces by June 30, 1971. This proves that the Nixon Administration has paid no attention to end the war in South Viet-Nam. And at the same time the war is not only in South Viet-Nam but also is being expanded into Cambodia and Laos. The operation into Laos in February of this year has revealed that the Nixon Administration is obstinately intensifying and prolonging the war. At the same time the United States has bombed and shelled the territory of North Viet-Nam by aircraft, warships, and artillery. This shows that the United States is plunging itself deeper into the war in Indochina.

If the United States Government really wants to put an end to war and solve the Viet-Nam problem and if it had declared total withdrawal of its forces from Viet-Nam by June 30, 1971, a short time after we made public the eight point peace initiative, then by now the war could well already have been ended. And
all the American troops as well as all American captured personnel would have been returned home safely.

But the Nixon Administration refuses to accept such a deadline by saying that June 30, 1971 set by our side is a unilateral proposal and that is why it cannot be accepted by the United States Government. Then we stated if for any reason the United States Government refuses to accept the June 30, 1971 deadline, then it propose another appropriate date and we will take this into consideration.

Up to now the United States Government has not shown any concern for the setting of date and still refuses to set a date for total withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam. Therefore, the public opinion all over the world and in the United States itself opposes the obstinacy of the Nixon Administration. As an obvious proof of this the meetings and demonstrations taking place all over the United States to show dissatisfaction of the American people of all strata and even in the United States Senate and House of Representatives a growing number of representatives are demanding that the administration set the date for total withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and disengagement from the Indochina war. In our point of view the American people who have taken such actions are for the mutual interests of the American and Vietnamese people. We think that this constitutes a pressure upon the Nixon Administration for an end to the war and withdrawal of all American forces for the sake of the development of the friendly bonds between the people of the United States and Vietnam.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN AND MR. NGUYEN VAN TIEN, PRG DELEGATION

(April 28, 1971)

Mr. Halpern. As one who has identified in the cause for peace and justice in Southeast Asia, and as one who is one of the sponsors of the Disengagement Act of 1971, I feel the American people would be more prone to support the efforts for peace if you people showed more flexibility and more evidence of good faith than that reflected by your rigid prerequisites and preconditions on what should be matters for the negotiations. I believe the American people want peace . . . that they seek it in good faith . . . but they want good faith in return.

And surely, as I said earlier, if you were smart, you would release the prisoners or at least the lists. That would help create a new atmosphere. Compassion and humanitarianism can do more to contribute to a just peace than words and might.

Mr. Tien. You misunderstand. Our positions are flexible. We have shown good will and a flexible position. Many flexible points are made in our 8-point peace initiative and three-point statement on the ceasefire. And as to the prisoners, let me say again, North Viet-Nam made public their lists of captured pilots. Do you think this has made the U.S. more flexible in negotiations?

Mr. Halpern. The American people and their representatives in the Congress—whether they support the Administration or not on the Viet-Nam issue—are completely united on the prisoner of war issue. All of us in the United States are concerned. Families are unknowing and are anguish by anxiety and speculation. It is just impossible for us to understand such inhuman policy that won't identify who the prisoners are: a policy that won't even allow mail. None of us can understand why you won't give us a list. In the name of compassion I bring the appeals of the American people for the release of the names. We don't care how you do it—through me, if you will, through Senator X, through the French, the Swedes, the Poles.

Mr. Tien. Don't forget there is still a war going on in South Viet-Nam—fighting against American transgressors. We cannot fulfill the lists because the list is being lengthened every day. We would have difficulties in doing this. One thing
we want to assure again and again to the American people and that is, we are
treating the captured men in a humane and very lenient way.

Mr. HALPERN. Only a few days ago I saw a news story in which the PRG called
on American soldiers to defect. They wouldn't be shot, etc. You'd help them go
anywhere they want... let them go home. If this is true, then obviously these
men would no longer be a threat to you militarily.

Tell me then, why don't you release the prisoners you hold? They will not be
used militarily again. They would have absolutely nothing to do with the war.
You can release them. Or at least you can identify them. Surely you should re­
lease the wounded and sick. Those who have been held prisoner pose no threat.
So wouldn't the net result be the same. Another thing, you are stupid not to
release the prisoners. It would be the smartest thing for you to do public re­
lationswise. The American people cannot accept your attitude and it causes not
only untold anguish, but hurts the goal for peace.

Mr. TIEN. The problem of the capture of military men is a problem connected
with the war itself. It is a problem to be dealt with as an aftermath of the war.
Generally speaking, it is only solved after the war is over. But in order to show
our good will, we have stated that the U.S. Government needs only to declare an
appropriate date for the total withdrawal of its troops from South Viet-Nam.
Then we are ready immediately to enter into talks on procedures and ways to
release the captured men.

The discussions will be on how to release the men. The question is not on
whether we will release them or not. We will agree to release the men. The dis­
cussions would be on procedures to expedite the release.

Let me also point out another fact. North Viet-Nam released a complete list of
American captive pilots even though the bombing is still going on. Yet, this did
not deter the United States from its position. The bombings are still going on
and very fiercely.

So it would not deter U.S. aggressiveness if we gave the lists. But we are
not able to do so anyway. We would have great difficulties to fulfill the list of
captured men.

Mr. HALPERN. But it would be the right thing to do. It would show real evi­
dence of good faith. And it would be the humane, decent thing to do. And you
profess how humane you are.

Mr. TIEN. We want to release all American captured men—not only make
the list public—but to release all. In this we think you and your colleagues instead
of raising this problem here, should exert more pressure with the U.S. Govern­
ment to end aggression, set a date for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Mr. HALPERN. I can only emphasize that your refusal to give a list can only
hurt the cause of peace and it is stupid on your part to maintain this attitude.

Mr. TIEN. The other side of the table—the U.S. and South Vietnam adminis­
trations, up until now refuse to enter into serious negotiations and talk directly
with us then the problems would be more easily settled. As for the Saigon dele­
gation, it reflects warlike policy which is seeking a military victory which doesn't
desire to end the war. So how can we reach a solution with such a delegation.

Only a few days ago, Thieu declared peace should be achieved through a
military victory, i.e., the Saigon government wants to stick to the U.S. in order
to get all-sided aid from the USA and in order to prolong the war. That is why
in order to reach serious negotiations the U.S. must not give support to this re­
gime. Let the South Viet-Nam population set up a coalition government of their
desires and then we are ready to talk to such a government.

Mr. HALPERN. Do you think the U.S. can dismantle the government of Saigon?

Mr. TIEN. If the U.S. wants to, of course, it can. Now the Nixon Administration
continues to support this clique.

Mr. HALPERN. The Administration says it will support whatever the people
want. They have assured they will support a political solution that guarantees
this self-determination.

Mr. TIEN. One thing I would like to add. We have been pursuing a very flexible
position. Since the beginning of the Peace Conference we have put forth many
proposals in order to settle the problem, but all have been rejected by the
American government and we think that now, the U.S. Government must take
steps toward peace. And the key to peace is in the Nixon Administration's hands.

Mr. HALPERN. You have questioned the good faith of my government. Isn't
President Nixon's policy of rapid withdrawal of troops evidence of U.S. good
faith?
Mr. TIEN. We have no confidence in Mr. Nixon. He talks about peace, but he intensifies the war of aggression in the name of Vietnamization. And now it is expanded in all of Indochina. That is why we say President Nixon is speaking about peace, but is actually intensifying war.

Mr. HALPERN. How can you say it is intensified if troops are rapidly being reduced?

Mr. TIEN. It is being intensified by air and artillery forces. As far as the Vietnamization program is concerned, this actually means a continuation of the war. It means the puppet Saigon troops will fight in place of U.S. troops with maximum air and artillery support—and logistic support of the USA.

Mr. HALPERN. This question is a very simple, but a very realistic one. Why in the world can't the Vietnamese get together and talk? Why can't you sit down and negotiate without prerequisite conditions involving issues that should be the basis of the talks? When you came to Paris you said you'd talk to them. They're the same people now as then. Why can't you get together? How can peace be resolved without negotiation. You agreed to meet. Now you say you won't talk. You must face reality. Why don't you get talking and take up your proposals at the table but don't impose them before getting started.

You must understand the realities that exist. The government of Saigon—regardless of what you may think of the individuals—recognizes this realization.

Mr. TIEN. Because of the rottenness of the present administration in Saigon, that is why we demand the U.S. renounce support of such a regime. We will gladly accept representation of the Saigon Government, but not Thieu-Ky-Khien—we will talk and work with any persons from the administration who stand for peace, neutrality and independence.

Mr. HALPERN. You are asking the United States to renounce the South Vietnam Administration—to depose it? But you would impose your concept of what the government should be. The United States doesn't want to impose or depose. We have made it clear that we will accept a political decision that would give the people of South Vietnam the opportunity to decide their own future. Also, aren't you preconditioning a viewpoint that should be the subject of the talks you refuse to participate in?

Mr. TIEN. We will not discuss the matter with Thieu-Ky-Khien. Just as I stated, we will be pleased to talk to anyone else within the administration who believes in peace, independence and neutrality.

Mr. HALPERN. But whomever would represent these stands would have to be cleared by the PRG. You would have the veto power. Isn't that the same as imposing?

Mr. TIEN. That is not correct. The provisional coalition government will comprise of three segments: (1) members of the PRG, (2) members of the Saigon Administration with the exception of Thieu-Ky-Khien. We will take anyone who believes in peace, neutrality, and independence, and (3) persons of other forces aside from the above—other political forces. The membership of the provisional government would be decided through discussions of these three segments. Discussions would decide how many members there should be in the government and what representation each segment would have.

Mr. HALPERN. You mentioned that the people of South Vietnam would settle their internal affairs. Through what means?

Mr. TIEN. Through free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam.

Mr. HALPERN. Would you accept international observers?

Mr. TIEN. The provisional coalition government comprising the segments mentioned would have the task of holding free and democratic general elections. That problem would be decided by this government.

Mr. HALPERN. Isn't this a subject for negotiation at the table?

Mr. TIEN. We think this will be a subject for discussion within the provisional coalition government. It is not a difficult problem.

Mr. HALPERN. The American people want more than rhetoric—or generalities—or simplistic, unrealistic formulas for peace. And this is what seems to be coming from your side. And what else seems to confuse the American people as to your good faith, is your constant reference to the word “consider” after you would gain certain conditions. People don't understand. Why only consider? Why don't you say you will do this; you will do that. Then we would know where we stand.

Mr. TIEN. We didn't state we would “consider” a cease-fire. We said it would be observed. It's the first point in our three-point statement. We will observe a cease-fire and will enter into talks.
Let me say there are many problems that could be settled immediately, such as the problem of a cease-fire. The cease-fire would be immediately observed. We will take measures to assure the safety of American troops as they prepare their withdrawals. But there are other problems that need certain discussions and then there is the question of carrying out the other problems, i.e., the question of release of captured military men, the discussion on the ways on how we can conduct it. We would talk immediately on the question of release if you announced a date. And concerning a date, by that I mean a most appropriate date for a rapid cease-fire.

Mr. Halpern. Let me get back on the issue of the prisoners. Will you reconsider your withholding of the names and make them available through whatever means you feel most appropriate.

Mr. Ten. We will take into consideration your ideas on the prisoners.

Mr. Halpern. Earlier I mentioned my bewilderment at the PRO’s stark refusal to recognize the South’s representation at the table. As I said, you knew who they were when you accepted to join these talks. Should not the differences you have be the very basis of the talks themselves. Recently I met with Vice President Kr in Saigon and he certainly has indicated a willingness to discuss the issues. He feels in order to go further there must be a form of reconciliation—some flexibility to negotiate aims.

Mr. Ten. Nobody can believe him.

Mr. Halpern. Obviously there is an impasse. Each must yield—even a little. We have yielded more than a little and have made clear our flexibility. I certainly feel there would be a lot more progress toward peace if the American people were to hear of some deviation from the rigid position of your side.

Incidentally, in your comments earlier about the large demonstrations and meetings in the United States and the growing number of Congressmen and Senators who support a disengagement date. I wish to take issue. You are reading these reports wrongly. They want this war to end. Of course, they do. I believe all Americans do. Through whatever formula they think best. I am among those who support a disengagement date. But I do so because I want negotiations for a lasting peace to get underway. So wanting peace is one thing, but for you to think it reflects full support of your terms is another thing.

Mr. Gallagher. How do they feel about our withdrawing?

Mr. Halpern. They expressed the opinion that they would release the prisoners without qualification whatsoever, if we would announce a withdrawal date.

I am glad you raised that. I meant to clarify that. There has been much question as to the language. Heretofore, it has been stated that they said they would first discuss the question of the prisoners of war, if we set a withdrawal date. They clarified that to me. They said that there is no question but that they will release the prisoners by discussions. They meant the logistics, they meant the procedures, the way to release the prisoners.

So here is an opportunity for us to call their bluff. Here is an opportunity for us to pass legislation or a resolution to establish a withdrawal date, and in it let’s have the stipulation that it be contingent upon the release of our prisoners of war.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.

Mr. du Pont.

Mr. du Pont. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Robison. I apologize for having walked out in the middle of your testimony. I am glad to have been back in time, particularly as much as I recognize that these are hearings and not discussions that we members of the subcommittee have. However, I am constrained to say that as long as we have the gentleman on my left entering into the record the testimony of his conversation in Paris, I would like to add that it is incredible to me that anyone would sincerely believe that
an unofficial, informal source of conversations with the North Vietnamese would give us anything but misleading and very much propaganda-oriented material. I had a discussion with Mr. Rosenthal yesterday concerning this topic, and I think that as long as it is going to follow Mr. Halpern's comments in the record, I just would like to disassociate myself from any belief that negotiation can go on between senior partners, junior partners, and middle partners at the same time.

Mr. Robison, I have been looking at your resolution and actually I think you are to be complimented for it. I think it comes very close to the mark. One particular item disturbs me. On page 3 in line 12, the last of the resolved clauses, that it is the further sense of Congress that all U.S. Armed Forces be withdrawn from Indochina.

Now we get back again to the question of Thailand, of what the definition of Indochina is. I am very much in agreement with you that we must remove our military forces from fighting in South Vietnam, including personnel that we have in Thailand. But what of military personnel in Thailand that might be doing things other than flying Vietnam missions? I would hope you might state what your thoughts are.

Mr. Robison, may I address myself to that again. My thought was to encompass only former French Indochina, which would not include Thailand.

Mr. du Pont. That would be Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams.

Mr. Robison. Yes.

Mr. du Pont. I think that clarification would help considerably. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

I again apologize for leaving in the middle of your presentation.

Mr. Gallagher. Thank you very much, Mr. Robison.

Mr. Robison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gallagher. Our next witness is Hon. Spark M. Matsunaga, one of the most energetic and effective Members of the House of Representatives, a member of the Committee on Rules. Mr. Matsunaga is a Democrat of Hawaii and will testify in favor of H.R. 4102, the Vietnam Disengagement Act. I am sure the subcommittee will hear a valuable statement.

We apologize for the lateness of the hour, Mr. Matsunaga, but it has been unavoidable. It has been with a great deal of interest that this subcommittee has followed your efforts to bring this war to a conclusion.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII

Mr. Matsunaga. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I first would like to commend you for holding these hearings on the proposed Vietnam Disengagement Act and other pending legislation relating to the war in Vietnam. I am happy to learn that great interest has been shown by the Members of the Congress.

These hearings may well be the most important hearings held by any committee in the 92d Congress. They are directed, as I understand it, at finding the best and quickest way to end our involvement.
in the war in Vietnam, and certainly there is no more urgent matter than that before the American people today.

Our participation in that conflict is now in the beginning of its second decade, making it the longest war in our Nation's history. Without question, it is also the most tragic and most unwanted war.

The human costs alone are almost beyond comprehension. We have heard the shameful statistics before, but we cannot allow their repetition to dull our sensitivities. More than 50,000 American lives have been lost; total American casualties number more than a quarter million. About 1,600 American soldiers have been captured by the enemy or are missing in action.

South Vietnam counts 150,000 lives lost in combat, and more than a million combined civilian and military casualties. Our Defense Department sets North Vietnamese combat deaths at 742,000, or a total almost equal to the entire population of my home State of Hawaii.

Costs in money are also enormous. In this country alone, over $100 billion have been diverted from urgent domestic needs to conduct the war that everybody wants terminated.

And the highest cost may, in the end, be the tearing apart of the fabric of American society. From 12,000 miles away, this conflict in a remote area of the world is setting parent against child, old against young, frustrated citizens against established institutions.

The time has come to say, "Enough." In so doing, we will, in effect, be catching up with the American people. Five months ago, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 75 percent—almost three in four of those surveyed—told pollsters they favored congressional initiatives to end the Indochina War by December 31, 1971. That is precisely the goal of the Vietnam Disengagement Act.

That bill would set a deadline of December 31, 1971, for the withdrawal of all American ground, air and naval forces from Indochina. Beyond that date, funds would remain available only for (1) arranging the return of prisoners; (2) providing for asylum or other means of assuring the safety of South Vietnamese who might be endangered by our withdrawal; and (3) offering such assistance to the Republic of Vietnam as the Congress approves.

All of us, undoubtedly, want to see the termination of American involvement in this seemingly interminable war. But many Members of Congress, including members of this very subcommittee, may have serious reservations about setting a definite date for complete U.S. pullout, just as the President has. Generally, these reservations are based on two reasons:

First, that we would be surrendering our bargaining position for the early release of our prisoners of war;

Second, that we would, by withdrawing at the end of this year, be forsaking South Vietnam in its struggle against Communist aggressors.

Let me address myself first to the prisoner-of-war question. It is undeniable that the Government of North Vietnam has consistently flouted the covenants of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, despite the fact that it agreed in 1957 to abide by those covenants, and we have no guarantee that it will abide by its declared intentions. But it is the sad truth that Hanoi has repeatedly announced that it will not even begin to negotiate for the release
of American prisoners of war until we have set a definite date for the withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam.

Unfortunately, our prisoners have become pawns in a chess game of war and politics. President Nixon refuses to set a date certain until Hanoi makes a commitment to release our prisoners; Hanoi refuses to make such a commitment until a date certain is set for withdrawal of all American troops. Like the question of the "chicken or the egg" we find ourselves without a solution.

If, as the administration now seems to be planning, we are going to leave 50,000 residual American troops in Vietnam to insure the return of our prisoners of war, we can expect the North Vietnamese to continue to hold them. Inasmuch as we are at a complete stalemate on this issue, we have nothing really to lose by taking the bold initiative of setting December 31, 1971, as that date certain.

The President has also indicated that the return of our prisoners is not the only consideration. He believes that we cannot "bug out" on Saigon until it has established a viable government.

I submit, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, that South Vietnam now has as viable a government as it can ever have. The fact is that South Vietnam today has more than a million men in its regular armed forces and another half million in militia-type forces—one man in five is formally under arms. We have been told in recent months about substantial South Vietnamese military successes in Cambodia and Laos. One of our top civilian advisers in Vietnam, John Vann, noted in a national news magazine interview last month that Saigon has extended its control of the countryside to the point where many Vietnamese believe the war to be all but over. Mr. Vann concluded, "If the South Vietnamese don't succeed from here on out, it cannot be blamed on the lack of U.S. support."

If anything, setting a definite date for the total withdrawal of our troops will have a healthy effect on Saigon's fighting capability. It would serve notice on that Government's leaders that the United States is not about to leave its combat forces in Vietnam forever, and that they had better undertake fully the responsibility for their own defense.

Setting December 31, 1971, as the date for total pullout of U.S. Armed Forces from Indochina, therefore, will have several positive effects:

- The door will be opened for the return of our prisoners of war;
- The Saigon government will be forced to assume, once and for all, the full responsibility of its own defense;
- We can put to rest the terrible divisiveness which has started to sour American life.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I urge your approval of H.R. 4102, the Vietnam Disengagement Act.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Mr. GALGAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman Matsunaga.

Congressman, you represent the area of the United States which is closest to the fighting in Indochina. I recall one of the major arguments advanced during the escalation period went something like this: "To avoid fighting on the beaches of Hawaii, we have to stop the Communists in Vietnam. Did your constituents ever find great merit to that argument?"
Mr. MATSUNAGA. For a while, Mr. Chairman, I will state that because of the closeness of our State to Vietnam, perhaps more than in any other State the people of Hawaii were hawkish in effect. As a matter of fact, the first troops to go to Vietnam were from Hawaii and as a consequence Hawaii has suffered the greatest percentage per capita of casualties of all States of the Union and it leads the second State by quite a wide margin.

But things have changed since the initial stages of the war. I for one perhaps reflect the attitude of my own constituency. I at one time was a dove contrary to the popular position in Hawaii at that time. I opposed the bombing of North Vietnam, I opposed the intercession in Vietnam. Despite the fact that the President was of the same political party as myself, I was one of the thorns in the President's side. Then I did take a trip to South Vietnam in 1965, spent about 6 weeks in that area, and came back with a conclusion that the President was doing the only thing that he could do under the circumstances and I began to support the President's policies. But then I always had deep reservations within myself and I have concluded that to begin with the entire thing was wrong, that we should not have been in there in the first place, and today I have reverted to my original position of opposing the war. I find it is true in Hawaii, as it is throughout the Nation, that 75 percent or more of the people are in favor of withdrawing our troops by the end of this year.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman Matsunaga. We do have a vote coming on and I am just wondering whether it might be possible for you to come back.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman, I am really delayed for another appointment at this time. I was expecting to go on at 3 o'clock, but as I can see there is great interest in this question. Unless there is a fast question, I could submit it in writing.

Mr. du Pont. There are no fast questions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Congressman.

Mr. HAFERN. I would like to commend our very interesting witness on his very good testimony, and I associate myself with the views you expressed.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Murphy. I agree with that statement.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you for your excellent contributions.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. I thank the chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will be adjourned until 2 p.m. tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, June 24, 1971.)