U.S. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR -- 1969-1972
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1967 as follows:
First, the attacks on the enemy mili-
tary targets have been on such a pro-
longed, graduated basis that the
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ample, inured themselves to the difficul-
ties and hardships accompanying the
war, dispersed their logistic support
system, and developed alternate trans-
port routes and a significant air de-
ense system.
Second, areas of sanctuary, contain-
ing important military targets, have
been afforded the enemy.
Third, covert operations in Cambod-
ia and Laos have been restricted.
Fourth, major importation of sup-
plies into NVN by sea has been permit-
ted.
On March 31, 1968, when President
Johnson announced to the American
people he would not seek reelec-
tion, he also restricted air strikes on North
Vietnam above a line that was soon set
at the 19th parallel. Then, on Novem-
ber 1, 1968, President Johnson or-
dered the complete cessation of bomb-
ing in North Vietnam. Only defensive
air operations were permitted until
the resumption of strategic bombing
in May of 1972.
During this bombing halt, U.S. air-
craft were prohibited from even
making protective reaction strikes into
North Vietnam unless the strike was
both below the 19th parallel and an
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emptive strikes against the maturing
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The rules of engagement were so
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March 1972, General Lavelle, com-
mander of the Seventh Air Force, was
relieved of duty for allegedly ordering
unauthorized raids against North Viet-
namese airfields and radar sites. Iro-
nically, during the same week General
Lavelle was recalled, North Vietnam
launched a major offensive against
South Vietnam and by the first week
of April the rules which he was ac-
cused of violating were already obso-
lete. Authority was granted in April to
use tactical airstrikes against SAM’s,
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the 18th parallel and protective reaction
strikes were authorized as far as the
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When President Nixon ordered the
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opened throughout North Vietnam
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secutive five days on B-52’s on a sustained basis for the first
time over the northern part of North
Vietnam. Hanoi reacted immediately
by returning to negotiations in Paris
and integrating the peace agreement
within 6 weeks.

Mr. President, on March 8 and 14, I
placed two documents in the Record
that were declassified recently at my
request. These materials were Air
Force reports examining the impact
of the rules of engagement during the
periods of 1960-65 and 1966-69, respect-
ively. Today I wish to make available
to my colleagues and the wide audi-
ence served by this Record, the third
and final of these reports, known as
Project Checo. The last report is en-
titled "Rules of Engagement November
1969-September 1972.”
These rules unquestionably denied a
military victory to allied forces in
South Vietnam, and I hope that histo-
rians will come to recognize the impor-
tance of these self-defeating restric-
tions in preventing the culmination of
military activities, an artifi-
cial handicap which must never
again cripple our Armed Forces.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

VIETNAM RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT—1969-1972
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
the Pentagon Papers reveal that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly
argued against the artificial limita-
tions, known as the rules of engage-
ment, that impeded the objectives of
our Nation in the Vietnam war. The
Chiefs pointed out that these self-im-
posed restraints allowed North Viet-
nam to receive war supporting materi-
al from external sources through
routes which for the most part were
immune from attack and then to dis-
perse and store this material in politi-
cally assured sanctuaries from which
it was infiltrated to South Vietnam
and Laos. The relatively un molested
receipt of supplies from Russia, China,
and Soviet satellite countries contribu-
ted to Hanoi’s belief in ultimate vic-
tory.
A few civilian advisers, such as Walt
Rostow, reasoned that systematic and
sustained bombing of war-making re-
sources in North Vietnam would have
decisive results, but Secretaries of De-
fense McNamara and Clifford, especi-
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limitations on military operations. The
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Record, as follows:

PROJECT CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL EXAM-
INATION OF CURRENT OPERATIONS REPORT
(Rules of engagement, November 1969-
September 1972)

(1 March 1973, HQ PACAF, Directorate of
Operations Analysis, CHECO/Corona
Harvest Division)
(Prepared by Capt. Paul W. Elder and Capt.
Peter J. Melly)

PROJECT CHECO REPORTS
The sources of intelligence and unconvention-
al warfare environment of Southeast Asia
has resulted in USAF airpower being em-
ployed to meet a multitude of requisites.
The varied applications involved the full
spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support
equipment, and manpower. As a result, the successful
uses have accumulated which should be collect-
d, documented, and analyzed for current
and future impact upon USAF policies, con-
cepts, and doctrine.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE
March 18, 1975

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting Air Force strike controllers and crew members to trim examination on the strike operations are in SEAs.

Besides their own ROE training, the strike controllers and crew members to trim examination on the strike controllers and crew members to trim examination on the strike operations are in SEAs.

(1) The ROE for the November 1971-March 1972 period in NAY are presented in Chapter V under "Protective Reaction Strikes."
March 18, 1985

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
S 3013

The dual U.S. goals in Laos were to support the neutrality of Laos and to hinder the infiltration of North Vietnamese men and supplies into South Vietnam. The American Air Force projected a detailed plan to interdict the border area. The principal measures were identified as: (1) the construction of a group of tactical airfields; (2) the use of air power to interdict the enemy's movement along the border; and (3) the use of air power to support ground forces in Laos. The ROE for the DMZ, modified in 1972, was as follows:

- Strikes within 2,000 meters of the border were prohibited.
- Strikes within 200 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft.
- Strikes within 100 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.
- Strikes within 50 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.
- Strikes within 25 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.
- Strikes within 12.5 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.
- Strikes within 6.25 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.
- Strikes within 0 meters of the border were limited to FAC/FAG-controlled aircraft with prior approval.

The ROE also included a provision for the use of area denial munitions. Area denial munitions are designed to prevent the enemy from using certain areas for military purposes. They are typically used to create no-go zones or to prevent the enemy from using specific locations for military operations.

The use of area denial munitions in Laos was part of a broader strategy to support the Laotian government and its allies in their efforts to maintain control of the country. The ROE was intended to ensure that the use of force was proportional to the threat posed by the enemy and that civilian populations were not harmed.

In conclusion, the ROE for the DMZ in Laos was critical to the effectiveness of American military operations in supporting the Laotian government and its allies in their efforts to maintain control of the country. The ROE was designed to ensure that the use of force was proportional to the threat posed by the enemy and that civilian populations were not harmed. The ROE was also designed to support the Laotian government and its allies in their efforts to maintain control of the country. The ROE was critical to the success of American military operations in Laos.
February 1972, a special night SOA existed within the Raven box on the southern half of the Plain of Jars. There, the ROE for SOA allowed considerable freedom of action at night but the rules for the Raven box applied during daylight hours. Figure 3 shows the location of the Raven box and SOAs in southern Laos encompassing the major LOCs from Laos into Cambodia.

At the same time, the ROE in LR West were becoming less restrictive, those in LR East were being tightened. The Chinese had begun to move troops closer to the east-west road they had been constructing within the southern boundary of LR North. Later in 1969, the spurt began to emerge from LR West in the Nam Bev Valley where U.S. air operations were authorized. While the Royal Laotian Government was deciding its policy toward the road, an interim ban was placed on low level reconnaissance and combat strikes within five kilometers either side of the road. Apparently the Laotian policy was to avoid the road because, early in 1970, the restriction became permanent from Muong Sai to Muong Houn. Later in June 1971 it was modified for SL West to require that SOA be authorized for SL West by CINCPAC and the JCS. By October 1971, this last restriction was lifted permitting the North Vietnamese to ship supplies to the Cambodia/RVN border area within the southern boundary of Bac North.

Late in 1969, the spur began to emerge from the Thai border. Soon after that, the so-called Laos Border was placed on low level reconnaissance and combat strikes within 500 meters either side of the road. Apparently the Lao regime was trying to extend the restriction as road construction and anti-aircraft installations were developed within certain cities, unless ground fire was received from the VC. However, within the first five weeks of May, "higher authority" requested the JCS prepare an outline plan for air interdiction operations in eastern Cambodia. This apparently was motivated by intelligence estimates that the enemy would attempt to consolidate his positions in northwestern Cambodia by air striking LOCs from Laos into Cambodia in preparation for renewed efforts in South Vietnam.

The plan drafted by JCS called for interdicting LOCs, storage sites, supply dumps, and movement of men and material along the LOCs; air support of friendly troops in the vicinity of LOCs and the control of air traffic. The JCS had patterned the target validation procedure after that for Laos in that the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, or its designated representatives, would validate all targets and areas of operation. The JCS specified some ROE but there were few specific ones for Laos other than restricted areas. Ordinarily, FACs would control all strikes but fighter aircraft would be allowed to strike any sites in Cambodia firing at U.S. aircraft. ARC LIGHT strikes would be conducted against targets a minimum of one kilometer from the nearest combatants and not less than three kilometers from friendly troops. B-52 target areas could not contain monuments, temples, or other historical landmarks.

In a message to CINCPAC regarding the JCS outline plan, General Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV, envisioned validation procedures involving both U.S. and Vietnamese FACs. According to one report, the American FACs were required to sign a document attesting that the expanded air operations would entail no more close air support than interdiction because the Allied forces had overrun the majority of the enemy base areas in the north of the Vietnamese border area and established new ones. Finally, General Abrams recommended a meeting between PANK, RVNAF, and MACV representatives be held in Saigon to implement target validation procedures.

The JCS transmitted the execute message for operation plan on 24 May. This interdiction was later nicknamed Freedom Deal, was that part of Cambodia bounded by a line 200 meters west of the Mekong River on the west, the north, the RVN border on the east, and Route 13 on the south. Strikes outside that area would require prior approval of the JCS. The plan as transmitted in the execute message was still an interdiction plan but the JSC had modified it to reflect General Abrams' recommendations. Thus, the American Embassy was removed from the normal target validation procedure. The JCS continued in the requirement for a coordination meeting between PANK, RVNAF, and MACV representatives to develop target identification procedures and means to prevent noncommunist ships from being involved. This meeting was held on 29 May 1970 in Saigon. The result was a memorandum of agreement, "Rules of Engagement-Cambodia".

The ROE promulgated in the memorandum were very similar to those for South Vietnam. FACs would control all tactical fixed and moving aircraft except for those lost in radar controlled attacks. The PANK would validate all targets. Aircraft could return ground fire immediately if not from an urban area, town, village or hamlet to which case PANK approval was required.

In general, air strikes could not be directed at an inhabited area unless only enemy forces and was validated for strike by the PANK. As in South Vietnam and Laos, the ROE provided for special operating areas wherein all targets were prosecuted only by the PANK and aircraft could attack any enemy target without further approval.

Unique to Cambodian ROE were prevalidated Category A and B lines of communication along which enemy targets could be attacked with air strikes. The LOCs comprising Category A LOCs were those along which there were friendly personnel, traffic, installations, or dwellings. Those aircraft could expect up to five monthly expected targets within 1000 meters on either side of the road or waterway. Category B LOCs were those within which there were only enemy forces and was validated for strike by the PANK. As in South Vietnam and Laos, the ROE provided for special operating areas wherein all targets were prosecuted only by the PANK and aircraft could attack any enemy target without further approval.

Since 1966, Prince Norodom Sihanouk had permitted the North Vietnamese to ship supplies into Cambodia through the port of Sihanoukville. The ports of Sihanoukville, Prey Dijk, and Haiphong were all within range of CAMPA air operations. At the same time, Prince Sihanouk refused the use of Cambodian airspace for U.S. air operations. Consequently, the NVA had to establish procedures for the collection of intelligence and weapons. The other complicating factor was that the Laotian government had refused to allow the SOA as long as there were English speaking PANK liaison officers stationed at Pleiku AB, RVN. They had renewed contact with Sihanouk and other FACs and with the authority to validate targets of opportunity, they facilitated immediate acquisition of information during the 14 September 1972. Their Raven box and SOAs in southern Laos encompass the major LOCs from Laos into Cambodia.

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March 18, 1985

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S 3015

attacks against fleeting enemy targets. Later, TAP further tightened the validation process by requiring that all such strikes be approved by TAP TACC only. In that case, a Cambodian observation pilot would also be present to report the target, since a Cambodian reconnaissance pilot would be present to report the target, since a Cambodian reconnaissance pilot would be present to report the target.

Additionally, the Secretary of State has conducted her own evaluations showing concern over possible damage to TAP, and has asked TAP to report on the situation. The Secretary of State's evaluation, however, is not intended as a recommendation, although TAP may consider her recommendation. TAP TACC continued to report on the situation.

With the beginning of U.S. military operations in Cambodia, the U.S. government felt that Cambodia could be saved from a communist-type government, and that U.S. military forces would be needed to support the Cambodian government. The U.S. government also felt that U.S. forces would be needed to support the Cambodian government, and that U.S. military forces would be needed to support the Cambodian government. The U.S. government also felt that U.S. forces would be needed to support the Cambodian government, and that U.S. military forces would be needed to support the Cambodian government.

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In March 1970, the JCS authorized TAF to conduct tactical reconnaissance and a one-time strike on the site of any SAM! sites and logistic targets in NVN along Route 1 west of Barthelemy Pass. The authority for these actions was a slight relaxation of the ROE for later that month the JCS advised TAF that preplanned attacks against SAM sites in the Route 1 area were the only site fired at U.S. forces during the course of normal U.S. operations. Then on 10 June 1970, preplanned July 10th attacks at South Vietnamese by State William Rogers described the May 10th as suppressive fire to prevent reconnaissance flights over NVN. He stated that each of an attack by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy against targets on the south of 20 degree were authorized if the sites were identified and available for mission over NVN. This added protection to aircraft flying tactical reconnaissance below 19N.

At the beginning of May 1970 the JCS authorized armed reconnaissance and strikes against targets in NVN within 20 NM of the Laotian border. They also permitted a few strikes along the routes in NVN leading to the Mu Gia and Barthelemy passes and against ground targets in the area. The Secretary of Defense, Dr. Laird, and U.S. aircraft were conducting protectionist actions against SAM/AAA defenses pose a threat to the strike force. The necessary preconditions will be taken to avoid endangering third country shipping. Aim points will be located no closer than 500 NM to any third country shipping in the Dong Ho transtshipment point area.

(3) Air-to-air combat is authorized against hostile SAM/AAA defenses.

(4) SAR operations in NVN are authorized as requested for recovery of aircrews.

(5) A new term was applied to the next "special mission" conducted in November 1970 under the name Freedom Batt.

On 21 November, TAF executed Operation Freedom Batt against SAM sites, POL storage, and airfields in NVN below 19N. The plan called for armed reconnaissance along heavily used infiltration routes. A Department of Defense spokesman described the operations as "protective reaction strikes" in response to enemy attacks on unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. He noted that these strikes were consistent with earlier Secretary of Defense statements that the U.S. was ready to take appropriate action in response to attacks on unarmad reconnaissance aircraft, to major military targets, and to the destruction of the major South Vietnamese cities. Saigon and Hue had been shelled on November 20th.

Operation Freedom Batt was followed by a series of protective reaction strikes against increasing SAM threat to B-52 and other aircraft operating in designated urban areas and SAM/AAA defended areas. These operations, conducted below 19N, included an armed reconnaissance effort to capture or destroy SAM/AAA associated equipment and installations located by the reconnaissance. The series of operations was nicknamed Louisville Slugger.

The Louisville Slugger authorities were originally for strikes against SAM/AAA sites in the Khe Sanh-Karl/Route 137 area and to be phased out of November 1971; however, on January 1972, they were extended on a case-by-case basis through February. Many of the targets were located in Route Package 1 (RP 1)1) where the ROE permitted reconnaissance to strike only in response to hostile fire. However, Louisville Slugger authorities permitted armed reconnaissance to locate and destroy SAM and SAM associated equipment in NVN south of 20N and east of 100W, and to conduct missions below 18N.

The ROE and Prize Bull were typical:

(1) Protective reaction strikes north of the described arc (northern boundary of operational area) are authorized when SAM/AAA defenses pose a threat to the strike force.

(2) Necessary precautions will be taken to avoid endangering third country shipping. Aim points will be located no closer than 500 NM to any third country shipping in the Dong Ho transhipment point area.

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"The current air force operating authority allows immediate protective reaction strikes against SAM/AAA sites which fire at aircraft or is activated against aircraft. I urge you to make maximum use of the existing authority for immediate reaction to SAM/AAA sites in NVN and, AAA in NVN, and provide a one-time strike on the site of any SAM/AAA site which fires at, or is activated against, our aircraft. I urge you to make maximum use of the existing authority for immediate reaction to SAM/AAA sites in NVN and, AAA in NVN, and provide a one-time strike on the site of any SAM/AAA site which fires at, or is activated against, our aircraft."
March 18, 1985

Congressional Record — Senate

S 3017

Air Force/Seal of Independence.

On 25 October 1972, on the 20th anniversary of the Vietnam Peace
Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the United States
would begin a phased withdrawal of its forces from Vietnam. The
withdrawal was to be completed by the end of 1973. The
announcement came as a surprise to many in the United States,
who had been led to believe that the United States would remain in
Vietnam for an indefinite period of time.

On 26 October 1972, General William Westmoreland, the
commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, announced that the
•

U.S. forces would begin pulling out of Vietnam by the end of the year.

On 27 October 1972, President Richard Nixon announced that the
United States would begin a phased withdrawal of its forces from
Vietnam. The withdrawal was to be completed by the end of 1973.

The withdrawal was a major victory for the United States, which
had been involved in the Vietnam War for 10 years. The
withdrawal was also a major victory for the Vietnamese people, who
had been fighting for their independence for many years.

The withdrawal was not without its problems, however. The
Vietnamese people were not convinced that the United States was
taking the withdrawal seriously, and there were many who felt that
the United States was. leaving Vietnam too quickly. The
withdrawal was also seen as a setback for the United States in its
efforts to maintain its global power.

The withdrawal was a major event in the history of the United States,
and it had a major impact on the country. The withdrawal was a
symbol of the end of the Vietnam War, and it was a major step
forward in the development of the United States as a world power.
Congressional Record—Senate

March 18, 1969

Glossary

AAA—Anti-aircraft artillery.
AMEDD—Army Medical Department.
ARC LIGHT—(S) B-52 operations in Southeast Asia.
BR—Barrel Roll.
COMUSMACV—Commander, United States Marine Corps, Vietnam.
DACS—Deputy Chief of Staff.
DMZ—Demilitarized Zone.
EO/LGB—Electro-optical/laser guided bomb.
EW—Electronic Warfare.
FAC—Forward Air Controller.
FAG—Forward Air Guide.
FANE—Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (Cambodian Army).
GCI—Ground Controlled Intercept.
IRON HAND—(S) SAM and radar-controlled AAA suppression flown by specially equipped P-100 aircraft.
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.
LOC—Line of Communication.
MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MIG—Soviet-built jet fighter aircraft.
NM—Nautical Mile.
NVA—North Vietnamese Army.
NVN—North Vietnam.
POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.
POW—Prisoner of War.
PRC—People’s Republic of China.
ROE—Rules of Engagement.
RP—(S) Route Package—numbered interdiction areas in North Vietnam.
RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile.
SEA—Southeast Asia.
SECDEF—Secretary of Defense.
SI—Steel Tiger.
SOA—Special Operating Area.
TACAIR—Tactical Air.
TACC—Tactical Air Control Center.
TALOS/TERRIER—U.S. Navy ship-launched surface-to-air-missiles.
TFW—Tactical Fighter Wing.
TMO—Target Management Officer.
USMACV—United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
VCF—Viet Cong.
VNAF—Vietnam Air Force (South Vietnam).

APPENDIX—Continued

Rolling Thunder, 1968

1. Naval prohibited area was authorized through September 1968 with the following areas excluded: 1. No fire within 50 NM of the Chinese border from the border of Laos to the eastward to 110°45' W. 2. No fire within the border line of the Chinese border from 110°45' W. to the westward of Hanoi.

2. Except for strikes authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.

3. Naval prohibited area was authorized through September 1968 with the following areas excluded: 1. No fire within 50 NM of the center of Hanoi.

4. Naval prohibited area was authorized through September 1968 with the following areas excluded: 1. No fire within 50 NM from the center of Hanoi.

Rolling Thunder, 1968

1. Naval prohibited area was authorized through September 1968 with the following areas excluded: 1. No fire within 50 NM of the Chinese border from the border of Laos to the eastward to 110°45' W. 2. No fire within the border line of the Chinese border from 110°45' W. to the westward of Hanoi.

2. No fire authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.

3. No fire authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.

4. Naval prohibited area was authorized through September 1968 with the following areas excluded: 1. No fire within 50 NM from the center of Hanoi.

Rolling Thunder, 1968

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2. No fire authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.

3. No fire authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.

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4. No fire authorized against certain RVN line, bridges, and tunnels to be bokeh within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in the past 2 weeks I have placed in the Record three reports prepared by the Air Force explaining the effect and evolution of rules of engagement which hampered and restricted operations by the Armed Forces in the Vietnam war. These reports reveal that through 1968, the air campaign against North Vietnam was centered on attacking enemy lines of communication below Hanoi and Haiphong, while primary targets in the northeast, where the bulk of North Vietnamese war supporting resources were located, remained almost untouched.

The long delay in approving targets in North Vietnam and plenemal approval of such targets unquestionably contributed to our aircraft and pilot losses since it gave North Vietnam time to set up massive air defenses and to disperse its stocks of war supplies. One point on which military experts disagreed most vehemently with civilian managers, who dictated and wrote the rules of engagement, was the certainty among professional military men that these self-imposed restrictions greatly increased U.S. casualties.

Targets on the Joint Chiefs of Staff list could not be hit without the approval of the Secretary of Defense and other high civilian authority. As a result, the air campaign was less than optimum. For example, in 1966, as a result of this procedure, only 22 of 242 targets on the Joint Chiefs of Staff list of recommended fixed targets were struck.

The charge is untrue, although I know that some revisionist historians are trying to argue it, that military commanders did not press their views clearly or persistently. Anyone who takes the time to read book 6 of the Pentagon Papers, relative to the air war in North Vietnam, will find proof enough that the Joint Chiefs and commanders in the field repeatedly transmitted to the President and Secretary of Defense proposals for putting more pressure on North Vietnam. Over and over the Chiefs protested the artificial limitations impeding the achievement of our Nation’s objectives in the war.

To refute critics who obviously do not know what they are talking about, I will place in the Record excerpts from the Joint Chiefs’ bombing policy paper submitted by General Wheeler to the Clifford group in 1966. This was a senior group of advisors convened by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford from the State and Defense Departments, the CIA and the White House to review U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The cover memo for this paper noted that “General Wheeler would favor action to close the Port of Haiphong through mining or otherwise,” but a specific paper was not included since the general had received word that closing the ports was not an action President Johnson was going to consider, even as part of a comprehensive review. This fact itself illustrates what our military leadership was up against.

I ask that the paper written by the Joint Chiefs be included in the Congressional Record.

The excerpt follows:

TEXT OF VIETNAM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. The air campaign against North Vietnam is now entering the fourth year of operations. Only during the latter part of the past favorable weather season of April through October 1967, however, has a significant weight of effort been applied against the major target systems. During this period, even though hampered by continuous and temporarily imposed constraints, the air campaign made a marked impact on the capability of North Vietnam to prosecute the war. Unfortunately, this impact was rapidly overcome.

The constraints on operations and the change in the monsoon weather provided North Vietnam with numerous opportunities to recuperate from the effects of the air strikes. Facilities were built and reconstructed and dispersal of the massive material aid from communist countries continued.

2. The viability of the North Vietnam military posture results from the availability of adequate assets received from communist countries which permits defense of the homeland and support of insurgency in the South.

3. A coordinated and sustained air campaign could hamper severely the North Vietnamese war effort and the continued support of aggression throughout Southeast Asia. An integrated interdiction campaign should be undertaken against the road, rail and waterway lines of communication with the objective of isolating the logistics base of Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of North Vietnam. To achieve this objective, the following tasks must be performed employing a properly balanced weight of effort:

a. Destroy war supporting facilities as well as those producing items vital to the economy.

b. Attack enemy defenses in order to protect our strike forces, destroy enemy ground crews and weapons, and force the expenditure of munitions.

c. Conduct air attacks throughout as large an area as possible to destroy lines of communication targets and associated facilities, dispersed material and supplies and to exert maximum suppression of normal activities because of the threat.

d. Attack and destroy railroad rolling stock, vehicles and waterborne logistics craft throughout as large an area as possible, permitting minimum sanctuaries.

e. Targeting criteria for the effective accomplishment of a systematic air campaign would continue to preclude the attack of population as a target, but accept greater risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve the stated objective. The initial changes in operating authorities necessary to the initiation of an effective air campaign are:

1. Delete the 30/10NM Hanoi Restricted/Prohibited Area and establish a 3NM Hanoi Control Area.

2. Delete the 10/4NM Haiphong Restricted/Prohibited Area and establish a 1.5NM Haiphong Control Area.

3. Delete the Special Northeast Coastal Armed Reconnaissance Area.

4. The present Restricted Areas around Hanoi and Haiphong have existed since 1966. The Prohibited Areas were created in December 1968. A reduction of the control areas would expose approximately 140 additional miles of primary road, rail and waterway lines of communication to armed
reconnaissance, as well as hundreds of miles of second echelon supply, communication, dependent upon USN operations and additional military targets would automatically become authorized for air strikes under remaining regulations.

This would broaden the target base, spread the defenses, and thus add to the cumulative effects of the interdiction program as well as reducing risk of aircraft loss.

There have been repeated and reliable intelligence reports that indicate civilians not engaged in essential war supporting activities have been evacuated from the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Photographs of Hanoi, clearly shows that materials of war are stockpiled in all open storage areas and along the streets throughout almost one-half of the city. Rather than become an armed camp and a large logistics storage base, the city has become a base for urban living. Consequently, air strikes in and around these cities endanger personnel primarily engaged directly or indirectly in support of the war effort.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in order to assist interest Members, the media, historians or individual citizens in better understanding the rules of engagement, I asked Secretary Weinberger to declassify them. Earlier this year he agreed and I am now able to insert in the Record for study the actual text of the rules of engagement covering South Vietnam. In the interest of comparison, I will first insert the rules applicable to air and surface operations in South Vietnam, dated June 28, 1966, with 1967 revisions, and the same rules as they appeared 5 years later on December 30, 1971. Also, I will insert directive 95-4, establishing procedures for command, control and coordination of U.S. military air operations in South Vietnam, both as it was issued on June 28, 1966 and as revised on August 15, 1967.

The rules governing bombing in North Vietnam were included in regular message traffic and were not in the form of directives. That message traffic was not retained and is no longer available.

Mr. President, it must be remembered that our pilots and fighting men had to memorize every tiniest detail of these complicated and lengthy rules and to implement them under extreme moments of stress. If anyone ever again foolishly criticizes the performance of our military in the Vietnam War after having reviewed these materials, he or she does not understand the English language.

Mr. President, at this point I wish to insert the newly declassified documents described heretofore.

The material follows:

**Restrictions and Rules of Engagement, RVN**

1. (C) Purpose. To define specific operational restrictions and rules of engagement for US aircraft in RVN.

2. (C) General.

a. All targets selected for an air strike will be approved by the Air Force Chief directly or through higher ARVN authorities.

b. All pilots will endeavor to minimize non-combatant casualties and civilian property damage. Air strikes must be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.

c. All pilots will have a knowledge of the disposition of friendly forces and/or civilians prior to conducting a strike. This information may come from ground or air briefings.

d. For purposes of this directive, references to the Forward Air Controller (FAC) also encompass and apply to the Marine Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TACA).

e. USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will be controlled by the following, in the order of preference as listed: (1) US Air Force ALO/FAC or Marine TACA; (2) VNAF FAC/FAO; (3) USAF MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT) or USMC TIP-10.

f. In an emergency, when no qualified means of control is available, the following personnel may designate the target for strike actions:

1. The commander of a ground unit or US advisor engaged with the Viet Cong.

2. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, within visual or radio range with the ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

3. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, within visual or radio range with the ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

4. Commanders of aircraft supporting a ground unit required to obtain strike authorization by the Aviation Support Area FAC (ASFA) when the enemy attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation. Involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate USAF-RVNFAF approval is required, except in emergency. In the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants may be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeakers, and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

3. (C) Specific Instructions for close air support to include interdiction (day or night)

a. ALO/FAC will:

1. Have thorough knowledge of the ground scheme of maneuver.

2. Make every effort to secure a VNAF observer to assist in directing the air strike. If a VNAF observer is not available, an ALO/FAC is authorized to direct the air strike.

3. Maintain reliable communications with ground unit and with strike aircraft.

4. Make positive identification and mark the target.

5. Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.

b. USAF strike aircraft will:

1. 10,000 scale maps of target area, and photographs when available.

2. Strike Pilots will:

- Under VFR conditions, when a USAF, USMC, or VNAF FAC is not available, a qualified Army Target Identification Pilot (TIP) will designate the target to be struck and the flight leader of the strike aircraft will control the strike.

- In the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants may be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeakers, and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

- Strike at night only with flares, unless under control of TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.

4. (C) Border restrictions for aircraft conduct.

a. Aircraft will not cross the demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV.

b. FACs operating within 5000 meters of the border of the Cambodian border will have a 1500,000 map of the border area. Maps, mosaics, and photos will be available immediately.

c. Joint operations-intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefings will be conducted for strikes within 5000 meters of the border, when practical.

d. Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to the above:

1. Strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under positive control of a Forward Air Controller or MSS-10. The authorized to waive this requirement is restricted to COMUSMACV or his designated representative.

2. All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border will have posted in operations a 13500,000 or larger scale map on the Cambodian border is distinctly marked, on the RVN side, to the depth of 5 km.

3. Aircraft supporting border post units will not support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation will not be allocated. Aircraft are necessary in the border area, but will not cross nor fire across the border.

4. Aircraft supporting missions will follow aircraft on missions within 5 km of the border with equipment capability.

5. (C) Jettison.

a. Munitions will be jettisoned only in designated jettison areas.

b. During night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning.

c. During day VFR, drops will be monitored by radar whenever possible.

6. (C) USAF.

a. USAF and US Marine armed helicopters will be marked "US Army or US Marine as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commanders discretion.

b. If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, whenever possible an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and USAF-RVNFAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.

7. (C) USAF C-123 aircraft (Ranch Hand).

a. The aircraft used in the crop destruction missions in RVN for the purpose of crop destruction will be flown under "Farmgate" rules which require Vietnamese markings on the aircraft and a Vietnamese observer aboard.
(1) In coordination with their RVNAP counterparts, the commander where applicable, insures that all units conduct operations in accordance with this directive, and designates positive, practical, and immediately executable target clearance procedures to preclude error or misunderstanding.

(2) Insure that all personnel engaged in fire support activities are fully compliant with the contents of this directive, with specific emphasis on procedures pertaining to clearance for the employment of fires. Periodic testing of all units of personnel on their knowledge of ROE is encouraged.

(3) Require advisory personnel to insure that US forces support resources provided in support of RVNAP operations are employed in accordance with this directive. If the requests of this directive, the advisor will take action to suspend the US fire support which is in violation of the ROE.

b. Definitions.

(1) Air Strike. An attack on specific objectives by fighter, bomber, or attack aircraft on or near an air strike area will be governed by MACV Directive GRD-05-14(S).

(2) Armored Helicopters. For the purposes of this directive, all helicopters having an attached ordnance delivery system including door guns are considered armed helicopters.

(3) Artillery. Air attacks against targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of the fire and movement of those forces.

(4) Curfews, Inland Waters. The Army, Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) military region commanders in coordination with local authorities may designate curfews or enforcements within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(5) General Rules. These rules are applicable to MACV staff agencies and subordinate commands.

(6) General a. All possible means will be employed to limit the risk to friendly forces and property of civilian lives and property. In this respect, a target must be clearly identified as hostile. It may not be fired into unless (or with prior making a decision to do so on it). In this respect, a target will be taken to avoid the violation of operational and national boundaries.

b. The enemy known to take advantage of locally considered as non-military targets. Typical examples of non-military targets are places of religious or historical value and public or private buildings and dwellings. When the enemy has sheltered himself or installed defensive positions in such places, the responsible brigade or higher commander must positively identify the preparation for, or execution of, hostile enemy attacks before ordering an attack. During the attack, weapons and forces used will be those which will inspire prompt evacuation of enemy forces with minimum damage to structures in the area.

c. It is imperative that the RVN consider its own policies for the protection of friendly forces.

d. It is possible to destroy the compounding of an unconditional surrender to the US government in place the RVN will be.

e. It is possible to destroy the compounding of an unconditional surrender to the US government in place the RVN will be.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT—SURFACE WEAPONS

1. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the control of organic weapons and the artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire provided to the surface commander by US, FWMAF, and RVNAF.

2. (C) General.
   a. These rules of engagement apply to the conduct of surface operations to include the employment of artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire by US, FWMAF, and RVNAF in situations requiring the application of all gunnery techniques.
   b. Artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire require that care and attention be exercised in the formulation of fire requests and the application of all gunnery procedures. The exercise of sound judgment on the part of all personnel involved in originating requests for fire, solving the gunnery problem, and exercising precise gunnery procedures will provide the best assurance of avoiding friendly and noncombatants or destroying civilian property.
   c. Procedures applicable to the conduct and control of naval gunfire are contained in the effective CTO 70.8 Operation Order 320, Market Time units will comply with the provisions of COMCOSURPORVOP Operation Order 201.
   d. Fire support resources in close to friendly forces and military clearance.
   e. Urban Areas. Direct fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must precede unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property. Direct fire missions are directed against targets or urban areas. All types of munitions, except incendiary, may be used in direct fire missions directed against targets in urban areas. Urban (5) US OV-10 aircraft commanders. In an emergency, when compliance with the provisions of paragraph 2c, above, is not possible, the following personnel may designate the target for strike aircraft: (1) The commander of a company or larger ground unit or US advisor of any unit engaged with enemy forces.
   f. Watercraft. (b) Indirect fire support in urban areas will be governed by the following:
      (a) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance. 2. (C) Conduct of fire. (a) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
      (b) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance. 2. (C) Conduct of fire. (a) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
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      (y) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
      (z) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
      aa. Uninhabited areas outside a SSZ. (1) In uninhabited areas, fire may be directed against Viet Cong (VC)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in contact without obtaining military clearance.
      bb. Unobserved fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining military clearance.
      cc. Uninhabited Areas. Fire missions directed against VC/NVA targets in, or in the immediate vicinity of, uninhabited areas shall be conducted as follows:
         (1) Uninhabited areas from which hostile fire is received is subjected to such warming or delay. However, response should be couched in guidance for the control of organic weapons and the artillery, mortar, tank, naval, and riverine gunfire provided to the surface commander by US, FWMAF, and RVNAF.
         (b) Indirect fire missions will be controlled by an observer and executed only after political and military clearance has been obtained. Where enemy fire is received from leader control after obtaining military clearance.
         (c) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
         (d) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
         (e) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
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         (z) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
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         (z) Prior to trimming upon urban areas, leaders shall obtain military clearance.
strikes in inhabited areas must be approved by a FAC and be initiated only as political considerations have been obtained. The conduct of such air operations also must be approved by the attacking battalion or higher commander. 

(1) An attack deemed necessary on an inhabited area may be made without prior warning, except (prescribed in paragraph 3d), below) or on areas provided all three of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) Enemy fire is being received from the area.

(b) The attack is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement or employment of friendly forces through the area.

(c) In the judgement of the battalion or higher commander, his mission would be jeopardized by prior warning.

2. If the attack on an inhabited area is not in conjunction with an immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack, and given sufficient time to evacuate the area. Once the inhabitants of a target area have been adequately warned that the area has been selected as a target and given sufficient time to evacuate, the area may then be destroyed without further warning. An exception may be made for herbicide missions in cases where prior warning may be impossible.

3. In urban areas, air attacks directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property, and by their nature require greater precautions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. Therefore, the following specific US, GVN, and RVNAF commanders' and restrictions must be strictly adhered to:

(a) Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN army commander is required to conduct air attacks in urban areas including support of RVNAF. This authority will not be delegated except for the boost-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Diem Dinh City, CO, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for employment of US and FWMAF tactical air in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

(b) Aircraft attacks in urban areas will be controlled by a FAC.

3. Prior to subjecting urban areas to an air attack, even when fire is being received from within the area, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

4. Use watercraft.

(a) Fixed wing aircraft are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters, except as authorized in paragraph 3c(2) above. This restriction does not apply to aircraft not under the control of, and returning hostile fire in the exercise of self-defense.

(b) Watercraft on inland waters may be engaged after they have been positively identified as hostile and with military and political clearance granted. During hours of announced curfews, any watercraft on inland waterways may be presumed hostile and engaged after military and political clearance has been granted.

(c) Specific Instructions for engagement of watercraft by fixed wing aircraft in the Tran Hung Dao Fifteen and Market Time TAORs is defined as the water area off the coast of the RVN out to a distance of forty nautical miles. The northeast boundary is 17 degrees North Latitude; and the northwestern boundary is the seaward extension of the RVN/GKR border.

(d) Fixed wing aircraft will not engage watercraft in this TAOR except in support of TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME surface forces.

2. Specific Instructions for Close Air Support (Day or Night)

(a) The FAC will:

1. Have a thorough knowledge of the scheme of ground maneuver.

2. Maintain reliable communications with the ground unit and strike aircraft.

3. Make positive identification and mark the target.

4. Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.

5. Use 1:50,000 or larger scale maps of target area and photographs when available.

b. During a strike, pilots of strike aircraft will:

1. Always be under the control of, and in direct radio contact with, a FAC or designated control center, except in those cases where flight leader control is authorized (see paragraph 3a, above).

2. Have visual contact with the target or target marker. During night strikes, the target or target marker can be visually identified through illumination e.g., illumination flares, ground marking flares, fires, lunar illumination, etc. A waiver of this requirement is granted for aircraft equipped with night observation devices.

3. Always ascertain the position of friendly forces (or civilians when applicable).

4. Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.

5. Defend themselves against ground fire and air attacks.

(a) Munitions will be jettisoned in designated jettison areas. Surface unit or the US advisor of any unit in or near a threatened area.

(b) Fixed wing aircraft will not engage watercraft in this TAOR except in support of TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME surface forces.

(c) Surface units must be positively identified as hostile and firing clearance must be granted by the appropriate coastal zone command for coastal surveillance center execution, when firing is in support of a TRAN HUNG DAO FIFTEEN or MARKET TIME unit under actual engagement.

(d) Urban Areas.

1. Air attacks directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property, and by their nature require greater precautions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. Therefore, the following specific US, GVN, and RVNAF commanders' and restrictions must be strictly adhered to:

(a) Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN army commander is required to conduct air attacks in urban areas including support of RVNAF. This authority will not be delegated except for the boost-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Diem Dinh City, CO, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for employment of US and FWMAF tactical air in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

(b) Aircraft attacks in urban areas will be controlled by a FAC.

3. Prior to subjecting urban areas to an air attack, even when fire is being received from within the area, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

4. Use watercraft.

(a) Fixed wing aircraft are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters, except as authorized in paragraph 3c(2) above. This restriction does not apply to the boost-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Diem Dinh City, CO, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for employment of US and FWMAF tactical air in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.

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(a) Fixed wing aircraft are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters, except as authorized in paragraph 3c(2) above. This restriction does not apply to the boost-up areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Diem Dinh City, CO, TRAC, is authorized to delegate authority to Commanding Officer, Capitol Military Assistance Team, for employment of US and FWMAF tactical air in these areas. No further delegation is authorized.
can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

(3) The US, FWMAF, or RNVAF pilot of a helicopter required to operate in the vicinity of a hostile inhabited area for the purpose of conducting medical evacuation or supply missions, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter crew.

g. Airborne test firing of weapons will be conducted only after obtaining military and political clearance.

b. When appropriate, US Army, US Air Force and US Navy armed helicopter operations will be conducted only in operational areas with controller aircraft of the other services.

3. Conduct of fire.

(a) The use of fire by armed helicopters is required to engage in inhabited areas outside an SSZ except:

(1) When in close support of friendly troops in contact;

(2) When returning ground fire (paragraph 3c(3), above);

(c) When returning ground fire in support of friendly troops in contact with the designated control agent of the responsible ground commander. Operations may be initiated after military and political clearance have been obtained.

(2) If the attack on an inhabited area from which enemy fire is being received is deemed necessary, no warning shall be made without warning (as prescribed in paragraph 3c(3), below) or delay provided all three of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) The enemy fire is being received from the area.

(b) The attack is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area.

(c) The attack is directed by the commander, his mission would be jeopardized by prior warning.

(3) If the attack on an inhabited area is not in conjunction with a ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area. Once the inhabitants of a target area have been warned that they have been selected as a target and given sufficient time to evacuate, the area may then be attacked without further warning.

k. Urban Areas.

(1) Air attacks directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians or destruction of civilian property, and by their nature require greater restrictions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas. Approval by both the senior tactical commander and the ARVN commander is required to conduct US and FWMAF air attacks in urban areas, including supporting RNVAF. This authority will not be delegated with the exception of the bulk of the aircraft flying in the support of the ARVN in the RVN. For example, four companies of armed helicopters in the urban areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City.

(2) The commander is authorized to direct operations of armed helicopters in the upper areas of Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh City. No further delegation is authorized.

(3) Only the inhabited portions of a building will be engaged and these targets must be positively identified to the pilot. The engagement of area targets in urban areas is prohibited.

(3) Prior to subjecting urban areas to air attack, even when fire is received from the area, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets, loudspeakers, or other appropriate means prior to the attack and given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

e. Watercraft.

Helicopters are not authorized to engage watercraft of any description in international or RVN territorial (coastal) waters. See paragraph 3e(3), below. This restriction does not deny aircraft commanders the right to return hostile fire in the exercise of self-defense. However, surface waters may be engaged after being positively identified as hostile and with military and political clearance granted. During hours of announced curfews, any waterborne craft on inland waters may be presumed hostile and engaged after military and political clearances have been granted.

(3) Specific instructions for engagement of watercraft by helicopters in the Ton Theung Dau Fifteen and Market Time Taor:

(a) The engagement of watercraft shall be directed only after military and political clearance have been obtained by the appropriate coastal zone controller aircraft of the RVN.

(b) Helicopters will not engage watercraft in this Taor except in support of ground forces when fire is in support of a ground unit.

c. (1) Surface craft must be positively identified as hostile and firing clearance must be granted by the appropriate coastal zone commander or coastal surveillance center except when firing is in support of a ground unit.

(d) Jettison:

(1) Munitions will be jettisoned in designated jettison areas.

When flying night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning, except during emergencies covered in paragraph 4e, below.

(2) Aircraft may jettison munitions in other than designated areas during emergencies, or near inhabited areas, when there is an immediate threat of injury or damage. Munitions will be dropped only when it is determined that it is not necessary to jettison munitions, into inhabited areas in order to protect aircraft or personnel.

(3) Munitions will be dropped only when it is determined that it is not necessary to jettison munitions, into inhabited areas in order to protect aircraft or personnel.

(4) Munitions will be dropped only when it is determined that it is not necessary to jettison munitions, into inhabited areas in order to protect aircraft or personnel.

(c) The engagement of hostile aircraft, missiles, or drones on or near the coast of the RVN will be under the control of the appropriate coastal zone controller aircraft of the RVN.

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(z) Munitions will be dropped only when it is determined that it is not necessary to jettison munitions, into inhabited areas in order to protect aircraft or personnel.

Aircraft, missile, or drone engagements are not authorized without the specific authorization of the senior director of the appropriate Control and Reporting Center (CRC). The engagement of hostile aircraft, missiles, or drones on or near the coast of the RVN will be under the control of the appropriate coastal zone controller aircraft of the RVN. The engagement of hostile aircraft, missiles, or drones on or near the coast of the RVN will be under the control of the appropriate coastal zone controller aircraft of the RVN.
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crews will take immediate and aggressive protective measures.

d. Visual identification of airborne objects will be made before firing unless the track has been designated as hostile by proper authority or indicates commitment of a hostile act.

e. Precise location of friendly aircraft, vessels, and ground forces may be computed by clearance to engage enemy aircraft, missiles, or drones. Clearance will be granted to engage slow speed targets if the track extends into an area occupied by air assets.

f. In those circumstances where an intruding aircraft, missile, or drone is to be intercepted and engaged, but not engaged, the International Interception Signals and Procedures published in the JCS and population of the JCS Information Publication (FICL) will be used.

aviation: u.s. operations in rvn (u)

1. (u) Purpose. To establish the procedures and responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of United States (US) Air Force operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (d) Definitions.

a. specified strike zones. Those areas approved by a division chief where strikes may be conducted without additional political clearence. Whenever possible, a pac will support these strikes.

b. Close Air Support. Air action requested by the ground commander against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces and which requires integration of each aircraft with the fire and movement of the ground forces. Due to the widespread intermingling of friendly forces with enemy, SVN political and tactical approval of all strikes within RVN is required, therefore harassment and interdiction missions within country must be processed as close air support missions.

c. Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS). A composite of radio control systems which includes the MACV Command and Control System, the VNAF Command and Control System, and the JAGOS Tactical Air Control System (TACS). In RVN.

3. (c) General.

a. The mission of all US military aviation forces in the Republic of Vietnam is to provide airpower as part of the counterinsurgency effort of the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAP). The control of air operations must be integrated, and achieve the most effective results.

b. All services operate through portions of the same airspace and are frequently employed on joint and combined operations. Each possesses to some degree the capability to accomplish missions normally assigned to another service. Therefore, close cooperation and coordination are required to assure that efforts of the complementary, integrated, and achieve the most effective results.

c. En route Air Traffic Control is a function of the Joint VN/US Air Coordination Committee which coordinates the use of civil and military aviation facilities and personnel. Terminal Air Traffic Control is a function of the US Air Force, as defined by MACV. Air operations in the RVN, and MACV Directive 95-3, subject: Flight Facilities, will be coordinated by MACV. Air Operations in the RVN, and MACV Directive 95-8, subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Air Strip Operations. Aircraft performing close air support are controlled as specified in appropriate service Air/ground Operations directives.

d. Joint US military pilots providing air fire support will endeavor to eliminate incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatants, and damage to civilian property by adherence to Procedures, Restrictions, and Rules of Engagement established by RVNAF and this headquarters. While Rules and procedures are designed to minimize losses to friendly forces and non-combatants, the objective still remains to operate at maximum full productivity of US air resources with out appreciably inhibiting responsiveness or flexibility.

3. (c) Purpose.

a. To establish the procedures and responsibilities for determining the existence of such an emergency is COMUSMACV and will not be delegated. Upon termination of the emergency conditions or over all US/FWMAP air operations revert to normal as specified in this directive.

b. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Forces (III MAF), will conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established Rules of Engagement and will augment the US Air Force effort with resources not required to support operations of prime concern to MACV. These responsibilities are given in paragraph 3, Annex A.

c. Commanding General, US Air Vietnam (USAVN), will provide those US air aviation resources necessary to support both US/FWMAP and ARVN ground operations and will exercise all functions of command, except those specifically withdrawn by COMUSMACV of all US air aviation units not assigned to US Divisions. For detailed responsibilities, see paragraph 3, Annex C.

d. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, will provide strike aircraft as directed by CINCPAC to operate in coordination with the JAGOS.

5. (C) Operational Planning.

a. Joint operational planning for required aviation support will be conducted on a continuing basis at all levels of command down to and including battalion. Representatives of the ground commander (GD/3 Air or 82/3 Air), Air Liaison Office, and Army aviation representative will participate in the tactical ground planning to assure efficient utilization of all air support and proper integration into the scheme of maneuver. USMC and 7th Fleet liaison officers will be provided to the JAGOS when aircraft these services are participating in joint operations, or providing close air support.

b. MAVNAF advisors and US commanders of ground and Naval forces will assure that the use of air support for all operations. Plans for movement of convoys and trains, ground reconnaissance, search and rescue, quick reaction forces, will include provisions for obtaining use of air support. During the execution of these operations, close air support is essential to provide necessary support efforts to maintain contact with the enemy. In the conduct of air mobile operations, air coverage on all landing zones will be used as required where there is a possibility of opposition.

c. Requests for close air support will be processed through the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) (for III MAF/FWMAP) and the Corps/USAF relationship. See Annex B, Utilization of Air. The commander of close air support is in accord with the ground commander's plan and will provide required responsiveness.

d. Any Other Considerations: See Annex C, this directive.

e. Planning coordination of air support requirements will be made by the MACV Combat Support Coordination Center (see paragraph 6).

f. Herbicide operations (Tran Dust) must be selective and coordinated both politically and militarily. Requests must be initiated at province level (see paragraph 6).

3. (c) Special Air Support Operation:

a. Sky spot should be utilized to maintain close air support or interdiction during times of reduced visibility or darkness (see Annex A, this directive).

b. Troop Airlift. See paragraphs 6d, 6e, 6f, and 6g.

8. (u) References.


c. MACV Directive 55-2, subject: Movement of Units (u).

d. MACV Directive 55-4, subject: Movement System in RVN.

e. MACV Directive 55-3 (C), subject: DSA/USMC Aviation Support (u).


g. MACV Directive 55-6, subject: Joint and Combined Helicopter Operations (u).

h. MACV Directive 55-11 (C), subject: Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) (u).

i. MACV Directive 95-9, subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Air Strip Operation.


j. MACV Directive 381-1, (C), subject: Air Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) to be published.

k. MACV Directive 525-1, (C), subject: Herbicide Operations (u).

l. MACV Directive 525-12, (C), subject: Combat Support Coordination Center.

m. MACV LOI governing operations of III MAF in RVN, 6 May 1968.

7th Air Force Operations

1. (u) Purpose. To establish responsibilities of USAF for command, control, and coordination of military air operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (u) General. Command and control of USAF strike and the coordination of USMC/USN/VNAF strike aircraft will be accomplished through the Tactical Air Control Group (TACG).

3. (c) Responsibilities. Commander, 7th Air Force, will:

- Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include maintenance of air superiority, close air support, reconnaissance as requested by the ground commander or Combat Support Advisor, search and rescue, and troop transport, and other supplemental air support as required.

- Provide essential training of VNAF in offensive and defensive tactical air operations.

- Provide tactical air support through SKY SPOT when darkness or inclement weather create such a requirement.
d. Provide meteorological support for air operations.

e. Establish, in conjunction with other US and RVN agencies, an Air Traffic Control System which provides normal processing and flight following.

f. Prepare joint instructions in conjunction with CO, II MAF, MACV, Commander, 7th Field, to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

4. (C) Operational planning. a. Immediate and preplanned requests for Close Air Support will be processed through the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) as defined in reference 81, basic directive. 7th Air Force will maintain tactical aircraft on ground alert to fulfill immediate air requests.

b. Coordination of air activities will take place at all levels of JAGOS to eliminate conflict between participating forces and to insure required support.

c. Sky Spot Control Points (Hazard Direct-ed Bombing) will be submitted from friendly ground units to appropriate Sky Spot unit to insurle complete preplanning of air strike. Special Forces camps and outposts of special policy commanders will ensure that their control point coordinates have been catalogued by nearest Sky Spot unit so that points can be verified by USAF photo reconnaissance.

d. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, 7th Air Force will assume operational control of certain air resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

III MAF AIR OPERATIONS

1. (U) Purpose. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US Marine Corps aviation operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (C) General. a. Marine Corps aviation resources are organic to III MAF and are commanded and directed in support of tactical operations as designated by CO, III MAF.

b. The Marine Corps Tactical Air Control System, a component of Marine aviation, will exercise positive control over all USMC aircraft in support of Marine Corps operations and control as may be assigned in support of such operations. The Marine Corps Tactical Air Control System includes a Direction Center (DC), Direct Air Support Centers, radar surveillance capability, and such terminal guidance facilities as necessary to facilitate the orderly employment of aircraft. III MAF will coordinate with the TACS operated by VNAP/USAF and will be prepared to supplement and integrate with the existing Air Defense Control System.

3. (C) Responsibilities. Commanding General, III MAF, will:

a. Exercise operational control over all USMC aviation activities except as provided in paragraph 3e of the basic directive.

b. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations, to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, maintenance of air superiority, air transport, search and rescue, and other supplemental air support, as required.

c. Provide aircraft to support US 7th Field operations as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

d. Establish joint and combined planning coordination as required in connection with III MAF/USAF/RVNAP air operations in I Corps and make provision for assigning 7th Air Force (TACCC) of future ground forces and to provide USAF reinforcement requirements by the following means:

(1) Prepare in conjunction with the Command, 7th Air Force, joint operating instructions to insure an integrated and coordinated joint aviation asset system.

(2) Identify to the Commander, 7th Air Force, for coordination and control through the TACCC, all aircraft assigned to the III MAF as directed by the Joint Command. 7th Air Force will maintain tactical aircraft on ground alert to fulfill immediate air requests.

(3) Provide liaison with the Commander, 7th Air Force, to facilitate the coordination of operational control of USMC aviation assets as established in support of 7th Air Force requirements and for purposes of keeping 7th Air Force abreast of III MAF ground operations.

(4) Provide liaison with the I Corps Tactical Operations Center and I Corps Direct Air Support Center. This liaison effort will facilitate the timely passing of information on current and proposed military aviation operations and such information as may be most effectively utilized.

(5) In his capacity as Corps Senior Advisor, insure that the I Corps Advisory Group (USMC) establishes physical presence and is assigned for the purpose of informing III MAF of impending and current I Corps operations and required air support.

e. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be prepared to transfer to Commander, 7th Air Force, operational control of all resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) Purpose. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US Army aviation operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (C) General...

3. (C) Responsibilities.

a. US Army aviation resources not organic to combat units will normally be allocated to Senior Advisors and US commanders for employment in support of ARVN/US/WP/NAP operations. Aviation resources so allocated will be assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of ARVN divisions and US/WP/NAP missions, brigades, and regiments. Senior Advisors will establish and Army Aviation Element (AAE) within each ARVN Corps and Division Tactical Operations Center (TOC). US division or higher commanders will establish AAEs at their TOCs.

b. Aviation assets will be allocated as directed by CO, I Corps, as required.

c. US Army aviation resources assigned in general support and not allocated to support a specific ARVN Corps or US unit will remain under operational control of COMUSMACV. OV-1 units in this category are under operational control of MACV 1st Div. This control is exercised through HQ, USARV. Other resources in this category will be allocated to EAD, COC, MACV, in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters. When committed to operations, such resources exclusive of OV-1 will be under operational control or in support of the commander of the US unit, or the Senior US Advisor of the ARVN unit concerned, unless directed by CO, US commander or advisor, or recalled by MACV through the AAD.

d. US/WP/NAP units assigned to a CTZ or major US units will receive US Army aviation support through the respective TOC.

3. (C) Responsibilities.

a. Commander, General, US Army Vietnam (USARV), will:

   (1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support ground operations including airborne mobile operations, airmobile reconnaissance and surveillance, fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support, as required.

   (2) Exercise command, less operational control, of US Army Aviation resources and provide complete aviation support, as directed, to US/VMAP/RVN, as ordered for the conduct of combat, logistical, or other contingency operations throughout the RVN.

   (3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate Army Aviation Elements at corps and divisional level.


   (5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the joint Air Traffic Control System.

   (6) Prepare in conjunction with Commander, 7th Air Force, joint operating instructions to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

b. US Commanders will:

   (1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

   (2) Exercise operational control over non-allocated US Army aviation resources.

   c. Corps Senior Advisors will:

   (3) Establish joint and combined planning coordination as required in connection with other US forces. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be prepared to transfer to I Corps, 7th Air Force, operational control of all resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

   (4) Within allocated resources, provide primary aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in a one area including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.

   (5) Prepare to support the ARVN in accordance with the joint Air Traffic Control System.

AVIATION: US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U) Directive Number 85-4, this headquarters, dated 28 June 1966, is changed as follows:

ANNEX D

2. (C) General...

3. (Superseded) Close Air Support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must always be controlled by a PAC.

   (1) If the attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/RVNAP approval is required except in emergencies.

   (2) If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker broadcast prior to execution of the attack.

   (3) Commanders initiating a request for attack of a hamlet/village are responsible for ensuring that US/GVN/RVNAP approval is obtained, if the area is one wherein such an attack, that required warning is given prior to execution of the attack.

AVIATION: US AIR OPERATIONS IN RVN (U) Directive Number 85-4, this headquarters, dated 28 June 1966, is changed as follows:

3. (C) Responsibilities.

   (1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support ground operations including airborne mobile operations, airmobile reconnaissance and surveillance, fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support, as required.

   (2) Exercise command, less operational control, of US Army Aviation resources and provide complete aviation support, as directed, to US/VMAP/RVN, as ordered for the conduct of combat, logistical, or other contingency operations throughout the RVN.

   (3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate Army Aviation Elements at corps and divisional level.


   (5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the joint Air Traffic Control System.

   (6) Prepare in conjunction with Commander, 7th Air Force, joint operating instructions to assure integrated and coordinated air operations.

b. US Commanders will:

   (1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

   (2) Exercise operational control over non-allocated US Army aviation resources.

   c. Corps Senior Advisors will:

   (3) Prepare joint and combined planning coordination as required in connection with other US forces. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be prepared to transfer to I Corps, 7th Air Force, operational control of all resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

   (4) Within allocated resources, provide primary aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in a one area including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.

   (5) Prepare to support the ARVN in accordance with the joint Air Traffic Control System.
AVIATION: US AIR OPERATIONS IN SVN (U)

1. (D) Purpose. This directive establishes procedures and responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US military operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (U) Applicability. This directive is applicable to all MACV staff agencies and subordinate commands.

3. (C) Responsibilities: Commanding General, III MAF, will:
   a. Direct joint and combined planning coordination procedures for joint operations in III MAF, which the MACV expeditionary force (JAGOS) will coordinate.
   b. With JAGOS, establish joint and combined operational requirements.
   c. Establish joint and combined operational procedures.
   d. Coordinate joint and combined operational planning.
   e. Coordinate joint and combined operational exercises.
   f. Coordinate joint and combined operational training.
   g. Coordinate joint and combined operational support.
   h. Coordinate joint and combined operational evaluations.
   i. Coordinate joint and combined operational reports.

4. (C) Operational Planning.
   a. Joint operational planning for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   b. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   c. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
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   u. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
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   w. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   x. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   y. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   z. Joint operational planning will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.

5. (C) Operational Support.
   a. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.
   b. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.
   c. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.
   d. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.
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   y. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.
   z. Joint operational support for required air support will be provided by US/FWMAP air operations.

6. (C) Operational Training.
   a. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   b. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   c. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   d. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
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   y. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
   z. Joint operational training for required air support will be conducted on a continuing basis and in accordance with the basic mission assigned by COMUSMACV.
b. Coordination of air activities will take place at all levels of JAGOS to eliminate conflict between participating forces and to ensure required support.

c. SKY SPOT Control Points (Radar Directed Bombing) will be submitted from friendly ground units to the appropriate SKY SPOT unit to insure complete preplanning for air support. Special Forces camps and outposts of special political/strategic importance will insure that their control point coordinates have been catalogued by the nearest SKY SPOT unit so that points can be verified by USAF photo reconnaissance.

d. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, Cdr, 7th AF, will assume operational control of certain air resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

III MAP AIR OPERATIONS

1. (U) Purpose. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, coordination, and mission direction of USMC aviation operations in the MACV area of responsibility.

2. (C) General. The CG, III MAP, exercises operational control of USMC aviation resources in the RVN as assigned or attached by CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC).

3. (C) Responsibilities. CG, III MAP, will:

a. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations to include close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, maintenance of air superiority, air transport, search and rescue, and other supplemental air support as required.

b. Designate to Cdr, 7th AF, those forces assigned to participate in and conduct air defense tasks in accordance with MACV Directive 95-4(S).

c. Exercise operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, except as provided in paragraph 3e, basic directive. Make available to DECOMUSMACV for Air Operations strike and reconnaissance air assets and TACs as required for mission direction, retaining those assets necessary to support USMC peculiar operations, e.g., RABPAC beacon strike, helo escort, and landing zone preparation fire.

d. Provide aircraft to support US Seventh Fleet as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

e. Exercise scramble authority of III MAP assets for immediate air support in the III MAP area of operations.

f. Provide liaison with the Cdr, 7th AF, to facilitate the coordination and control of USMC aviation assets committed in support of 7th AF requirements, and for the purpose of keeping 7th AF abreast of III MAP ground operations.

g. In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be prepared to transfer to Cdr, 7th AF, operational control of air resources as designated by COMUSMACV.

ARMY AVIATION

1. (U) Purpose. To establish operating procedures and assign responsibilities for command, control, and coordination of US Army aviation operations in the RVN.

2. (C) General.

a. US Army aviation resources not organic to combat units will normally be allocated to military region senior advisors and US commanders for employment in support of ARVN/US/FWMF operations. Aviation resources so allocated will be assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of ARVN divisions and US/FWMF divisions, brigades, and regiments. Senior advisors will establish an Army Aviation Element (AAE) within each ARVN military region and division Tactical Operations Center (TOC). US division or higher commanders will establish an AAE at their TOC.

b. Aviation assets will be allocated as directed by COMUSMACV. US Army resources are subject to reallocation, recall, or diversion through the Aviation Support Branch (ASB), Surface Operations Division (SOD), MACV, to supply with priorities established by this headquarters.

c. US Army aviation resources assigned in general support and not allocated to support a specific ARVN military region or US unit will remain under the operational control of COMUSMACV. OV-1 units in this category are under the operational control of the ACoS, J-2, MACV. This control is exercised through Headquarters, USARV. Other resources in this category will be allocated by ASB, SOD, MACV, in accordance with priorities established by this headquarters. When committed to operations, such resources, exclusive of OV-1, will be under operational control or in support of the commander of the US unit, or the senior US advisor of the ARVN unit concerned until released by the US commander or advisor, or recalled by MACV through the ASB, SOD, MACV.

d. US/FWMF units assigned to a military region or major US unit will request US Army aviation support through the respective TOC.

3. (C) Responsibilities.

a. CG, USARV, will:

(1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support ground operations, including airborne operations, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and other supplemental air support, as required.

(2) Exercise command, less operational control, of US Army aviation resources and provide combat aviation support, as directed, to US/FWMF/ARVN forces for the conduct of combat, logistical, or other counterinsurgency operations throughout the RVN.

(3) Provide qualified aviation personnel to operate AAEs at military region and division TOC.

(4) Provide US Army aviation support for Headquarters, MACV.

(5) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System, coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System.

(6) Prepare, in conjunction with Cdr, 7th AF, joint operating instructions to insure integrated and coordinated air operations.

b. US commanders will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

(2) Exercise control over organic US Army aviation resources.

c. Military region senior advisors will:

(1) Exercise operational control over allocated US Army aviation resources.

(2) Within allocated resources, provide essential aviation support for ARVN military and paramilitary forces in their zone of responsibility, including units of the General Reserve and Special Forces when committed.
CIVILIAN MANAGERS LOST WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. GOLDBATER. Mr. President, until this year, the story had not been told of how civilian officials of the executive branch hobbled, chained, and bound American military forces with restrictions saying what the military could and could not do in Indochina. These restrictions were known as rules of engagement. The recent declassification of these documents, formerly classified top secret, proves the military took a bun in Vietnam.

United States military forces did not lose the Vietnam war, civilian policymakers did.

The rules of engagement caused a piecemeal of air operations which allowed North Vietnam to adjust to the U.S. air bombing campaign by importing war materials through routes immune from attack and then to disburse and secure the materials in guaranteed sanctuaries. From these safe areas North Vietnam infiltrated the material to South Vietnam and Laos. The rules allowed the enemy to protect its forces and material, provided it with military training and staging areas free from attack and permitted it to erect massed air defense weapons. One of the most tragic consequences of the rules was the impact on American aircraft and pilot losses by giving North Vietnam time to build up its sophisticated air defense system.

The lesson of Vietnam is that once civilian policymakers decide on war, the result of placing military operations under day-to-day management of unskilled amateurs and rejecting the advice of the best military professionals may be loss of the original objective for going to war. Such rules must never again be applied to our Armed Forces.

Mr. President, my legal counsel, Mr. J. Terry Emerson, was invited to speak on the subject of the rules of engagement at a symposium held on Capitol Hill last week sponsored by the American Security Council, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the American Conservative Union. His statement presents a tight history of the effect and evolution of these rules. One could not claim to understand the Vietnam war without being aware of the rules of engagement and for that reason I submit his remarks for the Record.

The remarks follow:

VIETNAM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

J. Terry Emerson)

United States military forces did not lose the Vietnam War. Congress did not block the Vietnam War. In fact, Congress was up to its ears in the Vietnam conflict, from as early as 1949 when it first pushed funds on President Truman to support anticommmunist forces in Indochina.

Although Congress can be blamed for denying Presidents authority to enforce the peace agreement with Hanoi after January 1973, it was civilian managers of the Executive Branch who first denied our military forces victory by imposing a complex and lengthy set of restrictions on what the military could and could not do in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. These restrictions were known as Rules of Engagement.

The rules were almost impossible to memorize or interpret, although our pilots had to do so. When some changes were made after repeated appeals of the Joint Chiefs, the reductions were gradual and not strong enough to serve strategic ends. Numerous partial and total bombing halts interrupted the effectiveness of preceding bombing campaigns. Often, when limited extensions of target areas were granted, they were withdrawn shortly afterward.

For years the contents of these rules were kept secret. It is only this year, thanks to the initiative of Senator Goldwater and the agreement of Secretary Weinberger, that the actual text of the rules were declassified. In addition, a contemporary historical examination of the air war in Southeast Asia compiled by the Air Force was among the top secret documents newly released at Senator Goldwater's request.

The rules covering North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were issued in the form of daily message traffic and these papers were not retained. They are described, however, in the three volume Air Force report entitled Project Corona. The detailed rules for South Vietnam were issued as official directives and the complete set of these rules for 1968 and 1971 were placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Goldwater. The Air Force reports and the rules appear in the Record of March 6, 14, 18 and 26.

These newly public documents reveal just how comprehensive the restrictions were that bound our military units in Vietnam. For example, one rule told American pilots they were not permitted to attack a North Vietnam MIG sitting on the runway. The only time it could be attacked was after it was in flight, was clearly identified, and showed hostile intent. Even then, its base could not be bombed. The same "hostile intention" rule applied to truck convoys driving on highways in Laos and North Vietnam, if you can imagine how a truck is to show hostile intent. In some regions, enemy trucks could evade attack under the rules by simply driving off the road. Even military truck parks located 200 yards from a road could not be destroyed. Another rule provided that SAM missile sites could not be struck while they were under construction but only after they became operational and dangerous, unless a bombing halt was in...
effect and not even an active missile site could be attacked. In 1967, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted extensive hearings on the conduct of the air war against North Vietnam. For example, in April 1972 to use tactical air strikes against SAMs, artillery and other military targets. One month later, President Nixon ordered the mining of Haiphong harbor and offensive air operations were resumed throughout North Vietnam except for a buffer zone at the communist Chinese border. There was a brief effort to bomb north of the 20th parallel in late October, but President Nixon initiated the famous Christmas bombings, 12 consecutive days of strikes extending from December 18, 1972, using B-52s on a sustained basis for the first time over the northern part of North Vietnam. Hanoi returned to the negotiating table immediately and signed a peace agreement within six weeks.

A major objection to increased war operations that prevailed among civilian policy makers had been concern about armed intervention by Red China. Yet Henry Kissinger tells us in his memoirs, "Years of Upheaval" that during his visit to Peking in February 1973 he discovered a unified communist Vietnam dominant in Indochina would be a strategic nightmare for Mainland China. The goals of the Paris peace agreement because it would benefit China by denying Hanoi primacy in the region and buffer North Vietnam with three Independent South Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger also writes that he discovered the answer to a mystery which had long confounded him. The road Chinese troops were building through northern Laos for nearly a decade was not intended or used to supply the Pathet Lao. It established a corridor for the advancing North Vietnamese and could be used to contain and threaten Hanoi's possible domination over all Indochina. That Chinese border was secured by passively when virtually unlimited bombing of North Vietnam had been permitted in December 1972.

Unfortunately, Congress made it impossible for President Nixon or Ford to uphold the peace terms. Again quoting Dr. Kissinger, the resulting collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 "not only led to genocidal horrors in Indochina; from Angola to Ethiopia to Iran to Afghanistan, it ushered in a period of American humiliation (and) an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe..."

But the Congressional abandonment of friendly peoples who relied on us came at the end of the war. The real architects of the lost opportunity that doomed our un-December 18, 1972, using B-52s on a sustained basis for the first time over the northern part of North Vietnam. Hanoi returned to the negotiating table immediately and signed a peace agreement within six weeks.

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But the Congressional abandonment of friendly peoples who relied on us came at the end of the war. The real architects of the lost opportunity that doomed our un-During this bombing halt, U.S. aircraft could not make even protective reaction strikes into North Vietnam. The strike was below the 19th parallel and it was an immediate response against enemy aircraft which had linked their GCI radars with the lock on radar capability of SAM sites to guide MIG attacks on U.S. aircraft and to SAMs until the instant of firing on our aircraft.

The Rules of Engagement were so tight that during the last week of March 1972, General Lavelle, Commander of the Seventh Air Force, was relieved of duty for illegally ordering unauthorized raids against North Vietnamese air fields and radar sites. But the Pentagon Papers and the newly declassified documents reveal that the Joint Chiefs of the JCS repeatedly argued against the artificial limitations impeding the objectives of American humiliation (and) an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe..."

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VIETNAM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DECLASSIFIED

- Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, U.S. military forces have been much maligned by some people in this country who blame the military for what they call the loss of the war in Vietnam. However, the Armed Forces did not suffer a military defeat in any sense of that term. Rather, it was civilian managers of the U.S. Government who denied our military forces a victory by imposing a complex and lengthy set of restrictions on what the military could and could not do in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam.

These layers of restrictions, which were constantly changing and were almost impossible to memorize or understand, although it was required of our pilots, granted huge sanctuary areas to the enemy. When certain limits would at last be removed after repeated appeals by the Joint Chiefs, the reductions were made only in gradual steps and seldom were strong enough to serve our strategic ends. Numerous partial and total bombing halts interrupted the effectiveness of earlier bombing campaigns. Often, when limited extensions of target areas were granted, they were unexpectedly canceled and withdrawn shortly afterward.

Mr. President, in the interest of informing the American people and any journalists who are interested in the truth of what really prevented a military victory in Southeast Asia, I have asked several Secretaries of Defense to declassify the pertinent records, the actual text of the rules which restrained military conduct in the Vietnam war. I am delighted to inform my colleagues that Secretary Weinberger has now agreed with me that it would be useful to declassify the remaining Vietnam rules of engagement. He and Assistant Secretary Defense Armitage recently provided me with several volumes of papers which were formerly classified top secret but have now been declassified.

These newly public documents clearly reveal the excessive restraints our military units had to operate under in Vietnam. For example, one rule told American pilots they were not permitted to attack a North Vietnam Mig sitting on the runway. The only time it could be attacked was after it was in flight, was unattended, had hostile intentions. Even then, its base could not be bombed. The same hostile intention rule applied to truck convoys driving on highways in Laos and North Vietnam. In some areas, enemy trucks could evade attack by simply driving off the road. Military truck parks located just over 200 yards away from a road could not be destroyed. Another rule provided that SAM missile sites could not be struck while they were under construction, but only after they became operational.

Mr. President, the declassified material I have received is too lengthy to make available all at one time in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Therefore, I plan to insert these documents as a series of publications over the next few weeks. I will begin today with the first of three studies prepared by the Air Force examining the rules of engagement governing USAF combat operations in Southeast Asia from their beginnings in 1960-65. I think it is very important for the Members of this body, the public, the press, and media to understand fully the restrictions that were placed upon all of our forces in Southeast Asia. It is unbelievable that Secretary of Defense McNamara would ever place such restraints on our forces, as Secretary McNamara did, or that any President would have allowed this to happen, and I hope the Joint Chiefs will decide once again that it is necessary to have to engage in war, and I pray that we will never have to do so, that such damaging restrictions will never be applied to our forces.

Mr. President, I ask that the document entitled "Project Checko Report," covering the years 1960-65, shall appear at this point in the RECORD.

The document follows:

PROJECT CONTEMPORARY HISTORICAL EVALUATION FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS REPORT EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR USAF COMBAT FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In a futile attempt to reverse the course of events engulfing the French in Indochina, the U.S. Air Force contributed 1,800 sorties in the first 20 flying hours, during the first six months of 1954. On 7 May 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communist Viet Minh, followed on 20 July by the Geneva Accords, partitioning Vietnam. The U.S. decision to pledge increased aid to the government in South Vietnam was announced on 24 October 1954. Thus began the role which the U.S. Air Force was to play in counter-insurgency within the overall framework of U.S. foreign policy as supplemented by the policies of the Department of Defense.

By spring of 1960, the counter-insurgency situation in SVN had obviously deteriorated. With the arrival of the first of the U.S. Special Forces Teams on May 30, SVN resistance stiffened. This month also marked the delivery of the first full squadron of A-1H aircraft to the RVN. Later, on 1 October 1961, PACAF deployed a Control and Reporting Post (CRP) to Tan Son Nhut Air Base:

"Its purpose was to provide radar coverage for the southern area of SVN and to train the Vietnamese Air Force in the use of radar and air traffic control. The area was divided into a military sector and a civil sector. The military sector was subject to control by the U.S. Air Force, a key part of the "Vietnam Air Traffic Control System, which was established in mid-January."

The JCS, on 14 November 1961, directed Jungle Jim forces to be deployed to the RVN. This deployment consisted of the 1st Air Commando Group (formerly the 4404th, CCTS) with the A-1H, A-20, and T-28's—all carrying RVN Air Force (VNAF) markings. Within 48 hours, President Kennedy announced the decision to bolster RVN strength but not to commit U.S. combat forces. On 11 December, two U.S. Army helicopter companies arrived in RVN.

The commitment, by the United States to a policy of unlimited support of the RVN, short of actual combat forces, was subject to many restraining influences. In addition to the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which the U.S., although not a signatory, had undertaken to support, there were other self-imposed restraints imposed by the framework of U.S. Foreign Policy. These restrictions included rules for the introduction of the American people; relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; and vulnerability to charges, by the RVN and Communist China, of aggression in Southeast Asia. Further, and of particular significance to the U.S. Air Force, was the opinion of Mr. McNamara (December, 1961) that the war in South Vietnam should be considered a ground war and that although "naval and air support operational in concept," they do not provide the U.S. military structure in the RVN and the ensuing intra-command relationships reflected an awareness of McNamara's views.

Two articles (Annexes VII and VIII) from the Geneva Accords of 1954 serve to illustrate the nature and scope of the constraints imposed. Article I (in part): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the United States, China, and Communist China, shall observe the following rules of engagement in the airspace over the partitioned territory of Vietnam:...." Article 17 (in part): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any armed forces or other elements of armed forces of the United States, China, and Communist China, shall be subject to the agreement between the respective governments or other appropriate bodies.

Thus, the U.S. decision to increase substantially its aid to the RVN ran head on into the Geneva Accords and the International Control Committee (ICC) established to oversee its provisions.

On October 28, 1951, Secretary of State Rusk issued a maxim that "the key to victory in Saigon requesting concurrence on ground rules for the introduction of the USAF Jungle Jim unit into the RVN. Mr. Rusk proposed that only serviceable Viet­namese markings painted on them before being flown in or being brought in by surveillance and other aircraft than aeroplanes, were to arrive in the RVN in civilian clothes but could then wear
their uniforms. Such were some of the efforts to circumvent the provisions of the Geneva Accords.

This issue was finally settled on November 16, 1961 when President Kennedy formally announced his intention to follow the Geneva Accords by a commitment of U.S. combat forces. The position that U.S. combat forces were involved in a commitment of Vietnam—short of introducing U.S. combat forces was maintained for the ensuing two years (until December 31, 1963).

By the close of 1961, the Communist insurgent forces had grown to proportions where immediate response was required to contain and then defeat the threat. This situation mandated revision of our policy position to provide for U.S. armed and manned helicopters to "defend themselves" and to secure fire from the ground. Subsequently, authorities were granted to initiate fire on known Viet Cong targets posing a threat.

The immediate, U.S. objectives, at this time, was to provide the VNAF with such training as would eventually enable the Vietnamese to perform all required missions. December 31, 1961 was set as the goal and to realize the "immediate response" requirement, PACAF conceived the covert Farm Gate operation, with the construction of aircrews in New Caledonia, the first of these missions was flown in December 1961.

The concept of employment of Farm Gate (Operation Jungle Jade) was utilized to utilize the function of performing a covert air operations of the VNAF, as decided at the SecDef meeting 16 December, all kinds of conventional and operational combat support missions can be flown in SVN by Detachment 2, 4400th CCTS provided by the Vietnamese on board of the aircraft, this mission was conducted so the Vietnamese crews could take over the missions at the earliest possible time. The ruled dictated that the aircraft be based-in-country and be of the same type as the host country. If the effort was to be plausible deniable. These latter dictates had been a continuing limiting factor on Farm Gate operations in the RVN.

The issue of U.S. pilots flying Farm Gate missions in the RVN came to the fore early in 1962. Admiral Felt's opinion of the State Department release of 9 March 1962 was that it evaded the issue. He recommended instead, a "factual" statement: "U.S. aircraft are operating in two-seat T-28's and RB-26's with VNAF pilots. The purpose of these missions is to train VNAF pilots in tactical and combat flying, and also to maintain aircrew proficiency."

The concept of employing on combat missions, the aircraft deliver ordnance on actual Viet Cong targets. No U.S. mission has used air-to-ground ordnance on Viet Cong targets. All U.S. aircraft were operating in support of VNAF aircraft, which were conducting ground support missions in the RVN.

March 6, 1985

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T. U.S. Army OV-1's (Mohawk). The OV-1's may be utilized in an armed configuration (only as specifically directed by COUSMACV) for fixed or armed scout missions; however, such armament will be utilized only defensively. These aircraft will not be utilized in an attack role. In a defensive role, they will be U.S. marked and flown in coordination with a U.S. and Vietnamese crew.

C. Cambodia, SVN/DMZ Border: MACV Lt. General, Subject Air Operations, dated 23 October 1962, applies to operations of all U.S. aircraft. However, the general policy of the COUSMACV is that aircrews will be employed on combat missions. Therefore, any armament, armed or unarmament, on any aircraft employed in SVN. Day: Normally no U.S. aircraft will operate closer than 100 miles to the Cambodian border and then only when the ceiling is at least 1500 feet and visibility is three miles or better. When the border is defined by physical landmarks, armament, armament may be conducted to a point not closer than one mile to the border; non-operational flights are restricted to five miles from the border and at least 2000 feet of altitude. Night: U.S. aircraft will operate closer than three miles to the Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by the Joint General Staff (JGS) only then when under positive radar control. Unless specifically authorized by this headquarters, no U.S. aircraft will cross the two mile line off the coast of Vietnam. Waivers to these border restrictions (paragraph e. above) will be granted by the Joint General Staff and then only when the border can be unmistakably defined by visual reference.

There were aircraft operating within the Republic of Vietnam which had VNAF markings and Vietnamese crews: VNAF aircraft were marked U.S.-Vietnamese crew; U.S. markings and U.S-Vietnamese crews, and U.S. markings with U.S. crews.

Admiral Felt pointed out to General Kline that JCS message Number 8276 of 29 September 1963 had authorized the initiation of fires by armed aircraft engaged in escourt.

"By definition (JCS 5072) suppressive fire resulting from escort missions are considered defensive fire. You should amend paragraphs 5D and E of (MACV Directive 22) in such manner as to indicate armament and armament on such aircraft as an escourt mission only when specifically directed by COUSMACV. Such an amendment will be used to initiate fire provided enemy target is clearly identified and is threat to the safety of the helicopter crew."

Moreover, JCS message 8878 of February 1963 (had) authorized an amendment to the rules of engagement, pertaining specifically to U.S. helicopters in the RVN, to allow them to engage clearly identified Viet Cong forces considered a threat to the safety of the aircraft and their passengers. JCS stated that during a visit of their team to the RVN, it was found that the JCS message of September 1963 concerning rules of engagement of U.S. helicopters in the RVN had been erroneously interpreted to mean that the helicopter must wait to be fired upon before initiating fire. Such an interpretation is more restrictive than was the intent..." COMUSMACV amended his rules of engagement accordingly.

"...U.S. Army OV-1's (Iroquois): The U.S. Army marked OV-1 may be used defensively only. It may not be utilized to initiate fires upon any target; however, if the aircraft in escorting a target, it may return the fire. Aircraft will be armed and marked.

"...U.S. Army UH-1's (Iroquois): The U.S. Army marked UH-1 may be used defensively only. It may not be utilized to initiate fires upon any target; however, if the aircraft is escorting a target, it may return the fire. Aircraft will be armed and marked."

The matter of the purpose and scope of FARM GATE appeared to remain essentially moot. The problem of armament on aircraft did not receive specific attention in regard to the introduction of U.S. Army helicopters. UH-1A's and UH-1B's were both introduced into the RVN. The first two of the AH-1A Iroquois arriving in the RVN aboard the USNC on 20 April 1962.
Certain violations (of the Geneva Accords) had evidently been tolerated in view of U.S. objectives—others were not. The bases of the value judgments involved were not always adequate.

From the inception of a border violation, Jim (Farm Gate) activities in the RVN in late 1961, the State Department evidenced growing concern that a border violation might become counterproductive by alienating the non-combatant population. Early in 1962, the Vietnamese Air Force had proposed suspending air operations within five miles of the borderline. The idea was thoroughly discussed at the next SecDef meeting scheduled for 19 February at Headquarters U.S. Army in Vietnam.

Although the DOD had not been in favor of suspending air operations, the issue was placed on the February SecDef conference agenda. Headquarters U.S. Army in Vietnam requested Headquarters PACAF to prepare a thorough briefing on the "concept of employing border violations" to include target selection and identification to include measures taken to assure minimum impact on civilian population.

During his visit, these procedures and the control structure which had been established were closely examined. The conclusion reached was that certain technical and operational problems involved a "solid control structure" existed. Targets were selected by the VN and checked by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the Support Operations Center (ASOC). Targets were marked by the VN forward air controllers (FAC) flying in liaison aircraft. The report illustrated the degree of care exercised by citing a mission in which the VN airborne controller did not arrive to mark the target. The USAF operating in liaison aircraft observed that a fire fight was taking place, and saw an officer in a jeep placed on the location of the enemy; nevertheless, the bombs were shelled in the ocean.

In December 1963, Secretary of State Rusk in a letter to A. to the Embassy in Saigon, views regarding border restrictions on U.S. aircraft. Leading to a discussion of the role of proper military tactics to defeat the Viet Cong, the Secretary stated:

"It remains that political significance at present in the minds of many enemy officials in border areas is of great importance, including the border incident certainly outweighs probable military advantages of air operations in border areas. This may, finally, count against us now and two to three years hence, because... there is a general agreement that success lies in drawing tight Cordon Sanitaire in the Mekong manner...

The implicit concern reflected in these messages was prompted by many charges of border violations lodged by both sides. For example, the Cambodian (and Laotian) border was marked, ill-defined, and hotly disputed. In response to this concern, on 25 January 1964, the Commander of 2nd ADVON restricted Farm Gate aircraft from conducting operations within five miles of the border during daylight, and ten miles during darkness. The VNAF did not have this restriction.

On 8 November 1962, the VN JGS published a memorandum entitled "Liaison of Air and Artillery Support Along Vietnam Republic Border Corridor." Whereas the application of 22 November restrictions on Farm Gate aircraft was provided for a five mile buffer during daylight hours, which was increased to ten miles during the night, the JGS memorandum placed a five mile buffer, restricted Farm Gate support and 15 KM along the south bank of the Ben-Hai River. Under emergency conditions, according to the JGS, requests for waiver of the restriction would be considered. With regard to the waiver authority for Farm Gate aircraft, the JGS advised COMUSMACV, in January 1963, that he also be prepared to waive, with discretion, the role of the Farm Gate. "I expect you to exercise the same (JGS) waiver authority for U.S. operations on case by case basis when deemed necessary and always expect you to weigh the worth of (border violation) involved."

At this time, and to the normal Farm Gate restrictions between JGS and the U.S., also was added by the 2d Air Division. The crews could only conduct strikes under a U.S. Air Force control. An exception was established for night strikes permitting Farm Gate crews to strike under a C-47 framework which established radio relay between the ground and the strike aircraft.

These restrictive measures created many problems, one example of which is illustrated by the Viet Cong attack on the Saigon Airfield on 10 September 1963. Within five minutes after the first 81mm mortar shell fell, all U.S. personnel were airborne. In the air, they nocc'd the AOC of the attack and asked for a flareshot and additional fighters. They then expended ordnance and achieved air superiority. It was subsequently learned that the Viet Cong mortar positions identified by what appeared to be muzzle flashes. This was being done during a mortar barrage with mortars and other fire. Immediately following the air attack the Viet Cong withdrew.

The commander of the 34th Tactical Group, whose T-28's were involved, commended the aggressive action of the USAF pilots in defending a base under attack. He stated that the action was in violation of the rules of engagement since there were no U.S. personnel on board, no FAC, no flareshot, and no way of positively identifying the target which was in an allegedly friendly area. In making this point, the 34th's commander noted that it was difficult to understand why certain rules had to be observed. In a COIN environment, he said, the rules of engagement are necessary sensitive since there are usually no clear-cut battle lines. He added that the winner of this war would probably be the side which wins over the population, and it was this that the USAF had to do to keep the sand of the enemy could be broken by the unintentional death of one of the friendly forces. The commander also stated:

"... the need for mature judgment and restraint at all times and abide by the rules of the game. This is vital, even though in certain situations, such as this case, it might appear that the proper course of action lies elsewhere. Take pride in accomplishing a difficult job under adverse conditions in a sane and professional manner."

Another case occurred on 5 December 1963. A II Corps outpost was attacked by a II Corps outpost at night were reported to have fired on friendly forces in an attack made without positive identification of the Viet Cong target. The commander, MACV, directed that corrective action be taken. He added:

"... it is also of concern that a possibility exists in which U.S. pilots conducted Indochina firing against ground targets without the requisite knowledge of the ground force disposition, without coordination with ground forces or the air control system, and without prior arrangement or briefing. It is also of concern to the end of the year, at which time a test plan involving the arming of OV-1's (Mohawks) was proposed. To permit such testing, General Harkins advised Admiral Felt that the rules of engagement would have to be changed. Mr. Felt recommended that the RVN be informed before the "Mohawk" were used offensively after being fired upon. The OV-1 test (in the role of an armed escort for transport aircraft) was approved and the rules subsequently modified.

Delegation (Ranch Hand) and crop destruction continued to be a source of discussion. In mid-1963, crop destruction was tightly held at the Washington level. On 19 June, the Embassy Saigon protested as such activities involved about 3000 acres. "We (General Harkins and Minister Truehart) urgently requested that this discretionary authority in order to minimize delays so that greatest possible crop area be hit before conclusion overall military operation toward mid-July." Both Truehart and Harkins were "satisfied that this area is Viet Cong controlled, and that Viet Cong do not repeat do not have nearby alternative sources of food.

The use of napalm was also the center of controversy; however, it was somewhat more controversial. Harkins testified that the joint operation. State felt that "political considerations would suggest limiting use napalm to high priority targets which are (clearly) Viet Cong installations."

In response to a query from the Embassy Saigon, State responded:

"...make discretion to use napalm. To extent control can be exercised, (it) should be left with Task Force Saigon. However, as you are well aware there are special political aspects in its use.

"...State and Defense be advised in time to approve in advance any operations... the Director of Operations requested that this operation be approved by the joint operation."

The VNAF had observed the results which could be obtained from napalm and had arrived at the conclusion that it was an effective weapon. While some elements in the U.S. remained unconvinced as to the desirability and essentiality of its use vis-a-vis U.S. political interests, the VNAF officially requested that this type of weapon be used in priority targets which are likely to have significant political repercussions."

The continuing and ever-changing state of operations of the VNAF efforts to approach operational effectiveness. Particularly, the various events within the RVN, and the attitudes of its hopes and the global context of the war, the prosecution of the war against the Communist insurgents. Such incidents as the bombing of the Presidential Palace in February 1962; the maturing of the Buddhist unrest in the late summer of 1963; and the coup of 1 November 1963, which deposed the Diem government, brought the joint air operations to a temporary but disruptive halt. Immediately following the bombing of the Presidential Palace, (27 February), there was a "mission to get back on RVN air operations to carry on operations without RVN air support numbers lower than 20mm. Subsequently, Colonel Vinh informed General Anthis that all restriction on VNAF strike aircraft would probably be removed by 5 March. The alleged repression and persecution of the Buddhist clergy and supporters were further confused and detract the RVN military efforts. The U.S. Embassy reported a conversation with General Khiem.
March 6, 1985

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Chief of Staff of the General Staff of 21 August. In an answer to a specific question, Bhutto stated that all general officers, in union, had lately become convinced that if situation (Buddhist problem) were to continue, the morale of Army would seriously deteriorate..."

Adding religious objectives to the military objective—progress toward which the operations were directed—and the scope and complexities of the Joint RVN/US problem and, effect opened a "second front," for the rebels, and an eternal political conflict as well as an external military conflict.

The coup of 1 November directly resulted from thevet these events. The VNAF, under Colonel Ky who had assumed command, fully supported the coup. The U.S. Air Attache noted, "Most VNAF pilots now bedded down in Alert Room, T-28's at Tan Son Nhat bombed and ready to go. FARM GATE standing by for Viet Cong outpost ata-ck...

Plans written in 1962 to saturate the countryside with air-ground actions to seek, destroy and fragment the Viet Cong. In 1963, the U.S. Air Force began to search and the Vietnamese General Staff is to have been conducted in two phases, one of which was bedded down during the June and November months of the joint operation. The operation was then faced with an internal political conflict as well as an external military conflict.

The beginning of 1964 saw the stage set for further restrictions, relaxations, additions, and changes to the rules of engagement in efforts to meet the exigencies of changing political and military policies. Compliance with these policies and rules was not enhanced by activities of the Joint RVN/US operation.

The big job now, and the entire team, needed a new boss. The new man, Acting JCS Chairman, Colonel Ky, had assumed command. This was the end of the situation as it was then perceived.

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With reference to the competition between the USAF aircraft and the MIGs, experiments were conducted for the purpose of training the VNAF and, that, comprehensive training sometimes involved combat missions with the USAF airman in an instructional role.

Certain reporters had received information, allegedly from a U.S. military source (and subsequently by VN armed forces sources) that FARM GATE aircraft, in many cases, spearheaded ground operations which were aimed against the Viet Cong. Also, it had been reported to them that there were now two air forces operating in the RVN, "the GVN Air Force and, secondly, American units (FARM GATE) controlled and operated by USAF." Ambassador Nitzius applied the latter charge to say the U.S. was "spearheading" the grand assault. "In training the VN Air Force in operation of T-28's, a new plane to them. We are giving them training under combat conditions, but that in case do U.S. pilots operate alone, purpose and objectives being the training of GVN pilots in combat operations." Noting labeled as "fake" the charge that there were two Air Force in the SVN. The reporters indicated that they were satisfied with these responses and the discussion made the reports considerably less "sensational."

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The beginning of 1964 saw the stage set for further restrictions, relaxations, additions, and changes to the rules of engagement in efforts to meet the exigencies of changing political and military policies. Compliance with these policies and rules was not enhanced by activities of the Joint RVN/US operation.
Until the May attack against the Neutralists, the RCAF possessed only four T-28's, plus a few non-tactical aircraft, and its air- craft were limited to the use of rockets and guns. On 17 May, when the attacks began, American Ambassador Leonard Unger (then Ambassador to Laos) authorized the RCAF to use 500-pound bombs against the attacking forces.

The initial efforts of T-28 or other aircraft operating over Laos were confined to providing mobile air defense of the United States in its various military installations and a system which would allow the Air Force to react to field requests. RCAF T-28's were also requested to provide ground support to the Northern Joint Command. An RCAF pilot had to be resolved at the earliest point in the Air Force effort to be effective.

A continuous program of reconnaissance in Laos was authorized by the JCS in a message to CINCPAC on 25 May. The Joint Chiefs also made it clear that this overflight of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was absolutely not authorized. CINCPAC added that the Yankee Team would have to be responsive to the requirements of the U.S.-team joint command.
will be escorted and escorts are authorized to employ best operational techniques to ensure the safety of the aircraft, which, when authorized by JCS, may include attack of known antiaircraft positions in advance of the reconnaissance mission. Hostile fire is considered essential for the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft.

The recommended by JCS, CINCPAC went on to provide further guidance:

a. Operational missions should be planned and conducted to emphasize minimum losses, to the extent possible, consistent with the achievements of desired objectives.

b. As a general rule, reconnaissance missions should be conducted at medium level. Medium level is defined as an altitude above the level of expected hostile ground fire.

c. A differentiation must be made between requirements and priority requirements. The determination of priority should be made by Ambassador Vienle and/or by COMUSMACV.

Missions over Laos and South Vietnam brought the two countries to a dangerous imbalance. Since 1959, an estimated 20,000 officers, men and technicians were known to have infiltrated into South Vietnam and another 17,000 probably came in according to the U.S. State Department.

The Communist forces in Laos were stepped up from their level of control over what it was in May 1964. Yankee team reconnaissance flights over Laos and air strikes by RAP T-28s (and later, by USAF jet aircraft) were the major contributing factors in curbing enemy activities.

In South Vietnam, the mid-1964 situation was also grim. Fighting under practically the same rules as were in effect when the United States stepped up its assistance in 1961, the government was making little progress against the Viet Cong. The Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and the Khanh coup in January 1963, left an aftermath of political instability that practically stopped pursuit of pacification programs elaborately drawn early in the year. The USARV, which, in the spring had guarded its B-52’s and T-28s, was in the process of receiving T-28s and B-58s that were available for combat in June and July. The month of July was the worst and bloodiest of the war for both U.S. and Vietnamese forces as the government in Vietnam continued their campaign to peak intensity, apparently to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Accords.

The Hanoi high level strategy meeting, in early June, to line up a new approach to the war, the change in command of both MACV and CINCPAC, might make the越南 are free of hostile ground fire and other areas where hostile ground fire will be expected. Most of these areas are known to you. In conducting future missions in areas where hostile ground fire is not expected, low-level coverage can be conducted if weather precludes coverage at medium level, and if risks at low level are acceptable. However, when missions are to fly over areas where hostile ground fire can be expected, schedule the mission at medium level. In those cases due consideration should be given to requiring use of suppressive fire if considered essential to the safety of the mission.

The Air Force wanted greater freedom to schedule low-level flights, as required, CINCPACAF recommended the removal of restrictions to permit such flights. Although CINCPACAF was able to tailor the mission to fit the needs for low-level missions, he did not feel the time was right to ask for full authority to fly them. He believed overall authority at his disposal and from other authorities at higher levels was convinced of the advantage of low-level reconnaissance.

The Air Force expressed concern to CINCPAC about suppressive fire. PACAF used considered use of suppressive fire by Yankee Team aircraft most desirable. The message suggested that a combination of counterbattery and preplanned interdiction strikes would be used against the “improving” Communist airfields.

It was recommended that suppressive fire was needed for low altitude missions, and while not 100 percent effective, it would give them from injury. It was also felt that the authority to order suppressive fire should be left with the commander.

Although a Yankee Team operations over Laos and USASAF support of the RAP T-28 operations signified an escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the events of early August, in the Gulf of Tonkin, triggered a sudden upsurge in air activity. The attack on October the 20th by U.S. destroyers Turner Joy and Maddux (August 2 and 4) and the subsequent U.S. Navy strikes on four RVN installations (August 9) helped a lot of pieces fall into place in the complex plans for defending Southeast Asia. First, the movement of USASAF jets into the RVN was carried out with justification.

A system for U.S. control of air defense operations got approval from the RVN government.

For the U.S. Air Force, the Tonkin Gulf incident was the start of a new emphasis on air power in the counterinsurgency struggle. At least significant, perhaps, than the retaliatory strikes, was the deployment of USASAF strength to Southeast Asia following the Tonkin attacks. PACAF was alerted to discontinue flights by B-57s from Clark to Bien Hoa on August 8. At the same time, it was to alert one F-105 squadron to move from Yokota.

It was also told to alert one RFT of six F-101's to deploy from WestPac to Tan Son Nhut. Deployment alert orders went out to other CINCPACAF units, including the Marines and the 173d Airborne Brigade.

On the morning of the 8th, General Khanh, in a meeting with General Westmoreland, urged to allow the B-57's and F-102's to enter the RVN. He also said that the VNAP, along with all Vietnamese armed forces, approved that 25 percent of could be off the ground in 30 minutes and the rest in 45 minutes. The RVNAP was ready to attack North Vietnam if the South Vietnamese forces attacked the south, and they would also attack Cambodia under similar conditions.

Actions were taken in several other areas to prepare for the new situation. With the increased possibility that a retaliatory attack might be carried out in South Vietnam, CINCPAC asked its commands to study the air defense needs. It noted that the rules of engagement had two voids: (1) there were no rules for intercept, pursuit, or destruction of hostile aircraft over Thailand and (2) no rule for allowing aircraft intercepted over Vietnam to be followed outside the RVN.

To prepare for a possible movement of Communist troops across the 17th Parallel, or into Laos, COMUSMACV recommended, on 5 August, that medium-level and low-level photo reconnaissance flights begin over RVN.

CINCPAC simplified its rules of engagement in mid-August. He said, for example, CINCPAC had agreed with CINCPACAF to allow the B-57's to enter the RVN. He also said that the VNAP, along with all Vietnamese armed forces, approved that 25 percent of the B-57's could be off the ground in 30 minutes and the rest in 45 minutes. The RVNAP was ready to attack North Vietnam if the South Vietnamese forces attacked the south, and they would also attack Cambodia under similar conditions.

CINCPAC urged the recommendation of OPCON for aircraft are fired upon by ground fire, retaliatory fire is authorized on the first pass only. At other aircraft are fired, or by circling subsequent passes by escorts.

b. If the reconnaissance or escort aircraft are attacked by hostile aircraft, they will receive both immediate and prolonged air defense.
launch Yankee Team weather reconnaissance missions had been delegated and did not require approval from higher headquarters. Weather reconnaissance missions were not considered as required, provided they were flown at altitudes and in areas where they would not be on the ground. The use of cameras on airplanes conducting weather reconnaissance was permitted on these flights.

Regarding the OP procedural messages, CINCPAC told his subordinate that, under current ground rules, missions requiring approval by State, Defense and JCS, missions had to be flown exactly as listed in the OP-08 and approved by COMUSMACV. These weather reconnaissance missions were approved for SAR operations in the RNW, combing, once again, the rules of Yankee Team operations. The JCS immediately set 10,000 feet as the maximum altitude for Yankee Team missions. Guidance for Yankee Team operations was as follows:

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CINCPAC reported that U.S. close air support was being increased, using forces based in Vietnam or aboard aircraft carriers. The Ambassador to Laos approved Yankee Team operations for fright operations in the area of the Nam Hu and Nam Hou and Nam Hou Rivers on 28 October.

In late October, renewed recommendations for Yankee Team operations against Route 7 were made and the first USAT interdiction mission was finally approved and flown. These interdiction missions later termed Barrel Roll were not authorized alternate targets when flown at night.

Shortly after the Victor 747 cruise attack on Bien Hoa, on 1 November Ambassador Taylor, concurring with the JCS plans for counterattacks, and with an endorsement from COMUSMACHV, strongly recommended that retaliatory air strikes be undertaken jointly with the RNW. COMUSMACHV wired that no specific Viet Cong target in the RVN which would constitute an appropriate reprisal. While the RNW was available for such a target, and with some limited success, none were found justifying a mass air attack.

In the proposed interdiction strikes along Route 7, these aircraft were authorized for use in high-cover support, skirt suppression roles and SAR operations. Armed Yankee Team reconnaissance aircraft were not authorized to fly over the area, and some strike targets beyond the capabilities of the RLAF T-Birds.

Near the end of Sept, 1964, gave the RLAF approval for use for its T-28Ds in the proposed interdiction strikes along Route 7. These aircraft were authorized for use in high-cover support, skirt suppression roles and SAR operations. Armed Yankee Team reconnaissance aircraft were not authorized to fly over the area, and some strike targets beyond the capabilities of the RLAF T-Birds.

In an embassy telecon from the Ambassador to the JCS, Oct 14, the Ambassador summarized guide lines for using Thal-based USAF aircraft from VNAP to USAP. The SECDEF authorized the use of "observers" considering the other changes as "not being in the interest of the United States".

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Prior to the second series of Barrel Roll flights, 2d Air Division requested and received approval to fly recon aircraft with the strike group with the recon aircraft authorized to fly below 10,000 feet at optimum altitude to get photos of the type and quality necessary to assess immediate strike results. If the recon aircraft did not descend, escort of CAP aircraft would support them. If the recon aircraft had to descend, escort of CAP aircraft would support them. Like the first mission, napalm was not authorized on this flight, nor were strike aircraft authorized to be launched from Thailand bases.

On 13 December, AC-47 aircraft were introduced to combat, which was to result in increased strike flexibility. Future Barrel Roll missions were to be conducted on a monthly basis, providing US forces with a standard and predictable strike capability.

On 15 December, AC-7 aircraft were in escort for CAP missions against Laos. CAP aircraft, which were to result in increased strike flexibility, were introduced to combat.

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U.S. military daily missions; larger numbers of aircraft were assigned to individual targets, napalm permitted when approved by the American Ambassador to Laos; removal of the two-mile buffer zone; low-level photography and more flexible target areas were provided for. However, many old limitations were replaced with new ones and political restrictions were a continuing problem in the Laos Interdiction operations.

Other photo reconnaissance problems were raised by the August 1964 prohibition of reconnaissance photographic surveillance on weather flights. Second Air Division said that such a restriction did not permit the best use of its aircraft assets. The division added that the JCS were unaware of the restrictions and thought it points, within the area, to dispose of ordnance. (Ho'oua however, there were no authorized jettison areas.)

Following several weeks of command and control discussions among CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV, the arguments continued until a message was transmitted containing CINCPAC that the rules barring photography had been waived and photos could be taken.

Rules of engagement appeared to be Quixotic—trucks sighted by escorts authorized except against the towns of Sam Neua, Khang Khay or Xiang Kheung. Use of suppressive fire not authorized unless AMEMB Vientiane coordinates and a written response was obtained. The Air Force continued to press for freedom in applying suppressive fire ahead of reconnaissance flights into heavily defended areas.

By September, the policy had changed. The Steel Tiger area was reconstituted as Tiger Hound in an effort to speed up the validation process. Interdiction operations were also extended to Tiger Hound. Air Force restrictions were permitted unlimited armed reconnaissance along all motorable roads within a three-mile radius, but only targets of opportunity within 200 yards of the road could be struck. Targets beyond this 200 yards limit or anywhere outside the specific geographical area could only be struck if they had previously been approved RLF targets, or were targets marked by the air on the spot. Targets of opportunity could not be attacked and napalm could not be employed.

Ambassador Sullivan (Laos) made it clear that there would be no relaxation of the rules of engagement and proposed to continue efforts to the special zone east of a line from the intersection of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam to UTM coordinate XI 6716.

The rules of engagement and the restrictions on Steel Tiger, BARREL ROLL and Steel Tiger, and BARREL ROLL programs were slowly being moderated, as indicated by a JCS message of 3 December in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the Steel Tiger area was no longer required for preplanned missions.

Things stood, however, all planned targets had to be coordinated and validated by AMEMB/USAIRA Vientiane and placed in one of three categories: Priority Alpha—All targets having some residual value that may be attacked without further Vientiane coordination except inclusion in the daily OPREP. Priority Bravo—Inactive targets, those already destroyed, abandoned or having very low residual value. Priority Charlie—Hold status, those targets that may not be struck for political or military reasons.

Although Tiger Hound aircraft were all performing low-level photography along the roads and motorable trails within the TAOR, they could not hit villages or built up areas, regardless of military benefit. Neither was one validated by Vientiane or the RALF. Even with the elaborate communications equipment aboard the aircraft, including the radio sidetone for communication, target validation took an agonizingly long time. In early December, it was proposed that the entire Steel Tiger Authority was to be transferred to the TAC reconnaissance and target validation personnel. This was not accepted, and the Steel Tiger Authority was given to the TAC reconnaissance and target validation personnel.
... This has worked out very successfully to date—much better than we thought at first. If the Lao observer is in doubt whether he is on the right target or not, he has a single side-band radio capability and can call the Laotian Air Force headquarters and there check the decision. When we first started the program, this happened many times, but since we have been working some months in the area the people have become quite familiar with our targets. We have received approvals almost immediately ...

b. Closing months of 1985, the rules of engagement governing strike operations in North Vietnam (Rolling Thunder) included the following:

- JCS targets previously struck could be re-struck without prior authorization (excluding locks, dams, and that portion of Target 3 which is formerly Target 38).
- Strike sorts were limited to 1300 for each 14-day cycle, with additional sorts authorized if necessary to destroy SAM installations, trucks, rail stock or NVN naval craft.
- Military targets of opportunity, in the vicinity of target areas (and crafts or units on enroute to or from missions) to be destroyed.
- Targets of opportunity situated outside the armed reconnaissance area were not to be struck if within 25nm of the China border, 30nm from the center of Hanoi, or 10nm from the center of Hsiphong.
- Those JCS targets authorized in paragraph "a", above (and with the same exclusions), could be attacked by aircraft returning from missions (including Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger aircraft overflying NVNO if these targets lay in the armed reconnaissance area and were suitable as jettison areas).
- Aircraft overflying Laos were authorized attack on KIAI target routes on their mission.
- Pre-strike, concurrent and post-strike reconnaissance authorized.
- MIGCAP, screen aircraft, and other appropriate elements were directed to engage in combat (including SAM suppression) when required to protect strike forces.
- When engaged in immediate pursuit, U.S. were not authorized to attack NVN air bases from which enemy aircraft were operating.
- Attacks on populated areas to be avoided during strikes against any target (including those developed by armed route reconnaissance).
- Flight paths of strike and armed reconnaissance missions to be planned so as to preclude approaching closer than 20nm to the China border.
- CINPAC was authorized to assign alternate missions to Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger aircraft in the Rolling Thunder area.

GLOSSARY

AAA—Anti-aircraft artillery.
ABCC—Airborne command and control center.
ACG—Air Commando Group.
ACGL—Air Commando Squadron.
ACW—Air Commando Wing.
AD—Air Division.
ADV—Advanced echelon.
AR—Air Attaché.
AMB—American embassy.
AOC—Air Operations Center.
ARVN—Army of the Republic of South Vietnam.
ASOC—Air Support Operations Center.
BDA—Bomb damage assessment.
BR—Barrel Roll mission.
CAP—Combat air patrol.
CUB—Cluster bomb unit.
CHICOM—Chinese Communist.
CHMAAC—Chief, Military Advisory and Assistance Group.
CINPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific Area.
CINPACAP—Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces.
CINPACFLT—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
COIN—Counterinsurgency.
COMUSMACV—Military Advisory Chief, Thailand (MACV/VN).
COMUSMACV—Military advisory Chief, South Vietnam (MACV).
CRP—Control and reporting post (CRC—Control and Reporting Center).
DOD—Department of Defense.
DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
ELINT—Electronic intelligence.
FAC—Forward air controller.
PAR—Laotian ground forces.
icc—International Control Commission.
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JOS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnam).
JOC—Joint Operations Center.
MACV—Military Advisory Chief, South Vietnam.
MIGCAP—Mig defense combat patrol.
NAVAL—Naval aid.
NVN—North Vietnam.
OPREP—Operations report.
PACAF—Pacific Air Forces.
PDJ—Plain of Jars (Plain of Jars, Laos).
PL—Plaiset Lao.
RA—Reconnaissance Attack.
RB—Reconnaissance/Bomber.
RESCAP—Rescue combat patrol.
RF—Reconnaissance/Fighter.
RKG—Royal Cambodian Government.
RLAF—Royal Laotian Air Force.
RTF—Reconnaissance task force.
RVN—Republic of South Vietnam.
SAR—Search and rescue.
SEA—Southeast Asia.
SL—Steel Tiger mission.
TPF—Task Force Group (Naval Carrier).
TSN—Tan Son Nhat Air Base, South Vietnam.
VC—Viet Cong.
VM—Viet Minh.
VNAF—South Vietnamese Air Force.
VIETNAM RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DECLASSIFIED—1966-89

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in August 1967 the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, then chaired by the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. STENNIS, conducted extensive hearings relative to the conduct of the air war against North Vietnam. The subcommittee heard the most knowledgeable and qualified witnesses, including both military leaders and their civilian managers. After gathering the basic and fundamental facts, the subcommittee issued a report on August 31, 1967, which was strongly critical of the rules of engagement restricting our aviation forces and preventing them from waging the air war in a manner best calculated to achieve results from a military standpoint.

The subcommittee concluded:

That the air campaign has not achieved its objectives to a greater extent cannot be attributed to inability or impotence of air power. It attests, rather, to the fragmenta-

tion of our air effort by everwidening restrictive controls, limitations, and the doctrine of "gradualism" placed on our aviation forces and preventing them from waging the air campaign in the manner and according to the timetable we had best calculated to achieve maximum results.

The Preparedness Subcommittee found that Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Johnson administration, in their professional judgment of our best military leaders and substituted civilian judgment in the details of target selection and the timing of strikes." In the judgment of the subcommittee, these civilian managers had "shackled the true potential of air power and permitted the use of what has become the world's most formidable anti-aircraft defenses."

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THE COUNTERINSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE REPORT

Hanoi-Haiphong areas, leaving the important targets untouched, the existence of large sanctuaries, the failure to close the port of Haiphong, the prohibition against a coordinated aerial mining of coastal water lanes of communication, and the attack continuously cutting rail and road lines to China, caused a piecelining of air operations which allowed North Vietnam to adjust to the air campaign by importing war materials from Communist countries through routes immune from attack and then to disperse and store this material in assured sanctuaries. From these sanctuaries North Vietnam infiltrated the material to South Vietnam and Laos.

By granting North Vietnam sanctuaries, the rules of engagement allowed the enemy to protect its forces and material, provided it with a military training and staging area free from attack and permitted it to erect massed air defense weapons.

Mr. President, while the air war in the Southeast Asia (SEA) conflict, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent through channels to the operational commands. Coving the rules of Engagement defined: geographical limits of SEA, territorial airspace, territorial seas, the South China Sea, and international seas and airspace; definitions of friendly forces, hostile forces, hostile acts, hostile aircraft, immediate pursuit, and hostile vessels; rules governing what could be attacked by U.S. aircraft, under what conditions immediate pursuit could be conducted, how declarations of a "hostile" should be handled, and the conditions of the attack.

The second set of rules was designated Operating Restrictions, which were contained in the CINCPAC Basic Operations Orders. These rules included prohibitions against striking locks, dams, hydroelectric plants, fishing boats, houseboats, and naval craft in certain areas; prohibitions against strikes in certain defined areas such as the Chinese Communist (ChiCom) buffer zone of the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted area, provided under certain conditions and restrictions, such as validation requirements, when FACs were, required, and distances from motorable roads.

The Operating Rules were issued the Seventh Air Force for Laos and Route Packages I (RP I) since July 1967 when the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), delegated most of the operating responsibility in these areas. Operating Rules that had been established, especially for Laos, concerned the use of Forward Air Controllers (FACs), the return of ground fire, the use of the AGM-45 (SHRIKE) missile, restrictions against mine-type munitions, and the requirements for navigational position determination.

Although, in theory, these three types of rules were distinct, in practice, they were almost always referred to collectively as "Rules of Engagement." This report examines this policy, since the formal distinctions were not always honored in message traffic and further, a report unifying the three types of regulations, miss, restrictions, and documentation of the restraints upon airpower that were in existence.

A detailed reconstruction of the many points in the evolution of the rules in the period of 1966-1969 is at this point in time both impossible and undesirable. A general pattern of development must be considered and the chronology of the evolution that gives unity to "Evolution of
the Rules of Engagement." At few other
points in the conduct of war are national
policies of a critical nature. The latter
rules and regulations enjoyed a special
importance because of the way in which
U.S. political relationship with other na-
tions, whether Allies, enemies, or potential
enemies, was reflected in the changing
termination of the Rules of Engagement
Gulf of Tonkin. The regulations for the
United Nations Armistice Conference
should have been, and were, much more
flexible than they actually were. In addi-
tion, the rules for the conduct of military
operations focused on the target of
peace offenses on the part of the
United States, but it failed to elicit adequate
signals that Hanoi was willing to move the
conflict to the halls of national decision.

The political value gained from strict
armistice in the halls of national decision.
the continuing validity of the maxim that
"war is an extension of national policy."
the ultimate story of the political back-
ground to changes in the conduct of war
must await a detailed investigation of the
files at the highest level of government. This
report traces their evolution primarily
from an operational viewpoint. with only
general restrictions limiting the effect of
creating a later in a letter sent by United
Nations Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg,
the President of the Security Council, in
which he stated:
"In recent attacks on petroleum facilities
every effort has been made to prevent harm
to civilians and to avoid destruction of non-
violent facilities. The petroleum facilities
attacked were located away from the popu-
lation centers of both Hanoi and Haiphong.
The pilots were carefully instructed to take
no action against targets that were not
to be hit. Moreover, to assure accura-
cy, the attacks have been scheduled only
when weather conditions permitting clear
visual sightings."

On 5 July 1966, President Johnston told
newsmen that every precaution had been
taken to avoid civilian casualties. At a
press conference on 20 July 1966, the
President stated:
"The men who conducted the bombings
on the military targets, the oil supplies of
Hanoi and Haiphong, did a very careful but
very perfect job. They hit almost 40 percent
of the intention, and almost 70 percent of it was
destroyed. We were very careful not to get out of the
targets, in order not to affect civilian
populations."

Throughout 1967, the Rolling Thunder
program escalated not only in the skies
over North Vietnam but also in political
issues in the halls of national decision. The
Basic Operations Order for RT, issued by
CINCPAC on 8 April 1967, contained Rules
which closely resembled those of the preceding year. Armed recon
was authorized from the Provisional Military
Demarcation Line (PMDL) north to the
ChiCom Buffer Zone. Use of classified ord-
inance was not authorized. Locks, dams, fish-
Ing and fishing facilities were not to be attacked.
Coastal armed recon
north of 20° 42' south was authorized only
against ships that were clearly of NVN reg-
ister and not clearly of NVN origins. The PMDL
coast and which fired first. The 30 NM re-
stricted area and 10 NM prohibited area
around Haiphong and the 10 NM prohibited
area around Hanoi were still a 10-NM circle around the city. Strikes within
these restricted areas could be made only by
officials authorized in the Operations Order or the succeeding Executive
Orders for Rolling Thunder. When conduct-
ging operations in the restricted areas, extreme
care was to be taken to avoid endanger-
ing foreign shipping. No change was made
to the boundaries of the ChiCom Buffer
Zone. Aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit were authorized to pursue enemy aircraft into the buffer zone if, no even closer than 12 NM of the Chicom Buffer Zone. When engaged in immediate pursuit of enemy aircraft, U.S. aircraft were not authorized to use weapons in the air against the aircraft from which the aircraft might be operating.

The RT Execute Orders during the first few months of 1967 brought about a gradual liberalization of rules of engagement. (Jan-Feb) authorized strikes against dispersed POL and SAM support areas within the Han-Phong area. In April, RT 55 contained an extended list of targets including the POL storage area, ammo depot, and cement plant in Hal-Phong, and the RR/Highway Bridge. RT 55 also authorized attacks against the Hanoi-Lac and Kep Airfield east and northwest of Hal-Phon, but limited these to small and random harassment strikes designed for attrition of aircraft and disruption of support facilities. A March 21 strike attack on Hal-Phon was considered small. For the first time, aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit of an enemy aircraft were permitted to attack airfields in this case, Hanoi-Lac and Kep.

These changes to the rules represented a gradual loosening of the air warfare against the war. For some, however, the expansion was too gradual. In January 1967, CINC-PACFLT, in a Targeting Concept Review, stated that the whole RT effort should not be expanded on transient targets but that the closing of the Port of Hal-Phon should be first. During the same month, Rear Adm. Curtis L. LeMay, in an interview in Washington, said that he would start the progressive destruction of SVN support and supply bases. For the first time, aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit of an enemy aircraft were permitted to attack airfields in this case, Hanoi-Lac and Kep.

The Secretary of Defense, however, did not share this enthusiasm for denying external assistance to North Vietnam. In his opinion, the limited bombing approach was successful when weighed against its stated objectives. During testimony before Congress in August 1967, the effectiveness of the bombing policy and Rules of Engagement came under discussion:

"Senator Smith: If you (Secretary McNamara) had read the testimony of the witnesses who have appeared so far today, you should be well aware that they have noted with satisfaction that they were virtually unanimous in concluding that if the restrictions and prohibitions against certain targets had not been in effect these past two years, the air campaign against the north would not only have been more efficient and effective but more humane.

"Secretary McNamara: Senator Smith, it is our experience that in the air campaign there is something of what other merit there might have been for following a different practice of air activity against the north in the past, it would not have reduced our casualties in the south."

Further, it was the Secretary's view that an intensive and extended bombing campaign against key industrial sites in the north would have been counterproductive. The Secretary stated that the bombing of key industrial sites in the north would have tied down, and therefore reduced, the fighting strength of the north in the south. As a result, the South Vietnamese military would have had to be strengthened in the south by the northern military. This, in turn, would have required a greater weight of effort to be continued on interdiction of LOCs to SVN from the north. In addition, the U.S. could have been once again authorized from the PMLD to the Chicom Buffer Zone, its implementa-

This rigidity of the Rules of Engagement for the coming campaign was the subject of a message sent on 28 March 1968, from the National Security Council in Washington to the commander of the 2d Air Division.

When the 2d Air Division came under pressure from the commanders of the 1st and 3d Air Divisions in South Vietnam, who wanted more flexibility to conduct their missions, the National Security Council communicated the message to the commanders of the 2d Air Division.

The message was directed to the commander of the 2d Air Division and stated that the Rules of Engagement for the coming campaign were the subject of a message sent on 28 March 1968, from the National Security Council in Washington to the commander of the 2d Air Division.

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The total impact of these various self-imposed restrictions was providing the enemy a situation which he was using to great advantage in Hanoi, Haiphong, and throughout the LOC structure in North Vietnam. The material gains were enormous in that activity was nonexistent within the area. Airfields except Giap Lam had been attacked, and there was open discussion in the U.S. that this was the casual attrition, and interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The few tribal inhabitants of this region had the opportunity to enter the fray. NVVN-III was completely an NVN operation. NVN soldiers guarded the trail structure. NVN engineers did the road building. NVN coiled fences were a normal part of the war. Nevertheless, the objective of U.S. air operations in the north was the preservation of the flank of Thailand, in the panhandle, it was the interdiction of supplies which passed from NVN to SVN.

The dual nature of the conflict was reflected by the division of the country for the purpose of air operations into two sectors, the northern Barreil Roll (BR) area and southern Schuerger. The line separating these operating areas ran from the Napsa Pass (18° 27' N/105° 06' E) on the Tonkin Border, westward to 18° 20' N/106° 57' E on the Cambodian Border. The ROE for both BR and SL were established by CINCPAC and the American Embassy (AmEmb), respectively, and were coordinated with and obtained approval from AmEmb, Vientiane, for the conduct of air operations by PACOM forces and kept the reconnaissance fixed.图表已压缩，无法正常展示。
Within the restricted Attapeu circle ran Route 110, a major avenue of infiltration. In a meeting held at Tan Son Nhut AB in November 1967, the South Vietnamese representatives to the Rules of Engagement for Laos, the Air Attaché representative said that he had no previous restrictions on the use of airspace within this 10-NM circle. The Basic Operations Order was subsequently changed to allow armament within this portion of the restricted area.

During the third week in February 1967, further restrictions were placed on air attacks within the BR area. Nearly all of these restrictions were temporary and were motivated primarily by political considerations. After Soviet and North Vietnamese attacks on Khan Khay had arisen, the rule for that village was strengthened to create a six-NM restricted area around the town. A temporary restricted area was also placed around Xiang Khouangville, because the International Control Commission (ICC) had been invited to the village to discuss the US invasion of Laos. No armed recon was authorized on the south side of the Nam Ou River because friendly forces were operating in the area.

In March 1967, a major change of zones and Rules of Engagement for the SL area resulted from a series of incidents involving the USAF. Short Round incidents near the Laotian/SVN/NVN Borders. On 12 February, the friendly Laotian village of Muong Phiane was inadvertently attacked by three T-38 aircraft. The intended target was a highway bridge 24 NM northeast of Muong Phiane. Three Laotian civilians who were killed and injured. Eleven houses were destroyed and damaged. The incident was an apparent case of which the T-38s were flying low in the area. The night had been rainy and a bridge near which the T-38s were flying was captured on the PL 113° radial of the Nakohn Phom (NKP) TACAN at 68 NM. It has a bridge in the center of the range. There was a report that the T-38s were flying low in the area.

The mission was under no outside control such as FAC or Combat Skipspot. Another Short Round incident occurred in 23 March when the RVN village of Lang Ve was struck by two T-38 aircraft. The flight leader's intended target was a group of trucks believed parked alongside a road along the river under the trees. The flight had been released by an airborne FAC to conduct armed recon in the TIGER BOUND area of Laos, along the RVN Border. Six 500-lb bombs, four LAU-3A rocket pods, and CBU-2 bomblets were expended on the village of Lang Ve which was located in the range. A small special operating area called combat search and rescue (SAR) missions could return ground fire, but not outside 1,000 meters in all directions from the exact location in which the SAR operations were being conducted.

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In an attempt to reduce the number of these incidents, a modified TACAN ranging system was implemented on Route 110 in early March 1967. (Fig. 3.) The armed recon line was reinstalled and four north-south zones were created, with each of its Rules of Engagement. The modification ranged the entire HOUND Special Operating Area along the Laotian/SVN Border was redesignated as Zone I and remained a free fire area with the same Rules of Engagement as before. The TACAN was armed recon in the center zone without FAC control on all roads, trails, paths, and rivers. Air attacks on all roads, trails, paths, and rivers were now allowed, but FAC control was restored to the high intensity antiaircraft fire zone.

The Zone II Rules of Engagement were still more restrictive. The Zone II Rules of Engagement followed: TACAN at 69 NM. The final report of investigation stated that apparently the pilot was flying a head-up, outside of villages. Outside of this 200-yard around the five villages already designated as restricted areas.

The Zonal order was subsequently changed to Zone IV. This was the region that contained the bulk of the native population of southern Laos. While the heart of the Anam Range was not within Zone IV, the three zones, the fourth zone was largely an area of plains, bounded on the west principally by the Laotian/VC panhandle. The major towns of the Laotian panhandle were located in this region—Savannakhet, Saravan, Thakhek, Attapeu, and Pakse. Since the RVN objective in the panhandle was the creation and maintenance of LOCs running down the mountain range from SVN into Cambodia and RVN, and the RVN objective was its interdiction, Zone IV was largely ignored by these countries. Consequently, the Rules of Engagement for airpower in Zone IV were the most restrictive of any.

All strikes within this zone had to have the double safeguard of AIRA approval and FAC control. Strikes could not be approved by Raven or Nall FACs. There were two exceptions to this rule: (1) two English-speaking, land ground forward Air Guidance (FAGs) in the immediate area of Attapeu were authorized to request and direct US air strikes without prior approval; and (2) helicopters carrying small armed forces engaged in Search and Rescue (SAR) missions could return ground fire, but not outside 1,000 meters in all directions from the exact location in which the SAR operations were being conducted.

Twenty-one miles northwest of Saravane, Route 23, a major link to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, left Zone III and entered Zone IV. The Zone III Rules of Engagement followed it into Zone IV, until it disappeared into the 10 NM restricted circle around Saravane.

Restricted areas remained in effect around the five villages already designated in Zone IV, and to them was added a sixth—Muong Phalane. The attack on Muong Phalane was proof of one of the main drawbacks of the rules—targets had to be validated and monitored. Orders were subsequently changed to Zone IV's on the north side of the Nam Ou River because friendly forces were operating in the area.

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Twenty-one miles northwest of Saravane, Route 23, a major link to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, left Zone III and entered Zone IV. The Zone III Rules of Engagement followed it into Zone IV, until it disappeared into the 10 NM restricted circle around Saravane.

Restricted areas remained in effect around the five villages already designated in Zone IV, and to them was added a sixth—Muong Phalane. The attack on Muong Phalane was proof of one of the main drawbacks of the rules—targets had to be validated and monitored. Orders were subsequently changed to Zone IV's on the north side of the Nam Ou River because friendly forces were operating in the area.

In an attempt to reduce the number of these incidents, a modified TACAN ranging system was implemented on Route 110 in early March 1967. (Fig. 3.) The armed recon line was reinstalled and four north-south zones were created, with each of its Rules of Engagement. The modification ranged the entire HOUND Special Operating Area along the Laotian/SVN Border was redesignated as Zone I and remained a free fire area with the same Rules of Engagement as before. The TACAN was armed recon in the center zone without FAC control on all roads, trails, paths, and rivers. Air attacks on all roads, trails, paths, and rivers were now allowed, but FAC control was restored to the high intensity antiaircraft fire zone.

The Zone II Rules of Engagement were still more restrictive. The Zone II Rules of Engagement followed: TACAN at 69 NM. The final report of investigation stated that apparently the pilot was flying a head-up, outside of villages. Outside of this 200-yard around the five villages already designated as restricted areas.
under visible conditions or on any motorable trail, road, ford, or bridge within the BR armed recon areas and Zones I and II in Steel Tiger. Napalm could bejetisoned from certain specified road segments in Laos under radar control.

The total effect of these 1967 changes to the Rules of Engagement was to make the ROE more complex and possibly more restrictive. In usage, some of the rules proved impractical. An example of the restrictiveness of the ROE may be seen in the rule requiring validation of targets. Three major ROE hampered ARC LIGHT operations in central Laos. One was the requirement that targets were made on targets that were within three KM of friendly forces such as RWTs or suspected PW camps. In addition, no ARC LIGHT strikes could be executed within five KM of the Cambodian Border. Finally, there could be no shrines, temples, national monuments, places of worship or sacred huts and villages within the target area. It was this final rule that created most of the problems for obtaining validation for lucrative ARC LIGHT targets. According to Seventh Air Force records, the average time consumed between identification of lighted targets and final validation of the instruction was 13.5 days. A large portion of this time (8.8 days) was used for administrative processing, transmission of the RoE itself, and the Vietname's response. Since success of these missions required timely strikes in response to the most recent reports, the delays in the administrative processes and Rules of Engagement combined to reduce the timelessness and effectiveness of B-52 bomb strikes.

The problem of validation time was thoroughly discussed at a conference at Udorn RTAFB in APR 1968. Initially indicating that it took Vietname from three to five days to process nominations for strikes, and eight to ten days for revalidation, were rejected by the Ambassador representative. Embassy records indicated its response in most cases was within one or two days. The need for improved and streamlined procedures was recognized. The Ambassador's office agreed to refer the Laos Embassy to the improvised areas, would be a smaller percentage of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was recognized by the Ambassador that an immediate improvement of ARV Light Operating Areas (SALOAs) would allow for a reduction of 25-30 days (7-10 days at Vietname) after the creation of the SALOAs, which was partially explained by the fact that larger numbers of targets were validated at once. Validation time continued to be a problem, with tactical as well as strategic aircraft.

In October 1968, the Air Attache at Vietname issued a list of rules and restrictions pertaining to the area. This list highlighted problems which had not been corrected. In the event that the Rules of Engagement were not followed, the JCS-imposed restrictions included those against operating in the area's air strikes, usage during the night, and general targets being ready for being validated en masse. The Vietnamese American Embassy representative reluctantly agreed to propose for the validation of targets for 25.5 days (7.0 days at Vietname) after the creation of the SALOAs, which was partially explained by the fact that larger numbers of targets were validated at once. Validation time continued to be a problem, with tactical as well as strategic aircraft.

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Zone IV. Armed recon was not authorized. All strikes required a FAC or Forward Air Controller. No reconnaisance mission could be used unless specifically authorized by the 22d Corps, Vientiane. Ground fire could be returned only on aircraft actively engaged in Air Force, SAM, or artillery. The only exception was limited to an area 1,000 meters in all directions from the exact location in which these operations were being conducted.

The April conference was less successful in changing the Rules of Engagement for the BR area. The Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie areas remained armee recon zones, with the same ROE as in the newly designated Steel Tiger East. In the BR area, routes were not authorized to be struck. All LOCs in Bravo were approved for armed recon. In Charlie, Routes 6, 61, and 7 could be struck. A Special Operating Area (SOA) northwest of Khang Khi was designated a Free Strike Zone. When Magula fell into this Free Strike Zone by ADC/CC, aircraft could attack all forms of military activity outside of 500 meters of an active village without FAC control.

The presence of Chinese road construction crews in the northern and northwestern areas of Laos created another restricted area. Following the 1962 agreement of Laos, the Chinese offered to assist the Laotian Prime Minister, General Phouthi Phouma, in building roads leading from China into Laos. The Prime Minister agreed. For more than five years, no construction took place. In 1968, the Chinese began to fulfill their promise and Souvanna Phouma was helpless to stop them. They built a major highway which ran east-west slightly above the dense forest from the Dien Bien Phu area in NVN across the top of Laos to the Chinese border near Ban Botor. This highway was extended further north of Phong Saly from the rest of Laos. Early in 1969, they were engaged in constructing a road southward toward Pak Beng. To avoid international incidents in this area, U.S. aircraft were prohibited from conducting airstrikes or low level photo reconnaissance missions. They were given special approval by the American Embassy, Vientiane, north of a line along the 21st parallel from the Chicom Border to the western edge of the armed recon area Alpha.

The Buffer Zone along the Laos/NVN border remained under the Rules of Engagement as before. No strike could be conducted within 10 NM of the SVN border or east of 115° 15′ E and between 19° N and 21° 15′ N unless authorized by Cincpac and directed by TAP. Even with this authorization, strikes had to be made under the electronic surveillance of College Eye and under FAC control. Further, College Eye monitor was required for all strikes in Barrel Roll.

A surge of NVN/Pathet Lao (PL) activity in Barrel Roll during the summer of 1969, which was climaxl by the enemy capture on 6 June of 1969 of the town of Muong Soul. Farther north, Route 6 and its tributaries connected North Vietnam with the central highlands of southern Laos. To the north of this northern province, and from there ran south to a juncture with Route 7. In addition to these main arteries, numerous trails ran to and from the nearby PL position and needed to supply the NVN/PL troops in Laos.

At a conference at Vientiane in August 1969, changes to the Rules of Engagement to bring them in line with the full situation. For two months, recommendations and comments were exchanged between the military areas were approved by JCS, and put into effect by Cincpac on 27 September 1969. The areas were realigned to make the rules more consistent with cultural and geographical features (Fig. 8). At the same time, the new areas and rules provided for sufficient clearance between friendly forward positions and armed reconnaissance areas.

Barrel Roll was divided into three areas: North, East, and West (Fig. 8). Of the three Barrel Roll North contained the most restrictive rules. No airstrikes nor Yankee of the province chief or a higher RVN authority before napalm could be used. The 24-NM prohibited circle around Vientiane was extended to cover the six small dam construction project. The circle around Luang Prabang was reduced to 10 NM. The main NVN LOCs were in Barrel Roll East and the Rules of Engagement occurred there. The A, B, and C armed reconnaissance areas were replaced with a solid zone to within 10 NM of the SVN border in which armed reconnaissance without FAC control was authorized within 500 meters of all LOCs. Outside the 200-meter limit, strikes had to be validated and controlled by a FAC/FAC. Ground fire could be returned anywhere in Barrel Roll East except into the town of Ban Nua. The Rules of Engagement did not apply to the areas and rules to provide more flexibility to the interdiction effort.

The line separating Barrel Roll East and Barrel Roll West was adjusted slightly westward. The rules for these sectors were essentially the same as those established for BR East and BR West, respectively.

The covert nature of U.S. air operations in Laos kept such operations out of the line of U.S. public opinion. Accordingly, the Rules of Engagement were shaped less by the need to create a favorable impression at home than by the restrictions laid down by the 1962 agreement and the necessity of avoiding damage to the image of Souvanna Phouma among his people. For these reasons, the role of FAC became the focal point in ROE determination.

Between 1966 and 1969, the ROE for Laos shifted from the relatively simple rules in effect in 1966 to more complex ones between 1967 and mid-1968, and back again to simpler arrangements by the end of 1969. The problem identified the greatest consternation was the need to obtain validation of the targets from Vientiane and the time required for this validation.

CHAPTER III—SOUTH VIETNAM

The Rules of Engagement for air operations in RVN remained relatively constant throughout the period. These rules were conditioned by the fact that in-country air activity was directed toward close air support (CAS) of ground forces and by the frequency of combined ground operations. The Combined Joint Task Force Assistance Forces (CJTF), the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and the Viet- Namee Air Force (VNAF). During this 90-day period, the ROE were characterized by a high degree of flexibility. As a result of the mounting number of Short Round incidents, particularly during the full-scale offensive, the rules issued late in 1968 contained "additional provisions to enhance Short Round prevention."

The agencies responsible for the Rules of Engagement pertaining to RVN was MACV, whose directive (525-13) contained the rules for the use of artillery, tanks, mortars, naval gunfire, riverine forces and air and armed helicopter support. The rules governing air support were further specified by TAP's Regulation, 55-49, which laid down the rules for the control of airstrikes and the duties of the FAC and pilots of strike and recce aircraft.

The basic requirement was the permission of the province chief or a higher RVN authority for strikes by U.S. aircraft. This was granted often temporarily and could be revoked at any time. A FAC could not return ground fire. The rules were conditioned by the existence before 1967, to more complex ones true for RVN, airstrikes did not require further RVN clearance, which was required by FAC/FAC. Ground fire could be returned anywhere in Barrel Roll East except into the town of Ban Nua. The Rules of Engagement did not apply to the areas and rules to provide more flexibility to the interdiction effort.

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The FAC was to ask the ground commander to accept responsibility in the event of a Short Round.

The success of a mission depended heavily upon reliable communication and complete understanding among FAC, ground commander, strike aircraft, and the target. The FAC communicated with the ground commander to coordinate marking, receive ground clearance to attack, and ensure the ground commander of all pertinent aspects of ordnance delivery. To advise the ground commander that the ordnance had been dropped was to take protective cover. FAC radio contact with the strike pilot was needed to ensure that the strike pilot was in the area, and could be on scene on time for the mission. The FAC had to supply the strike pilot with prominent ground references, any local landmark which could help to identify the target area. Upon return to the mission site, the FAC could advise them of their position from charts of a scale of 1:250,000 or larger.

When an airstrike was conducted in support of an ARVN unit the rules called for the FAC to be assisted by a VNAF FAC or VNAF observer to aid him in directing the airstrike. In the event the VNAF FAC had lacked a fire support aircraft, the FAC could assume control of the strike. When requested by the VNAF FAC, the airstrike was to be continued.

The strike pilot was enjoined by the Rules of Engagement to always be under control of the FAC or other designated control source. The pilot was to fire his aircraft on the target or target marker and be positive of the position of friendly troops. Strike pilots were authorized to defend themselves against ground fire when the source of the fire could be visually identified when the strike could be positively oriented against the source, and when the fire was of such intensity that counteraction was necessary.

The Rules of Engagement prohibited firing at ships or aircraft unless they were positively identified. Munitions were very specific. Municions could be jettisoned "safe" only in designated areas except during inflight emergencies. Munitions can be fired only once at any given area and were not to be dropped. The aircraft had to be under positive radar control while jettisoning. During day Visual Flight Rules (VFR) drops were to be monitored by radar whenever possible. During an inflight emergency, munitions could be jettisoned "safe" in other than designated jettison areas. In this case, immediate cover or cover on the order of the aircraft was to be assumed. Munitions could be positively identified against any vessel or aircraft that was operating in the area. Munitions could be visually identified when the attack was posted in Operations a 1:250,000 or larger scale chart on which the Cambodian Border was distinctly marked, on the RVN side, to the depth of five KM. Aircraft supporting border outposts were to operate as necessary in the outpost area, but could neither fire nor fly across the border. All aircraft on missions within five KM of the Cambodian Border were to be tracked by radar, which could advise them of their position relative to the border and of any impending penetration.

Along the RVN/Laotian Border, aircraft were not permitted to cross the border into Laos without prior approval of COMUSMACV. All operations planned near the border had to be reported in advance to COMUSMACV. In an emergency, U.S. forces could take appropriate countermeasures, in- and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial/ international airspace/sea as prescribed.

**APPENDIX I**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

Fixed targets: Caves, truck parks, open storage buildings, fortes, cantonment/baracks, trenches, and bunkers.

SALOA: Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area.

Target of opportunity: Target of a military nature such as vehicles, troops, active AA/AW, bridges, etc., not specifically designated in the frag orders.

**RAF target category:** Either:  
A — An RAF target on the Active Target List which is not approved by AmEmb, Vientiane, and can be struck without further approval.  
A — An RAF target approved by AmEmb, Vientiane, and can be struck with further approval.

**C — Listed on the Active Target List in "hold" status for political reasons. Must obtain specific AmEmb, Vientiane, approval for strike.

**AM target category:** Either:  
C — Listed on the Active Target List in "hold" status for political reasons. Must obtain specific AmEmb, Vientiane, approval for strike.

**SAO target category:** Either:  
A — An SAO target on the Active Target List which is not approved by AmEmb, Vientiane, and can be struck without further approval.  
C — Listed on the Active Target List in "hold" status for political reasons. Must obtain specific AmEmb, Vientiane, approval for strike.

**P MDL: Provisional Military Demarcation Line.**

**RAF target category:** Either:  
A — An RAF target on the Active Target List which is not approved by AmEmb, Vientiane, and can be struck without further approval.  
A — An RAF target approved by AmEmb, Vientiane, and can be struck with further approval.

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**AM target category:** Either:  
C — Listed on the Active Target List in "hold" status for political reasons. Must obtain specific AmEmb, Vientiane, approval for strike.
ured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the stages claiming over three miles, that distance shall be observed for the Rules of Engagement, as if it were the width of their territorial seas. The following are the states' claims with regard to their territorial seas:

1. Thailand, 6 miles presumed.
2. Cambodia, 5 miles.
5. Communist China, 12 miles.

GLOSSARY
AAA—Anti Aircraft Artillery.
AA/AW—Aircraft Artillery/Automatic Weapons.
ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center.
AIJA—Air Attaché.
AmEmb—American Embassy.
ARVN—Army of Republic of Vietnam.
BR—BARREL ROLL.
BZ—Buffer Zone.
CAS—Close Air Support.
CHU—Cluster Bomb Unit.
ChiCom—Chinese Communist.
CINCPAC—Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command.
CINCPACAF—Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces.
CINCPACFLT—Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CW—CRICKET WEST.
DMZ—Demilitarised Zone.
DOD—Department of Defense.
ECM—Electronic Countermeasure.
FAC—Forward Air Controller.
FWMAF—Free World Military Assistance Forces.
GGCI—Ground-Controlled Intercept.
ICCC—International Control Commission.
IFR—Instrument Flight Rule.
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.
KM—Kilometer.
LOC—Line of Communications.
MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MedEvac—Medical Evacuation.
NE—Northeast.
NKP—Nakhon Phanom.
NM—Nautical Mile.
NVA—North Vietnamese Army.
NVN—North Vietnam.
NW—Northwest.
P—Paihet Lao.
PMDL—Provisional Military Demarcation Line.
POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.
PW—Prisoner of War.
RCZ—Radar Control Zone.
RESCAP—Rescue Combat Air Patrol.
RLAF—Royal Laotian Air Force.
RLG—Royal Laotian Government.
ROE—Rules of Engagement.
RP—Route Package.
RR—Railroad.
RT—ROLLING THUNDER.
RTAFB—Royal Thai Air Force Base.
RVN—Republic of Vietnam.
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
RWT—Road Watch Team.
SAC—Strategic Air Command.
SHAO—Special ARC LIGHT Operating Area.
SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile.
SAR—Search and Rescue.
SL—STEEL TIGER.
SOA—Special Operating Area.
SSZ—Special Strike Zone.
SVN—South Vietnam.
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation.
USSR—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.