Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the U.S. Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes of southeast Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva accords of 1954. These efforts have included:

- Various approaches to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.
- Support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.
- Favorable reactions to proposals made by 17 nonaligned nations, and later by the Government of India.
- Approval of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate peace talks.
- Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in southeast Asia, including a United Nations mission of observers along the frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia; a United Nations mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam; and a United Nations invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.
- Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and social development projects in southeast Asia.
- A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.
- Repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least 15 occasions in the past 4½ years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in southeast Asia by peaceful negotiations.

I am sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my Government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the regime in Hanoi, which along with the Republic of Vietnam, is most directly involved in the conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council.

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations require us to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam. This responsibility—to persist in the search for peace—weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and security affairs.

The purpose of this communication therefore is to reemphasize to the members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in southeast Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.

It is the hope of my Government that the members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in southeast Asia.

I respectfully request that this communication be circulated to the members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.
LETTER DATED JANUARY 4, 1966, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all states members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of governments are the following: that the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document. I should urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of July 30, 1965 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, inter alia, that the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOEDDE.

LETTER DATED JANUARY 31, 1966, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva accords of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance
by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24, and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General. I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

"That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples."

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and, of course, from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was secretly a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, etc.

(Signed) ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

Senator Pell. I can't help but observe the last time we were talking here, I think, being low man on the totem pole, the last question I asked was that I hoped you would take it to the U.N. I am delighted you have since done.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Senator Pell. Why is it so difficult for us to get an estimate of the number of civilian casualties in the war? We have a real problem here.

Secretary Rusk. I don't know, Senator. You asked that of Mr. Bell and they are working on it.

Senator Pell. He told us they could not furnish it.

Secretary Rusk. I didn't hear the answer. The question is: Did we have any information or any meaningful information on that subject? A great effort is being made to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible, and, I just don't know, I have not myself seen any such figures. I can assure you that it is not a case of withholding figures. I just don't believe we have reliable or approximate figures on that.

Senator Pell. I think it would be of some interest to this committee—I don't mean to speak for the chairman—but it would be of some interest to me if some effort could be made, perhaps by the U.S. mission in Saigon, to come up with some kind of estimate based on the rolls and the people in hospitals, of the number of civilian casualties.

Secretary Rusk. May I look further into that, Senator?

Senator Pell. I wish you would and I would hope that you would pursue that, if you could.

NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Finally, it would seem to me that in connection with these hearings they have established sort of a negative consensus because most of us on the Senate side, this side of the table, and all the witnesses, nearly all of us actually, on both sides, have come to negative conclusions. Nobody is advocating, as one very civilized columnist put it, that we should scuttle and run; on the other hand, nobody has said we should knock the chips off the Chinese shoulders. But it is this area in between where we have disagreement and some of us would like to think we could hold the commitment as it is because we feel that time is on our side. The Communists first injected time as a fourth dimension in warfare. But we can use it too. If enough time goes by, if we keep our presence in South Vietnam the time will come when it will be to their interest to get us out through negotiations.

On the other hand, if we feel we must achieve a quick solution, and go up another 200,000 men this year and the same next year, it would indicate to us that we feel time is almost against us. It is for this reason that I, for one, would like to see us act as a brake on the administration to avoid the indefinite commitment of our young men abroad. I was wondering where your particular criticism of this policy would be.

Secretary Rusk. Well, the President has indicated all along that it is necessary to do what has to be done but that he is trying to act with prudence and care in light of all the circumstances.

You see, up until the end of 1961, we had in South Vietnam only those that were authorized, the numbers that were authorized, by
the Geneva agreement, despite the substantial infiltration that had already begun.

There were over 5 years of infiltration, stepped up infiltration, before there was any bombing of North Vietnam. That infiltration had included a division of the regular North Vietnamese Army before there was any bombing of North Vietnam. The bombing has been rather carefully circumscribed in character and purpose. We have tried throughout that 5-year period to bring this matter to negotiations, to the conference table. I think you can asume that there is no indication on the part of the administration, certainly not on the part of the Commander in Chief, to be reckless, to try to move this to a much higher level of violence, on the basis that one wearies of the effort. But, on the other hand, one has to face the fact that the other side, too, is making decisions, and that, if they build up the effort, then one decides whether to meet it or whether to let them have their way.

Now, I am rather encouraged by what has been going on in the last several months out there in terms of the initiative of the South Vietnamese and allied forces. I think the other side does realize the fact that this is a much more serious matter than they perhaps anticipated. The losses to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in 1965 were equivalent to the losses and killed by our own forces throughout the entire Korean war. So they are up against some real problems, and I think they have to face the fact that they are not going to have a military success in the south. We would hope that they would draw some conclusions from that—sooner rather than later—and move this matter toward a peaceful solution.

**Knowledge of Chinese Intentions**

Senator Pell. You don't feel, Mr. Secretary, that the Chinese will feel impelled to stiffen their spines and fill the vacuum when they find this flagging on the part of the North Vietnamese?

Secretary Rusk. Well, I am sure that the Chinese are considering these matters, but I think there are a lot of other things the Chinese will have to think about at the same time. I rather doubt that the Chinese want a bigger war. I think they realize that that would be a reckless and dangerous matter for them to precipitate. We certainly have no desire on our side to precipitate that kind of larger war. So, let's see where we come out.

Senator Pell. One final question. I was rather struck with a Reston newspaper column the other day that mentioned the strength of our intellectual resources when it came to examining the Kremlin's intentions and foreign policy, and I am also struck by the fact that at the time of the McCarthy years we pretty well swept out most of our China specialists. Where in the Government do we draw our analyses of Chinese intentions?

Secretary Rusk. Well, we have our own research group of analysts in the Department of State, and of course the intelligence community has a good many people working on it. There is, I think, a steadily growing body of analysis in the university field. There was a lag for a period after China went Communist, but there is much more stimu-
lating and effective work at the universities than, say, 15 years ago, on China.

Senator Pell. But, for instance, when you come to the conclusion that the Chinese will not necessarily stiffen the North Vietnamese spines or that they will not intervene, are you reaching into this university community at all for these recommendations?

Secretary Rusk. Well, their views and their estimates and their ideas on that subject are taken fully into account. But let me say that one does not come to a conclusion on that subject, because it may well be that Peiping doesn't know the answer. Therefore, how could anyone else?

One doesn't come to a conclusion on that, and then base policy upon it. But that is one of the possibilities that has to be taken fully into account in deciding what we do in a given situation.

Senator Pell. Because I am sure, going back to Korea, one of the reasons for our misjudgment of the Chinese intentions was the fact that we had tossed out so many of the Chinese specialists in the Department, and that is why in our estimates now I was wondering if we made use of the fellows from outside at the universities.

Secretary Rusk. Well, we try to get ideas on things like that, not only from some very competent men inside Government; we also keep in touch with people outside of the Government on subjects of that sort.

The Chairman. I believe that finishes the first round.

Mr. Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in saying that you are an extremely capable advocate of the administration's position as you have demonstrated this morning and this afternoon.

FAILURE OF SEATO FORCES

This morning Senator Carlson raised the question about the failure of our SEATO allies to support us. It prompted me to make a few observations of my own. I think the failure of the SEATO nations to furnish forces is very significant. There are now about 1,600 men from these countries in Vietnam, consisting primarily of Australians, plus about 150 New Zealanders. The forces of other SEATO members are quite small, as he mentioned.

As I understand it, there are none, or practically none, from Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and France. There are none from India, Indonesia, and Japan, which are the nearest major countries.

It seems to me that this fact is explained by their not sharing your view as to the nature of this war, which, as I understand your position, is that this is a clear case of international Communist aggression. I think they believe rather that it is more in the nature of a civil war in which outside parties have become involved. I can see no other logical reason why these countries which are either members of SEATO, or would be subject to attack much more quickly—and are more exposed than we are—would not give support if this were truly an example of international Communist aggression. In short, I do not think that they believe their security is at stake or that the SEATO treaty requires their participation in the war. We have discussed at length whether the treaty requires action or simply entitles us to act. I don't wish to pursue that aspect of it.
But even if the nations in the area do feel that their security is at stake, as in the case of New Zealand and Australia, they have sent only token forces. I suppose they believe that the United States will carry the whole load, and that our men will do the dying and that we will pay the bill. Otherwise, I am unable to understand why they do not send more than a token force.

In the case of Europe and NATO, we have collective security in which all members have shared. You asked just a moment ago how do we organize peace. I have always thought that, as a general proposition at least, we should use the United Nations, and collective security insofar as possible, and that our policy generally was not to arrogate to ourselves the role of a world policeman.

**DAMAGING CHARACTER OF VIETNAM WAR**

The Senator from Oregon in particular has insisted for a long time on this approach to finding a solution to the Vietnam problem.

A review of the development of this war shows, in my opinion, that it clearly began as a war of liberation from French colonial rule. It goes back to the time when indigenous Vietnamese nationalists who most unfortunately, from our point of view, were led by Communists; notably Ho Chi Minh. These nationalistic Communists were twice betrayed, once by the French in 1946 after they thought they had made an agreement for independence, and later in 1956 by President Diem who, with the support of the Americans, refused to hold unification elections. After 1956, the struggle became a civil war between the Diem government and the Vietcong, the nationalistic Communists remaining in South Vietnam, who believed they were cheated by the Diem government in 1956.

I think this background is important and does explain the apathy, or the indifference, of these friends and allies, that is, allies under certain treaties and friends in other respects.

Until 1960 the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the North Vietnam participation was slight, except for large amounts of aid to Diem by the United States. I believe that is a fair statement of your own testimony. After 1960, the character of the war changed, with increased participation by the North Vietnamese and by the United States, and apparently each time one has increased its support the other has responded by a similar increase, to where both sides are now there in very large numbers.

In short, I think it is an oversimplification merely to say that this is a clear-cut case of aggression by North Vietnam Communists against a free, independent neighboring nation. If that were so, I believe many of these nations I mentioned would be participating in a more positive way. I can see no other reason why they will not provide more help. It is this point that I believe is responsible primarily, if not entirely, for the lack of support from our friends. And also, I may say, for a good deal of the concern in this committee.

**REASONS OF TROUBLE IN EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE**

As to our efforts to negotiate, the real trouble, it seems to me, is uncertainty as to our terms for peace, not merely the procedure for negotiation. We have had a lot of very involved and complicated talk
about 4 points and about 14 points and about the significance of the 
third point and where parties to a conference will meet and who will 
be there. But I do not recall that we have ever made it crystal clear 
that we will support an election supervised by an appropriate interna­
tional body, and that we will accept the results of that election, regard­
less of how it turns out.

It is also not clear that we are willing to allow any participation of 
the National Liberation Front either in a provisional government or 
at any time, and, therefore, there is no alternative for them but sur­
render or annihilation. If this is true, there can be nothing to nego­
tiate about, with such a prospect. It seems to me that this is one of 
the reasons that they will not negotiate, unless we assume that they are 
utterly without reason and have no desire even to live. Because in my 
opinion there is no question but that we can kill them all if we wish 
to put enough troops over there. There must be some reason to ex­
plain their attitude.

There is the further point about our intentions regarding leaving 
Vietnam. You have repeated time and again that we are willing to 
leave and have no desire for permanent bases. But I think few people 
in Vietnam, and I believe in other places, can quite understand why 
we are building such extensive, costly, and large permanent-type 
bases—harbors, airfields, military housing and so on—if we have any 
tention of leaving in the foreseeable future. I don't think they 
believe us when we say we will get out. As has already been stated, 
we haven't gotten out of Korea and the Dominican Republic—I don't 
mean these are analogous in any way—but we do happen to have more 
troops spread around the world in bases than any other country today.

Finally, in spite of statements to the contrary, the policy objectives 
seems to be unconditional surrender of the National Liberation Front. 
Or to put it in another way, that this is not really a limited war, but 
that we intend to pursue it to victory even though that may result in 
bringing in the Chinese, and possibly even the Russians, which would 
force World War III.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS ASKED TO BE PLACED IN FORMAL TREATIES

Frankly, Mr. Secretary, we are very much more deeply involved in 
Vietnam, far more than I ever imagined possible and I am very 
worried about future commitments, as for example to Thailand, made 
without full discussion and consultation, and, I hope, approval by this 
Congress. I have already stated that I regret that I did not discharge 
what, in my opinion, I now believe to have been my duty to have full 
discussion of the 1964 resolution. I think I made a mistake, at least 
as one Senator and chairman of this committee, in not accepting the 
amendment offered on the floor by Mr. Nelson.

The discussion in the Senate about that amendment has just been 
put in the record by the Senator from Tennessee. I hope that any 
future commitments that might bring this country into a war will not 
be made by unilateral declarations or agreements between ministers, 
but will be made by treaties submitted to and ratified by the Senate.

This apprehension on my part has been greatly increased by our 
unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic last year, which, in 
my opinion, was a clear violation of our solemn treaty obligations.
I have tried to sum up here why I think there is this seemingly uncompromising attitude on the part of our enemies, who I assume are people capable of reason, and why there are also doubts in this committee.

I wish to insert in the record at this point three articles: One by Mr. Frankel of the New York Times in today’s paper; one by Mr. Lippmann on the 15th of February; and an article on Vietnam by a Frenchman, Jean Lacouture, which I think bears on these points. One relates to the history of this engagement and the other one particularly to the immediate problem discussed here today.

(The articles referred to follow:)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 18, 1966]

NEW LIGHT ON U.S. POLICY—GENERAL TAYLOR SAYS AIM IS TO COMPEL ACCEPTANCE OF A FREE SOUTH VIETNAM

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, February 17.—Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor brought out in public today what other high officials here have made increasingly plain in private—namely that the U.S. terms for peace in Vietnam are much stiffer than the offer of unconditional negotiations has implied. Though caught up in a debate with some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about whether the administration’s goals were limited or unlimited, General Taylor left little doubt about what those goals are. He said the United States could, should, and would achieve military and political successes of sufficient magnitude to force the Communists to accept an independent and non-Communist South Vietnam.

The Johnson administration has never wavered in the pursuit of that objective. Nor has it said anything to contradict the retired general’s assertion that his personal testimony was wholly consistent with official policy.

Many observers and diplomats here and abroad, however, have misinterpreted the administration’s offer to negotiate as an offer to compromise with the Vietcong in South Vietnam. General Taylor’s testimony should have made it clear that such a compromise is not anticipated here.

That clarification was explicitly recognized at the end of the long hearing today by Senator J. M. Fulbright, the committee chairman. The Arkansas Democrat said it seemed to him, in the language of the Ozarks, that the United States intended to apply the pressure until the Communists “holler enough.”

THE BASIC QUESTION

He said he wished instead that the administration was ready to deal with its principal adversary, the Vietcong, to seek a compromise to stop the slaughter and to give up the policy of waging a war that can end only if all the Vietcong would go home and go north.

General Taylor did not dispute this summation of the essence of the argument between the administration and its critics. If the Vietcong would in fact go home and stop trying to take over South Vietnam, he said, they could at least obtain “compensation”—presumably in economic aid to North Vietnam. But his basic reply was a question: “How do you compromise the freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese people?”

Compromise has had no appeal here because the administration concluded long ago that the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam could not long survive in a Saigon coalition with Communists. It is for that reason—and not because of an excessively rigid sense of protocol—that Washington has steadfastly refused to deal with the Vietcong or to recognize them as an independent political force.

It has offered to consider the Vietcong’s views in negotiations and even to let the Vietcong sit in the delegation of North Vietnam, whose agents it says they are. Washington’s purpose at such negotiations would be to ratify the end of the Communist threat to South Vietnam and not to compromise on the basis of the existing military balance.
As General Taylor reiterated, the administration believes the Communists have not been hurt sufficiently on the battlefield to enter into the kind of negotiations that have been offered. Privately, officials here agree with this presumed Communist assessment. They believe the Communists would now negotiate or give up only if they were prepared to honor the potential force that the United States can bring to bear.

As General Taylor also made clear, even the potential American military might is not enough to assure success. Force on the ground must be used to put the Communists into a highly unfavorable situation in South Vietnam, he said, while force in the air is used to inflict increasing loss and pain in North Vietnam.

NEED FOR VIABLE REGIME

In addition, he emphasized, the United States must construct a reasonably viable and stable government in South Vietnam and demonstrate a determination at home to see the struggle through.

The general said he was convinced that when all four conditions were met, North Vietnam would have been brought to the point where it was willing to talk. The purpose of the talks, he stressed, would be to "free South Vietnam from the Vietcong," and the essential ingredient is to "have them so beaten they'd be glad to come in and accept an amnesty."

These goals are not only limited but realistic, the general contended, although he would not be pinned down on the number of American troops that might have to become involved. The present 205,000 are not enough, he said, and 800,000 would be fantastic and unnecessary.

It is the realism of this assessment that troubled most of the administration's critics on the committee. They fear that no limits to the American involvement are in sight and that it could lead to an even more costly war with Communist China. Some seek more precise estimates of the ultimate cost, while others would prefer a reduction of the objectives—in other words, a compromise on the basis of present military and political strength.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1966]

TODAY AND TOMORROW—CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA

(By Walter Lippmann)

The televised hearings, at which General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have done an inestimable service to our people. For they broke through the official screen and made visible the nature of the war and where our present policy is leading us. On the rule that if you cannot beat them, join them, which in its modern form is that if you cannot debate with them, say you agree with them, the President takes the position that there is not much difference between the Gavin-Kennan thesis and the Rusk-McNamara policy.

There is in fact a radical difference, the difference between a limited and an unlimited war. The President may not want to fight an unlimited war. I have no doubt myself that he does not want to do so. But the promises he made in Honolulu which the Vice President is now broadcasting so lavishly in Saigon and Bangkok, are—if they are to be taken seriously—an unlimited commitment of American soldiers and American money. It is this unlimited commitment which those of us who belong to the Gavin-Kennan school oppose. For we see that as the numbers of our troops and the range of our bombing are escalated, and as the theater of the war becomes widened, it is highly probable, indeed it is well nigh inevitable that the United States will find itself confronting China in a land war on the mainland of Asia.

Last week's hearings made visible that this is where the course we are taking leads. Congress and the people would be frivolous if they did not examine with the utmost seriousness how real, how valid, how significant is the hypothesis that the kind of war the Johnson administration is conducting is leading to a confrontation with China.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who since 1961 has played a leading part in our military intervention in South Vietnam, has recognized that the prospect of a land war with China is today our greatest worry. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, General Taylor is asked about the danger
of "a military confrontation with Communist China." He replies that "one can never rule out the possibility. But I would list the probability quite low in terms of percentage."

This has an ominous resemblance to the colloquy in 1950 between President Truman and General MacArthur. (Cf. Lawson, "The United States in the Korean War," p. 76.)

"in your opinion," President Truman asked General MacArthur, "is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?"

MacArthur shook his head. "I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river our Air Force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas."

At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking there were already more than a hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, the American and other U.N. forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.

On the question of the need to contain the military expansion of Red China, there is virtually universal agreement in this country. The containment of Red China today, like the containment of Stalinist Russia after the World War, is necessary to the peace of the world and is a vital interest of the United States. What is debatable is the diplomatic policy we are pursuing in order to contain Red China. If we compare what Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy are doing with the diplomatic policy by which some 15 years ago Stalin was contained, the differences are very striking.

The cardinal difference is that our Chinese containment policy is a unilateral American policy whereas our Stalinist containment policy was shared with and participated in by all the Western Allies. It is often said officially that in the Far East today we are repeating what was done so successfully in Europe. If this were what we are doing, there would be an alliance to contain China in which Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, the United States, Great Britain, and France were aligned in a Far Eastern Marshall plan and NATO. Instead, owing to the miscalculations and blundering of the Vietnemese war, we have alienated and indeed neutralized all the great powers of the Asian mainland.

The difference between the two containment policies in Europe and in the Far East is the difference between realism and verbalism, between professionalism and amateurism. Our present policy is as if we had set out to contain Stalinist Russia by ignoring the British, the French, the Italians, and the Germans, and had decided to make our stand against communism by the defense of—let us say—Bucharest.

[From the New York Review, Mar. 3, 1966]

VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR

(By Jean Lacouture)

"On the long thin coast of Vietnam," wrote John K. Fairbank in the last issue of this paper, "we are sleeping in the same bed the French slept in even though we dream different dreams."

The dreams of course are very different but so are the beds and the dreamers themselves. Let us compare them and see when the end of the night may come.

Nothing could be more valuable for American leaders at the moment than a close examination of the disastrous errors made by the French in Indochina from 1945 to 1954. To know the faults of a friend may not cure one's own, but from France's experience American might well learn something of what has gone so dreadfully wrong in Vietnam today.

The French had three great dreams for Indochina and each led them into a different and more ugly phase of the war. At first, in 1946, they clung briefly to the dream of reestablishing their prewar empire in Indochina. Indeed, for
one hopeful moment they seemed to be on the verge of a promising new colonial policy: General Leclerc, sent out to "reconquer" the territory, decided instead to negotiate with the Vietnam revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh. Leclerc recognized Ho's Vietnam as a "free state," connected with France, but controlling its own diplomacy, army, and finances. This was the first agreement made between a European colonial power and the Asian revolution—and one of the shortest lived and saddest in retrospect. For within weeks the intrigues of colonialists in Saigon and Paris and extremists among the Vietminh and its nationalist allies succeeded in scrapping it. The way was now open for France to plunge into full-scale colonial war. But it soon became clear to everybody that this would have been a hopeless venture, doomed from the start by the half-ruined state of France, the lack of an air force and navy, and the disapproval of the Russians and Americans.

At this point the French conceived their second Indochina dream which led them into a second war, lasting from 1948 to 1951. Now they would transform their colonial struggle into a civil war. Against Ho's Vietminh they would set in opposition the "independent" Emperor Bao Dai, encouraging him to cultivate his own anti-Communist but nationalist leadership—a policy described by the distinguished scholar Paul Mus as "nationalist counterfire."

Perhaps it might have succeeded if the nationalists had been given a chance to make it work. But their power and prestige and autonomy were always limited. While Vietnamese and French troops died courageously, Bao Dai preoccupied himself with tiger hunting, his ministers with profiteering. The Vietminh methodically liquidated Bao Dai's officials, dominated the countryside, and organized its soldiers into divisions soon after the Chinese Communists arrived on the northern frontier in 1950.

After this decisive event and the outbreak of the Korean war, France dreamed once again of transforming the nature of the war in Vietnam, this time into an international conflict with communism. In September 1951 General de Lattre arrived in Washington to argue that France, faced with Vietminh subversion supported by Communist China, now needed and deserved to have its risks shared. He was given both credits and weapons. But later, in 1954, on the eve of Dienbienphu, the French Government demanded far more: It requested that several hundred American bombers be ordered to attack the enemy from Manila. To these requests Washington finally responded that "Indochina does not fall within the perimeter of the area vital to the defense of the United States."

We can now admire the wisdom which led President Eisenhower to reject both the agitated appeals of the French and the advice of Admiral Radford and Vice President Nixon, both of whom recommended intervention. But we may well ask why a country not considered of "vital importance" to American interests in 1944 became so in 1955. The Communist camp, after all, is no longer a monolithic force able to exert unified global pressures as had been the case in 1954. In Korea, moreover, Chinese had recently been fighting American soldiers, something they have since refrained from doing; and missile strategy has meanwhile diminished the importance of local airforce bases. One can only conclude that the diplomatic views of American leaders have hardened during these years. In the light of Mr. Rusk's performance the diplomacy of John Foster Dulles must be reconsidered and credited with admirable flexibility.

Thus France launched three wars in Indochina and lost them all. Its allies having refused to provoke a brutal extension of the war in order to avoid a local defeat, France's dream of an international anti-Communist "crusade" collapsed at Dienbienphu in the spring of 1954. General Giap destroyed France's main combat force; the Vietminh controlled two-thirds of Vietnam; and neither Hanoi nor Saigon were protected from attack.

Ho Chi Minh had offered negotiations 6 months before this debacle and had been ignored. Now Moscow and Peking were agreeable to an international detente and Washington seemed prepared to accept the consequences of its failure to intervene. Thus at the Geneva conference table in 1954 the Western powers benefited from a certain complicity on the part of Molotov and Chou En-lai: The West succeeded in wresting from the victors half of the territory and the larger part of the material wealth of Vietnam. Ho agreed to fall back to the north in exchange for a promise that elections preparing the way for unification would be held in 1956—elections that he had no doubt of winning.

A great deal of confusion surrounds this Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized that the only texts signed at Geneva were the armistice agreements between the French and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the "final declaration"
of the conference—both the United States and South Vietnam had reservations about it—and it carried only the force of suggestion. But apart from the North Vietnamese, the French were the only nation that formally guaranteed to carry out the Geneva accords that provided both for partition at the 17th parallel and for elections.

And now France committed a new error (its last?), dreaming this time that it might finally leave Vietnam and forget it altogether. Diem, now installed as dictator in the south, wanted the French to quit his country as soon as possible. This was not only because certain French interests were intriguing against him—something that helped strengthen his position as a nationalist leader—but also because the French Army was the only force that could compel him to hold elections in 1956. In the event, the French quickly yielded and the last of their Army departed in April 1956.

The consequences of this final French error were, and remain, enormous. Diem was now free to declare himself free of the Geneva obligations and soon did so with American encouragement. The south could now be reorganized as an anti-Communist bastion, from which a reconquest of the North could eventually be launched. The Diem government in fact soon created a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, which beginning in 1958, parachuted agents into the north, notably into areas such as Vinh, where Ho’s agrarian reform had provoked violent peasant uprisings. But meanwhile the north, considering itself cheated by Saigon and Washington (with France’s cooperation), began preparation to exploit the political and social discontent in the south to establish a base for subversive operations. And Hanoi was to show itself far more adept at this political game than Saigon.

Could the French have resolved this Vietnam problem? In fact, they were confronted by two immensely volatile forces whose demands would have shaken any Western government, as they are shaking the United States today. First, the demands of a people thirsting to overthrow colonialism and to recover their national identity, their freedom of maneuver, and their unity. But also the demands of a revolutionary group, supported by one of the great power blocs, which claims the right to impose its authority on the entire nation in the name of a Communist doctrine highly suspect to the majority: a group, nonetheless, whose heroism, discipline, and ruthlessly effective methods seem to assure its success.

It is the deep and constant intermingling of these two forces which have made the Vietnam problem seem so hopeless and defeating to the West. How can a Western government successfully sponsor an independent “nationalist counterfire” when the strongest feelings of many Vietnamese have been invested for many years in the local civil war; and when one finds among those who have rallied to the Vietminh, and then the Lao Dong and the NLF, a great many patriots, drawn to the organization because they believe it to be the hope of Vietnamese nationalism, capable of defeating colonialism and Western domination.

Perhaps it might have been possible for the French to disassociate the nationalist inspiration in Vietnam from the Communist organization. But to do this would have been very difficult. For to gain the confidence of the nationalists I believe that French aid to Vietnam would have had to meet three extremely demanding conditions: that the donor of the aid would have no right to intervene directly in the Government; and the aid would be given to the most worthy leaders; and that it would not lead to the creation of oligarchies of profiteers and a climate of corruption. By all these standards the French failed. If they ever had a chance to survive the Asian revolution, they lost it, basically, because they were unwilling to alter their patronizing colonialist attitudes and deal with Asians with some sense of mutual respect or cooperation. For the most part they preferred instead to appoint and then control the manageable, the incompetent, and the operators, many of whom made fortunes out of the corrupt French aid program.

Opposed in Vietnam, then, were a coherent, principled, and implacable revolutionary movement of militants organized in the villages—the country’s fundamental social and economic unit—inspired by an evident nationalism and posing defenders of stern justice and equality; on the other hand, a regime obviously supported and controlled by foreign powers, partly composed of former colonial officials, disdainful of peasant claims, tolerant of a social order where the influential and successful were frantically engaged in profiteering—preparing for the arrival of the inevitable catastrophe. The only possible result was a catastrophe on the scale of Dienbienphu.
How relevant is the French experience to Vietnam today? Certainly the American situation is different in important respects, but really how different? For example, the United States has no colonial past in Vietnam, no strictly imperialist drive for economic gain. But its objectives are, curiously, both more altruistic and more imperious than those of its predecessor. After all, a country seeking colonial profits is quite capable of making a compromise to preserve at least some of its endangered wealth. But what of a country that supposes itself to be defending a selfless principle? In fact, the United States does seem to have several fairly concrete motives; e.g., to prove to certain nations that it is faithful to its alliances; to show the underdeveloped peoples of the Southern Hemisphere how costly it can be to choose “Marxism-Leninism.” There would seem to be sufficient elements of calculated self-interest here to make realistic bargaining possible—on the basis of spheres of influence, for example.

A second difference concerns the size and power of the forces involved. General Westmoreland not only commands a good many more troops than General Navarre (750,000 as compared with 500,000) but he is also relatively free from the financial, logistical, and transport problems that plagued the French. A far greater advantage, however, lies in America’s enormous firepower as well as its Air Force and complete mastery of the sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States and South Vietnamese forces are now 20 times more powerful than the army of General Navarre (which had no more than 80 combat planes at its disposal during the battle of Dienbienphu). The small size of the present theater of operations in South Vietnam thus becomes a favorable factor of great importance: The French forces were charged with the defense of all Indochina, a territory four times the present size of South Vietnam.

But, given these advantages can it be said that the United States is now succeeding where France was forced to retreat? Of course, one answer must be yes, in the limited sense that it is impossible to imagine the United States suffering a major defeat in the present circumstances. During the past year President Johnson has been able to dispatch enough American troops to Vietnam to avoid another Dienbienphu, but beyond this the situation is less than hopeful. The arrival of over 100,000 troops has done no more than stabilize a deteriorating military situation; it did not result in a sharp swing of military advantage to the Western side, as some observers had expected. The military map published on January 30 in the New York Times showing four-fifths of the south under Vietcong influence” must be regarded as accurate, notwithstanding contrary claims by officials. (Incidentally, this map recalls the military chart the French press did not dare to publish 12 years ago. The American public has recently been getting far more information on the Vietnam question from the press, television, Senate hearings, etc., than was ever available in France.)

The fact is that American policy in Vietnam, although originally inspired by very different intentions, now resembles all too closely the disastrous policy of the French. The United States has also failed to solve the problem of providing support to genuine local leaders without excessive intervention in the country itself. Indeed, it can be said that the French—perhaps hypocritically—did nevertheless succeed in transferring some responsibilities to the Vietnamese: These were quite feeble ones in military matters, rather more important in politics, and nearly total in such administrative work as tax collecting. By contrast, we are now seeing the progressive Americanization of both the war and the country itself: The influence of the local military headquarters grows weaker; the efficiency of the Government in Saigon continues to decay; American experts have taken over a great many local functions. Of course one understands the concern for efficiency, but the psychological effects are hardly calculated to encourage the emergence of authentic nationalist leaders at the present time, as Roger Hilsman forcefully pointed out in his recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Certainly the Americans have done no better than the French in finding worthy non-Communist leadership. There is no need to reexamine now the tragic liquidation of Diemism, an event made inevitable by the sectarian religious isolation and the oligarchic obstinacy of the Ngo family. But since then, what decadence! Sad mandarins from certain conservative milieux in Saigon—courageous and out dated men—are followed in office by junta’s composed of young generals of fortune who add a new star to their shoulders after each defeat in battle.

As for the moral climate in Saigon, one can only say that the corruption which dominated the life of the city’s elite in 1953 has now been democratized. Shady dealings having to do with aid and military programs are no longer confined to
people in high places, but seem to involve every kind of business. Testifying
before the Senate on February 4, Mr. David Bell, the Director of Foreign Aid,
said that he knew of no black market in Saigon—which only shows that a brilli-
ant and hard-working official has had no time to stroll along the streets of a
town where someone begs you to break the law at every step.

It would be wrong to predict a priori that President Johnson's new "counter-
insurgency" and "pacification" programs, based on plans for economic and social
development in the southern villages, will fail as totally as did the quite similar
plans sponsored by the French and later by the Diem regime. Can they produce
a qualitative change in Vietnamese attitudes toward the present Government and
the United States? What can be said is that any efforts by political and army
leaders in the south, however doubtful their results, will surely be more effective
than the current bombing of the north. I will not take up the moral aspects of
these attacks. It should be sufficient to examine their diplomatic and military
results thus far. According to predictions made in January 1965, several weeks
of daily raids would bring the north to its knees and thence to the negotiat-
ing table. In fact, Messrs. Ho and Dong have since toughened their demands, pass-
ing from the relatively flexible "four points" of March 8 to the recent letter of
January 31, which refers to the NLF as the "only representative of South Viet-
nam"; until then, Ho had mentioned only the NLF "program."

As for military results, we must realize that the bombing of the north has no
overwhelming impact on a people who only recently emerged from a resistance
movement and are now being trained to return to one; for the most part their
lives are not greatly affected by the destruction of a bridge or a truck depot.
On the other hand, in January 1965 there were two northern regiments in the
south, while now in February 1966 there are eight. Furthermore, the combat
reserves forces in the north are numerous enough to permit the dispatch of more
northern troops to General Giap in the south every time the United States esca-
lates the bombing. The American public has been told that the north is being
bombed to save American lives. But, on the contrary, it seems clear that the
bombing in the north only increases the pressure on General Westmoreland’s
troops: The American foot soldier must pay for the destruction caused by the
American Air Force. And if Hanoi itself is bombed, we may be sure that the
Vietcong forces have well-laid plans to take atrocious vengeance on Saigon, a city they have both infiltrated and surrounded. The adversaries have
now sunk their claws into each other and so long as the ground fighting con-
tinues, we may expect that each blow will be followed by damaging reprisals.

Thus a political solution becomes all the more urgent—although unlike the
settlement of 1954, it will not be preceded by a military disaster. But here Amer-
ican diplomacy is the victim of its own myths. Because the U.S. Government has
decreed from the first that the war in the south was originally provoked by
invasion from the north, it has insisted that a solution must be negotiated with
Hanoi, and only Hanoi.

A false historical analysis has led to a political impasse. For a careful study
of the history of South Vietnam over the last 10 years will show that from
1956 onward, strong resistance groups, the surviving members of political-
religious sects crushed by Diem, were in active opposition to the regime in the
south; they were in fact already called "Vietcong" by the Diem regime at that
time. Furthermore, this essentially nationalist dissident movement gained
added support as a result of the rural discontent which led Diem to suppress the
elected municipal councils in 1957; it spread further after the promulgation of
the terrible law of 1959 which prescribed the death penalty for all "accomplices
of Communists"—and communism comes cheap in South Vietnam. At this time
the resistance was composed of nothing more than southern groups organized
in self-defense against Diem. Hanoi had made no connection with them. The
North Vietnamese did not begin to exploit this situation and infiltrate agents
until 1959; and it was only after pressure from a southern congress of "former
Vietminh resistants" in March of 1960 that they prepared to intervene. At the
northern Communist Party congress in September of the same year the Hanoi
Government gave direct encouragement to the revolutionary activities in the
south. Still, it was not until November 11, 1960, following an attempted mili-
tary putsch against Diem, that the Vietcong—feeling the pressure of competition
from military nationalists—gave itself formal identity and established a political
headquarters by creating the National Liberation Front.

Today it is clear that the NLF leaders are closely linked to Hanoi, on which
they depend for much of their supplies and arms. But anyone concerned with a
peaceful settlement in Vietnam should be aware of both the local origins of the
front and its strong persisting regionalism—its attachments to the milieux, tradi-
tions, economy, and countryside of the south which give it a fundamental
autonomy.

And yet, notwithstanding the fact that the southern origins of the Vietcong
insurrection have been carefully confirmed, no element of the Vietnam problem
has been so neglected, especially in American official circles. We may be
astonished, for example, that the immense, spectacular, and probably sincere efforts
of recent American diplomacy to persuade Hanoi to negotiate finally produced,
after 30 days of pause in bombing, a single defiant letter. Yet America is dealing
here with a small and poorly armed country; its allies are reluctant to give it
aid too openly, fearing a crushing American response. Certainly it is a Com-
munist government, but one presided over by a man who in 1946 and 1954 was
able to prove to the French his willingness to accept compromise. And of the
four points posed as conditions by Hanoi last year, Washington now accepts
three. Why then doesn't Ho play Lyndon Johnson's game? In a conference the
North Vietnamese would hold so many trumps that their present position is
hard to understand.

But perhaps they were not in a position to negotiate at all. If we look back
over the history of the NLF we find support for the view that Hanoi is not able
to speak for the front. First for psychological reasons: The published program
of the NLF expressly mentions the possibility of an independent South Viet-
nam; and it looks forward to forming an alliance with Laos and Cambodia only.
Thus it seems most unlikely that the front would consider itself adequately rep-
resented by the northern government. Finally, there may be a purely practical
reason. Combat conditions in the south are such that it is by no means certain
that a decision or an agreement even if approved by the NLF would be supported
by all the fighters in the field.

If we are to undertake a serious and credible search for peace in Vietnam, we
must take account of this diversity of the southern resistance; we must recognize
that it is in fact a federation of maquis of different ages and differing inspira-
tion, and that it is not as yet completely unified.

There is not as much geographic and psychological distance between the typical
southern military chief and Ho Chi Minh as there is between Ho Chi Minh
and Mr. Kieu Quynh. But to be effective now in Vietnam diplomacy must certainly
take account of the maquisard and his part in the war. It must also attempt
to understand the role of the Central Committee of the NLF, where Maoist influ-
ence is strong but where all tendencies coexist; of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi,
with its pro-Chinese and pro-Russian factions; and the Political Bureau in Peking,
with its cast of performers, both civilian and military. And finally we must
comprehend the very complex position of the Soviet Union, which is quite un-
willing to sacrifice either its policy of peaceful coexistence or its commanding
position as leader of the Communist world. If the diversity of governmental
levels, alliances, and forces involved in the war presents difficulties, it also offers
many more chances for an alert diplomacy than were available during the mono-
lithic conflict of the cold war.

It is true that American leaders now argue that to recognize the Vietcong is to
admit defeat. A curious intellectual position indeed—to refuse to recognize
your adversary for what he is. Perhaps it is worth recalling that in December
1953, after Ho Chi Minh had first announced himself ready to negotiate, the
French Socialist, Alain Savary, suggested to Georges Bidault (then Foreign Mini-
ster, now living in Brazil) that he seek Ho out for talks. "You only make them
bigger by talking to them," said Bidault—who did finally talk with Ho's dele-
gate at Geneva, but after the fall of Dienbienphu.

"Recognizing" the Vietcong certainly will not solve the problem of peacemaking
in Vietnam at a stroke. It would nevertheless be an extremely constructive idea
to focus diplomatic attention firmly on the south at the present time—without
meanwhile ceasing efforts both to make contact with Hanoi and to assess Commu-
nist Chinese intentions.

But to bring about peace it will not suffice simply to recognize the existence of
a powerful revolutionary organization supported by the north and already in con-
trol of the largest part of the national territory. More important is the task of
reestablishing the constitutional legitimacy which Diem embodied for a brief
period—reactionary as he was—and which has since vanished. The NLF is an
essential element of this legitimacy because it is the heir to the revolt against
Diem's totalitarianism as well as the principal force of resistance to foreign
intervention. But there are others who make up the social and political society
as well—the Buddhists, the Catholics, and also the Army, a bourgeoisie in uniform.

An effective policy to bring about a peaceful settlement should begin by making it possible for each of these groups to return to an active political role. While General Ky, after having won his sole victory of the war at Honolulu, occupies the stage, we may be sure that the other groups are ready in the wings, waiting for the protection and encouragement the United States could still supply. And from such a revived political life we could expect an authoritative leadership to emerge whose lot it would be to debate with the NLF on the future of the south and to establish a coalition government to represent South Vietnam in future peace conferences. While the NLF is the largest force in the south it recognizes that it is obviously not the only force, reserving a large fraction of the seats on its Central Committee for groups who do not belong to the NLF. The democratization of power in South Vietnam is not a fantasy. The destruction of the small democratic movements struggling to survive under Diem was among the factors that led to the civil war.

French colonial policy was only too familiar with these very diverse political factions and brilliantly played them off, one against the other. But to divide and rule became a pathetic policy as France's control became more feeble. An American policy which seeks a peaceful settlement must take account of both the sociopolitical pluralism of South Vietnam and its extraordinary capacity for finding original—and local—solutions to its problems. Surely it is time for American leaders at last to confront the people with whom they have become so inextricably involved.

HOW TO BRING HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE

The Chairman. I am frank to say it puzzles me, when I listen to you, why people are not more reasonable, more rational under these circumstances. There must be some explanation, unless we just assume that the world has gone completely mad.

I have taken up most of my time. You do not have to answer unless you care to. There is 1 minute of my time left.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I think that I spent almost an hour this morning answering the observations you have just made.

The Chairman. I know that you did and they were based upon your observations.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask you to amplify your statement in one respect. What do you want Hanoi to do in these circumstances?

The Chairman. What I want them to do, both Hanoi and the Vietcong, is to come to a conference with you and the Russians and the Chinese—everyone who has a legitimate interest—roughly the same people who participated either in the 1954 Geneva or 1962 Laos Conferences. I do not care whether it is the Geneva Conference on Indochina or the one on Laos. They are the people with the primary reasons—historical or geographical—for having a conference.

I do not think you can have a conference out of thin air, unless you or someone representing this Government go to the parties who are involved and give them some assurance that we mean what we say in public. I am not saying that you are trying to deceive anybody, but our actions, which I know you do not control, in my view are not consistent with our words and I do not blame you for that. You do not build the bases. You do not control the military activities and many other things. You make the best case you can, and it is very ably made.

But I think there is great doubt on the part of these other people certainly. I have no other way to explain why such people as the
Japanese and the Indians will not come and sacrifice their men in this struggle. Therefore, I do not believe they accept your thesis. That is why I want to go to a conference.

I think you would have to assure them as to what kind of a settlement you will accept. I get the impression, not from your statement as much as General Taylor’s, that we are in an unlimited war and the only kind of settlement is unconditional surrender. Therefore, there is nothing to negotiate about.

Secretary Rusk. Unconditional surrender of what, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. But you deny this and I think so did the general.

Secretary Rusk. But unconditional surrender of what?

The Chairman. That they give up and they come to the conference at your mercy and we have total victory.

I see no occasion of any disposition to compromise. Now we are the strongest nation in the world. We can probably impose our will. I am saying that this is not wise in the long run even though we do have that power. I know we have the power. But I think this is not the lasting way to do it.

This is the way great empires have done it in the past, and it has usually not been very lasting. It has not brought about a stable peace.

I am just saying that I am thinking about a compromise in which you assure them in some way that is persuasive to them this time—because once before we did not go through with a settlement—that, if an election is held in Vietnam, we will abide by it regardless of the outcome. I do not think that has ever been said in any convincing way by this administration, and I do not know whether you are prepared to say it.

Secretary Rusk. The only convincing way in which you could say that to the other side apparently is to let them have, to start with, the government that would conduct the elections.

The Chairman. I do not believe that is the only way at all.

Secretary Rusk. I am saying what they themselves are saying.

HAS THE U.S. POSITION BEEN CLEAR?

The Chairman. They have not said it in any way that I know of. This is our disadvantage. They may have said this to you. It has not been my impression that they have said, “You have to turn everything over to us and therefore we are going to run it completely without any interference at all.” As you say, I have never had the impression that they require of us that we get out and turn the country over to them without an election or any further ado about it.

It is not clear to me, and I do not think that there is any good evidence to that effect.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, do you have any doubts about the good faith and the credibility of the other side here in this situation?

The Chairman. I have no doubts that they are a very cruel, ruthless, and mean people, as has been expressed here often. They have engaged in all kinds of terrorism. What they say in public is very often, and I think generally, propaganda designed for public consumption. I do not know what they say in private. We have had these insinuations, or even statements, that you or others have been approached
through U Thant and so on. There has been great mystery about most of these.

I am not aware of what has gone on in the orthodox diplomatic circles. What is said on these great expeditions of sending people all over the world and making statements that we are for peace, I do not think is relevant to what I am trying to get at. To say we like peace, we are peace-loving people, does not seem to me to mean much. It is what you say privately to the people concerned, and how persuasive you are as to what you are willing to agree to in case you had a negotiation, that I am not aware of.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I just illustrate the problem? On the matter of persuading the other side, back in 1961 Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Kennedy agreed that everybody ought to leave Laos alone, get their forces out, let these people look after their own affairs. We went to the Laotian conference in Geneva—Ambassador Harriman first, and then I came over for the closing stages. I was there also at the opening. Those were long and complicated negotiations.

We accepted the Communist nominee to be Prime Minister of Laos, the present Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma. When the agreements were signed we took our military people out of Laos. They left several thousand, Hanoi did—several thousand of their armed forces—in Laos, specifically contrary to the agreement. Not for a day did they stop using Laos as a route of infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, specifically contrary to agreement. And they used a veto to paralyze the ability of the International Control Commission to go anywhere in Laos to look at the possibilities of infringements.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I believe all that. Are you not still glad that you had that—even with all its defects, with all the difficulties you have cited—rather than a world war, or even a major war in that area?

You settled it in a way that was unsatisfactory.

Secretary Rusk. No, but it is not settled, Mr. Chairman; it is not settled.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not settled, but it is not escalating into a war of major proportions.

Secretary Rusk. Well, the major North Vietnamese effort is channeling south into South Vietnam. We have no present reason to believe that they have accepted the basic agreement in 1962 as a permanent structure for Laos.

They are not permitting the Government to function on that basis. They are not permitting the ICC to visit around the country. They are putting more people into Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it is influenced to a great extent by the Vietnamese problem?

Secretary Rusk. Well, I have no doubt, from the point of view of the other side, that they violated the Laotian agreement because it was convenient to them in order to pursue their enterprise against South Vietnam. But that is no defense. That is no defense.

The CHAIRMAN. It is no defense and of course we are doing the same. We are building bases—

Secretary Rusk. There was no provision in the Laos accord, that "of course you can go ahead and use Laos if you really are going after
South Vietnam—just use it for infiltration.” They were supposed to stop it.

The Chairman. I agree with you.

Secretary Rusk. This was supposed to be one of the significant steps toward peace in southeast Asia. The Vietnam problem would be a quite different problem if Laos were not open to this infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

TESTING GOOD FAITH ON BOTH SIDES

Now we tested there the matter of good faith on both sides in southeast Asia. I must say I am not at all—well, let me say this, Mr. Chairman: I suppose that the other side may have some doubts, if they wish to entertain them, that we will draw our troops out of there. All they have got to do is to come and test it, come and test it.

The Chairman. You cannot test that. I mean, if you do not do it, how do you test it?

Secretary Rusk. Because arrangements can be made under which our troops will come out—arrangements at the table, the nature of the settlement, the provisions for the withdrawal of forces on both sides. The arrangements can be made.

There is no need for us to be obscure about that point. I would be a little disturbed if, say, members of this committee were to express doubt about our intentions in that respect merely because we are building some facilities to take care of the forces that we have there in South Vietnam. We have built and abandoned many facilities in the course of the last 30, 40 years, in many places. This has nothing to do with good faith. This is a matter of meeting our present military requirements, which we will be prepared to abandon if the other side makes peace. These things can be easily tested.

I find it hard to get the other side to come in with anything that would show their interest in peace or their good faith with respect to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. And so I find it difficult to be patient with people who keep on saying, “Oh, but you have not convinced them. You have got to give them something else.”

We have given them practically everything but South Vietnam, in terms of trying to find a basis for peace in southeast Asia. Now, I cannot believe that we are expected to give them South Vietnam.

In terms of elections, sure.

Senator Gore. What do you mean by that?

Secretary Rusk. Elections as you and I would mean them.

FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Gore. Are you saying now if a free election was held, the U.S. Government would stand by and accept it?

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Gore. That is a great step.

Secretary Rusk. But, Senator, if is a step we took a year ago. That is not a new step.

Senator Morse. You did not say it in 1966.

Secretary Rusk. Well, in 1966 the problem there was elections throughout Vietnam on the issue of unification. I read you this morning the description which General Giap, the North Vietnamese general
gave of the mistakes they were making in 1955 and 1956. The situation developed in such a way that it was quite clear that North Vietnam was not going to have free elections. They will not have them today. They will not have them today. The other side has said, “North Vietnam is a member of the Socialist World. So you can forget it. We are not going to be talking about North Vietnam. What we are going to be talking about is South Vietnam.”

Now, they made it very clear that there are going to be no free elections up there. So that they, with some 17 million people up there, with 17 million votes in their pockets, they want some elections in the south, so that the combined numbers would clearly mean that they then would take over South Vietnam through that process.

Now, there were violations of various sorts in those days, including the terrorists that were left behind to make those elections more difficult, and to insure their effect in the south. But what we are saying, Senator, is that if that is the issue, let us have the elections. If that is the issue, let us have the elections. Let the South Vietnamese decide.

Now, we have not qualified that, Mr. Chairman. What I have said is that I do not myself believe that the South Vietnamese people in genuinely free elections would be the first people in history voluntarily to elect a Communist regime to power.

I have said that—and that is, in turn, interpreted by some as, “Oh well, then you do not mean elections.”

Well, of course we mean elections: let the South Vietnamese decide these questions for themselves.

The Chairman. I do not wish to impose on the time, but has it not been quite clear that you have coupled this with the idea that, no matter what happens, there is no possibility of any participation by the National Liberation Front. Therefore they have no alternative but to fight on? Has that not been pretty clear from what you and others in the administration have said?

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, it has not been said in those terms, but they do have an alternative.

The Chairman. To give up.

Secretary Rusk. They do have an alternative. They are the front of Hanoi. They do have an alternative of quitting, of stopping being an agent of Hanoi and receiving men and arms from the north for the purpose of taking over South Vietnam.

The Chairman. That particular question is disputed by some people who know much more about it than I do—that while the Vietcong are allies with and supported by Hanoi, they have an identity of their own. They have representatives abroad of their own. They treat with people; that is, they have representatives in various countries, not this one. I do not profess this, but I have read a great many articles—this piece I put in by a Frenchman who I am told is one of the better authorities on conditions in South Vietnam—and many of these statements of fact are that this or that is so. I am not capable now of disputing you.

I have my doubts, if I may say, about our knowledge generally of this whole area, as well as China and South Vietnam, as to what the actual facts are—the actual relations between the National Liberation Front and the people. I do not really know. I doubt that anybody knows very well except the people within their own organization.
SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

IS VIETNAM WORTH A CONFRONTATION?

But all I am really trying to say is I do not think that this dispute is worthy of an escalation that would result in a confrontation with China in a world war. I do not believe that there is much evidence that this is the kind of a test in which it would follow that, if we should make a compromise, then all the world will collapse because we have been defeated.

This country is much too strong, in my opinion, that it would suffer any great setback. We are much stronger than the Russians were when they withdrew from Cuba. For a week maybe people said they had had a rebuff and within a month everyone was complimenting them for having contributed to the maintenance of peace.

We are certainly strong enough and decent enough and good enough in every respect to withstand any kind of a compromise that is at all reasonable.

Secretary Rusk. Yes. I do not understand though, Mr. Chairman, just what the substance of the compromise would be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it strikes me that the essence—

Secretary Rusk. I mean some of the things you said suggested that we should abandon the effort in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am not suggesting that we should abandon it, but that we should have a conference. I do not think you will get it until you propose reasonable terms that would allow the Vietnamese, even the liberation front, to have an opportunity to participate in an election.

After all, Vietnam is their country. It is not our country. We do not even have the right that the French did. We have no historical right. We are obviously intruders from their point of view. We represent the old Western imperialism in their eyes. I am not questioning our motives. I think our motives are very good, as has been testified on numerous occasions.

But I still think from their point of view it is their country, however bad the people have acted. Other countries have had civil wars; we had one. In my part of the country we resented it for a long time. So did yours. You can remember the feelings that were there.

These are very unfortunate controversies. But what bothers me and, I know, a number here, is that this is in one sense a relatively minor matter. In another sense it seems to be the trigger that may result in a world war, and I do not want that to happen. That is what we are really concerned with.

Secretary Rusk. And none of us want it to happen, Mr. Chairman. But when you say this is their country—

The CHAIRMAN. It is their country, with all its difficulties. If they want to be Communists just like the Yugoslavs, I do not know why we should object to it.

Secretary Rusk. We are making a distinction, though; that is that South Vietnam is not Hanoi's country.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not our country. It used to be one country.

Secretary Rusk. But there was a settlement, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the 17th parallel. There were some differences about various aspects of that.
The Chairman. What kind of settlement was it? I think it would be fine if you would describe it very precisely. Did it divide it into two separate nations?

Secretary Rusk. It did not establish it as two separate nations, but it provided some procedures by which this could occur if that is what the people wanted. And then it worked out so that North Vietnam was not interested at all in holding anything like genuinely free elections. It was perfectly clear that North Vietnam was marking time for the time when it could seize South Vietnam regardless of the views of the South Vietnamese.

The Chairman. I have no doubt they expected to win that election. They thought they had won the war at Dienbienphu, didn't they?

Secretary Rusk. I suppose they did.

The Chairman. And didn't the Vietminh occupy a great deal of what is now South Vietnam and withdraw in response to that settlement or cease-fire?

Secretary Rusk. They withdrew in part. They left substantial numbers behind.

The Chairman. Many South Vietnamese thought they had been cheated by the Geneva Accords, didn't they?

Secretary Rusk. You mean the North Vietnamese?

The Chairman. The South Vietnamese did, too. They thought they had been sold out by the north because they did have to withdraw. But they were persuaded by the Russians and, I think, us and the French that there had better be a cease-fire—this was leading to a terrible situation—so they agreed to a cease-fire anyway. Isn't that about true?

Secretary Rusk. I think the people in Hanoi undoubtedly felt that they had been let down by the agreements in 1954, and they immediately rolled up their sleeves to go after it again.

The Chairman. And the only reason they accepted it, the best that I can read, is that they thought there would be an election and undoubtedly they thought they were going to win. General Eisenhower, I think, thought they would, too. He indicated that in his book.

Secretary Rusk. He indicated that in terms of the fighting, not in terms of the period of the—

The Chairman. He referred to it.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

The Chairman. One of our proteges, of course, threw out Bao Dai, shortly thereafter. It was really the French's responsibility to guarantee the elections, wasn't it? They signed the cease-fire. The only people who signed the Geneva agreement were the Vietminh and the French.

Secretary Rusk. That point was a little confusing because the French were not in a position to hold elections.

The Chairman. They retired.

Secretary Rusk. The responsibility was turned over to the South Vietnamese, and the South Vietnamese Government did not sign the agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. No. There wasn't any South Vietnamese Government at that time. That was constituted subsequently. It was only the Vietminh who were the Communist national—

Secretary Rusk. The French military command signed the agreement with the Vietminh.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary Rusk. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary Rusk. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The French responsibility was to see that it was carried out. But the French retired and gave up their responsibility to hold the election. We didn't sign. Our participation was by proxy through Diem. I apologize. I don't wish to take all the time.

OBSTACLE TO ELECTIONS

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I would comment that that is not, or need not be, the obstacle today, because there can be elections in which the South Vietnamese people can make their own decisions about these matters. But the Liberation Front, or at least Ho Chi Minh in his message to the heads of government, particularly to President Radhakrishnan recently, says: "If we really want a peaceful settlement we must accept the four point stand of the North Vietnamese Government and prove this by actual deeds; we must end, unconditionally and for good, all bombing raids and other acts against the DRV," with no reference whatever to any of the acts of war that they are committing; and that "We must recognize the Liberation Front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know they have said that. This morning, I think, I gathered that our statements at Honolulu, or part of them, were for public consumption and to try to bolster their morale. This is what I call a form of propaganda. I think you can find both sides have said things that are designed to help morale. I don't think they are final at all. The National Liberation Front itself has said on numerous times that they call for free elections. I don't think this can be settled in public declarations by one propaganda agency or another. I am suggesting that it has to be done in the old-fashioned way of going to these people privately and trying to assure them, if you can make them believe, that we would agree to the kind of program of genuine free elections that I mentioned.

I think it would be a major undertaking to convince them that we would live up to that, in view of their past experience with us and particularly the French in 1956. I am not saying you or this country is responsible for all that. I don't think we are. But there have been some very, very difficult historical facts that are hard to overcome and make people believe and have any confidence in a conference. All I am pleading with you for and have been very awkwardly, I think—is that this isn't the kind of conflict that warrants a vast escalation, a vast expenditure of money and many thousands of deaths. I think it is not
that kind of a vital interest, as I can cite in other instances. I also think that the great countries, especially this country, is quite strong enough to engage in a compromise without losing its standing in the world and without losing its prestige as a great nation.

On the contrary, I think it would be one of the greatest victories for us in our prestige if we could be ingenious enough and magnanimous enough to bring about some kind of a settlement of this particular struggle.

That is all I am trying to get at. I don't want you to give up or do anything disgraceful.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, we wouldn't have much of a debate between us on the question of compromising and a settlement, but we can't get anybody into the discussions for the purpose of talking about it.

The Chairman. I think there is something wrong with our approach. Let's assume that these people are utter idiots. There must be something wrong with our diplomacy.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, is it just possible that there is something wrong with them?

The Chairman. Yes, there is a lot wrong with them. They are very primitive, difficult, poor people who have been fighting for 20 years and I don't understand myself why they can continue to fight, but they do.

Secretary Rusk. And they want to take over South Vietnam by force.

The Chairman. It is said the liberation front would like to take it over by election. That is what they say.

Secretary Rusk. They are requiring us to accept the liberation front as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam.

Now, that is what we have heard privately. We are not hearing a lot of things privately that you don't get publicly.

The Chairman. Normally in the old days that is the way it used to be done—not on the front pages in every capital in the world. It used to be done in a different way. I confess I am at a disadvantage to know what they have done or what we have done privately.

I yield to the Senator from Oregon. I have said too much already.

SUPPORT FOR CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

Senator Morse. Before asking the questions that I am going to ask, on which I want to have the Secretary comment, I want to say to you, Senator Fulbright, in my judgment I consider your statements on this record the most eloquent and the most penetrating analysis of the problem that confronts us in southeast Asia by anybody at any time who has come before this committee. I seriously do not doubt, if all in this room and in this country could have heard you, that they would fully appreciate the significance of what you say.

You have presented a case that I pray my Government is going to give some heed to. I speak with a sad heart and I am sure the Secretary knows from my standpoint over the years that I am very unhappy to find myself in such complete disagreement with him for the past several months and still tonight. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think our difficulty goes back to 1954 and 1955. Our
Government doesn’t want to face up to the very unfortunate record of the United States made in southeast Asia in 1954, 1955 and 1956. That is when we made our horrendous mistake.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION FINDINGS OF GENEVA ACCORD VIOLATIONS

The Secretary reads, on page 23 of his statement this morning, the findings of the International Control Commission about the violations of North Vietnam in respect to the Geneva accords. They have violated them and violated them and violated them. And so did South Vietnam and so did the United States.

I would like to put in the record the reports of the International Control Commission, Mr. Chairman, that show the violations of others besides the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. (The reports mentioned appear in the appendix.) That is where a lot of this mess really started. Don’t forget the Geneva Accords called for the starting of conferences in July 1955 in the preparation for these elections. The Secretary said the North Vietnamese won’t have anything to do with the election. I want to say most respectfully I think he is dead wrong. I want to say we stopped the elections beginning as early as 1955. We took a course of action of supporting this man Diem whom we supported from the very beginning. He refused to sign the accords or be a party to them and he had the encouragement of John Foster Dulles not to sign them. We started at that time to scuttle the Geneva accords, although we gave lip service to them under the statement of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, and the President.

Our record in 1954, 1955, and 1956 paved the way for the shocking catastrophe that is taking place in South Vietnam today.

BILATERAL SETTLEMENT NOW HOPELESS

I happen to think, Mr. Chairman, that we have reached the point where this can never be settled bilaterally between the United States, the Vietcong, and the North Vietnamese. I think a bilateral settlement of this is hopeless. I think even if you force them to a surrender, the settlement is still hopeless. I think you are going to have to have other parties come in and do the settling for us. That is why I have been pleading that we get other nations of the world to realize their stake in this. I think their stake is so great. I agree completely with an observation that the Secretary of State made over in Paris some weeks ago when, as I recall, he went before NATO and tried to get them to see their stake. They have a stake. And I think their stake is such an important one that they ought to recognize it, move the United States out of the negotiating position, step in at the head of the table in the interests of the peace, and work for a negotiated settlement. I don’t think we are going to lose any face by that. I am about through but I wanted to express after these remarks of yours, Mr. Chairman, what my great fear is. I think we are going to continue to stumble along here into world war III. I think we are going to say, “all you have to do is lay down your arms; all you have to do is stop aggressing; all you have to do is move out of South Vietnam and we will have peace.” We have reached the point where that is not any longer for us to determine.
I wish it were. I think it is for the rest of the world to determine what all sides including the United States shall be expected to do to stop this war. I think we have an obligation to stop it along with the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese and Red China.

STUMBLING INTO A WAR WITH CHINA

But my last point, Mr. Chairman, is this fear that wakes me up in the night time and time again. I think we are following a stumble approach here in regard to this matter, until we will finally stumble into a war with Red China. If I ask the Secretary a question it would be only this. If we stumble into that war, are you of the opinion, Mr. Secretary, that we can ever fight that war successfully by so-called conventional war, or will we have to fight it as a nuclear war?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I don't believe that it is for me to try to predict that situation. I think that Peiping and we both do not want to stumble into that war. I think that we have had that situation in front of us many times before. I think these are questions which cannot be resolved on the basis of the worst case that could occur at the end of the trail, but should be weighed on the basis of what makes reasonably good sense in the present circumstances in which we find ourselves in such crises.

PARTICIPATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN PEACE SEARCH

But, in terms of participation with other governments, I agree with you, Senator, that this is not a matter just for bilateral handling between the United States and Hanoi, or the United States and the Vietcong. Many other governments have projected themselves into this situation. Seventeen nonaligned nations tried to set up negotiations without preconditions. The British Commonwealth set up a committee to try to visit the capitals concerned to see if they could find a basis for peace in this situation. The Secretary General of the U.N. has tried to be in touch with all the governments concerned to see if he could find a peace. He was not permitted to visit Hanoi and Peiping. The British, as cochairman of the Geneva Conferences, which would be the most logical and natural way to proceed on this, have worked indefatigably trying to revive and stimulate and make use of the Geneva Conferences. There are many governments who have, on their own, tried to be in touch with the parties privately to see if they could contribute.

The ICC governments have made their effort to do so; that is, the Control Commission.

In other words, many governments are doing this, and there are also many who are expressing their views on the merits of the matters by giving aid of one sort or another to South Vietnam—some 35 or more of them.

Senator Morse. But that keeps the war going. That is not what I am pleading for at all.

I am pleading for us to use our great influence among these nations to say, "All right, the time has come for you to select the divisions of men and whatever number of divisions of men are necessary to send over there and separate the parties. Go in between the United States
and the South Vietnamese on the one hand and the North Vietnamese on the other. You have to go there and enforce the peace." In my judgment if you continue this bilateral approach, Mr. Secretary—and I know you don’t share my view—I think you are going to end up in a war with China. I think you know that can’t be fought on a conventional basis but will have to be fought on a nuclear basis. That is what I think we are stumbling into. I think we are stumbling, and I think we ought to say to the other nations of the world, “You have to come in and separate us.”

It is a case now where somebody has to go on to the playground, so-called, and pull the fighting boys apart.

Secretary Rusk. President Radhakrishnan of India proposed that Afro-Asian forces be intruded in this situation. We thought that was a good idea and that we ought to explore it thoroughly.

The other side rejected it with considerable abuse of President Radhakrishnan. I think most of these noninvolved countries, that is these nonaligned countries, would themselves put their forces in there to try to suppress a side that is unwilling to accept a peaceful settlement.

This would be their taking on the war. They are not prepared to do that. What they are prepared to do is to try to facilitate every machinery, every forum, every channel for discussion in order to find out if there can be found a basis for peace, and that itself is an important effort on their part, but there has to be some interest in peace on the part of Hanoi here, if anyone is to make any moves in that. And this is not the case of simply going to them and persuading them that we are acting in good faith.

Senator Morse. I don’t want to do that. I want a period of time, 5, 6, 10 years for a protectorate over there or a trusteeship. You can’t go to an election immediately. Everybody knows that. But it would make a lot of difference between having only the United States and a few nations that are giving us token support over there fighting now, or between having 80 or 85 nations that have really faced up to this and said: “Listen, we are going to stop this war. That is what our obligations under the charter call for and we are going to send over whatever number of divisions is necessary to move in between the fighting forces.”

That is what we ought to be pleading for, it seems to me. They talk about getting more support from other nations to go over and help fight a war. We have to keep a peace, stop making war. Our motives are of the best—I don’t question my country’s motives—I simply say the policy we are following is not the best, because it is making war, and you can’t make war in 1966 and not endanger mankind in a nuclear war not too far away.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, I have been here all day, and as they say out in the farm country, I think this field has been plowed lengthwise and crosswise repeatedly. Every question has been asked, and I think the answers have been given with great repetition.
It occurs to me that we know what the objectives are; that is, peace, a reliable peace in South Vietnam, and I am not certain that this hearing will settle the situation. As far as I am concerned, I have had all the answers to the questions that are in my mind. The only thing that I want to comment on is the apparent connotation that we are all wrong. I do not believe we are. I believe the stimulating or the motivating force involved in this situation perhaps does go back a good many years to the fact that the Communist nations have never in good faith kept any major agreements which they have made along the line of peace. Oh, they may have paid their bills if they buy something somewhere. If they have to pay in 6 months, they may do that. And I think countless mistakes were made by this Government of ours at the end especially of World War II. I think some mistakes were made in the Korean war. I think we failed to do some things that we should have done which would have brought a happier solution to the war. But we find ourselves up against a situation here.

We are in that situation, and to me either we have to bring this to a successful and reliable conclusion, to lay the basis for peace, or we have to get out, acknowledge our defeat, and leave southeast Asia. Now to me it is just about that simple. And I do not want to see our country follow the line of defeat, inasmuch as we are involved.

I think it is perhaps like a person who gets in some quicksand, and he is looking for a way out. He would have a lot of trouble if a fellow stand on the bank and argues how he got into that. The job is to get a solution, get out of the difficulty that we are in. Unless it is brought to a conclusion where a reliable peace can result there, then it would seem to me that the Communist world would enjoy a great victory. We would only postpone the day when we really had to meet this in an all-out struggle either in southeast Asia or somewhere else, if freedom is to survive as the dominant factor in this world, and if international Communist tyranny is not to take over eventually, according to the well-known plans that they have had for so many years.

I am not going to ask any more questions because, as I say, the ground has been plowed quite a bit, and the questions have been asked and answered repeatedly. But I think we are up against a serious situation, and I think it has to be pretty satisfactorily resolved.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. Senator Gore.

Senator Gore, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, it may be that I misjudge the situation. I hope not. I believe we have made substantial progress. The Secretary has been a candid, a frank, and forthright witness. Such a great issue as is pending of necessity must be thrashed out. Men must be communicating with each other with great responsibility and sincerity and candor and frankness. This has occurred, particularly here for the last 30 or 40 minutes. I think we have made much progress. To begin with, some members on this committee had the feeling, Mr. Secretary, that we had passed the point of no return in
communicating our concern to you and to the President. I do not say this facetiously. I say it, I think, in truth. We have reached the President by this hearing. I understand he has been listening today and yesterday. And yesterday General Taylor came in and talked to us about limited objectives, limitation of forces. I was unable to get a definition, but I can understand why. And now you come here, and you speak of "the limited nature of our purpose there." I have the feeling that this hearing—Mr. Chairman, I would like to address this to you, maybe I should wait for executive session to say so, but I will say so now, and I will ask no further questions though I have several—I have the feeling that this is the climax of this public hearing. We should have our sessions with the Secretary and with the President behind closed doors for awhile. This has reached, I hope, a fruitful point from which some unity can be achieved in the country.

Thank you very much. I will terminate.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator Aiken. Mr. Secretary, this year we will spend about as much for military purposes in Vietnam as we spent for the entire Korean war. Do you feel that this expenditure is justified?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, I do indeed.

Senator Aiken. And that the force is necessary?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, I do.

Senator Aiken. Last April I believe you felt that the force in the Dominican Republic was necessary.

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM IN CUBA

Senator Aiken. And not long ago you felt that the use of force in Cuba was inadvisable. Now what virtue does communism have in Cuba that makes it less dangerous to the United States than communism in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, assuming that there was a degree of communism in the Dominican Republic, which some claim?

Secretary Rusk. In the case of Cuba, Senator, that country became Communist for all practical purposes by the summer of 1960. My first engagement with the problem had to do with the problem of cure rather than the problem of prevention. We discussed that matter in the hemisphere, and, in January 1962, with the very important assistance of Senator Morse and Senator Hickenlooper at the Punta del Este Conference, we got the hemisphere to recognize really for the first time in a broad and comprehensive way the nature of the Communist threat. But it did not seem desirable to use military forces directly against Cuba under the then existing circumstances. The casualties inflicted upon the Cuban people, the attitudes among the hemisphere and the scars that would be left in the hemisphere on that matter, and the general world situation in which there were some other very dangerous questions, suggested that it would not be appropriate to use armed force as a solution of that problem—although any action by Cuba against its neighbors might very well precipitate the use of force.
In the summer of 1964 the hemisphere applied against Cuba all of the peaceful remedies that exist under the OAS Charter. Therefore the Cuban Government could create a very dangerous situation if it now proceeded to give effect in actual practice to some of the threats that were made recently in the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana, which threatened other members of the hemisphere, some of them by name, with a militant policy of subversion and intervention through force.

Now the hemisphere has already warned Cuba that any further actions of the sort which it used against Venezuela, could bring down upon it the penalties, the remaining penalties, of the Rio Pact.

We would hope they would have the good sense not to let themselves get into that position.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SITUATION

In the case of the Dominican Republic, the situation was somewhat different there because, regardless of what has been said elsewhere, the specific occasion for, and the motive for, the introduction of the U.S. Armed Forces was to prevent the loss of life, and particularly the loss of American lives, in a situation where those who had such authority as existed could not themselves take such responsibility, and where they themselves asked us to come in to accept that responsibility. After we got onto the island, the situation in the city developed very rapidly, and a great deal more information became available as to what the situation was.

Meanwhile, the Organization of American States, rather than repudiating the action taken by the President, or rather than rebuking us for having done it, elected to build upon that action, to organize an Inter-American force, to establish a commission of the OAS to help the Dominican people work their way into the middle path between the two extremes which the hemisphere had already rejected.

In the autumn of 1960, under the Eisenhower administration, the hemisphere said that Trujillo was not the right answer here, and they applied sanctions on Trujillo because of some actions he took against Venezuela. In January 1962, as I indicated, the hemisphere said that the Castro-type answer is not appropriate to this hemisphere. So there were the two guideposts on the soft shoulders of the road, on either side, about the hemisphere's policies about how to deal with a situation such as that that was created in the Dominican Republic. So the OAS committee has been there for the purpose of working with the Dominicans—to help them form a constitutional government by the choice of the Dominican people, which would give them a political system in between the two extremes already rejected by the hemisphere. Those are comments on those two problems in the use of force.

COMPARISON OF CUBAN AND VIETNAMESE SITUATIONS

I think here in southeast Asia the problem is that of an armed attack against a small country to whom we have a commitment under treaty, and we are called upon to use force to repel that aggression, as indicated in the resolution of August 1964.
Senator Aiken. Wasn't the fact that Russia was involved in Cuba a factor in our decision not to use stronger forces against Cuba? We did approve the Bay of Pigs invasion, which was abortive. But then it was in the fall of 1962 that we told Russia to take their missiles and go home.

Have we told them to do the same thing in North Vietnam?

Secretary Rusk. The missiles are not the same type missiles.

Senator Aiken. Are you sure of that? I am speaking of conventional missiles. I expect Cuba and North Vietnam are both plastered with Russian conventional missiles, and I wouldn't rule out the other type of missile, but we don't know about that.

RUSSIAN ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

But what is Russia doing to try to bring about peace in southeast Asia? Is she encouraging continuation of our difficulties there? Is she making any effort to get peace established? What is your opinion on it? That is the only question I have.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, the authorities in Peiping have leveled some very bitter criticism at Moscow on the grounds that somehow Moscow is in collusion with us—

Senator Aiken. Do you believe that?

Secretary Rusk (continuing). In southeast Asia. I would have to say that I am not aware of any such collusion.

Senator Aiken. I don't believe it.

Secretary Rusk. The Soviet Union is the cochairman of the Geneva Conferences. We would hope very much that they would fully exercise that responsibility and do their best publicly and privately to make good on the agreements of 1954 and 1962. Now if they have been acting behind the scenes to try to find some solution to this situation, quite frankly we have not been informed.

Senator Aiken. There is no indication that Russia is doing anything to prevent the spread of the war, is there?

Secretary Rusk. Well, I think perhaps I had better leave the comment where it is, Senator, in an open session. We perhaps could pursue it a little bit further in closed session.

Senator Aiken. All right. I haven't seen any such indications. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Symington.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, my definite impression, after spending time in South Vietnam, was that if the North Vietnamese stopped supplying the Vietcong with ammunition, men, and guns, the South Vietnamese could work things out favorably in a fairly short time, then obtain free elections to ascertain who is in the majority, under democratic principles. Would you agree with that?

Secretary Rusk. I would think that is very much the case, sir.

FEAR OF CHINA

Senator Symington. There has been a great deal of apprehension about China. I worry about China, like every American must. Perhaps, based on my background, I worry a little more about the Soviets, based on what they now have; but our relations with the latter are im-
proved. Do you think that our country should be afraid of Red China to the point where that fear should be the primary consideration incident to decision in the matter of our foreign policy?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think that anyone in a responsible position must keep this element very much in mind and must take it fully into account. And I think this is also a matter which the other side must take very much into account.

I do not believe that we can organize a peace, or even maintain the security of our own Nation, if in successive crises we turn aside from what has to be done on the basis that at the end of the day or the end of the road it could move into something else. I mean that would have been the case with the Berlin blockade. It would have been the case with the Cuban missiles or with any of these other matters.

Senator Symington. Let me repeat. Do you believe that the fear of Red China reacting to some action we took in protecting our interests under treaties and agreements in South Vietnam should be decisive with respect to decisions made about our foreign policy around the world?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir, because if we do not meet those responsibilities, we shall find a Red China much more voracious and much more dangerous if they should discover that this technique of aggression is successful.

Senator Symington. Do you believe the President is doing everything he can to obtain a just peace with honor?

Secretary Rusk. Everything that we can possibly think of. And he spends an enormous amount of time analyzing the situation and trying to find out whether there are others who might do more or whether we could do more in this direction, to probe for the possibilities of peace.

Senator Symington. He is spending more time on this than anything else, is he not?

Secretary Rusk. I would think this is the overriding problem. There are many other matters around the world to which he has to give attention, but this is a matter which naturally engages his deepest interest in the maintenance of peace, and so he spends a great deal of time on it.

Senator Symington. I understand we have about 40 treaties with other countries, and that we base the peace of the world upon these agreements. Is that right?

Secretary Rusk. These are the alliances that we have involving just over 40 countries.

EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Senator Symington. Perhaps the best person high in Government best able to comment on this told me that if we recognize the National Liberation Front, any Saigon government would promptly fall. In addition, he said, in his opinion, that within a relatively short time there would be riots in West Berlin.

Would you comment?

Secretary Rusk. I think that is possible. I do very much have the impression that, if we were to recognize the Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, and try to impose
them on the South Vietnamese people in the way that the front wants us to, we would have to turn our soldiers around in order to impose them on the South Vietnamese people, because I am absolutely convinced that the South Vietnamese people don't want any part of them, and that, if we have any respect at all for what these people in South Vietnam want, we cannot recognize the Vietcong as their spokesman.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. COMMITMENTS

Senator Symington. Now, there was some discussion this morning of a letter the President of France wrote; that it was firm, perhaps tough, even insulting, to the President of the United States. I have never seen the letter and I don't know if it exists. But isn't it true that it is common knowledge President de Gaulle, in his efforts to achieve a cleavage between this country and its allies, is constantly saying that we would not, in the clutch, defend Europe against attack?

Secretary Rusk. That letter—by the way, apparently there has been an additional comment from Paris to the press during the day. I believe Paris has denied some of the things said earlier this morning about that letter. So, they seem to reaffirm what I said this morning myself.

Senator Symington. I am glad to hear that. But the thrust of my question—isn't the problem we now face around the world the fact that many people who, putting it mildly, haven't the best interests of the United States at heart, are assuring our allies, or attempting to persuade them, that we will not honor our commitments if they, our allies, are attacked?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it is a point that is serious insofar as it creates differences among our allies. But where it becomes deadly serious is that, if some of these people persuade the Communist world that these commitments of ours are not serious, then that becomes extremely dangerous, and not just a matter of disagreement and dissension.

Senator Symington. I would hope the American people would listen carefully to what you have just said.

From what I gather in these hearings, nearly everybody thinks you are doing good but not doing good enough.

AVENUES TOWARD PEACE EXPLORED

What else is it you can do—I am sure you have thought of everything you might do. I am sure you want peace, but I am also sure you want to see a peace without sacrificing the honor of the United States. What else can we do in our effort to counteract the heavy criticism that you are getting from some Members of the Congress, the Senate?
What else can you do to achieve a peace, a viable peace, a peace with honor, so we don’t go around with our heads down?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not believe that there are procedures or forums or diplomatic channels that are available, or that could be created, that have not been used. I do not think that we are in a situation where a procedural invention is going to deal with the situation. I think that, while we keep all these channels open, and we keep the discussions going among governments and across the curtains with governments in the Communist world, we have got to meet the central four points on which Hanoi seems to have been living:

First, their hope for military victory in the south. It must be made clear that they are not going to get that.

Second, that there will be an internal collapse in the south. I do not believe they are going to get that, and their hopes for that must be disappointed, and I think are being steadily disappointed.

Senator Symington. Unless we run out on the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Rusk. That is right.

Third, that international opinion might build up to force us to change our commitments. That is not going to happen, but Hanoi must be persuaded.

And fourth, that internal divisions in this country might cause us to change our commitment—and they must be persuaded that that is not going to happen.

Then I think they will be ready to realize that they are off on a futile track, and that it would be well for them to start exploring the possibilities of peace on a more serious basis.

Senator Symington. Thank you very much.

May I say I have full confidence in you as a Secretary of State, and believe you are an outstanding public servant?

Secretary Rusk. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

Emphasis on Economic Reconstruction

Personally, I have great confidence in your efforts and in your ability. I shall not ask any questions. I notice in your statement this morning you have mentioned, I believe, 14 points in regard to the provisions that are acceptable by us as a part of the peace program. I notice that No. 12 deals with resources for the economic reconstruction of that country.

I think that should be an appealing thing to these people who are suffering so. I would like to get into that problem of funds for re-
construction. We have spent billions of dollars over there and we will be voting more. But I shall do that with Mr. Bell and others possibly when they come back, not this evening.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Pell!

WITNESSES' POINTS OF SIMILARITY

Senator Pell. Mr. Secretary, having sat here now for 4 days in these hearings, listening to two witnesses with somewhat different views than yours, and you and General Taylor presenting the administration's view, I am struck by the fact when you dig into what each of you have said, the points of similarity are much stronger than the points of difference.

It seemed to me that there is a great area of agreement which is that we must keep the military presence there as long as is necessary.

DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A GRAND DESIGN?

The question really boils down to the question whether we should increase that presence or not, and I am wondering if you would bear with me that what we have most to keep in mind is a sure knowledge of what our eventual objective may be. The only leader in the world today that I know of who seems to have a truly grand design is President de Gaulle. He has his design. We do not have to agree with it, but I think he has a picture of the kind of globe he would like to see.

I am wondering if we could visualize the globe that we would like to see, would it not basically be a world where nuclear weapons are under international control? And also, do we not accept the fact that with the passage of time the militancy, the drive and the virulence of communism, which is an utterly unnatural and cruel and impractical system, will wear itself out?

What we need, looking for the long goal, is to achieve the passage of time without plunging into a general war.

Would that be a correct statement?

Secretary Rusk. I think we need the passage of time. I think this country does have some great designs of its own in terms of the general structure of the world community. I think you would be one of the best witnesses to describe the world community that we saw in the United Nations Charter at the end of World War II. Those general propositions in the charter represent a pretty good statement of the long-term policies of the American people toward the rest of the world.

So, I think we have some good ideas about the structure of the world community.

President Johnson has been trying to support that structure in every way possible in the economic and social, educational, and health fields as well as in these security matters that are so troublesome.

Senator, the question of time is important. We do not know, for example, what the next generation of Chinese leaders will look like. We have some impressions of, shall we say, the second generation of leaders in the Soviet Union. But we do not have much of an im-
pression of the next group in Peiping. But I do not think that we—we cannot buy time at the expense of a successful aggression against smaller countries. And this is the problem.

THE FACTOR OF TIME

We need to stabilize that postwar settlement. We need to stabilize that international community as sketched out in the U.N. Charter, and then let time try to heal some of the memories, and let time give us a chance to deal with some of the specific questions that need solution.

In our own dealings with Peiping—we have had 128 discussions with them now in the last 10 years—everything turns on Formosa. We try to talk about disarmament, we try to talk about southeast Asia, we try to talk about the exchange of newsmen or the exchange of doctors. They always keep coming back to the point “Well, are you going to surrendered Formosa?” because they say that if we do not do that, there is nothing to talk about.

Well, maybe time will get over that. As you know, the Eisenhower administration attempted to get agreements from Peiping to renounce force in the Formosa Straits. Well, they have never been willing to do that.

So, gentlemen, time may help, but we cannot let time get away from us by having it used by the other side to develop a momentum and an appetite and a danger that will be increasingly difficult to bring under control.

HOLDING DOWN OUR COMMITMENTS

Senator Pell. I guess the differences between some of us, as I see our role, and my role, is that of trying to hold the Vietnam war down and work for time. I think there are others, yourself and others, who would believe that we could achieve these goals perhaps more quickly. This is what has come through in these 4 days of hearings.

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, let me say that, as far as South Vietnam is concerned, the United States has not been rushing into this matter in order to achieve a quick solution regardless of cost. The time factors and the rate of escalation have been determined really by the action of the other side.

Senator Pell. I realize that, but the thing that concerns me, and concerns the people in my own State is the thought that the present planning is for an expansion in the order of another 200,000 by the end of this calendar year, and a further commitment of the same number next year.

In my own view, if our present commitment could be held down to last over a 5-year period if necessary, we would be better off.

I gather your view is we ought to move up.

Secretary Rusk. I think the planning has to be on the basis of leaving it to the Commander in Chief, as he consults with others who are constitutionally responsible, such as the Congress and the congressional leadership—to give him the chance to have choices when the necessity for choices occur.

Now, if we did not have those bases, for example, in process of construction, and it became necessary some time later to use them, you couldn’t do it if they were not there.
But, on the other hand, if Hanoi were to start moving toward peace, say by the 1st of March, then that would turn the situation around. In other words, we are not on a track here where everything is frozen on both sides. We don’t know what the other side is going to do in this situation. We do know that they must face the fact that they are not going to have a military success in the south, and we hope that will mean then that they will start moving toward peace and we move down these commitments—and that is where deescalation can come.

**CHOOSING BETWEEN REAL ALTERNATIVES**

But I do believe, Senator Pell, that there is more agreement than some of the conversations these past few weeks would indicate, particularly when one takes into consideration the necessity for choosing among real alternatives.

Now, there is the major alternative of abandoning South Vietnam. There seems to be very little interest and support for that point of view.

There is another major alternative: of rushing into a general war or a larger war, to get it over with as quickly as possible, regardless of cost, without a sense of the prudence and care that one must use in these matters in the modern world. I think that there is relatively little to support generally from that point of view.

Now, that leaves the center position. That leaves the position of firmness coupled with prudence and some care in the way this matter is handled. That has about it certain dissatisfactions. It has about it certain concerns, because we can’t know for certain exactly what the future will hold. But I think that it is always useful, in thinking of these matters, to try to put the question to oneself, whether a private citizen or official, in terms of what would I do about this if I were in fact the President of the United States—to try to reach toward the point of view which is nailed with responsibility rather than simply to discuss it—and I am not suggesting we have been doing that—simply to discuss it in terms of opinion or in terms of not having to live with the results. For, it is the President who must guide us in choosing among the real alternatives.

I think myself, without any doubt, that the country understands that he has approached this matter with the greatest solemnity, that he has tried to act with the firmness necessary to organize the peace, but to act also with the prudence which is necessary to prevent events from moving out of control, and that, as we move ahead here, every chance to bring this to a peaceful settlement will be explored.

But that, we make it clear to the other side that they will not succeed, there is no avenue to a peaceful settlement that has any chance of producing the peace that we are after.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

**LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND UNLIMITED COMMITMENT**

The Chairman. Senator Case?

Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, Senator Fulbright said earlier he had concluded that this was not a limited war, because in fact our objective was not a limited objective. We wanted victory. You disagreed. But it seem to me that in one sense you and he would be in agreement.
It is an unlimited commitment of our resources. There is no limit that either you or General Taylor or anyone else has put on it.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I begin to think that there is no such thing as a limited war in the sense that you go into it with any reservation as to the degree of your resources you are going to put into it.

I just want to know whether this, in your judgment, is a correct understanding or analysis of the situation, a war with limited objectives but no limit on the resources and the extent to which our resources may become involved.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I don't want to conjure up the picture of a major conflagration in the answer that I give.

Senator Case. No; I don't want you to.

Secretary Rusk. Because, as you pointed out, we have a most limited objective here in terms of denying to the other side its attempt to seize Vietnam by force. Therefore, the scale of the action, in a rather specific sense, turns to a considerable extent on how much of an effort the other side is going to use to try to take over South Vietnam by force.

Now, we have tried to make it very clear—and we hope very much the other side will be under no misapprehension on this—that we consider that our commitment is such that they cannot be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force.

What that means no one can surely say. We hope, as it has meant in other situations, that that will mean that they will come to the conference table and make peace.

Senator Case. I understand.

Now, I promised to take only a couple of minutes.

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.

WINNING BY DESTROYING VIETNAM

Senator Case. Perhaps you saw the Times story this morning which suggested that the only way this can be won is by destroying Vietnam. This is not something we should look forward to. Do you have any comment on that statement, because it keeps coming up again and again?

Secretary Rusk. Well, still the principal problem is to find the enemy—it is not the mass destruction of massed divisions in its present situation. Defections from the Vietcong are multiplying rapidly. They are having very considerable difficulties on their side. I don't know what is meant by winning by destroying Vietnam. We are not trying to win anything except—

Senator Case. In order to prove they can't win.

Secretary Rusk (continuing). The rejection of aggression, that is what we are after.

When we say victory over aggression, we mean by that that we repel this aggression, and that we prevent it.

Senator Case. Our objective is limited to that?

Secretary Rusk. As stated in the congressional resolution.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Williams?
Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, you have been down here all day. We have been holding these hearings for the past 3 weeks. If I could think of any additional question that I could ask or that you could answer or any comment that you could make that would bring us 1 day closer to the solution to this problem, I am sure both you and I would be glad to stay here all night. But I have no such words of wisdom so rather than ask a question I am merely going to wish you Godspeed. I hope that we can all of us achieve the objective that this committee and the country and all of us are working for and that is a solution to this dilemma. I wish I could give it to you, but I can't.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator Williams.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman!

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper!

Senator Hickenlooper. I just want to say, because apparently this testimony is coming to a close, that while it is possible and probable that you and I haven't always agreed on every point in the past several years, Mr. Secretary, I have agreed with you on a great many. I know of no man with greater fortitude or physical strength to do the job which you are doing under all pressures from all of the world—and under the stirrings and restlessness that is occurring in the world today—who has a greater grasp of the basic facts and the incidents, the situations which are moving in the world today.

I frankly say I don't know how you stand it physically. I think we are fortunate in having a man whose physical endurance is such as yours. I think, as public servants go—this is aside from the fact whether anybody agrees always or disagrees—I think you bring to the Government and to your responsibilities the highest degree of devotion—at least as high a degree as any man could bring to the intelligent discharge of his duties in the interest of his country and his responsibilities.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I also wish to say that I appreciate your patience here, and I admire your vitality and vigor, as I have for a long time. I think you have done an extraordinary job in defending a position and explaining it. I know the committee, and I am sure the country, have benefited a great deal by your testimony today. I agree with Senator Gore. I think this has been a very fine meeting to end up these hearings. I hope we end them up, and that we can proceed in executive session and consider this matter.

I appreciate very much the devotion that you have given to us today and the time that you have given as you have in the past.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The committee is recessed.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)