# GENERAL BRIEFING BOOK

## JUSPAO Vietnam

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U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

The war in Vietnam is many wars, with no frontiers.

In its military aspect it ranges from the attack by night in a delta hamlet to the disposition of divisions by great military powers. Intertwined with this military war are a political war, an economic war and a psychological war, each conducted at the national level, in the provinces of Vietnam and on the international scene.

The U.S. objective, as defined by the President on August 21, 1966, is "to let the people of South Vietnam decide what kind of government and what kind of country they want. They cannot do this while armed forces from North Vietnam are waging war against their people and villages... There are times when the strong must provide a shield for those on whom the Communists prey. This is such a time... The United States must stand behind its word -- even when conditions have added to the cost of honoring a pledge given a decade ago."

U.S. Mission Agencies

A diverse array of organizations and programs has been developed to meet the challenges of the several dimensions of the Vietnam conflict. The organization of the United States Mission to Vietnam today -- the largest U.S. Mission in existence -- reflects the combined lesson from earlier
American missions in Europe and Asia with counterinsurgency responsibilities: The lesson that defending and building a nation require integration of four dimensions of action -- military, political, economic, and psychological.

The present U.S. Mission in Vietnam is composed of six elements, each with its own functions under the guidance and direction of the Ambassador:

**The Embassy** -- for political action and policy.

U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) -- military action.

Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) -- operating within MACV for U.S. military and civilian nation-building programs in the field.

U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) -- for economic action.

The Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) -- for psychological action.

Office of the Minister Counselor for Information and the Mission Press Center.

**Mission Council**

The Ambassador's primary instrument for integrating Mission action is the Mission Council composed of the Ambassador, the Deputy Ambassador and the Mission heads of MACV, USAID, JUSPAO and the intelligence community plus special representatives consisting of the Deputy to the Commander of MACV for CORDS, the Minister Counselor for Information the Counselors for Political
and Economic Affairs, the Senior Liaison Officer and the Mission Coordinator.

As the policy-making body of the Mission, the Council meets formally each week to consult with the Ambassador, advise him on major Mission decisions and receive guidance.

Vietnam Interdepartmental Committee, Washington

Under White House chairmanship this committee meshes U.S. policies and action in Vietnam. Committee members include representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, USIA, CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee coordinates guidance to and support of the Mission in Vietnam.
DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF VIETNAM

Diversity is an outstanding characteristic of life among approximately 17 million South Vietnamese who have had an opportunity to share a common nation only since 1954. For effective action by an American, it is pertinent to bear in mind some central factors which tend to make it difficult for the Vietnamese to think in terms of national unity.

Some familiar alignments of continuing major importance among Vietnamese, as among other peoples, include: military vis-a-vis civilian, urban vis-a-vis rural, more conservative politically vis-a-vis those termed "more revolutionary;" and, among religious groups, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, animists, confucianists and others.

However, Vietnamese cannot automatically be categorized within these alignments. For a sizable number, these differences are tempered by personal factors. For example, many families have members in both military and civilian positions; many urban Vietnamese have family roots in the provinces.

One factor which pervades much of Vietnamese psychology is regional origin -- whether a Vietnamese considers himself from the North (primarily Hanoi), the Center (Hue to Nha Trang), the South (Saigon and the Delta), or a member of such minority groups as the Chinese, the Montagnards, or the Khmers of Cambodian origin.
This regional orientation of the three main groups has its roots in the three civilizations of the Tonkin Delta, Central Annam and Cochin China. Even the Vietnamese language is distinctive for each of these areas. For many Vietnamese, a close, deeply personal affinity with their region often underlies their cultural and political appraisal of other Vietnamese.

This regional identification also blurs the reaction of many Vietnamese toward the Communist question. Many families who fled South after 1954 still have relatives in the North. Profound in Vietnamese memory is the military role played in securing independence in 1954 by the Viet Minh, the Communist-led organization which later formed the core of the Communist government in Hanoi.

Many a family in South Vietnam has a son in the Viet Cong, either voluntarily or under duress. These factors influence a family's reaction to news of action against the VC or north of the 17th Parallel.

Also influential are the experiences under Communist Hanoi of the one million Vietnamese who fled south after 1954 and the southerners' memories of the Communist effort to undermine the South Vietnamese economy before the Viet Minh withdrew to the North.

The diverse land of Vietnam also conditions the effectiveness of American action in Vietnam. The terrain of Vietnam poses formidable obstacles for rapid movement: dense jungles, the mountainous Highlands, wandering Delta rivers, muddy marshlands and narrow coastline hemmed
in by mountains. This varied terrain also contributes to the differences in the way of life and points of view among Vietnamese.

A map of communications facilities also reflects the difficulties of movement in Vietnam. The major rail lines are open to Viet Cong attack. Coastal ports and north-south shipping have only recently undergone major expansion. Roads are limited and Delta rivers only provide predominantly east-west thoroughfares. Commercial air transport, although expanding rapidly, is expensive.

Telecommunications have linked the cities of the south but are sharply limited from south to center. A daily press is mostly a Saigon affair. However, progress is being made toward building a national radio network with regional stations. Television, begun in Vietnam in February, 1966, is moving toward establishing at least one station in each of the country's four Corps area in order to reach a majority of the population.

In the eyes to the Vietnamese, the major U.S. presence in Vietnam is and should remain a temporary, not permanent necessity.

Four aspects of Vietnamese psychology underlie this sentiment:

*Their pride in the ancient civilizations of Indochina --

*Their memories of other foreign presence --
*Their knowledge that the Vietnamese have and continue to carry the main burden of dying in war and building their nation --

*Their awareness that the other non-Communist peoples of Asia are their own masters.

In large part, the underlying measure of success of an American in Vietnam is the degree to which he works himself out of a job by working with his Vietnamese counterpart to the point where the Vietnamese can carry on without assistance.

Working through Vietnamese officials sometimes means achieving progress not in a continuous curve but in stages. The very nature of Vietnam's political development will often result in changes in Vietnamese personnel. These changes require the flexibility to start again with new counterparts and the realization that, by the same token, the turnover of U.S. personnel often requires the Vietnamese to learn to work with a new American.
JUSPAO VIETNAM

In Profile

Early experience indicated the need for unified direction in Vietnam of all U.S. psychological action -- civilian and military. By decision of the National Security Council in April 1965, the responsibility for policy direction and coordination of all U.S. psychological action programs in Vietnam was delegated to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. A new U.S. Mission organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), was then established to implement this responsibility within Vietnam.

JUSPAO represents the integration of the U.S. Information Service in Vietnam which is responsible for information programs explaining U.S. foreign policy and cultural programs designed to develop better understanding of the United States, together with the Communications Media Division of USAID, providing communications equipment as well as technical and program advice to the National Information Program of the Government of Vietnam. To this integration were added personnel and resources from USIA, MACV, USAID and the Department of State. These steps united substantive and technical aspects to form a unified U.S. psychological/communications program.

JUSPAO provides guidance to MACV's Psychological Operations Directorate which supports tactical operations and the Chieu Hoi program. JUSPAO also works closely with the Psychological
Operations Division of CORDS, thereby assuring common policy and close operational coordination at all program levels -- nationally, regionally and provincially.

JUSPAO installations include a headquarters building, a Mission printing center, American Cultural Centers in four major cities and six Vietnamese-American Associations throughout the country.

The organization of JUSPAO breaks down into a Director's office composed of Advisory, Planning and Executive Offices; and four operational areas -- information, culture, North Vietnam Psychological Operations programs and the Field Development Division responsible for JUSPAO's Psyops support to field programs conducted by CORDS (Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support in MACV).

The accompanying chart shows in more detail the organization and interrelation of these offices.

JUSPAO represents a revolutionary development in U.S. overseas psychological action since the establishment in 1953 of the U.S. Information Agency.

Its revolutionary nature lies in (1) its scope of responsibility, combining civilian and military operations reaching from the provinces to the worldwide level; (2) its degree of U.S. agency integration with officers from USIA, MACV, the Department of State and USAID; (3) the degree to which JUSPAO works with the host government, with JUSPAO support to the Government's Ministry of
Information extending from the provincial to the international level; (4) the degree of experienced personnel assigned, many with previous counterinsurgency experience; and (5) the worldwide implications of JUSPAO for future U.S. psychological action in other countries threatened by insurgency or subversion.

The objectives of JUSPAO are to help the Government of Vietnam --

1. Increase the Vietnamese people's identification with and participation in their government in the war against communist subversion and aggression and promote the development of political institutions from the hamlet/village level to the national level --

2. Increase the Vietnamese people's participation in their government to accomplish Vietnam's social and economic aims and develop unity as a nation within the Free World community, including acquainting the Vietnamese with the American society --

3. Increase other nations' sympathy and assistance to the cause of Vietnam.

In support of these objectives, JUSPAO has a variety of "communications" responsibilities. In this sense, the term "communications" means many things -- the initial determination of what needs to be said; how this thought or idea can best be conveyed; the preparation of the message, its delivery; and finally the evaluation of its effectiveness. These substantive aspects are balanced by the equally important technical aspect of developing the means of communication (e.g., the construction of radio stations and the distribution of radio receivers). Another area of attention is the
personnel -- to develop both technical and program competence.

The scope of JUSPAO operations can be summarized by describing its five basic programs:

Within Vietnam, JUSPAO conducts a cultural program to improve the cultural exchange and understanding between our two countries through scholarships, libraries, English instruction, visiting lecturers and professors in Vietnamese universities; an information program to provide the Vietnamese people with current information about American society and American foreign policy through radio, television, motion pictures, pamphlets, exhibits, news releases to the vernacular press; a psychological operations program coordinated with the Government of Vietnam to convince the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to end the war honorably and convey to the Vietnamese people their Government's concern and activity on their behalf; an advisory program designed to improve the substantive program quality and ability of the Vietnamese Government to communicate with its citizens; a technical program to provide the communications equipment, facilities and training for the production of JUSPAO and U. S. Mission programs.

Worldwide, JUSPAO is also responsible for producing material which explains Vietnam to other countries of the world. Other U. S. Mission elements under the direction of the Minister-Counselor for Information also contribute to the official U. S. flow of information on Vietnam abroad. JUSPAO coordinates closely with both these elements: the U. S. Mission Press Center and the MACV infor-
The extent of JUSPAO operations can be measured by the substantial assistance provided from U.S. Information Agency and U.S. military facilities in the Far East in support of JUSPAO operations: The Tokyo Regional Production Center for motion pictures; The Manila Regional Service Center whose large printing plant devotes nearly half its production to Vietnam; the Philippines' "Voice of America" base which relays radio programs to Vietnam; and the 7th PSYOPS Battalion at Okinawa which provides audio-visual and printing support.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The Director serves as the psychological advisor to the Ambassador, the Mission Council, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Information. He represents JUSPAO in the Mission Council and chairs the Mission Psyops Advisory Committee composed of senior officers from each Mission agency which advises on major psychological programs.

To assist him in his overall responsibilities, the Director depends on his Deputy Director and three offices: Executive; Policy, Planning and Research; and the Program Liaison Office to the GVN (Government of Vietnam) Ministry of Information.

The Executive Office, under the Assistant Director for Administration and Technical Services, works closely with the Director and other key officers in JUSPAO in developing the Country Plan by providing recommendations as to the feasibility of proposed or existing programs from the standpoint of funds, staff, facilities, program equipment and materials.

The Executive Office assists in the implementation of the Country Plan through the following services:

1. The Logistics Branch includes the operation of JUSPAO's headquarters complex and the support of all programming elements of JUSPAO (as well as CORDS/PSYOPS Division), in addition to receipt of program materials and storage, property accountability, packing, shipping and distribution within Vietnam to certain overseas points.
2. The Production Branch provides printing, graphics and photographic processing support to all civilian elements of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam. The printing facility includes a fast-reaction capability for the production of psychological operations materials such as leaflets, posters, slogans, newspapers, etc. Also, this branch supplements the GVN's production of similar materials.

The Graphics Section prepares photo-ready copy for JUSPAO and also work to be printed at RSC, Manila and the military printing plants in Okinawa and Japan. This section also prepares charts, mounts maps, makes signs and performs other related work for the entire U.S. civilian mission.

3. The Audio-Visual Branch provides the major technical support to the field arm of the GVN's Ministry of Information, the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). Working with MOI, the branch has conducted inventories of VIS units on a country-wide basis, developed a standard table of equipment and from these projected realistic requirements of the field program. It also assists the VIS in developing a repair capability for existing equipment in the field and assists in technical training of VIS personnel in the operation, maintenance and first-echelon repair of equipment used in the program.

The branch is also responsible for repair and maintenance of JUSPAO audio-visual equipment in use throughout the country. It provides traveling teams which perform repairs in all sections of South Vietnam, as well as maintaining a repair shop in Saigon.
Within the foregoing framework, the Executive Office prepares the annual budget submission in close collaboration with other JUSPAO elements as well as the administrative elements of USAID/Saigon and the Embassy. A financial plan is developed within the annual allotments and is carefully administered in accordance with regulations and program plans.

The Policy, Planning and Research Office has six major tasks: formulation of policy guidances; planning, research; evaluation; liaison and reporting.

Policy and Planning Branch:

The extensive psychological operations problem carried on in Vietnam by GVN/U.S. civilian and military personnel in tactical and pacification programs requires very close coordination at all levels. Policy Guidances issued by JUSPAO in consultation with the GVN provide the basis for this coordination. Guidances provide the beacon light toward which programs are to move and they also provide a framework within which new programs are developed or old programs revised. Planning also contributes to the careful coordination of the various GVN/U.S. elements involved in psychological operations. This office has primary responsibility for preparing national campaign plans such as the Tet Chieu Hoı campaign and the Country Plan which forms the basis for a year's operation including assignment of priorities to major programs and defining program criteria to be met in the forthcoming year. Preparation of project papers, contingency plans and background statements are additional planning functions.
Survey Research Branch:

It is axiomatic to say that effective communication depends on how well you know the person you are talking to. This Branch designs, organizes and manages systematic surveys of Vietnamese attitudes and reactions to provide background and guidance to JUSPAO's program elements for the obvious purpose of improving the effectiveness of operations. The Branch also maintains liaison with other GVN and U.S. Mission elements engaged in communications and social science research.

Evaluation and Analysis Branch:

This Branch conducts evaluations of the psychological operations material produced by JUSPAO both after it has been developed and after it has been distributed. The pre-test or pre-distribution evaluation is undertaken by an evaluation panel composed of ordinary Vietnamese citizens representing various segments of Vietnamese society. These panels review the proposed material for style, substance accuracy and effectiveness. Another pre-test is conducted at Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Centers among recently returned Viet Cong for another reading. The corrections and suggestions gathered go into a revised product which is then distributed. A post-test is held after the material has been used to determine the reaction of the people who received the material. The post-test again employs local Chieu Hoi camps as well as the man-in-the-street. Additional suggestions and critiques are gathered which will then be incorporated in other materials. This continuing evaluation process
is also accompanied by an analysis of JUSPAO programs in general to assess their effectiveness and quality and whether they are satisfying the requirements outlined in the Country Plan.

VC/NVN Research Branch:

In this Branch, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese developments are monitored through radio broadcasts, publications and other pertinent source material including captured documents. This Branch also serves as a contact point for correspondents, scholars and observers interested in this area. Topical files on the Viet Cong and North Vietnam are maintained, research assistance is provided as requested and special studies are prepared. This Branch also provides material for policy guidances and memoranda based on enemy vulnerabilities for use by the various program elements. Through the Liaison Section, constant liaison is maintained with the U.S. intelligence community for the collection of meaningful intelligence data on VC/NVN affairs. It arranges for the declassification of captured documents and other material which is then disseminated by program elements in JUSPAO and throughout the Mission.

Reports Branch

The scope of JUSPAO operations naturally results in a heavy reporting requirement. A sample of the kinds of reports prepared are the regular weekly and monthly activities report; the yearly evaluation report as well as a variety of other regular and ad hoc reports.
Program Liaison Office

Officers of JUSPAO provide program and technical advice to the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI) in order to improve that agency's ability to enlist the support of the Vietnamese people, and of public opinion abroad, for the GVN's efforts to repel the present aggression and to build a more viable nation.

The JUSPAO's advisory effort is principally concerned with the improvement of MOI program output, operating concepts and staff proficiency. Concurrently, U.S. assistance to the GVN's information program provides for a build-up of the technical facilities needed to deliver the government's message to the various target audiences in the urban and rural areas under GVN control as well as to contested areas and those under VC control.

The principal MOI components to which the U.S. gives materials, equipment, training and advisory assistance are as follows:

VTVN - the Vietnamese National Radio Network

This proposed 4 or 5 station radio network, a modification of the USG-supported "Jacob's Plan", will raise coverage from an original 65% to 95% of the population.
THVN - the Vietnamese National TV Network

Under U.S. auspices, television was introduced to Vietnam in February 1966 with a long range goal of establishing a four station network capable of reaching audiences in the four regions of South Vietnam. From the completed studios in Saigon and with the assistance of U.S. provided special aircraft which broadcast television from pre-determined orbits, THVN has already gathered a significant listening audience around community TV receivers placed in selected locations in both rural and urban areas. Because of the popularity of this medium, commercial sale of television receivers has grown (estimated sets - 120,000) and an important segment of the population is being reached.

NMPC - National Motion Picture Center

NMPC produces newsreels, documentaries and feature films for use in commercial theaters, on TV and by VIS information cadres in the towns, villages and hamlets.
VIS - Vietnamese Information Service
This is the field arm of the MOI and has offices in all the province capitals and district towns. Their task is to disseminate the government's message via the distribution of MOI and JUSPAO-produced materials of both a nationally and locally oriented nature, and via face-to-face communication with the people.

VIIP - Vietnamese International Information Program
This is the overseas arm of MOI, and offices are maintained in Laos, Thailand and Tunisia for the purpose of disseminating the GVN's message abroad. VIIP also supplies GVN Embassies abroad with information for the same purpose. Responsibility for the VIIP is shared with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

IPH - the Information Printing House
This component is potentially capable of serving all of MOI's central printing needs, including printing for other ministries of the GVN in support of specific GVN information program goals. With U.S. advice and assistance, the plant is being refurnished, old equipment