Part Three

THE DEFECTORS
VII. WHY DO THEY RALLY?

Political and military weaknesses of an insurgent movement may be illuminated by an analysis of the reasons why some of its followers leave it. Thus, the 15 accounts of defection in our total regroupee sample of 71 reveal stresses in the VC system that were strong enough to make regroupees abandon a cause which they had served for ten years or more.

Some basic information on these regroupee defectors may help in evaluating their reasons for defection. The most recent defectors in our sample, and the only ones to come over in 1965 (both in May of that year), were a squad leader of a village guerrilla unit, who also served as a VC deputy chief of village, and a senior sergeant. The next most recent, a sergeant and a lieutenant, defected in July 1964, six others between January and June 1964, four in 1963, and one, who now works for the GVN Chieu Hoi program, in 1962. Ten of the defectors were Party members, three were not, and the membership of the remaining two is unknown.

The ages of the defectors are relevant in view of their common complaint that they were growing "old," and the apparent feeling that their life was slipping by before they had had time to found a family and settle down. The oldest in our sample was 44 at the time of defection, two were between 36 and 40, and the others ranged between the ages of 29 and 35. (In Vietnam, where life expectancy is considerably lower than in most advanced Western countries, 35 is considered quite old.)
When asked to rate their families' relative wealth according to the categories established by the Vietminh, eight of the fifteen defectors stated that they came from "poor" backgrounds, two specified "middle," and five "well-off" or "rich." Among those who classified themselves as well-off or rich, there was an indication that being relegated to this category was a major factor in their decision to defect.

The defectors ranged from a former member of a province Party committee with the grade of senior captain down to a corporal from a main force battalion. Between them, as regards their level of responsibility in the Front, were two cadres who had performed administrative tasks (one was involved with transport at the province level and the other was a district committee secretary); seven lieutenants with military tasks (three with the artillery, two in communications, and two platoon leaders); three sergeants; and a village guerrilla squad leader. Twelve of the defectors had been in the South less than a year when they changed sides; one had served with the Front almost two years, another two-and-a-half years, and one (the senior captain), four years.

Most cases of defection are to be explained by a combination of reasons. Generally speaking, they were brought on by material hardship and personal dissatisfaction coupled with opportunity. Among the regroupees, weariness, hunger, loneliness, and fear were the most common complaints likely to make them think about rallying to the GVN. The long separation from family and home was particularly painful, and the hunger, dampness, and cold of jungle life, coupled with fear of death in combat and
the apprehension of improper burial, made this loneliness hard to bear. Once his morale had been shaken by these hardships, the weary combatant was prone to find faults in the VC system. Some of the defectors, for example, complained about the undue severity of the control system, especially the criticism sessions. (Men with poor combat records, and those who had difficulties with their superiors, were particularly sensitive on this score.) There were also those whose parents had been classified as well-off, including a few sons of rich landowners. Never fully integrated into the communist environment, some of them had witnessed the persecution of landowners during the land reform in the North, and would seem to have been waiting only for a safe opportunity to escape. Other regroupees, having noticed that conditions of life in the South were quite different from what they had learned in their Northern indoctrination, had reexamined and revised their faith with regard to superiors as well as ideology.

A senior captain who had served four years in the Front before defecting gave a lucid description of the hardships faced by many Viet Cong. As his account suggests, guerrilla life in the highlands is especially difficult for the ethnic Vietnamese, who are lowland people and traditionally have found the mountains uninviting. Soldiers who have to move frequently are particularly aware of the cold nights, the scarcity of food, the wild animals of the mountains, and the strangeness of the sparse montagnard population. The senior captain had been secretary of a district Party committee and a member of the province Party committee in the highland region of
Central Vietnam. An intelligent observer, he summed up some of the problems faced by Viet Cong operating there:

We lacked many things. From 1960 to 1962, we were completely self-sufficient. In 1963, the organizations among the people developed and the people supplied us food; this lessened our hardships. At the time I rallied (June 1964), the situation, relatively speaking, had improved, because our forces had grown considerably. However, the troops' morale was tense, because they never had a moment to rest: study sessions, production of food, and fighting all day long. We did not have enough medicine to care for the sick, nor blankets to warm ourselves when the weather was cold. Everybody was weary, but thanks to the ideological guidance, they still liked the Front.

I knew in advance that I would have to suffer hardships in the South, and that I might die. Compared to conditions in the Resistance, conditions in the Front are not bad. During the Resistance, we had nothing to cover ourselves with when it rained, but now each one of us has a nylon sheet. . . . However, during the Resistance, whenever we were hungry we could go to see the people and obtain something to eat. [In the Front], if we didn't have enough food to eat, we had to dig up roots in the forest to eat. Shortly after I had arrived in the South [in 1960], we did not have any salt for six months, and we had to burn one kind of tree (similar to bamboo), mix the ashes with water, and eat rice with this kind of "soup," which is a little bit salty. . . . (51.)

Asked to suggest ways in which the GVN might appeal to the Viet Cong to encourage them to rally in larger numbers, the captain said:

In the liberated areas, the VC lead a good life, they don't suffer any hardships. Their emotional needs are satisfied, because they live among the people and are loved and helped by the population. There are organizations such as the "Soldier Foster-Mothers' Association" etc. which provide consolation to the VC away from home. In addition, most of the
VC have their families there with them. Consequently, the GVN should not dwell on the hardships in the Front, nor should it try to work on the emotions of the VC (being away from home, etc.). Rather the GVN should try to counteract the appeal of communism. It should destroy the VC dream of building up a socialist state.

It should be noted that, in describing the "good life" in liberated areas, the captain was referring to conditions which prevailed in some parts of the Delta prior to his defection in June 1964. With the increased air and ground activity by U.S. and GVN forces in 1965, this picture of relative security in liberated areas has obviously ceased to be accurate. Also, the captain's belief that most of the Viet Cong in these areas had their families living with them was exaggerated, reflecting perhaps his own wishful thinking. Inasmuch as he himself had been assigned to the mountain region, the following of his comments are likely to be more authoritative:

In the mountain areas or unliberated areas, the VC live away from home and have to endure considerable hardships. Their material as well as emotional needs are not fulfilled. Therefore, the GVN could stress the hardship and difficulties the VC have to endure in the Front. In particular, the GVN have to strike hard at the fact that they are away from home and appeal to their emotions. If the GVN could influence the emotions of the VC, they would be at the same time influencing the minds of the VC. Once the emotions of the VC have been touched, they will start thinking about their families and so on.

They are watched constantly, and such a change in their attitude will be noticed. If they suddenly became sad and absorbed in thought, for example, they would be immediately suspected of harboring devious thoughts. They would be made the subjects of a
self-criticism session. They would be watched more closely. Their friends would avoid them out of fear of being accused as their accomplices. They would become utterly discouraged, for there they were, away from home, isolated and abandoned by their friends, and their fighting spirit would disappear. The VC who arrived at that stage would be considered useless, and they themselves would rally out of discouragement and dissatisfaction.

In explaining his own defection, the captain emphasized the difference he had observed between life in the North and that in the South:

At that time, I liked to struggle for my ideals. I learned of the sufferings of the South Vietnamese people under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and I wanted to liberate the population from Diem's tyranny. For this ideal I endured all the hardships in the Front. However, later on (in 1962), after I had learned of the real situation and the life of the people in the South, I became discouraged, and began to compare the life of the North Vietnamese to that of the South Vietnamese in all aspects. I found out that the South Vietnamese people are much better off from every point of view. At the present time, they have to endure hardships because of the war; but if it hadn't been for the war, they would be much better off than the North Vietnamese people. I compared the situation in two regions, and weighed the pros and cons from 1962 until after the overthrow of Diem, when I decided to rally (in June 1964).

I did not want to rally when Diem was still in power, because I was prejudiced against his regime. I believed that his regime was totalitarian and cruel. Also, I did not have the opportunity to defect.

His having endured four years of hardship in the mountains, and the fact that he was 35 and had not yet founded a family, suggest that lowered morale may have made him susceptible to ideological qualms.
The difference between the suffering in South Vietnam that they had been led to expect and the reality that they found upon arriving in the South was mentioned frequently, not only by defectors, who may have been more calculating in their statements, but by prisoners who exhibited no desire to ingratiate themselves with their captors. Nor is there any objective reason to doubt that they were being truthful. The South has far greater agricultural riches than the North, and its people live better, and any intelligent observer who had a glimpse of life in the South could easily wonder whether things in general were quite so bad as he had been taught to believe.

A 39-year-old district administrative cadre, who had been recruiting laborers for production work, defected in April 1963, after more than two years of service with the Front. According to his story, his decision was prompted by ideological disillusionment mixed with weariness:

The Party in the North told us that the people in the South were living in misery under the oppression of the Americans and the Ngo family. However, having had occasion on my [propaganda] missions to Banmethuot to verify that the living conditions of the people were not that bad, I realized that the Party had lied to us.

Furthermore, I compared the life of the mountaineers before and after the existence of the Front, and I found that the Front brought them only unhappiness and misery. Before the Front came, the mountaineers had been happy and free; they sang, danced, traded, and had enough to live on. After the Front came, they were forced to the extreme end of the forest and mountains. They lost their freedom, they had to abandon their musical instruments, etc. Their identity papers were destroyed, they could not therefore buy
salt, for instance. The mountaineers who lacked salt became sick immediately; many children died for lack of salt.

Also, the Chieu Hoi leaflets [telling us about the rallier program of the GVN] and my personal radio helped me to follow day after day the news on the GVN side. Furthermore, I knew this would be a long war and I thought I had participated too much in it already. It made me unhappy not knowing when and how I could see my family again. And, the Front forces could not fight against those of the GVN. The propaganda from the North was all lies. (56.)

Two other defectors blamed the hardships of life in the Front for the fatigue and disillusionment that caused them to rally:

I should tell you that I thought over my feeling of weariness while I traveled to the South. I thought about how my father had sacrificed his life for the Party, that I myself had served the Party for more than ten years, that I was still a simple member without being appreciated and rewarded justly. Tiredness, and discontent because of the Party's ingratitude, were my motives for abandoning the communist ranks.

I no longer have ideals. I wanted to see my family again; I have done so already. What I want now is to live a new life, honestly. (39.)

[In the North] life was too intense, too active. . . . I wanted to be more easygoing, out of the army. Added to this, the "absence of sentiment" made life hardly bearable. I wanted to get married, but it was impossible because the command knew from my records that I [already] was married. . . .

[I rallied because] I had been gone from home too long and received no compensation. I had grown old (34 years), my health had been declining. Life was hard with privations. I was not allowed to visit my family, although I was stationed near my home. I did not know the way home, because it would take two days to get from where I was to the nearest hamlet.
From the VC point of view, the least reliable combatants turned out to be those whom the Vietminh had classified as upper-class and who had never been successfully absorbed by the communist system. The rich landowner's son whose description of harrowing denunciation sessions was cited earlier (pp. 52-53) explained his defection as follows:

I was unhappy about the agrarian reform of 1954-1957. It was unjust. Even if the Front won, my family would always be in the enemy class. Then, too, the material conditions of the battle in the South are too difficult. . . .

What I especially didn't like in the Front was the extreme severity of material life. When a person reaches a point of extreme poverty -- with not enough to eat and drink -- the poverty degrades him, makes him vile and base. Also, they have too much training procedure for the men, too many subtle means. (50.)

The son of another rich farmer said that he had had a political change of mind regarding the Communists while he was still in the North, primarily as a result of the land reform program. He infiltrated in September 1963 (like all the respondents, he dwelt on the arduous march to the South), and defected in July 1964. These were the reasons he gave:

One must live according to circumstances, it is necessary to conform to them. When I was young, the Vietminh suited me -- to go fight the French, that was right. When I arrived over there [in the North], I sensed a dissatisfaction in myself, notably with the agrarian reform. I now reflected on the political point of view. Before 1954, they had had a prejudice against my family. My family was feudal, my grand-father and my father were mayors of the village. Taxes were high. The treatment was different. Before, I believed that that was right; but beginning in 1955 I changed my mind. (49.)
Still another case attributable to family background is that of a lieutenant who defected in January 1964. The son of a family of prosperous small traders who sold cattle and illegal Western medicine, he had joined the Party with a false statement that he was a poor peasant, hoping thereby, as he put it, "to gain their trust." Though the interviewer's impression of him was not favorable, suggesting caution in accepting his political statements, the lieutenant's explanation of why he defected seemed plausible enough:

I found that life in the North and in the army was too hard, and "social" life [life in the society] there was stifling. I thought it would be better to leave to go with the national government because of the economic conditions in the South.

I knew that the economy of the South was more prosperous because of the imports and the climatic conditions which were favorable to agriculture. (54.)

One defector claimed he had been barred from Party membership in the North (though he was a member of the Labor Youth Group) because of "his behavior as a petit bourgeois intellectual." The majority of Party members, he said, belonged to the poor-peasant class. He reported having quit the Viet Cong in May 1962 (though, curiously, he told another interviewer that he had left in April 1961), and gave the following reasons for his defection:

At that time, I observed the situation, the state of the population, the economic life of the region placed for nine years under the control of the Southern government and which had just come under the occupation of the liberation troops. I found the level of the
life of the population clearly superior to that of the population in the North (several peasants had their bicycles, several families even had radio sets). In particular, the life of the population of Quang Ngai was very different compared to the time that I had left the region to go to the North. In addition, I found the organization of the Southern army very much progressed, not only from the point of view of equipment, but also from the point of view of morale. So I said to myself that the government of the South wasn't so bad as they had told me up to now. After reflection, I decided to give up. (44.)

Another former Viet Cong cited his resentment of the agrarian reform program as having contributed to his disenchantment with Communism. The son of a rich farmer, he had joined the Vietminh in 1953, claiming to have come from the working class. But he did not feel at ease in the political climate that followed the defeat of the French. Though life had been more arduous in the Resistance than in the Front, he said, he had felt happier there:

We felt [in the Resistance] as if we belonged to a family. It did not matter what social class you came from if you were a good warrior. Under the Liberation Front it isn't so. To become a trusted cadre you have to possess basic requirements. You have to belong to the proletariat. (48.)

He said that he first began to think about rallying when he was still in the North: "The reasons that led me to that position were a result of the agrarian reform." Moreover, he claimed, the Vietminh had killed his father in 1950 because they suspected him of being a spy, and although he joined them thereafter, he never overcame his anger at them.
One defector, a former Party member, 2d Lieutenant and Viet Minh, who had been working for the Chieu Hoi program, summarized his charge thus:

Logically speaking, it is a surprise to hear that I rallied to the government side while still clinging to the belief that there are good points on the Viet Cong side. I was not afraid to die or to lead an arduous life, but I had realized that the Viet Cong had betrayed the Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong had betrayed the revolution, and that was their mistake.

Even though most defectors we interviewed tended to denounce the Communist movement, a good number of them betrayed an almost grudging respect for those who continued the fight, and some seemed to feel guilty at not having been able to withstand the hardships that the others were willing to face.

The oldest defector in our sample was a 44-year-old former dock worker who, according to his interviewer, "spoke of his past activities in an apologetic tone and, unlike most other subjects, did not derive any pride from having served in the Front." It is interesting to compare the ideological content of his comments with the more straightforward answers of other defectors:
I had contemplated rallying when in the North. I did not dare tell anybody. I tried hard to move south in order to be near my home and eventually actually to return there. The Vietminh promised every social freedom. But I found that the regime in the North was not a liberal one. The Nhan Dan newspaper, like all other newspapers, was censored before publication; yet it had to criticize the regime. They never said Ong [Mr.] Pham Van Dong, as you would call a government member here, they always had to say Thu Tuong Pham Van Dong [Prime Minister Pham Van Dong]. Everything was in the hands of the state. They availed themselves of our patriotism to establish their rule and lead us in the wrong direction. We were parted from our families. We were old and still felt the stifling atmosphere. Many regroupees were repressed, demoted, and caused to commit suicide. (53.)

A 31-year-old platoon leader, who had guarded buffaloes for a rich family until he entered the Vietminh in 1949, had spent almost ten years in the North before infiltrating the South in June 1963. He defected in a Delta province in March 1964, for reasons that he described as a mixture of personal grievance and ideological disaffection:

Because the Liberation Front guerrillas killed my mother, whom they suspected of being a liaison agent for the Hoa Hao, I could not go back to my native village to see her, but relatives of mine in the village who were selling fruit told me what happened to her. Furthermore, there was a conflict between my immediate higher-level cadres and myself. I myself did not have much faith in the abilities of the cadres from the South to fight or to command. Any time we suffered a defeat, we got the blame for not knowing how to command even after nine years of
training in the North. A third reason is that I had heard while in North Vietnam that we were to fight against foreigners, not against Vietnamese in South Vietnam. But this line of propaganda was not true, because I saw that the Americans did not fight directly. . . .

Judging from the political situation in our country I thought that to continue to fight with the VC would not help my personal interests in any way because I was only serving the imperialists' interests of Russia or China. I began to think that way when they sent me to the fighting unit. Actually, to be fair, I must say that they did help me a great deal and that among the members of the unit there was much sympathy. I was in conflict only with two people in the unit: the political commissar of the company, who had gone north, and the deputy commander of the company, who had come back from the North with me and was older than I (about 40 years old).

Asked by the interviewer to give an example of the conflict between himself and the political commissar of the company, he said:

For instance, once they took me as the target of their criticism session. The Party section had twenty-one persons and the Party cell six. The troops were stationed at the Chia La Canal, and they asked me to come to their meeting in a garden. They said that I had feudal and militaristic tendencies, although the preparations for the operation were jointly decided upon and I only gave my opinions as to how the troops had to be deployed. The political commissar and the commander of the battalion made the final decisions. Yet, when the operation failed, they blamed me for not knowing how weak my unit was, for not knowing how to command, and for not gathering enough ammunition. (60.)

In many cases, no doubt, personal disgruntlement, rather than ideology, is the chief cause for defection. Our sample included a senior sergeant who had worked in an infiltration corridor, in a rugged highland region of
Central Vietnam, where he had the job of carrying materiel from one relay post to another. Apparently a grumbler by nature, he had not been admitted to the Party because he was, in his words, "short-tempered." He hated life in the mountains, and he frequently quarreled with his superiors. He gave the following reasons for defecting:

For a long time, the question of the future bothered me. I often said to myself: I am getting old (34 years); I live in poor conditions; I fight for an uncertain future. Why continue this way? The idea of defecting tormented me in May 1964. Then, in June, one thing decided me. This was a fight with Trung, the Section 1 chief (I was in Section 2, under Tien), when I tried to defend a man named Tron, 40 years old, who was caught eating a piece of manioc before the meal. The company chief, Son, supported Trung, and they were getting ready to criticize me by reporting this to the superiors. I couldn't stay any longer. My decision was made. (33.)

A similar case was that of the most recent rallier we interviewed, who had defected on May 26, 1965. Like the senior sergeant, he had worked as a porter of supplies from North Vietnam destined for the Front. For two years, he carried goods across the Ben Hai River, which divides North from South Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, and he, too, disliked the mountains and hated his task. When he was given a new assignment in a village in the plains, he seized that opportunity to defect. His own account follows:

The Communists recruited me a long time ago. When peace came, I feared for what I had done, and fled to the North. While farming in the North, I kept thinking that only the high-ranking cadres were better off. When they needed to have something done, they called on the citizens. When it was finished, the citizens returned to their farming. The cadres had no policy whatsoever regarding the citizens. Then they said: "You must go south to liberate South Vietnam. It has been three-fourths
liberated, and you'll only need to liberate the cities." Having learned this in education sessions, as well as in their propaganda, I wanted to be active for some period of time and to rejoin my wife and children.

But, for two years, what I did was transport duty in the mountains, carrying on my back ammunition, mail, newspapers, etc. Every week, I had only one day off to wash up. You will excuse me: when we passed by a girl, she did not want to look at us. Our clothes were so dirty and smelly from the dry fish and fish sauce we carried. In many houses, they absolutely refused to let us in. Some families gave us rice and cassava roots, true; but this was arranged in advance by district cadres. Yet, they would not give us any quarters.

I compared the real conditions with what I had heard in the North during the education sessions and in the daily propaganda of the government of the North. They had said that the people [in the South] had lost their liberties and had been burdened with hundreds of taxes. Arriving in the South, I saw nothing of my home village. I wanted to go to my village, but I was too far up in the mountains. When I was finally allowed to go to the plains, I could see that everything was free in the South, free trading (if you have money, you can buy anything, and as much as you want, unlike in the North), free dressing (nobody prevents you from being well-dressed), etc. In my own hamlet, there were only thatch houses at the time I went North. Now, there are plenty of brick houses, or at least the houses have brick walls. The roads are wide and clean. People can practice their religions freely, can kill cattle for food whenever they want.

In brief, the political and economic situation has improved, in contrast with the North. There, they kept saying: "Do not ask what time of the day, what day of the week it is." Each citizen was allowed to buy only 12 kilograms of paddy a month, and had to complement the rice with sweet potatoes and cassava roots, in keeping with the slogan, "Shrink your belly and tighten your belt in order to build up socialism." I saw with my own eyes that the people had to change what they called "financial notes" into "bank notes." If a person turned in 200,000 piasters, he was given back
only 20,000 piasters with the promise that he would be allowed to draw money from the bank when he needed it. And there were many other instances of exploitation. Regarding the army, troops had to carry heavy loads as a means of transportation; if you carried loads that were not heavy enough, you were put on the self-criticism stand. Coming south, I found relatives and friends had gone into the armed forces of the government. I did not see Americans; I saw only brothers killing one another. I joined the Resistance and the Viet Cong, and what have I got: my wife has become a hired laborer and my mother is destitute. (65.)

A man's motives for defecting are inevitably complex. Although most ralliers seemed to find it less damaging to their self-respect to cite ideological enlightenment rather than the baser reasons of fear, fatigue, and loneliness, the foregoing accounts would indicate that the negative feelings induced by the protracted hardships of life in the Front actually weighed a great deal more heavily in the decisions of defectors than did the positive reasons that most of them stressed.
APPENDIX

Following is a list of 71 regroupees (here numbered 1 to 71) and 9 Front members, not regroupees (designated by numbers a to i), who together constitute the group interviewed for the purposes of this study. The first line of each item shows the number (or letter) by which the interviewee's statements in the text of the study have been identified, and indicates whether he is a prisoner-of-war or a defector. Below that line will be found the basic information available about him, arranged by three possible categories: (a) biographical information (date and province of birth, parents' social class at the time he joined the Vietminh, schooling, and peacetime occupation); (b) career in the Vietminh and in North Vietnam; and (c) career in the Front (including area of assignment and Party status).

Abbreviation key:

PW: prisoner
elem schl: elementary schooling
occ: occupation before joining Vietminh
VM: Vietminh
NVN: North Vietnam
SVN: South Vietnam
infil: infiltration to South Vietnam
cap: captured
def: defected

REGROUPEES

1. PW
   a. Born: 1929; Quang Nam; poor fisherman; elem schl; occ: fisherman.
   b. VM: 1949; soldier. NVN: 1954; corporal.

2. PW
   a. Born: 1938; Phu Yen; rich farmers; elem schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1947; youth org; soldier. NVN: sergeant; transmissions section.
3. PW
   a. Born: 1924; Binh Dinh; poor laborers; elem schl; occ: laborer.
   b. VM: 1945; liaison work. NVN: social aide at rest center for Southerners; transport division.

4. PW
   a. Born: 1934; Kien Phong; orphan; poor farmers; no schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1952; soldier. NVN: military training; transmissions schl.

5. PW
   a. Born: 1933; Gia Dinh; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1950; soldier. NVN: sergeant; adjutant; aspirant.

6. PW
   a. Born: 1933; Quang Nam; poor laborers; no schl; occ: laborer.
   b. VM: 1952-54; militia. NVN: adjutant.

7. PW
   a. Born: 1922; Quang Nam; poor traders; no schl; occ: trader.
   b. VM: 1947-54; militia. NVN: aspirant; in farm center.
8. PW
   a. Born: 1928; Phu Yen; poor farmers; elem
      schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1947-55; ammunitions factory. NVN:
      transport convoy; mechanic.

9. PW
   a. Born: 1939; Quang Tri; middle farmers; elem
      schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1954; to North. NVN: production work;
      male nurse; soldier.
   c. Infil: Nov 1961. Front: corporal; male

10. PW
    a. Born: 1924; Phu Yen; poor farmers; no schl;
       occ: laborer.
    b. VM: 1947-54; youth grp; civil guard. NVN:
       soldier; regt cook; state farm.

11. PW
    a. Born: 1930; Darlac; poor farmers; no schl;
       occ: farmer.
    b. VM: 1950; kidnapped for training; liaison
       agent. NVN, 1954-61: production worker;
       sergeant.
    c. Infil: June 1961. Front: chief, production
       group; Darlac. Party member, April 1964.
       Cap: May 1964.

12. PW
    a. Born: 1933; Quang Tri; poor laborers; elem
       schl; occ: laborer.
    b. VM: 1954; to North. NVN: army regiment on
       17th Parallel.
       propaganda; Thua Thien. Non-Party. Cap:
       July 1964.
13. **PW**
   a. Born: 1931; Thua Thien; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1948; army. NVN: barracks construction.

14. **PW**
   a. Born: 1917; Phu Yen; rich farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1945; liaison agent; Party econ committee, village. NVN: 1955; econ cadre in farm production.

15. **PW**
   a. Born: 1930; Quang Ngai; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.

16. **PW**
   a. Born: 1938; Quang Tri; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1954; to North to study. NVN: farmer; soldier.

17. **PW**
   a. Born: 1924; Quang Tin; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1947; militia. NVN: 1954; state coffee farm.

18. **PW**
   a. Born: 1916; Quang Ngai; small traders; elem schl; occ: small trader.
   b. VM: 1949; Demo Chinese Youth; transport grp. NVN: 1954; commerce house; agr reform work.
19. PW
a. Born: 1926; Binh Dinh; small traders; elem schl; occ: trader.
b. VM: 1946; army: co commander. NVN: 2nd lieutenant; market research dept; political cadre.

20. PW
a. Born: 1935; Quang Nam; poor farmers; no schl; occ: servant.
b. VM: 1953; army. NVN: farm camp; cook (worked with 60 former prostitutes sent to camp for reeducation).

21. PW
a. Born: 1930; Quang Ngai; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
b. VM: 1947; militia. NVN: 1954; transport, chief of sect; construction work.

22. PW
a. Born: 1925; Kien Phong; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: laborer.
b. VM: 1945; liaison; squad leader; asst co commander. NVN: PAVN; committee chief, training and operations; sr captain; (after Jan 1961): Domestic Collection Off, Research Bur, DRV; training functions.
23. **PW**
   a. Born: 1921; Quang Tri; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1948; Nat'l Farmers Assn. NVN: charge of welcoming former PWs under French; propaganda cadre; agr production work.

24. **PW**
   a. Born: 1920; Quang Ngai; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1945. NVN: inspector, salt refinery; agr reform cadre.

25. **PW**
   a. Born: 1936; Phu Yen; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1953. NVN: cultural and military training.

26. **PW**
   a. Born: 1925; Thua Thien; petite bourgeoisie (father, doctor "de cadre supérieur"); occ: medical student.
   b. VM: 1947; to liberated zone to study; medical service in mt. regions. NVN: Haiphong hospital.

27. **PW**
   a. Born: 1937; Quang Tri; middle class; elem schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1954; NVN: army and nat'l farm.
28. PW  
   a. Born: 1918; Vinh Long; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1945; Vanguard Youth; security agent; army; head of military intelligence section. NVN: sr captain.  

29. PW  
   a. Born: 1931; Quang Nam; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  

30. PW  
   a. Born: 1918; Binh Dinh; poor farmers; secondary schl; occ: teacher.  
   b. VM: 1945. NVN: 1955; registry of traders; accountant in Min of Recon.  

31. PW  
   a. Born: 1926; Quang Nam; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1949. NVN: construction work; state farm.  

32. PW  
   a. Born: 1922; Quang Nam; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1945; youth grp. NVN: 1954; farm production distillery service.  
33. Defector
   a. Born: 1934; Khanh Hoa; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1954. NVN: 1954; soldier; sr sergeant.

34. PW
   a. Born: 1930; Quang Ngai; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1949; army. NVN: 1954; soldier; lumber yard, econ branch.

35. PW
   a. Born: 1921; Binh Dinh; proletariat; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1945; militia. NVN: 1955; worked on dams, irrigation; production.

36. PW
   b. VM: 1946; village comm; province cadre. NVN: 1955; merchandise sect; accountant.

37. PW
   a. Born: 1930; Phong Dinh; poor farmers; secondary schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1949; statistics clerk; secretary. NVN: 1955; personnel office of state farm.
38. Defector
   a. Born: 1931; Quang Nam; poor farmers; 
      secondary schl; occ: farmer; weaver.
   b. VM: 1953 (before, in French army and captd by 
      VM forces). NVN: 1954; corporal.
      Quang Nam. Def: Jan 1964.

39. Defector
   a. Born: 1934; Vinh Long; well off (father, 
      traditional doctor); elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1947; liaison; province comm of Party; 
      army gen staff. NVN: adjutant; Hanoi radio 
      service, gen staff. PTT in Hanoi.
   c. Infil: Feb 1963. Front: defected on trip to 

40. PW
   a. Born: 1931; Long An; petite bourgeoisie; 
      secondary schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1946; liaison agent; army. NVN: 1954; 
      on army gen staff.
   c. Infil: April 1962. Front: 2nd lieutenant; 
      training recruits; guard communication center 
      to NVN; Bien Hoa. Party member. Cap: Jan 
      1963.

41. PW
   a. Born: 1925; Quang Nam; poor farmers; elem 
      schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1948; army. NVN: 1954; farm work.
   c. Infil: July 1962. Front: asst chief of 
      group; production work; armed propaganda; 

42. PW
   a. Born: 1918; Phu Yen; rich farmers; elem 
      schl; occ: farmer; VN medicine.
   b. VM: 1945; liaison; village and district finan 
      chief. NVN: purchasing cadre.
      purchasing sect; cell leader; Phu Yen. Party 
43. PW
   a. Born: 1933; Gia Dinh; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer; in French army engineer corps.
   b. VM: 1954. NVN: construction work; soldier.

44. Defector
   a. Born: 1936; Binh Dinh; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: student.
   b. VM: 1953. NVN: in signal c; adjutant; off training schl; instructor of transmissions.

45. PW
   a. Born: 1924; Binh Dinh; poor fishermen; elem schl; occ: fisherman.
   b. VM: 1949; militia. NVN: 1955; dam and canal construction; water plant; agr production; economic agent.

46. PW
   a. Born: date not given; Gia Dinh; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1949; army. NVN: milit and political training.

47. PW
   a. Born: 1930; Binh Dinh; poor farmers; no schl; occ: servant.
   b. VM: 1954 (in VM village groups before). NVN: transport unit; work camp.
48. Defector
   a. Born: 1933; Dinh Tuong; rich farmers; elem schl; occ: student.

49. Defector
   a. Born: 1934; Binh Dinh; rich farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1952; VM youth; chief of grp, army. NVN: 1954; aspirant; 2nd lieutenant.

50. Defector
   a. Born: 1929; Quang Ngai; rich farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1945; youth grp. NVN: 1954; sergeant; farm camp.

51. Defector
   a. Born: 1929; Quang Nam; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1947; polit sect of company; polit officer. NVN: adjutant to polit officer.

52. Defector
   a. Born: 1930; Quang Tin; poor laborers; elem schl; occ: laborer.
   b. VM: 1951; militia. NVN: 1954; salt production; transport platoon.
53. Defector  
a. Born: 1920; Quang Nam; poor laborers; elem schl; occ: docker.  
b. VM: 1945; village youth grp; militia. NVN: 1954; construction work; barge transport work; ministry of transport.  

54. Defector  
a. Born: 1935; Quang Nam; well off; commerce (medicine); farmers; secondary schl; occ: farmer.  
b. VM: 1945; Nat'l Youth; army. NVN: military training.  

55. PW  
a. Born: 1942; Quang Tri; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: student.  

56. Defector  
a. Born: 1925; Quang Ngai; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  
b. VM: 1945. NVN: bldg construction; agr reform program; state farm.  

57. PW  
a. Born: 1934; Binh Dinh; poor farmers; occ: farmer.  
b. VM: 1954; militia. NVN: transport co, driver.  
58. **PW**
   a. Born: 1932; Phong Dinh; poor traders; elem schl; occ: trader.
   b. VM: 1945; Vanguard Youth; militia police. KV: 1954; radio commu unit.

59. **PW**
   a. Born: 1933; Thua Thien; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1954; transport. KV: 1954; cook for army; state farm.

60. **Defector**
   a. Born: 1934; Dinh Tuong; poor farmers; occ: farmer.

61. **PW**
   a. Born: 1926; Binh Dinh; middle farmers; no schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1949; army. KV: 1954; agr field service; caretaker at officer quarters; Reunification Committee.

62. **PW**
   a. Born: 1933; Darlac; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   b. VM: 1953; cultural training; KV: cook; cultural and military training.
63. PW
a. Born: 1933; Quang Tri; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: fisherman.
b. VM: 1953. NVN: milit training; land surveying course; econ missions.

64. PW
a. Born: 1931; Thua Thien; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
b. VM: 1949; militia. NVN: 1952; went to Laos and Cambodia agst French; NCO schl.

65. Defector
a. Born: 1926; Quang Tri; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
b. VM: 1949; militia. NVN: 1955 (fled to NVN to escape village authority harassment); transport trooper in PAVN.

66. PW
a. Born: 1932; Thua Thien; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
b. VM: 1947; VM youth; army. NVN: state farm.

67. PW
a. Born: 1934; Quang Tri; middle farmers; secondary schl; occ: student.
b. VM: 1951. NVN: 1954; production group; factory overseer.
68. PW  
   a. Born: 1925; Quang Nam; middle farmers; no schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1954. NVN: 1954; built dikes; tea plant.  

69. Defector  
   a. Born: 1933; Thua Thien; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1951; army. NVN: 1954; production work; squad leader.  

70. PW  
   a. Born: 1932; Quang Ngai; poor farmers; no schl; occ: farmer.  
   b. VM: 1951; army. NVN: 1955; regiment cook.  

71.2 PW  
   a. Born: 1930; Thua Thien; poor farmers; no schl; occ: farmer.  

NON-REGROUPEES  

a. PW  
   a. Born: 1917; Gia Dinh; poor traders; elem schl; occ: carpenter.  
   c. Front: 1961 (fled to VC secret base); training and work in rural areas; propag agent, recruiting for VC Labor Front in Saigon; Gia Dinh. Party member. Cap: Sep 1964.

b. Defector  
   a. Born: 1938; An Xuyen; middle farmers; occ: GVN village self-defense youth.  
c. Defector
   a. Born: 1940; Kien Hoa; middle farmers; father, hamlet chief; elem schl; occ: farmer, later jobless.
   c. Front: 1959; sabotage work; guerrilla in village; then district regional forces; weapons transport; regional main force; private; asst squad leader; Kien Hoa (Ben Tre). Member of Labor Youth Grp but not Party. Def: June 1964.

d. PW
   a. Born: 1908; Ma Nam (NVN); parents' class not given; no schl; occ: dock worker.
   b. Workers of Democratic Front: 1936; prison: 1936-40; VM: 1940; admin committee; Lieu-Viet Front, 1951; admin committee of Lao Dong (West reg).

e. Defector
   a. Born: 1931; Kien Giang; middle farmers; last yr elem schl (GVN); occ: selling radio cabinets.
   b. VM: 1949, clerk-typist; distr finan affrs section; head of entertainment group. Left VM for govt-controlled area in 1953.

f. Defector

g. Defector
   a. Born: 1937; Chuong Thien; poor farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.
   c. Front: 1957; liaison off; polit officer in guerr platoon; propaganda and training cadre of distr unit; Chuong Thien. Party member. Def: March 1965.
h. Defector  
a. Born: 1940; An Xuyen; poor farmers; 3 yrs elem schl; occ: farmer.  

i. PW  
a. Born: 1930; Quang Tri; middle farmers; elem schl; occ: farmer.  