THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S 9TH PLENUM
RESOLUTION DISCUSSING THE
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DECEMBER 1963
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Terminology Used in the Document

15th Central Conference

The 15th plenary session of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee met in Hanoi in January 1959.

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RESOLUTION

(9th Plenum Central Committee, December 1963)

This is the resolution of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee on South Vietnam which replaces the preliminary draft.

Wholeheartedly fight in advancing toward new victories in South Vietnam.

The war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam is the largest war in the world at the present time. It belongs to the special war category in the new military strategy of the United States. The U.S. imperialists are using South Vietnam as a testing ground for this type of special war aimed at resisting the national liberation movements of the many peoples throughout the world. The U.S. imperialist war of aggression in South Vietnam has created an extremely serious situation. The entire world is concerned over the problem of South Vietnam.

During the past two years, since the U.S. imperialists established a military headquarters in Saigon and introduced American troops to directly participate in the war in South Vietnam, the heroic South Vietnamese people under the leadership of the Party have overcome many difficulties and hardships, continually manifested the struggle, courageous, and indomitable traditions of the nation, created many rich forms of struggle, and have won glorious victories. Especially since the beginning of 1963, the people of
South Vietnam have won many important victories, causing great changes in the South Vietnam situation, with our forces strongly developing and the enemy's forces gradually declining.

The overall results of two years of courageous struggle by the people of South Vietnam has been the defeat of the Staley-Taylor plan aimed at pacifying South Vietnam within eighteen months and the upsetting of the enemy's strategic hamlet plan in South Vietnam: Not only has the enemy been unable to gather two-thirds of the people into strategic hamlets as intended but the strategic hamlets which have been established were smashed and many have become our combat villages.

The extraordinary efforts of the people and liberation army of South Vietnam have rendered the new tactics and weapons of the enemy ineffective, caused the enemy manpower to be annihilated and wasted, and the morale of the enemy's army to steadily decline. The political struggle movement was maintained and developed and the scope of the struggle widened. There are great mass movements against the enemy in the large cities consisting of many classes of people, including the press, Buddhists, students, intellectuals, and especially the movement of tens of thousands of the masses in Hue and hundreds of thousands in Saigon - Cholon who demonstrated their strength with an extremely powerful and valiant air. Guerrilla warfare developed, our military forces were strengthened and swiftly matured in technical and tactical standards, and have won many glorious battles under extremely arduous conditions.

Our victories and the enemy's defeats have caused the swift development of the enemy's internal dissension. The Americans and Diem were in open conflict and the Americans used a military coup d'etat to cast out Diem and place other more easily controlled lackeys in power, assemble an additional number of pro-American anti-Communist elements, and introduce new swindling demagogic policies in an attempt to win over the masses and firmly control the army of the puppet administration to promote their war of aggression. However, they cannot overcome the increasingly growing internal dissensions of the new authorities who are struggling with each other for power and prestige, destroying the previous fairly strong anti-Communist organizational structures of the Diem-Nhu family, and also cannot overcome the confused and decadent morale of the puppet army. Within the ruling class,
the Americans have generated differences in opinion concerning the policy and strategy against the South Vietnam revolution. A number of Americans, especially in intellectual circles, have publicly opposed the U.S. government's policy of aggression in South Vietnam. There is also dissension among the imperialists in the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc, especially between the French and U.S. imperialists. One important point is that after the serious defeat of the Staley-Taylor plan and especially after the Ap Bac victory of the army of South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have begun to lose confidence that they can win and have publicly stated this loss of confidence. Our people are increasingly confident in final victory and the people of the world are increasingly sympathetic in support of the just struggle of the people of South Vietnam.

The victories of the South Vietnamese people during the past two years prove that the potential forces of the South Vietnamese revolution are extremely great and that the undertaking of the South Vietnamese people will surely be completely victorious. These victories have simultaneously allowed us to see more clearly the specific steps on the road to total victory.

The resolution of the 15th Central Conference (January 1959) and afterwards the resolution of the Third National Party Congress clearly outlined the road of South Vietnam revolution and the struggle course to attain victory. The resolutions of the Political Bureau in 1961 and 1962 clearly outlined the struggle guidelines and specific policies aimed at effectively resisting the U.S. armed aggression. The resolutions of the Central Office of South Vietnam have substantiated and developed the overall resolutions of the Party on the South Vietnam revolution. The victories of the South Vietnamese compatriots during the past few years prove that these resolutions of the Party have been entirely correct.

Through the struggle against imperialism led by the U.S. imperialists in the world arena and in South Vietnam, we now more clearly recognize the patterned characteristics of the enemy's line, formulas and policies, the scientific basis for our anti-U.S. line, formula and policies, and have strengthened our confidence in the leadership of the Party.

Based on Party resolutions and directives concerning the South Vietnam revolution and the rich experiences of the patriotic struggle of the people of South Vietnam during the past few years, this resolution more clearly indicates the expectations of the South Vietnam revolutionary movement, the struggle
guidelines of the South Vietnamese compatriots, and simultaneously outlines the course and mission for advancing to new greater victories in the coming period.

PART I


In order to evaluate the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy as well as the expectations for a change in this balance of forces, it is necessary to stand within the framework of the "special" type of war presently being waged by the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam.

After World War II, the U.S. imperialists became the imperialist ringleader of the camp of international reactionaries, the primary force of aggression and war, and an international gendarme. At first relying on their temporary superiority in nuclear weapons, they introduced the "brink-of-war" policy in conjunction with a military strategy of an offensive nature called a policy of "massive retaliation" in an attempt to achieve the dream of ruling the world. However, the balance of forces swiftly changed in an unfavorable way for imperialism. On the one hand, our camp swiftly grew, has become the decisive factor in the development of human society, and has attained superiority in nuclear weapons. The national liberation movement is intensely rising, and not only has led to the establishment of sovereign nationalist countries but in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba, led to the establishment of socialist countries. On the other hand, dissension between the imperialist countries is steadily increasing. Although the imperialists, led by U.S. imperialism, are still busily preparing for a world war and the danger of such a war is still serious, the capabilities for preventing a world war are increasingly greater. If the imperialists insanely launch a new world war, they will be buried by the people of the world. Faced with this situation, the U.S. imperialists were forced to admit that their military policy was bankrupt and they introduced a new military strategy not only of an offensive but also a defensive nature. This is the "flexible response" strategy with the three types of war: World war, limited war, and "special war."
The type of war used by the U.S. imperialists and the area for maintaining or expanding their interests depends on the following objective factors:

The overall balance of forces in the world and in that specific area and the nature of interests of the U.S. imperialists and the nature of dissension which they must cope with in that area. The "special war" was put forth because the U.S. imperialists wished to gain the initiative in a number of areas of an overall defensive nature and also because the strong revolutionary movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was forcing them to change their methods of opposition. In this area, not only is the national liberation movement presently strongly developing but so is the revolutionary movement of the worker-peasant alliance. Also, this situation has not only caused the colonial system of imperialism to disintegrate into great fragments but has also shaken the newly-risen bourgeois systems and other subordinate bourgeois systems, creating an extremely serious danger for all world capitalism. This danger has stimulated the imperialists to hurriedly reach agreements with reactionary bourgeois classes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to maintain colonialism under new forms and methods. On the other hand, the increasingly developing revolutionary situation in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has prompted the reactionary bourgeois elements to collaborate with the imperialists to resist the revolutionary movement of the worker-peasant masses. Neocolonialism was born under these circumstances. Special war is mainly a type of aggressive war consistent with the neocolonialist policies. In the economic aspects, the imperialists use bourgeois administrations in the nationalist countries to exploit the people and when waging a counterrevolutionary war of aggression, they primarily use the army of the reactionary bourgeois administrations while they hold command, supply weapons and funds, and only introduce their own army into direct combat participation at a fixed level.

However, in order to suppress the national liberation and revolutionary movements of the masses, the U.S. imperialists have not only used special war. Under fixed conditions, they can use limited war. Even so, they cannot wage a limited war anywhere or at any time. Although their military forces are large, they must divide their strength for confrontation in many areas and their capabilities in each area are limited. Therefore, they must use their forces on the basis of the objective established and the balance of forces in each area.
Southeast Asia is an area where the imperialists have many interests. After being defeated in China, Korea, and along with the French imperialists in Indochina and faced with the rising revolutionary movement of the people in Southeast Asia, the U.S. imperialists joined the British and French imperialists to establish the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc. South Vietnam is a most important link in the Southeast Asia strategy of the United States and is also an area where the revolutionary movement is the most heated and also an area where the military forces of the Americans and their lackeys are receiving the most emphasis. In waging a special war in South Vietnam as well as establishing the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc, the U.S. imperialists are pursuing three objectives:

- To suppress the national liberation movement and achieve their neocolonialist policy.
- To build military bases in preparation to attack our camp.
- To prevent the spread of socialism in Southeast Asia.

The reason why the U.S. imperialists put forth the third objective is because at the present time the primary tendency of national liberation movements is to unceasingly develop into socialist revolutions. This is increasingly clear in the Southeast Asian area in general and in South Vietnam in particular, where national democratic revolutions are being strongly led by Marxist-Leninist parties and are closely connected with our camp.

The above three objectives express the intentions of the U.S. imperialists in wishing to overcome the existing contradictions in South Vietnam, the contradiction between the Vietnamese people and the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the contradiction between the farmers and feudal landlords, the contradiction between the socialist and imperialist camps, and the contradiction between the U.S. imperialists and other imperialists, especially the French.

The U.S. imperialists are determinedly pursuing all three of the above objectives. Nevertheless, the third objective is the most important and urgent to them because it is vital in the requirement of preventing the process of decline and disintegration of bourgeois imperialist systems.
in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. In order to attain this objective, the U.S. imperialists, when necessary, wage a "special war" and if this use of "special war" is unsuccessful, they may consider the use of a limited war.

However, the U.S. imperialists have suffered one defeat after another in the war in China and Korea. The U.S. and French imperialists were defeated in the Indochina war, withdrew completely from North Vietnam, recently suffered an additional defeat in Laos, and were forced to recognize a neutral government with the participation of the Neo Lao Hak Sat. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists have been forced to withdraw step by step before the attacks of socialism, the force with which they are engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Consequently, whether they expand the war in South Vietnam into a limited war or not, the U.S. imperialists surely must carefully weigh the specific balance of forces in the Southeast Asian area and must carefully consider the serious consequences to them. On the other hand, the South Vietnam revolution has put forth the requirements of resisting the invading U.S. imperialists, achieving national independence, democracy, and neutrality and peace, actively restricting the enemy in the "special war" and seeking every means to moderate the contradictions between the imperialist and socialist camps concerning the problem of Vietnam, winning over the national bourgeois class in South Vietnam to resist the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, simultaneously winning over and using the sympathy of nationalist countries, and further stimulating the contradictions between the U.S. and French imperialists.

We must and can restrict and defeat the enemy in the "special war." This capability will greatly increase if we resolutely resist the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, simultaneously have a clever strategy, and know how to better utilize the enemy's internal dissensions between the U.S. imperialists and other imperialists, especially the French, and between the Americans and their lackeys in South Vietnam with the bourgeois authorities in Southeast Asia, and consequently cause the U.S. imperialists difficulties in using forces of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc to expand the war in South Vietnam. On the other hand, we must strive to expand the movement of resistance against the U.S. imperialists' war provocations and aggression, causing the people of the world (especially those in the socialist countries and the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) to support the South Vietnam revolution in an increasingly more profound and effective manner.

The victory of the revolutionary war in South Vietnam is a process of carrying out all three aspects of political and military struggle against the enemy in South Vietnam and the diplomatic struggle to isolate the enemy,
and taking advantage of the sympathy and support for us on the international arena. The political and military struggles in South Vietnam are basic and the diplomatic struggle is extremely important.

Nevertheless, we must constantly uphold our vigilance and actively prepare to cope with the situation if the U.S. imperialists run the risk of expanding the war in South Vietnam to a limited war. The possibility of the war in South Vietnam turning into a world war is virtually nonexistent because the objective and status of this war cannot create the conditions for development into a world war.

Within the framework of a "special war" there are two possibilities:

The first possibility is that the Americans will participate at the present or a slightly higher level.

The second possibility is that the Americans will more strongly participate, introduce many more times the number of troops, or will intervene with American armies and the armies of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc.

If the Americans participate more strongly but still primarily utilize the army of their lackeys, the war in South Vietnam will still be a "special war." If the participation of the Americans is increased to a level in which use of the U.S. army is primary or U.S. forces and the armies of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc are introduced, the war in South Vietnam will no longer be a "special war" but will fall within the framework of a limited war although still occurring within South Vietnam. This possibility can occur under the following circumstances:

The first is that faced with their difficulties in South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists may believe that they can surely win if they intervene on a larger scale.

The second is that if they believe by intervening in South Vietnam that North Vietnam will not react strongly.

The third is that if they believe that intervening in South Vietnam will not create large protests from the people of the world and the United States.
First of all, the above possibility is not great because the U.S. imperialists have still not completely assessed the disastrous consequences if they intervene on a larger scale. They clearly recognize that if they are bogged down in a protracted war on a large scale, they will fall into an extremely passive position in the world. Conversely, this possibility will increase if the South Vietnam revolutionary movement is not strong.

Through our subjective efforts, we must strive to cope with the first possibility while simultaneously actively prepare still to defeat the enemy if the second possibility occurs.

We have the conditions to swiftly and steadily change the balance in a manner favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy. Concerning the enemy, even if the American forces participating in the war remain at the present level or are possibly increased slightly, the U.S. imperialists must still depend primarily on the army of their lackeys. The basic weaknesses of the lackey army which cannot be overcome are its soldiers' steadily declining quality, increasingly ailing morale, and increasing dislike of the American and lackey systems. These are factors causing the American and lackey armies to easily disintegrate. No amount of American monetary or weapons aid can prevent this decline and disintegration.

Regarding ourselves, the more we fight, the more confident we become in the victory of our army and the more advanced our technical and tactical standards, and the higher our combat morale. Because all the people of South Vietnam have arisen to resist imperialism for nearly twenty years, their political awareness standards are extremely high. The more victories that are won the greater the enthusiasm for the struggle becomes, that the greater the capabilities created by the people's revolutionary movement to strengthen and build military forces. If we give good leadership to the political and military struggles and the construction of forces, it will be possible for our military forces to swiftly and strongly mature. To create a basic change in the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy is completely possible. In the contention between ourselves and the enemy, our position of strength will increasingly develop while the enemy's internal organization steadily becomes more confused and his morale increasingly wavers. The enemy's weak points since their defeat at Ap Bac and especially since the overthrow of Diem have been clearly revealed and have swiftly developed. The enemy is in a continuous internal crisis. The more the
revolution develops, the greater the enemy's internal crises become, the
greater the possibility for disintegrating of the enemy's army and adminis-
tration, and for a general offensive and general uprising which is the
necessary course of development of the South Vietnam revolution to attain
final victory.

Faced with coming defeat, if the U.S. imperialists throw into
South Vietnam many additional troops in an attempt to save the situation, the
South Vietnam revolution will encounter many more difficulties and the
war will be more arduous and prolonged but final victory will surely be won.
If the French imperialists with 800,000 crack troops could not defeat heroic
Algeria with only twelve million people and finally were forced to return
independence and freedom to the Algerian people, the U.S. imperialist
aggressors also can never defeat the eighteen million compatriots of
South Vietnam who have taken up arms to resist aggression for nearly twenty
years, joined the compatriots of the entire nation to defeat hundreds of
thousands of French expeditionary troops and who are now winning increasingly
greater victories. The people of South Vietnam have clearly proven that
they have the capabilities to defeat the enemy under any conditions and
surely have sufficient perseverance, ability, forces, and patience, to defeat
every plot and plan of the U.S. imperialists, causing them to become bogged
down, caught in a dilemma, and finally forcing them to follow the road of
the French imperialists in admitting defeat and withdrawing from South
Vietnam.

The South Vietnam revolution also has a possibility of passing through
transitional steps with new complex struggle forms and methods to reach
total victory. The road to the reunification of the fatherland is a gradual one.
During the present period of the national democratic revolution in South
Vietnam, and originating from the balance of forces between ourselves and
the enemy, we must resolutely lead the South Vietnam revolution in advancing
on the course of winning partial victories, gradually repelling the enemy, and
advancing toward the general offensive and general uprising in order to reach
total victory, but it is also possible that transitional steps must be passed
before final victory is attained. Naturally, under any circumstances, it is
necessary that leadership determinedly mobilize the entire Party, people,
and army to win maximum victory. A half-way attitude and desire to stop
at a transitional phase is unnecessary. Only with a determination to win
the greatest victories and prepare to cope with every situation can final victory
surely come to our heroic people no matter how the situation develops.
PART II

STRATEGIC GUIDELINES AND STRATEGY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The strategic guidelines and strategy of the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam as outlined by Central has been proven correct by the victories of the compatriots of South Vietnam during the past few years.

In order to resist the South Vietnam revolution, the U.S. imperialists are using a "special war," a type of war suited to their neocolonialist policy. The primary characteristic of this policy is that the U.S. imperialists do not directly rule but suppress and exploit the people of South Vietnam through a lackey administration and the use of economic and military aid.

In the special war, the U.S. army participates at a fixed level but the primary military forces are those of the lackeys. Examined on its class nature, the pro-American administration represents the most reactionary landlords and comprador bourgeoisie class in South Vietnam at the present time. In a situation where one-half of Vietnam has eliminated the exploiter class and is advancing toward socialism, these classes have an extremely deep class hatred and strong hatred of the socialist system in North Vietnam and of the worker-peasant masses in South Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists and the pro-American administration have joined the reactionary landlords and comprador bourgeois class in South Vietnam, on the one hand, relying on each other but, on the other hand, in contradiction with each other over their interests.

The patriotic struggle of our people in South Vietnam has both a national and a class nature. On the one hand, it is a struggle of the South Vietnamese people against the U.S. imperialists for independence and freedom, while on the other hand, it is a struggle of the U.S. imperialists and the pro-American feudal landlords and reactionary bourgeoisie against our camp, North Vietnam, the worker-peasant masses in South Vietnam, and the democratic line of the South Vietnamese people represented by the workers and working peasants.

Concerning objectives, the war in South Vietnam at the present time is primarily a war of aggression and anti-aggression because the counter-revolutionary administration in South Vietnam relies on the U.S. imperialists to carry out the U.S. policies of colonialist aggression. However, because
it is a war of neocolonialist aggression, it simultaneously has the nature of an internal war. Whether a war of aggression or a counterrevolutionary internal war, it is aimed at supporting U.S. political policies and is under its direction.

2. In the U.S. special war in South Vietnam, the enemy on the one hand must primarily rely on money, weapons, and ammunition brought in from the United States but, on the other hand, he carries out a policy of using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese and is scraping up part of our people's property to continue the war. Therefore, the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys must seek every means to win over the masses of South Vietnam. To do so, they must carry out cheating political stratagems to hold and win over the people.

However, the pro-American administration in South Vietnam is one molded by the Americans from the defeat of the French imperialists who were supported by the Americans and is not a national bourgeois administration created from the victory of a national liberation movement. This administration is unjust without a concern for the independence and democracy of the people. Its social foundation is extremely thin. Immediately after its establishment, it was forced to cope with the powerful people's forces. Because the people of South Vietnam joined those of the entire nation, the August Revolution was successful and the war of resistance was victorious. The people of South Vietnam are one-half of a heroic people who completed the people's national democratic revolution mission and are building socialism in one-half of the country. The people of South Vietnam have a high political awareness, indomitable struggle spirit, strong confidence in their just undertaking, actually have taken control of many wide rural areas, and are led by a much experienced Marxist-Leninist party. Therefore, from the very first, the people of South Vietnam have had an absolute political superiority over the Americans and their lackey clique. If the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys use only demagogic political stratagems, the people of South Vietnam will use them to rise up even stronger to threaten their entire rule. Therefore, in order to exist, the South Vietnamese administration became fascist from the very first and used stratagems of blatant violence to suppress and win the people away from the revolution.

The more the people's revolution in South Vietnam develops, the more contradictions develop between the lackey administration and the U.S. imperialists and the more conflicts arise in the ranks of the bourgeoisie and landlords. This causes the political position of the pro-American administration to steadily weaken and increasingly forces it deeper down the fascist path.
Consequently, to resist and destroy the South Vietnam revolution, the enemy is using both political and military but primarily military methods. The military methods are primary but it is impossible not to use political methods. Regarding the people, we are inferior to the enemy in weapons, ammunition, military supplies, and war material but we have an absolute political superiority. Therefore, we have the capability to mobilize the people in the political struggle against the enemy and simultaneously have the armed forces to resist the enemy's military schemes. Anyway, the revolutionary war of our people in South Vietnam is a war of the weak attacking the strong. In this war, our people must wear down and annihilate the enemy's manpower, maintain and develop our forces, and attack the enemy in every aspect, causing his forces to decline and the morale of the enemy troops to become tired, discouraged, and disintegrated. The combat process is one in which we become stronger and the enemy weaker. The more we fight the enemy, the more victories we win and the more defeats the enemy suffers. We will in the end annihilate the enemy or smash his will of aggression and slavery.

Due to the enemy's policy of resisting the South Vietnam revolution and the characteristics of our struggle, the overall strategic guidelines for the revolutionary war of the people in South Vietnam are to carry out protracted combat relying primarily on our own strength by coordinating the political and armed struggles in an active manner in accordance with each different area and period.

The war of the South Vietnamese people is a protracted war because we are a small country resisting the leading imperialist, the United States. We are politically and spiritually strong but materially and militarily weak to resist an enemy which is politically and spiritually weak but materially and militarily strong. A period of arduous struggle and individual effort is required to enable the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy to change favorably, for us to change from weak to strong, and the enemy to change from strong to weak. Only in this manner can we win final victory. We must seek every means to restrict the enemy in the special war but must simultaneously prepare to cope with circumstances in which the Americans participate in the war on a larger scale or send troops of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc in to attack us.

During the previous war of resistance against France, we also put forth the guideline for a protracted war of resistance. However, the protracted combat guideline at the present time is different. We stated that
the war against France was a protracted war of resistance but the objective conditions of victory during the first few years of the war of resistance were only developing capabilities. Only when the Chinese revolution achieved decisive victory in 1949 did we have a strong rear area next to our country and within our camp. Consequently, we had additional extremely favorable external conditions to bring the war of resistance to victory with the glorious victory of Dien Bien Phu and the total liberation of North Vietnam.

At the present time, the struggle of the South Vietnamese people is also protracted but has firm victorious factors. Besides the subjective conditions, the people of South Vietnam also have more favorable objective conditions for winning victory. Behind the people of South Vietnam is all of North Vietnam which is presently building socialism and our entire camp which is steadily growing and becoming the decisive factor in the development of human society. The patriotic struggle of our people in South Vietnam is increasingly receiving the support of peace and justice-loving people throughout the world, including the people of the United States. Nevertheless, the revolutionary people of South Vietnam must still uphold a spirit of self-reliance. The imperialist camp has greatly weakened and is steadily becoming weaker and its leader, the U.S. imperialists, the invaders of South Vietnam, have suffered the greatest defeats of all the imperialists. They have suffered defeat from China to Korea and from Indochina to Cuba. Contradictions between the imperialists is steadily becoming deeper. They are falling into a contradictory condition of being unable to do anything alone but encountering increased disharmony when united. There is also dissension between the U.S. imperialists and the bourgeois authorities in Southeast Asia. The tide of the national liberation revolution is like a wave beating against the bank and the imperialists do not have sufficient strength to block it.

On the one hand, we must thoroughly understand the guidelines for protracted combat but, on the other hand, we must take advantage of opportunities to win victory within a period of time that is not long because in a revolutionary war against aggression, which has the character of a limited war, such as in South Vietnam, and under the present world conditions, we must know how to prepare for and take advantage of sudden situations in order to promptly change our struggle into a widespread revolutionary movement to disintegrate the enemy's army and overthrow the enemy's administration. To firmly grasp the protracted guidelines while simultaneously taking advantage of opportunities to win victory within a time that is not long are
two things which do not contradict each other because the secret of success of the revolution of the South Vietnamese compatriots is to strive to build and develop strong forces in every aspect. The more efforts that are made to build and develop forces for victory within a period of time that is not long, the more conditions exist to fight a protracted struggle under any circumstances or difficulties.

During the process of protracted struggle against the enemy, the South Vietnam revolution also has a possibility of passing through a transitional period with complex struggles and methods before reaching total victory. Nevertheless, no matter what possibilities exist in developing the revolution in accordance with the necessary capabilities, the most important and decisive condition is to strive to strengthen our forces in every aspect, especially our military forces, and accumulate forces in every aspect in preparing to grasp favorable opportunities to win final victory.

During the process of developing political and armed forces, every method must be used to gradually repel the enemy and win victory bit by bit. Therefore, while resolutely carrying out the protracted war guidelines, efforts must be made to prepare the forces in all ways and with sufficient strength to create and grasp opportunities to propel the South Vietnam revolution forward toward the greatest victory.

We are at present politically stronger than the enemy and must continue to strengthen our political forces. However, because we are militarily weaker than the enemy, a key point at the present time is to make the utmost efforts to swiftly strengthen our military forces in order to create a basic change in the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in South Vietnam.

The formula of coordinating the political and armed struggles must be correctly understood.

The political struggle plays an extremely basic and decisive role. First, this is because the political aspect is a basic strong point of ours and a basic weak point of the enemy. From the very first, we have held the political superiority over the enemy. Second, the enemy cannot help but use political stratagems to cajole the people and a false label of "nationalism, people, democracy" in an attempt to win over the people.
Therefore, we must and can take advantage of this position forced on the enemy to strike him. Third, the masses of South Vietnam have long traditions and experiences in political struggle. These traditions and experiences have been developed to a high degree. The masses have formed a "political army," consisting of millions of people, who are regularly resisting everywhere with extremely rich forms of struggle and possess extraordinary courage to attack the enemy and to protect their lives and property. The political struggle of the masses has been firmly coordinated with the armed struggle of the people's armed forces in every case. Directly resisting the enemy on the front line is not solely the people's revolutionary army but also the "political army of the masses" which is charging forward to the front line to directly resist the armed forces and activities of the enemy.

Armed struggle also plays an extremely basic and decisive role. First, because only with the support of a strong armed struggle can the power of the masses be developed, allowing the political struggle to strongly develop and maintain a long-term position in a situation in which the enemy uses military means to suppress the people. Second, because the enemy uses military force as a primary stratagem to maintain his rule and counterrevolutionary war against the people, the people must use revolutionary war to resist the enemy's counterrevolutionary war in order to protect their lives and property and to liberate themselves. If the enemy's primary stratagem of using military force to kill and plunder the people is not smashed, it is impossible to overthrow his rule and bring victory to the revolution. In order to destroy the enemy's military forces, the armed struggle must surely be used. Consequently, the armed struggle plays a direct and decisive role.

The development of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam during the past nine years proves that the overall strategic aims of protracted warfare and relying mainly on one's own efforts are correct and that the guidelines on coordinating the political and armed struggles are entirely correct. Chiefly because the people of South Vietnam have followed these guidelines, great victories have been achieved.

The guideline on coordinating the political and armed struggles must not only be temporarily applied but should be applied over a long period.
The process of achieving this guideline is also one of actively preparing to gradually advance in determinedly striking and overthrowing the entire enemy rule by the general offensive coordinated with the general uprising, using military and political forces to annihilate the enemy and defeat the army of the pro-American administration, and carrying out uprisings in the rural and urban areas still occupied by the enemy. The general offensive and general uprising are indispensable progressive goals of the coordinated political and armed struggles. A process of advancing toward the general offensive and general uprising is also a process of limited offensives, partial uprisings, complex contention, gradual repulsion of the enemy, partial victories, and the advancement toward total victory.

To speak of the coordinated political and armed struggles does not mean that armed struggle need not follow the rules of war, develop the high effectiveness of the revolutionary army, nor attain the highest objective of war to annihilate the enemy's manpower. When the armed struggle is used, it must follow the rules of war and strictly develop in accordance with those rules. The war of the South Vietnamese people demands full utilization of appropriate military strategies, operations, tactics, and techniques. Problems such as base areas, relations between the three troop types—main force, local force, and militia and guerrilla troops—methods of activity in the different areas, etc., must be resolved in keeping with the actual situation of South Vietnam. Armed activity must not only be aimed at destroying the enemy's manpower but must also support the political struggle. The armed struggle's best support is to develop the highest mission of armed struggle which is the annihilation of the enemy's manpower. The armed struggle must attain its final objective of annihilating the combat strength of the enemy's army. Because the primary enemy force is the army of the lackey administration, the principal objective of the armed struggle in South Vietnam is to attack, destroy, and defeat the army of the lackey administration. Only in this manner can the revolution win decisive victory. Therefore, not only must the people of South Vietnam have strong political forces but also powerful military forces. They must operate simultaneously in order to annihilate the enemy's manpower, maintain and develop our forces and create a basic change in the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in the military field. If the armed struggle increasingly develops and becomes decisive according to its own patterns, the political struggle will also develop and attain a great and decisive level in parallel with the armed struggle.
Based on the characteristics, the balance of forces, and the enemy's activity in each area, we must fully utilize the guidelines of the coordinated political and armed struggle in all three different areas: the mountains, rural lowland, and urban areas.

The mountainous area of South Vietnam has an important strategic position. This is the location in which we have conditions to maintain a long-term struggle under the most difficult and changing situations, the location where we can build strong armed forces, and the location where we have the conditions to launch strong attacks to annihilate much of the enemy's manpower. At the same time, using the mountainous area as a springboard, we have the capability of moving into the lowlands and, where the opportunities exist, of striking the enemy's major positions. In case the enemy expands the war on a larger scale, the highlands have the conditions for joining with the lowlands in maintaining a protracted war with the enemy. We must advance in controlling the highlands and determinedly build them into a firm base area. Our activity guideline in the highlands is to primarily use the armed struggle. At the same time, we must still emphasize the mobilization of the ethnic minority masses which are concentrated in the highland areas to carry out the political struggle against the enemy's policies of subjugating, dividing, and cheating the ethnic minorities, gathering them into populated areas or strategic hamlets, and blockading or destroying the plateau and highland economies, etc.

The rural lowland areas are populated areas with a revolutionary movement and a fair and relatively uniform revolutionary base. It is also an area where the enemy obtains men and material, carries out the policy of using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese, and uses war to nurture war. It is also the area where we resolutely compete with the enemy for men and material to carry out protracted war. If we can hold the rural lowlands, the highlands will not be isolated and we can mobilize men and material to develop our forces both in the lowlands and the highlands. If we can secure the rural lowlands, a favorable situation will be created for joining with the highlands in daily support of the urban movement and, when opportunities exist, to advance and attack the enemy's leading positions. Our activity guidelines in the rural lowlands are to carry out the simultaneous political and armed struggles, wear down and annihilate the enemy's forces, compete with the enemy for men and material, strive to control the hamlets and villages, and gradually expand our liberated areas from the highlands to the lowlands. The simultaneous political and armed struggle is the
overall struggle aim of the rural lowlands but under certain conditions and in certain areas, either the political or the armed struggle may become primary, using the rural lowlands as an area of prolonged contention with the enemy or to annihilate large enemy forces.

The urban area is the area of the enemy's leading organizations, including the central administrative agencies, the area where the enemy has concentrated large amounts of material and forces for his strong suppression, and also the area where large numbers of the masses are concentrated and the political awareness is fairly high with many instances of strong protest. When the opportunity arrives for the general offensive and general uprising, the masses in the urban area will have the capability of rising up in an overall general uprising and coordinating it with outside revolutionary forces to attack and overthrow the enemy's central administration. Our activity guidelines in the urban area are primarily the political struggle, preparing to maintain and accumulate forces, and await opportunities. Military activity in the urban areas is at a fixed level designed to support the political struggle but it must avoid losses or too early disclosure of the forces. Therefore, to whatever level the situation develops, in a situation where the balance of forces changes in a manner favorable to us, we can strike decisive military blows in the urban areas.

We will carry out activities in three areas as cited above, but we cannot allow the enemy to delineate and zone out the areas as they desire. The enemy's objective of delineation and zoning is to maintain his rear area and destroy our liberated areas.

Originating from the guideline of coordinating the political and armed struggles, we must combine attacks on the enemy with the three prongs: political, military, and troop proselyting (propagandization and mobilization of the enemy's soldiers). Because the military forces of the enemy are primarily the army of the lackey administration, troop proselyting plays an extremely important role. It simultaneously supports the political and armed struggles, assists in winning over the people and destroying the strategic hamlets, defeats the enemy army, causes mutinies, and strengthens our forces. Troop proselyting not only has a tactical nature but actually a strategic nature. Troop proselyting must be successfully carried out in order to competently support our path toward the general offensive and
general uprising. One of the important conditions for a successful
general offensive and general uprising is the successful carrying out of
the Worker-Peasant-Soldier alliance slogan.

The guideline of the coordinated political and armed struggles must
be thoroughly understood in every field of work, form of military and
political organization, each struggle action and phase, each combat action,
and during each campaign. Consequently, the war of the South Vietnamese
people is a total war of all the people. It continues the traditions and
develops the experience of the previous war of resistance against France
under new conditions and to a higher and richer level.

Briefly, in order to defeat the enemy's troops, we must thoroughly
understand the strategic aims of protracted war and rely mainly on our own
efforts while simultaneously understanding the struggle aims of the
coordinated political and armed struggles, fully utilizing activity guidelines
in all the three areas, attacking the enemy along the three political,
military, and troop proselyting elements, and mobilizing every revolutionary
force to carry out the total, people's and protracted war to advance toward
the general offensive and general uprising. If the U.S. imperialists throw
into South Vietnam an additional 50,000 to 100,000 troops the total,
people's and protracted war must strongly develop and cause them to
become bogged down and gradually defeated. A decisive condition for
winning victory under any situation is to politically mobilize the entire
people and strengthen the revolutionary forces in every aspect, first of
all by swiftly strengthening the military forces.

While fully adhering to the overall strategic aims of protracted
warfare, relying mainly on one's own strength, and the coordinated
political and armed struggles, we must exercise the strategic and tactical
leadership over ideology which is: active, flexible, initiative-oriented
and firmly coordinated in every aspect.

All the strategic and tactical aims cited above were created by
people of the entire country and of South Vietnam during the past and at the
present time through nearly twenty years of courageous struggle under the
leadership of the Party. They are also the aims that will lead the South
Vietnam revolution to final victory.
3. During the struggle to win victory, we must strive to develop our advantages and thoroughly recognize difficulties in order to overcome them, and avoid subjectivity and one-sidedness.

Although the enemy has suffered continuous defeat and is beginning to doubt the possibility of victory, the U.S. imperialists still refuse to abandon their determination to secure South Vietnam. They can still further increase the size of the lackey administration's army in South Vietnam. After ousting Diem and while the dissension between them and their new lackeys have not yet developed to a high degree, they may concentrate their forces to more strongly attack. They may use additional new weapons and change their tactics. They may achieve a part of the strategic hamlet plan and formulate more insidious plots to strengthen the strategic hamlets. They may take advantage to a certain degree of a number of religious sects to resist us, something which Diem refused to do. Moreover, we must still take precautions against the possibility that the Americans may throw an additional 50,000 to 100,000 troops into South Vietnam to intensify or expand the war in South Vietnam into a limited war.

Our armed forces are still weak and although we have the capabilities for great development, time is required. The base and liberated areas are still small and not well constructed or strong. In the highland base areas, difficulties still exist in the economy and manpower is limited. In a number of rural lowland areas, the revolutionary movement is still weak. The urban movement does not have a strong base and our base within the enemy's ranks is still poor.

Nevertheless, these are only difficulties on the road of development. The South Vietnam revolution will surely overcome every difficulty and finally will win glorious victory.
PART III

IMMEDIATE MISSIONS

Our direction is to take advantage of favorable opportunities, concentrate forces, and determinedly win decisive victories during the next few years while resolutely engaging in protracted combat.

In order to attain this goal, our immediate overall mission is to mobilize the entire Party and people to overcome every difficulty and, on the basis of more strongly developing the political awareness of the people, strive to build the political and armed forces (especially armed forces,) causing a swift change in the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in a manner favorable to us. We must actively build and expand the base areas, especially the strategic and mobile bases of the main forces, advance to destroy and defeat the enemy's army part by part, destroy a large part of the strategic hamlets, take control of the highlands and a large number of the hamlets and villages in the lowlands, create conditions for the mass movement in the urban area to strongly rise up, push the U.S.-lackey regime into a deeper crisis and decline, enable the movement to achieve the strategic initiative, and create good opportunities to win decisive victory.

In the immediate mission above, there are two primary matters and also two primary objectives which we must be determined to achieve:

1. **Annihilate the enemy's army part by part to create conditions for defeating the entire military force which is the primary support of the Americans and their lackeys in South Vietnam.**

2. **Defeat the enemy's plan to concentrate the people in strategic hamlets, destroy a large part of the strategic hamlets, secure men and material for the revolution, and take control of the highlands and a large part of the lowlands.**

The two missions cited above are firmly related to each other and support one another. The enemy's manpower must be destroyed and the enemy's army defeated part by part before a large number of the strategic hamlets can be swiftly destroyed and the strategic hamlets must be destroyed before conditions are created to wear down and annihilate much of the enemy's manpower.
By successfully carrying out these two missions, we can destroy the enemy's plots to control the people by strategic hamlets and annihilate our armed forces with their strong military forces, and this amounts to defeating the strategic policies of the enemy in the entire war in South Vietnam at the present time.

In order to carry out the immediate overall mission noted above, efforts must be made to achieve the specific missions below:

1. We must operate in order to wear down and annihilate the enemy's manpower and defeat the enemy's army part by part.

The overall strategic mission of our armed forces in the total people's war is to annihilate the enemy's military forces and, in conjunction with political struggle, defeat the enemy's forces, specifically defeating the lackey army, the primary tool of the enemy regime, and create conditions to achieve the general offensive and general uprising and overthrow the reactionary administration in South Vietnam.

In order to achieve this strategic mission, the South Vietnamese people's armed forces must strike and destroy. We have three types of forces--the main forces, local forces, and guerrilla and militia. All three types must strike to destroy at differing levels from a large to a small degree, from the annihilation of individuals and seizing of weapons to the destruction of enemy units. Only in this way can we build up our forces and wear down and scatter the enemy's forces.

Each type must have an appropriate operational formula and be firmly coordinated to complete the overall mission.

Although our armed forces have steadily matured and our main force troops have increasingly grown, the attack methods of our three types of troops for a long time still remain within the guerrilla warfare strategy. Our campaign and combat objective is to annihilate the enemy's manpower. We must avoid the enemy's strong points and find his weak points and strike. Therefore, during the present period, we must primarily strike the enemy troops outside of their fortifications and while they are moving on land, sea or air. The primary tactical forms are ambushes and raids, while gradually advancing toward mobilized attack under favorable circumstances. We must move out a distance and mobilize in areas where the enemy is located outside of his fortifications to carry out ambushes and raids. Large or small
ambushes and raids will depend on the conditions of each battlefield, each period of time, whether we are able to concentrate large or small numbers of troops, the enemy situation, and the mission of the campaign and battle. We must thoroughly understand the principles of attacking victoriously and swiftly along the lines of rapid recovery and military and political advantages, coordination of operations with the political struggle and troop proselyting to annihilate and defeat the enemy's army, a firm grasp of the aim of carrying out long-term strategic warfare and swift tactical attacks and withdrawals, annihilation of the enemy forces, maintenance of our forces, and our abilities to strike more strongly as the more we attack. We must constantly control the situation and know how to attack the enemy everywhere. We must constantly uphold vigilance and maintain secrecy to assure the initiative in combat.

The enemy is presently waging a special war against the people of South Vietnam. They have also organized three types of troops (regular army, civil guards, and militia) coordinated with each other both to control the people and to destroy our armed forces. The enemy's three types rely on each other for existence and combat support with the enemy's regular divisions as the main elements. Whenever these regular divisions have not been annihilated part by part or destroyed, the civil guard and militia forces still have support to operate. On the other hand, if the civil guard and militia troops are destroyed and are unable to carry out their mission of controlling the people, the regular army is forced to disperse and cope with us in a passive manner. Our overall operational objective is the enemy's military forces but with our army's maturing capabilities and based on the overall mission, we must set forth specific missions for each area, type of force, and unit and stipulate the operational relationship between the three types of troops in annihilating the enemy to carry out our definite military and political objectives. In the past, we mainly attacked the civil guards, militia, and commando groups. This was correct because our forces were still small with insufficient strength to destroy the enemy's regular army and was also consistent with the requirements of protecting the lives and property of our people. However, when our forces mature, our main force army must strike and annihilate the enemy's regular army, since only in this manner can we demoralize the enemy troops, defeat the enemy's civil guard and militia forces, and consequently give adequate support to the destruction of the strategic hamlets and the strong development of the guerrilla militia forces.
In 1963, we struck and annihilated company after company and in some battles two companies of the enemy's civil guards suffered heavy casualties and some of the enemy's regular army battalions were destroyed. In order to determine greater victories, we must actively and urgently build our forces, maintain our operational and command standards, technical and tactical standards, and the morale of the troops and advance toward the widespread annihilation of enemy companies and battalions. We must resolutely develop mobile attack methods of the main force troops in all strategic areas so that the role of the main force troops maintains its decisive position in our revolutionary war against the enemy's special war.

In operational aspects, the army and people of South Vietnam have achieved many great accomplishments and created many extremely rich attack methods. We must swiftly summarize experiences in order to successfully lead operations. We must combine the new experiences and the experience of the previous war of resistance and coordinate our experiences with those of other countries. In combining this experience, we must avoid mechanical dogmatism but we must also not neglect our former experiences and those of other countries.

2. Destroy strategic hamlets.

The people of South Vietnam have many extremely precious experiences in the destruction of strategic hamlets. Each local area has set good examples in this task. We must strive to summarize and disseminate experiences in the destruction of strategic hamlets. Our requirement over the next two or three years is basically to destroy the enemy's strategic hamlets and effectively control a large part of the hamlets and villages. The destruction of strategic hamlets is a revolutionary movement of the masses against the policy of aggression and enslavement of the Americans and their lackeys. This movement falls within the entire political and military struggle of the people and army to liberate South Vietnam. During the past months in the Nam Bo lowlands, and especially in Central Nam Bo, we have been greatly successful in destroying many enemy strategic hamlets. This fact proves the great capabilities of our political and military forces in the destruction of strategic hamlets and proves the bankruptcy of the enemy's "strategic hamlet policy." After the overthrow of Diem, the enemy
declared that this policy will not be abandoned. He will probably construct and strengthen the strategic hamlets, strengthen fortifications and defense units in these hamlets, especially in the critical areas.

In order to build strategic hamlets, the enemy has used a policy of savage control consisting of many military, political, and economic schemes, primarily military. Due to heavy defeats, the enemy has recently been forced to use a fairly large military force to safeguard the strategic hamlets. This has caused them to disperse their forces over a wide area. The enemy established strategic hamlets to create a strong position, but, on the contrary, faced with the power of our political and military forces, the strategic hamlets have become an enemy weak point, places which are easy for us to attack. Therefore, the destruction of strategic hamlets must be developed in parallel with the guerrilla war, defeating the militia and "combat youth" organizations, paralyzing the civil guard forces, and restricting the enemy's main force troops. We must know how to fully utilize the capabilities of military forces coordinated to the highest degree with the political struggle movement and troop proselytizing. Actual experiences have proven that the stronger the strategic hamlet destruction movement becomes, the more the "combat youth" and militia forces disintegrate, the more the enemy's civil guard troops lose their support and become paralyzed, and the more the main force troops are hampered and dispersed in sweep and destroy operations. Conversely, the more the militia forces are destroyed, the local forces are paralyzed, and the enemy's main force troops are hampered and the more widespread the strategic hamlet destruction movement becomes.

In conjunction with the mobilization of the masses in political struggles, the enemy's prestige must be destroyed. A number of tyrants who owe many blood debts and who stubbornly resist the revolution must be appropriately punished while simultaneously emphasizing indoctrination to reform and convert those erroneously following the enemy and assist them to return to the people. The policy of "repression combined with leniency, punishment combined with re-education" must be properly executed and avoid rightist and leftist deviations.

After the two recent coup d'etats, the confused and oscillating situation of the puppet army and administration and the disintegration of Diem's control organizations and apparatus (such as the Personalist Workers' Party, the Republican Youth, women's and espionage organizations,
reactionary factions among the Catholics, etc.) have created extremely favorable conditions for us to step up the destruction of strategic hamlets. We must promptly seize this opportunity to launch an extremely strong mass movement both to demand the abolition of the strategic hamlets, wards and precincts, and use every political struggle form, coordinated or uncoordinated with the armed struggle, to destroy every form of persecution and control and destroy a large part of the enemy's strategic hamlets.

In order to promote the political struggle, we should motivate the people ideologically, correct the overevaluation of the enemy, the lack of confidence in the capabilities of the masses to rise up and destroy the enemy's control in the hamlets and townships, and correct overevaluating the awareness standards of the masses, etc., by thinking that the masses are truly ready to rise up but because of the enemy's tight control, have not done so.

In places where we have destroyed strategic hamlets, we must construct combat villages. The construction of combat villages is one of the great accomplishments of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam in the recent past. Combat villages are the result of developing the political and military struggle movement of the people and the coordination of many extremely rich forms of resistance against the enemy in the political, military, and economic fields. We must summarize experiences in constructing armed forces, developing guerrilla warfare, developing the economy, maintaining and protecting production, mobilizing the masses, and upholding the political awareness standards of the people in the development of combat villages for wide dissemination to all hamlets and townships in order to motivate the people to build and strengthen combat villages and turn these villages into bastions of guerrilla warfare and strong supports for protracted combat.

3. Building the armed forces.

In order to achieve the immediate overall mission and the operational mission set forth above, one of the most important and specific missions is to urgently build the armed forces so as to enable our armed forces to swiftly mature. The construction of the armed forces must be aimed at both insuring the completion of the immediate missions and
preparing to meet favorable opportunities which could unexpectedly occur. The balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy must be changed in a manner which is basically favorable to us.

The basic principles in the building of the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam are also the basic principles for building the Vietnam People's Army. The three types of troops of the South Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces (main force, local force, and guerrilla-militia troops) are under the absolute leadership of the Party, carry out a system of Party committee leadership and responsible command, and also have a system of company and field grade political officers. It is a combat, work, and production army. In building the army, democracy and strict discipline must be assured together with the achievement of united solidarity between cadres and soldiers and between the army and people.

First of all, we must emphasize the balance between the types of forces, such as having many more guerrilla and militia than local force troops and many more local force troops than main force troops. However, force construction must be active and not mechanical or inflexible because the highest standard in force construction is that it should be in accordance with the situation and mission at each moment in order to assure victorious attacks and support of our strategic concepts.

At the present time, important strictures must be established in the building of the main force and in boldly developing the guerrilla-militia and local force troops. Main forces must be actively constructed but precautions must be taken against deviations stemming from a desire to swiftly concentrate while weakening the local forces and guerrillas at the primary level.

Increasing the quantity of the types of forces is extremely necessary but even more important is increasing quality, achieving exemplary troops and cadres, assuring internal purity and organization to constantly maintain high mobility, elevating political awareness and technical and tactical standards, and increasing the firepower and strength of the army.

We must perfect and strengthen the command apparatus at all levels in order to help the staff, political, and rear services organizations at all levels have sufficient strength to assure operations and the construction of the armed forces.
4. Promote the political struggle movement, strengthen the political forces, and expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam, there is a strong people's political struggle movement and political force. However, because the revolution is entering the decisive battle and the requirements of the new mission are higher, we must continually promote the political struggle movement, develop the political forces, and further expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.

We must achieve to the highest level the theme of total people's war. We must consistently promote the increasingly more strict standards of the armed struggle aimed at destroying the strategic hamlets, resisting sweeps and terrorism, proselyting enemy soldiers, protecting the lives and property of the people, and demanding improved standards of living, democracy, etc. We must fully utilize the present favorable situation in which the new lackey administration is not yet strong in order to expand the political struggle movement and to firmly develop the organization of the Front.

We must mobilize to the highest degree every potential capability of the people to build and develop the armed forces and to support the armed struggle. We must make the entire people profoundly recognize that the people of South Vietnam are waging a patriotic war and everyone must do everything to bring this war to victory.

We must strive to strengthen and expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance and under the leadership of the Party, and give the Front the capability to mobilize the masses in a truly widespread manner in order to accomplish the newly prescribed political mission of the Party and give it sufficient strength to assume part of the responsibilities of a revolutionary government in the liberated areas. Based on the program of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, which consists of achieving independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and advancing toward the peaceful reunification of the country, and taking advantage of the time when we are winning increasingly more resounding victories, the enemy is becoming increasingly
more confused and weak, and with the contradictions between the French and Americans steadily increasing, we must unceasingly launch phases of political attacks through setting forth policies, slogans, and a number of new political organizations aimed at isolating the enemy to a high degree and winning over progressive organizations or individuals with anti-American tendencies or those desiring peace, neutrality, independence, and democracy in South Vietnam, including pro-French elements or any pro-American element that is in favor of peace.

However, we must clearly distinguish the expansion of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam from the expansion of an alliance with anti-American groups and factions which do not participate in the Front. On the one hand, we must expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, that is, to develop an organizational base for the Front among the masses, workers, farmers, petty bourgeoisie, pupils, students, national bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, especially among the workers and farmers. At the same time, we must strive to admit into the Front a number of democratic rank-and-file and anti-U.S.-lackey personalities, establish patriotic and democratic parties, factions, or organizations, liberation organizations, etc., and admit them into the Front. On the other hand, we must achieve an anti-American alliance between the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and the political factions and groups with anti-American tendencies. The admission of an individual or organization into committees of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam must be carried out properly and in accordance with the statutes of the member organizations of the Front or the common statutes of the Front, thus constantly assuring the Front's strength. In achieving an anti-American alliance between the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and anti-American groups and factions outside the Front, it is possible to use relatively broad forms of alliance in order to achieve a unity of action against the Americans under fixed conditions or, at least, strive so that these groups and factions maintain a neutral attitude sympathetic to us.

We must advance toward true control over a large part of the hamlets and townships, firmly grasp the political situation in all hamlets and townships with the aim of promptly blocking every enemy espionage and destructive activity. We must intensify organizational work, organize the farmer masses into strong political and combat units, firmly control the
masses in each hamlet and township, and especially organize and control the youth. We must intensify political and indoctrination work among the youth in order to swiftly develop the armed forces, make each youth conscripted by the enemy become one of our active elements within the enemy's ranks in order to create conditions to turn each enemy unit into a force of ours.

In the lowland areas of Zones 5 and 6 and other rural areas still under the enemy's control, we must put forth appropriate slogans to mobilize and organize the masses and study the land problem in order to work out correct policies aimed at expanding the political struggle movement among the people while further building and developing the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The political struggle movement in Zones 5 and 6 and a portion of Zone 7 is still primarily weak because it does not yet have appropriate slogans and methods for organizing and mobilizing the masses, does not yet have a plan for fully coordinating the political and armed struggles to reduce the prestige of the enemy lackeys in the hamlets and townships, isolate them from the people, and build hard-core forces, and does not have a plan for prolonged maintenance of newly emerging mass forces. We should strive to further enlighten the people on political matters so that they will profoundly understand the country-robbing and selling nature of the Americans and their lackeys and clearly recognize that the U.S. imperialists are not strong but are being defeated and will surely suffer total defeat. We should build the absolute confidence and united struggle strength of our people in the final victory of the task to liberate South Vietnam and reunify the country. We should highly develop the spirit of courageous sacrifice, willingness to endure hardships, and determination to fight and win on the part of the cadres and people. In order to do this, we must politically motivate the masses, provide ideological guidance and fully utilize every form to arouse a deep hatred of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. We should educate the people to clearly understand that the sacred and urgent duty of every Vietnamese is to stand up and save his country and home.

In the cities and surrounding areas, we should seek every means to raise the standards of the masses to a level of readiness to rise up and overthrow the enemy when a favorable opportunity arrives.
The long-term tasks are to maintain the primary level, strive to develop the movement, and build, strengthen, and develop the forces. First of all, however, we must fully utilize the favorable situation caused by the enemy's coup d'etat to promote the mass struggle movement, prevent the enemy from controlling the situation, and simultaneously take advantage of the enemy's false national and democratic slogans to struggle with the enemy and maintain the legal position of the masses. We should develop the movement to educate the people, expand mass organizations, develop a Party which must thoroughly understand and strictly achieve the principles of secrecy in organization, construction, and development of the Party and Front. We must know how to conceal and preserve the key forces of the masses in order to motivate the people when an opportunity arises to advance toward winning decisive victories. We must summarize experiences of successes and defeats and set forth policies and methods of engaging in appropriate activities in the cities and surrounding areas to cause the urban movement in these areas to rhythmically coordinate with the overall movement in order to favorably advance the revolution. We must make greater efforts to organize basic level units within the enemy's army and administrative agencies and among all classes, especially to recruit those with influence among the masses and with social position. We should build sympathy with the left wings in the legal parties and factions and closely coordinate with them.

Concerning the ethnic minorities and especially those in Tay Nguyen, the Western highlands, we must further strive to help to promote production, improve their standard of living, lessen the contributions of the people, expand cultural work, sanitation and disease prevention education, and create a spirit of fraternal solidarity between the people of the delta and the lowlands and the ethnic minorities. We must provide political propaganda and education to improve the patriotism and spirit of revolutionary vigilance of the ethnic minority compatriots and take precautions against the enemy's insidious plots and schemes to divide the ethnic minorities and destroy our national unity bloc. We must know how to work with the ethnic minority leaders, firmly coordinate with them, and win them over. Shortcomings, mistakes, and violations in motivating the ethnic minorities must be immediately corrected and attention must be given to the training of ethnic minority cadres.
Great attention must be given to intensifying religious proselyting. We should take precautions against the enemy's new plots of utilizing a number of religious factions against us. We should actively motivate and increase the awareness of religious followers, gain the sympathy of the leaders of religious factions to prevent them from falling into traps of the Americans and their lackeys who want to use them to create conflicts with us, and win them over in joining us to resist the enemy.

5. **Intensify troop proselyting.**

**Troop proselyting is a political task of the entire people and army, an important strategic mission, and the worker-peasant-soldier alliance must be thoroughly understood throughout our political and armed missions.**

The results of troop proselyting are also the results of our political and military work. On the one hand, the political struggle movement of the masses must make enemy soldiers clearly understand that their interests are closely related to those of the people in the South Vietnam revolution. On the other hand, strong battles of annihilation must be fought to cause enemy soldiers to lose confidence in the American and lackey forces and to increasingly recognize the inevitability of their defeat. Only in this way will troop proselyting disintegrate the enemy's troops. Besides supporting daily activities, such as destroying strategic hamlets, resisting sweep operations and conscription, etc., troop proselyting must advance toward coordinating with combat operations in order to create uprisings in entire enemy units. Attention must be paid to activities aimed not only at enemy privates, noncommissioned officers, and low-ranking officers but also at high-ranking officers and government employees working in secret organs within the enemy's army. We must make use of their capabilities in a way most favorable to the revolution, and consequently maintain the absolute secrecy of our important individuals and basic level units.

We must correctly carry out the policy of leniency toward prisoners and defectors and simultaneously uphold a policy of using enemy soldiers and officers in circumstances when they sincerely wish to rally to the people and the revolution.

At the present time, troop proselyting is not fully meeting the requirements of the revolution and is not fully utilizing available capabilities and advantages. Supervision of this work must be urgently intensified to give it a truly mass nature.
6. **Build base areas and intensify economic and finance tasks.**

A strong base area is an important factor in victory. When the war has developed to a definite degree in which there are strong main force troops, it is absolutely necessary to have large and strong base areas. Only by expanding and strengthening the base areas can a position be swiftly created for the main force troops to create conditions for attacking the enemy in great battles of annihilation and changing the situation in a manner which is basically favorable to us. Only by expanding and strengthening the base areas can we maintain and promote the war of resistance under any conditions. **Our base areas are at present still small and weak. This is a great weakness of the South Vietnam revolution which must be overcome.** We must actively and urgently build and expand primary base areas in the strategic springboard areas. We must improve such tasks as political tasks, motivating and organizing the masses in Party construction, implementing policies in the ethnic minority areas, developing guerrilla warfare, increasing production, improving the standard of living of the people, assuring the supply and stockpiling of provisions, mobilizing the cadres and masses in counterespionage and internal secrecy preservation against all types of enemy spies, agents, and commandoes, building our organizations, and carrying out order and security measures from top to bottom. Of these tasks, the key ones are guerrilla strikes, increasing production, assuring the supply and stockpiling of provisions, and counterespionage, security, and protection of the base areas. In order to overcome difficulties in sparsely settled but extremely important areas, methods must be actively sought to transfer people into these places. The construction and expansion of base areas must be considered an extremely important task. It must be carried out no matter what the difficulties. A revolutionary spirit must be used to overcome seemingly insurmountable difficulties and in so doing can we create a great strategic surprise for the enemy.

Every favorable condition must be created for launching large-scale destructive attacks in the highlands. In particular, conditions must be prepared to seize opportunities when the enemy attacks the highlands with main force troops or when we lure the enemy to concentrate in these areas in order to annihilate major portions of his main force troops.

In conjunction with the active construction and expansion of the base areas, other base areas in the lowlands and border areas must be continually
expanded to create many connecting base areas wherein those in the lowlands connect with those in the highlands to form a base area system surrounding the enemy in order to defeat him.

The liberated areas must be well managed in every aspect for the purpose of mobilizing the people's forces against the enemy, creating a good effect on the people in areas under the enemy's control, for the requirements in swiftly developing our forces, and for the needs in urgently promoting increased production to assure supply. Only by resolving the great contradiction between developing the forces and assuring the supply of equipment can our revolutionary war attain great decisive victories during the coming years.

The primary problem of the economic and financial tasks in South Vietnam at the present time is to strive to develop production, practice conservation, assure transportation and supply, expand economic interchange, and struggle to resist the enemy's extortion, exploitation, destruction, and encirclement of our economy. We must increase self-sufficient production by agencies and units and have a responsible and rational policy of both assuring supply and maintaining a proper level of concern for the living conditions of the people. The political and armed struggles must be coordinated to protect and achieve the economic interests of the people, expand the economic forces, win over men and material from the enemy, protect production, and protect the material and cultural lives of the people. A spirit of self-reliance must be heightened while simultaneously contending for and satisfactorily utilizing aid. We must conserve men and material and be economical. We must enhance the spirit among the entire Party and people of enduring hardships and overcoming difficulties to fulfill the mission.

Great attention must be given to policy and ideological leadership, strengthening the organizations and taking specific steps in the economic and financial tasks.

7. Continue to intensify efforts to win international sympathy, support, and solidarity.

First, efforts must be made to win the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the national liberation movements, and the working class and laboring people throughout the world for the just struggle of the South Vietnamese people.
During the past few years, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has made a number of worthwhile accomplishments in this aspect but these accomplishments are still not enough. The capabilities exist for doing much more. Efforts must be made to motivate peace, labor union, youth, women's and lawyer's organizations and other professional organizations of the people throughout the world and organizations of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America which have strongly coordinated actions in demanding that the U.S. imperialists stop their war of aggression in South Vietnam, withdraw their army, military personnel and weapons from South Vietnam, and allow the people of South Vietnam to settle their own problems. At the same time, emphasis must be given to winning over the sympathy and support of the people in nationalist and imperialist countries (United States, France, Great Britain, etc.).

In the arduous and complex struggle of our people against the U.S. imperialists, international support and solidarity is one of the important factors in victory. In conjunction with intensifying the political and armed struggles in South Vietnam, the diplomatic struggle must be intensified and aimed at isolating those in the United States in favor of war and winning over those in favor of peace, thoroughly taking advantage of the contradictions between the imperialists, and winning over the sympathy and support of countries pursuing a policy of peace and neutrality.

8. Strengthen Party leadership.

The immediate mission is extremely great and heavy but also extremely glorious. In order to complete this mission, many great difficulties must be overcome and extraordinary efforts must be made by the entire Party and people. Therefore, strengthened Party leadership is a problem of decisive significance.

In understanding and ideology, the entire Party must first of all make a profound change in understanding, clearly recognize the fundamental characteristics of the situation, the advantages and difficulties, the new decisive factors and developments of the South Vietnam revolution, our capabilities for certain victory, and the enemy's inevitable defeat. The new mission and specific steps leading to final victory must be clearly understood. On this basis, cadres and Party members must have a spirit of prolonged combat, self-reliance, determination to fight and win, work enthusiasm, confidence in final victory, fearlessness of prolonged hardships, while simultaneously understanding how to seize opportunities for
victory, heightening the spirit of vigilance, and the will to fight, resisting rightist ideologies, a yearning for peace and the fear of sacrifices, and preventing against adventurist tendencies or underestimating the enemy.

Party construction must be intensified in the organizational and leadership fields to meet the requirements of the war, considering the strengthening of Party chapter and education of Party members as the central steps. Efforts must be made to develop the Party within the people's armed forces, especially paying attention to Party construction in the vital areas, the areas under the enemy's control where the movement is still weak, within the cities and within the ethnic minority areas.

While building the Party, attention must be paid to protecting the Party. Therefore, attention must be given to a careful internal review and the good management of Party members as a precaution against the enemy's plots to infiltrate the Party or proselyte cadres and Party members, especially those in the leadership organizations. Attention must be given to the education and training of Party members with worker, working peasant and intellectual backgrounds. We must strive to strengthen the Party chapters. We must especially intensify the training of cadres, and heighten the military leadership standards in accordance with the requirements of the overall mission.

Actively develop the People's Revolutionary Youth Group. In South Vietnam, the Youth Group is the arm and reserve unit of the Party.

In principle, centralization must be intensified while developing democracy to the proper degree. The new mission demands that the entire Party and people be mobilized in efforts of the highest level. The development of the war increasingly demands the most effective coordination of all battlefields. All South Vietnam must act in accordance with one united plan. Therefore, centralization must be strengthened and ideologies of narrow-mindedness and particularism must be overcome. Along with intensified centralization, democracy within the Party must be developed. Our war is a people's and revolutionary war. A revolution is the creative undertaking of the masses. Democracy must be developed, the correct mass line followed, and the creativity of millions of people developed in order that everyone will think night and day of finding the best methods to defeat the enemy. In a revolution and especially in a revolutionary war,
the role of subjective activism by individuals is highly developed. The
determination to win a war by many people is good but the basic factor
is the individual. We must develop democracy in order to develop the
subjective activism of millions of people. The more victories that are
won, the more democracy must be emphasized. We must rely on the
masses, the people, and the soldiers. From the experiences of the
people and soldiers in attacking the enemy, we must summarize the best
lessons. Leadership ideology should be extremely active and not bound
by old formulas. The enemy is losing, primarily because he cannot cope
with the millions of brains which never stop seeking the best ways of
defeating him under every condition and by countless means. We must
highly develop this superiority. Democracy must be developed in the
political and armed struggles, among the people and army, in the
destruction of strategic hamlets, combat, operations, in the struggle
against all types of spies and agents in order to protect the revolution,
and, in brief, in every revolutionary task. Efforts must be made to
resist bureaucratic, authoritarian, and mechanical attitudes, the
detachment from reality and separation from the masses while simultaneously
resisting the deviations of liberalism, disorganization, lack of discipline,
narrow-mindedness and particularism.

The mission of North Vietnam.

In order to carry out the above missions, not only must the Party
organization and people of South Vietnam make outstanding efforts but
the Party organization and people of North Vietnam must do the same.
The position of the two regions in the revolutionary undertaking of the
entire country as outlined by the Third National Party Congress has not
changed but the time has come for North Vietnam to increase aid to South
Vietnam. North Vietnam must further develop its role as the revolutionary
base for the entire country.

1. A strong evolution must be made in the leadership of the mission
to support and aid the South Vietnam revolution. It must be fully realized
that under the leadership of the Party, our people must both peacefully
build North Vietnam and wage war against the Americans in South Vietnam.
The struggle against Americans and their lackeys is the responsibility of
the entire country. Because the enemy must be restricted in his "special
war" and the war must be limited within the scope of South Vietnam, the
struggle participation methods of each region are different. However, each
region must carry out to the maximum degree whatever it can to defeat
the enemy.
2. Cadres, Party members, and the masses in North Vietnam must be more strongly educated in the obligation of every individual toward the South Vietnam revolution and heighten their revolutionary spirit and fighting determination, causing them to enthusiastically engage in patriotic emulation, enthusiastically work while enduring difficulties and hardships, and, when necessary, be ready to fulfill their obligation toward the South Vietnam revolution no matter what the circumstances or under any form.

3. There must be a plan of support for South Vietnam in every aspect to meet the requirements of the South Vietnam revolution and because of this support, there must be an appropriate adjustment of the plan for building North Vietnam.

4. We must clearly understand that in order for the South Vietnam revolution to successfully develop, we must unceasingly strengthen North Vietnam in every aspect. Therefore, efforts must be made to strengthen the economic and national defense strength of North Vietnam, and constantly increase our vigilance and readiness to cope with new enemy plots to intensify destruction or provocation against North Vietnam. At the same time, preparations must be made to cope with a situation in which the enemy might expand the war by carrying out his "To the North" plan.

5. We must strengthen the research agencies which are assisting the Central Committee in directing the South Vietnam revolution. We must know how to coordinate with related sectors in North Vietnam in order to better support the South Vietnam revolution.

Following the prolonged war of resistance of the people throughout the country against the French colonialists, the revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese compatriots has lasted for nearly ten years. The armed struggle began during the middle of 1959 and has become decisive since 1962. The evolving situation during the past two years has assisted us to better evaluate the enemy and better understand our capabilities. Consequently, we can more clearly recognize the developmental steps in the South Vietnam revolution.

We have a firm basis for believing that we will definitely win final victory. The most important thing at the present time is that our entire
Party and people from the North to the South have a full determination and make outstanding efforts to bring success to the revolutionary undertaking of the South Vietnamese compatriots and achieve the peaceful reunification of the country, win complete victory, and build a peaceful, united, independent, democratic, prosperous and strong Vietnam.