A COSVN STANDING COMMITTEE ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THE END OF 1961 TO THE BEGINNING OF 1964

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TERMINOLOGY USED IN THE DOCUMENT

Chin Nam, TWC, TUC (Truong Uong Cuc) Designations for the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN).

TV (Thuong Vu) TUC, TV Chin Nam Designations for the Standing Committee of the Central Office.

15th Central Resolution References to the 15th plenary session of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee which met in Hanoi in January 1959.

Resolution 15

The document was seized in Phuoc Long Province, South Vietnam, on 29 April 1969.
REPORT
ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THE END OF 1961 TO THE BEGINNING OF 1964 (JANUARY 1964)

PART I
THE ENEMY WAGES A "SPECIAL WAR"

According to the spirit of Resolution 15, the South Vietnam Party organization has since the end of 1959 led the people in limited uprisings and offensives, partially overthrown the enemy's administration in a number of rural areas and has begun a revolutionary tide of continuous attacks on the enemy, gradually destroying the enemy's local administration and winning control over a large portion of the Nam Bo delta and the Trung Bo highlands.

In order to retrieve their situation and in an attempt to extinguish the revolutionary movement of South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have changed their strategy course from the scheme of pacifying South Vietnam and preparing to attack North Vietnam to a concentrated effort of attacks against the South Vietnam revolution and commando activity against North Vietnam, the primary base of the South Vietnam revolution. They are waging the special war begun under the Staley-Taylor plan, a war of an experimental nature that initiated the strategy of the imperialists, led by the U.S. imperialists, to destroy revolutions.

The primary objectives during the eighteen month period of this plan were:

--To isolate the South Vietnam revolution from the great rear of socialist North Vietnam and our entire camp.

--To regain the rural areas, gain control of the people and drive the revolutionary forces away from the people.

--To swiftly destroy the armed forces of the revolution while they are still inexperienced and weak and to surround, isolate and destroy the revolution's base areas.
--To stealthily attack and provoke North Vietnam with spies and commandos.

In order to attain the above objectives, the enemy has used the following methods:

--Increasing military and financial support.

--Strengthening the armed forces in South Vietnam and overcoming weaknesses in troop strength, equipment and mobility.

--Intensifying fierce sweep operations, beginning with a "90-day counterattack phase."

--Striving to encroach the land by concentrating the people and establishing strategic hamlets.

--Actively carrying out a policy of bribing and dividing the ethnic minorities, religions and opposition forces and assembling counterrevolutionary forces on a wider scale.

--Striving to blockade and destroy the people's economy.

--Promoting espionage and commando activities to sabotage North Vietnam.

During the past two years, the enemy has vigorously launched and carried out the Staley-Taylor plan, the key plan of his "special war." He has achieved a number of definite results, causing us many difficulties but this plan has now been basically defeated.

Following is the evolution of this plan:

1. The United States has drastically increased military aid:

The United States established in Saigon the Harkins Command for southern Indochina to directly command the war in South Vietnam. More than 15,000 military specialists and special units were introduced to serve as key forces for the South Vietnamese Army and directly attack the revolution.

The United States introduced many weapons and large amounts of war materiel into South Vietnam (700 aircraft of all types, 260 M-113 and M-118 amphibious vehicles, 400 tanks, 20,000 pieces of modern communications
equipment and many modern weapons, such as flamethrowers, rapid firing weapons, automatic mines, radar sets, chemical poisons, etc.

The U.S. 7th Fleet was in direct support along the coast of South Vietnam and has many times carried out amphibious exercises with South Vietnam as the objective.

The United States has spent up to 2,029 million dollars for South Vietnam.

The United States solicited a number of its supporting countries, such as Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Malaya to assist South Vietnam with military personnel, espionage activities, weapons and other war materiel.

By these actions, the United States has helped the South Vietnamese regime stave off immediate collapse and prolong its strength to resist the revolution. Nevertheless, due to this situation, the colonialist and bellicose policies of the U.S. imperialists have been exposed and the contradictions of the South Vietnamese regime have become increasingly deeper. Not only have the fundamentally hostile masses resolutely risen up to fight and resist the Americans but all other classes, such as soldiers, civil servants and the upper echelons have also become dissatisfied with the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and have indicated their sympathy and support of the people resisting them. The struggle movement of the people of South Vietnam against the Americans and their lackeys has reached an unprecedented level.

2. The noteworthy characteristic is that the U.S. imperialists have waged a special war in South Vietnam by relying primarily on the puppet army and using every form of sweep operations to fiercely attack and massacre the people.

a. The U.S. imperialists planned to raise the South Vietnamese army to twenty times the size of the revolutionary army and to double the combat strength of that army.
By the end of 1963, the puppet armed forces had increased to approximately 500,000. Specifically:

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<tr>
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<th>1961</th>
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<tr>
<td>Main Force</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>211,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Guard</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>98,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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Moreover, they have provided approximately 40,000 weapons for the combat youth, republican youth, and other types of youth units organized by them, and they have organized many other specialized military branches.

The greatest reinforcement rate occurred from 1962 to mid-1963 but since mid-1963, not only has the military strength not increased but it has greatly declined and many units were far below strength. The morale of the enemy troops declined to an unprecedented level. The combat youth have disintegrated platoon after platoon, especially in areas where the movement is strong. The combat strength of the self-defense and civil guard forces steadily declined, a series of mass desertions and surrenders occurred, mutinies took place involving entire Platoons and thousands of recruits have deserted. The main force troops did not want to go into battle or fight, often fired mistakenly at each other causing many deaths, and incidents of their mass surrender in combat have begun, etc. In particular, the spirit of resisting and fighting the Americans, not desiring war and desiring peace and neutrality widely developed from among soldiers to officers. Among the high-level officers, internal conflicts became increasingly more acute, many incidents of firing on and killing each other, purges and dismissals occurred, several military coup d'etats took place, and there are many possibilities that this will continue.

The United States sent over 300 intelligence specialists to South Vietnam, applied many modern methods of reconnaissance and organized and developed an espionage network in many areas.
The enemy reorganized the battlefields in South Vietnam, establishing tactical areas, tactical zones, special zones, commando zones and counter guerrilla zones. Until recently, he deployed the majority of his main force army on the Zone 5 battlefield when up to 40 percent of his forces were in this area, but faced with the development of the South Vietnam movement and especially the Nam Bo movement, since mid-1962, he shifted a number of units from Zone 5 to Nam Bo in mid-1963, one division and one regiment were sent to Nam Bo; he soon intends to introduce an additional two divisions and there is information that two regiments have been sent.

Due to his developed forces, an increase in mobility and firm coordination with espionage activities, the enemy's sweep operational strength strongly increased.

He had the advantageous capability of moving quickly into difficult mountainous, swampy and forest terrain to savagely attack the revolution. In mid-1963, the enemy was able to concentrate a few regiments and at times an entire division or several divisions in each tactical area, but recently, our developing strength and the enemy's weakness has greatly decreased the enemy's concentrated strength.

b. The enemy used military forces to carry out attacks to annihilate the revolutionary armed forces while fully promoting the pacification plan on a large scale. The enemy's primary forms of attack were sweep operations, building outposts, gathering the people to establish strategic hamlets and attacking and occupying the revolutionary base areas. Sweep operations, land encroachment and the gathering of the people to establish strategic hamlets became the primary pattern of operations in the enemy's special war.

The objective of the enemy's sweep operations were to annihilate the revolutionary forces, gather up the people to establish strategic hamlets, surround and blockade the revolutionary base areas and block our support from the outside.

The main objectives of the enemy's sweep operations were the areas where the movement was strongly rising, positions where the people gathered to establish strategic hamlets and our base areas. All the zones in Nam Bo, especially Zones 6 and 7, were locations where the enemy concentrated the most effort in conducting large-scale, savage and continuous sweep operations. Some provinces such as Ben Tre experienced up to 500 sweep operations in one month, of which fifteen were battalion-sized or larger.
There were generally three types of sweep operations: Large sweeps with one regiment and above, moderate sweeps with a few battalions and small sweeps that entailed searches, commando activities and continuous small attacks with forces of one company or less and at times with only a few squads. There usually were two methods: A prolonged sweep of one week or more and at times up to three to six months or more with a large force and coordinated with all types of troops, such as during the Binh Minh and Khac Kho campaigns in Zone 7, U Minh and Song Tinh Thuong in Zone 9, the Dong Tien and Hai Yen campaigns in Zone 5, the An Lac and San Lo campaigns in Zone 6, etc.; and the lightning actions of a commando nature during a period of several hours, one or two days, or an entire week with at times using only a few types of troops and a number of small units and at times coordinated with many types of troops into a large force aimed at assaulting and annihilating our organizations and troops, such as the battles of Tan Ninh in Central Nam Bo, Chach Tho in Zone 9, Na Mau and Phuong Lua in Zone 5, and the Phi Hoa operations. Moreover, there were also forms of commando and counter guerrilla activities against our base areas.

Although the large and medium sweep operations were savage and furious, they were not as continuous or as dangerous as the small sweeps because these sweeps usually utilized local forces and the activity was of a grinding, strike and restrike and see-saw prolonged nature creating many losses to the installations and mass movement.

Roughly estimating, the enemy throughout South Vietnam carried out 16,962 large and small sweep operations (not counting Zones 5 and 6) in 1961, 29,461 in 1962 and up to 34,847 in 1963. The most violent period in 1963 was the first six months (20,000 sweeps) and although many have occurred since July 1963, their scale and fierce nature have not been as before.

The enemy's sweep operations before mid-1963 were characterized by active attacks on our base areas, organizations and troop units, but this situation was dependent upon the balance of forces on the battlefields between the enemy and ourselves and on whether the period of attacks was long or short (in Zones 8 and 9 only during short periods and in Zones 6 and 1 during longer periods.) However, since mid-1963, the nature of the enemy's sweep operations became increasingly passive and incomplete and the enemy's defensive situation became increasingly evident.

The reality of the past two years shows that in the war in South Vietnam at the present time and whereas the revolutionary struggle movement has risen up while the enemy and we are still in a see-saw situation, the revolutionary base areas are not yet strong, the balance of forces has not yet tilted in a manner favorable to us, we have not yet fought battles inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, and the enemy still continues to carry out large-scale and fierce sweep operations in an attempt to block the movement and annihilate the revolutionary forces.
Along with the sweep operations, the enemy was engaged in building occupation outposts, largely in the contested areas and between the base areas and lowlands to strengthen his defensive position and achieve occupation of the land and resettlement. In 1962, the enemy built an additional 1,200 outposts and guard towers, primarily in the Nam Bo delta. In 1963, the enemy built an additional 818 outposts but in Nam Bo alone he was forced to abandon 1,169.

With the above schemes to strengthen his forces and carry out destructive sweep operations, the enemy during the past two years attained a number of important results, especially in 1962, and at times caused us many awkward difficulties. He reoccupied a number of areas in Zones 8 and 9, struck deeply into the base areas and carried out his resettlement plans. A number of our military units suffered heavy attrition from the enemy’s attacks, a number of locations were zoned and delineated at one time, and there were still many difficulties, especially in Zone 6. Preliminary estimates are that the enemy encircled two million people, killed 12,700, wounded 8,500, and imprisoned 15,000, killed and stolen more than 15,000 buffaloes and cattle, burned 35,000 homes, and destroyed more than 14,000 hectares of subsidiary food and garden crops.

However, the enemy also suffered heavy defeats:

---A large part of the sweep operations were smashed by our army and people and campaigns in which an entire division was concentrated for five to six months suffered casualties of a thousand troops and only relocated a few hundred people, such as in the campaigns of Duc Ben Cat, Song Tinh Thuong, San Bo, etc.

---He was unable to destroy our armed forces, revolutionary forces and leading agencies. The ratio of military strength between the enemy and ourselves has declined from ten to only [number unspecified] times. During the past two years, more than 250,000 enemy troops were lost, annihilated and dispersed, 28,000 weapons of all types fell into the hands of the people, 797 aircraft were downed or damaged (328 downed), 1,183 military vehicles were damaged and destroyed (including 209 M-113 and M-118 vehicles), 55 trains were destroyed, 351 ships were damaged and sunk (110 were sunk), and the Americans suffered 857 dead, 246 wounded and 10 captured. In particular, the heliborne tactics which played an important role in the enemy's mobility and lightning attacks were destroyed and heavy losses were inflicted on the M-113 and M-118 amphibious vehicles, although they still had an important influence on a number of battlefields.
The above defeats weakened the enemy, causing turmoil in the enemy's ranks and instability in the enemy's rear areas and the enemy's shifting from a position of furious attacks against our areas to a defensive and passive position. He was confused over whether to conduct large or small attacks, to concentrate or disperse, and whether to strengthen his rear areas or strike our areas. This was also one reason for the two military coup d'etats which have seriously weakened the enemy's ranks. Defeatism, disbelief in the outcome and a trend toward peace and neutrality strongly developed among the enemy administration's troops and civil servants.

The strengthening of the U.S. military intervention, the increasing of the amounts of weapons and equipment aid, and the increasing of the puppet army could not change the situation in a manner favorable to the enemy. On the contrary, more serious weak points were further revealed which led to great failures which the U.S. imperialists could not prevent.

3. The enemy concentrated forces to carry out the "national policy" of establishing strategic hamlets and resettlement:

The establishment of strategic hamlets and the resettlement of the people were the key schemes of the Staley-Taylor plan. Ngo Dinh Nhu thought strategic hamlets were the final plan and advocated that the scheme be implemented at all costs and regardless of the indignation caused in carrying out this plot. This was a scheme combining every strategem of attacking, terrorizing, dividing, deceiving, robbing and impoverishing the people by primarily relying on the use of force and the army.

During the past two years, the enemy concentrated all forces to resolutely establish a system of strategic hamlets throughout South Vietnam. He considered this to be a great and most effective blow to the South Vietnam revolution. He relied on the strategic hamlets hoping to annihilate the key forces and armed organization of the revolution and isolate the revolution from the people. By establishing strategic hamlets and resettling the people, the enemy would then have the conditions for amassing manpower and material resources to build additional forces, increase military strength, employ the civil guard and militia forces in controlling the people and concentrate the mobile main forces to attack the revolution. He poured 50 million dollars into the construction of strategic hamlets and resettlement and planned to construct 16,000 strategic hamlets within a period of eighteen months.

He carried out experimental projects since July 1961 and since March 1962 concentrated efforts in furious construction activities over all the urban and rural areas. He worked on focal and important positions beginning with those populated locations and important strategic positions where he had
favorable conditions in controlling the masses and which were centers ad-
vantageous in expanding his occupation of the land in order to surround,
divide and isolate us and form defensive lines against the revolution.

The different enemy methods were based on the balance of forces
between the enemy and ourselves in each area:

--In the areas under the enemy's control, he controlled the people
through administrative means coordinated with the force of the militia and
civil guards in the local areas. In these areas, most strategic hamlets had
many exploitable weaknesses and existed in places only for the sake of form.

--In the contested and liberated areas, he concentrated forces,
including the main force, civil guards, and self-defense force, to build
outposts and carry out grinding and fierce sweep operations from one month
to the next in order to relocate the people and construct strong strategic
hamlet zones.

--In the mountainous jungle base areas, he initiated campaigns of
suppression, terrorism and destruction together with bribery, trickery,
division, and the forced acceptance of weapons and the organization of local
armed forces in order to relocate the people into strategic hamlets which
were established on the corridors and at times right along the roads between
our areas and the enemy's areas.

--In order to protect the strategic hamlets, expand his security and
regularly contend with us in an effective manner, he organized outer stra-
tegic hamlets into combat hamlets with strong fortifications and selected
youths and organized local armed forces in order to use the strength of the
people against the revolution.

The enemy also firmly coordinated military and political aspects,
especially through terrorism and fierce sweep operations in the areas where
the movement was strong in order to carry out the above scheme.

By July 1963, the enemy had constructed 7,200 strategic hamlet
zones containing approximately seven million people (not counting the urban
population), including approximately 150,000 people in the highland areas
and more than one million people in the recently reoccupied liberated low-
land areas.

Due to a definite level of achievement in the above scheme, the enemy
began to increase the army, amass large amounts of materiel, rapidly
organize armed forces in the townships and hamlets, and in an instant he caused us many difficulties in expanding our areas, developing the revolutionary base areas, exploiting manpower and material resources and promoting the patriotic war. In Zones 5 and 7 and especially Zone 6, he temporarily established cleared belts, creating confusion for the movement.

However, because this scheme was contrary to the interests and feelings and upset the living conditions of every strata of the masses, it was decisively and continually opposed by the masses in all urban and rural areas who used every activity form from sporadic to successive and partial destructive activities, small-scale to intense destructive activities, the destruction of outposts and the liberation of areas, causing instability in a large portion of the enemy's strategic hamlets and causing the enemy to become increasingly weaker and more lax in the rear the more he expanded the front. The local puppet administrations did not have the strength to control the masses or safeguard the strategic hamlets, the civil guard was dispersed and so, too, the main forces stationed to safeguard the strategic hamlets where many of the weaknesses in the ruling system were concentrated.

Faced with the development of the people's political and armed movements, the Americans and their lackeys in March 1963 were forced to discuss reducing the number of strategic hamlets so as to concentrate efforts on consolidating hamlets having advantageous conditions, but the further they moved to the rear the scheme became more seriously defeated.

At present, the Americans and their lackeys have created the "New Life" hamlets which in substance are the old strategic hamlets. The enemy will return to employing the old methods of the Ngo Dinh Nhu period to carry out this scheme, is cunningly displaying many demagogic stratagems to swindle the masses and will gradually carry out this scheme using specially selected positions in the oil spot method, beginning with the important populated areas. The enemy will encounter difficulties and new contradictions because as he concentrates on the focal positions he must abandon other areas. The enemy is applying a demagogic policy in a situation in which the mass movement is rising up and if we know how to take advantage of the situation, conditions will also be created to increase the movement in the weak areas.

4. In parallel with the military schemes and establishment of strategic hamlets, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys have striven to carry out other political and economic schemes.
Oppressive force has been the primary aspect of American and lackey policy in South Vietnam during the past two years but they have also devoted great attention to other political and economic schemes, most prominent of which are:

a. Efforts to divide the ethnic minorities, assemble reactionary political forces and build the "Anti-Communist Religions Alliance" Front: The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys were seriously defeated in this scheme. The majority of religious followers have had intimate experience with the enemy's schemes since the war of resistance and since the South Vietnam revolution began. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists and the lackey leaders could not deceive them while they were being unceasingly oppressed and exploited. Hundreds of thousands of Buddhists in the large cities protested against Diem during the summer of 1963 and the protest of the Buddhists in Tra Vinh and Soc Trang against the reactionary policies of the U.S.-Diem broke up the "Anti-Communist Religions Alliance" Front.

b. The "Chieu Hoi" plan. After the defeat of the "denounce Communism" and "anti-Communist" schemes, the enemy began to implement the "chieu hoi" plan in the beginning of 1963.

Along with the campaign to sweep, attack and surround the base areas and destroy their economy, the enemy temporarily made a number of definite accomplishments in the "chieu hoi" field on those battlefields where there were many difficulties. During the first nine months of 1963, there were approximately 500 cases of desertions to return home and 80 incidents of joining the enemy to return and attack the revolution, which included 61 Party members and 250 full-time members and people of guerrilla teams and the masses in townships and hamlets. Since August 1963, due to the enemy's internal crisis and the strong development of the revolutionary movement, the enemy's chieu hoi plan was no longer effective.
c. Intensifying spying and espionage: The enemy highly evaluated the role of intelligence in the special war and strongly promoted this scheme. He introduced more than 200 intelligence specialists into South Vietnam, reserved eleven million dollars for indirect activities, and provided much modern equipment, such as aircraft, radar, cryptoanalytical equipment, radios, etc. for spying activities. The enemy developed much information concerning our activities and accurately struck a number of our organizational units. However, because the South Vietnam revolutionary movement was strongly developing and the liberated areas expanding and because we had correct policies, whereas after two enemy coup d'etats and purges, the enemy became weak and confused, the enemy's spying activities have greatly declined.

d. Concerning the economy. The economy of South Vietnam is that of a colonialist economy dependent upon the Americans and was in total decline. Agriculture was failing, trade and commerce deteriorating, and exports were only one-fifth of imports and continued to decline each year (in the first nine months of 1962 alone, the volume of exports declined by 41 percent). In 1962, South Vietnam had to import 100,000 metric tons of rice, an unprecedented development. Surplus goods flooded the market and from 40,000 to 90,000 metric tons were stockpiled each year while the standard of living declined. Although the United States provided 400 million dollars in aid in 1962, 14 billion South Vietnamese piasters in 1963 and taxes were increased each year, the budget of South Vietnam continued to show a deficit, inflation was becoming serious, and the currency steadily decreased in value.

It is clear that the economy of South Vietnam became increasingly confused and stalemated although the U.S. surplus goods flooding the South Vietnamese market presented the external appearance of a developing economy.

Although the enemy's economic policies seriously destroyed the economy of South Vietnam, our Party gradually carried out land policies on a number of battlefields and because of the struggle movement and production activities of the farmers and all classes of the laboring people, the living standards of the masses in many locations were maintained and improved in some parts although there were some, especially in the highland base areas that have been strongly swept and encircled by the enemy, where the living standards of the people encountered difficulties.

e. Commando activity to sabotage North Vietnam. The enemy planned to use aircraft and boats for dispatching commandoes to North Vietnam for sabotage actions but was painfully defeated. Not only was the enemy unable to adversely affect the peaceful socialist construction in North Vietnam but on the contrary, he increasingly exposed his bellicose and unjust nature, increasingly pointing up the weakness and isolation of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.
In order to cope with the developing revolutionary tide, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys used several extremely insidious and cunning schemes to save the South Vietnamese regime from a situation of serious collapse. They waged a special war on the greatest scale in the world situation at present. The Americans sent more than 15,000 troops including special units and branches and the most modern weapons and equipment to South Vietnam and concurrently had a relatively large puppet army which employed large-scale and savage forms of attack that began with the Staley-Taylor plan.

The past two years marked a defeat of strategic significance, causing the enemy increasing weaknesses and more serious conflicts and crises. The U.S. imperialists have indicated their confusion and loss of confidence in their war of aggression and are now caught in a dilemma. The South Vietnamese puppets have moved from one defeat to another and are presently in a stale-mated situation.

Although the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys have not yet admitted defeat, they are planning new schemes to block collapse in an attempt to create a favorable position. The U.S. imperialists have the capability to increase their troops and provide additional financial aid and much more new war materiel. Although the lackeys have collapsed at the basic township and hamlet levels and are beginning to waver and become confused at the upper ruling levels, they still have an administrative system from the province to the district level. They still control thousands of strategic hamlets and dominate an entire one-half of the people of South Vietnam. The main force troops, civil guard and militia have only begun to become disorganized, confused and disintegrated in morale, and they still have the capability to conscript soldiers. They still may carry out many schemes to counterattack the movement, as expressed primarily in the 1964 McNamara plan.

Although the 1964 plan is a step backward in the enemy's passive position, if we do not fully recognize his insidious and cunning nature, do not properly evaluate the enemy's capabilities and do not have a spirit of high determination and urgency, the enemy can still cause us many difficulties. Conversely, if we have a correct understanding, a high determination and urgently and fully execute the directives and resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the enemy in his passive and confused position will become increasingly more passive and confused, the enemy will suffer heavier defeats, and the South Vietnam situation will shift in a more favorable direction.
PART II

WE WAGE A PATRIOTIC WAR

FEATURES IN THE OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT SINCE THE FIRST CENTRAL OFFICE CONFERENCE WAS HELD

Since the 15th Central conference, the South Vietnam revolution has changed to a high tide of strong attacks against the enemy, causing the enemy's ruling apparatus in the rural areas to collapse and gradually disintegrate to its present passive position of serious crisis.

On the basis of the situation and the Political Bureau's resolution in January 1961, the first Central Office conference (October 1961) recapitulated the situation and defined the line, mission, course and direction of the South Vietnam revolution.

This conference marked an important step forward in the South Vietnam revolutionary movement, creating a firm foundation for advancing to new victories. Nevertheless, on the one hand, because the situation was undergoing complex changes, and on the other hand, because there was partial complacency over the new victories of the rising movement, we did not properly evaluate the level of armed intervention of the U.S. imperialists and did not fully recognize the insidious and bold nature of the Staley-Taylor plan. Therefore, when the U.S. imperialists strengthened their military forces, provided large amounts of modern war materiel and weapons and furiously carried out the Staley-Taylor plan, we temporarily encountered difficulties and a passive situation (beginning approximately from the period of April to July 1962 on the Zone 8 battlefield and successively later with difficulties during a five to seven month period on other battlefields, the most prolonged difficulties were on the Zone 6 battlefield, but the lowlands began to stabilize since the summer of 1963).

In April 1962, through struggling and the guidance of the February 1962 Party Central Committee resolution, the TV TUC [The Standing Committee of the Central Office] conference correctly evaluated the enemy's schemes, clearly recognized the expected capabilities of the South Vietnam revolution, firmly grasped the revolutionary line of absolute resistance to imperialism and feudalism and resolutely defeating the enemy's schemes and of simultaneously pursuing the political and armed aims in the three
areas. Since then, we have maintained and developed the South Vietnam revolutionary movement in an atmosphere of continuous attacks in accordance with the characteristics of the new situation.

The December 1962 Political Bureau resolution evaluated very highly the achievements of the South Vietnam revolution during this period: "... The South Vietnam revolutionary movement has advanced with firm steps and now has won great strategic victories." The Political Bureau resolution also asserted that the people of South Vietnam are waging a patriotic war in a national and democratic context. The development of the South Vietnamese people's patriotic war is a process of developing a total, national and protracted guerrilla war oriented toward the general offensive and general uprising while not abandoning the capabilities and transitional efforts of repelling the enemy on a gradual basis and winning limited victories while advancing toward total victory.

During the past two years, confronting a most powerful and wicked foe, the revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese people has undergone a winding and tortuous road and extreme difficulties and hardships but has won glorious victories in defeating the Staley-Taylor plan, the key plan of the special war waged by the U.S. imperialists.

Below is the evolution of this arduous and fierce struggle in each specific aspect:

1. **Activities and the building of the revolutionary armed forces:**

   a. **Activities.**

   In the patriotic war against the enemy's special war, the simultaneous political and armed struggles are the two primary forms of activity, coordinating with and supporting each other and increasingly developing in a strong and decisive manner until victory is achieved.

   During the past two years, firmly coordinated with the political struggle, armed activities have won many important victories, maintained its decisive and direct role in wearing down, annihilating and defeating the enemy's military forces, made a great contribution to defeating his schemes and promoted the advancement of the revolution.

   Roughly estimated over the past two years, we have worn down, annihilated, and dispersed 260,000 enemy troops, captured 28,000 weapons of all types and destroyed much enemy military materiel, and in particular
killed an increasingly greater number of American troops. In specific estimates for each year: In 1961, we killed and dispersed 51,000 enemy troops and captured 7,470 weapons; in 1962, we killed and dispersed 87,000 enemy troops and captured 9,100 weapons; and in 1963, we killed and dispersed 172,000 enemy troops and captured 12,000 weapons. In 1962, we killed, wounded and captured 258 Americans and in 1963 over 855.

In considering our attrition as compared with the enemy's, in 1961 we lost one man to the enemy's twelve and one weapon to the enemy's 14.5; in 1962, we lost one man to the enemy's 13.6 and one weapon to the enemy's 9; and in 1963, we lost one man to the enemy's 23 and one weapon to the enemy's 11.

Fighting an army of about a half million men and equipped with the most modern weapons, we have annihilated the enemy at the levels cited above, proving that our armed forces have rapidly matured.

--Because the enemy has used sweep operations, attacks, the establishment of strategic hamlets and resettlement as the primary forms of activity, our revolutionary armed forces must in order to defeat the enemy plots undertake countersweep operations, resistance to strategic hamlets and resettlement and resistance to encroachment as some of the main missions.

During the past two years, the enemy's sweep and our countersweep operations occurred in an extremely intensive and fierce manner over all battlefields, especially the Nam Bo delta battlefield since the beginning of 1962. The locations where the enemy carried out fierce large-scale sweeps were the locations where our movement was strongly developing, and the more strongly the movement developed, the stronger and more decisive the countersweep activities became. In 1962, the enemy carried out 28,468 sweeps and we resisted 3,561, meaning that the enemy carried out eight sweeps to our one countersweep. In 1963, preliminary estimates indicate the enemy carried out 34,847 sweeps while we resisted 7,440, an average of four sweeps by the enemy to one countersweep. As time went on, our victories became greater and the enemy's defeats grow more severe. We resisted the sweeps from small troop units engaged in sporadic guerrilla activities and uncoordinated types of troops to the use of companies, battalions and at times several battalions, firmly coordinating all three types of troops. While sweep operations were becoming universal on all battlefields, we wore down and annihilated small enemy detachments or evaded the large enemy units engaged in sweep operations while advancing toward resolutely resisting sweeps and achieving many victories in battles to annihilate enemy companies. There were also battles in which we annihilated nearly an entire enemy battalion and captured
weapons to supplement our own. Our troops not only defeated the infantry engaged in sweeps but also defeated many other crack specialized branches, including helicopter squadrons, the M-113 armored vehicles supported by airborne troops and coordinated with air and artillery, etc. At present, a situation in which one of our companies successfully resists a sweep operation employing one to two thousand enemy troops has become commonplace on all battlefields of Zones 8 and 9. On many other battlefields, one guerrilla squad or one local force platoon can resist an entire enemy battalion for several successive days. We not only successfully resisted sweep operations in areas of difficult maneuver but even on battlefields having a complex terrain and in the highlands and dry lowland areas favorable for the activity of armor. The guerrillas, local force troops and combat hamlets played an extremely important role in resisting sweeps.

The strong political struggle and troop proselyting movements of the masses also created advantages for the troops to successfully counter sweep operations. The famous Ap Bac victory began a strong movement to resist sweeps over all of South Vietnam. The Ap Bac victory was a lesson of great creativity, demonstrating the victorious capabilities of our army and people under any conditions. This lesson strengthened the confidence and combat experiences of the troops and guerrilla and militia forces on all battlefields. Immediately after the Ap Bac battle, many large countersweeps were conducted and many victories on all battlefields were won, and as time went on, our victories became greater. Our countersweep victories wore down and destroyed much of the enemy's manpower (accounting for approximately one-eighth of the enemy's total losses), and especially caused the morale of the enemy's troops to rapidly decline, and as time went on, the enemy's sweep activities declined and were not as furious and bold as before. The countersweep victories heavily frustrated many of the enemy's military and political schemes, especially the scheme to establish strategic hamlets and resettle the people, creating conditions for the total development of the revolutionary movement.

Due to their determination to defeat the enemy, our troops displayed much initiative in countersweeps, and in such things as building strong fortifications, resolutely holding to these fortifications to form stubborn combat supports for days against the enemy even on battlefields having for us an unfavorable terrain, in concentrating, dispersing and active mobility which was closely coordinated with the activities of guerrillas, combat hamlets and in other forms of attacking the enemy simultaneously and over broad areas causing the enemy to become extremely confused and passive. In Zone 8, not only did the creation of strong combat-ready fortifications become a regular mission of the troops, but the people and guerrillas in all areas had
a fairly uniform movement of building ready fortifications for the troops. Consequently, wherever the troops moved, they needed only to carry out small repairs on the fortifications in order to immediately fight. Especially in countersweep operations, our troops knew how to concentrate their efforts in totally annihilating enemy units, especially the evil commando units directly oppressing and controlling the masses in the local areas, thus effectively supporting the movement.

The above accomplishments were achieved by our troops and people through a process of training and through many arduous challenges.

Since the beginning of 1962, TUC \[the Central Office] and the Military Party Committee have paid attention to leading the troops in countersweep operations, but because the concepts of countering sweeps were not fully grasped by Party organization echelons, while the enemy was applying new tactical forms which leadership guidance did not promptly shift to meet, our troops encountered much confusion and many units, especially on the complex battlefields, were not yet confident in the success of countering sweep operations. Since August and September 1962, active leadership has been exercised by all echelons of the Party organization not only in the ideological field but also in specific methods and experiences gained from the realities and thanks to this and the progress in the ideological and combat standards of the troops, from the end of 1962 and to the beginning of 1963, we won many victories on all the battlefields. At present, the troops, militia and guerrilla forces realize that countering sweeps is one of their primary duties and they are confident in the success of countering sweeps, are constantly and determinedly resisting sweep operations, have adopted countering sweeps as a mission to annihilate the enemy and train ourselves in effectively supporting the mass movement, and through countering sweeps were indoctrinated in improving their ideological, technical and tactical standards. This marks a great maturity of our armed forces.

Nevertheless, along with the above progress, our armed forces on a number of battlefields at the present time still do not engage in effective countersweeps and are not closely coordinating in many locations to annihilate the enemy.

Especially in 1963, after being indoctrinated and fully realizing the important significance of resisting and destroying strategic hamlets and after having resolved their ideology in highly evaluating the defensive capabilities of the enemy in the strategic hamlets, our armed forces actively participated in the mission of resisting and destroying strategic hamlets and resettlement. Depending on the balance of forces between the enemy and us in different areas,
our armed forces at different levels primarily participated in eliminating traitors and attacking armed groups and enemy cadres who were establishing strategic hamlets, resettling the people and controlling the masses. In the areas where the enemy's sweeps and attacks were fierce and the mass movement was encountering many difficulties, the armed forces, including the concentrated troops of the provinces and zones, viewed resistance to and the destruction of strategic hamlets in coordination with countering sweeps as the mission of primary importance. By November 1963, there were 3,500 large and small attacks against strategic hamlets which accounted for over ten percent of the total armed activity; the number of enemy wounded and captured in strategic hamlets accounted for twelve percent of the total number of enemy casualties; and the number of weapons captured in strategic hamlets accounted twenty-five percent of the total. In locations where the movement was strong, strategic hamlets daily became targets and active battlefields of the guerrillas and local force troops in attacking the enemy to loosen, weaken, and break the enemy's control, and in the process supplementing our forces.

Along with resisting and attacking strategic hamlets, our armed forces also utilized many other rich forms to attack the enemy. Such forms as raids, ambushes and attacks on water and land traffic, outposts, and military supply depots of the enemy developed relatively well. Especially in 1963, attacks on main positions developed relatively rapidly in Zones 8 and 9. We used raids or raids coordinated with superior force strikes to destroy many positions held by from one platoon up to one or two enemy companies and in some battles, striking several positions in one area at one time. It became common for our troops to reach the standard of engaging in superior force raids to annihilate positions of enemy platoons. In the numerous battles to destroy the enemy on open battlefields in 1963, which were many more than in 1962, we regularly destroyed company after company and began to annihilate entire enemy battalions. Moreover, such forms as surprise attacks in the cities to annihilate Americans and attacks on military supply depots, airfields and commando schools also caused the enemy many losses and had a great effect. The destruction of roads and culverts also caused very many difficulties for the enemy and actively contributed to the attacks on the enemy.

In the activities of the guerrilla and self-defense militia forces during the past two years, much progress was made. The guerrillas and self-defense militia forces engaged in approximately 80 percent of the total number of attacks on all battlefields of South Vietnam, caused one-third of the enemy's total casualties and captured approximately seventeen percent of the total number of weapons attained. Activities designed to wear down, harass, maintain close contact with the outposts and enemy, encircle and resist sweeps, destroy strategic hamlets, force the enemy to surrender and withdraw, carry
out troop proselyting and armed propaganda and kill tyrants regularly occurred on all battlefields. In Nam Bo, the guerrilla and militia forces in particular, maintained an extremely important role in resisting and attacking the enemy. The movement of establishing defenses and building combat hamlets and townships increasingly developed in locations where the enemy's control and strategic hamlets were destroyed, that is, in the Western highlands and especially strongest of all in Zones 8 and 9. Due to the establishment of combat hamlets, the guerrillas in many locations carried out an effective resistance to sweep operations. There were also circumstances in which one guerrilla squad resisted for twenty-nine successive days an enemy regiment that was engaged in a sweep operation. In particular, guerrillas in many locations effectively participated in the movement to hunt down helicopters, fire on all types of aircraft and counter M-113 vehicles. By November 1963, guerrillas had shot down and damaged 82 aircraft (one-sixth the total) and damaged 78 M-113 vehicles (ten percent of the total). Guerrillas of southern and northern Ben Cat alone destroyed or damaged eleven M-113 vehicles and damaged or sunk thirteen ships (eight percent). Locations where the guerrilla movement had grown and many combat hamlets and townships were constructed were locations having many advantages for the troops to concentrate and attack the enemy and effectively resist sweeps and also were locations where the troops were victorious in resisting sweeps and where the guerrilla movement and combat hamlets and townships had conditions to strongly develop.

Much progress was made in battlefield coordination and in the coordination of the three types of troops. Forces gradually began to closely coordinate with each other although the coordination on some battlefields was still weak. A plan of united military activity had begun among the battlefields during a number of battles and on some battlefields it reached a campaign nature.

Generally, our armed activity during the past two years strongly developed at a heated and rapid rate. The victories in the armed struggle not only had a great effect in wearing down and annihilating the enemy, invigorating us, resisting and destroying strategic hamlets and resettlement, protecting the lives and property of the people and expanding the liberated areas, but also created a position for and stimulated the development of the mass political struggle movement and smashed many of the enemy's military and political schemes. The greatest weakness at the present time in armed activity is that because the movement is not yet uniform and is still weak in many areas, the enemy is able to concentrate forces on the battlefields in strong movements to attack us.
Concerning the construction task:

Along with activities, all Party organization echelons overcame every difficulty in the effort to actively and urgently build the three types of troops.

At the end of 1961, we had approximately troops over all of South Vietnam concentrated from the district level upwards with the most common unit the platoon. Only a number of provinces had company units and there were battalion units in only a number of zones and the equipment, weapons and tactical standards as well as the combat capabilities were still weak. In the guerrilla forces at that time, there were only about good weapons and a number of self-manufactured weapons, while the remainder were rudimentary and their effect was not yet uniformly developed on all battlefields.

Since then, due to the determination of the entire Party and relying on the potential capabilities of the people and the increased efforts of the higher echelons, all three types of troops developed in a relatively rapid manner with the ratio of military forces between us and the enemy increasing from at the end of 1961 to at the end of 1963. In a situation in which the enemy simultaneously carried out fierce sweep operations and attacks and furiously strengthened his forces, such a change in the ratio of forces between us and the enemy was an especially great accomplishment. Concerning unit organization, all districts now commonly have from and up while some districts have units; provinces all commonly have from and up with some provinces establishing; and all zones have organized with some established into . In the guerrilla and self-defense militia forces at the present time, we have a total of men, including approximately , and guerrillas. In all of South Vietnam, was organized. Forces directly subordinate to TWC were also developed in size. Although tactical and technical standards, command and leadership standards, training, organization and Party and political work within the units increased, the requirements of the battlefields generally were not yet attained and some units are still extremely weak. Especially in morale, the troops and guerrilla and militia forces have, in general, maintained and highly developed the glorious traditions of the people's armed forces during the war of resistance against France and have demonstrated that they are extremely worthy of the trust and confidence of the Party and people.
We strived both to attack, wear down and annihilate the enemy and actively build and develop our forces in a relatively rapid manner. Thanks to this, we made great accomplishments in the recent past. However, we still have several important weaknesses, the most outstanding one being that in the situation of building our armed forces there are still many disparities between the battlefields. On some battlefields, the ratio of forces between us and the enemy has risen to [blank] and operations have been strong and continuous, smashing many enemy sweep operations, resettlement activities, strategic hamlets and wearing down and annihilating much of the enemy's manpower, such as in Zones 8 and 9, but there are still battlefields where the ratio of forces between the enemy and us is still at a great disparity. In some locations, the ratio is only 1:10 and our equipment and weapons are still poor, activities are not yet strong or uniform and the enemy is not yet seriously stagnating. In the building of forces, there are times when and locations where we emphasize the development of guerrilla and militia forces and neglect the building of concentrated forces. There are also times and locations in which the reverse is true and the development of the types of troops was not balanced. There is a common situation at the present time on many battlefields in which there are fewer guerrilla and militia forces than local forces, fewer local force troops than concentrated troops and few concentrated forces as compared with the requirements of the revolution. This situation has had a great adverse effect in promoting the overall movement throughout South Vietnam.

In general, we have made great accomplishments in the activities and the building of the forces during the past two years. The role of the armed forces competently supported the political movement of the masses and strongly stimulated the forward movement of all aspects of activities. On a number of battlefields, the leadership of armed activities coordinated with the political struggle demonstrated a sharp vitality and the combat morale of our army and people was extremely solid.

Nevertheless, in view of the overall requirements of the movement at the present time, our armed struggle and armed forces are still weak and unbalanced. On a number of battlefields, the role of the armed forces has not yet been developed to the proper level, the three types of troops have not yet been well coordinated and the building rate is still slow. As a result, we have not yet fully exploited the recent enemy situation of collapse and crisis in promoting the advancement of the movement to greater victories.

The cause behind the above shortcomings and weaknesses was that we did not yet fully realize the characteristics of the new situation, did not properly evaluate the enemy's weaknesses and crisis and did not yet fully recognize the capabilities of the masses to attack the enemy more strongly and continuously.
2. The political struggle of the masses:

The first TWC [the Central Office] conference evaluated the accomplishments and experiences of the political struggle and set forth the basic and decisive role of the political struggle movement and the political forces of the masses. The political struggle and forces were not only the foundation for the armed forces but constituted an important force in surging forward together with the armed forces to continuously attack and gradually rise up and place the administration in the hands of the people through advancing toward the general offensive and general uprising to win decisive victory. The conference also set forth the missions of further promoting the political struggle simultaneously with the armed struggle, of continuously attacking the enemy and the winning of greater victories.

After the conference, the political struggle movement of the masses increasingly developed on a wide and strong scale from the rural to the urban areas, attracting the participation of millions of the masses from all levels. Meetings were held with from 5,000 to 7,000 and up to tens of thousands of people bearing slogans protesting sweep operations, oppression, U.S. aggression, resettlement, the establishment of strategic hamlets, the enemy's control, etc.

However, since February 1962 when the U.S. imperialists intensified their armed intervention in South Vietnam and the war proceeded on a large and fierce scale with the enemy using many forms of blatant oppression, the leadership of a number of Party committee echelons in the political struggle movement became ineffective and confused. In some locations, the movement was half-heartedly carried out or weakened and the pursuit of gains and illegalities occurred in many locations. Even in T[Zone] 2 and T[Zone] 3, where the movement was strong, the direct struggle by the masses was difficult and in a declining state.

The causes in the leadership field were that committee echelons did not yet firmly grasp the struggle guidelines in applying them at a reasonable, favorable and proper level and primarily because we did not clearly evaluate the enemy, did not properly realize the characteristics of the present patriotic war, did not fully understand that the political and armed strategic guidelines go hand in hand, and thought that in the war the political struggle movement of the masses would be difficult to maintain and develop and that the political struggle would no longer be a fundamental and decisive struggle form.
Discerning these weaknesses, the April 1962 conference of TVTUC (the Standing Committee of the Central Office) examined the situation and affirmed that the political and armed struggles must be pursued simultaneously; this caused the Party organization echelons to clearly recognize that the political struggle still was capable of existing and developing throughout the revolutionary struggle process. At the same time, a number of specific shortcomings in leading the struggle were corrected. Since then, the movement has been continuously maintained and developed, employing more incisive slogans and more active and effective forms.

Roughly estimated, in 1962 throughout all the rural areas of South Vietnam, there were more than two million people directly protesting against the U.S. armed intervention in South Vietnam, against oppression, resettlement and the establishment of strategic hamlets, and demanding democracy and social welfare. Almost twenty million participated in the movement to resist and destroy strategic hamlets and resettlement and over seven million people carried out the building of combat hamlets and afforestation. Compared with 1961, the number of masses participating in direct struggles in 1962 was only one-half but the movement's quality was higher and there were many more widespread forms of struggle. In particular, the urban movement among the intellectuals, bourgeoisie and overseas Chinese developed fairly well and the movements to resist and attack the Americans and demand peace and neutrality were stepped up.

Throughout 1963, the political struggle movement of the masses steadily rose in all three areas.

In the rural areas, the movement was intense, decisive and continuous, especially in resisting resettlement, strategic hamlets, oppression and sweep operations. In direct struggle, the movements to establish defenses and build combat hamlets and townships were simultaneously developed. Especially since May 1963, through the phases of opposing the oppression of the Buddhists to the 20 July phase and the phase of overall activity since September 1963, the movement continued to steadily, strongly and uniformly progress. In particular, in the struggle against the oppression of the Buddhists, tens of thousands of compatriots from many provinces, including thousands of Cambodian compatriots, monks and nuns, went to Saigon-Cholon and other cities and towns to violently engage in protest.

More worthy of attention is that since the coup d'etat of 1 November 1963, the political struggle movement of the masses in the rural areas has become increasingly decisive and rich, with the masses openly destroying strategic hamlets, denouncing the crimes of the Americans and their lackeys, demanding that the Americans return home and demanding peace and neutrality.
In many lowland areas of the Zones 5 and 6, the compatriots spontaneously arose to destroy the enemy's control and punish the tyrants.

In 1963, nearly three million people in the rural areas engaged in direct and indirect struggle. In T [Zone] 2 and T [Zone] 3 alone, sixteen [sic] million people participated. An outstanding characteristic of the political struggle of the masses in the rural areas was the active and creative coordination between the political and armed struggles. The combat achievements of the troops provided good occasions for the masses to move forward in demanding the return of their husbands and sons, in opposing oppression, in demanding democratic rights and social welfare, and in successively attacking the enemy, causing him to become extremely confused and helping us to increasingly develop additional victories.

Along with the movement in the rural areas, the struggle movement for social welfare and democracy in the urban areas was maintained and developed, especially the struggle movement against the oppression of the Buddhists, which attracted hundreds of thousands in demonstrations with intense and courageous spirits and steadily higher slogans. This movement spread throughout all the large cities of South Vietnam and strongly developed a mass atmosphere against the enemy's fascist dictatorial policies.

After the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat, the struggle movement in the cities moved forward. Along with the intense struggle movement for social welfare and democracy, there were also the movements demanding freedom of speech and attacking Diem's lackeys, which attracted the participation of many levels, and, in particular, the trend toward peace and neutrality widely developed among the upper classes and even among the ranks of the enemy's soldiers and administrative personnel and this is becoming a movement to attack the enemy's colonialist and bellicose policies. Following this, since December 1963 in Saigon as well as in many other cities, hundreds of thousands of workers, including more than 30,000 enterprise workers, have continuously protested under many forms to demand social welfare and democracy and unyielding strikes and occupation of firms, especially in the protests of the VINATEXCO and VINATEFINCO workers which received the victorious response of many enterprises and local areas.

The realities of the mass political struggle movement during the past two years have clearly proven that:

In the patriotic war of the South Vietnamese people at the present time, the political struggle truly constitutes a blow to the enemy and plays as fundamental and as decisive a role as the armed struggle. The political and armed
struggles are two forms of struggles which are connected together and affect each other throughout the developmental process of the revolution until the general offensive and general uprising.

Due to its awareness of this fundamental matter during the past two years, the South Vietnam Party organization led the political struggle movement in attaining increasingly greater achievements.

Nevertheless, the movement at the present time still has a number of serious weaknesses:

-- The movement, in general, is still not uniform with its strong development in Nam Bo but still weak development in Zone 5 and although some zones and provinces have strong movements, there are still a number of Catholic and ethnic minority areas and areas under the enemy's control where the movement has not yet risen on par with the favorable situation.

-- Although the urban movement has risen, it is slow in spontaneity and extremely lacking in a leadership nucleus.

-- The masses are continuously and strongly participating in the struggle but mass organizations are still small and weak.

The weaknesses noted above indicate that along with the overall progress in realizing policies and guidelines, there are still some local areas and cadres that have not yet truly and fully understood the role of the political struggle, have not absolutely trusted in the political struggle capabilities of the masses, who at times overestimated the enemy and lacked boldness in attacking the enemy and are therefore not yet truly and determinedly promoting the political movement and building the political forces of the masses.

3. The movement to resist and destroy strategic hamlets and resettlement of the people:

The establishment of strategic hamlets and resettlement were the key elements of the Staley-Taylor plan. The main method used in establishing strategic hamlets and resettling the people was the armed forces in sweeps and attacks to overthrow the people's struggle movement and to annihilate our armed forces, Party and revolutionary bases.

In defeating this scheme, we had to mobilize the masses, build the revolution's strength, promote the political and armed struggles, carry out
troop proselyting, smash the sweep operations, counter repression and oppression and wear down and annihilate much of the enemy's manpower.

The enemy established strategic hamlets and carried out resettlement since the end of 1961, vigorously expanding the pilot areas since January 1962. Because we at first did not properly evaluate the enemy's capabilities in carrying out this scheme, our leadership in confronting it was lacking in specific fields and efforts were not concentrated. Since the beginning of 1962, we discerned the enemy's vigorous activities and placed resistance to and the destruction of strategic hamlets and resettlement as prime tasks. The April 1962 conference of TV TUC (The Standing Committee of the Central Office) profoundly analyzed this plot and formulated a plan of mobilizing the entire Party, army and people in the effort to carry out the tasks.

The struggle movement of the masses to resist the strategic hamlets and resettlement strongly and decisively arose in many locations despite the enemy's barbarous terrorism and suppression. The armed forces actively participated in resistance and destruction. In locations where the enemy constructed hamlets, the masses inside them rose up in coordination with the actions of the armed forces outside in resisting and destroying the enemy. However, because the enemy concentrated his armed forces in sweeps, attacks and terrorism, our resistance and destruction activities were not as yet strong or concentrated to the proper level, the mass movement was not uniform, and the resistance to sweeps by the troops and guerrillas was still weak. Therefore, the enemy attained many results. In locations where the enemy established strategic hamlets and resettled the people and because our installations and cadres were ejected and agents inside were not yet reestablished, the enemy was able to control the masses in some locations. At that time the mass movement was weak in many locations. The more the enemy concentrated his efforts to vigorously expand the strategic hamlets and resettlement in all areas, the more difficulties the movement encountered and in some locations by May 1963, the situation had still not favorably changed.

The more the scope of the strategic hamlets and resettlement was expanded, the more clearly the enemy's weaknesses were revealed. The contradictions between the enemy and the people became steadily more acute, the enemy's internal control became lax, and the enemy's armed forces were dispersed to safeguard the strategic hamlets. After a period of decisive and arduous contention, we better understood the enemy, the masses were better able to meet the challenge and gain additional experiences, leadership was determined, the cadres maintained close contact
with the strategic hamlets, installations within the strategic hamlets were reconstructed and the armed and paramilitary forces became more mature, all of which created favorable foundations in effectively resisting and destroying strategic hamlets and resettlement.

Since the end of 1962, the political and armed struggle movements have developed, many enemy sweeps and attacks to resettle the people and establish strategic hamlets were smashed, the masses within the strategic hamlets were mobilized to rise up and strongly resist and destroy the enemy, outside forces actively participated in support and military proselyting, especially in the proselyting of the combat youth, self-defense forces and the local oppressive forces was strongly stimulated. We advanced from regular and sporadic destruction activities to phases of activities in which some locations concentrated forces to destroy outposts and enemy's ramparts and fences in order to change the strategic hamlets into combat hamlets, and in other locations, the enemy's internal control was weakened and the masses stood up to struggle for social welfare and democracy. During the period from October 1962 to April 1963, the enemy established approximately 4,000 more strategic hamlets for an overall total of more than 7,000. Nearly one-half have been destroyed, of which approximately 500 have not yet been rebuilt. Since July 1963, the political and armed struggle movements have strongly increased, causing the enemy to be defeated in many fields. There are increasingly more conditions for attaining further results in the resistance to and the destruction of strategic hamlets and resettlement. At this time, not only is the enemy not building additional strategic hamlet areas but a number already constructed, including a number of strong hamlets near the enemy's important political and military positions, are being steadily destroyed. After the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat, the masses in many locations spontaneously rose up to topple the traitors, destroy strategic hamlets and utilize all overt and legal forms in destruction actions. The movement to resist the strategic hamlets and resettlement is still violently occurring in many locations, including the lowlands of Zone 5, the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien and the border areas under the enemy's heavy control, where the masses are rising up to effectively resist and destroy.

By December 1963, we had destroyed 3,800 hamlets, including 1,200 destroyed and changed into liberated areas. The movement to destroy strategic hamlets is strongest in Zones 8 and 9. In other areas since the end of 1963, the movement also began to successfully develop, such as in Zone 6 where a majority have been destroyed, Zones 4, 5 and 6 where the masses have risen up to destroy the enemy's control over the strategic hamlets, to lower the enemy's prestige, return to their former locations, etc.
Due to the effective resistance to and the destruction of strategic hamlets, the area of our control has expanded, material resources have been supplemented and our political and armed struggle position has been strengthened, causing the enemy increasingly greater difficulties and confusion.

The enemy is presently striving to build and strengthen the key remaining strategic hamlets largely in areas where the movement is still weak, in areas close to the cities and towns, close to the strategic areas, in areas of the ethnic minorities and religious followers and in plantation and land resettlement areas, which are locations the enemy still has the capability to control and where he has the conditions to swiftly increase his forces to counter uprisings by the masses in their resistance and destruction actions. Nevertheless, in view of the enemy's weaknesses and our increasingly expanding political and armed struggle movement, with the rich experiences gained during the recent past and with full and proper implementation of guidelines and the active use of forces, we are confident that we now have the capabilities to smash large numbers of the remaining strategic hamlets.

The defeat of the strategic hamlet and resettlement schemes will have the effect of defeating the enemy's pacification plan. Therefore, the resistance to and the destruction of strategic hamlets and resettlement must be recognized as tasks of a strategic nature and that in order to attain results, the enemy's schemes and capabilities must be properly evaluated, a high determination is required, correct and timely leadership must be provided and the Party's rural policies and lines must be promptly grasped. In resolving the question of land for the peasants, there are locations where a lack of differential treatment existed in offending the interests of the middle level peasants and with regard to the landlords. In locations where many land interests have been won for the peasants, the control and utilization of the land was confused at times. The developmental course of the liberated rural areas where the land has been basically returned to the peasants was still not clear. The above problems have had an adverse effect on the problems of unity in the rural areas, developing the peasants' active revolutionary enthusiasm, isolating the enemy, repelling the reactionary power of a number of stubborn landlords in the puppet administrative apparatus and in promoting the revolution.

4. The military proselyting task:

The resolution of the first TWC [the Central Office] conference set forth the requirements of military proselyting in South Vietnam, which were to step up propaganda activities to undermine the ideology of the enemy's soldiers,
mobilize to disrupt the enemy's ranks along with operations to wear down and annihilate the enemy, destroy the enemy's paramilitary forces along with resistance to conscription, the motivation of soldiers' relatives, officers, American military personnel, etc. The military proselyting conference at the end of 1962 summarized the situation and experiences of several previous years and set forth a number of specific policies in the proselyting of enemy military personnel.

In general, we made a number of important accomplishments during the past two years and military proselyting still maintained its position as one of the three prongs in attacking the enemy. In locations where military proselyting was good, many enemy reinforcements were rendered ineffective, the enemy's sweep operations, terrorism, attacks and killings were restricted, and the enemy's soldiers were being attracted to sympathize with, support and participate in the mass struggles, particularly in the movement against resettlement, the establishment of strategic hamlets, the spreading by the enemy of chemical poisons and in the movement to resist and attack the Americans. Such forms as cease fires during Tet and major holidays throughout South Vietnam or in each local area increasingly demonstrated that the justness and superiority of the revolution have gained the warm response and praise of nearly all enemy soldiers. The struggle movement among main force and civil guard soldiers steadily developed. In 1963, five d [battalions] and three main force c [companies] refused to go on sweeps or carry out reinforcement missions. Mutinies doubled those of 1962. Defeatism and anti-war attitudes increasingly developed among the soldiers and several mass surrenders recently occurred with at times 60 to 70 soldiers in one company surrendering after fifteen minutes of combat. The trend toward peace and neutrality strongly developed in the army. The two military coup d'etats which occurred in a period of less than three months also demonstrated to an extent the deep hatred of the war and the resistance against dictatorship and the subordination of the South Vietnamese army to the Americans. In particular, the proselyting of the enemy's paramilitary forces, especially the combat youth, militia and ethnic minority armed youth, has attained many results. The enemy's paramilitary forces have been routed in many locations and many combat youths have participated with the masses in destroying strategic hamlets, have served as fifth columnists, or revolted and carried over their weapons to the revolutionary side. Roughly estimating, during the two years of 1962 and 1963, 99,200 enemy soldiers deserted with 1,634 weapons of all types. As compared with 1961, the number of desertions in 1962 increased by 10,000 men, and the number in 1963 was much greater than 1962, over 45,000 men. As compared with 1962, the number of weapons brought over to us during 1963 increased by 188 weapons, not counting the 4,147 weapons we obtained from fifth columnists. Combat youth organizations were seriously disrupted, in some
provinces up to 95 percent. Preliminary estimates indicate that in 1963, 23,000 of the enemy's combat youth and paramilitary forces were annihilated and 38,000 disorganized.

The ethnic minority forces have also been seriously dispersed and at one time an entire 1,000 recruits deserted all at once. In the beginning of 1963, the militia of one township in Quang Tri brought over all their 100 weapons to the revolutionary side and began an uprising and anti-American movement among the militias of the ethnic minorities. In 1963, the Darlac tribesmen three times delivered 147 weapons to the revolution. In Tra Vinh, the Khmer armed forces rebelled many times and brought over loaded weapons to the revolution, and commando, civil guard and combat support platoons mutinied bringing all their weapons over to the revolution (in 1963 in Tra Vinh, 1,200 weapons were obtained, more than 600 as a result of military proselyting).

In general, the enemy's declining morale and the developing concept of national independence and the aspirations of peace and neutrality are favorable conditions for us in promoting the military proselyting task. The worker-peasant-soldier alliance slogan has been gradually achieved in many respects. Nevertheless, compared with the overall capabilities and favorable conditions of the movement, there were still few results from military proselyting. The strong political and armed struggle movements of the people and the enemy's unprecedented deep internal dissensions that led to two military coup d'etats were extremely good opportunities for us to promote the military proselyting task, but we still did not establish the foundations or actively organize mutinies to collapse the enemy in more serious crises; this was a great weak point. Although the worker-peasant-soldier alliance attained results, it still was not a strong political motivation slogan within the enemy's military ranks and did not help to create the foundation for important mutinies and uprisings within the army when the opportunities existed.

In performing the military proselyting task, the education of the class viewpoint for the cadres, Party members and people to clearly distinguish the dividing line between ourselves and the enemy was still not given due attention. Along with a number of accomplishments, there remained a number of soldiers and their families who still did not realize the shame of losing the country or fighting for the enemy against the people. The anti-conscription tasks among the youths, pupils, students and all levels of the people were still not strongly developed. Consequently, not only was the enemy able to fully compensate for his military attrition but he also organized several new units. The proselyting of officers, which is
closely related with the proselyting of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, civil servants, landowners and upper classes and is a task of both a military proselyting and Front nature, was still not actively achieved. And because we did not pay due concern to this task nor prepare a specific policy to assure their and their families' rights, status and interests, the results attained were still limited.

The reason our military proselyting task during more than two years did yet strongly develop on a par with the favorable situation was that the understanding of all echelons concerning the role of military proselyting was still incomplete, the propaganda and indoctrination tasks among the enemy's soldiers were still not profound, and in particular, the education and motivation among the masses of our Party's military proselyting policies, ethnic minority policies and class concepts were not widely disseminated.

5. The civilian proselyting-Front tasks:

The civilian proselyting task requires us to mobilize the ideology and awareness of the masses and organize and mobilize the masses to participate in the patriotic war under all forms and with all capabilities. The Front task requires us to build and expand the Front from the central to the local levels, disseminate the policies of the Front to the rural areas and the areas of the ethnic minorities and foreign nationals, and to develop the influence of the Front within and outside the country, etc.

Concerning the results in the civilian proselyting task, we carried out propagandizing and indoctrination of the masses, created a hatred for the enemy and motivated the masses to struggle in many relatively broad areas. The accomplishments by our Party in the struggle, in attacking the aggressors, in military proselyting, land reform, production, force building, the improvement of living conditions, etc. were also the accomplishments of the civilian proselyting task. Due to these accomplishments, we have brought the South Vietnam revolution rapidly forward in a firm and strongly developing manner.

Nevertheless, we still have several serious shortcomings in the civilian proselyting task:

In the organizational field, all of South Vietnam has approximately 800,000 organized masses (400,000 peasants, 330,000 women, 100,000 liberation youth, etc.) double the number in 1961 with the majority still largely located in Zones 8 and 9, but compared with the total number of people we control (approximately seven million) and the requirements of
the masses' struggle movement, this number is still too low. Within the
cities, the number of organized masses is still too low and committee
echelons often initiated movements more than concerning themselves with
organizing the masses. In the rural areas, the movement is strong and the
majority of mass organizations have recently been formed at the primary
level, but even here every task concerning the masses was assumed by
Party chapters.

In many locations, committee echelons established mass organiza­
tions just to have a means of accomplishing assigned tasks rather than
serve the rights of the masses and they have not relied on the conscientious
struggle solidarity of the masses in order to build the organizations. Many
locations frequently and confusingly changed the organizations, causing the
masses to lose their enthusiasm, determination and effectiveness in the
organizations.

Concerning the fields of indoctrination and ideological motivation,
the strengthening of the political awareness of the masses was not strongly
and continuously carried out, the motivation of the masses was not carried
out in depth, particularly in enemy and contested areas where the masses'
understanding of the revolution was still low, a passive attitude of waiting
for opportunities existed, and the initiative and capabilities of the masses
were not utilized in the struggle against the aggressors for national salva­
tion. The youth are a key force in participating in the army, guerrillas,
serving on the front lines, and in struggling against all oppression and
terrorism, every reactionary policy, and the degrading culture of the enemy.
The enemy is presently engaged in a scheme to turn the youth into a counter-
revolutionary force. The activities of the youth are closely connected with
the revolutionary undertaking, but the Party's youth propaganda, education
and motivation tasks were not strongly implemented, especially regarding
the youth in the areas still under enemy control where we have not yet
encouraged a profound hatred for the enemy or enabled the youth to clearly
recognize their path and responsibility concerning the nation and class. The
motivation of the youth to join the army, participate as guerrillas, carry
out corree labor, resist conscription and participate in combat was done
with much difficulty. Concerning the workers and laboring masses, especial­
ly the enterprise workers, who constitute the vanguard forces of the revo­
lation, their motivation and organization did not receive due attention. The
workers movement made more progress than previously but still was the
weakest point in the civilian proselyting task, greatly affecting many aspects
in the national liberation undertaking and preventing the worker-peasant
alliance from becoming firm and strong.
Now as before, in the task of motivating the masses, the mobilization of the masses to support the political struggle and armed activities is still emphasized while aspects of improving and raising the material and spiritual conditions of the masses are neglected and sometimes not at all attended to in a number of locations.

The cause of these shortcomings was that Party committee echelons did not clearly recognize the role of the civilian proselyting task or deeply study how to promote the civilian proselyting task. Because many locations did not properly pay due attention to each phase of activity and each mass organization, the capabilities of the masses therefore were not developed.

Concerning the Front task during the past two years, we have made much progress and also gained many accomplishments in building and organizing, devised policies to assemble widespread forces, set forth many specific policies and appropriate propaganda struggle slogans, such as the four urgent national salvation demands, and the peace and neutrality theme increasingly attracted the sympathy and support of the masses, especially in the upper classes, among foreign nationals and among military and civil personnel in the ranks of the puppet administration. In the propaganda task and in implementing the Party's Front policy, there was at one time overemphasis on overexceeding the goals in winning over objectives and in the unification of action in motivating the ethnic minorities and religious masses, but we have attained many results in defeating the enemy's schemes to take advantage of the ethnic minorities and religious followers. Not only has the role of the Front been heightened within the country but the prestige and influence of the Front has spread throughout the international arena, and not only does China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries sympathetically support us, but many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have also indicated their warm sympathy toward us and many international organizations and countries have movements in support of us.

Nevertheless, the national solidarity Front has not succeeded in gaining the sympathy of every tendency and force against the Americans and their lackeys. The Front's anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation banner has not yet attracted a majority of the upper classes in the cities nor the middle classes, including the bourgeoisie and intellectuals, and personnel within the enemy's ranks. They realized we were strong, that we will surely win, and they think that the reason we are at the present time doing nothing concerning them is but only a tactic and policy; they do not clearly recognize their future, rights and status if they join us and we have not succeeded in mobilizing their enthusiasm for the revolution. Party factions having a bourgeois democratic tint and created by our Party and Front committees at all echelons, especially from the province level upward,
have not formulated plans and patterns of activity to broadly assemble forces and have not succeeded in enlisting representative personalities who would have the effect of attracting the upper classes. The movement among the urban petty bourgeoisie was still weak and the workers movement did not become strong enough to serve as the nucleus of all urban movements. The weak urban movement and the improper carrying out of the task of motivating the basic masses and of the concept to win over the upper classes are the reasons for the above shortcomings.

While much progress has been made in the task of motivating the religious and ethnic minority masses, it is still weak and has many weaknesses, especially in the tendency to overemphasize the winning over of the upper class strata and neglect the deep study of the basic masses, disregarding political indoctrination and ideology and the building of revolutionary installations, although our efforts to win over the upper classes have attained good results.

The organizations of the Front have not yet taken shape in many areas, working procedures have not been prescribed appropriately and the role of the Front was still vague in many locations.

In general, our attitude concerning the Front task has not been resolute or firm in some areas.

6. The tasks of building the revolutionary base areas and the management of the liberated rural areas:

a. The task of building the revolutionary base areas in the highlands.

One of the enemy's schemes during the past few years has been to strike deeply and occupy our base areas, regain the liberated lowlands, and create a cleared belt to isolate the highland base areas. Resolute and decisive combat has been carried out by the people and armed forces in order to protect, build and expand the revolutionary base areas.

Although the time periods were different, generally speaking, from 1962 until mid-1963, the base areas from Zone 5 to Southern Tay Nguyen [Western highlands] and Eastern Nam Bo were occupied and lost population. In Zone 5, the enemy resettled 65,000 highlanders and in Southern Tay Nguyen, the population in areas under our control declined from 50,000 to 20,000 people. In Eastern Nam Bo, the enemy built a number of positions deep in the base areas and relocated 145,000 people. At present, after a period of fierce combat, the highland base areas of Zone 5 and Eastern Nam
Bo have been restored to nearly the situation which prevailed in mid-1961, that is, control has been regained over lands with 500,000 people and a number of locations have been expanded over previous levels. In Western Tay Nguyen, although only 20,000 people are presently under our control, the base areas have been strengthened in every respect and the mass movement in the strategic hamlets has been established and improved. Because the masses in some locations have broken out to return and work in their old fields, good prospects exist for the expansion of the base areas. One characteristic to be mentioned is that during the past few years, although our forces were newly established and the movement was still weak and inexperienced whereas the enemy was concentrating his efforts in counter-attacking and destruction, we still maintained and strengthened the base areas, the masses resolutely resisted the enemy through many arduous challenges, famine and suffering were overcome, the awareness levels and combat spirit of the masses were increased, the guerrilla warfare movement was expanded, and the armed forces were strengthened in every respect. In the base areas of Zone 5, Southern Tay Nguyen and Eastern Nam Bo, mutually supporting positions were formed and communications corridors between the local areas were constructed, although in some sections they were not firm.

A serious weakness of the highland base areas was that because the contested areas were not broad, they were still in a surrounded and isolated position. This very weakness caused the highland base areas many long-term difficulties. During the past few years, the slow development of the movement in the Trung Bo and Eastern Nam Bo lowlands prevented the armed and political movements in the highlands from rising up strongly. To the present time, the mobile base areas have not been firmly pushed ahead and this represents an important shortcoming.

While the highland base areas at present have many difficulties and shortcomings, the overall position of the movement is rising, our armed forces are maturing, the armed and political movements in the lowland and urban areas are developing, the enemy must passively confront us everywhere, and we have the capabilities to exploit manpower and material resources from other battlefields to support the activities in and the building of the highland base areas. The highland base areas connect with North Vietnam and hence with friendly countries and within these areas, there are also several heavily populated locations which have a level terrain and good production and where the employment of concentrated troop units is possible. If we exercise proper leadership, are determined to overcome difficulties and weaknesses, develop strong points and exploit available capabilities, it is possible to turn the entire highlands area into a firm revolutionary base area and a location for annihilating much of the enemy's manpower.