b. The task of building revolutionary bases in the lowlands.

During the past two years, the lowland base areas have encountered extremely many difficulties. Since the summer of 1962, nearly all the lowland liberated areas suffered some occupation and some areas were narrowed and nearly lost. In Western Nam Bo, only 1,528 of 2,543 liberated hamlets remained and we only controlled 1,189,000 people. In Central Trung Bo, only 63 of 74 townships remained and only one million people were under our control. From mid-1962 to the beginning of 1963, the Dong Thap Muoi [The Plain of Reeds] base area was attacked, seriously destroyed and divided by the enemy's using occupation outposts and canal systems. In Eastern Nam Bo, only twenty-two of thirty-five liberated townships remained and we only controlled 205,000 people. The situation was similar in Zone 5 where the highest level of control prevailed at the end of 1962 with nearly 500,000 people and in mid-1963 with only 360,000 people. The lowlands of Zones 6 and 4 have both been seriously threatened with occupation. During this process of encroachment, forms of contention were violent, the people incessantly engaged in fierce political and armed struggles everywhere, and we wore down and annihilated much of the enemy's manpower. In Zone 9, when the enemy occupied one location, we expanded another and in Zone 8, the period of occupation lasted only a few months. When armed countersweep operations were victorious and the movement to resist and destroy strategic hamlets became stronger, the enemy forces suffered serious attrition and annihilation, and especially since the July 1963 phase, we successively restored and increasingly expanded the liberated base areas. There are now in Eastern Nam Bo twenty-six completely liberated townships with 280,000 people. In Central Nam Bo, we control 1,900 hamlets, including 100 liberated townships with 1,800,000 people. In Western Nam Bo, there are 2,600 hamlets (out of a total of 3,120) with thirty-six liberated townships consisting of two million people. Compared with the end of 1961, the liberated base areas in the Nam Bo delta have not only expanded but have also been strengthened. The awareness levels of the masses, the armed forces and the political movement all were improved both in quantity and quality. In particular, many more higher quality combat hamlets have been constructed, creating favorable conditions for the armed forces to wear down and annihilate the enemy. Economic interchange relations between the enemy and our areas is a characteristic and outstanding strong point of the revolutionary movement of South Vietnam. In the lowlands of Zone 5 since the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat, we have restored the base areas to a level nearly equal to that in 1962 with a stronger composition and we have at present a strong momentum to expand, destroy the enemy's control and destroy the strategic hamlets. In the lowlands of Zone 6, although some areas were
surrounded, isolated and fiercely attacked by the enemy, and penetration bases were restricted, the remaining locations met the challenge and our armed forces improved in quality.

Generally, the lowland base areas, especially in the Nam Bo delta, through arduous challenges have been maintained and are developing to higher levels, mutual support links between penetration bases have been gradually formed, and especially at present, we have many wide penetration bases of up to 400 to 500 square kilometers with many people and much property, and which, due to their proximity to cities and towns and communications and liaison corridors in the lowlands, have become stronger.

c. **The task of managing the liberated rural areas.**

The liberated rural areas have expanded and their management has become an urgent mission. Management must be successful before the livelihood, property and improved standard of living of the people can be assured and before the capabilities of the people to attack the aggressors, safeguard their villages, save the country and build a new life can be mobilized and developed.

This task in the beginning encountered many difficulties but in time the political and armed struggle movements were extensively developed, the liberated areas were enlarged, the Party and mass organizations were strengthened, and our concepts of management were improved. We gradually made many accomplishments in the fields of education, uniting and mobilizing the people to resist the aggressors and safeguard their villages, maintaining order and security, protecting lives and property and giving due concern to the material and spiritual lives of the people, such as in resolving the land problem, production guidance, cultural studies, sanitation, etc. Due to this, although the enemy was continuously encircling and attacking, the living conditions of the people in the liberated areas increasingly became easier to endure than in the enemy-controlled areas, especially with regard to spiritual activities.

In the areas of the ethnic minorities, although we made many efforts in the guidance of production, cultural indoctrination and preventive sanitation, because there were few people there, the economic standards were low, there was a lack in mobilizing people and property to support the revolution, and the interchange of goods was not well resolved, many difficulties were encountered in the material living conditions of the people and the ideology of the masses consequently was often tense. This situation has not been improved to the present time.
Concerning the forms of management, the January 1961 Political Bureau resolution stated that in the highland areas and a number of lowland areas where the enemy's administration has disintegrated, we should use local Front committees to carry out all missions of maintaining order and security, building the people's solidarity, production, improving the standard of living, etc. The first TWCCentral Office] conference affirmed: In the liberated areas controlled by the people and in the contested areas where the movement is strong, Front committees have the responsibility of managing the rural areas. Committee echelons have implemented this resolution but because the township and district Front committees were not strengthened and their working procedures were not improved, a situation existed in which Party chapters undertook this task instead, and the management of the liberated rural areas was carried out only on a limited scale with regard paid to a number of problems of an urgent nature, while many long-term, important requirements of the people remained unresolved.

The task of the liberated rural areas is actually an administrative task which must embody two aspects: Assuring democratic rights for the people and exercising dictatorship toward the enemy. These two aspects have become crucial in the relatively stable liberated areas. However, these two aspects at present have not been fully expressed in the management task as implemented. This situation affected the enthusiasm of the people in the liberated areas and the people were not strongly motivated to safeguard their villages by resisting the enemy.

Recently in a number of local areas, pilot projects of electing liberation councils and establishing people's liberation committees were initiated. This form had the effect of enabling the people to clearly recognize their mastership rights and created enthusiasm among the masses.

7. The urban task:

In the liberation of South Vietnam, the urban task has a strategic position both throughout the period of waging revolutionary war and later in the construction period. For the enemy, the cities are a safe rear area, a location where manpower and material resources are reserved to support the war, and also the final combat rampart. For us, only with a strong urban movement can a position be created for the overall movement to develop and the capabilities exist to advance toward the general offensive and general uprising.

During the past few years, the enemy arrested people, carried out conscription, evicted people and burned their homes, increased rents,
established strategic neighborhoods and blocks and terrorized and oppressed the people in the cities. The living conditions of all strata of the people here were constantly tense, hard and wanting in many respects, especially in regard to the working masses and laboring people.

The struggle movement of the masses during the past two years was maintained and unceasingly developed. Mass protests for social welfare and democracy continuously occurred under legal and semi-legal forms. Some struggles had as many as a thousand or several thousand people participating with some attracting the workers of several enterprises. Some received the support of tens of thousands of workers or laboring masses. Most intense, fierce, and continuous were the movements against eviction, the burning of homes, the establishment of strategic neighborhoods and blocks and the anti-American movement. These movements attracted the support and struggle participation of thousands of soldiers and their families. The pupil and student movement was also maintained and steadily developed. Approximately one-third of all middle level pupils and students participated in protests, noteworthy of which was the protest against the trial of Le Quang Vinh which caused widespread repercussions within and outside the country.

Since July 1963, the struggle movement against the oppression of the Buddhists and the movement of the students and pupils strongly and drastically developed, spreading over all the large and small cities in Trung Bo and Nam Bo. This movement was not only geared for religious interests alone but also had anti-regime political concepts. This movement continued to develop until the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat and increasingly expanded under the slogans for social welfare and democracy, against dictatorship and the war and demanding peace and neutrality. In particular, the people's movement has recently developed in a continuous fashion and is developing under violent protests of a high and broad nature, uniting many areas and enterprises.

The mass movement caused additional deep crises for the ruling regime in South Vietnam. It was primarily due to this movement that since May 1963, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique had ordered the majority of its armed forces back to safeguard the cities, especially Saigon-Cholon, and the armed and political movements in the rural areas had additional conditions for favorable development. The more the rural movement developed, the more it adequately supported the urban movement, stimulated the enemy's internal dissension, forcing him to use a coup d'etat to settle accounts. We have taken advantage of the coup d'etat to win many additional victories in the rural areas, thus increasingly stimulating the strong development of the urban movement. This movement has caused extreme confusion among the puppets, increased their internal dissension and created the threat of new coup d'etats. The present
situation is a great favorable opportunity for the further widespread advancement of the urban movement.

The victories and public opinion of the masses in the cities have had a great influence on the international scene and on the rural movement and have competently supported the political and armed struggle movements in the rural areas.

Concerning Party leadership, during the past few years and especially in 1963, much more attention was given to the urban task, the working guidelines and formulas for the urban tasks were improved, Party installations were constructed and expanded, and the condition of disclosing secrecy was reduced. At present, installations in the large cities have been more or less restored and expanded, and mass organizations have concentrated the masses more broadly than in the past.

Nevertheless, the mass movement in the cities was still largely of a spontaneous nature, the motivation of the masses' ideology was still shallow, Party leadership was still weak and at many times did not firmly grasp the requirements of the immediate mission and long-term building of installations, and especially, the workers movement was still weak and did not become a firm nucleus for the overall movement. Consequently, although the movement of the middle classes recently developed in a heated fashion, it did not have a strong foundation. Our greatest shortcomings in the urban task were that the Party's installations were too weak; leadership organizations within the cities in many areas were still new; there was a small number of cadres engaged in urban work, many did not have a background in the internal city movement and a situation existed in which some were not truly interested in urban work; springboard areas into the cities were still largely not assured; the understanding of the role of the urban movement by Party organization echelons was not at the proper level and leadership was not appropriately intensified. Mainly due to all this, we did not take advantage of favorable conditions in the past to win greater victories for the movement.

8. The economic and financial task.

During the past few years in order to resist the enemy's special war and along with promoting the political and armed struggles, TWC [The Central Office] correctly set forth the role of the economic and financial task in the revolutionary undertaking to liberate South Vietnam and a number of accomplishments have been made in all aspects. However, the lower the echelon, the more shortcomings there were in ideological understanding and specific achievements.
a. Concerning production: At the same time they were actively resolving the land interests of the people, Party organization echelons paid attention to leading the people in unifying their mutual assistance in order to increase production, especially grain production, improve harvests by increasing yields, expanding cleared cultivated areas, multicropping and improving technology, and to actively protect production against natural disasters and the enemy's destruction, especially in resisting the enemy's schemes of resettlement, the establishment of strategic hamlets and crop destruction. The strongest movement with regard to land clearing, multicropping and improved technology occurred in Zones 8 and 9. In Zone 8, the people carried out multicropping on more than 60,000 hectares and in some locations worked three crops during one year. The ethnic minority areas of Zones 5 and 6 developed forms of farm labor and exchange labor, restored and developed handicrafts, such as ironwork, weaving, paper production and the use of medicinal herbs, supplied the compatriots with salt, cloth and agricultural implements and led in the sale of a number of local forest products. Production and self-sufficiency by agencies and groups were also strongly developed in Zones 5 and 6 and Eastern Nam Bo, and some units were completely, two-thirds, or at least one-half self-sufficient in grain. The harvest from self-sufficient production in 1963 from Zone 7, as it turned out, was able to feed 25,000 people for one year at a value of 46 million piastres. In Zone 5 alone, the results from self-sufficient production were double the quantity contributed by the highland people.

Due to increased production, the people in the liberated areas, even though encircled and attacked by the enemy, were able to maintain their standard of living and provide grain for the troops and agencies with some locations accruing reserve amounts and others even surpluses for sale on the outside. However, the production movement generally was still not developed and uniform, many of the masses' potential capabilities were not developed, economic interchange and relations between areas was not appropriately resolved, the mobilization of corvee labor had no clear policy, and the material lives of the people and troops in a number of locations encountered many difficulties. These shortcomings limited much of the combat strength and enthusiasm of the people, troops and cadres.

b. Concerning finance: Because we actively increased revenues, set forth collection policies and systems of public financial responsibility, undertook decisive reorganizations and provided guidance in rational expenditures and good budget management, collections in 1962 constituted 50 percent of the requirements (in Zones 8 and 9, collections exceeded the rate of expenditures, other zones only collected approximately one-half
the rate of expenditures and many locations collected much less). In locations where indoctrination was good, the tax system was strongly supported by the masses and although the people were poor, their enthusiasm was higher than the moderately rich for which there weren't as yet measures for their active motivation. The sources of revenue still relied on agriculture in areas under our control; collections still encountered difficulties in the cities, towns, plantations and areas under enemy control, and we still did not mobilize the many capabilities of the masses. In locations where contributions were fairly large, the living standards of the people still were not greatly affected because in these locations, the average yearly per capita agricultural contribution to the revolution was only $100\piaster$, or equivalent to only five or six percent of the total agricultural harvest of each family. Moreover, along with encouraging the people to contribute, we also encouraged the promotion of production and the living standards of the people therefore were maintained at a normal level. Because the movement was not expanded to the lowlands of Zones 5 and 6, the mobilization of the people's talents and material resources was still low. In the ethnic minority areas of Zone 5, the rate of contributions to the revolution was extremely high (in the areas under our control, collections in some locations was up to twenty or twenty-five percent of the total harvest and many people performed services for the revolution for four months during the year).

In expenditures, more progress was made than in the past in that there were estimates and accounting but they were still disorganized, passive and not yet tightly administered. Military expenditures still comprised a large part with only an extremely small percentage used in implementing tasks. Expenditures between battlefields varied greatly. In locations with fair-sized collections, expenditures were relatively sufficient and in locations with poor collections, expenditures were extremely low. Waste was also serious, financial discipline was lax, and captured war materiel was not properly utilized.

In general, there were many difficulties in our financial situation, collections were still too low and insufficient to meet expenditures, expenditures were used up as fast as they were collected, no reserves existed, and our financial situation was dependent upon the enemy's currency, therefore, it was often stagnant. The piaster continued to decrease in value, and each time the enemy changed currency, we had to accept great losses.

At the present time, our greatest difficulty is still the financial aspect, actually not because the people of South Vietnam lack the capabilities
but because our understanding of the financial problem is still incomplete and the people therefore are not actively encouraged to contribute at proper levels to support attacking the aggressor for national salvation.

c. Concerning the economic struggle with the enemy: Along with the political and armed struggles, we have led the masses in opposing the enemy's false land policies, plunder, taxation, impressment, conscription, economic encirclement, spreading of chemical poisons and destruction of property, and in demanding freedom of movement, trade and the earning of a living, maintaining economic interchange between the enemy's areas and our own, and in demanding improved living standards. Many of the enemy's schemes were thwarted, a number of the masses' vital interests were maintained, and the masses' living conditions in many locations were not upset. However, the results from the economic struggle were, in general, greatly limited and it was not widespread or developed systematically. In particular, because the problem of self-sufficient production by the people was not promoted, many necessities were purchased in the enemy's areas instead of being self-produced and supplied in our areas; the use of luxury and foreign goods was still commonplace and the concept of thriftiness was still lacking; because the circulation of goods had to follow a triangular pattern going through the enemy's areas, therefore dependence upon the enemy's economic and financial situation grew more severe. We did not have a plan for developing and fully utilizing our economic capabilities in order to gradually repel the enemy's economic influence and develop our own. Also attacks on the enemy's supply depots both to destroy enemy materiel and to supplement our own were not yet strong.

In brief, the economic potential of South Vietnam, especially in Nam Bo, has many rich resources, which offer favorable conditions for us to develop the spirit of self-sufficiency to defeat the enemy and raise the living standards of the people and troops. However, because this was a new problem and many weaknesses existed in understanding, our leadership capabilities in this field were few, and the economic apparatus was weak, we therefore were able to accomplish little.


One of the greatest victories of the South Vietnam Party organization during the past few years was in achieving the Party's land policies. If it is roughly estimated that all of South Vietnam has a cultivated area of 3,300,000 hectares, according to incomplete statistics up to the
present time, the peasants in Nam Bo alone own more than 1,300,000 hectares (Nam Bo has a total of 2,500,000 hectares). Many locations have allocated 60 to 70 percent and in some locations 80 percent of the total land to the peasants. In locations where the masses were motivated to destroy the enemy's control, land rent reductions were carried out on the lands owned by landlords and cultivated by peasants. In many locations in Nam Bo, land rents of landowners are now only 10, 15, or 20 percent with some places only 5 percent with the highest 30 percent. In Trung Bo, the amount of land rent has only begun to be reduced by 20 to 25 percent over the level prior to the August Revolution. The peasants were also encouraged and assisted in clearing lands.

During the past few years, Party committee echelons closely studied the land problem and policies, promptly corrected errors while implementing rent reduction policies and the punishment and use of property of tyrant landowners, and resolved the problem of rural solidarity. The above achievements rapidly changed the appearance of the Nam Bo liberated rural areas (two-thirds of the poor peasants have advanced to middle level farmers and only one-third are still poor or landless peasants).

The above achievements in implementing land policies are of great significance indicating that our Party has been concerned with the interests of the peasants, the main force army of the national democratic revolution. Due to this, the awareness standards and struggle spirit of the peasants have been raised, rural solidarity has been strengthened, enthusiasm among the masses has been created, and the peasants have been motivated to determinedly follow the revolution, participate in the war of resistance, develop production and wholeheartedly follow the Party. The results in achieving the Party's land policies were also the results of the national salvation war of resistance waged by the people of South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, it can also be stated that this problem was not given sufficient attention by Party committee echelons or was given very little emphasis (some locations in the liberated areas only reduced the amount of land rent by 20 percent, which was lower than the stipulated reduction level prior to the August 1945 revolution). This could not but adversely affect the motivation and mobilization of the masses in the war of resistance. Because a number of local areas did not firmly grasp the Party's rural line and policies, the resolution of the matter of lands for the peasants contradicted the interests of the middle farmers. Regarding the landowners, there were also locations lacking differentiating and judicious attitudes. Locations where many land rights were attained for the peasants sometimes led to confusion in the adjustment and use of the lands. The developmental
course of the liberated rural areas where land was basically returned to
the peasants has been unclear. The above problems have had a limited
adverse effect on rural solidarity, in developing an active spirit of revo-
lutionary enthusiasm by the peasants, isolating the enemy and repelling
the reactionary influence of a number of stubborn landowners in the pup-
pet administrative apparatus, and in advancing the revolution.

10. **The task of protection and security.**

In the recent past, the suppression of counterrevolutionary ele-
ments attained many good results, causing the disintegration and detection
of spy and espionage networks in the liberated areas, and by doing so, thus
assisting in protecting the Party, the fruits of the revolution and the political
struggle movement of the masses, and assisting in destroying strategic
hamlets and expanding the liberated areas. Particularly since the guidance
directives of TWC [the Central Office] and the all-South Vietnam security
conference at the beginning of 1963, this task developed and progressed in
many respects.

The lines, guidelines and policies of countering spying and espionage
activities were universally studied from top to bottom and a number of errors
in understanding, ideology and behavior were corrected.

Although the task of motivating the masses in counterespionage and
security maintenance was not yet coordinated and carried out widely, in
depth or continuously, many locations effectively relied on the masses to
encourage counterespionage and counterspy activities. Through training
and motivation, the masses simultaneously safeguarded secrets and skill-
fully dealt with and mislead the enemy, protected the Party and protected
the revolution in the face of every enemy scheme of arrest, beating, exami-
nation, bribery, flattery, pressure and exploitation. Many spy networks
were exposed by the masses and many people boldly denounced the counter-
revolutionary activities of their own relatives. The majority of spies
captured in 1963 were discovered by the masses.

We paid attention to reforming the old social elements in the lib-
erated rural areas. This also had a good effect on offenders and reactionary
and backward elements in strategic hamlets and temporarily occupied areas,
not only influencing, repelling and narrowing the enemy's support but also
contributing to the strengthening and developing of installations in the weak
areas, the loosening of the control apparatus in the strategic hamlets and
the defeat of the scheme to use the strategic hamlets as springboards for
developing spy networks in the liberated areas.
In a number of locations, we closely coordinated the security, military, Front and military proselyting tasks to support the armed activities and to assure secrecy in campaigns and combat.

Internal counterespionage also began to be well achieved in a number of locations. Moreover, more progress was made in professional respects and in the security task as well as in suppressing counterrevolutionary activities, in that there were investigations, collection efforts, research, classification, more effective strikes and more specific plans. Arrests, detention and reviews became less sweeping and indiscriminate than before. Open reviews also had a good effect among the masses and influenced the enemy's ranks.

Nevertheless, while correcting leftist errors, incidents of rightist tendencies occurred in many locations in the suppression of counterrevolutionary activities and in not appropriately judging those bad elements engaged in activities aimed at disrupting order in the rural areas. This also proved that the guidelines were not truly firm and that counterespionage lines and related policies were not thoroughly understood.

The areas under our control have increasingly expanded to markets, city wards, entry points, etc.; security nets in many locations have just been established, cadres were still new, professional standards and experiences still poor and the further down, the weaker these aspects become; and at present, there are many difficulties in view of the movement's rapid development.

The espionage task has an extremely great political significance with respect to the immediate revolutionary movement and especially with respect to prolonged attacks against the enemy. The objective conditions are favorable for espionage activities but because our subjective capabilities are still too weak and have not been emphasized by Party committee echelons, the task is not yet vigorously conducted. This is an extremely serious weakness in attacking the enemy.

11. The propaganda and training task.

Since the first TWC (the Central Office) conference, many important accomplishments have generally been made in the propaganda and training task:
Concerning propaganda: We have made many efforts in closely studying the Party's lines and policies concerning the masses, in educating and politically motivating all the people to continually attack the enemy both politically and militarily in order to defeat the Staley-Taylor plan and wage a total protracted patriotic war. We have set forth the basic requirements in all aspects, continuously encouraged the masses ideologically on the need to destroy strategic hamlets, carried out the political attack and military proselyting, intensified efforts to develop guerrilla warfare, wore down and annihilated the enemy's manpower, constructed combat townships and hamlets, administered the rural areas in the building up of the liberated areas, increasingly developed the revolution's influence, and we have taken advantage of the sympathetic support of all nations, especially the people in the Asian, African and Latin American countries as well as the public opinion of progressive peoples throughout the world.

Propaganda themes have increasingly received firm leadership with the aims of exposing the enemy's plots, encouraging patriotism, love of class and the courageous struggle of the people and army; the continuous indoctrination in the correction of errors and in the proper evaluation of our advantages and difficulties and the enemy's weaknesses and failures were carried out; and the prestige of the Front illustrated through the struggle accomplishments of all the army and people of South Vietnam and the Front's correct policies were promoted. At the same time, more attention was given to propagandizing the Party and to international propaganda.

In carrying out the task, many locations also demonstrated many initiatives under rich forms. The press, arts and letters, movies, photography, etc., developed everywhere and received united leadership from top to bottom. In particular, liberation radio during the past two years was established and put into normal operation and it has increasingly improved in themes and techniques in making a great contribution to informing and motivating the masses, disseminating the guidance of committee echelons to the masses, and in expanding the great influence of international propaganda within the country and throughout the world.

Nevertheless, propaganda themes did not firmly coordinate political slogans with the vital daily interests of the masses in order to improve the class awareness and revolutionary combat spirit of the masses. Current events and immediate policies were not firmly coordinated with the basic and long-term line, tactics and strategy; Party propaganda was not systematically conducted; and propaganda concerning the socialist construction of North
Vietnam, the socialist camp, the Communist and workers movement in the world and international propaganda were not given true emphasis, and counter-propaganda efforts against the enemy were still slow and lacking vitality.

The propaganda task was not truly widespread and profound, particularly in depth, and it did not promptly meet the requirements of a situation in which the movement was developing extremely fast, especially in the cities, towns, strategic hamlets, refugee, religious and ethnic minority areas, and areas still under the enemy’s firm control. In particular, the mission of motivating the entire Party and people to participate in the patriotic war was not strongly, vigorously and continuously carried out from rural to urban areas and from our areas to enemy areas. Many people are still at present indifferent toward the patriotic war, the mobilization of men and materiel has not yet developed into a strong nationwide movement, and propaganda against conscription and the enemy’s army and administration has not yet been absorbed among all classes of the people, especially among the youth, pupils, students and the ethnic minority and religious classes.

Although the forms were rich, they were not truly rapid, prompt or continuous and did not profoundly reflect the rich struggle activities of the masses.

Concerning education and culture: We have carried out united leadership in lines, programs, documents and curricula methods. In the liberated areas, general education has been fairly strongly developed; many schools and classes have been established and strengthened all the way to the hamlet level and partially resolved the study requirements of the children; and a number of locations have made efforts in opening middle level schools and a number of worker-peasant supplementary education classes. We have underlined a relatively accurate policy of encouraging the arts and letters and disseminated it throughout the Party, army and people. In particular, in the ethnic minority areas of Zones 5 and 6, a cultural and literary movement has been carried out and achieved many good results and effects.

Along with the above accomplishments, we still have a number of serious weaknesses and shortcomings:

--Mass education, the advancement toward eliminating illiteracy, and the improvement of culture among the masses, agencies and troops has not yet met the requirements or received the proper level of emphasis.
The resistance to the enemy's enslavement culture, especially the struggle against the enemy's educational lines and policies, is still weak.

Preservation and maintenance efforts have not been given attention.

The leadership over the arts and letters has not been profound or firm and artistic and cultural works have not reflected the profound, rich and broad struggles of the people and have especially failed to point up examples of the absolutely courageous sacrifices of the cadres, soldiers and people.

Concerning the training task: Since the first TWC [The Central Office] conference, we have intensified and expanded the theoretical and political indoctrination of the cadres and Party members for the purpose of raising their standards of awareness, ideological concepts, etc.

During the past few years, we have provided elementary and advanced training to more than 200 middle level cadres to assist them in leading the movement and efforts have been made in all zones in educating and training elementary and primary level cadres. The indoctrination of Party members has received more emphasis with unified program materials concerning basic problems, work experiences, policy line matters, etc. In the indoctrination of cadres, the TWC [The Central Office] paper Tien Phong has also actively contributed to disseminating lines, policies and work experiences to low level cadres.

Training themes and methods in Party schools have been more effectively improved.

Moreover, cadres of all branches have received much motivational training.

Nevertheless, the indoctrination of Party members has not been truly emphasized and promoted at a time when the majority of Party members were new and inexperienced and the indoctrination and training of cadres still did not promptly meet the requirements of the movement. Because the training curriculum and programs did not fully resolve the problems of work effectiveness for all types of cadres and did not help each cadre thoroughly understand his mission and his function, confusion was often encountered after graduation, when actual problems were faced and tasks were sometimes carried out incorrectly or not at all. An important point is that the development of methods of relying upon realistic work activities to accompany,
motivate and assist the cadres in their daily missions as well as extremely good training methods did not yet receive attention. Many locations still overemphasized the opening of schools and classes and neglected studying other training methods. Cadres engaged in the school mission largely had little understanding of the actual struggle of the masses.

In brief, much effort and progress was made in the propaganda and training task, and it made important contributions in countering the enemy's attacks and in our construction, but in the organization and leadership of this task there are still many echelons and branches which have not yet worked out their plans or are determined to overcome difficulties and obstacles in order to move forward and promptly meet the requirements of the developing revolution.

12. The Party and group tasks:

The development of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam during the past two years fully demonstrated the maturity of the South Vietnam Party organization and showed that the Party organization was strengthened and developed in every respect.

In the ideological field, although the situation progressively changed in an extremely complex fashion, the ideology of the South Vietnam Party organization clearly and constantly demonstrated a firm resolve and absolute confidence in the lines, policies and guidelines of the Party, maintained inner Party solidarity and constantly maintained close contact with the enemy and the people in creatively executing the Party's directives and resolutions, with the result that many outstanding and courageous examples appeared in the struggle process. This was the basis for our victories during the past few years and also the foundations for winning victory in the coming years.

However, within the Party organization there were also times and locations where weak points and shortcomings in the ideological field still existed. At times, we did not fully recognize the nature of the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression during the years when it was still unclear, we were not concise in ideology, and we did not motivate the entire Party and people to fully participate in the patriotic war. There were still times and locations where the application of the political and armed guidelines was not firm. Assessments were subjective at times in failing to recognize the enemy's capabilities and insidious nature or the people's great capabilities, in generally overestimating the enemy and underestimating ourselves and attitudes of prolonged dissatisfaction, fear of sacrifices and hardships occurred, in failing to maintain close contact with the masses, in failing to continuously fight, wishing for peace, wavering, etc. The ideology within
the Party organization in the future will be to encourage a spirit of over-fulfillment and striving to successfully achieve the missions assigned by the Party in order to advance toward great victories in the coming years.

Concerning Party members, in all South Vietnam at the end of 1961 there were 34,800 Party members, and at the end of 1962 there were 54,000 and 69,580 in December 1963, including 19,776 within the army, 33,465 in township and hamlet installations, approximately 5,073 female Party members and 8,130 ethnic minority Party members. A majority of the Party members came from revolutionary backgrounds, have undergone challenges in tasks and combat and have displayed good ideology. A serious weakness is that the number of Party members is still small, its development is slow compared with the capabilities of the movement, their distribution is still not uniform, especially with regard to Party members at the primary level, those living in areas still under the enemy's control, in the cities and among the ethnic minorities and religious believers, and there are still too few females Party members. Party members have also suffered much attrition, some through combat but also through desertions due to the inability to withstand the prolonged and arduous fight.

There are also locations with good experiences in developing new Party members, such as through the mass struggle movement in selecting outstanding elements, the holding of Party indoctrination courses, then leading and developing them in their tasks and admitting them as Party members all at once. However, there still are many Party organizations which have pursued daily tasks and have neglected to develop additional new Party members.

In the management of Party members, there were also many locations which did not satisfactorily carry out admission procedures, the transferring of official Party members, the assignments of old Party members, etc., and shortcomings still exist. The training activities to raise the political and work standards so as to strengthen ideological concepts have been given more attention than before but still have not met the combat requirements at the present time.

In primary level organizations at present, South Vietnam has 4,400 Party chapters of all types, of which one-half is located among the masses and the other half in the army and agencies; this is an increase of 50 percent in the overall total from that at the end of 1961. However, there are still extremely few Party chapters in the cities, strategic hamlets, plantations, land distribution areas, enterprises, important areas and areas still under the enemy's control. Development in this regard has been slow
and in some locations nearly nonexistent. The leadership standards of Party chapters as compared with previous levels have made much progress in accomplishing missions and in relationship to the masses, but there are still many shortcomings in grasping policies, methods and work procedures, and in thoroughly understanding the overall tasks.

All Party organization elements have paid attention to the tasks of the recruitment, training, and promotion of cadres. At the present time, South Vietnam has approximately 3,700 cadres with standards equal to those of district Party committee member levels and upward and there are 18,000 at the chapter Party committee member level (not counting the number of cadres in the army). The ideological standpoint of the majority of cadres has improved and much progress has been made in the carrying out of the lines, guidelines and policies and in work experiences. There are also a number of cadres whose ideology is not firm in the arduous, changing and complex fight and are constantly confused. Attitudes of vanity and status and errors in daily activities and behavior have also appeared, which were caused by poor ideological and indoctrinational work, but through discovery and correction good changes have been made.

During the past two years, the leadership apparatus of the Party has been improved, especially in the Party committee echelons, but in locations where the movement has not improved, Party committee echelons are still few in number and are of poor quality; in many local areas, a situation still exists in which cadres are assigned from other locations, returning cadres still account for a high percentage while there are few local cadres, especially Khmer cadres. Specialized branches of the Party, including the major branches, such as military, finance and economy, organization, military proselyting, etc., are all still weak and lack many cadres. Much progress has been made in Party organization echelons' working procedures in regard to the collective and democratic aspects, in maintaining close contact with lower echelons, in discovering problems and in promptly recapitulating experiences. However, a situation still exists in which committee echelons work in a dispersed fashion lacking concentration; there are still occurrences of division; democratic elections have not been implemented within many parts of the Party; and in some locations, leadership agencies still are far removed from the masses and thus do not have close contact with the movement.

In general, much progress has been made in the Party's tasks and thus the leadership of the Party organization has been strengthened, but compared with requirements of the revolution, the development of the Party organization is still not in pace. Given the present capabilities of the movement, especially in Zones 8 and 9, and the present ideological standards of
the cadres and Party members, if we urgently undertake the tasks of building the Party and cadre training, surely the Party organization will become stronger and the revolutionary movement will more strongly develop.

Compared with the growth of the Party, the Working Youth Group has recently been fairly well developed. By December 1963, the Group had 65,160 members (including 13,000 in the concentrated forces). Compared with the end of 1961, the total number of Group members doubled but if compared with the overall movement and the number of Party members, the number of Group members is still too few. Nearly all Group members exhibit strong qualities, have a high combat morale, enthusiastically and diligently engage in work, and are ready to shoulder every mission assigned by the Party regardless of the level of difficulties and dangers. There are also shortcomings in the task of developing the Group in that the training of Group members has not been carried out to a great extent and has not promptly met the requirements of the movement. The Group's organizational system has not received a unified development, and thus the Group has not yet developed its full key role in the overall movement. The development of the Group has been slow, and the number of female, ethnic minority and religious group members is still extremely low. Basic level Group units in cities and towns, plantations, land development centers, enterprises and in areas still under the enemy's control are extremely few and weak. If the leadership of the Group by the Party is given more attention, the Group's effect on the overall movement will be much greater.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

During the past two years, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys have waged a special war in South Vietnam on the largest scale known in the world situation at the present time. With the Staley-Taylor plan, the enemy initiated an extremely savage and total counterattack against the patriotic war of the South Vietnamese people. He has been highly determined in concentrating all force and efforts and has even solicited the material and moral support of a number of sympathetic countries in the Southeast Asian bloc to wage an experimental war aimed at destroying the South Vietnam revolution within a period of eighteen months.

The South Vietnam revolutionary movement still had many shortcomings until the end of 1961, but with the correct line of the Party Central Committee and the resolute struggle spirit of the army, people, cadres and Party members in South Vietnam, we have waged a protracted and total
patriotic war of all the people. Developing the country's indomitable cour­
ageous traditions and overcoming every difficulty and hardship to defeat
the enemy, the people of South Vietnam have created many rich forms of
struggle.

The Staley-Taylor plan to pacify South Vietnam within eighteen months
was basically defeated. Not only was the enemy unable to resettle two­
thirds of the people in strategic hamlets as intended, but many strategic
hamlets were destroyed by the people, many became liberated areas, and
many became combat villages in strongly resisting the enemy. Not only
was the enemy unable to destroy our armed forces and revolutionary agencies,
but on the contrary, we resisted, smashed and destroyed much of the enemy's
manpower; the morale of the enemy's army steadily declined, and the revo­
lutionary forces rapidly matured. The political struggle movement of the
people was maintained and developed, the scope of the struggle steadily
widened, struggle slogans were increasingly of a higher level, and the
struggle forms became increasingly stronger. The struggle movement
spread throughout the rural areas and cities, concentrated many levels
of the people to strongly participate, and it took advantage of the participa­
tion of many enemy soldiers and administrative personnel. Maintained and
developed by our people, the political and armed struggle movements led
to an increasingly stronger and more widespread position throughout the
rural and urban areas, causing the enemy to become confused, passive,
panic-stricken and to seriously collapse, although our and the enemy's
specific positions on each battlefield differed in respect to strength, and
in some locations and at times, we were weakened and difficulties were
encountered. The revolutionary movement strongly rose up over all of
South Vietnam and the enemy's internal contradictions strongly developed.
In a period of less than three months, the Americans were forced to carry
out two coup d'états in an attempt to save the situation and gather their
forces in resisting the revolutionary movement of our people. However,
these coup d'états have caused the ruling regime of South Vietnam to more
seriously collapse and there is no escape at the present time. Not only
has the lackey puppet clique become panic-stricken and disintegrated but
even within American ruling circles, an attitude of panic and doubt in vic­
tory has occurred. A number of Americans and even the French imperialists
and a number of partisan countries of the U.S. imperialists have differing
opinions on how to get out of the stalemated situation in South Vietnam.

The victories of the South Vietnamese people during the past two years
are victories of the people's war against the special war of the U.S. imper­
ialists, victories of the guidelines on the simultaneous political and armed
struggles, and victories of the correct revolutionary lines of our Party.
These victories have changed the balance of forces in South Vietnam in a
manner favorable to us and opens new prospects. These victories have fully demonstrated the awareness standards and the spirit of resolute combat, courage and perseverance of the army and people of South Vietnam, the maturity and determined-to-win spirit of the South Vietnam organization, and the potential of the South Vietnam revolution. These victories have also shown that we firmly have the basic factors to determine victory in the patriotic war, and enable us to clearly recognize the specific steps gradually leading to total victory. The victories of the army and people of South Vietnam are at the same time the victories of the army and people throughout Vietnam, are of great significance in the protection of socialist North Vietnam, and are a great contribution to the liberation of the oppressed peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Nevertheless, the South Vietnam revolutionary movement still has many shortcomings:

--Although the political movement is strong and widespread, it is not uniform and many locations are still weak. The political forces in the mass organizations and even in the liberated areas are still narrow in scope, are not yet highly mobilized, and are not precisely meeting the requirements of the revolutionary movement.

--Although much progress has been made with regard to the armed aspects, it has not been strong in both quantity and quality; the guerrilla warfare movement is not uniform, the concentrated forces are few, and the armed forces have not reached the proper level, especially in strategic positions.

--Fairly successful changes have recently been made in the movements in the urban and vital areas, but basic level organization and leadership is still weak.

--The base areas still have many weaknesses and the liberated areas have expanded, but guerrilla development, the tasks with regard to the masses, economic leadership and protection and security are not yet truly good.

--Although fair improvements have been made in the Party organization's quantity and quality, there are still many shortcomings as compared to the requirements, especially in regard to installations which are not uniform, an apparatus which is weak, and the shortage of cadres.
Although the enemy has been seriously defeated, he still has many capabilities and is planning new destructive schemes. The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are striving to use every form and strategem to savagely destroy the revolution and cause us many new difficulties. The war between us and the enemy is presently evolving fiercely.

We must clearly recognize the enemy's new schemes and our shortcomings, strive to highly develop our strong points and victories, not become complacent or satisfied and also not become timid and afraid of difficulties and hardships, wholeheartedly oppose rightism and passivism, strive to rapidly build and strengthen the revolutionary forces, thoroughly develop the position of continuously attacking, and fully carry out the missions set forth by the Party Central Committee.

20 April 1964

TV CHIN NAM (Standing Committee of the Central Office)