THE POLITICAL BUREAU'S ASSESSMENT
OF THE SITUATION:
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY
GENERAL NGUYEN CHI THANH,
20 NOVEMBER 1964
Terminology Used in the Document

Anh Sau (Brother Sau) Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh who was the leading figure in the Communist organization in South Vietnam from late 1964 until his death in July 1967.

Bac Huong (Uncle Huong) Probably designates the Political Bureau of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee.

Cau Vu (Aunt Vu) Probably designates the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party.

Anh Tam (Brother Tam) Probably designates the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN).

The document was seized by U.S. forces in Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, on 13 May 1970.

The document was classified TOI MAT (Top Secret) by the Communists.
A Summary of the Ideas of Bac Huong as Disseminated by Anh Sau

(Document not to be Disseminated)

Recently, Bac Huong met not only to discuss the problems of South Vietnam and North Vietnam, but the entire world situation as it relates to the evaluation of the balance of power between us and the enemy throughout Vietnam, especially in South Vietnam.

I. An Assessment of the Situation

Bac Huong recognized that the world situation consisted of two major points:

1. The world situation during past years, as it relates to the balance of power of the international Communist movement, is to the advantage of Marxism-Leninism rather than revisionism. Although the situation develops in a complex manner, it is to the advantage of the South Vietnamese revolution (This was an observation made prior to the removal of Khrushchev).

2. Bac Huong especially discussed and recognized the fact that the world situation in 1964 accented many advantages for the world revolution, that imperialism was at a disadvantage, and that the United States was rushing into a worsening situation in the international arena. Following are the major points:

(a) The conflicts between one imperialist and another were revealed to be far more widespread than before. The most salient indication of this was the struggle for control and resistance to control among the imperialists. Bac emphasized that following the second world war, the United States introduced the Marshall Plan as an aid policy to control the other imperialists, including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan, and so forth; and that the forceful struggle by these countries against that U.S. policy was specifically in opposition to the control of markets
and raw materials by the United States and in opposition to U.S. capital. That situation caused changes to take place in the balance of power within the imperialist bloc at a continuing disadvantage to the United States. Some of the imperialist countries which had been crushed during the second world war were now in competition with the United States for profit. The imperialist United States, which had greatly expanded during the war, now encountered many crises and problems which placed it heavily in debt. This is explained by the fact that De Gaulle turned against the United States suddenly after many years when imperialist France had depended upon the United States.

It is clear that the internal situation among the imperialists is presently very different from the years during which United States imperialism was carrying on the Korean War. At that time, United States imperialism used the banner of the United Nations to lure 16 countries into sending troops to Korea. However, the imperialists are without that capability in South Vietnam at present. The disastrous failure of the recent journey by Cabot Lodge speaks loudly for that fact. It also gives additional proof that it would be very difficult for the United States to attack North Vietnam because if it did so, it would have to attack China as well; and it would have to fight China at a time when it does not have the capability of allying with the imperialist United Kingdom and France so that it would surely suffer a greater failure than when it attacked North Korea.

The world revolution has expanded to a point where it is causing conflicts among the imperialists to become fierce and those conflicts are coming home to roost in the imperialist United States and causing it to suffer continuous failures and many problems.

That situation has created a great objective advantage for the revolution. As Lenin said, "We are living during a period in which the widespread conflicts of the imperialists are a direct military advantage to us."
(b) United States imperialism is much more isolated than before. Although the United States is prosperous, it is in a far more complex situation than ever before. It must be concerned with handling problems on many political fronts:

The policies of the United States have caused social conflicts in the United States to become profoundly apparent, and the struggle of the people of South Vietnam has especially led to internal dissension within the United States. The United States had to face up to opposition forces in the United States but this was different than the problems faced by the ruling class in France while it was carrying on a war in Vietnam. At that time, it appeared as though there was no conflict within the ruling class in France but there were relatively clear conflicts between Bidault and Mendes France right up until the end of the war. Many different inclinations toward resolving the problem of South Vietnam have now appeared in the United States: There is the Nixon-Goldwater idea which is to win victory at any cost; the Johnson-Lodge-Dean Rusk idea which is to continue the special war in South Vietnam as a means toward victory; and finally, there is the Morse-Mansfield idea, which is to end the war. We had previously anticipated these ideas but they have emerged earlier because United States imperialism is losing heavily in South Vietnam.

The second political front the United States must cope with is that of its alliances. The military blocs (SEATO, NATO, and CENTO) are presently shakier than ever and conflicts over economic competition are developing broadly within the blocs. This is a very complex problem and it has seriously isolated the United States. The anti-U.S. domination forces, led by De Gaulle, are counter attacking forcefully. De Gaulle has the political and economic forces to attack the United States. The two-pronged attack by De Gaulle has been primarily aimed at Asia and Latin America.
This problem is closely related to South Vietnam and to our resistance. As the United States becomes more deeply involved in South Vietnam, its interests throughout the world are greatly affected because France, Japan, and West Germany are anxious to regain their losses. We previously anticipated these events but did not expect that they would emerge so early.

The third political front which the United States must cope with is the neutral and nationalist countries. This is a very perplexing problem to the United States because these countries stand between the two sides. The United States is plotting to control the economies of neutralist countries but these countries want to win the right of economic independence, while the socialist countries are prepared to help them and to cause the failure of the United States in Egypt, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Some countries follow the socialist bloc and some countries follow the French. Faced with that situation, the aware people in the United States recognize that the isolation will get worse if they stay with the puppets. The United States has also recognized that not only do the nations monopolized and controlled by the United States have the power to disagree, but that they also have the necessary objective conditions to resist it with material strength. The United States was very embarrassed over the Congo problem because if it did not help Tshombe, he could not survive; yet if it helped Tshombe it would be more isolated and more violently opposed. That is a problem which we must study in order to determine its full application to the further isolation of the United States because it is a delicate problem. In fact, there have been countries opposed to China and the South Vietnamese revolution who have been isolated from the nationalist countries in Asia and Africa.

The fourth, and most powerful, political front which the United States must cope with is the world revolution. The anti-United States revolution, in major and minor forms, is broadly expanding throughout the world and includes the people of the middle and capitalist classes. The existence and location of anti-United States movements is of great concern to the United States.
The forces of socialism grow stronger every day. Not only does the Soviet Union have a first class military force but China has the atomic bomb and a powerful military force. An Asian country with such military power must drive the United States crazy.

In short, the political situation of United States imperialism is very different than it was 5 or 10 years ago. Although it is still a powerful imperialist, the United States has been faced with many conflicts and it has many weak spots.

We should not complacently underestimate United States imperialism. However, we must recognize that we are capable of progressively winning victory over the United States in the common revolution throughout the world and in the revolution in South Vietnam.

(c) The world revolution is developing very well and to the disadvantage of the United States. It broadened constantly in 1964. Throughout 1965, 1966, and in the future it will cause the U.S. to be blocked and overwhelmed. United States imperialism will surely lose in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The position of the United States has wavered in the face of the political situation wrought by the current world revolution. There has been a tendency among the U.S. capitalist class to more wisely search for a way out for U.S. imperialism. The power of China has overturned all U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia. The intelligent, commentators in the United States advocate not only change in individual parts of its policy but rather a total change in policy. There are those who believe that if the United States insists on staying with the puppets in Taiwan and does not establish relations with China, it will be more isolated and will face disastrous failure.

In view of the current situation, United States imperialism has hundreds of international political problems which it cannot resolve, such as the Japanese problem and the De Gaulle problem. During a recent trip to Japan, Bundy was forced to admit that U.S./Japanese relations were stormy. The foreign minister of Japan answered, "There is a storm in Japan at present,
but that storm will pass." The United States is very concerned because Japan continues to carry on trade with China and because China maintains a trade delegation in Japan. De Gaulle stands in the forefront of the counter attack against the United States. The United States is the center of all conflicts in the world and all gangs are taking advantage of this by wearing an anti-United States banner as though it were in fashion.

The United States has a number of policies about which it must think. In the United States there is the Cuban problem; in Asia there is the Chinese problem; but the leading problem is that of Vietnam. Some capitalist politicians said during the second world war that Japan with only 7 divisions in the Pacific and was able to occupy all of Southeast Asia, and with regard to the "Viet Cong" 10 divisions ought to be enough. On 5 August, the United States sent hundreds of planes of various types to attack North Vietnam. They failed and that showed us the true capability of the United States.

These are fundamental weaknesses of United States imperialism which those who follow revisionism cannot recognize. We properly evaluated United States imperialism and are therefore very determined with the revolution. Especially, with regard to the revolution in South Vietnam at present, an analysis in depth will illuminate the following issues:

1. Does United States imperialism dare to attack North Vietnam? Can the peace in North Vietnam be maintained? We are certain that given the relative balance of power between us and the enemy at present, United States imperialism does not dare to attack North Vietnam and that the peace in North Vietnam will surely be maintained, unless the United States goes insane. This is true because to attack North Vietnam means to attack America and this means a confrontation with the entire world revolution. Also, De Gaulle is standing behind the back of the United States searching for a way to gain the interests now held by the United States. If it attacks North Vietnam, United States imperialism will be defeated.
such an observation allows us to more boldly undertake the liberation of South Vietnam, where we are entirely capable of winning victory.

II. Predicting Enemy Plots

1. The Vietnamese revolution took a major step forward in the past: In North Vietnam, the building of socialism develops daily and in South Vietnam, especially during 1964, the campaign went well. There was continuous and forceful progress in Nam Bo and a great deal of progress in Region 5. The imbalance of the campaign between Region 5 and Nam Bo has been resolved to some degree. That is quite significant.

Although there were many agricultural difficulties in North Vietnam in 1964, there was some expansion and this created an additional material capability for other efforts. Although the people of North Vietnam are poor, their revolutionary spirit is very high. The fifth of August was proof of that.

Following are some of the special characteristics of the present situation in South Vietnam:

(a) The international policy and effort of the United States relative to the South Vietnamese problem have failed miserably in the past. The journey by Cabot Lodge, taken to campaign among the satellites for support of the war in Vietnam, was not pleasant. The only active response for support of the United States came from such worthless places as Taiwan and Thailand. Some countries openly opposed the United States policy. The majority of countries demonstrated a lack of interest. Lodge was most angry when he went to France. Not only did he not get to meet the Chief of State or the Prime Minister but he was told by the French foreign minister that the situation in South Vietnam gave even more evidence that the French policy was correct.
(b) The U.S. lackeys in South Vietnam are more isolated than ever and the internal conflicts have become extremely violent. During the resistance against France, the French lackeys in Vietnam were in conflict but never to the degree that it is happening in South Vietnam today. During the previous war of aggression, France did not lose control over military affairs until it was defeated at the border (1950), that is, when our forces were concentrated into divisions. The United States lost control earlier in South Vietnam, that is, as soon as our forces reached the battalion level.

The new war has a special feature in that the United States is relying upon the lackeys. But that support is very weak as opposed to the Korean war when the United States was relying upon a group of relatively strong lackeys. The lackeys in South Vietnam at present are madly killing each other everyday. It is clear that the enemy is deteriorating rapidly and that we are becoming stronger. That fact more clearly proves that the United States has no hope of defeating us in the special war.

(c) The rise of the revolutionary movement causes the tendency toward peace and neutrality to expand at all levels. The revolution has come of age and is creating conditions for the appearance of decisive steps toward victory. We must seize and take advantage of this opportunity to act.

2. Based upon an analysis of the above-mentioned balance of power, we can predict the following possibilities:

(a) Some U.S. militarists have talked about attacking North Vietnam. But to do so, as we know, is to attack China and this would mean that the enemy had changed its strategy; that it had shifted from a special war to a new war with global connotations (meaning a war which would attract some countries to participation on a large scale rather than becoming a total world war in which both sides were fighting each other). Such a war could take place within the current situation only if the U.S. power structure went insane, or by mistake. Therefore, it can be said that this possibility can be just about eliminated. However, we must maintain vigilance and be fully prepared to guard against it. The military adventure of 5 August cost the enemy militarily and politically because the world supported us and the enemy
is more seriously isolated. The enemy does not have the forces available to attack both North and South Vietnam. However, if the enemy madly attacked North Vietnam, there would be nothing to fear because the enemy would be more rapidly defeated.

(b) The enemy could shift to a neo-colonialist war in South Vietnam from the old colonialist war and not only bring in military advisors and personnel but thousands of troops as well. This capability exists at this time. The introduction of thousands of troops into South Vietnam would not only present difficulties to the United States in South Vietnam but throughout the world. If the United States did introduce troops into South Vietnam they would be primarily army. Therefore the entire 7th Fleet would be stuck in its position and many other areas of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans would be exposed. This would allow the liberation movement in other areas to greatly expand, and so forth. During the Algerian war, France brought in 700,000 foreign legionnaires and these, plus 100,000 native soldiers, could not defeat the Algerian people. So even if the United States brings troops into South Vietnam, it cannot defeat us in a prolonged war. Such an action would expose even more the colonialist nature of the United States. We would surely encounter difficulties but not to the same degree that they did in Algeria (Algeria's forces had previously been organized only up to the company level and it is completely different among our forces in South Vietnam). Therefore, this possibility is still very slight. However, we must be prepared to take the initiative. If it happens, we will still win even if it takes 5, 10, or 20 years.

(c) The enemy may continue the special war with greater skill and flexibility. However, this will also be very difficult for the enemy because although he can be more flexible and can bring in some more troops, he must also rely upon the lackeys, who are very weak and are, therefore, also very limited in their scope in the war in South Vietnam. However, we must recognize that the United States has the necessary material bases to carry out two plots. We must continuously take the initiative in every respect so as to prevent the enemy from overwhelming us. In this way, the enemy will not maintain its interest and will not have any faith in victory.
The primary problem facing the United States at this time is finding a way out of the South Vietnamese problem. The enemy has lost its high spirit already, and it will be difficult for him to continue the war until victory.

(d) The enemy might consider negotiations this issue is to be discussed only at the regional party Standing Committee level and is not to be widely discussed. Goldwater is violently opposed to De Gaulle's policy while Johnson and Dean Rusk are somewhat opposed. As for Lodge, when he went to France, he said that the South Vietnamese problem must sooner or later be resolved by political means but that this was not the time (It is true that it is not the right time because we have not yet forcefully attacked.) It is obviously of no advantage to the United States for the war to be prolonged for 5 or 10 years. But at this point, it is not yet prepared for negotiations. The powers that be in the United States have considered this possibility but when they do, they think in terms of preparing for new plots to resist us, such as the establishment of a dissident army, preparing buffer zones, and so forth. The enemy does not think of negotiations in terms of his withdrawal but rather in terms of our withdrawal and getting rid of us. Therefore we must be totally vigilant. We must be prepared to fight to win and if we act superficially or recklessly, we will suffer the consequences. The enemy continuously explores us, wanting to know our policy on neutrality: Is all of North Vietnam to be neutral or only South Vietnam? We merely show a lack of interest and act as though it is of no concern. We say only that we will fight to the end and that we will win.

The slogan calling for step by step victory is a very good one and an appropriate one, which everyone can accept, including the enemy, the revolutionary masses, and even those of other persuasions. That slogan can effectively isolate the U.S. to a high degree. However, the problem facing us at this time is not the problem of negotiations but rather the problem of winning victory in negotiations. This is a problem which effects changes in the
balance of power and actually one of what must be done
to win victories at the proper level. At a time when
we have not had any victories such as that at Dien Bien
Phu and when the enemy is putting forth the issue of
negotiations, the entire problem of negotiations is very
complex and it cannot be simplified.

We must act in a manner appropriate to the present
balance of power without regard for image or ideological
problems and we must be closely organized. The entire
issue will be resolved by our strength and we must win
larger victories.

III. Policies

This time, Bac Huong will not discuss lines of major policies
(as was done in previous directives) but rather will address and introduce
some specific policies.

General Policy:

1. With regard to North Vietnam, the enemy will be more
provocative in its special war strategy. For the past 3 months, the
enemy has not used paratroopers and attacks against the bases have
been few. The enemy's plan is to devote a great deal more attention
to striking lines of communications, including highways and water­
ways. In addition, the enemy will plot to establish reactionary political
elements within North Vietnam. However, the enemy will encounter a
great many problems. The provocations at sea are conducted primarily
by the South Vietnamese and the 7th Fleet is used only as a show of
force and for patrolling. It is not used for provocations because the
enemy fears a loss of political influence.

Our policy in North Vietnam is primarily to build up the economy
and to maintain our vigilance and combat readiness. If attacked by the
enemy, we will mobilize the entire army and all of the people to fight
and destroy the enemy and to completely cope with the provocations.
However, with regard to coping with the provocations of the enemy,
there must be a balance. If he takes one step, we take one step. With
regard to defense against such attacks as the United States has already
conducted against North Vietnam, we will cope with them as we have
done in the past. If the enemy takes stronger action, we will cope with
that action more strongly.
With such a policy for North Vietnam, we will acquire the conditions through which we can greatly strengthen the material and spiritual forces of South Vietnam. Bac Huong and Cau Vu consider that the revolution in South Vietnam is in a tense period in that conditions exist in South Vietnam for rapid progress in the campaign to change the balance of power. That is why the leadership must motivate the people of North Vietnam to devote a great deal more attention to the revolution in the South.

2. In South Vietnam, we assert that the strategic ideology is to be prepared to cope with the worst that might happen, that is, that the enemy might widen the attack to North Vietnam and transform the war in South Vietnam into a limited war. This means that we must be ideologically prepared for a prolonged fight, that we cannot be hasty, that we are unafraid of sacrifice and adversity, and that the more we fight the stronger we become and the more we win.

At the same time, with regard to the special war which is now in progress, we must be totally skillful in our policies and we must know how to concentrate our forces upon resolving key problems in order to win victory within a period of time that is not overly long.

The prolonged war position and the skillful concentration of forces for the purpose of winning progressive victories in a period of time that is not overly long presents the leadership at all echelons with many extremely complex problems which will require the greatest possible foresight on our part if we are to cope with them under any and all conditions.

The determination of the problem of long-term fighting rests on that strategic ideological position (It is necessary to fully understand such fundamental problems as politics, arms, the countryside, the cities, guerrilla attacks, and so forth). However, we must at the same time recognize that 1965 will bring new problems, problems which will arise earlier or later than we predicted, in order that we can skillfully create and take advantage of opportunities.

Bac Huong emphasized: In order to win under conditions where the enemy is rapidly deteriorating while we are not yet strong enough, we must fully understand the key problems in the mission.

Following are some key problems:
(a) Strengthen military forces so as to destroy the enemy; dissipate the enemy's manpower much more; draw the enemy in and attack everywhere; draw the enemy in and attack at the same time so that he will collapse (in operations and in troop proselyting). Bring up the particular problem of a given situation for discussion and do what must be done to make the problem clear, as well as the solutions. If reasonable and possible, resolve the problem appropriately yourself. The balance of power in each locality must be known, including the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and us. It is necessary to plan so as to allow us to shift our forces in order to acquire numerical superiority over the enemy at a fixed period of time. This can be done by strengthening our forces in every respect while destroying, weakening, and paralyzing the enemy.

The war in South Vietnam is presently being conducted on both the political and military fronts. The forward movement of the political campaign at this time is a very fundamental and urgent issue. However, at the same time, we must strengthen military forces quickly so that when a situation arises (for example, the enemy raising the issue of negotiations), our forces can be expanded half again as much, by double, or by triple on a crash basis, depending upon the place, so as to allow for a complete change in the balance of power to our advantage. With regard to operations, local forces, especially main force units, will conduct relatively large battles.

(b) Quickly reinforce the effort in the cities, especially Saigon, Hue, and Danang. The strategic position of the effort in the cities is clear. In the long run, it is very important and in the short run, it is vital. Pressing the expansion of the campaign in the cities has had a concomitant effect upon the campaign in the countryside. There have recently been campaigns in the cities which were not led by us but which were rather generated by the masses or by anti-government gangs which advocate serious reforms.
That situation must be quickly overcome as stated in the recent directive from Bac Huong. It is presently possible to expand the movement in the cities very rapidly and a pattern may emerge where one day is equivalent to 20 years. However, in order to do well, all party committee echelons must more properly recognize the role of the movement in the cities, and must concentrate their strength much more heavily on leading and strengthening the forces engaged in the cities. The Russian revolutionary council completely changed the situation in the cities of Petrograd and Moscow in only 7 months but Lenin criticized himself because that was too slow for the situation. With regard to us at present, in order to promptly lead the movement ahead, all party committee echelons must be especially concerned with guiding the movement in the cities.

(c) We took advantage of the opportunity to win over the delta and build up the mountains and jungles relatively well. In 1965, we must seize virtually all of the delta; specifically, we must control two-thirds of the delta and we must build broad base areas there. If we do the same in all areas, we will have acquired the real strength necessary to win.

(d) Politically motivate the people in liberated areas forcefully to get them to realize the slogan: Everything for victory. In order to meet the above-mentioned requirement, we must first of all study the land problem so that it can be resolved. All other slogans must be designed to motivate the masses toward eagerly supporting victory.

(e) Initiate an eager, widespread and continuous political struggle. The campaign in Nam Bo has been strung out and it must be conducted so as to make more forceful and uniform progress. In Region 5, the campaign must be strengthened so that it will keep pace with the one in Nam Bo.
In order to complete the above-mentioned key missions, all party committee echelons must have specific policies and plans, inspect and supervise, and guarantee that minimum assigned requirements are met during each one and three month period.

Although the above-mentioned problems are old and have been mentioned before, it is necessary to study, accept, and apply them with a new spirit appropriate to the special characteristics of the ripened situation.

IV. Leadership

In leadership, a proper evaluation of the situation is totally important, especially with regard to the current situation in South Vietnam which is changing and developing rapidly. Proper policies and work methods can be acquired only if the new situation is properly evaluated. This is a scientific, complex, and delicate problem. It is necessary to fully understand the lines and policies of the Party, to have experience, and to fully understand revolutionary theory in order to properly evaluate the situation. In addition, it is necessary to become deeply involved in the study of the rights and inclinations of each class in order to clearly understand their hopes; and it is necessary to introduce proper slogans which will attract the broad masses to participation. The publication of a newspaper, even legally, in the cities can provide widespread motivation if the contents are proper and appropriate to the hopes of all classes of the masses.

In short, leadership requires that proper conclusions are drawn, that lines are fully understood, and that actions are neither leftist or rightist.

There are several areas in the current situation in South Vietnam to which leadership must be fully applied:

United States imperialism is still quite strong and still has many insidious plots. But it is stalemated in its attempts to resolve the South Vietnamese problem. The United States has not yet suffered serious political, economic, or financial crises because its potential is great. But in its war in South Vietnam, the United States is faced with considerable problems. That is a very
complicated situation. When we talk about those problems we should be correct and effective. At the same time, we should study appropriate policies because if we do not it will be counter productive. For example, to say that the balance of power between us and the enemy in South Vietnam shows us to be politically and militarily stronger is not true. It would also be complacent, a simplification, unscientific, and serve no useful purpose.

The enemy is facing great difficulties in South Vietnam and from an international standpoint, he is faced with more problems than was France during its previous fight with us. But overall, the enemy is still quite strong and he is quite strong in South Vietnam. We must clearly recognize the substance of the situation for only in that way can we acquire the proper ideological leadership methods. Lenin said that leadership was an art and the art of leadership in South Vietnam at present demands great skill because the South Vietnamese problem is presently very complicated. It is more complicated than during the period of the Chinese revolution, more complicated than the period of resistance against the French, and in some respects more complicated than the Russian October revolution.

- The enemy in South Vietnam has lost his strength in the rural delta and there are some places in which the enemy still controls the people. But he still has no really solid base. We have only liberated approximately one half of the rural delta and the remainder of the delta is contested. The enemy also has no social base there and he must use violence to carry out his conscription and thievery.

The enemy has no strength in the mountain regions, although it must be admitted that he is simply not located in these areas. The enemy is currently relying completely on armed force and the local armed forces are very shaky. The fact that one special military unit stationed 50 kilometers from Ban Me Thuot moved into the city and took over the Ban Me Thuot radio station shows us the weakness of the enemy and the revolutionary possibilities of the ethnic minority peoples.

The attitude of the Buddhist, the Christian, and other classes of the masses in the cities toward the enemy recently demonstrated that the enemy would have no significant social base if he did not employ armed force. The demonstration by 100,000 workers in Saigon on
September 21 proves that the vanguard role of the working class in the campaign in the cities has begun to appear. That is a very new factor and forms a basis by which the entire situation can be changed. It also demonstrates that the revolution in South Vietnam is different from the Russian revolution and the Chinese revolution. That fact also proves more clearly that in the revolution in South Vietnam at present, it is not only the peasant class which is totally determined and that a key factor in the progress toward victorious general uprisings and attacks is that the working class in the cities must rise up.

The above facts also indicate the need for creativeness in the revolutionary campaign in South Vietnam. We must not become slaves to experience or to predetermined courses of action.

The appearance of a demonstration by 10,000 workers in Saigon also presents problems relative to slogans, forms of organization, and forms of the struggle which must be studied. As the movement of the working class expands, it will attract greater numbers of the masses of all classes toward participation in revolutionary struggles. That is a significant development which can create the conditions necessary for the revolutionary movement to expand by leaps and bounds. The rule of one day being equivalent to 20 years, as Lenin said, can apply to the cities of South Vietnam.

In short, the enemy administration has totally bogged itself down in the cities and the enemy does not have any political territory which he can penetrate.

The people of South Vietnam in the cities, the countryside, the delta, and the mountains are eagerly following the revolution. This is a phenomenon which was not present during the Russian or Chinese revolutions. The Chinese revolution operated only in the countryside and unlike ours, there was no campaign in the cities. On the other hand, we have a campaign in the cities such as they did in the Russian revolution. But during the Russian revolution the Bolshevik party ran up against political opposition which was attempting to win the right to leadership, the dangerous and capable Mensheviks. These are conditions which are very advantageous to us.

However, we must on the other hand recognize that faced with the crisis of collapse, the enemy is forming plots, policies, and strategies to attract the monopolists into its campaign for the workers and attempting to use all classes of the masses as a force with which
to continuously fight the revolution. The time has not yet come when the enemy is accepting defeat. But the enemy in South Vietnam will surely not attain the capability to control the workers and divide the various classes of the people if we have the proper organization, slogans, strategy, and proper forms of struggle necessary to lead the movement ahead to new progress.

The masses in South Vietnam are prepared to stand under the leadership of the Party. Slogans for peace, neutrality, independence, democracy, and progress toward the unification of the country have become the earnest hopes of all of the people in South Vietnam. Therefore, when Buddhist leaders introduce slogans which are relatively appropriate to them, they are actively responding to participation, even though they recognize that not a great deal will come of it.

The revolutionary situation in South Vietnam has developed successfully to some degree along the lines of a neutralist peace. Not only are the worker and peasant masses desirous of overthrowing the old regime, but great numbers of students, intellectuals, the capitalist class, and the middle classes want a neutralist peace. The ruling gang recognizes that it can no longer use its old ruling methods. It is, therefore, planning to set up spurious neutralist peace organizations because it knows that if it does not genuine neutralist peace organizations will appear and draw the masses to them in opposition to the enemy. The enemy then is presenting these spurious neutralist peace organizations to fool the masses and to oppose the revolutionary neutralist peace movement which presents a danger to it.

The revolutionary situation has ripened exactly as Lenin said: A revolutionary condition exists when the enemy cannot survive and when he can no longer rule by the old methods. At present, the movement is suffering the pain of childbirth and needs only a skilled midwife at the proper time, i.e., the Party must introduce the proper slogans, organization, and strategy to be successful. If the midwife comes too early, she wastes her time; and if she comes too late, she misses the opportunity. Opportunities must be considered each day and not monthly or every several months.

The heart of the matter is that there must be a real strength, and the masses must have organization and leadership, all controlled by the Party. We must know how to calculate true strength closely and meticulously. We must move toward highly developed, close, and fine leadership.
With regard to ideology, leadership must be undertaken so as to see everything new in order to be constantly active and vital. If ideological efforts are not skillfully performed, illusions or pessimism is created, enthusiasm is lost, and the efforts of the masses cannot be motivated. For example, to speak only of long-term difficulties without addressing efforts to take advantage of opportunities of short periods of time is to talk vaguely without reason or clear proof.

The revolution in South Vietnam has long-term characteristics and always, conditions for good, small, medium sized, and all opportunities to appear. Opportunities may not resemble each other and they may or may not require changes in plans. As it is with conditions necessary to win total victory, 2 or 3 possibilities must be forecast and 2 or 3 plans for action must be presented. A proper analysis of opportunity will create conditions under which the lower levels can take creative and proper action, not only to meet overall requirements but to train the masses to be skillful as well.

In order to lead properly, we must fully understand Party lines and policies and know how to accurately analyze the situation. At the same time, we must fully understand patterns so as to avoid being passive or erratic and so that any shortcomings are not serious.

The pattern of the revolution in South Vietnam is that the people of the South are carrying out a long-term and difficult struggle. It is necessary to know how to apply the rule that one day is equivalent to 20 years rather than just knowing about its existence. At the same time, it is also necessary to recognize that in a movement which is just being born and which has not been widely expanded, terrible problems created by the enemy cannot be avoided. It is also a rule of revolutionary leadership that the most difficult time is not when mistakes are being made but rather at the time when victory is close; and when problems are often caused because of erroneous leftist tendencies resulting from a lack of understanding about patterns, acting scientifically but complacently, and acting according to emotions. To be determined to win is to act forcefully but there must be a proper and profound analysis generated by objective action rather than in accordance with personal failings.

During 1965, we will win more great victories, (clear if not overwhelming) but the enemy will also greatly increase his terrorism. Now it is possible that we will win victories but will suffer heavier losses in that more troops will have to die and the masses will be terrorized more. There is nothing strange in the development of that situation and our cadres and Party members are unafraid of death and adversity. They will not waver but rather must prepare the conditions for progress.
Political motivation among all of the people, the entire army, and all party organizations, is very meaningful and it must have specific requirements, guidelines, and plans.

All of the assignments issued by us must be carefully checked. We must act so that our forces grow stronger as they resist even though they may have to fight for a long time. However, at the same time, we must know how to concentrate our forces to win decisive victories. This issue is raised only to motivate and stimulate so that organizations will ensure that the most important part about concentrating forces is that they must be highly determined and have specific plans. During the general uprising of 1945, with only a very few party members and a few slogans, we were able to motivate toward accomplishment. The current situation is completely different and we have a large capability to meet requirements. The issue at hand is that we must organize and lead skillfully.

In South Vietnam at present we are fighting an enemy who has many shortcomings but who is in fact, the most powerful imperialist of the capitalist world. Therefore, fighting against this enemy is no simple problem. Moreover, after we have defeated the enemy in South Vietnam, the problem is not completely solved as it was in North Vietnam following the victory at Dien Bien Phu; there are still many complex problems. After we defeat the U.S. and its lackeys heading up the puppet administration and puppet army, we must continue to defeat the Dai Viet, the Quoc Dan Party, the leaders of various religious groups, and the leaders of various other reactionary factions. Whether at that time we go through a stage of neutralist peace or are obliged to continue on for 5 or 10 years before unifying the country, we must still take the offensive in order to make progress. The most decisive factors are those of real strength control of the masses, the availability of armed forces, and the increasing strength of the Party.

The current phase is a critical phase and the critical phase must sometimes be carried on for a few years in order to win victory. Washington is watching the situation on an hour to hour basis and issuing policies and plans to cope with us during the critical phase. We must strive during the period to build up a true revolutionary force, especially among the masses, and especially among the masses in the cities and enemy areas.

In order to complete the great revolutionary mission above, all Party organizations must carry out ideological efforts well. They must have a good, sharp, and centralized ideological base. In the face of the
new situation, the problems are presented in a new light and ideological efforts must create a new atmosphere among all party organizations, the entire army, and all of the people. Anh Tam must issue a succinct resolution addressing the special characteristics of the situation, the missions, guidelines, principles, concepts, and assignments. It must be total, systematic, and reasonable so as to form a basis for ideological efforts and all other specific efforts. That resolution is to outline that which must be done, how it is to be done, and where it is to begin for all Party organizations and the entire army.

The revolution in South Vietnam over the past several years has developed very well under the leadership of the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh and by the Central Office. There are still many complex aspects of the current situation which demand concentrated leadership, intelligence, and great creativeness as the conditions necessary to win certain victory.

20 November 1964