NOTES

NORTH VIETNAM: LEFT OF MOSCOW, RIGHT OF PEKING

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

(Titles of articles from Vietnamese periodicals are omitted from the citations because of their frequently great length and the fact that the author's name and date of journal issue suffice for the location of the materials in question -- Authors.)


2. Nguyen Huu Khai article in the Party journal Hoc Tap (i.e., Studies), March, 1963.

3. Duong Huong, article in Hoc Tap, September, 1963.


7. Le Duc Tho, article in the official Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan (The People), November 7, 1966.


11. Article by Truong Chinh in Hoc Tap, September, 1963 (based on a speech delivered in April).


16. These calculations are based on data announced in a Hanoi domestic broadcast in Vietnamese on January 31, 1964.

17. This speech was serially published by Nhan Dan on July 13 to 15, 1962. The exchange rate used here is 3.53 dong to the U.S. dollar. Other exchange rates used by Vietnamese and foreign (including some American) sources range from 1.2 to 4 dong to a dollar.


20. See, for example, Nguyen Van Tran's article in the Hanoi periodical Tuyen Huan (Propaganda and Training), October, 1966, in JPRS, Translations on North Vietnam, No. 96 (February 2, 1967), pp. 28-30.


26. For example, Ho Chi Minh declared in a letter of greeting to the Soviet Communist Party that the American threat "requires that fraternal Socialist
countries, Communist and Workers parties and all forces of peace, democracy and progress in the world unite closely to oppose United States imperialists... " Characteristically, Chinese and Soviet aid to the DRV was praised with equal fervor. See New York Times, April 1, 1966, p. 6.

27. The official Soviet news agency Tass broadcast on August 27, 1967, for instance, that goods valued at over one million rubles were being sent out of Soviet "peace funds" (donations from the Soviet people).

28. During 1965 and 1966, for example, Hanoi received aid from Hungary (long-term loans) and Bulgaria (interest-free loans to purchase equipment). Far Eastern Economic Review, op. cit., p. 287.


30. See the report in New York Times, August 12, 1966, p. 4, which gives the estimate of American officials that Chinese troop strength had reached 50,000 uniformed soldiers, most of whom were said to be engaged in repairing and improving the Sino-Vietnamese supply lines.


34. See ibid., March 14, 1967, p. 3 and August 27, 1967, p. 1. So far as is known, however, North Vietnamese aircraft operating from bases in China have not engaged American jets.

35. The extent to which the DRV must go in its "neutral" position on aid from Moscow and Peking was lucidly illustrated during 1966 when the Russians charged that Soviet aid destined for Hanoi was being delayed en route in China (some reports saying the Soviets had accused the Chinese of taking equipment or making blueprints for themselves). In rebutting the charges, the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), in a broadcast of December 10, 1966, cited them as stemming from "Western news agencies."
36. For further information, though in somewhat exaggerated fashion, on these shifts of position, see P. J. Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam*, pp. 40 ff. See also the text of Le Duan’s speech to the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in December 1960 after returning from the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist parties. The speech exemplifies Hanoi’s difficulty at that time of seeking to harmonize Sino-Soviet differences while simultaneously translating them into meaningful statements of DRV policy. Le Duan, *On Some Present International Problems* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964).

37. This admission was made openly and frankly in a "top secret" resolution issued by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the headquarters of the PRP and the NLF. The resolution was captured by American forces during 1967 and released to the press by the U.S. Embassy, Saigon, on August 18, 1967. The PRP, in fact, is never referred to except as the Lao Dong’s "Southern branch" and as an organ "closely led by the [Hanoi] Party Central Committee."


42. The text was published in the Vietnamese Army newspaper, *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (People's Army), May 25, 1963, and broadcast by Radio Peking in English on June 8.


44. See, e.g., an unsigned article in *Hoc Tap*, September, 1963.


46. For example, in an article by Hoang Minh in *Hoc Tap*, October, 1963.
47. Thanh's scathing attack on the opposition is in ibid.

48. We know from Le Duan's speech that Truong Chinh recapitulated the Central Committee debate and introduced a draft resolution. The resolution, too, was never published.


50. The "four points" were made public by VNA on April 13, 1965 in a broadcast citing a report the same day by Premier Pham Van Dong to the second session of the Third National Assembly. The points are: first, that the United States, in accordance with the Geneva agreements, must recognize Vietnamese territorial integrity and unity, withdraw all forces and dismantle all bases in South Vietnam, and "stop its acts of war against North Vietnam . . ."; second, pending peaceful reunification, the two zones of Vietnam "must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries," including refrainment from permitting foreign bases and forces on their respective territories; third, South Vietnam's internal affairs must be settled by its people" in accordance with the program of theNFLSV without any foreign interference"; fourth, the Vietnamese of both zones will alone settle the matter of peaceful reunification.

51. The former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, implicitly attacked Hanoi's "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet dispute when he said during the visit of an Albanian delegation in May, 1966: "There can be no centrist line in the struggle between Marxism and Leninism and revisionism." New York Times, May 12, 1966, pp. 1, 11.

52. Thus, when Hoang Van Hoan represented Hanoi at the fifth congress of the Albanian Workers' Party in late 1966, he praised Albania's policies (thus antagonizing the USSR), but spoke only of the DRV's opposition to the "Tito revisionists." See Nhan Dan, November 6, 1966, as translated by JPRS, Translations on North Vietnam, No. 72 (December 7, 1966), pp. 23-24.

53. As examples, see the Radio Hanoi broadcast of October 28, 1966 and the Nhan Dan article, "The Great CCP," carried by VNA international service July 1, 1967 on
the 46th anniversary of the Chinese party. Significantly, the DRV has not gone so far as the Albanians in attributing CPR technological accomplishments to "the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

54. Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily, Peking) article by "Observer," February 20, 1967, as broadcast by NCNA (Peking) domestic service, same date.


56. See supra, note 12.

57. Typical were the speeches of DRV representatives at celebrations of Communist China's 18th national day held in Hanoi. At a reception, profuse praise of Mao's thoughts as being responsible for all China's successes (in a speech by Lu Wei-chao, CPR chargé d'affaires ad interim in the DRV), contrasted sharply with Pham Van Dong's passing reference to the cultural revolution in a speech devoted mainly to North Vietnam's resistance struggle. (Reported, importantly, by VNA, international service broadcast of September 29, 1967.) But at Peking's affair, things were different, according to China's NCNA services. There Le Thanh Nghi followed Chou En-lai to the rostrum with reportedly vigorous applause for China's revolution "to prevent a capitalist restoration and insure that China will never change her color." (For the text of the speech as rendered by NCNA, see the broadcast of September 29, 1967).

58. The critique appeared in commemoration of Ho Chi Minh's 77th birthday, and was written by Hong Chuong, deputy editor of Hoc Tap, in the journal's May, 1967 issue.

59. In particular, a letter sent from Le Duan in March, 1966 to high-ranking cadres in South Vietnam for dissemination to COSVN and other Viet Cong agencies. The letter was captured in January, 1967 and released to the press by the U. S. Embassy, Saigon.

60. For comments on the establishment of the permanent representation, see the Nhan Dan editorial of December 13, 1966, as broadcast by VNA international service, same date, and the December 13 editorial of the army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan that proclaimed: "The Front
has actually performed the functions of a genuine state of the southern people." Broadcast by Hanoi domestic service, same date.

61. Interview with the President of the Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, in Le Monde, December 14, 1966, p. 3.

62. The complete political program of the Front, said to have been adopted at an extraordinary congress convened by the central committee in mid-August, 1967, was broadcast approvingly by VNA on September 1, 1967. See also an interview between Nguyen Huu Tho and Wilfred Burchett, the pro-Communist Australian writer, in New York Times, February 11, 1967, p. 4; and further comments on the August program by a member of the NLF central committee presidium, Dang Tran Thi, in the September, 1967 issue of Hoc Tap.

63. See, for example, the comments of Premier Pham Van Dong in an interview with the chief editor of the Tokyo newspaper, the Asahi Evening News, April 24, 1967.

64. VNA international service broadcast, December 10, 1967.

65. Major General Tran Do's statement was part of a lengthy taped speech captured by U.S. forces in January, 1967 and made public by the U.S. Embassy, Saigon. Tran Do is Deputy Commander of the Viet Cong and an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party.

66. For a fuller discussion of Hanoi's perception of the war and negotiations, see Melvin Gurtov, Hanoi on War and Peace, P-3696 (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, December, 1967).


68. New York Times, February 2, 1968, p. 2. A similar statement under the same authority was broadcast the previous day by Liberation Radio (clandestine), which identified the new "Headquarters" as "the commanding organ of various patriotic South Vietnamese Armed Forces."
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