NLF REPORT ON ETHNIC MINORITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM -- Circa 1965
(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document, and concerns a report on the motivation of people in the ethnic minority areas in Military Region 6. This report covers the characteristics of the present situation in the areas, the development of the Revolution in Region 6 since 1954, the destruction of strategic hamlets, the motivation of the ethnic minorities and the missions for all forces in the ethnic minority areas.

This document, less capture data; all references to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) to include personnel, comments, and log numbers; US remarks indicated by double parentheses, i.e., ( ); and deciphering of code words, cover designations, and enemy units, was declassified on 10 Oct 1970 by Dir. US ELM, CDEC. This declassification does not constitute authority to release information contained therein outside of US military channels.

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(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document. The document was received at CDEC on 21 February 1970 and is listed under CDEC Document Log Number 01-0508-70.
REPORT CONCERNING THE MOTIVATION OF PEOPLE IN ETHNIC MINORITY AREAS

Region 6 was previously composed of the provinces south of the Western Highlands (Darlac, Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc) and the provinces of Khanh, Minh, and Binh ((possibly Khanh Hoa, Minh Thuận, and Binh Thạnh)).

In late 1963, the provinces of Darlac and Khanh Hoa were restored to Region 5, and the provinces of Laml Dong and Phuoc Long were merged ((with Region 6)).

Previously, most people in Darlac, Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc, and the western areas of the remaining provinces were tribesmen.

At present, the population in the entire region including plantations and lowlands is about 726,000 people. The Vietnamese population in this region is about 546,000 and the ethnic minority is about 180,000. The ethnic minority is less than the Vietnamese, but they occupy a very important position. All the bases which belong to the region and provinces and strategic lines of communication are located in their (ethnic minority) area. As a result of the enemy’s policy of relocating the people in strategic hamlets, there are presently strategic hamlets for the ethnic minority along the enemy’s strategic communication lines; therefore, motivating the ethnic minority in Region 6 is of great concern to the Party Committee echelon.

However, because the organization was changed many times and because of the lack of investigators, we could not recapitulate the situation systematically.

At present, the numerous difficulties which confront us and the lack of time have considerably limited the recapitulation.

This report only pointed out a number of weak and strong points in the motivation of the ethnic minority people. It is not a complete recapitulation.

This report emphasizes only new missions in recent years (such as motivating the people to destroy hamlets in enemy areas and conducting three-pronged attacks in the mountainous and lowland areas) because these missions are practical and expeditious.
The activities concerning the motivation of the people in areas where
our organizations have not been established and which are too far from
the enemy to seize power (as done in the southern area of Darlac) or
concerning the motivation of the people in production sites to
establish defensive systems, build combat villages, etc. (sic)),
are only summarily reported.

The agencies have only begun to motivate the people to destroy
strategic hamlets, break the enemy's oppressive control of the
population and prepare to conduct three-pronged attacks in
mountainous and lowland areas. Therefore, the recapitulation is
incomplete. Some reports are without proof. They were made
subjectively.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION OF THE ETHNIC MINORITIES IN
REGION 6.

Although small, the ethnic minority consists of many tribes:
Raglai;

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Koho, Ma, Bumong, Stieng, Cau, Châu Ro, Khome, Chăm, and Nung
(refugees).

The social status of the Chăm and Nung are similar to the
Vietnamese. The social status of the others is not very clear. In
general, like the people in the Western Highlands, the society of
these tribes consists of two social classes.

a. Laboe ors (servants and farmers who have their own economy
but are poor and just have enough food for themselves).

b. The upper class consists of a number of rich people who have
seized political power or who are members of a rich family.

In general, they are industrious. The lower class who suffer
hardships clearly realize the disgrace of being exploited and scorned.
They like freedom very much and dislike obligation.

Before the August Revolution, many tribes have struggled
against the French and the feudal royal government. The typical
movement was the Matrang-Lon movement waged by the Bumong in Region 3
at the Phước Long border. Other tribes, such as the Ma under the
leadership of Bố-lọxłat ar ((Lâm-Dông)), had struggled against the
Chám kingdom. The Koho tribes (in west Bến Thuán), under the leadership
of Borum, struggled against the Vietnam kingdom which had levied
taxes on them and forced them to provide elephant and rhinoceros (sic)
tusks. Tribesmen in Vung Stiék (Phước Long), under the leadership
of Hot Mo, struggled against the French who had plundered their land.
The above movements are still lauded. We can heighten their pride by
vivifying past glory.

During the nine years of the Resistance, wherever guidance was
provided by the Revolution as in the western part of Ninh and Binh
Thuan Provinces, the people eagerly participated in the struggle
against the enemy. Some places became guerrilla bases (as in the
eastern part of Tanh Linh, Binh Thuân, and Bac Ai, Ninh Thuân).

Since 1954, people in areas influenced by the Resistance have
opposed the enemy's terrorism and have refused to denounce the
Communists. They have opposed the relocation of the people and the
building of strategic hamlets. Before the armed struggle period, the
people had fed and protected cadre in areas where our installations were
set up.

Though having a glorious fighting tradition, these tribes enjoyed
different levels of economy, culture, and social welfare. The
imperialists took advantage of this difference to separate them
showing discrimination among them. (Recently, thanks to our leadership
and indoctrination, the discrimination was considerably reduced).
However, they were still ingrained with prejudice towards one another.
They still doubted the Vietnamese, especially in areas where they were
not strongly influenced by the Revolution. In some places where
we conducted indoctrination, this was gradually improved, but the
enemy still took advantage of the above shortcomings to separate
them. The Vietnamese were also separated from the Montagnards. This
was aimed at preventing us from motivating the ethnic minority to
revolt.

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During the first few years of peace, the RVN propagandized as
follows: "During the Resistance period, the Communists urged Montagnards
to die for them. Now as peace is restored, the Communists, who still
hide in the mountains, force the people to protect and feed them. Later
on, the Communists will rule the Montagnards." To relocate the people,
the following theme was used by the enemy: "The Communists are hiding
in the mountains; to protect the people, the government must gather
them together." During the Resistance or in recent years, wherever
we terrorized, killed, or forbade the people to live freely, they still
maintained a distrustful attitude towards us even though corrections
have been made. Recently, this situation has improved thanks
to the development of the movement and the influence of our
contact with them. Nevertheless, they are still reserved, and we
must pay attention to this while motivating them.
The French still have an important influence on them, especially in areas where the revolutionary movement was not widespread. It was in these areas where many French soldiers, officers, and their Government resorted to deceptive and demagogic policies (Phủ Đức Long and some places in Lâm Đồng). Even now, many people in strategic hamlets think that the French were better than Diệm. Salt and other materials were sold very cheaply by the French. They have a vague judgement about the US. They have not yet perceived the aggression of the US (strategic hamlets in Phú Quốc).

Those tribesmen who lived near us such as Raylar, Ro, or others living in bases, clearly made progress. There the people clearly distinguished foes from friends. They are confident in our policy and in the Party. Sometimes the people could not discern the subtly deceptive tricks of the enemy. But the enemy could not deceive them for long. Strategic hamlets have caused the people a lot of suffering. As a result of our achievements throughout the country and our propaganda activities, the people everywhere have joined the Revolution en masse.

The revolutionary spirit of the working class is different from that of the upper class. The basic social (proletariat) class always has an inferiority complex. They lack self-confidence, but they are faithful to the Revolution, and they hate the enemy very much and are very receptive to the Revolution. Whenever the cadre come in contact with this class, rely on them and the movement will be strong. In some places, our cadre relied on this class, especially the former administrative personnel. The people lamented: "Under French domination they were fathers, Under Diệm's regime they were also fathers; now, the Revolution is also like that." In some places the people were relocated into strategic hamlets, but there were some poor people hiding in the forest. These gave support to our cadre.

Pacifistic, easily confused, but greedy of fame, most tribesmen were bribed by the enemy and used by the latter as henchmen. In some areas, these individuals impeded the advance of the revolutionary movement. When facing difficulties, they compromised or surrendered to the enemy. They did not believe in the people's struggles.

The ethnic minorities in Region 6 did not have their own culture. Previously, the colonialists taught them a language called Koho (sic) in an attempt to preach religion and train a number of henchmen, but it was not extensively developed among the people. During recent years, we have improved the Koho language by adding the Bùmông (sic); however, because of our poor activities, it was not widespread among the people.
These people help one another in the face of sufferings, diseases, or famine. They display a high spirit of unity. They bury their dead in the mountains and forests to bind their people to their (highland) villages and hamlets. This is favorable for our struggle against the enemy's plan of relocating the people into strategic hamlets. However, many bad habits still exist. They create unfavorable conditions for the increase of production and social welfare. Sometimes, because of their superstition, they have abandoned their farm work. In some areas, they are afraid of blood-sucking vampires and think that they could be killed by them.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT SINCE THE RECOVERY OF PEACE TO DATE:

From 1954 to 1959:

From the recovery of peace (1954) to 1959 and when the military activities were not yet initiated, our agents in some areas maintained good relationship with the people. They did not make any mistakes concerning the people's policy. However, a number of our cadre were relocated, killed, or captured. Some of them surrendered to the enemy. The above facts have confused the people and reduced their confidence in us.

Such is the situation in the western area of Khánh, Ninh, and Binh Provinces. In other areas of operations such as Nam Lạc (of former Region 6), Phước Long, Lâm Đồng, and Quảng Đức, we have not planted our agents since the Resistance. As a result, we were not able to assess the situation in these areas. Generally, our agents are still weak. They cannot coordinate their activities with other areas. Even in the same province, they were not able to maintain contact between two districts. Agents were only planted in the western provinces adjacent to the delta, but not in important areas (west of Khánh Hòa), and areas which connect with Nam Bộ (Tân Lĩnh and Phước Long). The revolutionary movement is irregularly initiated even in areas where our cadre are available. In Bạc Ai (Ninh Thuận Province, 15,000 people) the movement is comparatively better.

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In this area there are local cadre and key Party members. In different areas, Party Chapters are not activated; so, there are no Party members nor labor youths. The best district has 30 labor youths, while in some other areas there are only three to five.

During this phase, especially in 1956 and 1957, the enemy exerted his efforts to seize Montagnard areas and destroy our strongholds.
Although the enemy attacks were fierce, we still stayed close to our key positions and maintained and developed our movement. The movement rose up due to the following reasons:

1. Cadre maintained contact with the people and lived with them. They maintained unity and equality. The people put full confidence in them. They motivated them to struggle against the enemy in order to build up the Revolution.

2. Cadre properly carried out the Party's policy concerning ethnic minorities. They displayed a spirit of fraternity and solidarity while protecting the life and property of the people. They disseminated our policy among them through propaganda and indoctrination while implementing their missions in compliance with the regulations of our movements. They maintained unity, provided mutual aid, increased production, improved living conditions, and fought the enemy.

3. Cadre paid attention to bettering the people's living conditions, providing them with what they needed, and improving their cultural knowledge.

Generally, the movement was not largely developed and the struggle against the enemy was not strongly motivated because:

1) We did not properly evaluate the fighting spirit and the capability of the Montagnards. In the face of enemy's attacks, we were confused and failed to provide guidance for the people to struggle against him, especially to oppose the (enemy) relocation and to counter local reactionaries.

2) The strengthening of our forces and promotion of enthusiasm among the people were limited. That was the reason why revolutionary prestige could not be increased. Since 1959, based on the new policy, the revolutionary movement initiated in lowland and mountainous areas were intensified. We overcame weaknesses, led the movement into a new position, seized areas of operation, and expanded our activities.

Since 1960, we have intensified our struggles and uprisings in mountainous areas to destroy the enemy's oppressive control. We have consolidated our positions and brought the people back to their home villages. We have expanded our areas of operation (Nam Lāc, north of Road No. 20, Phước Long, Quang Đăc, and Tuyên Dūt).

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We won over a number of people relocated by the enemy, (Mạ Lụ, Mạ Lụ,
Ba Rau in Ninh Thuan Province, and a majority of people in western areas of Binh Thuan Province. We succeeded in controlling the tribesmen in western areas and north of Daklac Province. We succeeded in penetrating the southern part of the Western Highlands which was previously controlled by the enemy. We have motivated the people to join us while occupying a large and important area thus strengthening our leadership. We succeeded in establishing the north-south corridor. After that (in 1962-1963), the enemy strove to launch continuous counterattacks against us, but we still held the areas of Khanh, Ninh, and Binh Provinces and developed guerrilla warfare activities. Particularly, in the south of the Western Highlands, our movement was still weak and the guerrilla warfare activities were not initiated. The enemy attacked us continuously and relocated a major portion of the population into strategic hamlets. However, in various areas we were determined to lead the people to counter sweep operations, develop guerrilla warfare activities, and establish combat villages. We maintained many penetration bases, transformed them into our bivouac sites, and established bases for regions and provinces. The people who were relocated by the enemy fully understood our policy. They realized the enemy's scheme and understood the Revolution. This was favorable for us to plant agents, intensify the movement, lead the struggle against the enemy, destroy hamlets and the enemy's oppressive control and intensify three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas. In some areas even though being attacked by the enemy, our cadre continuously maintained contact with the people, stayed close to strategic hamlets, encouraged our agents, motivated the people to rise up and destroy the enemy's oppressive control, and led the movement into a new phase. In late 1963, our people seized hundreds of weapons from the enemy's Popular Forces and Combat Youths. We motivated the people to rise up and destroy strategic hamlets.

During this phase we strove to motivate the people to work for the revolutionary movement, to develop guerrilla warfare activities, and to penetrate the enemy controlled areas. However, many shortcomings still remained (south of the Western Highlands) in the motivation of the people, in the strengthening of our forces and in the consolidation of our positions. In areas under the enemy's control where there were no agents, the purpose of our activities was to motivate, propagandize and indoctrinate the people, reveal the enemy's schemes and crimes in order to sow deep hatred and indignation among them, and disseminate our policy and motivate the people to struggle against the enemy. We had to direct our movement in densely populated areas to obtain their support.

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On the other hand, we must consolidate the union of rural areas in order to create favorable conditions for the motivation of the basic social class ((proletariat)).
At the beginning, although the people did not understand the Revolution, they joined without hesitation thanks to their deep hatred of the enemy. Gradually as they became familiar with revolutionary activities, the people rose up against the enemy. They broke the enemy's oppressive control and chased him out of the rural areas. They organized the autonomous committees, participated in the revolutionary tasks, developed guerrilla warfare, and were determined to counter the enemy attacks in their own villages and hamlets.

In areas where we have planted key agents, we should enthusiastically urge the people to annihilate the enemy administrative personnel and spies. Youth and Women's Associations have been organized. We turned out key Party members and key Group members and trained ethnic minority cadre. We developed guerrilla warfare, and in a short period of time, the working class people in various areas have turned their activities into armed struggles.

We developed our guerrilla force and expanded our boundaries. Guerrilla units in some places have directly engaged in combat, using primitive weapons and traps.

However, deficiencies still persisted in the motivation of the people to rise up to gain the control of political power.

Our stratagems always presented shortcomings. In some places, the political indoctrination was not extensively conducted for the working class people so as to turn them into hard-core cadre. High ranking cadre struggled to find one way to improve their personnel. Incapable cadre often relied upon their superiors for the accomplishment of their missions and have therefore placed political and economic organizations under their control. Cadre did not show solidarity, neither did they develop their enthusiasm.

We were not energetic in annihilating the personnel of the Self-Defense units, Popular Forces, combat and Combat Youth forces, and rural administrative personnel, nor have we lowered the prestige of those people and their organizations. This attitude has created great difficulties for our movement.

In addition, we failed to break down and isolate the enemy's wicked tyrants and re-educate the people who were on the wrong side. In some areas we have excessively oppressed the enemy's employees and mistakenly punished them. This caused confusion among the people and disadvantages to the motivation of the enemy administrative personnel and tribesmen.

We conducted our activities in the area under mixed control as we did in the area under our own control, consequently, these activities were discovered by the enemy. Then, when the enemy launched strong attacks and resettled the people, our installations were uncovered.
Beginning in 1963, the area (of operations) of the region was divided into two areas; the base area, which was under our control and was an illegal area, and the strategic hamlet area.

In the area under our control, we continued to motivate the people, heighten the deep hatred against the enemy, and heighten patriotism and love of people and class.

Determination and unity were initiated for the people to counter enemy sweep operations, relocation and the construction of strategic hamlets. They were also motivated to increase production, better living conditions, contribute their part to the Revolution, and effectively implement rural administration... etc (sic). We have developed a more stable base area under our control. The people's organizations and the Party and Group organizations developed step-by-step. Many local cadre have considerably contributed their share to the population's solidarity. We developed guerrilla warfare, increased production, improved living conditions, and succeeded in soothing famine. We also made some progress in preventive medicine and culture. (At the present time, there are 70 schools with 1,223 students including general knowledge and mass education. We are on the way towards expansion).

In the strategic hamlet area, our policy is to urge the people to counter the enemy, recruit key agents, and bring our movement up.

In 1963, our activities in strategic hamlets consisted only in denouncing the enemy's scheme and crimes; killing wicked tyrants; persuading the enemy's administrative personnel, Popular Force and combat youths, to side with us; establishing organizations; and motivating the people to struggle for free circulation and other social welfare rights. We conducted armed propaganda activities in strategic hamlets or established contact with the people to go into the forests for indoctrination. We succeeded in building up some installations in strategic hamlets. We also succeeded in establishing a wide contact with the people in some areas.

In other places we contacted the enemy's administrative personnel and combat youths. However, the policy of raising the movement was still confused. In some places, we could recruit new agents but we did not know how to initiate the movement; in other places, we brought a number of people to our base area. They were of illegal status.

In the middle of 1964, thanks to motivation, the people destroyed strategic hamlets, broke the enemy's oppressive control, and began their three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas. We enlarged the areas under mixed control and the areas under our control. We strengthened and enlarged the base area. We concentrated our forces to motivate the people according to the above policy from about September 1964.

The achievements we attained for more than three months gave us the idea that we are capable of strengthening the movement.

III. DESTROYING STRATEGIC HAMLETS, BREAKING THE ENEMY'S OPPRESSIVE CONTROL, MOTIVATING THE PEOPLE AND STRENGTHENING THE MOVEMENT.

1. The Enemy Situation before Initiating the Movement.

Tribesmen had their strategic hamlets in the entire region. They rose up while the enemy weakened. There are not many enemy posts in strategic hamlets.

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The people were oppressed and controlled by the enemy's administrative personnel, combat youths, Regional Forces, or Popular Forces personnel.

The troop strength in these strategic hamlets was one B (platoon) or one A (squad). The reinforcement of these units consisted of two B's (platoons) or one C (company) organic to the district. The hamlet has an administrative board consisting of two or three personnel (one chief of the hamlet, one policeman, and one person in charge of combat youths). In each hamlet, there is one A (squad) to one B (platoon) of Combat Youths. Some hamlets were adequately equipped, some were only equipped with grenades, and others had no weapons. Hamlets consisted of inter-families and the chief of inter-families.

The enemy tightly controlled the people. They had to ask permission for displacement. The enemy forbade the people to cultivate far away from strategic hamlets, or stay overnight in cultivated sites. The people were forced by the enemy to buildup and guard strategic hamlets.

Since the end of 1964, indeed since the middle of 1964, before our victories and the enemy's decadence, when the people's pride rose, the enemy's oppressive control had lessened considerably. The enemy's administrative personnel became undermined. They lost confidence in their government. There were not many wicked tyrants. A number of enemy administrative personnel made concessions to the people, allowing them to work in a faraway place of stay overnight in the ricefields. A number of administrative personnel and combat youths abandoned their posts, especially inter-family chiefs. Some combat youths did not attack us when meeting our forces. After the military revolt at Ban Me Thuot, the enemy disarmed a number of combat youths at Phước Long, Quảng Đức, and Lâm Đồng.

During this time, some enemy administrative personnel and combat youths established contact with us. But their attitude showed that they were still hesitant. They were afraid of us and of the enemy. They established contact with us but also kept close relations with the enemy. They continued to support the enemy's conscription plan and mobilization of labor by all means. Some individuals really wanted to quit their jobs, but they were afraid of the enemy's terrorism. One man said: "The enemy forced us to work for him. He will kill us if we refuse to work for him. Please, allow us to temporarily work for him and we will give all our salaries to the Revolution or to the people to buy buffaloes and kill them for food."

(In Phước Long (Province)) some administrative personnel did not carry out their tasks except when the enemy came. Some other
men promised us that they would quit their jobs, but they still secretly contacted the enemy. Because of the presence of the enemy's administrative personnel, even though they did not hurt the people, the latter were still afraid of them.

They prevented the people from moving out of the strategic hamlets by saying that: "If the people go to the forests, the Americans will shell and kill them. If we could not hold the strategic hamlets we would be moved to a farther place..."

2. The people's situation and our installation. The people had no freedom to earn their livelihood. They spent a lot of time in fatigue and sentry duties. As a consequence, they gathered a poor crop. They suffered from famine. Many areas had enough food for only three months.

Many people did not have any clothes or only had one suit. In some places, such as the strategic hamlets along Road No. 10 in Phuoc Long, 30 to 40 percent of the women had to wear loin clothes. Because of malnutrition and lack of sanitation, the ratio of death was higher each year. During the past year, in Phuoc Long ((Province)) and Buon Ria Hamlet, 150 people out of 500 died.

In Bu Vai Hamlet, 70 out of 640 people died.

In Tong Lon Hamlet, 59 out of 450 people died.

In Bu Dam Hamlet, 50 out of 580 people died.

Being oppressed and concentrated in strategic hamlets, the people suffered misery. This was the reason which deepened the hatred against the enemy, especially the hamlet administrative personnel and the cruel tyrants. In opposition to the enemy’s oppression, the people remained negligent in the construction of strategic hamlets (in Kién-Dúc, the construction of five strategic hamlets remained unfinished for two years) and in performing guard duty. In some places, they annihilated the local administrative personnel and the cruel tyrants (such as in Buon Ria Hamlet; during Feb 63, 20 people annihilated two local administrative personnel in the forest). In Bu Bong, seven people killed Blo (possibly a highlander).

When our troops attacked strategic hamlets, the people detected the enemy and guided us in annihilating enemy units (such as the people in Phuoc Long Hamlet, Bu Bong District).

Due to family relationships or to their ignorance of the administrative personnel's crime, or due to fear of revenge, the people did not dare denounce the crimes of the enemy. Sometimes, the people even concealed them (for instance, the people pretended
that they stopped working though they were still working (for GVN). This situation persisted for the reason that the people wanted to rely on them for safety.

The people living in strategic hamlets had a desire to return to their mountainous villages to till the land. Those who were native to the same areas as the strategic hamlets were still reluctant to leave them. But those who were herded from distant areas wanted to destroy strategic hamlets. Those who had lived in our deep base areas were all the more angry. They wanted to return to their land at all cost, even if they had to live as illegal citizens. However, they were hesitant. They wanted to destroy strategic hamlets, but they were afraid that the enemy might come back and force them to reconstruct these hamlets or move them to a remote area. Under this condition, they would undergo more hardships. They were also afraid that the enemy might terrorize them and drop bombs. During the recent years, the people realized our strong position and the enemy's weak position. For this reason, they moved out of strategic hamlets at their will to make their living. In some areas, the people destroyed the fences of strategic hamlets. But they still feared the local administrative personnel that had been acting in an underserved manner so they dared not rise up against the enemy.

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In some areas, the people said, "Do not fight any longer because if you fight the enemy now, he will come back." Someone said, "The Revolution is good but not strong enough to eliminate the enemy. Let the people put up with both sides."

The people have realized the demagogy of the US and its henchmen, but some people had an equivocal attitude. Someone said that Diệm and Khanh were bad but the Americans were good because they gave them cloth and rice.

In areas where we made contact with the people, they felt a deep sympathy for our cadre and protected our installations. For instance, the stepping-stone and our action units were in the forest near a hamlet for one year but were not discovered (such as in Dac-O). In some areas, when we did not come for a long time, the people carried rice to the forest for our troops (such as the people at Bu Bồng Hamlet, Phước Long). Particularly, the people showed their emotion because of our cadre's and soldiers' democratic attitude. They compared our cadre with enemy personnel and said, "When the district chief came, he did not shake hands with the people. The Montagnards had to stand in the distance. He scorned the people's messing and billeting. The revolutionary cadre ate with us, spoke to us like friends, and lived with us."

In short, the people had confidence in the Revolution and showed their indignation against the enemy. Their aspiration was to destroy strategic hamlets and return to their home villages. They were
also afraid that our troops were not strong enough to protect and liberate them.

3. Situation of our agents.

a. Agents established in strategic hamlets prior to Jul 64.

Our agents in strategic hamlets, in general, were weak. In many strategic hamlets we did not have any agents. But in some hamlets, our agents made contact with all the people in the hamlet, even with local administrative personnel and combat youths and sometimes organized Internal Party Chapters. But in general, the result was still poor. For instance in Phước Long with 45 strategic hamlets consisting of 14,307 people (incomplete statistics), we only had 30 Party members, five Group members, 45 hard-core cadre, and 90 agents. Usually, Party members motivated some people to participate in destroying strategic hamlets in support of the forces from outside (according to the report of cadre on the outside). As for the agents, they are only capable of carrying out intelligence collecting (according to their knowledge) and supply. In many strategic hamlets, we had no agents because when the people were relocated, we did not stay close and make contact with them to recruit agents.

b. Action units.

One action unit, consisting of five to 10 comrades, was in charge of three to five strategic hamlets. In each unit, few members were capable of carrying out propaganda activities. Their capabilities are limited, and their working skills are poor. There were not many new agents recruited for a long time. Cadre did not have a plan for agitating the movement.

The major shortcoming was that action units consisted mostly of Vietnamese. They were either military cadre or cadre belonging to various specialized branches. They did not know the ethnic minority language, neither were they familiar with the customs and ways practiced by the tribesmen, nor were they proficient in civilian proselyting. In some units, there were ethnic minority cadre. Those who were trained in skills succeeded in motivating the people: Comrades K'o-mui and Thuân in Lâm Đông, and Comrade Dech in Phước Long for instance. But in general, the minority cadre in action units have not yet been well trained and assigned missions appropriate to their skills. They were only assigned with guard duty, communication, and supply tasks.

In the units, few comrades concentrated their efforts of holding strategic hamlets to strengthen the movement. The remaining personnel were not much interested in dealing with Montagnards. Some comrades said, "If we study the Montagnard language, the Party might keep us for duty with the Montagnards. Then, we may
not expect to be reassigned for duty in a lowland area."

The holding of strategic hamlets was a great shortcoming. Few units had the ability to attack strategic hamlets vigorously. Most of them remained in forests, which are sometimes one day's walk from the above hamlets. The recruitment of agents in strategic hamlets was not properly carried out. For example, in Phuoc Long before July 1964, K58 could only establish contact with two out of 19 strategic hamlets, recruit some agents and control some families. K4 established contact with five out of 14 strategic hamlets, assessed the general situation of the people and bought rice. K6 established contact with four out of six strategic hamlets... etc. (sic). Some action units planned to stay in the forest. They scheduled their rendezvous with their agents (agents were urged to meet them in a forest) for intelligence reports. Only some comrades knew how to recruit agents. Yet, there were very few new agents. This working procedure was called "going to see the trap."

The units usually had no confidence in the revolutionary capabilities of the ethnic minority. Especially, they did not believe that with their capabilities, these people could carry out armed and political activities and conduct the three-pronged attacks. Usually, units members said, "The ethnic minority people are simple-minded. They can either carry out armed activities for us or live under the enemy control. Since they are too honest and simple-minded, they can be easily arrested by the enemy and cannot cope with the enemy in reasoning."

c. Supporting armed forces. The armed forces in districts which directly supported the motivation task were still weak. In some places, there was just one platoon at most, and sometimes just one squad. The support, therefore, was limited considerably.

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4. Advantages and disadvantages.

Through the above facts we realized that in this phase of motivation we had to cope with the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages: The enemy is on his way toward collapse. His oppressive system in various installations has slackened. His oppressive control as well as armed forces in strategic hamlets were weak while the people's enthusiasm was rising. The people displayed deep hatred against the enemy and his strategic hamlets. They were determined to destroy the strategic hamlets.

Disadvantages: In the enemy's strategic hamlets, some of our agents were still weak. The hard-core cadre were not determined to provide leadership to the action units who were short of personnel.
They lacked experience, and their skills were still poor. In addition, they did not fully understand the Party's line and they were not determined to stay close to the enemy and the people. They had no confidence in people and displayed a shirking attitude.

Upon completion of the Regional Conference held in ...(sic) ((month unspecified)) 1964, we organized political reorientation courses for cadre of all levels. As a result they fully understood the ((Party's)) policy. Their shirking attitude has been corrected, but in general, they have not succeeded in overcoming all weak points. To make improvements, units members should overcome through specific action.

5. The results of our motivation (propaganda) efforts.

Since August ((possibly 1969)), a number of local areas have motivated the people to destroy strategic hamlets, break enemy oppressive control over the people, and intensify the movement ((VC)).

After having fully understood the Party's guideline through political indoctrination, all cadre, especially cadre in action units, have overcome the shirking attitude, strengthened their determination to hold onto the ground, and put full confidence in the people. They were also determined to motivate the people to destroy hamlets and break the enemy oppressive machinery. To motivate the people, small elements from action units penetrated the areas where the Montagnards lived to spread propaganda.

First, they established contact with some individuals and employed them to contact others and spread our propaganda widely. Propaganda was either spread to small Montagnard groups in their production sites or in strategic hamlets.

Parallel with the conduct of political indoctrination, we re-established contact with old agents and recruited new agents. Advanced separate training courses were conducted for old agents.

After having trained a number of hard-core cadre, we gathered a large number of people in the forest. There, we motivated them to destroy strategic hamlets.

Our ((VC)) armed forces and action units did not attack strategic hamlets until we finished motivating the people. We dominated the situation, annihilated local ((GVN)) administrative personnel, dissolved combat youths, held meetings and, together with the people, we worked out plans to engage the enemy the following day.

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In some areas, although we were unable to spread propaganda or re-establish contact with old agents, we still preserved our strength. As the opportunity arose, we immediately
attacked the enemy and controlled the situation for a period of time, searched and captured ring leaders, then gathered the people to urge them to destroy the strategic hamlets. We also worked out a plan for further struggles.

The propaganda themes for motivation were usually aimed at the following matters:

1. Incite the people to hate the enemy and his strategic hamlet regime by denouncing his crimes and enumerating the damage he has caused the people.

2. Heighten the people's confidence in our army by divulging the enemy's decay and by glorifying our victories and the people's fighting spirit.

3. Explain a number of policies: The policy of autonomous areas and the policy towards the enemy's local administrative personnel, self-defense members and combate. Youths. Explain to the Montagnards that they had the wrong idea to think that we had the intention of occupying their land, killing them, or forbidding them to cultivate in remote areas.

4. Discuss the method of struggle against the enemy in order to achieve victories (provide guidance for the conduct of three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas). Discuss the method of conducting a legal political struggle.

Our motivation efforts gave the following results:

The people enthusiastically destroyed strategic hamlets. In some attacks against the strategic hamlets, thanks to the hard-core agents which we had recruited before, we succeeded in motivating more than 50 or 70 percent of people to participate in the meeting against the enemy. They destroyed all the fences and defensive works.

In some areas they moved their property out of strategic hamlets, burned their houses and moved back to their own areas.

After having destroyed the strategic hamlets, on the following morning, as previously instructed, the people sent their representatives to the district office to struggle against them. Some hamlets selected from 20 to 30 representatives, some others appointed hundreds of representatives. If the administrative personnel from a higher echelon came to the area, they fought on the spot.

They generally claimed that we (VC) have destroyed or have forced them to destroy strategic hamlets. They also claimed that GVN was too weak to protect them. They demanded freedom, social relief, and the cessation of shelling and bombing.

In some areas the people demanded that the enemy pay them for having constructed strategic hamlets.

In political struggles, they argued with the enemy but in some others, they did not know how to argue when the enemy asked about something (sic). For example: In Bumblan (Phuoc Long Province) after having destroyed their strategic hamlets during the night in December 1964, the people moved to their production sites. The day after, when the district chief came, they moved back to the hamlets. He asked:

- Who destroyed the fence?
"The VC did it," replied the people.

- Were the VC numerous?

- Yes, there were 20 to 30 of them armed with weapons. Although some entered the hamlet, the greater number stayed outside, and we could not count them.

- Therefore, it was the people and the VC who destroyed the hamlet, wasn't it?

- It was. The VC forced the people to do so.

- Now, let's reconstruct it.

- We won't. It is too difficult to construct it because they will force us to destroy it again. We should imitate the people of Da Lù (The people of Da Lù moved out of the strategic hamlet and lived in small groups).

The district chief knew that he could not argue any longer with the people, so he let the matter drop.

Another time in Bù Oai (Phước Long) Hamlet, the people were arrested by the enemy because they had participated in a political struggle in the district. He (the district chief) said, "The VC could enter the hamlet because the people had burned it. It was also due to the Combat Youths' negligence while performing security guard; yet they were not armed, therefore, they must receive weapons in the future." The people were speechless but they were unmoved.

Another time in Bù Oai, the representatives of the people came to the office of the district chief to give their petition, but they were not received.

By and by, the people became familiar with political struggles. They know how to struggle when their interests are violated. In Bù Oai, once (OVN) soldiers came and killed chickens. A number of families in the area brought their dead chickens to the enemy soldiers, forcing them and their commanders to pay for the damage.

Through the above events, we understood that the people actively participated in the face-to-face struggle. Through their struggle was not fierce, they succeeded in motivating other people to face the enemy, and maintain their legal status.

Concerning the armed struggle, a number of people have constructed spike pits and established a defense system. (In Bù Blanh and Phước Long, the people have planted 1210 spikes while those in Bù Oai were making their spikes).
A number of youths actively participated in secret guerrilla activities, and they were issued weapons. A small number of youths joined action units (these people will be trained to become full time guerrillas). A report reached us, that in Phú Quốc (in Bu' Oai, two secret guerrillas have received their weapons, and two youths left their families to join the Revolution). In Tôn Lôn, two secret guerrillas were issued one rifle and one grenade.

In areas where strategic hamlets were destroyed, we have set up our agents; however, this task progressed slowly. At present, some places have established their self-governing committees.

In Phú Quốc after a number of strategic hamlets were destroyed, the people were enthusiastic. Our agents stepped up the movement and the following situation took place:

After the strategic hamlets were destroyed, the people began to conduct the legal struggle and argued with the enemy. They abandoned the strategic hamlets and returned to their villages. They had a strong will to defend their villages and attack the enemy.

(The revolutionary spirit of the people has remained low and weak. In some places, the people have left strategic hamlets to make their living. But when forced by the enemy, they had to reconstruct the strategic hamlets. Almost all youths were determined neither to avoid the enemy, nor to participate in fighting him. This was the reason which favored the enemy in conscripting them easily.

This movement (sic) was not strongly developed because the people were afraid of air strikes and artillery shelling, sweep operations, and resettlement v.v. (sic). But, the main reason for the above facts was that the support we gave them was not strong enough. We did not: Constantly stay close to the enemy, counterattack effectively, succeed in completely destroying local (RVN) administrative personnel and spies, spread the Revolutionary movement, have enough key agents for spreading propaganda, and those we have on hand are not well trained.

6. The situation and experiences in the motivating the people to break the enemy's oppressive control at present.

a. A few remarks on the situation.

During the past time, the motivation of the people to break the enemy's oppressive control in some places was successfully carried out.

We had good control of the situation. Supported by the people, we had collected a lot of intelligence on the enemy
(operating methods in messing and billeting, as well as the enemy's shortcomings). We were able to classify henchmen by category and identify their crimes, and this enabled us to take appropriate measures against them.

In some places, penetration agents provided the enemy's situation for us and helped us draft a combat plan. In addition, they have exploited captives and the enemy's administrative personnel. They immediately contacted good people as soon as they penetrated the enemy's area. This enabled them to better their activity plans for greater successes.

Improve the cadre and people's ideology. Some agencies were concerned about improving the ideology of the personnel of the action unit. They were particularly interested in making the cadre and soldiers of the ethnic minority fully understand our policy so that they will make up their minds to annihilate the enemy's oppressive control. Once they become imbued with the policy, they will instinctively agitate the masses to unanimously struggle with us. Regarding the people, an indoctrination session should be held for key cadre and the people to make their activities consistent with our plans. They will be used as key cadre to motivate the people and to counter the pessimistic non-cooperative attitude.

Due to their firm control of the situation, many units, even though modest in strength, have courageously infiltrated the (enemy's) hamlets (sometimes during the daytime), to destroy these hamlets, disorganize Combat Youths and to establish contact with agents to establish a base.

Units which penetrated some areas for the first time did not properly assess the situation. In areas where we lacked agents or did not have enough agents, infiltrating units had to simultaneously attack the enemy, pursue the RVN administrative personnel, motivate the people to rise up, and solve complicated problems. However, thanks to knowing how to assign specific tasks to every element and place emphasis on main links, they succeeded in accomplishing many tasks.

In some cases, the people seemed to be afraid of us when we first entered the villages. They dared not talk with us, but later, thanks to the intermediary of enthusiastic elements, (youths, women, etc) the people changed their attitudes. They began to put confidence in us and supported us in our tasks.

In order to motivate the people to rebel, we succeeded in lowering the RVN administrative personnel's prestige and separated them from the people, so that the people could give their opinions and participate in the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control.
Our cadre made preparation in advance, and infused the people with hatred for the strategic hamlets. They helped the people transport their property and motivated the people to burn down all fences and houses and to move their families out of the strategic hamlets. They motivated youths and women, who are the most zealous elements, to break the enemy's oppressive control and reorganized the people's life and continued attacking the enemy who resumed the relocation of the people.

After fighting the enemy, our cadre promptly motivated the people to conduct a face-to-face struggle in the districts; conducted political struggles against the enemy; and maintained and developed their advantageous conditions. In some areas, our cadre began to provide guidance for the people to set up a defense system and conceal properly ... etc. ((sic))

We could stay close to the battlefield to attack the enemy and support action units to create a foothold in the area. Then we could penetrate the area, plant our agents, motivate the people to conduct struggles, and consolidate our prestige. The action unit served as a protection force to create confidence in the people and encourage them to struggle bravely. At the same time, thanks to our staying close to the area, we could support the people and foster the movement.

2. In addition to the above strong points, in some other areas, our cadre still carried out their tasks superficially and improperly. In general, we only increased armed propaganda activities and motivated the people to conduct the struggle. We only carried out some tasks but did not continue to break the enemy's oppressive control and motivate the people to strengthen forces in compliance with the policy line.

We often had the following shortcomings:

A number of cadre still had a rightist attitude and they did not realize the traitorous character of the tyrants. They were not positive in denouncing their crimes to lower their prestige and to destroy their organization completely. Sometimes, our cadre seemed to yield before them. As a result, their ringleaders took advantage of our leniency to restrict our determination of breaking the oppressive control. These tyrants also made acquaintance with our cadre, separated the people from our cadre to prevent us from motivating the masses.

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Regarding the Combat Youths, we were not determined to annihilate them. Some places, our guerrillas did not try to attack and disarm them. They did not know clearly whether or not they should attack the Combat Youths and disarm them.
In other places, the cadre stated that they had dissolved the administrative personnel and Combat Youths. But they did not do anything to destroy their prestige and organization completely. They did not isolate them from the masses, but still allowed them to attend meetings with the people and assigned them some missions. For this reason, the movement of the people against the administrative personnel and tyrants could not be strengthened. The cadre did not know exactly the crime of the tyrants. They did not rely on the people to investigate and make the people support them in punishing the tyrants. As a result, when our troops entered a village to arrest the administrative personnel, sometimes the people (and even our key agents and Party members) came out to protect them and asked our troops not to kill them. All this has frustrated our plan of annihilating the administrative personnel.

A number of Montagnard cadre and Party members in the action units did not fully understand the policy line of the Party and their ideological concept was still so vague that they opposed the annihilation of the administrative personnel and tyrants and the stripping of the Combat Youths of their weapons, especially in cases where the administrative personnel were their relatives or lived in the same highland village.

Concerning a number of cadre and soldiers in the action unit, especially Montagnard cadre and soldiers, we did not try to improve their skills in the motivation of the people. Instead, our cadre have turned them into their subordinates and have given them odd jobs.

The unit commanders failed to urge the entire unit to do all works. They did not clearly know some important problems. The plan worked out by them was not clear and specific. Even in regards to propaganda and motivation, cadre explained the policy line to the masses differently and incorrectly.

Cadre in the action units did not have a firm attitude of fighters and victors to suppress the enemy and make the people put their confidence in us. They were not determined to attack the enemy and did not accomplish the plan worked out by the unit commander.

In the plan, the assignment of mission was not specific. They lacked a close coordination. Cadre did not properly carry out their missions, and did not place emphasis on the main points. Sometimes, they forced the people to accomplish tasks which the people did not like. Therefore, while this yielded some temporary results, sometimes their actions created an adverse effect.

Upon completion of the destruction of the hamlet, friendly units withdrew without maintaining contact with the enemy. The armed forces did not create a foothold to attack the enemy's
reinforcements and reactionaries. They did not continue increasing their activities and besieging and oppressing the enemy to enable the action units to motivate the people to struggle.

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In general, the action units failed to stay close to the people and did not properly carry out their tasks. In some places, the people came out of strategic hamlets of their own will but our cadre failed to stay close to motivate them to rise up.

In short, the cadre and troops failed to stay close to the people, therefore the movement rose slowly and did not show an upward development. Therefore, our activities were not increased.

b. Some specific experiences.

1. Firm control of the situation.

We must maintain a firm control of the situation to enable a suitable activity plan which favors greater successes. The experiences gained from the recent combat activities, show that:

In principle, to make preparation for an attack, we must properly assess the enemy situation to know his shortcomings in order to implement a plan of activities sooner. We should not review the situation many times, because the enemy can uncover us and may change his operating procedures. This will create difficulties for us.

We must clearly know the crimes of the administrative personnel and agents to destroy them completely. We must make the people aware of their crimes and create good opportunities for the people to rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control.

We must try to clearly know the people's sorrow, deep hatred, aspirations, capabilities, and their problems in order to properly motivate them to struggle. We must draft a specific motivation plan covering immediate objectives which interest the people. The most important and realistic point of the problem is to urge them to participate in our struggle.

In order to maintain a firm control of the situation, the cadre in charge of reconnoitering the terrain must work among the people to know the newest developments of the situation and fully understand the main points of the requirements. We must pay attention to organizing fifth columnists to keep abreast of the enemy's situation and operation methods.

In an area where our fifth columnists are not organized and the situation has not been assessed properly, we must work out a plan before entering the villages to provide guidance for activities.
2. We must try to promote the awareness of troops and soldiers to enable them to properly perform their missions.

We must urge our cadre to maintain consistency in the assessment of enemy and friendly situations; use democratic methods in drafting the plan. If the thoughts of any cadre or soldiers are erroneous, we must correct them. We must ensure that a close coordination in all fields be maintained by all levels. We must encourage them to display high determination to fight and win in order to gain the final victory. We must make sure that no one can change our mind.

Local cadre and soldiers should clearly understand the Party policy lines and strengthen their efforts to motivate the people to rise up.

There should be a district differentiation in the assignment of duties among different agencies, especially in the political and military fields. Meticulous plans should be carried out to deal with all eventualities. We must gain the initiative and properly implement the plans of the leadership.

Along with the democratic development, we must maintain discipline in the execution of the Party's policy; we must also eliminate irresponsibility and the attitude of blaming others. Through each phase of activity and task, we should promote and award those who set good examples. At the same time, criticize and use appropriate disciplinary measures against unenthusiastic individuals.

Besides, criticism and self-criticism should also be maintained in the internal organization to avoid erroneous thoughts.

3. We must try to stay close to the people:

This is the main point we should consider in motivating the people to develop the movement. However, it is our biggest shortcoming which caused us many difficulties. In addition to the contribution of efforts and conditions to stay close to the people, we should also avoid the habitual mistake of penetrating ((the enemy's)) area suddenly, operating quickly and then withdrawing.
In order to successfully implement the task of staying close to the people, we should find ways to constantly attack the enemy's reinforcements. We should also operate and oppress the enemy to stay in his strongholds, district seats and province capitals. As for action units, they should display a high determination to stay in the area. They should try to provide favorable conditions for themselves such as:

Foodstuffs, protective measures and defensive systems in order to stay close to the enemy. However, our main point is to make the people enthusiastically support us. Consequently we must create a strong support among them.

4. Improvement of the movement:

This task is more difficult and complicated than the motivation task.

It requires more effort, intensity and close coordination. Only when we implement the plan exactly will we succeed in the development of the movement and the strengthening of our forces.

The above matters are aimed at successfully creating and developing the three-pronged attacks by the people in the mountainous and lowland areas. Consequently, we must consider these points:

The people's struggle: In order to consolidate our forces since we have successfully oppressed the enemy, we should motivate the people to direct the struggle against the enemy. In this way, they will believe in their leadership and their solidarity in combat. Our preparations for the first struggle should be carefully made to ensure victory.

The most critical point is to display the people's will and power. Motivate them to rise up and counter the enemy's plan of erecting strategic hamlets. We must accuse the enemy of having impoverished the people, and causing them sorrows and bereavements. We must drive him into a deadlock instead of imploring him ((sic)). To successfully carry out this task, we should motivate the people to display their deep hatred of the enemy. We must prepare our arguments, readily and select hard-core elements to argue with the enemy. As for enthusiastic people, we should motivate them to rise up to defeat the enemy. Uncommitted individuals and those from the upper class should not be allowed to represent the people in the struggle because these elements will be easily threatened or soothed by the enemy. We must take this into consideration so as not to demoralize the people.
In addition, we should train the people from lower to higher classes to pay particular attention to fostering our achievements in order to stimulate the people to continue their uprising. In case of difficulties, we should try to overcome them and continue to motivate the people to struggle. The main factor in our course of action is to place the leadership element close to the people in order to help them resolve difficult problems. We should also expeditiously strengthen our forces in order to guide the force of the masses.

Only when we stay close to the people, organize and guide them to operate, will we succeed in discovering the enemy's weak points and the people's capability; gain experiences and timely reorganize all of our slogans, forms of action and combat methods as well as heighten the people's knowledge of their struggle.

After destroying the enemy's strategic hamlets and liberating the people, we should reorganize our organization to suit the people's new life and continue our motivation task. We should continue to destroy the enemy's local administrative personnel and spies and create enthusiasm among the people. We must arrest all wicked people and separate them from the masses. We must discover the enemy's spies and prevent their intelligence activities, and also prevent them from undermining the people.

Organize their new living conditions. We must break them down into small groups in areas where they can conceal their property, rice, food and so on...((sic)). Our main point in the struggle at this time is to counter the enemy's terrorism, destruction of crops and property and relocation of the people so as to maintain our legal status instead of being driven into the illegal status.

We should also conduct military proselyting activities in mountainous areas. We must place strong emphasis on ethnic minorities' troops and operate deeply in their area in order to arouse their nationalist spirit and motivate them to rise up and destroy the enemy. We should try to gain their backing so that they give their support to the people in the destruction of the strategic hamlets, to break the enemy's oppressive control, liberate the people and move them to our liberated area where they will make their living. We must also counter the enemy's terrorism.

We should take advantage of the enemy's weak points to develop our victories and apply our policy of attacking the enemy politically as well as causing him a great defeat. In addition, we should motivate the ethnic minority troops to secretly conduct military revolts among the enemy's ranks.

Troop proselyting tasks should also be coordinated closely with our armed forces. It should be organized in many phases according to the requirements of the area of emphasis. Specific plans and forms of propaganda, canvassing (leaflets,
megaphones, letters of appeal to the groups, letters to individuals, holding of meetings of the soldiers' dependents, and the rewarding of partisans (VC) and different forms of diversionary tactics to support the campaign should be used. We should try to motivate the people to rise up against the enemy; organize many military proselyting cells with key cadre that have been trained in political and technical fields in order to lead the people. In addition, we should try to recruit more agents to spread the network in depth; exploit and use all relations between the people; soldiers' dependents; and deserters in coordination with those in the enemy's ranks to develop our propaganda activity, conduct military revolts. Also use traitors to operate among the enemy's rank.

Armed forces to be organized among the masses: This is a new problem. It requires much energy, efforts, courage, determination and patience.

In order to be successful, sometimes we have to perform the same task over and over. In the field of leadership, we should prepare the problems in detail and have specific measures to fulfill them. Compare our tasks in the past and learn from these experiences to develop our general movement.

As for the people at present, our most important point is to motivate them to rise up. We must make them realize the enemy's weak points, believe in their combat solidarity, and liberate their country by themselves (gain the initiative in rural and mountainous areas). We must train and rehearse them over and over again and develop their creativeness in order to clear up all hardships and difficulties in the advance of the movement. In general, our experiences in building an armed force among the people are as follows:

- Pay particular attention to strengthening guerilla forces. Motivate male and female youths to positively participate in the training of guerrillas and militias in order to set the defense and protect the people's production. We must familiarize the people with the life in combat and how to recognize the enemy's weak points.

Try to recruit full-time guerrillas in local areas; train, equip and guide them to kill several enemy soldiers then they will have confidence in the struggle. To take advantage of this opportunity, we will employ them as motivation for our general movement.

In addition, to set the defensive system, we should carry it out step-by-step. We must use the following forms: Guards, warnings, conceal properties, lay spikes, set wild animal traps. Coordinate with the military proselyting personnel and the armed forces in outer areas to attack the enemy. We must use diversion to deceive the enemy. We must also threaten, oppress and encircle him... Following this method, we will create a new and strong position for the people to develop their guerilla tactics and establish their combat villages under different forms in order to prevent the enemy from his ranger operations and to protect the people's living conditions.
Establishment of troop strength:

In this connection we must:

Take interest in the development of unity in rural areas. Promote the revolutionary enthusiasm among the people. Motivate them to conduct three-pronged attacks against the enemy in mountainous and lowland areas, and enthusiastically participate in every revolutionary mission. The propaganda and indoctrination missions must be performed in a procedure aimed at accomplishing the missions of all fields. Settle the differences in the people's internal affairs, and avoid creating deficiency for the enemy. Suppress and reform Puppet troops by establishing house arrests to indoctrinate wicked individuals whose prestige can still influence the people. Rely on the people to discover enemy spies. The security mission must be carried out deep in newly liberated areas. Recruit reconnaissance agents to operate in border areas to prevent the enemy from destroying our installations and undermining our movements.

Organization:

Establish district and village Front Committees (as mentioned in the previous directive) in Montagnard areas. All Front Committees should undertake controlling liberated areas.

Regularly hold the people's congress in villages to have the people's idea of the struggle against the enemy.

The people's organization:

In areas of Vietnamese nationals, place emphasis on the establishment of Farmers' Associations, Youth Associations, Women's Associations, and Teenagers's Associations. In Montagnard areas take interest in Youth and Women's Associations. Develop rotating cells and work exchange cells and provide mutual support to increase production.

Particularly in contested area or areas under enemy oppression, we must develop rotating cells, work exchange cells, Economy and Society Associations, Culture Associations, and other legal associations.

The revolutionary associations such as Youth, Women's Liberation Laborers', etc...((sic)) must be organized secretly and separately. We also must skillfully take advantage of legal organizations to conduct our struggle.
Party and Group:

We must conduct political struggles, spread propaganda in favor of the Party, and admit as many people as possible to the Party.

The most urgent problem is the recruitment of many cadre to develop the movement

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and enlarge liberated areas. We must conduct short-term training courses to teach cadre and agents basic problems. Provinces and districts must organize mobile training teams to carry out this mission.

Buildup armed forces and semi-armed forces:

Strive to recruit personnel and full-time guerrillas. This task must be coordinated with the missions of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and initiating an ideology campaign. Otherwise, we must try to excite the revolutionary attitude of youth. Our soldiers must be trained in various phases and be guided when assigned missions in separate phases. They must participate in fighting to be acquainted with it and then be assigned to a distant area. Use full-time guerrillas to motivate personnel who still stay home. Pay attention to the lives of recruits and properly train them before they are assigned for operation.

Concerning the establishment of a guerrilla network:

Select good personnel, organizing them into full-time guerrilla teams, to act as key cadre in the people's armed struggle. Equip full-time guerrillas with weapons and strive to turn out village and hamlet guerrillas.

Concerning economic activities:

Increase production by organizing rotation cells and work exchange cells. Provide mutual support to raise many crops, especially agricultural produce to counter famine. On the other hand, take care of the people's health and mental life. Indoctrinate on sanitation and gradually reform some customs that are harmful to the people's lives.

Supply salt, silk, medicine, and farmers' tools for the people.

To meet the above requirements, we must continuously initiate many phases, provide proper guidance, and disseminate experiences.