crucial proportion of these were talented people, killed off by the Communists because they represented their most deadly challenge - parallel national administrative apparati. The human impoverization incumbent to this twenty year slaughter has warped the country's growth enormously.

The hoi chanh are currently experiencing what any needy, unskilled peasant confronts there - a lack of opportunity. Only the ralliers have the added encumbrance of a political stigma to overcome. Their recent initial entry into the skill apparatus is encouraging. Hopefully they will soon be joining the legitimate political competition as individuals. At present, however, their large scale entrance into the productive structure of South Viet Nam is meeting resentment and obstacles for both economic and political reasons. This is exacerbated by suspicion within the ruling juntas and the lack of healthy economic growth in the country at large. Because of the stain of their past, they are generally
following quiet, private paths of livelihoods. Their efforts at leading normal, unencumbered lives, after their decision to seek amnesty, are shot full of risks from both sides—be it a Viet Cong death warrant or discrimination experienced in the national economy and society. Job attainment and a desire for a legitimate status are their prime considerations. Their real productivity awaits the society's ability to fully receive and utilize them. Their stake in the national future is a vital one. It has yet to be even moderately realized. Just as the outcome of the war awaits the fashioning of an integrative, responsive political fabric in the South, the hoi chánh, semirootless in their own country, must await the healing of the wounds before they can assume their rightful position.
CHAPTER V - POLICY RECOMMENDATION
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The author considers the Chieu Hoi Program to be a very valuable and necessary component of the Government's effort to stop the Viet Cong. In terms of pure cost, it is much cheaper to get an insurgent to surrender than to kill him. It is also a more difficult operation, requiring a delicate concert of psychological and military instrumentalities.

The Program brings in approximately 2,500 guerrillas per month. Last year nearly 30,000 Viet Cong surrendered; very few of these guerrillas were hard core Communists. Probably only between 5 and 10% of the ralliers were "valuable" defectors in terms of providing either useful military intelligence or depleting the National Liberation Front or North Vietnamese Army of administrative or organizational talent.

In a sense the Program resembles a sieve. There were undoubtedly hoi chanh who should really have been classified as refugees. Draft dodgers from both Viet Cong and Government call-ups can be
found in the camps. Others were bribed into the camps by corrupt officials. Yet these marginal inputs are to be expected and, I feel, tolerated for the sake of the Program's overall rationale. As a means of obtaining tactical intelligence and the incremental weakening of the Front, this Program is definitely worth the effort.

The implementation of the Chieu Hoi Program has improved considerably since its inception. The addition of the Filipino advisors was probably the most astute phase of its refinement. They provide the shrewdest means of monitoring its enlargement we have yet developed.

However there remain many blocks to the Program's final success. They are of three kinds and have to be considered on separate levels. The initial difficulty of combating the Viet Cong's slander and propaganda about the Program does not seem to be an area the GVN can significantly ameliorate. As long as even a skeleton of the National Liberation Front remains in the jungle, it will
control people and manufacture grievances. Its ability to communicate with the Vietnamese peasant and reap support from this act is not under strong danger of competition from the Saigon regime at the time of this writing. As Douglas Pike has pointed out, every act of the National Liberation Front was an act of communication.* Their ability to reach and hold a peasant base remains largely intact. They will undoubtedly accelerate their counter Chieu Hoi offensive as the Program hurts them more. But the Government holds one unexpected and increasing advantage with respect to the communications gap. With the advent of huge numbers of people flocking to the rural capitals, the ease of targeting them for propaganda is obvious. While this migration may have very bad effects on the rice economy in many areas, it does mean that more peasants will come under the GVN's communications umbrella. The story of Chieu Hoi will reach more ears.

The second major impediment to the enhancement of the Program is the ARVN's feelings about it. The Program's low priority has been mentioned. The derisive name of "the American Program," while seemingly superficial, is indicative of the barren reception the device has long been plagued with in the juntas and under Diem. The manifestations of this low priority have cropped up in the intelligence organization's treatment of the Program. Incidents of brutality on hoi chánh, refusal to allow continued training of Armed Propaganda Teams at the Revolutionary Development Center in Vung Tau and the continuing suspicion of much of the ARVN toward the hoi chánh are so ingrained to the operational environment of this war that this author does not see much hope for a significant change of these types of behavior. The hoi chánh are therefore resettling and working under largely separate conditions. Their true acceptance will take years.
A. **Structure and Propaganda**

With respect to the Program itself there are some areas that certainly can be improved. Starting with the least strategic problem of inducement I would like to offer a number of suggestions based on the findings of this research.

1. Hire as many propaganda oriented hoi chanh into the inducement efforts as can be accommodated. Native inducement teams used in tactical situations such as the 1st Infantry Division is setting up should be considered wherever feasible. They should also be brought into the design efforts in Saigon and absolute candor should be required of their suggestions.

2. Rebudget up to ten percent of the leaflet funds for research and evaluation. There is not enough feedback getting into Saigon from the mass saturation dropping. Provisions should be made for continuing leaflet and psychological war evaluations in prisoner of war compounds, Chieu Hoi camps and in the villages. Field research can have a considerable cost-effective value here.
3. In the psychological war effort, change the ratio of employees in Saigon to those in the field in favor of the latter. Decentralize back-up and support facilities wherever possible.

4. Stop all vilification of the Viet Cong unless absolutely positive it will not be counterproductive. No general mass consumption leaflets should carry a vilification theme. The peasants do not believe it, and the Viet Cong resent it.

5. Avoid overloading the formal lines of communications any further. The peasant is liable to be more suspicious of a message coming from an American aircraft than hearing it from a Vietnamese propagandist. Fill the informal word of mouth channels with the Program's message.

6. Never promise more than can be realized.

B. Motivational Indoctrination

These suggestions for improvement of indoctrination in the camps are based upon Viet Cong techniques which have proven to be effective.
1. Divide the classes at the National Center into smaller groups organized among men of similar political sophistication. Pitch the content to the audience.

2. Change the ratio of lecture to discussion (in all centers) heavily toward the latter. However, discussion groups should be quite small, no more than ten, for more thorough questioning and indoctrination. No more than three hours a day of indoctrination is necessary.

3. Eliminate all memorization requirements. Clear up any misunderstanding of previous material before launching into new topics. The rest of the time should be spent in physical activity.

4. Pay real attention to rapport between teachers and students. Again and again it comes out, teachers who read a canned text and then hurry off on a fancy motorcycle detract from the whole meaning of this effort—sympathetic indoctrination. Utilize Viet Cong techniques—eat,
sleep and work with the men in the camps. The best Chieu Hoi chiefs do this.

5. Continue to hire hoi chanh into the program, especially as teachers if they are qualified. Let the best review both the content and techniques of teaching at the centers. Many of the teachers up country are clerks in the camps on 3500 piasters per month payrolls. Without better salaries the program cannot be properly staffed.

C. Jobs

This author believes job placement to be the most crucial factor in the Chieu Hoi program. With all our preoccupation with techniques of inducement, appeals, medical aid, and indoctrination, we are in danger of losing sight of what this program must contribute toward the total effort: rehabilitation of these defectors for the long haul. The acquisition of practical skills and their useful employment on the outside are so
absolutely crucial to any developing country, that their importance in a wounded society like South Viet Nam takes on an even increased role. The utilization of hoi chanh in meaningful occupations means the program will be geared toward a national development effort rather than simply a weakening of the Viet Cong. For too long the Chieu Hoi Program has been concerned only with the individual hoi chanh--how to extract him, indoctrinate him and maintain surveillance over him. Now the Program must direct its efforts toward the larger task of rehabilitating the ralliers into useful, productive citizens for the Republic's future. This can be done under the strain of war.

I suggest a three pronged attack on the problem: rapid expansion of facilities for training hoi chanh, absolute priority on their placement in jobs and a high pitched advertisement of the new look. I would build the entire concept around the theme of "your country and your family need you--return to the GVN and let us train you for a good job. You
are a patriot, help your country to build for a peaceful future instead of tearing it apart.

1. If training facilities do not exist in the camp, then the Chieu Hoi chiefs should do everything possible to obtain entrance of hoi chánh into local training facilities, technical schools, ARVN trade schools, local mills and factories.

2. Integrate all technical training wherever possible to immediate needs of the locality. Start "on-the-job" training in the local industries immediately.

3. Advertise to all levels of the Viet Cong the availability of the new training. Suggest job possibilities for certain types of ralliers. Do not promise anything unobtainable. The advertising can be done most successfully through non-American vehicles such as Armed Propaganda Teams rather than from airplanes. Case histories of men who left the ranks of the Front, were rehabilitated and are now employed are potential subject matter for the propagandists.
4. This new program cannot be realized without coordinating hoi chanh employment to job needs throughout the Republic. The Ministry of Labor should be brought into the new scheme. They would be responsible for studying the best avenues for the hoi chanh's injection into the labor market. It seems best not to try and push the military and Revolutionary Development organizations for acceptance of hoi chanh immediately. But certainly the generals can understand the necessity of getting ralliers into the job market quickly. And if the accent was put on long term rehabilitation of the hoi chanh rather than immediate acceptance of them in existing agencies, I feel we would be accomplishing the same result with less animosity.

The hoi chanh would then begin to participate in the Republic's productive future. Such an incentive became the crucial element of the Philippine and Malayan solutions. The hoi chanh's need for a financial stake in the game is so great
in Viet Nam as to be often overlooked. We must create an atmosphere for them and their children to live in where there is something besides disappointment and despair. This is the real task of the Chieu Hoi Program.
APPENDICES
To soldiers in the VC ranks

Dear friends:

Your families and the people are stretching out the hand of love to welcome the return of misled sons to the great family of the Nation. Don't hesitate to turn your guns on the VC lackeys of the Chinese Communists who are leading you in the destruction of the country and the slaughter of innocent people.

We are certain that you would never voluntarily do such things, unless you were forced by the bloodthirsty and ruthless Viet Cong. Your country and its villages are being invaded; and your loved ones are in extreme anguish because of their love for you. Awake to the just cause and return to the great family of the Nation to fulfill your duty as a son of the nation.

Good-bye, dear friends.
Caption under replica of Pass: Those safe conduct passes are more valuable than gold because they can save the lives of your loved ones.

TO THE MOTHERS AND WIVES WHOSE HUSBANDS ARE IN THE VC RANKS

Keep the Safe Conduct Passes distributed by the Government bearing pictures like the ones on the leaflet. Each Pass is an official document of the Government. Each is numbered and officially recorded. These Passes are invaluable for those VC cadres who wish to use them to return to the Government side. Save as many as you can of those Passes in order to save the lives of your husbands, sons and friends. Give these Passes to them when they return for visits. If possible, take the Passes to them. These small Passes are more valuable than gold...
Here are instructions that will help you return home to the National Just Cause.

1. Keep one of the GVN Safe Conduct Pass. Keep it carefully and await a favorable time to return.

2. Wait patiently for a favorable opportunity, continue to demonstrate extreme loyalty to the VC to avoid suspicion.

3. When the opportunity comes, seize it, leave the VC ranks at once to return to your families.

4. If you can escape only at night, seek a hiding place. Report only in the daytime. Hide your weapon someplace before reporting. After reporting, you can show the friendly forces where the weapons are hidden and receive your reward.

5. Always keep the Safe Conduct Pass hidden your body. If you have an unexpected chance to return to the National Government, or if accidentally arrested, you can show your good intention of going back home and to the Just Cause.

6. Regardless of your situation, day or night, if investigated produce the Safe Conduct Pass and be warmly received as friend.

Back side: COMPatriots in the VIET CONG. The Government of Viet Nam will reward you and help you return. $24 a day for your food; $24 a day for your wife; $12 for each of your children; plus other gratuities. Additional rewards will be based on the weapon you bring.
BẠN CÒNG NGHỊ ĐẾN HẠNH PHÚC
GIA DÌNH BẠN?

- Bây giờ anh ở đâu?
- Anh đang làm gì?
DO YOU THINK OF YOUR FAMILY’S HAPPINESS?

Today, the members of the family sit around the dining table, feeling very melancholy and down-hearted because brother Hai or sister Tu or uncle Sau are missing. The Tet season has passed and every year, when the anniversary of the death of our ancestors and the common festivals return, these beloved figures are still missing, the absence of these persons has created solitude and sadness in the family.

Where are they? And what are they doing at this moment? Who takes care of their wives and children? Who looks after their old parents? Who does the farming of their fields and gardens? And who worships their ancestors?

We all know that they do not want to endure the present hardships any longer. They do not want to be cheated by the so-called "NLF". They also do not want to live in misery: lack of medicine; lack of clothes; lack of family ties. Moreover, they really do not want to take up weapons to kill innocent people which includes their own wives, children and relatives. That is why nearly 20,000 VC cadres and soldiers returned to the Government side in the Open Arms Policy. There are still a number of them who were forced to follow the VC and have not found the way to return yet!

The GVN and Armed Forces are always ready to welcome their return warmly.

BACK SIDE: (Under pictures)

- Do you ever think of your family's happiness?
- Where are you?
- What are you doing?
Do you want to die and be buried in an unmarked grave or come back to your family and enjoy the government's protection.

It is your choice, either this or that.
THINK OF YOUR FAMILY

What is happening to your family now that you are hiding in the unhealthy jungles? What will it do to your loved ones when you die far away from your native home and are buried in an unmarked grave?

Your family misses you and needs you. Don't bring heartbreak to your family by being killed for a wrong cause. Have the courage to act on behalf of your family, to stay alive, and to return to your relatives.

You can only realize this by using the Safe Conduct Pass. Otherwise you will most certainly be subject to an undue death.

All VC soldiers, whether their birthplace was in South or North Vietnam, are given a warm welcome if they leave the subversive aggressive forces.

The Safe Conduct Pass is your guarantee for survival. Live to see your family again.
VC Come Home!! Your family needs you. They fear for your health and welfare. They know you will die if you do not heed their plea.

The Government also wants you to come home. Contact the nearest Government soldiers and officials. You will be well treated, and both you and your family will be helped as soon as you return to the just cause.

Don't Delay. Come Home!

Side II

Return to your family! They miss you and need you.
TO THE SOLDIERS IN THE VIET CONG RANKS

Your family misses you when they sit around the dinner table, they worry about you and the hardships you endure, they wonder what has happened to you. Your family is without a man—the important element in the family—and they feel more lonely than ever. Your family hopes that the birds, the wind and the clouds will carry this message to you so that you will return to your family and the open arms policy of the GVN.
TO THE SOLDIERS IN THE RANKS OF THE VIET CONG

We miss you. Do you remember us? Do you ever think of your family? You know the GVN forces are winning everywhere. I worry about you. Where are you? What has happened to you? The Open Arms Policy of the GVN will welcome your return to us. I hope that this letter reaches you in time and that you will make up your mind to return to us. I am waiting for you, hoping for your safe return.
Đây là một tấm Giấy Thông Hành có giá trị với tất cả cơ quan Quan Chinh Việt-Nam Cộng-Hoa và lực lượng Đông-Minh.

Lưu ý: Giấy Thông Hành này phải được giữ kín và không được chia nhau.

Mã số: 495036 AU

Leaflet #10
GIƯỜNG PHÁI LỤC TRÙ VÌ VŨ CẢNH SÀO?
AIH CHỜN CẢNH HẢO TRÊN NAY?
VỀ DẤY QUI CHÁNH AI SƠI, 
NO CÔM, ÂM ĂO CUỘC ĐỜI TỬ ĐO

Anh Nguyễn Văn Bảy thuộc đơn vị R2D 
quận thôn Cẩm Vận, xã Thanh Sơn, 
qui chánh ngày 1.7.1966
TRƯỜNG MÃ
CÁC CỘT TRONG
VẾC CỘT C5
Hữu Trọng Phú
THUẬT CÁM
HÀNG 5
VẾC CỘT C6
LETTER FROM L/COL LE XUAN CHUYEN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE VC TO HIS OLD COMRADES STILL FIGHTING IN VC RANKS

To the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and fighting men of the National Liberation Front:

My Comrades, it made me most sad to have to leave you. Today I send you greetings and hope that you are all in good health. I shall always have great respect for the kind of friendship which exists between fighters like us, brothers-in-arms. The people of Viet Nam will always remain a great people and it is they who are my benefactors.

I, Xuan Chuyen, miss you very much and think of you always. It is my hope that you do not cast blame on me for leaving your ranks. Why did I leave? I think that all of you can understand the reasons which compelled me to do so, and I am certain also that each of you know in your hearts that regardless of the ideals for which we all fought, each man must be allowed to keep his freedom, individuality and above all human dignity, without which there can be no guarantee of the good life for us, our families and the nation.

But now I ask you, what have the last twenty years of sacrifice brought us? It is absolutely senseless to have to sacrifice our youth in exchange for a life devoid of freedom and one in which there is no concern for the individual.

Even now they do not leave us alone. And what of those healthy, eager, intelligent young men who might have become doctors, engineers, teachers, and other specialists who could have helped to build their country? Who was it that coerced them to fight on for such a hopeless cause, like mayflies plunging headlong into the open flame? And for what purpose? The realities of this life dictated that I think deeply about these questions and truth has led me to the final decision that I must escape from communism to fight for freedom.
I acted as I did not only to fight for freedom, gain my own liberty and preserve my own dignity, but that of the rest of our generation as well.

I want to tell you that I now live in freedom and peace of mind and that I have received every help and assistance. I have been given an honorable job and here I see open hearts offering friendship and conciliation while working in harmony to build the nation. There is a unity of purpose in the struggle in defense of freedom, democracy and independence and the happiness of the people. I see also that there is a cherished desire for an honorable peace.

I miss you all and my beloved family in the North, but there is much to do and the job to be done is paramount to my personal feelings. May the passing of time give you the answers you seek and may those answers console each of you and my beloved family.

I urge you to think deeply on these questions and to free yourselves from the control of the organization and the prison of its ideologies.

I call upon you to come back here, come back to the free south and together we will resume the work of young patriots.

With hopes of seeing you all.

Cordially,

XUAN CHUYEN
CÁC BAN VIỆT CÔNG VÀ CĂN BÌNH TRONG BỘ ĐỐI Baeda VIỆT
Nếu lộ bí thุง tich, sở phán ban sẽ ra sao?

Yoii cãi choi đi dôi, lê lê bể không ai sâm sóc trong bệnh viện thúle. lô đề dùng cụ và thúa men củu Việt Cộng...
HAY... đỗc cãi bể củ Cách Phủ và Bằng Minh sâm sóc và củ sâm trong nhung bệnh viện củu Cách Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa.

BÁN CÓ THỂ CHỌN LÂY SỞ PHÁN
B. Lt. Colonel Chu Yen's Testimony

Q. What was it that attracted you, personally, to rally to the Government side?

A. I had many reasons for rallying. These reasons came together and became meaningful little by little, and over a long time. The reasons grew up in my private life, and in my public life and in everything that I did. The first reason is that I do not like this kind of war and I don't like this kind of method of operation, which is designed to impose the yoke of Communism upon the Vietnamese people. The reason that I do not like this kind of war is that it is necessary to leave every person free to choose the life that he desires. One must not impose it on him. Everyone must be left free to choose which way he wants to go. In my opinion, all people should be free to choose what regime they want to live under and what religion they want to practice. And I think also that if you employ military force to win the victory, this is not a permanent victory. It is only an ephemeral victory and it will not last for a long time. By its nature, war is very destructive. As an old soldier and a participant in many campaigns, I have come to recognize that war is good for only one thing, and that is destruction, tearing the country apart. During the time of the French, the French took advantage of the war to begin a civil war among the Vietnamese. I also think that if there was no war, Viet Nam could organize a better life for itself because it has the natural richness, the talents, and the ability to do so. And I think further, that if the war continues the Vietnamese people will become beggars and will depend for their life for the assistance of foreigners.
The second reason I left is that I have been a member of the Party since 1946 and I have studied very many things - the principles, doctrines, theories, and ideology of Communism. I have also studied the theories of capitalism and the way in which both sides choose to live. The thing I object to among the Communists is that under their regime, the people lack liberty. For example, the elections in North Viet Nam. I must emphasize that I have been thoroughly indoctrinated in Communist ideology, and you might compare me to a fervent Catholic in that regard. But among the Communists, there is no freedom. In the North there is only one Party and that is the Communist Party. There is no one who is allowed to be against them. Here, for example, there are three or four or five parties, each of which is free to be against the Government. I will give you an example. If there is a person who does not have the same opinion as the Government in Hanoi, he does not have the liberty to speak about it openly. And so, in sum, my reasons for leaving were that there was no liberty and no political democracy. We were not free. Also, from the economic point of view, in the North the Viet Minh have a program for economic production in order to raise the level of living of the country, but they have not been successful in that. In the North, they have imposed a Government plan for production on the people, but they do not leave the people free to produce. The reason that they do not encourage the people to produce is that everyone is organized into associations and societies for production, but there is no individual liberty given.
The final reason that I left was that I was not in agreement with the VC about the way in which they employed the higher ranking cadres like myself. I have been in the military ever since I was a child, and since that time I have been designated for very high level functions, such as regimental commander and Chief of Staff. But during that time I was not well treated from a material or a spiritual point of view in either political or military matters. For example, I know some VC colonels in posts more important than I had, who have never been under fire and who have never participated in any military operations. Also, when I was in the North, I had disagreements on various matters with my superiors and when I came to the South, they were willing to recognize that I had abundant military experience, but they did not trust me for my political morale. This is the reason why I was not given any unit to command in the South. I know, for example, some friends of mine who are now of the rank of colonel, commanding a division, but these men do not merit their rank. Before I became a rallier, I had a dispute with several of these colonels. Also, before I came to the South, when I was in the North, I had a dispute with a corps commander in the army. This occurred three years ago. I suggested to that general that we have a public debate, but he did not dare to do that. He also did not dare to do anything to me. I had a disagreement with the general and also with those colonels about the way in which one should treat inferior officers and the way in which we should organize military operations. The reason the others could not do anything to me was that I was widely recognized as being a man of experience and who had made many accomplishments. These people were my old comrades, and they did not dare to do anything against me.
C. Ex-Viet Cong Provincial Committeeman's Testimony

Mr. An* is the highest level civilian defector Simulmatics has interviewed to date. He has spent 20 years with Vietnamese revolutionary movements. When he quit the Viet Cong in January 1966 he held the responsibility for all provincial civilian proselytizing in Tay Ninh. He was a member of the Communist Party and remains a dedicated nationalist. He translates documents at a Catholic mission in Saigon where his wife is the caretaker.

An's story is one of dedication to, accomplishment within, and eventually a bitter ideological dissolution with the Viet Cong, that combined with polio contracted in the trenches made it imperative that he quit or succumb.

He grew up on a well-to-do farm of Catholic parents in Tay Ninh. Sent by his father to Saigon for training in a French Lyceum, young An enjoyed being a student, found the competition of intellectual life in the city worthwhile.

*Pseudonym
Swept up in the flood of the anti-French campaign, the young student began to involve himself in Viet Minh activities. Using his natural persuasive abilities he took on civilian and religious proselytizing jobs. Eventually the young propagandist was to speak before crowds as large as 10,000.

As the needs of the revolution mounted An moved among a series of jobs involving rural people. He organized a mass literacy program. He taught mathematics in his spare time. He helped organize two politically oriented high schools with a view toward expanding them into university level establishments. He became in Viet Minh terminology an "Encyclopedic" cadre; consulting, organizing, teaching, propagandizing.

When the war ended in 1954 An went back to a high school position in Tay Ninh. For the next two years his life consisted of part time teaching while dodging Diem's security police.

In 1956 An rejoined the Communists on a full time basis. Applying the old skills in familiar territory he moved up through provincial positions in War Zone C.
By 1960 he had been charged with all civilian propaganda and education work in Tay Ninh province. His duties brought him into contact with VC officials in every facet of their work. He had frequent associations with zone and even central committee members. He witnessed the remodeling of the intelligence infrastructure in Saigon as well as the countryside. He gave us insights into the power relationships in the Viet Cong hierarchy. He elaborated at length on the primacy of civilian control in the Front. He spoke of the changing Northern leadership role and the Cambodian involvement. He outlined for us the entire administrative structure of the Front on all levels.

But in 1960 the Front decided to initiate an extreme land reform policy. It called for the killing of rich landlords. An took exception, he felt the Front should coax the renters more. In a series of prolonged and often heated discussions with Zone administrators, An fought for his beliefs but eventually lost the fight. He said he felt utterly alone in his despair. Indeed the fact that he had
come from a land owning family was to attenuate his rise in authority sharply after 1960. The first indications of the problem had shown themselves when he had applied for Party membership years before. A long probationary period had ensued. He watched as other less qualified men from proletarian backgrounds had been immediately admitted. It had become clear that he would be given no larger responsibilities. Two years later An's health began to fail rapidly. Years spent in the jungle, often in underground quarters, coupled with hurried meals and unsanitary conditions had left him racked with malaria and respiratory ailments. He had always had an arthritis problem but it could be controlled. Then he caught polio.

For the next three years he was essentially an invalid, often completely paralyzed from the waist down. The waiting list for evacuation to the North was a long one. When finally he was marked for radiation treatment in Russia and a place reserved for him on a train out of Hanoi, another Southerner
of equal rank but lower class origins was given the slot. That was the final straw. As soon as he had the strength he contacted Saigon through his wife and began negotiations for amnesty. His wife delivered to him a secret guarantee from Saigon for his safety and several days later he asked his province secretary for permission to seek private treatment from a nearby native doctor. Using the opportunity to hail a sampan, An got down to Saigon and was given clemency.

The interrogation that An went through was, he remembers, emotionally very upsetting. He was insulted, threatened, but never physically beaten. He then spent 6 months in the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, where he was repeatedly lifted by Military Intelligence for interrogation purposes. An made the best marks in his class at the Chieu Hoi Center. He considered the course a poor one, however, "I learned nothing," he said.

An stayed in Saigon. He found a home in an American sponsored Catholic mission. He ekes out a living for his family as a translator of religious documents. He
told us he has applied for numerous jobs involving clerical, education or secretary work—and has been turned down. He spoke of an oral agreement between other ministries not to hire ex-Viet Cong. Recently he was contacted about a potential job at the Chieu Hoi center but we recently learned he has tuberculosis. He has often spoken of the GVN being controlled by the US Embassy. Much of his terminology remains Marxist.

The overriding factors that led An to quit the Viet Cong were a growing disillusionment over discrimination within the organization coupled with a realization that the National Liberation Front was out to exploit its followers as cruelly as Diem or others had ever envisioned. As a Catholic and a moral man, he could not condone the land redistribution decisions. He witnessed a great deal of suffering in his 20 years in the ranks, unnecessary suffering he now admits. He believes that the National side, while often wrong, is basically out to help the peasant more than the Viet Cong. He realized that if he stayed with them he would die. He has now turned to his family and his God with whom he lives a quiet life.
D. Philippine Medical Team

There is a Philippine Medical Team visiting here today consisting of a Captain, two officers, and four enlisted men. One of the officers is a doctor; the others are medical cadres. They come to this province and up to this camp every two weeks to visit the refugees and Chieu Hoi Centers and the hospitals throughout the province. The doctor told me that the most common ailments of defectors here are respiratory ailments in the upper thorax as a result of living in smoke-filled areas or in tunnels. The care prescribed is rest, clean air, and the normal dosage of penicillin or aspirin.

These Filipinos, of course, speak English and fairly good Vietnamese. They carry dictionaries with them, and their rapport with the Vietnamese is very good. They organized the sick call by having all the hoi chanh in need of attention line up and catalog through one of the local clerks. Then, using interpreters when necessary, the clerk would explain to the doctor exactly what the man complained of. The doctor then diagnosed the problem and gave appropriate treatment.

The Filipinos carry with them a full complement of medical equipment including stethoscopes and blood pressure devices, drugs and pharmaceuticals immediate for injections. They also have attached to them several dentists, but these men are out on other calls today.

Dental problems are not as great as fatigue and respiratory ailments. The dentist is out in a refugee village going through a process similar to the one we saw here at the Center. They first came here on the 24th of November (1966), and they will make what seems to be ten day visits, ten days apart. The dentist was here the first time and took care of the needs that he found.
In watching the medical inspection today, we noticed the doctor test the hearing of two patients from Hoa Nghia Province. These two men came up to Tay Ninh City because it was nearer than their own provincial center. Both were victims of concussion and nerve paralysis in the ears as a result of a B-52 bombing. The doctor used a number of tin and brass devices to see if they could hear any resonance. One is totally deaf and the other is deaf in one ear but has fairly good hearing in the other. We also watched the doctor diagnose a girl who said that she sneezed a lot and had a large amount of mucous in her nose at night. The advice was to change from a feather pillow to one made of foam rubber.
E. Mistreatment of Hoi Chanh

During the past two months I have searched for reasons to explain a downward trend in our numbers of Quy Chanh. One possible explanation is the damage to the Chieu Hoi program caused by current interrogation procedures. I have always considered the jungle grapevine of the Viet Cong an important part of our exploitation and in the local districts and Provincial Center "humane treatment" is given all returnees.

Too often, however, a Quy Chanh appeals to those collecting intelligence at the division or CTZ level. In some cases movement of the rallier to Corps or National Centers is certainly justified. I have discussed with Mr. Osborne and others there my concern over apparent "disappearances" of such important Quy Chanh. In this respect I have suggested a program of encouraging these individuals to send to the Provincial Center first receiving them a "having a swell time, wish you were here" type message. This would help erase fears among others in local Centers. The problem with intelligence interrogation for long periods and then return to the Center is more damaging.

To cite some examples of what is happening in the 41st DTA (9th Division) on July 29 a medical specialist from Chuong Tien Province rallied in Kien An District of this province. He was brought to Rach Gia, and against his will, quickly moved to Can Tho by American-manned helicopter. It seems 21st Division wanted to question this returnee. From Can Tho he was taken to Bac Lieu where he was beaten by a Vietnamese lieutenant attempting to extract information. He was eventually returned to Can Tho, then to Sadec and finally back to Rach Gia. In all he was gone 27 days, offered poor sleeping accommodations and no food money (fed in various places and fashions). In Chau Doc on August 3 a medical specialist and assistant platoon leader of the Viet Cong 6th Artillery Company rallied at Triton. On August 5 at 1600 hours American-manned helicopters
moved both men to Sadec. There for fourteen days, they slept without mosquito netting in poor accommodations next to the prison. They ate with the prisoners and indicated it was very poor food. Each man was interrogated once. One man was threatened with a beating and watched a Vietnamese aspirant hit in the head a Quy Chanh from Vinh Long Province. In all an average of ten Quy Chanh were kept there for interrogation. All knew about the beatings and threats. The two Chau Doc ralliers were returned on August 19 and express total displeasure with their initial Chieu Hoi period. At Chau Doc they are treated well but cannot be exploited.

I strongly recommend attempts be made with the Vietnamese to forbid the transfer of Quy Chanh for intelligence purposes, but rather that interrogators visit provincial centers to talk with returnees in whom they have a military interest. Similarly the use of American helicopters should be discouraged since American presence during the first few days of Chieu Hoi exposure distracts and confuses Quy Chanh.
F. Comparisons of Rapport, GVN Versus VC

The VC have a heavy tax but they even make the people glad to pay it because they are good to them. The VC soldiers will even help you to build your house. They will take out their handkerchief to wipe the nose of a kid. The soldiers and the cadres are good to people. The rural people respect them. The rural people don't like mustache people like the Revolutionary Development Cadre who come in here. They regard them as playboys. They act silly. They order the people around. They order the people to help them. The people don't listen to them and don't like them. The VC are not this way. General Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development, I think, always talks in the right way and he always has the right things to say. I don't think he knows how his cadres act when they are in the field. Just compare the wives, for example, in the VC with the wives of GVN officers. In the VC even the wife of General Giap we call "Sister." We don't have to respect her especially, but we respect her as a woman. We respect her husband but we are friendly with her and we are not conscious of a difference between her and ourselves. Here for example, can you imagine calling Mrs. Ky or Mrs. Thieu "Sister?" You have to salute and call them Your Excellency. This is very ridiculous. The men are talented but not the women. Why do you have to show such respect to the wives? In the VC we call ministers, Brother, and we call Ho Chi Minh, Uncle. When I rallied and I met Premier Ky, I called him Brother, but after that I was told that was not the respectful way to call him. This is absurd.

Q. Tell me about your meeting with Premier Ky. What did he say? How long did you see him?

A. He told me that I should tell the truth, that I should expose the evils of the VC, and that I should also express the truth about the Chieu Hoi Program even when they were false about it. My interview was about ten minutes with him.
G. Suggestions for Improvement of Chieu Hoi Program

The most thoughtful suggestions made by a defector for improvement of the program's indoctrination came from a Provincial Committeeman who went through the course in Saigon with perfect marks and yet stated, "I didn't learn a thing." 

Q. You have had the opportunity to be an instructor and a teacher for the Viet Cong. If you had been given responsibility for the methods of indoctrination in the Chieu Hoi center, how would you have changed what you witnessed there? Would you have made any improvements or alterations?

A. If we talk about the techniques and methods of teaching, then I think that these two things depend chiefly upon the personnel available at the Chieu Hoi center. It also depends on the caliber and quality of the instructors. Before talking about the techniques and methods of teaching, we must first ask these questions. Who is going to teach the class? Who is going to be trained? We must first lay down the main purpose of the class; to convince the returnees, to make them believe in the national cause. Then once the purpose of the course is laid down and is a clear cut one, then we should look for experienced men, and select them to become instructors. By experienced men, I mean the men who have actually had experiences with the Front or with that life. And then secondly, must determine the target audience of the course. In other words, we must determine who will be the student body and we must divide them into two groups--the majority and the minority group. The

1 C.H. 5, p. 69-75
majority group at the Chieu Hoi center consisted of mostly farmers and poor urban people. Therefore, the rule of thumb which we should try to lay down is to take these forces into consideration. These farmers and poor urban people, these petit bourgeois, don't like theories because they cannot understand them. In teaching them, we must draw concrete examples from actual life. Concerning the method of teaching, we must aim at improving their knowledge about what's happening around them. Regarding this matter, I would like to use an example. While pouring water into a bottle, it's not good to pour a large quantity of water at one time. We must try to find some method to pour a big enough quantity of water into the bottle, perhaps drop by drop, although it takes time, so that the water cannot be wasted.

Q. You also mentioned that when the hoi chanh come into the center they carry with them a knowledge of the cell system that was used in the Viet Cong. Can you make any other suggestions as to how in the actual mechanics of teaching this might be utilized for more effective instructions and reception?

A. We should use to the maximum advantage possible the existing organization of cells and squads and platoons in every Chieu Hoi center. Presently, all these cells and squads and similar organizations are organized mainly for the purpose of closely watching each other, that is the mutual control system, for other purposes than helping to develop the knowledge of the returnees. By this I would like to say, we should use the existing organizations and squads, for instance,