making them discuss among themselves, and
helping each other to develop their knowledge
in matters concerning what we are going to
teach them. Concerning the organization of
the cell, the first thing I must point out
is that in the Front, whether it be a three
or a four man cell, it is always a confidential
cell. By confidential cell I mean that each
member of the cell can be guided in such a
way that he will tell all secret things, all
secret feelings to other members of the cell.
Over here, presently, the existing cells at
the Chieu Hoi center are chiefly for
intelligence purposes. This not good
because as long as everyone can see that it
is clearly for intelligence purposes, no one
can speak of his secret feelings to others.
Regarding this matter, how should we develop
existing cells at the Chieu Hoi centers into
confidential cells like in the VC? I would
suggest that in the organization of these
cells we check on the personal records of
each individual before we put them together
into cells. In organizing them into cells,
we must pay attention to the following factors:
First, the type of unit they served with while
still with the VC, for a village guerrilla
cannot talk freely with a main force soldier.
The second factor is the age, because an old
man cannot be confidential with a young man.
Regionalism also plays a considerable single
control in this matter. That is, a northerner
cannot be confidential with and say the things
deep in his heart to a southerner. By the
same token, a man who was born in this province
cannot be confidential with the man who comes
from another province. The same is true of
men from different districts or villages. We
must consider also the political background
of each individual, because two low level soldiers cannot speak freely about their secret feelings to a man who is as politically experienced as a major. The second thing is how to employ these cells. Once we have organized these cells, we must respect them, we must trust them, and we must employ them. By trusting it I mean that we have to trust it whole-heartedly, not half-heartedly, as presently we are. Before we try to indoctrinate them we must try to instill into their minds a basic idea about democracy and freedom. In teaching them, first by using this cell as a basic unit, we must work two ways, or in other words, this process consists of two steps. The first step is from the steering committee down to the cell, and the second step is from the cell up to the steering committee. To illustrate this, I would like to point out an example. For instance, I would want to teach them a certain subject or political topic. The steering committee must give the main point of interest to that subject, must present these points of interest in front of the whole class. Then when the students leave the class, they will hold a ground discussion to discuss and find any problems or difficulties that seem ambiguous to them.

Q. Now does it make sense to break a large group of men, say 200 men, up into smaller groups, with a discussion leader being one of these higher level cadres and giving him the responsibility for indoctrinating, teaching the lower level cadres?
A. I concur with your opinion 100%, because I think that idea would work out perfectly. However, I would like to suggest that whenever we divide the class, a large class into smaller groups, then we must let these members of each group elect a leader among themselves. Above these small groups we have also a steering committee to provide these groups with guidance concerning indoctrination matters. In the steering committee we must include also returnees who are experienced and who have held high positions in the Front. This committee should not be constituted entirely of the cadres from the National Government. In class we must develop a certain democratic process. We must encourage them to speak out freely, and more importantly, we should not talk too much about nice things of the Government. Everything we talk about should not be geared merely to the nicest things the Government is doing. Sometimes we must criticize some points, and then we can suggest some better methods that could improve these wrongdoings. I think that by applying these methods the students can be convinced more easily than just through pure theory. And furthermore, I think that everything we say at the National Chieu Hoi Center or in other Chieu Hoi centers must be translated into good actions, because the returnees examine the Government policies toward the behavior of GVN cadres. For instance, when they say that the Government treats all the returnees with clemency and leniency, and a humanly brotherly manner, if they cannot see it being translated through the actions of the cadres then chances are that they do not believe it. I recognize that the Communists themselves talk in one way and then act in the others, but they conceal their intentions carefully and very
skillfully. I do not say that the Government is now trying to imitate that kind of behavior, or that attitude of the communists, however we should try by all means to translate the words of the Government into good actions, and these actions must be done by the cadres themselves, at the Chieu Hoi centers.

Q. Now you mentioned that in your Chieu Hoi center, there were two kinds of Hoi Chanh. There were the majority and the minority. You mentioned that for the majority, the technique of instruction would concentrate less on theory. What about for the minority? Who are they and what kind of teaching program would be most beneficial to them?

A. I would like to say that these groups consist mostly of those who have a good educational background or who are politically experienced so I think it would be cumbersome to apply two methods of teaching at a time. I am of the opinion that we should unify the methods of teaching to the majority group as well as to the minority group. That is, we should not separate the majority group from the minority group. We must integrate them into one student body, into one class only. But while we maintain the basic things that we should teach these two groups together, we should pay attention to making adjustments to the minority group. We should deal with each member of this minority group on a person-to-person basis. We must talk with them individually in different sessions. This kind of person-to-person talk represents special training, because while these members of the minority group are still obsessed with an inferiority complex, the feeling of surrender, they are still obsessed on the other hand by a feeling of superiority.
toward the instructors. By this I would like to say that in appearance they seem to be convinced by what the instructors teach or tell them, but deep in their hearts they just don't care or mind what the instructors teach, because they think that they are more politically experienced than the instructors. While the instructors claim that they are college assistant professors or full professors, they are still unable to convince low level cadres who are present in the class. And if they are not able to convince the low level cadres, then how can they convince the high level returnees? I think that the most important thing that an instructor should do is try hard to consolidate the opinion of the returnee and to make good sense out of these opinions, and then try to answer these opinions in the most satisfactory and most convincing manner. If the low level cadres are satisfied with these answers, then the minority group, or the high level returnees would be satisfied.

Q. How big would these group discussions be? How many people?

A. Depending on the size of the class, each group may consist of from three to five cells, and in this group discussion they will find out any difficulties, anything that they don't understand clearly about the points of interests that they have just been taught.

Q. And a cell is three or four men?

A. Yes. And then if there is anything that cannot be resolved in group discussion, then they would be brought down to the cells. If there is any questions in group
discussions, then these questions must be put down on a sheet of paper. The cell in turn will discuss the subject matter, and if they cannot understand a certain point they will jot these points down on a sheet of paper. During the second step, the cell will in turn submit for group discussion any questions that cannot be solved satisfactorily at the cell level. If at the group discussion they still cannot solve these problems, then these problems must be submitted to the whole class for further discussion. The steering committee will be present in these class discussions to first solve all these difficult problems of the students, and to point out, to guide them toward our policy, toward the main object of the lesson. By this method the first step from the steering committee to the cell level, and the second step from the cell level to the steering committee, each individual is exposed to indoctrination at least three times.

Q. You mentioned that the higher level cadres felt superior to the Chieu Hoi instructors. Would they also feel superior and arrogant toward the lower level hoi chanh cadres?

A. Yes, of course it is the tendency of the high level cadres to feel superior toward lower level returnees. However, we should try to convince them, we should use these minority group members, these high ranking VC escapees or these politically experienced people. I would like to say this more clearly. That is, on the one hand, we must try to convince them and make them work for us, in other words, we must dominate them. But we must encourage them to participate more equally in the teaching activities at the Chieu Hoi center. The reason I say
this is because most of these politically experienced cadres, although they have a good political background with the VC, their knowledge is still one-sided only. It is still superficial, they lack an overall knowledge, they cannot see the picture, they cannot see everything in the National side. So on the one hand, we must let them enjoy their feeling of superiority by helping them to become instructors, and on the other, we must try to dominate them by just letting them become ordinary students. Then besides teaching, we must have an opportunity to talk with them individually, we must give them special treatment as compared to other returnees, and at the same time, we must help them to broaden their knowledge and to develop good ideas about the National Government and its policy.
H. Khmer Kapachea Krom (KKK) Analysis

The KKK were received by the Ky Government in September 1965. They are organized around two rival leaders, Chau Hien and Chau Ouch.

The rivalry between their two chiefs, Chau Hien and Chau Ouch, grew out of the decision to seek amnesty. It seems that Ouch asked Hien for weapons on one last operation against the ARVN, and, instead of using the guns, he turned them in at Trinh Tien District. That took place in August 1965. A month later, Chau Hien and his faction (450 men) came in and were given amnesty. Neither group once entered a Chieu Hoi camp. These men are Cambodians and apparently there was a great deal of initial friction with local Vietnamese farmers over chickens and livestock. Several Vietnamese were killed. Since then they have essentially farmed their valley privately.

*Our team found, as we attempted to interview these Cambodian KKK chiefs, that their interpreters were coaching the chiefs on the answers. As our interpreters could not speak Cambodian, we had to rely upon the question in Vietnamese being asked and then translated by hand-picked interpreters (personal friends) of the KKK chiefs. The loss in credibility was so obvious that we finally did away with the formal interview schedule and simply relaxed with the KKK's, trying to open them up. We were only marginally successful.
Our most successful interview was with Chau Ouch, the most pro-ARVN of the KKK chiefs. It turned out that he had been an NCO under the French. When Diem came to power he was an ARVN sergeant. He deserted and fell in with the Viet Cong, fought Government troops around the Cambodian border, and then turned around and refused to carry out orders for the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong in turn infiltrated the KKK some time between 1960 and 1963. They set up cell systems and self-criticism. At this time Chau Ouch got into a feud with the local Cambodian Viet Cong commander and, to this day, Ouch carries a retinue of bodyguards--seven strong--around with him wherever he goes. He denied any connection with Sihanouk, the Free Khmers (the Khurer Serai, dedicated to Sihanouk's downfall), or the Cambodian Army. He said that he was born in Viet Nam, his land is here, and he wants to stay here. Asked "If the war ends, what will you do?", he said, "I will go back to my native village."

He is apparently under a Viet Cong death warrant and this was what propelled him out of any permanent liaison
with the Communists. But because of the poor performance of his group and that of Chau Hien, we broached the topic of decommissioning the KKK and got a very urgent plea.

Q. What would you do if the US or CIDG disarmed your KKK group?

A. If you do this, the Viet Cong will slaughter us. We cannot go back to our fields. I am hunted and all I really want to do is eventually get back to my home areas once the war stops.²

The Special Forces will eventually phase these KKK's out from under their tutelage. When that happens they will probably be integrated into an RF/PF group and trained at Chi Lang, which is in Tri Tan district, Chau Doc province. The tricky process will be the disarmament procedure. What will the local population do? Will the Special Forces and the CIDG just surround the KKK group at Ba Xoai and take the weapons? Then, what is the attitude of the population? Do they begin to feed intelligence to the Viet Cong? Do they begin to break the tacit agreement with the Cong to keep hands off this valley? Do they pick up and leave? All of these questions are not clearly answerable at the present.

²C.H.62, p. 22
A number of factors, however, seem to point toward a settlement.

First of all, there is the fact that Chau Ouch is hunted by the Viet Cong and pro-US and that he is a friend of the district chief who was trained in the US. Secondly, the American advisor at Chi Lang believes wholeheartedly in the district chief. And, finally, most of their housing settlements around here seem permanent enough with their cement bases and some cement walls. (Contrary to this is a conversation which one of the Berets had with Chau Hien several months ago. In a joking manner he said, "Someday we'll leave here and take you with us," implying that they would take them as hostages.) Nonetheless, when one looks at this valley, at the lush crops and ripe agricultural area that it represents, it is difficult to think of anyone abandoning it. A number of factors, as we have mentioned, now seem to point toward a stabilization here. The main thing is to achieve the phase out with as much tranquillity as possible.
The problem as it now stands is simply that these KKK are semi-autonomous within their own region. The only law out here is theirs and the Vietnamese Special Forces. The KKK is an ethnic group distinct from the Vietnamese Special Forces, rural to themselves, so that the Vietnamese Special Forces commander, a captain, is in reality an advisor to these men, and the American Special Forces captain is an advisor to the Vietnamese captain.

If the KKK were brought in under an RF/PF tutelage, one that did not benefit so much from a tacit standoff, then possibly we would begin to see a different situation both militarily and politically here. As it is now, the KKK conduct no operations in dangerous areas. The valley is utterly pacified.

The only fire fight they got into for months happened when we were interviewing there. One of the KKK corporals was killed; he was shot six times in the body with a carbine. He was carrying or had been issued by the CIDG an American carbine, an ammunition belt and a canteen. When the body was recovered, everything was found except the carbine. His body was placed in the
dispensary. They cleaned him up, put him in a new uniform and draped a CVN flag over his face and laid him on a board. The widow did not attend the funeral. She came straight to the Special Forces camp to get the indemnity allocation due her--21,600 piasters or about $190.00 US currency. She was delayed this allocation because of the hang up over the missing carbine. As it could not be accounted for and because American Special Forces believed he might have been killed by his own men to get the gratuity, the American captain decided to wait for the missing carbine. The LLBD (Vietnamese Special Forces) captain finally sanctioned the indemnity out of his personal fund after some real tension between himself and the KKK's. The next day the widow was engaged to another KKK who became $190.00 richer upon their marriage the next week.