The Teacher¹

IN WHICH SOCRATES EXPLAINS THE CASE METHOD OF TEACHING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND ALMOST BECOMES AN ADMINISTRATOR HIMSELF THEREBY

Nearly forty years ago the case approach to administrative behavior was introduced into the American classroom. Its principal characteristic was the careful examination of a single administrative decision or action, whether important or minor, and its principal value was in giving the students who used it a sense of participating in an actual administrative operation. The method was new, but its roots stretched twenty-five hundred years, to Socrates and his successors Plato and Aristotle.

Here is how Socrates might have introduced the method to his Athenian friends if he had happened to think it necessary to supplement the education of philosopher-kings with a little practical work in public administration:

SOCRATES: That was indeed an eloquent speech of Protagoras; yet I am not sure just what I have learned from him today.

GLAUCON, A STUDENT: You are not easily satisfied, Socrates. Is not Protagoras our most famous teacher of administration? Has he not written the most useful formulas for the organization of men? And are not his principles the most acclaimed of all the teachings of our learned men?

SOCRATES: That is true, and I may be at fault for not knowing how to master his principles and put them to good use.

GLAUCON: You would be the last man I should accuse of stupidity, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So indeed I am.

GLAUCON: But what could be simpler than his advice regarding “span of control,” or the “scalar principle;” or his teachings about the division between “line” and “staff”?

SOCRATES: Simplicity is indeed a virtue.

GLAUCON: I know what you are going to say, Socrates, and I will anticipate: that the truth is a greater virtue than simplicity.

SOCRATES: Will you then go further and tell me how we can learn the truth about the public administration?

GLAUCON: I have heard you too often not to have an answer to this question: you learn it by observing the works of good and bad administrators, and by deriving general principles which can withstand the criticism of thoughtful men.

SOCRATES: You have learned my simple wisdom very well.

GLAUCON: Now you are taunting me, Socrates. Do you not agree that Protagoras’ principles are reasonable as well as simple?

SOCRATES: They are impressive when he teaches them.

GLAUCON: Your words are words of praise, but in your mouth they have a critical sound.

SOCRATES: Then I must speak further, so that you will not think me jealous of Protagoras, or that I do not prize his wisdom and eloquence. For I know that his lecture was a model of organization and presentation, and that what he has said is commonly thought about the sciences and arts of administration. And yet, as you have suggested, I am dissatisfied. For what have we learned from Protagoras? How will you prove these principles? Which of his students shall we rate the highest?

GLAUCON: These are many questions, Socrates, but I shall try to answer them honestly. First, we have learned the rules of administration. Second, we shall prove them as we apply them in our public careers. Third, we must finally rate highest the man who has achieved the greatest success as an administrator; and in the meantime we shall acclaim those students who have best learned the rules of administration.

SOCRATES: And how shall we be assured that those of his hearers who have learned the rules can best apply them? I see that this question displeases you; so let me ask another. How do we know that the rules themselves are wise?
GLAUCON: But this is administration itself: the rules agreed upon by wise men and preserved by the traditions of scholarship and inquiry. These rules are the alphabet of the language of administration.

SOCRATES: And does knowledge of the alphabet make a great poet?

GLAUCON: No, but there are no poets who are ignorant of the alphabet.

SOCRATES: Is this knowledge a part of poetry, or does it rather enable the poet to communicate his works to those who cannot hear him speak?

GLAUCON: We are straying, Socrates. Surely you are not proposing that an administrator should not trouble to learn the rules of administration.

SOCRATES: That is true. Just as the teachers of the alphabet are useful in society, so are those who explain to us the rules of administration. Yet the poet does not think of the alphabet at all as he works. Is not the administrator as well too busy to worry about the precepts of Protagoras? But I see you do not need to answer this question, for here comes Iphicrates, who has spent his life in the service of the state, and who can therefore answer these troublesome questions better than either you or I. Iphicrates, can you stop and talk with us a few minutes?

IPHICRATES: I will gladly talk, and still more gladly listen; but as I am nearly late for my next appointment, I must ask you to walk along with me while we converse.

SOCRATES: This is still better, Iphicrates, for we can in this way learn your principles of administration while you are at work.

IPHICRATES: I have no principles except to be on time.

GLAUCON: Is this the only advice you can give to me in preparing myself for the public service?

IPHICRATES: The only way to prepare for the public service is to work for the state. I myself have served that master since I was conscripted into the army many years ago, and there is no teacher—not even Socrates—who can equal experience as a source of wisdom and knowledge.

SOCRATES: Least of all, Socrates, I should have said: and Socrates would be the last to deny the pre-eminence of experience as a teacher of men. But not all men can have the richness of experience that you have enjoyed, Iphicrates; and fewer still can learn as much from it. Shall we not work to the end that Glaucon and others may learn from your experience, and from your ability to convert each experience into knowledge?
GLAUCON: Socrates is in danger of contradicting himself now, for he is asking you, Iphicrates, to develop principles of knowledge that I may learn; but a few moments ago he told me that principles were of little practical use to an administrator.

IPHICRATES: I cannot formulate general principles, in any case, for I am a practical man rather than a follower of theories of government.

SOCRATES: Before I allow myself to become inconsistent, I must ask another question.

IPHICRATES: You will learn, Glaucon, that Socrates never contradicts himself, for he never commits himself to anything, but only asks questions so that those who answer may be guilty of contradiction rather than he.

SOCRATES: It is true that I am more interested in asking questions than in hearing answers readily given; and yet I have committed myself today by saying that I do not think the teaching of rules and principles of administration is a sufficient means of training men for the public service. Do you agree, Iphicrates?

IPHICRATES: I do. And yet I confess myself discomfited by Glaucon's question, and yours, Socrates. Must all men wait until experience has ripened them into good administrators? Must the state suffer the errors of its apprentices while men are adding to their own private wisdom at the public expense?

SOCRATES: Is that how you learned your art, Iphicrates?

IPHICRATES: Indeed it is, Socrates, for no one made more mistakes than I in those early years when I first had charge of the work of other men of even less experience.

SOCRATES: Did you learn from errors only, or did your wise decisions also furnish the basis for further action? Cannot men learn from their successes as well as their failures?

IPHICRATES: I think adversity is the better teacher.

SOCRATES: You are saying, are you not, that one can surely learn from experience only those things which he should not do, and must use his imagination to find some other solution if he is to avoid similar mistakes in the future? If this is so, then how is anything well administered except by accident? Must all administrators proceed solely by using their imagination to avoid the errors of the past? Is there no virtue in the past which can be brought into the present and the future?
IPHRICRATES: I cannot think this is right, Socrates; but I have no time to answer you further, for we are already at my office door, and I see that I am just in time for my appointment.

GLAUCON: I am not satisfied with our progress, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Nor am I. Iphicrates, before you go you must answer one more question.

IPHRICRATES: Please make it a practical one, then, Socrates, for my mind does not work by abstractions and fine distinctions.

SOCRATES: It is this: do you think that if Glaucon went with you and observed your day’s work he could learn how you have proceeded in finding the solution to the problems of this day? For I know that each day at your office you are compelled to resolve questions of some public importance.

IPHRICRATES: I confess that I do not see how my own processes of making decisions can instruct another.

SOCRATES: Can he not learn from your present wisdom how you avoid the mistakes of your own past? In this instance I shall suggest that Glaucon talk not with you alone, but with others with whom you will work in resolving today’s question and with those whom it will affect and those who have an interest in its outcome. When he has learned from all these sources what your problem really means, perhaps he (and I, if he will tell me all he has learned) can know as much about the problem as you do.

IPHRICRATES: More, I should think, because I cannot take the time to see everybody who will be affected by the decision I must make today. In fact, in this case I doubt if even he can consult all the interested parties, for I am working on the interpretation of a tax law, and every citizen in Athens will be affected by what I decide.

SOCRATES: In that case, can we not invite Cepalus and Polemarcus to look into this matter as well, so that we may have as much information about it as possible?

IPHRICRATES: But I do not see how this can be of any practical use, for by the time you have finished your study the decision will already have been made. My decision cannot wait until you have organized your question-and-answer parties into an “interview schedule” and finally written up a case history of this question.

SOCRATES: That is true; but if we have learned what you know now, and can find out what else can be known today, can we not also determine
how adequate the information was upon which you had to act? And can we not speculate upon the additional or alternative means that could have been employed in reaching a wise decision? Can we not thus see how the rules or common sense of administration can be applied in similar future cases?

**IPHICRATES:** You are going, then, to attempt to recreate the circumstances of this day's decision so that it may be better understood by others and by myself?

**SOCRATES:** If you have no objection.

**IPHICRATES:** But even if you succeed in reproducing the immediacy of one of my experiences today, how will this help Glaucon become a successful administrator? Would it not be wiser to assign him as my assistant, not only to observe, but also to assist me in my administrative operations, and thus gain practical experience as an administrator?

**SOCRATES:** What kinds of practical work experience would you assign to Glaucon? He has already had instruction in the law and in administrative organization, and has some understanding of the economy of the artisans' shop and of the market place. I can testify to his love of learning and his readiness to absorb the wisdom of his teachers. Does he qualify for service as a professional assistant? And if he does, how will this improve his administrative skill?

**IPHICRATES:** He can handle my routine affairs and learn how the working of my office is organized so as to reduce the need for constant personal attention to mechanical details. This should be helpful to any administrator, for one of his most important problems is to free himself from details so that he can devote his attention to policies.

**GLAUCON:** I agree that this kind of experience would be helpful, but would repeated participation in mechanical administrative operations help me develop an understanding of the more important problems of administrative judgment? I need to know the work of clerks and messengers, but how will this knowledge teach me the subtleties of supervision and leadership? For I am beginning to agree with Socrates, and with you, Iphicrates, that knowledge of principles and rules will not be sufficient.

**IPHICRATES:** I am already late for my appointment. But before I go, let me propose a compromise: if you will put Glaucon at my disposal for several weeks so that he may gain the necessary administrative background of my work, at the end of that time I will explain the tax decision I am about to make and give him an opportunity to explore the reasons for it thoroughly. What do you say, Socrates?
Socrates: It is for Glaucon to agree, for it is his time that we are about to commit, and his career, and those of his fellow students, that we hope to advance.

Glaucon: Of course I agree. I shall return in an hour to learn my new duties if you will be ready for me.

Socrates: And now that we are in the market place, let us seek out Cephalus and Polemarcus, and inquire if they would be interested in our proposal.

Cephalus, will you join with Glaucon and me in testing some of the administrative principles we heard Protagoras describe so eloquently this morning?

Cephalus: Good day, Socrates, and you, Glaucon. I do not understand your purpose. Does the obvious need testing?

Socrates: The commonplaces should be examined first of all, since we depend so much on them. And should not this be true especially of the affairs of state, which are so unpredictable, and are yet the most important of men's concerns? We have been discussing the training of public administrators, and have agreed that the application of general principles is as important as the principles themselves, yet is often neglected in the discourses on the subject. Iphicrates has just told us that experience is the only way of learning how the general should be applied to the specific, and Glaucon and he have agreed to examine intensively the background of a single important decision he is to make today, so that we can learn from his experience how other similar decisions can best be reached.

Cephalus: This seems a promising venture, but I do not see how I can help.

Glaucon: Socrates thinks that while I study Iphicrates' point of view in this case, you can be learning about the same decision from others who participate in it or are interested in its outcome.

Socrates: That is what I propose, if you are willing, Cephalus. And when you and others have finished your studies, we shall gather together to prepare a single history of the case, with all the relevant facts introduced, so that those who come after us may also benefit from our efforts.
CEPALUS: This seems very accommodating to you, but will not Protagoras and the other lecturers be forced to abandon their labors if the case method proves a successful means of teaching the art of administration?

SOCRATES: Say rather that their work will become the more effective, for experience enriches theory and the exposition of principles; it does not displace it.

GLAUCON: Does not even Iphicrates, who says that he has learned by experience alone, hope himself to gain still more knowledge from our efforts? For through them he can test the adequacy of his own information system.

CEPALUS: This language of yours is more suited to the analyses of a technician or an efficiency expert than to the modest dimensions of our case inquiry. Are we, then, to undertake administrative measurements, to plot efficiency scales, and to trace processes and flows on charts and graphs?

SOCRATES: Certainly we shall use all methods of analysis that are appropriate to our inquiry. For our work is still too humble to scorn the offerings of those who have designed exact measurements of administrative performance. Our task is to press more deeply into the process of administration than the general principles can reach, and to do this we shall need the resources and the experiences of all the students of government.

GLAUCON: Well, good day to you again, Iphicrates, and how is that you are with us again so soon after your appointment?

IPHICRATES: I finished early, and came to inquire whether Socrates has really tricked you all—and himself, too—into joining in this case study. For you know, this will be the first time that Socrates will have trapped himself into doing something instead of just talking about it.

SOCRATES: That is so, my dear Iphicrates. But I have this one consolation: that if we do our work well, there will be more talking done about it than you or I could do in a lifetime. And my work, and that of others to follow, will be simply to raise questions and to guide those who would answer, by posing further questions. So you see, Socrates will win after all, for his questions will help others find answers.

We are reliably informed that this conversation never took place, and that this project was never undertaken in ancient Athens. But similar occurrences in Saigon during the last quarter of 1957 can now be reported; and if any of my readers would like to learn how the resulting project is faring today, they are invited to call at the National Institute of Administration and ask a few Socratic questions.
APPENDIX

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR CLASSROOM USE
INTERVENTION OF A DISTRICT CHIEF:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF DAP SO DAM

1. Why did the district chief decide not to tell Mr. Huan about the change in wood for the pilings?
2. Why did the district chief decide to notify Mr. Huan about the change in the location of the dam? Why did he fail to tell him that he had discussed this matter with the province chief?
3. Should Mr. Huan’s representative have told him about the change in pilings?
4. Should the province chief have consulted Mr. Huan before approving the district chief’s plan? What influenced him to give his consent? Was he taking full responsibility for the construction in doing so?
5. Assuming that Mr. Huan noticed the substitution of pilings, should he have commented on it during his tours of inspection?
6. Discuss the use of local committees in resolving technical problems. What could the district chief have done if he had disagreed with the committee’s suggestions? What would have been the committee’s probable reaction if its suggestions had been rejected?
7. Discuss the desirability and administrative consequences of each of the three alternatives indicated by the District Chief. Were there others? Discuss his reasons for rejecting the first alternative.

THE DECISION TO INTRODUCE MECHANICAL ACCOUNTING TO THE NATIONAL BUDGET

1. Discuss the advantages of “sudden change” as proposed by Mr. Thai and the “gradual change” as proposed by his assistants.
2. What were the necessary preconditions to the “sudden change” approach followed by Mr. Thai?
3. What measures are necessary to prepare the way for such a change? Could the “gradual change” approach have been carried out technically?
4. Discuss and evaluate the criticisms of the new system.
5. In what way could the concentration of the accounting function in a single agency be said to give it too much power?
6. What uses could be made of the four accounting classification devices in use in the new Vietnamese budget?
7. How can mechanical accounting contribute to better management in government operations?
8. What problems of standardization in coding, accounting practices, and budget theory are revealed by the conflict between departments and the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid?

THE MONKEY BABY STORY

1. What interests did the government have in the controversy? Should the Press-Directorate have taken action?
2. Are there any evidences to support Mrs. But Tra’s argument that she was being discriminated against?
3. How valid were the criticisms of the other newspapers against Saigon Mol for publishing the story?
4. Did Saigon Mol violate either press regulations or professional ethics in publishing the story?
5. What punitive elements were present in the sanctions voted by the Disciplinary Committee? Were they adequate?
6. Should the committee have required Mrs. But Tra to produce evidence supporting the story?
NEW LEADERSHIP AT THE VIETNAM PRESS

1. What evidences are there that the agency was in a state of disorganization?
2. Should N.T. have taken action against X and Z earlier?
3. What evidences of poor communications between the management and staff members are presented in the case?
4. What evidences did N.T. have for believing that deliberate sabotage was involved in the errors made in the first days of his administration?
5. Could methods short of dismissal have been equally successful in changing the atmosphere at the Vietnam Press?
6. How adequately did the changes introduced by N.T. touch the administrative weaknesses in the agency?
7. Would allowing individual reporters and editors to work free of "mechanical" controls produce better quality and variety of reporting, as Mr. Z argued?
8. Discuss the comment on page 28 that "It seems to be a tradition in Vietnam to have a turnover in personnel every time there is a change in administration." Was Mr. N.T. guilty of following this practice?
9. Discuss the appropriateness of (a) the anonymous letter (page 33); (b) the memorandum to employees (page 34); (c) the resolution taken by personnel (page 34).

REORGANIZING THE FISHING COOPERATIVE ON PHU QUOC ISLAND

1. How did the purposes and organization of the original fishing cooperative relate to the social structure of Phu Quoc Island?
2. Discuss the real or possible conflicts of interest among the ham ho, the fishermen, and the Government of Vietnam. How were they reflected in the acts of the original cooperative and the reorganization plan?
3. Why did the original cooperative fail? How did the proposed remedies deal with the original problem? What were the prospects of success?
4. Would the new cooperative work to the disadvantage of the fishermen? The ham ho? Would it increase the fishermen's independence of the ham ho? Would it restrict their economic freedom in other respects?
5. Why did the original cooperative fail to recover the outstanding loans? What were the possible means for collecting them in the future?
6. Would the cooperative tend to increase production? What advantages to the nation may be expected from the cooperative?
7. Discuss the human relations problem involved in dealing with the ham ho elements of the managing board.
8. Discuss the relative advantages of the "self-governing" versus the "government-controlled" cooperative.

ACTIVATING THE NUOC MAM PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVE ON PHU QUOC ISLAND

1. How could a cooperative assist in problems of (a) quality control, (b) transportation, and (c) sales and prices? What did the cooperative actually propose in each of these fields?
2. What do the expenditures and other activities of the cooperative reveal about its conception of its principal functions?
3. Contrast the viewpoints of the government and the cooperative members concerning the proper role of the cooperative.
4. How could the misunderstanding arising out of the memorandum of August 14 have been avoided?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Mr. Tich's first two suggestions (page 46) (a) for the nuoc mam industry?, (b) in terms of the general economics of distribution in other fields?
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING FOR THE CAI SAN RESETTLEMENT PROJECT

1. Discuss the problem of interministerial coordination. Compare it with the alternative of creating a special administrative unit locally with full power to carry out the project.

2. What were the results of the newspaper announcement about the Cai San project? Could the decision to move the refugees to Cai San have been delayed?

3. Discuss the payment of workers and the consequences of delays. Assuming that the administrative regulations governing the disbursement of funds could not have been revised, what alternative devices could have been used to relieve the annoyance of the workers?

4. Discuss the adequacy of the administrative arrangements for carrying out the project during Mr. Do's absence.

5. Discuss the part played by Mr. T. in the canal digging problem? Could Mr. D. have set aside Mr. T.'s plan in January 1956? Should he have countermanded Mr. T.'s orders and overruled Mr. T.'s decision after he came back from France in March 1956?

6. What would have happened if Presidential Administrative Order No. 906 TTP/KH had been issued a few weeks later?

THE CAI SAN TRACTOR LOANS

1. Compare the per capita cost of settling refugees in Cai San with those for the program as a whole. What considerations other than financial served to justify the Cai Sun project?

2. Contrast the financial controls and procedures used in this case with those followed in the Vinh Xuong elementary school case.

3. Discuss the allocation of money within the Cai San project, distinguishing between capital outlays and working funds. To what extent were the outlays chargeable to refugee relief?

4. Discuss the efforts at building community responsibility on Canal D. What was Father Do's role? Should he have adopted other means of enlisting cooperation from the refugees?

5. Discuss the integration decision from the point of view of (a) the government; (b) other refugees; (c) the older local inhabitants.

6. Discuss the reported attitude of the refugees during the development phases.

7. Discuss NACO's decision to extend 800 piasters per hectar instead of the usual sum of 700 piasters.

8. Discuss NACO's decision to administer part of the funds by means of its own local representative, Mr. Van.

COMPETITION AT THE CAI RANG COOPERATIVE RICE MILL

1. What changes occurred in principal objectives and outlook for the cooperative between 1953 and 1958? Did the cooperative in 1958 serve the same purposes as when it was founded?

2. Compare the alternative advantages enjoyed by independent merchants and the cooperative, respectively, in the purchase, processing, and storage of rice and the extension of credit. What special problems confronted (a) private merchants, and (b) the cooperative?

3. What devices could the cooperative management use to improve its relations with the membership?

4. Did NACO have enough information upon which to make its decision, assuming that the case presents all that was available? What other government agencies were concerned in the Cai-Rang Cooperative, and to what extent?
5. What effect would it have on the cooperative if the price of paddy rice was fixed at the market level?
6. Should the cooperative management have attempted to recover the original loans? If so, how?
7. Did the NACO loan offer a basis for anticipating an improvement in the cooperative's future operations?

The Employee Suggestion Plan at Stanvac
1. What human relations problems were posed by Suggestion 0618? Did the management recognize them?
2. How valid were Mr. Strasburger's reasons for recommending an award for Suggestion 0618?
3. What human relations problems were posed by Suggestion 0501? How did the procedures set up in the Suggestion Plan affect the outcome of this suggestion?
4. Assuming that Mr. Strasburger's original reaction to Suggestion 0618 was right and the Review and Award Committee was wrong, should Mr. Strasburger have overruled the committee and granted the award?
5. How did Mr. Strasburger's reaction to Suggestion 0501 affect the outcome of the suggestion?
6. How would you contrast the circumstances surrounding the suggestion plan in 1958 with those surrounding the 1952 plan?
7. What does the employees' participation in the suggestion plan reveal about their attitudes towards the company management?
8. Could the suggestion plan system be further improved by removing it from the context of "savings" or otherwise changing it?
9. What is the general effect of a suggestion plan on (a) executive development and responsibility; (b) supervisor-employee relationships; (c) the public relations of the company; (d) the merit promotion system; (e) employee morale; (f) union-management relationships?
10. What elements in employer-employee relations are necessary before a suggestion plan can be operated successfully?

Land and Boundary Questions at Tan Mai Village
1. What were the principles laid down by the Comigal in the choice of resettlement centers? Were they adequate? Did Fr. Hy follow them?
2. What assumption were made in each of the recommendations presented to the district chief by the Provincial Representative of the Comigal in his note of Aug. 14, 1957?
3. Discuss the reasons given by each party for its position on the land rental contract.
4. If Mr. Thu's son-in-law had escaped arrest for impersonating a lieutenant, would the rental problem have been settled? What does this suggest about the role of the government in this case?
5. How were the land problem and the boundary problem related to each other?
6. What were the reasons given by Tan Hiep and Bui Tieng for their respective positions about the integration of the communities? How adequate were they?
7. Discuss the roles played respectively by Fr. Hy and Mr. Ho Van The in the conflict.
8. Why did Bui Chu and Phan Thanh Gian pay their taxes to Tan Mai? Why had no effort been made to correct this practice?
9. What would be the probable consequences of the continued independence of Tan Mai? Of integration with Tam Hiep? How would either solution affect the problem of Bui Chu and Phan Thanh Gian?
10. Contrast the "legal" and the "human" problems posed by the integration controversy.
11. Was the Central Government consistent in maintaining its neutral position in these questions?

THE COMMISSAR AND THE LAW:
DEVIATIONS FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS

1. Discuss the circumstances used to justify setting aside normal civil service regulations in recruiting for the Agricultural Development Directorate. Was Mr. Than's criticism of the resolution of this problem valid?
2. Discuss the devices used for selecting Comigal personnel for retention on the GCLD staff. Was the principle of seniority justified? How valid were the "tests" used in re-engaging temporary and contractual personnel?
3. What is the reason for the limitation on field trip per diem payments under the civil service regulations? When should it be suspended?
4. Under what circumstances should the educational basis for classifying civil servants be set aside?
5. "Rigidity is a vice if carried to extremes" (page 101). Discuss when "flexibility" is also a vice.

TECHNICIAN'S DILEMMA: THE KENAF FIBER CASE

1. Why did Mr. Trinh feel so strongly about the introduction of kenaf?
2. Discuss the psychological and administrative obstacles he had to overcome in introducing the kenaf program. What other approaches could he have taken in resolving these problems?
3. Discuss the reasons why kenaf was not introduced earlier as part of the original land development program.
4. Discuss the validity of the early criticisms of the kenaf program. Was it good psychology for Mr. Trinh to enlist the support of a foreign expert in his campaign?
5. What would have been the result if Mr. Trinh had left the decision entirely to the Commissar?
6. Discuss the devices used to enlist the cooperation of the farmers in the centers.

10,000 DIKE BUILDERS COMMUNITY PROJECT AT HA LIEN

1. Distinguish between the concept of "community project" and that of forced labor.
2. Discuss the economic and other advantages and disadvantages of the community project approach as against using contractual labor.
3. What purposes were served by conducting the pilot projects in advance of "D-Day"? Why was it necessary for Mr. Huan and the others to join in the work?
4. What provisions could have been made for maintaining and repairing the dike?
5. In what sense was the Ha Lien dike of benefit to the entire community? Why was it necessary to conduct a publicity campaign to secure local cooperation?
6. Discuss the "logistical" problems of planning the work so that it could be accomplished in a single day.
7. Evaluate the criticisms against the dike project. Were they avoidable? Would they have justified abandoning the project?
PLANNING THE MUNICIPAL MARKET AT DALAT

1. What groups in the city were concerned in the building of the market and what role did each play in reaching the decision?

2. What are the respective interests of the city of Dalat and the Central Government in the municipal development program for Dalat? How is this reflected in the financing of the market project?

3. What economic and social considerations lay behind the decision to build the municipal market?

4. What administrative procedures were followed in drawing up the plans for the city market? Discuss the participation by the city council in this decision.

5. How does the building of the market coincide with other aspects of the city development plan (tourism, the universities, movement of the population, and economic development, for example)?

6. Discuss the trends and growth prospects in Dalat. What were the roles of the successive mayors and of the city council in the city's development? Why was the market plan postponed in 1956 and a more ambitious plan adopted in 1958?

THE CLASSROOM-LABORATORY CONTROVERSY

1. "The quibble over the provisions of Project 30-65-153, 1957 was a mere question of semantics. Anyone who took the trouble to learn the meaning of the word laboratory in Vietnamese and English could have avoided the entire controversy." Discuss this interpretation of the case.

2. How did accidents of personal background influence the outcome of this case? How were Mr. King's and Mr. Dien's positions affected by their academic and governmental backgrounds?

3. How did the working relationship between Mr. Dien and Mr. King affect the outcome of this case? How did each justify his viewpoint?

4. How would the prestige of the Department of Education have been involved in making the alterations suggested by Mr. King?

5. Will the new project statement obviate problems of this sort in the future?

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL IN VINH XUONG

1. Prepare a timetable of principal events regarding the school construction program as it relates to Khanh Hoa.

2. Draw a flow chart indicating the processes of fund allocations, commitments, and releases.

3. Distinguish between the "line" and "staff" functions in this case.

4. What different theories of governmental relationships are involved in the original agreement and the amendment? Explain the USOM and Vietnamese positions on the 50 percent aid-to-all-provinces provision of the original agreement.

5. Discuss the delays in making funds available. Is Mr. Dien's list of reasons complete? How could the funding operations have been speeded up?

6. How was the "half and half" basis for financing elementary school building followed in Vinh-Xuong? Describe the contributions of each element. Discuss the communities' response to the proposed building.

7. Discuss the implications and possible results of the plan to provide funds for school buildings without guaranteeing funds for teachers' salaries in the future.

8. Explain the policy of withholding funds until completion of the project. Discuss the deputy province chief's response to this policy.

9. Discuss the alleged shifts in policy concerning the school building program and its effects on the provincial administration.
DEVELOPING IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAMS IN LONG AND BA XUYEN

1. How are the in-service training programs of the two provinces calculated to overcome the professional disabilities bequeathed to the Vietnamese civil service by the colonial period?

2. Discuss the differences in organization and content in the two provincial programs. What rationale can you give for beginning training with provincial civil servants instead of village committees, and vice versa?

3. What role did Central Government play in the development and conduct of these two programs?

4. Discuss the problem of morale among the trainees. How was it resolved in the two provinces?

5. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the training programs of each province, both in substance and teaching methods?

6. Discuss the policy of promoting employees who do well during a training course.

7. Why was it considered necessary to have a period of “popularization” of in-service training before organizing a program?

8. Discuss the teaching methods used in the two provincial courses.

9. How adequate was Professor Dong’s investigation of the program in the two provinces?

EXPORTING FISH FROM THE MAU COOPERATIVES

1. Discuss the role of the government in establishing the cooperative. Were the original fears of Mr. H.V.D. justified?

2. What was the influence of the government in regard to the success or failure of the cooperative during its first year of operation?

3. Discuss the marketing problems faced by the cooperative. Were the contracts with Singuanhuat Fishing Industries of Singapore adequate? What influence did government manipulation of the exchange rate have in 1959?

4. Was the Directorate of Fisheries justified in awarding the contract for 1959 to the Asian Produce Agencies? Who had the responsibility of verifying the reliability of the Asian Produce Agencies? Was the interministerial committee justified in nullifying the contract?

5. What should Mr. O.T. and his colleagues have learned from this first venture in competitive bidding?

RESETTLING THE HIGHLAND TRIBES AT BINH TUY PROVINCE

1. What were the implications of the decision to settle the Highlanders into land development centers in La Ngia?

2. Would the use of interpreters solve the problems of communication between the province chief and the Highlanders?

3. Discuss the use of the seers by the province chief as a means of luring the Highlanders to the lowlands.

4. Compare the two alternative approaches used in resettling the Highlanders (i.e., bringing in entire families or inviting only the young men to be followed later by their families).

5. Evaluate the process of education and training of the Highlanders which were outlined by the province chief in farming, trades, and health activities.

6. What is the importance of papers of ownership for the possessions of the Highlanders? What effect would payment for road construction work have upon the Highlanders?

7. Discuss the implications of destroying the tribal customs of the Binh Tuy mountaineers.
INDONESIAN ASSIGNMENT

1. Was it proper for the Vice Consul to consult with the Indonesians in spite of the Consul General's anticipated opposition to such action?
2. What personal factors strengthened the Vice Consul's decision to follow his own inclinations in the case?
3. Would the Vice Consul's decision have been different if he had been a member of a large staff of technicians serving under similar circumstances?
4. What factors induced the State Department in Washington to grant such a large measure of discretion to the field office in Batavia?
5. What factors were responsible for the Consul General's attitude toward consulting with the Indonesians?
6. What form of discipline (if any) was appropriate for the Consul General to impose upon the Vice Consul to prevent further insubordination?

STUDENT STRIKE AT AN ASIAN UNIVERSITY

1. What differences in American, Vietnamese, and Burmese approaches to education are illustrated in this case?
2. Was the University administration aware of the problem of student unrest? What had been done about it? Was it adequate?
3. How does the student body reflect political tensions in Burma? What are the implications of such political activity on a college campus for the development of a national democracy?
4. How could the policy of installing new attendance regulations have been introduced by the University without arousing student friction?
5. What is the significance of U Nu's reference to Communist agitation and responsibility for the strike? What effect did his radio address have?
6. Why did the Dean decide to suspend classes in order to permit the students "to practice for a variety show"?
7. Why did the University use force to resolve the strike?
8. How did U Nu's final action and that of the University Council provide a "lesson in the ways of democracy"?