THE REFUGEE SITUATION IN PHY-YEN PROVINCE, VIET-NAM

A. Terry Rambo, et al.

Human Sciences Research Incorporated
McLean, Virginia

July 1967
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A. Terry Rambo
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John D. LeNoir

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The head of a refugee household responds to a question from one of the thirteen students who served as interviewers for the HSR study.
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July 1967
HSR-RR-67/9-Aa

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PREFACE

In the fall of 1965 it became apparent that the rapidly increasing number of refugees in the Republic of Viet-Nam would present a continuing problem in the conduct of the counterinsurgency effort. Consequently, the Advanced Research Projects Agency contracted with Human Sciences Research, Inc., to conduct a scientific field study to provide empirical data on the refugee situation.

This report presents an analysis and discussion of the refugee situation in Phu-Yen Province, based on data collected in the summer of 1966 as part of the Human Sciences Research Refugee Study Project in Phu-Yen Province, Viet-Nam. An abridged version of the report (HSR-RR-67/6-Aa), summarizing the principal findings, is also available.

The previously issued Field Research Memoranda series on selected aspects of the refugee problem in Viet-Nam will continue to be issued at irregular intervals. A listing of memoranda prepared to date appears on the inside back cover of this report.

Comments on this or other Refugee Study Project publications are invited and should be addressed to:

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U.S. Governmental agencies in Viet-Nam may communicate directly with:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To acknowledge everyone, Vietnamese and American, who assisted in the completion of this study would be a lengthy task; the best we hope to achieve is to mention those individuals who made major contributions in the collection and analysis of the data presented in this report.

Foremost thanks must be expressed to Capt. La Van Truong of the Combat Development Test Center, Viet-Nam, the RVNAF counterpart agency to OSD/ARPA, Saigon. Capt. Truong participated in all phases of the project, assisting especially in arrangement of field operations. While unable to participate in the analysis of the data in Washington, he has continued to make contributions to the research effort from Saigon. Capt. Truong has been commended by Major General Charles J. Timmes, former Director of ARPA/AGILE, for outstanding service to the Refugee Study Project in Viet-Nam.

In Saigon, Col. Kemper Baker, USAF, formerly Director of the OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit, and his successor, Col. John Patterson, USAF, have aided us in all respects. Lt. Col. Robert Nelson, USA, the Field Unit Project Monitor, contributed greatly during the initial phase of the project. To his successor, Maj. Robert Cottee, we wish to express our special thanks for his continuing efforts on behalf of the project.

Col. Bui Quang Trach, Commanding Officer of the Combat Development Test Center, Viet-Nam, provided considerable support to the field effort. Officials connected with USAID, particularly Mr. Edward Marks, formerly Refugee Coordinator, also aided in the execution of the study.

Dr. Gerald Hickey and Mr. Douglas Scott of the Rand Corporation were extremely generous with both their time and knowledge of refugee problems.

Special appreciation must be offered to those in Phu-Yen Province who provided the most essential and direct kind of support during field work there: specifically, Chief of Province Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Ha, MACV Senior Sector Advisor Lt. Col. Jay Hatch, and Mr. Campbell McClusky, formerly USAID Assistant Province Representative for Refugees.
At HSR, Dr. M. Dean Havron and Dr. Robert Teare assisted in analyzing the field data. Mr. Donald Link provided assistance with the data processing problems while Mrs. Carol LeNoir put much of the data into usable format. Mrs. Virginia Hunter edited the final manuscript and Mrs. Audrey Reniere has ably served as project secretary.

A. T. R.
J. M. T.
J. D. L.

Saigon
27 July 1967
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SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

I. Introduction

- The refugee movement has grown so rapidly that the Government of Viet­Nam has faced great difficulties in both aiding the refugees and assessing their potential as an asset or a liability in the current pacification effort. Much of the continuing difficulty is caused by a lack of information on the precise dimension and nature of the refugee movement.

- This study is an attempt to provide such information on the refugee situa­tion in Phu-Yen Province. Its purpose was to discover who become refugees, why they want to relocate, and when and how they move; to examine some of the problems involved in relief and resettlement for the refugees, their host community, and their Government; and to propose and set forth some implications of the refugee situation for the pacification effort.

- The information presented in this report was developed through question­naires administered to 1,193 refugee households; through interviews with U.S. and Vietnamese officials at district, province, and national levels; and through the personal observations of the authors.

II. Characteristics of the Refugee Population

- Of the Phu-Yen refugees studied, 96% are ethnic Vietnamese; the remain­der are Rhade and Hroi tribespeople. Buddhists form 45%, ancestor worshippers 39%, Catholics 8%, Cao Dai 5%, and animists 3%. This roughly approximates the general population of the area, except that the Cao Dai are slightly overrepresented and the Catholics slightly underrepresented.
Almost half of the refugees are children 14 and under; one-third are of productive age -- 15-49, one-sixth are older than 49. There are more children and old people than in the general rural Vietnamese population, and both males and females in the 15-35 age group are greatly underrepresented. In the 15-29 age group, there are only 69 males per 100 females, compared to 90 males to 100 females in the overall refugee population and 96 males to 100 females in the general population.

The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons, smaller than that of the nonrefugee population; one-fourth of the families reported separating from one or more members of their family at the time of moving. There are more small children per woman than in the nonrefugee population.

Nearly 40% of the refugees are literate, and males have a higher literacy rate than females: in the 15-29 age group, 84% of the males and 53% of the females are literate.

There are more nonproducers than in the nonrefugee population: each refugee of productive age (15-49) must support 2.7 other people, compared to a 1.3 ratio among nonrefugees. Only 4% of the total refugee sample were physically disabled, but this included one-fourth of those 60 and older.

80% of the refugees were formerly employed in food-producing industries; only 6% were employed in the service sector of the economy. Three-quarters of the households had access to farm land in their native villages and 65% owned the land they worked. Distribution of land was on a relatively broad and egalitarian basis -- the mean holding was 2.4 hectares and the mode 1.5.

III. Causes of Movement

Refugees cite a complex of factors as contributing to their decisions to move, with most respondents citing two or more reasons. Various military activities were cited by 86% of the refugees, and 68% cite terrorist and coercive acts as reasons for moving. Bombing and artillery specifically were cited by only 32% of the refugees, and only 6% indicated that they were physically forced to move during military operations.
The Viet-Cong are the causal agent most frequently associated with refugee movement — cited by 84% of the refugees — while Allied Forces are cited by 67% of the respondents (refugees could cite more than one agent).

Almost 17% of the refugees were GVN civilian or military cadre or their families who fled because of threats of Viet-Cong reprisals.

One-third of the refugees reported being encouraged to leave their villages, principally by Allied military forces and friends and relatives.

15% of refugees reported Viet-Cong efforts to discourage them from moving.

When asked why their neighbors became refugees, nonrefugees gave reasons coinciding with those actually cited by the refugees themselves.

IV. Characteristics and Dynamics of Movement

Refugee movement in Phu-Yen has been almost wholly intraprovincial and primarily intradistrict; the small amount of interdistrict movement was largely toward the provincial capital of Tuy-Hoa. As this suggests, the median distance traveled by Phu-Yen refugees from their homes to their relocation area is short: the mean distance was only 13 km (8 miles), and three-fourths of the refugees traveled 18 km or less.

Duration of travel was also short: over half (55%) reached their new settlement site within 8 hours, and most of the rest arrived within one day. An overwhelming majority (95%) traveled wholly during the daytime, differing from refugees in Dinh Tuong Province, 15% of whom moved after dark.

The principal means of travel was walking, cited by 53%, 13% used lambretta scooters or other motorized transport and 7% used small boats.

The majority of refugees — 51.2% — moved only with their immediate family members, and 44% indicate that their family traveled with other hamlet neighbors; only 2% moved alone. This indicates at least some carryover of pre-migration social structure into the resettlement areas.
The type and number of refugees appear to vary according to the stage of the insurgency, which in Phu-Yen passed through five fairly distinct phases. If the pattern of insurgent-counterinsurgent activity which occurred in Phu-Yen proves applicable elsewhere, the number and kind of refugees can be generally foreseen. The factors operating in each phase singly would appear to operate even where the sequence of events varies.

V. Relief and Resettlement Characteristics

• Over one-third of the refugees said they have received no government aid. The remainder report receiving varying amounts of assistance, principally food-stuffs and money. Most of these receiving aid have been in settlement areas for over six months.

• Most refugees have resettled in existing hamlets around the six major provincial towns; only 14% have been relocated in government sponsored resettlement camps.

• Hamlets around the province capital have experienced a mean increase in population of nearly 50% with three reporting increases over 100% due to refugee immigration. The refugee influx has resulted in inflation, increased unemployment, and the overburdening of community facilities.

• Only 14% of the refugee children are enrolled in schools.

• Relocation has caused marked changes in the occupation of refugee heads of household. Most shifted from agricultural occupations to general labor.

• Approximately 33% of the refugee heads of household are unemployed.

• The average daily income of refugees is less than 99 piastres per day.

• Some refugees who were in the lower income brackets before migration are now earning more money, while those who were previously in the higher income brackets have suffered considerable losses in income. These changes in income suggest that there may be incentive for some refugees to stay in settlement areas rather than return to their native hamlets.
When refugees were asked where they would like to reside in contrast to where they expected to reside in the future, a large majority (92%) said they expected to remain in refugee settlements, but would like (63%) to return to their native hamlet.

VI. Implications of the Refugee Movement for the Pacification Effort in Phu-Yen

- Refugee movement represents a major liability to the insurgents in Phu-Yen. It has directly attacked their basis of power in the rural areas without offering the Viet-Cong new exploitable opportunities of sufficient value to balance this loss of control of the population. In turn, refugee migration has presented the government with a major "negative" gain: by reducing the strength of the guerrillas -- by simply denying them a resource -- refugee movement has, in effect, bettered the GVN position in Phu-Yen.

- Refugee movement could, however, present the GVN with a "positive" asset. Yet, it is precisely here that the balance sheet suffers: the counterinsurgents have generally failed to take advantage of the latent opportunities inherent in the refugee problem. In Saigon, the slogan is that "refugees are an obligation and an opportunity," but in Phu-Yen the refugees are generally seen only in terms of the considerable burden they represent to the provincial government, while their potential as a pacification resource is ignored. Thus the province has suffered a double loss: it has had to divert resources to meet the problems presented by the refugees, and it has failed to exploit a potential human resource offered it.

- In sum, refugee movement has been more harmful to the Viet-Cong than to the GVN position in Phu-Yen. But refugees have not represented an unalloyed gain to the Allies; rather, they have placed heavy new burdens on a provincial administration unprepared to exploit the opportunities offered by the refugee movement. Thus refugees are a liability for the Viet-Cong, but they are not yet a positive asset for the government.
SỞ LƯỢC PHỤC TRÌNH

I. Nhap đê

- Phụng trao ty nan lên cao nhận đên nồi Chinh Phú VNCH để phải đối phó với nhiều khó khăn về cả hai phương diện cứu trợ và nhận định về giá trị của phụng trao như là một lợi ích hay một bất lợi trong một lúc hình định hiện nay. Phân lơn của sự khó khăn liên tục này là do sự thiếu sót tin tức chính xác về kích thước và ban chắc của phụng trao ty nan.

- Cuộc nghiên cứu này nhằm cung ứng losi tin tức nơi trên về tình hình dân ty nan tại tỉnh Phú Yên. Mục đích là khám phá xen những người tro thành dân ty nan lể ơi, tại sao họ rời bỏ lường mac và lực nào và bằng cách nào họ để ra đi; cứu xét một vài vấn đề liên quan đến sự cứu trợ và định cư, về sự tiếp nhận của công động và chính quyền địa phương dân ty nan đi chuyển đến; và đề nghị cung đưa ra một vài quan hệ ảnh hưởng của tình hình ty nan đối với nồi lục hình định.

- Tin tức trình bày trong bản phục trình này là kết quả khảo thac tư các bạn phong văn đề thức hiệu với 1.193 gia đình dân ty nan; những cuộc phong văn các viên chức Hoa-Ký và Việt Nam từ cấp quan, tỉnh lên đến trung ương và sau hết là sự quan sát của chính các tổ giả.

II. Những Bộc Tích cua Dân Ty Nan

Mỗi nơi đã dẫn số tỷ năm là trẻ con từ 14 tuổi, trẻ tuổi; mỗi phần ba năm trong lứa tuổi tặng xuất thuộc: 15 dân 49 tuổi; mỗi phần sau là những người trên 49 tuổi. So với thành phần tổng quát của dân quân Việt Nam, ở đây ta thấy số trẻ con về người già cơ khổ cao và tỷ số dân ông và dân bà trong khoảng tuổi từ 15-35 lại quá thấp. Các nhóm tuổi từ 15-29, tỷ lệ dân ông và dân bà là: 69 dân ông và 100 dân bà, so với tỷ lệ 90 dân ông/100 dân bà trong toàn khối dân chúng tuổi này và 96 dân ông/100 dân bà trong khối toàn thể dân số.

Trung bình một gia đình ty năm là 5.2 người, số người ít hơn trong một gia đình không ty nên; mỗi phần từ các gia đình ty nên cho biết trong lúc đi chuyển cần có ít nhất là một người hay nhiều hơn nửa tốc độ khó gia đình. Trong nhóm người ty năm, số người dân bà cùng có nhiều con nhỏ hơn số với người dân bà trong số dân không ty nên.

Gần 40% dân ty năm biết chủ, về số dân ông biết chủ "cào hón dân bà: trong cơ tổ từ 15-19 có 844 dân ông và 539 dân bà biết chủ."

Trong số dân không ty năm lại có nhiều người không nhận xuất hiện: số người dân ty năm ở trong tổ từ năm xuất (15-49) phải cấp dưỡng 2.7 người khác so với tỷ lệ 1.3 trong số những người không ty nên. Chỉ có khoảng 41 dân ty năm, trong số 'đảm' được phân vùng là yếu kém werk thiết nhất phần phân từ số người này lại là những người già từ 60 tuổi trở lên.

83% dân ty năm trước đây là những người làm công việc sản xuất thuộc phân, chỉ có 61% làm việc trong các ngành kinh tế dịch vụ. Ba phần tư các gia đình ty năm là nghề nông tật là lao động và 65% những người này là số như chủ đất của họ cậy. Sự phân hạt đ date thông doc rộng rãi và cũng đúng: số như sản trồng bình là 2.4 mâu và con số thường thấy là 1.5 mâu.

III. Những Nguyễn Đỗ Di Chuân

Những người dân kéo dân ty năm quyến lịnh ra đi khá phức tạp, hầu hết các đối diện đã rời ra từ 2 hay nhiều tỷ để cách đây hơn ra đi. Những hoạt động quân sự đã được 861 dân ty năm về ra và 681 kẻ tăng những hành động không bồi và áp bức đã lại lý do của sự ra đi. Các biết những cuộc phản kháng với quyết môch chỉ có 32 dân ty năm đã kể lại lý do ra đi cứu họ, về chỉ có khoảng 64 tiểu tổ tăng họ đã biết được ra đi trong lúc có những cuộc hành quân.
Việt-Cộng được thấy là nguyên nhân thường xuyên liên quan đến sự đi chuyển của dân tyen năm 1965 - năm 1968, dân tyen đã nhiều lý do này - trong khi các lực lượng Đông Minh chỉ có 674 dân tyen năm nhạc tổi (dân tyen năm cố tổ chức nhiều ra nhiều lý do một lần).

- Nếu như 175 dân tyen năm là viễn chức Chính Pháp hay cảnh báo quân sự hoặc gia đình đã phải ra đi để tránh những đe dọa từ Việt-Cộng.

- Một phần nữa số dân tyen năm được các lực lượng quân sự Đông Minh, bè quan ở đồng bằng sông Lòng ra đi.

- 15% kế ra những tương hợp Việt-Cộng với lực lượng cán bộ ra đi.

- Khi được hỏi về lý do khi nhiều người lớn giông của họ tổ chức dân tyen năm, những người không thể ra đã đưa ra những lý kiến trong hợp với những điều chỉnh dân tyen năm đó sai ra.

IV. Những Đặc Tính và Cơ Bóng Của Cuộc Đi Chuyển

Sự đi chuyển của dân tyen năm trong tỉnh Phú Yên hầu hết là có tính cách liên tính và trước nhất là liên quân; một phần nhỏ các cuộc đi chuyển có tính cách liên quân là những cuộc đi chuyển hướng về tỉnh lỵ Tuy Hòa. Do đó khoảng cách mà dân tyen năm tại đây phải đi chuyển từ nhà đến nơi định cư tương đối ngắn: trung bình vị khoảng 13 cây số (7.8 dặm) và ba phân từ dan số đến di chuyển khoảng 18 cây số hay ít hơn.

Thời gian di chuyển cũng ngắn: quá nữa (56%) dân tyen năm đa tối cho đỉnh cuối trong khoảng 9 tiếng đồng hồ và đa số còn lại đi đến nơi định cư trong khoảng một ngày. Một đa số lón lao (95%) đa di chuyển hoạn toàn bằng ngựa kéo với dân tyen năm tại tỉnh Bình Thuận, chỉ có 15% đa di chuyển bằng dân.

- Phan lớn đa di bộ, 63%; 13% đa sử dụng xe Lambretta bằng huyệt hai phò trong diesen có đồng cỏ heo và 7% sử dụng thuyền nhỏ.

- Ba số dân tyen năm -- 51.2% -- di chuyển cùng với gia đình và 44% cho biết cùng đa đi với những người cùng áp; chỉ có 4% đa đi một mình. Biểu này cho thấy ít nhất đa có sự chuyển vận một phần nào cãi có câu tổ chức lồng xóm tại nông ở cừ đến nội định cựu.
V. Nhưng Đức Tinh Của Công Cược Của Trở và Bình Cụ

- Trong một phần ba dân số ty nan kẹt trong ho không nhận đủ trợ nào của chính quyền. Sở cọn lại cho biết có nhiều số trợ giúp khác nhau, phần chính là thực phẩm và tiền bạc. Đa số những người nhận đủ trợ giúp đã ở trong khu vực dân cư trong sâu lắng.

- Phân lơn dân ty nan đã đình cư tại các áp biên khu nam quanh sao thi trận quan trọng của tính; chỉ có 14% đã được định cư trong các trại định cư do chính quyền bảo trợ.

- Dân số tại các áp chung quanh tỉnh ly đã gia tăng trung bình vào khoảng 50%, trong số có 3 áp báo cáo dân số gia tăng trên 100% do sự xâm nhập của dân ty nan. Trở lưu dân ty nan này đã được đến hầu qua làm phát, nan thợ nghề gia tăng, và là cả một mạng kinh do các cơ sở công động địa phương.

- Chỉ có 14% trở còn ty nan được đi học.

- Sự thay đổi nơi cư trú này cũng gây ra sự thay đổi trong tương quan giữa các gia đình ty nan. Đa số đang tăng nhẹ những biếng béo

- Gần 33% các gia đình ty nan không có việc làm.

- Lợi tức trung bình hàng ngày của dân ty nan chưa được 99 đồng.

- Một vài người trẻ em có lợi tức thấp kém này kiển được nhiều tiến hơn trong khi những người trẻ em có lợi tức cao này lại phải chịu những thiệt hại lớn về lợi tức. Sự thay đổi về mức lợi tức này có thể là nguồn gốc nguyên khích một số dân ty nan ở lại trong các trại Định cư vẫn lơ trẻ và lang cu.
VI. Những Liên Quan Của Phòng Trão Đàn Ty Nan Với Tổ Lực Binh Định Tại Phú Yên

- Phòng trao ty nan tại Phú Yên tiến biểu một bất lợi quan trọng cho quân pháiiran. Nó thúc tiệp người hiểu đến nén tăng quyền hành của Việt-Công tại vùng nông thôn mà không cung diện một nơi họ nào khả dĩ khi thấy được de bửu đáp lại sự mất quyền kiểm soát khỏi dân chúng này. Nếu lại, sự địa chuyên của dân ty nan đã đếm lại cho Chính Phú VNCH một thành quả "tiêu cực" quan trọng: làm suy giảm lực lượng du kích bằng cách giảm dạ là cả giai đoạn tiếp theo Người cùng cấp - phòng trao dân ty nan do đó đã cùng có vị trí của Chính Quyền VNCH tại Phú Yên.

- Tuy nhiên, phòng trao ty nan có thể là một lợi khi "tiêu cực" của Chính Quyền VNCH. Nhưng đây khi thể này chưa được thể hiện: các tổ lực chống phái liên nào có chung chủ chái thấy được những thuận lợi tiêm đến nơi tại của văn đề dân ty nan. Tại Saigon, khấu hiệu công tác là "giúp đỡ dân ty nan là một trách vụ và cùng là một cơ hội," nhưng tại Phú Yên dân ty nan được cơ như là một gánh nặng đáng gây cho chính quyền tỉnh trong khi tiêm nang có thể xài cho quan phái như một tài nguyên phục vụ công cuộc bình định lại bị bối rối. Vì vậy, tình nay đã phải gánh chịu một thiệt thòi gấp đôi: một mặt phải chuyên dùng một số tài nguyên để đổi phơi với những vấn đề dân ty nan mặt ra và mặt khác đã không khai thác được tiềm năng nhân lực mà khởi người này đưa lại.

- Tóm lại, phòng trao ty nan tại Phú Yên đã gây ra người hối cho Việt-Công hồn lên cho Chính Quyền VNCH. Nhưng dân ty nan cũng không phải một thành công dân đều của lực lượng Bộ Minh; họ muốn, dân ty nan thực ra đã đạt một gánh nặng mới lên vai cuộc chính quyền tỉnh, một chính quyền không được suôn sẻ dễ dàng khác thường không có họi thuận lợi mà phòng trao ty nan mang lại. Do đó dân ty nan chính là một bất lợi của Việt-Công nhưng cũng chưa thật là lợi khi tiêu cực của Chính Quyền VNCH.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

This study was undertaken in the context of an increased concern with and need for detailed information on the refugee situation in Viet-Nam. Refugee movement related to the current conflict began relatively early, initially involving only small groups of people in isolated areas. A generalized movement into urban areas is reported as early as 1958, perhaps reflecting a normal rural-urban demographic shift as much as a "refugee" movement. One early sign of conflict-related refugeeism is reported for the delta province of Long-An, where in 1960 village officials and a few large landlords had taken refuge from the Viet-Cong in the provincial capital. In the Central Highlands in July 1962, some 10,000 Montagnards reportedly fled from Viet-Cong control to Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) resettlement centers, and one source states that 150,000 mountain tribesmen out of a total of about 700,000 sought refuge in government-controlled areas during 1962.

It was not until 1964-65, however, that refugee movement reached major proportions. The 1964 spring floods had displaced thousands of families in the central coastal regions; before this initial group of refugees could be resettled, it was vastly augmented by the major rural civilian population displacement, which began to occur simultaneously with the 1965 Viet-Cong military effort in Central Viet-Nam and the large-scale introduction of Allied forces to checkmate the so-called "summer offensive."

The first official estimates of the refugee population were compiled and released in May 1965 by the Ministry of Social Welfare in Saigon, indicating that over 300,000 people had become what were labeled "refugees from communism." (The term "refugee" is a misnomer, as by international agreement refugee refers to persons crossing national boundaries. A more accurate term would be "dislocated or displaced persons," but "refugee" has been used so extensively by the U. S. Government and the press that it is adopted here.) The following month the Ministry reported an additional 250,000 refugees, bringing the total in July 1965
to slightly less than 600,000 (see Map 1). By November 1965 the total refugee population reported by the GVN was nearly 750,000, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that the Vietnamese Government underestimated the actual refugee populations in the provinces. Toward the end of the year it was anticipated that the total would exceed one million by January 1966.

The development of a refugee problem of this magnitude apparently had not been anticipated, and GVN officials, particularly at the provincial level, were undecided as to whether the refugees presented the government with a liability or an opportunity.

Thus an ambiguity of policy developed toward aiding the refugees, stemming in part from the considerable fear that if the refugees were offered too much assistance, they might never return to their villages and would remain a permanent drain on government resources. Moreover, some Vietnamese officials and Military Assistance Command-Viet-Nam (MACV) officers were concerned that the refugee movement was inspired by the Viet-Cong as part of a strategic "plot" to force the rural population to flood government secured areas, thus overburdening GVN administrative and logistic systems and infiltrating subversive agents.

In some areas the refugees also disturbed the local political balance, such as in Binh-Dinh Province, where latent political-religious frictions were exacerbated by segregation of refugees into Catholic and Buddhist camps under the control of their respective religious leaders. As these refugees could provide ready-made mobs for denominational political activity, the reaction of provincial authorities was actively to resist aiding them, hoping that they would be forced to return home, thus reducing political tensions.

These and other fears were frequently held by province-level officials who, in the final analysis, had direct responsibility for administering refugee relief programs. During most of 1965, then, refugees received assistance largely according to how each province chief viewed them.
MAP 1,
Refugee Population Density
(as of August 1966)

Source: Special Commission for Refugees, Saigon
In the wake of press reports and growing U. S. Mission concern—evidenced during the hearings conducted in the summer of 1965 by the U. S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees—decisions were made both in Washington and Saigon to pay increased attention to refugees. USAID established a special Office of Refugee Coordination (ORC) to supervise and coordinate an increased American effort in refugee assistance. A Washington-based Viet-Nam Refugee Relief Coordinator was appointed and Dr. Howard Rusk, Director of New York University's Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, was sent to Viet-Nam to assess the role U. S. private charitable groups might play in refugee assistance. The Government of Viet-Nam issued a number of directives to provincial authorities that authorized increased expenditures for refugee relief, and the Ministries of Social Welfare and Rural Construction were allocated additional funds for temporary relief payments and resettlement allowances to refugees.

Despite this increased relief effort, there was still considerable uncertainty as to the precise dimension and nature of the refugee problem. Other than the tentative statistics compiled by the Ministry of Social Welfare, no assessment was available to government planners as to the numbers, social characteristics, locations, needs, and motivations of the refugees. USAID's new Office of Refugee Coordination deployed American representatives for refugees in key provinces and began to gather the first general report on refugees. In its first quarterly Refugee Status Report in December 1965, ORC observed that further attention was required in order to develop

...more complete information about the refugees including why they became refugees, more reliable statistical data for planning purposes, and information concerning refugee attitudes including their desires and expectations for the future, and a clearer definition of the term 'refugee'—who qualifies as a refugee.

Similarly, at this time, elements in the Department of Defense and MACV expressed interest in determining what benefits the refugee movement might offer to the Allied war effort, both in terms of direct resource gains to the GVN—e.g., increased manpower pool for the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) recruitment—and indirect or longer range impact on the rural pacification effort. Against this background the present study was begun.
Refugees represent a national problem with certain common characteris­
tics. Although this report will be viewed in the context of the Vietnamese refugee problem as a whole, numerous regional or provincial variations weigh against drawing generalizations from these data, which were derived from a single pro­
vince: Phu-Yen.

Objectives of Research

The objectives of this research were to discover which people become refugees, why they want to relocate, and when and how they move; to examine some of the problems involved in refugee relief and resettlement for the refugees, their host community, and the Government of South Viet-Nam; and to propose and set forth some implications of the refugee situation for the pacification effort.

Methodology

The information presented in this report was developed through the use of questionnaires administered by Vietnamese trained in their use to a sample of 1,193 refugee households in Phu-Yen Province, where 17% of the population are refugees; through interviews with U. S. and Vietnamese officials at district, province, and national levels; and through the personal observations of the authors. (Further discussion of methodology is treated in Appendix C.)

Organization of the Report

Information derived from the field investigation is organized according to its relevance to research objectives, as follows:

Who are the refugees? -- Chapter II, Characteristics of the Refugee Population, reports the demographic charac­
teristics of the refugee population—age, sex, religion, literacy, and so on.

Why do they become refugees? -- Chapter III, Causes of Move­
ment, examines the factors and agents contributing to the decision to move, assesses the extent of
forced movement, and compares the motivation of Phu-Yen refugees to refugees from another province to a nonrefugee population.

When and how do they move?—Chapter IV, Characteristics and Dynamics of Movement, describes the time, distance and rate of refugee movement and hypothesizes the relationship of refugee movement to phase of insurgency.

What was the impact of movement on the refugees, their host community, and their government?—Chapter V, Relief and Resettlement, outlines the development of government policies and the impact of the refugee movement on the refugees, their host community, and the government.

What are the implications of the refugee movement for the pacification effort?—Chapter VI, Implications for Pacification, discusses, in the light of data developed in this study, 18 propositions derived from current official opinions on the pros and cons of the refugee movement.

Appendix A, Reference Tables, provides additional statistical background and information. Appendix B presents a description of Phu-Yen Province at the time the research took place. Appendix C, Survey Method, provides a discussion of the methodology and samples of the questionnaires used. The GVN's "Return to the Village" campaign plan is presented as Appendix D.

Footnotes


3 "10,000 Tribesmen Flee Viet-Cong" (Saigon: The Times of Viet-Nam, July 23, 1962).
4 Fall, _The Two Viet-Nams_, op. cit., p. 366. See also Jerry Rose, "I'm Hit! I'm Hit! I'm Hit!" _Saturday Evening Post_, March 23, 1963, 11. 35-46.

5 These figures, upon which Figure 1 and Map 1 are also based, were compiled by the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare; they are limited by unsystematic collection and by the irregularities in defining "refugee."


8 In late 1966 ORe was transferred from USAID/Saigon to the newly-formed OCO (Office of Civil Operations); in 1967 it was again reorganized under CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support).

CHAPTER II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUGEE POPULATION

Introduction

Not surprisingly, reliable data on the demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the Vietnamese refugee population are in short supply. In Phu·Yen, for example, interviews revealed that even statistics as to the overall size of the refugee population vary considerably between officials and agencies: USAID reported 69,505 persons, the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare representative counted 71,200, and the MACV Sector Advisor estimated 78,000. Further, there were no figures available whatsoever regarding such important characteristics of the population as age and sex distribution, occupational skill, and so on.

Questions as to whether the refugee movement is a deliberate program of the Viet-Cong to "evacuate" women and children from their areas of control or whether, to the contrary, the flight of refugees from Viet-Cong areas represents serious losses of laborers and potential conscripts can only be answered when the population has been described. The need for such data is all the more important if the government is to use the refugees as a pacification resource or to design effective programs of assistance, military or civilian labor recruitment, or vocational training. Experience in Phu-Yen provides an excellent example of the kinds of administrative difficulties that can result from lack of such demographic data: while one U.S. government agency was planning to transport hundreds of refugees to another province to relieve unemployment in the Tuy-Hoa area of Phu-Yen, another agency was planning at the same time large-scale importations of third-country nationals to alleviate a supposed labor "shortage" in the province.

This chapter presents basic social, demographic, and economic data on the Phu-Yen refugees. Persons using this information for planning purposes must keep in mind that there is great regional variation in Viet-Nam, and other refugee groups in other areas of the country may well display considerably different demographic configurations from those reported here. Further, refugee populations appear to be quite mobile, and there may have been considerable change in the characteristics of the Phu-Yen refugee population since the time this research was carried out.
Social and Demographic Characteristics

Ethnic Groups

The vast majority—96%—of the refugees in Phu-Yen are ethnic Vietnamese, the remaining 4% belong to the Hroi (3%) and Rhade (1%) Montagnard tribes. The Montagnard refugees are found in only two districts: Son Hoa, where they comprise a little over 20% of the refugee population, and Dong Xuan, where they represent just under 6% of the population. Montagnards compose roughly the same percentage of the total Phu-Yen refugee population as they do of the overall population of the Province. However, it is possible that additional tribesmen from Phu Duc District have taken refuge in neighboring Phu-Bon Province. The ethnic breakdown among refugees reflects the general ethnic composition of the Province.

Religion

The bulk of the refugee population is about evenly divided between Buddhists (45%) and ancestor worshippers (39%), with Catholics (8%), Cao-Daists (5%), and animists (3%) having lesser representation.

Cao-Daists appear to be overrepresented, comprising 5% of the refugee population but only 2.5% in the general population of the region.

Roman Catholics appear to be somewhat underrepresented among the refugees, comprising only 8% of that population compared to the estimated Catholic affiliation of 13% of the overall area population and 10.5% of the national population.

Literacy

38.5% of the total refugee population and 55% of the heads of households consider themselves literate. Sex and age are important variables in determining literacy: 47% of all males are literate, as opposed to 30.9% of all females. Persons in the 15-29 age bracket have a rate of 65.4%, with males in this category reported as having 84.2% literacy and females a rate of 52.5%.
The female literacy rate is consistently lower than that of males, but the differential is most accentuated for ages 40 and older. This is predictable in view of the lack of emphasis on education for women in rural Viet-Nam prior to World War II. (See Figure 1.)

Two additional variables relating to the literacy of the refugees are religious and ethnic group affiliation. Catholic refugees report a significantly higher literacy rate than the norm for all religions (see Table 1). Montagnard refugee heads-of-household report a literacy rate of 18% compared to a rate of 57% for ethnic Vietnamese (see Table 2). The numbers of Catholics and tribal people included in the refugee population are not large enough to shift the overall literacy rate to any significant extent.

Table 1. Literacy Rate by Religious Group (Refugee Heads of Households)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Buddhists</th>
<th>Ancestor Worshippers</th>
<th>Roman Catholics</th>
<th>Cao-Daists</th>
<th>Animists</th>
<th>All Religions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Literacy Rate by Ethnic Group (Refugee Heads of Households)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnamese</th>
<th>Montagnards</th>
<th>All Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relatively high literacy rate reported by the refugee population is contrary to the stereotype of populations of underdeveloped Asian countries being predominantly illiterate. Since no objective test of literacy was given to the refugees, it is possible that the number of literate persons is somewhat exaggerated.
Figure 1  Comparative Literacy Rates of Male and Female Refugees
(By 5-Year Age Group)
(n = 6160)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% Literate</th>
<th>% Illiterate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent

0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100

Male
Female
However, the validity of this data is supported both by the frequency distribution across age groups in the sample (presumably older persons would be as likely to provide biased responses as younger refugees, yet there is a marked difference in the extent that literacy is reported) and by evidence collected for another rural population by an independent investigation. A 1958 survey of an adult rural population by the Fundamental Education Center reported literacy rates somewhat higher than those of the Phu-Yen refugee report (see Table 3)².

The high extent of literacy reported for the refugees has important implications both for Allied psychological operations in support of the pacification effort and for economic assimilation and utilization of the refugee population. Certainly, as Hendry notes for Khanh Ha, in a population possessing even rudimentary reading skills "the learning process can continue and new ideas can be introduced through printed materials which the people can use."³ (See also Appendix A, Item 1.)

Table 3. Comparative Adult Literacy Rates: Phu-Yen Refugees and a Nonrefugee Rural Population ⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% Males</th>
<th>% Females</th>
<th>% Both Sexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Nonrefugees</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 44</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 and older</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age and Sex

Figure 2 presents in standard pyramid form the age and sex distribution of the refugee population. Two characteristics are notable: (1) the high number of males ages 0-14, compared to a "normal" sex balance, and (2) the underrepresentation of persons of both sexes ages 15-34.

A normal ratio for the 0-14 age group is 101 males per 100 females. Thailand has a ratio of 102, Cambodia, 103, and Malaya, 104.⁵ This contrasts with the refugee population, which has 109 boys to 100 girls, and with the only
available data on nonrefugee Vietnamese, that reported 1958 by Hendry in Khanh Hau. The causal factors which produced this demographic phenomenon in the Vietnamese population have not been determined.

Several factors contribute to the underrepresentation of young adults:

1. the non-conflict-related migration of rural young people to urban areas, characteristic of most developing countries;
2. military recruitment and conscription, both VC and GVN;
3. war losses; and
4. evasion of conscription.

Refugees in Phu-Yen reported that 121 persons ages 15-34, formerly members of their households, were now serving in GVN military units. Comparable data is not available on refugee family members serving with the insurgents, but without doubt many of the 133 youths listed as being absent from their families but not in the military have actually been recruited or conscripted into Viet-Cong units. A considerable number of young people have also been killed as a result of the war. Eighty-five males (55 of them serving in GVN) and 15 females in the 15-34 age group have been killed during the insurgency.

Comparison of the number of males age 15-34 now in the refugee population (511 persons) with those reported as separated from their households (193) or killed in war (85) reveals that 35.2% of all males reported as composing this age group in the premigration population have been removed from the present refugee population. Even if a composite pyramid of the population is constructed by adding reported war casualties and separated household members to the refugee population (see Figure 3), the 15-29 age group is distinctly under-represented. This may partly reflect the refugees' failure to report persons serving in the Viet-Cong and partly result from a lowered birthrate during World War II and the French-Viet-Minh struggle in the 1940's and early 1950's (persons in this age span would have been born between 1939 and 1951). In this regard, Hendry attributes a deficit in persons in the 11-12 year old category in his 1958 census to a lessened birthrate in 1945-1948, when conflict was most acute in Long-An.
Figure 2. Population Pyramid

Refugee Population of Phu-Yen Province

Male: 2,927    Total: 6,174    Female: 3,247
Figure 3. Composite Population Pyramid
Refugees and Former Members of Household (Separated and War Casualties)

Male = 3,424
Female = 3,438
Total = 6,862
War losses and separation resulting from migration have also affected other age groupings in the population but to a lesser extent than is the case for young persons.

The refugee population as a whole has a sex ratio of 90 males per 100 females. For refugees in the 15-29 age group, the ratio is decreased to 80 males, and in the 20-34 age group the sex ratio is only 81 men per 100 women.

In percentage terms, males comprise 47.4% of the total refugee population; 40.7% of persons between 15 and 49 years of age; and 33.9% of the population age 20-34.

The same tendencies in age and sex distribution are reported for a non-refugee population in the delta, but with a considerably better balance between males and females. The sex ratio for the overall village population in 1958 was 96 but decreased to 82 for the 15-28 age group and to 79 for persons 21-34 years of age. Males represented 48.9% of the total population, but only 44.1% of the population in the 21-34 age group.

Analysis of data from a 1965 USAID/ORC-conducted registration of persons living in government refugee camps in Binh-Dinh Province shows sex distribution tendencies generally similar to those for the Phu-Yen refugee population. The Binh-Dinh camp population has a sex ratio of 89, with a ratio of 74 for the 15-49 age group and 48 for the 20-34 grouping. Thus, the Binh-Dinh refugee population has a slightly higher percentage of males in all age categories than is the case for Phu-Yen, but has a lower percentage in all categories than the non-refugee population of Khanh Hau Village in the delta (see Table 4).
Table 4. Sex Ratios and Male Percentage of Population for Phu-Yen Refugees, Binh-Dinh Refugees, and a Nonrefugee Village in Long-An

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Ages</th>
<th>15-49</th>
<th>20-34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu-Yen Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>Males % of pop.</td>
<td>Males % of pop.</td>
<td>Males % of pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh-Dinh Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hau Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(nonrefugees)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marital Status and Household Size

Data on marital status by age and sex reveals a consistently higher percentage of females than males who are widowed. In view of the marked deficit of unmarried males in the population there exists a potential for serious strain on the social fabric, although to some extent the excess females may be absorbed by an increase in the number of polygamous marriages (a traditional, although illegal practice in rural Viet-Nam). (See Appendix A, Item 2.)

The number of children ages 0-4 per 1,000 women ages 15-49 provides indirect evidence on the fertility of a population. The Phu-Yen refugee population has a child-woman ratio of 713, compared to a ratio of 688 for the non-refugee population of Khanh Hau.

The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons; the mode is 5. In contrast, Hendry reports a mean size of 5.5 persons for households in Khanh Hau, with 5 the mode, a difference suggesting that one effect of migration on Vietnamese social structure is a reduction in the number of people composing a
Data on refugee and nonrefugee household size distribution confirms that there is a tendency towards reduction in family size. This is not surprising, as one-quarter of the refugee households are reported to have had one or more family members separated from them at the time of migration (see Table 5).

Table 5. Disruption of Households by Refugee Movement
(n = 1179)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intact Households</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with one or more separated members</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households with one separated member</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with two separated members</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with three separated members</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with four or more separated members</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Premigration Economic Characteristics

Occupation

71% of the refugee heads of household had formerly been employed in the agricultural sector of the economy as farmers, laborers, tenant farmers, or gatherers. If fishing is added, 80% of the refugees were engaged in food-producing activities. Laborers and craftsmen constituted a total of 13% of the respondents, and 1.0% were unemployed. Only 6% of the refugees had been employed in the service sector (merchants, government cadre, and soldiers) of the economy. (See Figure 4.)
Hendry reports a similar distribution of occupation for delta villagers. "Upwards of two-thirds of heads of households regard [farming] as their main occupation. The only other primary occupation to claim a sizeable number of heads of households is that of laborer, from one-fifth to one-fourth. All other occupations, however important in other terms, are proportionately small."  

The impact of refugee movement on occupation is discussed in Chapter V.

Figure 4. Principal Premigration Occupation of Head of Household  
(n = 1187)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Laborer</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Laborer</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Farmer</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Civil Cadre</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN Military or Paramilitary</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Merchant</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatherer/ Woodcutter</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Land Tenure Patterns

Land tenure practices are divisible into three basic patterns: households owning all the land they work; households owning some land and renting additional land; and households using wholly rented land. 56.9% of all refugee households fall in the first category, 8.5% in the mixed owning and renting group, and 8.6% wholly in the renting class. Thus a total of 74% of all refugee households had access to agricultural land in one form or another (see Table 6).

Table 6. Premigration Land Tenure Patterns
(n = 1152)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Land Owned</th>
<th>Land Ownership (in hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents in each category renting land</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents in each category not renting land</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A survey of 46 nonrefugee households in two hamlets in Phu-Yen revealed that 51.1% owned all the land that they worked, 27.7% supplemented their plots by renting additional land, and 14.9% were wholly dependent on rental land. Thus some 93.6% of all households in this population had access to farm land.

Land tenure patterns in Phu-Yen are in sharp contrast with the nonrefugee population in the delta village of Khanh Hau, where only 16.8% of all households owned land and 54.3% were tenant farmers, with a total of only 62.1% of the village households having access to tillable land. 13

20
Land Ownership

The majority (65.5%) of refugee households had owned farm land, and some (8.5%) of these also rented supplemental land. Plots ranged in size from 0.1 hectares to 20 hectares, with a mean area of 2.4 and a mode of 1.5. Owners of very large plots (20 hectares or more) would probably not be represented in the sample, since persons of such wealth most likely would not reside in refugee settlements.

Adequate comparative data on land ownership by nonrefugee populations in Phu-Yen are lacking, although the limited information available suggests that the tenure pattern for the refugees does not diverge from that traditional in Central Viet-Nam. One source states that "In parts of this area [the Central Lowlands] three-fourths of the farmers owned their land, with holdings averaging from 2 to 5 acres. In the whole Central area, not more than 50 individuals owned as much as 125 acres.""14

Of the 49 nonrefugee households surveyed in Phu-Yen, 37 owned land. Plots ranged in size from 0.2 hectares to 4.0 hectares with a mean area of 1.32 hectares and a mode of 1.0.

According to a French survey conducted prior to World War II, 93.9% of the land owners in Central Viet-Nam held plots smaller than 2.5 hectares and 99.9% owned plots less than 25 hectares in size. 15

Comparison of the Phu-Yen refugee population, a nonrefugee population of Phu-Yen, and the nonrefugee population in Central Viet-Nam reveals that the refugees on the whole own slightly larger plots than the nonrefugees, but the distributional patterns appear quite similar. (See Appendix A, Item 4.)

The pattern of land ownership of the refugees in Phu-Yen is in sharp contrast to that reported by Hendry for the delta. There, prior to the 1958 agrarian reform, only 18.6% of the peasants owned land (compared to 65.4% among the Phu-Yen refugees). Further, there were extreme inequalities in the distribution: only 13.2% of the village landholders owned over half (53.6%) of the arable area. (See also Appendix A, Item 5, which presents comparative Lorenz curves of
distribution of land ownership for the Phu-Yen refugee population and the Khanh Hau nonrefugee population.

The wide extent of land ownership in Phu-Yen makes one question the frequently cited view that maldistribution of the land is one of the primary factors behind peasant support of the Viet-Cong. Certainly the statement by one analyst of the insurgency that "South Viet-Nam is actually one of the places in the world where drastic land reform is most badly needed" is not supported by data on refugee land tenure patterns in Phu-Yen. Agrarian reform may, in some areas of Viet-Nam, offer one method of winning the support of the peasantry, but it is clearly not the panacea it often is claimed to be. (See Figure 5.)

**Land Tenancy**

17.1% of the refugee households rented land; half of these were renting to supplement plots which they owned. Rented plots range in area from 0.1 to 6.9 hectares, with a mean size of 1.3 hectares. (See Figure 6.)

While data collected on rental rates is not satisfactory for detailed analysis it indicates that rental rates run from one-third to one-half of the reported harvest (see Appendix A, Item 5).

**Ownership of Major Capital Goods**

61.8% of refugee households were reported as having owned their major means of production. 46% (554) of the households owned buffalo or cattle and 7.5% (90) owned sampans. Other capital goods listed were sewing machines and fishing nets (see Table 7).
Figure 5. Premigration Land Ownership
(n = 756)

Figure 6. Premigration Land Tenancy
(n = 199)
### Table 7. Premigration Ownership of Capital Goods

(n = 1183)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Asset</th>
<th>Number of Households Citing</th>
<th>% of all Refugee Households Citing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boat or sampan</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing machine</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing nets</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 head of cattle</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 head of cattle</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 head of cattle</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle, number unspecified</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Refugee Productive Capability

Assuming that only persons between the ages of 15 and 49 are capable of sufficient productive activity to create a surplus beyond their own needs, and that persons outside this age range are consumers rather than producers, it is possible to calculate the comparative productive capability ratios of various populations. Following this approach, it can be calculated that the refugee population has 268 producers per 1,000 people; i.e., each refugee producer must support himself plus 2.7 other people. While no comparable data for a nonrefugee population in Phu-Yen is available, Khanh Hau, a village in the Mekong Delta, had, in 1958 (i.e., the pre-insurgency period), 435 producers per 1,000 population: each villager of productive age had to support himself plus 1.3 others. This compares favorably with the ratio of 454 per 1,000 for neighboring Cambodia, but is considerably lower than the 492 producers per 1,000 population reported for Thailand. (Different employment patterns make comparisons with the U.S. population difficult, but if 20-64 is taken as the productive age grouping for an industrial economy, the U.S. has a ratio of 522 producers per 1,000 population.)
It is evident from the above that the refugee population has a considerably greater number of nonproductive individuals than is the norm for rural Vietnamese society and thus, even if effectively "resettled," is likely to remain a population at least partly dependent on outside aid to meet its productive deficit.

Ninety-six percent of the refugees are reported to be able-bodied, i.e., free of major physical defects. In determining able-bodiedness, the interviewers asked if any members of the interviewee's household were currently incapable of working; this criterion was used to classify persons as physically disabled. It is probable, given Vietnamese attitudes toward health and labor, that a considerably greater number of persons are physically disabled by U. S. standards than are reported as such in the survey. Expectedly, the ratio of disabled to able-bodied persons increases with age, with only three-fourths of persons 60 and older reported as being able-bodied. (See Appendix A, Items 7 and 8.)

Summary

- Of the Phu-Yen refugees studied, 96% are ethnic Vietnamese; the remainder are Rhade and Hroi tribespeople. Buddhists form 45%, ancestor worshippers 39%, Catholics 5%, Cao Dai 5%, and animists 3%. This roughly approximates the general population of the area, except that the Cao Dai are slightly overrepresented and the Catholics slightly underrepresented.

- Almost half of the refugees are children 14 and under; one-third are of productive age—15-49; one-sixth are older than 49. There are more children and old people than in the general rural Vietnamese population, and both males and females in the 15-35 age group are greatly underrepresented. In the 15-29 age group, there are only 69 males per 100 females, compared to 90 males to 100 females in the overall refugee population and 96 males to 100 females in the general population.

- The mean refugee household size is 5.2 persons, smaller than that of the nonrefugee population; one-fourth of the families reported separating from one or more members of their family at the time of moving. There are more small children per woman than in the nonrefugee population.
• Nearly 40% of the refugees are literate, and males have a higher literacy rate than females: in the 15-29 age group, 84% of the males and 53% of the females are literate.

• There are more nonproducers than in the nonrefugee population: each refugee of productive age (15-49) must support 2.7 other people, compared to a 1.3 ratio among nonrefugees. Only 4% of the total refugee sample were physically disabled, but this included one-fourth of those 60 and older.

• 80% of the refugees were formerly employed in food-producing industries; only 6% were employed in the service sector of the economy. Three-quarters of the households had access to farm land in their native villages and 65% owned the land they worked. Distribution of land was on a relatively broad and egalitarian basis—the mean holding was 2.4 hectares and the mode 1.5.

Footnotes

1 According to a recent study, "The Religions of South Viet-Nam: in Faith and Fact" (Navy Chaplains Corps, Southeast Asia Religious Project, typescript, n.d.), pp. 123, 133, there are an estimated 60,000 Cao-Dai (out of a national membership of 617,000) in the II Corps area. Thus Cao-Daiists represent approximately 2.5% of the regional population of 2,383,000.

2 James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Haü (Chicago: Aldine, 1964), p. 13. Reliable demographic data for a nonrefugee population in Central Viet-Nam is unavailable. As far as the authors are aware, the only reasonably reliable census of a rural village anywhere in Viet-Nam is that reported for 1958 by Hendry for Khanh Haü, a village of some 3,000 persons located in the delta province of Long-An. In the absence of other sources, Hendry's report has been utilized throughout this chapter to provide comparative data on the nonrefugee Vietnamese rural population.

3 Ibid., p. 25.
