THE STRATEGY OF PEOPLE'S WAR AND THE BUILDING OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

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People's war has its own strategy. The strategic military missions are determined by and are subordinate to the strategic revolutionary missions. After the August Revolution the strategic mission of the revolution was to protect the results of the August Revolution, protect the independence and unification of the Fatherland, and create conditions for completing the democratic people's revolution throughout the country. Therefore, the strategic military mission was to wage an all-round war of resistance against the French imperialists and their traitorous lackeys, in order to liberate the homeland.

In order to achieve the above military mission, our Party came forth with the strategy of relying principally on long-term fighting and on self-reliance. Our resistance was a just cause, so our people had enough spirit and strength to engage in long periods of fighting. The aggressive war of the enemy was unjust, so they had to attempt a quick victory. In the balance of forces between us and the enemy, both sides had definite weak points and strong points. We were stronger than the enemy politically and spiritually. We were weaker than the enemy economically and militarily. Our strength was basic and our weakness was temporary and could gradually be overcome. The enemy's strength was temporary, but their weakness was basic and could not be overcome. Therefore, in the course of long-term fighting, we would become strong and the enemy would become weak.
Under the leadership of the strategic policy of long-term fighting, the Party at the very beginning clearly revealed that our resistance would pass through three stages: defense, resistance, and counter-offensive. The defensive stage was one in which we were still weak and the enemy was still strong, in which the enemy's strategy was to attack and our strategy was positive defense. The enemy's policy was to, after having occupied the cities and important lines of communication, rapidly spread out and control the vast countryside, setting up puppet administrations and organizing puppet military units, and progressing from a period of "occupation" to a period of "pacification," in accordance with their traditional experiences in conquering colonies. The characteristic of the enemy's strategic plot was to occupy the South first, then occupy the North: to pacify Cambodia and Laos first, then pacify Vietnam; and to pacify the mountain regions first, then pacify the delta areas. Our strategy of positive defense was intended to wear down the enemy, prevent the rapid spread of the front, maintain and strengthen our forces, and keep control of the countryside, especially the revolutionary base areas, in order to wage a long-term resistance.

The stage of resistance was the stage in which the balance of forces between us and the enemy changed gradually in our favor, and in which the enemy's mobile strategic forces became dispersed and so weak that they could not launch major attacks to annihilate us in a short period of time. Our guerrilla warfare developed and threatened the enemy's rear areas, forcing them to turn around and cope with us in the areas they controlled. The enemy's strategy gradually changed from offense to defense, from striking quickly to achieve a quick solution to undertaking long-range fighting. Forced to accept a long war with us, the enemy was defeated in strategic plot of seeking a quick victory, and to undertake an unprofitable long war. At that time they encountered unsolvable contradictions, the contradiction between attack and occupation and that between concentrating and dispersing their forces. Our strategy changed from one of resistance to one of counter-offense, with the goal of smashing the enemy's pacification scheme and transforming their rear areas into our front lines, while wearing down and annihilating the enemy's manpower and strengthening and developing the resistance forces. In order to achieve that goal we endeavored to promote guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear areas, while creating conditions for progressing to regular warfare. The stage of resistance was also a stage of transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare with the strong development of three kinds of troops. From that point, guerrilla warfare and regular warfare became united and promoted the development of each other.

The third stage was the stage of counter-offense. The
enemy had to adopt a defensive strategy and retreat step by step. Our strategy was counter-offense, from isolated offensive to general offensives, in order to annihilate the enemy's manpower, restore our territory, and destroy the enemy's will to resist. That was the time at which we gained absolute superiority, although materially, despite our advances, we were still behind the enemy. With regard to strategic reserve forces, however, we were gradually able to concentrate more than could the enemy. Our principal mission during this stage was to promote guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear areas. We also promoted regular warfare on the main battlegrounds and on the battlegrounds on which we could harmoniously combine guerrilla warfare with regular warfare.

With regard to strategic leadership, therefore, our Party correctly understood the following matters:

First, our Party understood correctly that guerrilla warfare is the basic form of people's war, and therefore developed guerrilla warfare extensively all over the country, causing it not only to play a strategic military role, but also to become a matter of revolution strategy.

Second, our Party understood correctly the developmental laws of warfare in the specific conditions of our country. People's war must begin with guerrilla warfare, and progress from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare. Our Party also understood correctly the use of each form of warfare, and clearly understood that guerrilla warfare plays a decisive role and that regular warfare plays a direct decisive role. Therefore, it strengthened the elements of regular warfare and promoted its strong development.

Third, our Party led the close coordination between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare, between the interior lines and exterior lines, and between the battlegrounds all over the nation with the main battleground. This coordination during the last stage of the war became very close and flexible, rich both in content and forms. The victories of the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign and the battle at Dien Bien Phu were the most beautiful and highest manifestations of that skilful strategic leadership and coordination.

Fourth, our Party understood clearly that "the correct execution of a war requires that there be a stably organized rear area." Our Party, therefore, mobilized the entire citizenry in building up the rear areas of the resistance, and strengthened the resistance forces in all ways. When our Party reduced taxes and interest and achieved land reform, the building up of the rear areas of the resistance had more practical and richer
The rear areas of guerrilla warfare are base areas
and guerrilla areas. The rear-area needs of guerrilla warfare
are resolved on the spot. The rear area of regular warfare is
the national base area. Its rear-area needs are met by the
contributions of the people of the entire nation. The building
up of rear areas is carried out under the correct leadership of
the rule of "moving self-reliance is the central concern, although
international aid is important."

Our strategy is that of people's war, so our methods and
tactics are also those of people's war. The stage of the appear-
ance and development of the various forms of combat of the
people's war in our nation are closely united with the develop-
ment of the whole war, and with the skilful leadership of the
Party with regard to strategy and tactics. It is also united
with the correct resolution of the relationship between men and
weapons, and between politics and technology; and it is united
with the struggle to overcome the militarism of the capitalist
class and hold high the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat,
making that the principal method for creating techniques and
tactics. In warfare in general, and in the history of the
development of military science specifically, men and weapons
are two essential and inseparable elements. The capitalist
class pays more attention to weapons than to men, and regards
weapons as the decisive element and men as secondary. The
Titoist revisionists stress the decisive role of atomic weapons,
which is but re-chewing the out-moded viewpoint of the capitalist
class. The proletarian class, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist
viewpoints, believe that the masses are the creators of history
and are the source of all victories in warfare, so the prole-
tarian class regards man as the decisive element and weapons as
an important element. As Engels said, "Men, not weapons, win
victories in battles."

Because it firmly grasped that correct viewpoint, our
Party led the people's armed forces in developing all of their
latent strength, overcoming many difficulties and deficiencies
in technical equipment and material bases, and creating appro-
priate forms of warfare. That creation is essential, for "the
liberation of the proletarian class will have its military mani-
festation, and it will create its own methods of warfare." In
general, in all wars there are two basic forms of warfare:
onfence and defense. Making full use of those basic forms in
the specific circumstances of Vietnam, we came up with three
forms of warfare which were appropriate to the nature and special
characteristics of the people's war in our country, appropriate
to the strategy of long-term warfare, and appropriate to our
specific conditions with regard to our technical equipment, the
terrain, the enemy, etc. Those three forms of warfare are
guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and fixed battle warfare.
Guerrilla warfare, the basic form of warfare of our people, is based on an heroic spirit and cleverness, on using primitive weapons to defeat the modern weapons of the enemy, and on using initiative, mobility, secrecy, and surprise, to attack the enemy. That notion of fighting is very flexible, avoids the enemy's strong points, and strikes the enemy's weak points; sometimes it is concentrated, sometimes dispersed; sometimes the goal is to wear down the enemy, sometimes to annihilate him; it fights small, certain battles, advances from small battles to large ones, strikes the enemy everywhere and according to no one rule, wears down the enemy's forces and lowers their morale, and forces them to disperse their forces in order to cope with us. Mobile warfare is the form of regular units and local units in cooperation with guerrilla forces, which operate in a relatively large area without fixed front lines, with the goal of perplexing the enemy, striking the enemy when it is on the move or off-balance, concentrating superior forces, striking quickly to win quick victories, and surrounding and dividing the enemy in order to annihilate the whole enemy army. The fixed battle stage is the form of warfare in which regular and local units, in combination with guerrilla forces, defend a front or an important region, attack the enemy's outposts one-by-one, or concentrate forces to annihilate the enemy's manpower and occupy his territory.

As is the case with the forms of warfare, military tactics also have their own law of development. That law is to progress from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, in combination with fixed battle warfare, and to progress from fighting small fixed battles to fighting large fixed battles; those three forms are closely related and promote the development of one another. In the first stage of war—the stage of defense—the enemy, in order to win a quick victory, used large-scale military operations and used a combination of naval, land, air, and paratroop forces to attack and occupy; they used sweeping operations and the tactic of "small posts and small relief forces" in order to achieve pacification. For our part, at the beginning, in order to achieve a strategy of positive defense, with the goal of preserving and strengthening our forces and wearing down those of the enemy, the principal tactic was to wage guerrilla warfare and destroy roads and bridges. Advancing to the second stage, the enemy changed from the offense to pacifying the war areas, making that their central mission, and making their principal tactic selected pacification and "small posts and small relieving forces," in order to strengthen the occupied areas. They also used large clearing operations and large relief forces to destroy our reserve forces and interrupt communications among our areas. Our strategy was that of resisting and of preparing for a counter-offensive, with the principal content of extensively developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy-occupied areas,
along with creating a basis for regular warfare and promoting its development. Therefore, we came up with the tactic of "guerrilla warfare is most important, mobile warfare is secondary; endeavor to promote mobile warfare." Compared to the past, therefore, our tactics took a new step in development. In addition to guerrilla warfare there was also mobile warfare, and guerrilla warfare itself developed with extremely rich methods of fighting. The form of fixed battles also made its appearance. To progress from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare is an essential law in the stage of resistance to the enemy. Without guerrilla warfare there can be no mobile warfare. To promote mobile warfare is to create conditions for the development of guerrilla warfare, with the goal of annihilating the enemy's manpower and creating conditions favorable for the development of the war to a new stage. In this third stage the enemy became more and more on the defensive and gradually retreated. Therefore, with regard to tactics the form of "large bases," then "combinations of bases," in order to stop our advances. The enemy also organized large reserve forces, in hopes of stopping our offensive operations and progressing to the strategic offensive in order to annihilate our main forces. For our part, in order to achieve the strategic visions of the stage of counter-offense, on the major battlefronts our tactic was "mobile warfare is the main concern, guerrilla warfare is secondary; progress from small-scale fixed battles to large-scale fixed battles." On the secondary battlefronts, "guerrilla warfare is the main concern, but we must study mobile warfare and fixed battle warfare." Therefore, when we entered the stage of counter-offense, when regular warfare had become equal to guerrilla warfare or was the principal form on a certain number of battlefields, with regard to tactics the form of guerrilla warfare was still basic behind enemy lines, mobile warfare had developed to a higher level and played a direct, decisive role, and the form of fixed battles became more and more important.

With regard to the revolutionary army, correct strategy and tactics were not enough; it also needed correct combat leadership principles. This is an extremely important matter. Our combat leadership principles were those of a revolutionary war. Those principles were to develop political superiority, heroism, and cleverness, in order to defeat an enemy with strong technical equipment; to positively annihilate the enemy's manpower and preserve and strengthen our forces; to concentrate superior forces and annihilate the enemy bit by bit; to fight certain battles, be prepared, and win the very first battle; to attack resolutely and constantly; to defend positively and obstinately; to combine military matters and politics, combine combat with propaganda, etc. Those principles are combat principles and are the leadership principles of all of our army's building and fighting. They assure the winning of many battles.
Those principles gradually arose and developed during our people's stage of armed struggle. The stage of the emergence and development of these principles was bound to our Party's stage of establishment in combat leadership, and to the maturation of the political organs and organs of the various echelons in the combat leadership work.

Correct determination of our strategy throughout our resistance; clear knowledge of the developmental laws of warfare—from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare; the bringing forth of appropriate forms—guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, fixed battle warfare—and a correct understanding of their laws of development; and the bringing forth of correct principles of combat leadership—those are the accomplishments of the Party with regard to strategic leadership, military operations, and tactics, during the people's war in our country.

The doctrines of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat of Marxism-Leninism point out clearly that the State apparatus of a class is that class's tool for smashing all of its class enemies. The army is the principal tool of the State for achieving a class dictatorship in general, and for carrying out armed struggle specifically. The proletarian class, if it is to fulfill its historic destiny in the give-and-take class struggle with the enemy classes, must lead the masses in using revolutionary violence to annihilate the army of the exploiting class and replace it with a new army, a revolutionary army led by the proletarian class. Therefore, the line of building the people's armed forces has become a basic part of the military line of our Party. Lenin said that "A revolutionary army is essential, for only with force can the great historical problems be resolved, and the strong organization of the present struggle is the military struggle." From its very beginning, therefore, our Party has been concerned with building up, training, and developing the revolutionary armed forces and the people's armed forces. The stage of the emergence and development of the people's armed forces in our country is a stage of development from "have not" to "have," from small to large, and from weak to strong; it is a long stage of the revolutionary struggle and armed struggle of our people against many strong enemies.

In the course of that development, the existence of a correct line for building up the revolutionary armed forces has a very important significance with regard to the victory of the revolution. Our Party gives its utmost attention to that matter.

Our Party has always taken the position that the people's armed forces are the revolutionary armed forces of the working people, that they have a worker-peasant nature, that they fight
for the rights of the people and of the class, and that they are organized, educated, and led by the party of the working class. Such is the class nature of our revolutionary armed forces. Their common mission is the political and military mission of the revolution; their specific mission is to fight, work, and produce, making fighting their principal concern. Before the August Revolution, their mission was to protect the struggling masses and support the political struggle. With the masses, they carried out guerrilla warfare and uprisings.

Under the conditions of the August Revolution they fulfilled the mission of uniting with the political forces of the masses in carrying out general uprisings, fulfilling one of the basic missions of the revolution — to smash the administrative apparatus of the imperialists and feudalists and take political power for the working class. During the period of resistance they joined the people in resolutely resisting the French imperialists and the American interventionists, and joined the peasants in positively participating in the reduction of taxes and interest, in the achievement of land reform, in overthrowing the feudal class, in completing the democratic people's revolution, and in creating conditions for advancing our nation to socialism. The people's armed forces in our nation were formed and grew up in a backward agricultural country in which 90% of the population were peasants. Therefore, working peasants became the principal force in the revolutionary armed forces. The percentage of workers was very low. There were, in addition to the workers and peasants, other laboring elements in those armed forces, as well as revolutionary armed forces, patriotic students, and some people from the exploiting classes. They were warriors with consciousness of the rights of the people and of the proletarian class, and voluntarily took up arms to fight for independence, for land for the tillers, and for socialism. Firmly grasping these points, our Party constantly educated the cadres and soldiers politically, caused them to have class awareness, caused them to struggle resolutely to preserve the Party's proletarian class nature and ideology and positively resist the capitalist ideology and other non-proletarian ideologies. Because of that education and training, and because of a firm grasping and understanding of the Marxist-Leninist principles of building revolutionary forces, the people's armed forces constantly preserve their good qualities and traditions: "Be loyal to the Party, love the people. Fulfil all missions. Overcome all difficulties. Defeat all enemies."

The people's armed forces must come under the absolute, direct, and complete leadership of the Party. That is one of the basic principles in the building of our Party's armed forces. It is also a Marxist-Leninist principle to resolve the relationship between the Party and the army. Our Party never loses sight of that principle. The first resolution of the Party Congress,
in 1961, confirmed that "the revolutionary worker-peasant self-defense units were under the unified command of the Central Military Committee of the Communist Party," and we must always preserve the Party's right of leadership in self-defense. ... If that is to be accomplished, we must bring the most resolute Party members and League members into the self-defense units and leadership echelons." The history of more than 20 years of building and fighting of the people's armed forces in our country prove that the absolute leadership of the Party is the life, the source of strength, and the decisive element in all victories, of the people's armed forces. The Party's leadership of the people's armed forces is absolute and is not shared with any other class. The Central Executive Committee of the Party and the Party committees of the various echelons of the armed forces lead the armed forces directly and completely. That leadership includes political, military, and technical leadership, and encompasses the whole scope of activity of the revolutionary armed forces. To strengthen the Party's leadership of the people's armed forces is to strengthen the Party's political, ideological, and organizational leadership. Politically, we must ensure the people's armed forces to understand clearly the revolutionary missions, the political policies, and the military lines of the Party, and on that basis carry out all aspects of the work, ensure that the people's armed forces do not deviate from the Party line, correctly and solemnly carry out all stand and policies of the Party, and do a good job of achieving all missions entrusted to them by the Party. Ideologically, our Party makes Marxism-Leninism its leadership ideology in building the armed forces, and constantly trains the cadres and soldiers in the stand, viewpoints, and ideological methods of the working class. With regard to organization, our Party always follows its class line in the armed forces. That line is to "make the workers and peasants the backbone" in cadre work, make them the basic element in the Party echelons, and focus on workers and peasants in developing party members and Labor Youth League members; to give constant attention to perfecting the Party's organization, especially Party branches; and to solemnly carry out the regulations of the party committees and leadership branches, and stop all tendencies to deviate from the collective way of doing things.

Our Party leads the armed forces in carrying out all revolutionary missions by educating and organizing the masses. Therefore, the political work is given full attention in the armed forces; this is also one of the basic principles in the building of the people's armed forces of our Party. The essence of the political work is Party work and its mass agitation within the revolutionary armed forces, for "in all wars, ultimate victory is decided by the spirit of the masses who spill their blood on the battlefields." The principal content of the
political work in the people's armed forces is to make political education and ideological leadership the crux in constantly increasing the national consciousness and class consciousness of cadres and soldiers, ensuring the solemn and voluntary carrying out of the lines and revolutionary mission of the Party, strengthening unity and unanimity within the army and between the army and the people, increase the spirit of international proletarian unity, hold high democracy and discipline, sharpen the spirit of revolutionary vigilence, and cause the armed forces to always be prepared to fight and fulfil all combat missions entrusted to them from above.

The political work is the soul of the people's armed forces, and is carried out by the masses under the leadership of the political work organs. The mass line, therefore, is also the basic line for carrying out the political work within the revolutionary armed forces. Because it has followed that line, the political work in our revolutionary armed forces has many rich forms and a very profound content, and has become a sharp weapon of our army in combat, work, and study.

If the people's armed forces are to become strong, they must, in addition to constantly forging their nature and tradition, strengthening the absolute, direct, and complete leadership of the Party, and extensively carrying out the political work among the masses, positively build ranks of outstanding cadres who are always loyal to the Party and the army. Therefore the "positive building of ranks of outstanding cadres, in accordance with the line of making workers and peasants the backbone," has become a principle of building the people's armed forces of our Party. That line of building ranks of strong cadres, and the line of making workers and peasants the backbone, are the class lines of the Party in the cadre work. The line of making workers and peasants the backbone means that we must endeavor to create superior worker-peasant elements, develop their good points and overcome their deficiencies, and cause them to be more stable politically and to have knowledge of military science; and we must endeavor to train cadres who do not belong to the worker-peasant element, training them especially in stands, viewpoints, ideology, and methods, and making them good cadres in the Party work within the army. Actualities have proved that the above-mentioned line is entirely correct and appropriate to the circumstances of our nation. Because it firmly grasped and clearly understood that line the Party has during the past 20 years created many cadres in the people's armed forces who have definite military and specialized skills, who are absolutely loyal to the revolutionary undertaking of the Party, and who resolutely fulfil all missions assigned to them by the Party. It is very clear that the positive building of an army of cadres in accordance with the line of making workers and peasants the
backbone has created a source of strength for the people's armed forces, and has led these forces to the winning of ever-greater victories.

If we are really to wage people's war, and assure that the masses of people can participate in it directly, we must arm all the people. If we are to arm all the people, we must have appropriate means of organizing armed forces. In the building of armed forces our Party has organized three kinds of troops: guerrillas, regional troops, and regular troops. The guerrillas are the vast, semi-armed force of the people and are made up principally of working peasants, who do not abandon production. In the enemy's rear areas they have the missions of fighting the bandits and preserving the villages, and cooperating with the regional and regular units. In the free area, they are the principal tool of the people's administration at the local level, and preserve local order and security. They form an enormous strategic force, and are the liveliest picture of our Party's policy of arming all the people. The regional units are the concentrated units of the provinces and districts, and do not engage in production. They have the mission of operating within the region, guiding the guerrillas, and cooperating with the regular units. They are the principal force for initiating and promoting guerrilla warfare in the localities, and are a supplementary source for the regular units. The regular troops consist of various concentrated units relatively united in organization and equipped relatively well. Their principal mission is to wage regular warfare. But when necessary they disperse into small units to lead the regional troops and the guerrillas, and promote guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. They are usually the mobile strategic force, and are the principal force for fulfilling the strategic missions on certain battlefields. Their activity is usually closely coordinated with that of the regional troops and guerrilla forces. Building three kinds of troops is the form of organizing armed forces which is the most appropriate for achieving people's war. And only in the people's war led by the Party of the working class can that form develop all its positive capabilities, assure the close unity of guerrilla warfare and regular warfare, and assure that our regular troops are superior to the enemy with regard to mobile strategic forces on certain battlefields.

The people's armed forces of our Party were formed and grew up during the stage of revolutionary struggle of the people of a colonial, semi-feudal, backward agricultural country. On the basis of that situation our Party correctly resolved organizational problems and those related to the building of the material and technical bases of the armed forces. With regard to organization, our Party affirmed that the organization of
our army had to meet the needs of actual combat, that it had to be appropriate to the strategical and tactical policies of each stage of the war, and that equipping and supplying capabilities had to be based on the people's economy and on the specific conditions of the war in our country. When resolving the organization of our army, the Party relied on the positive revolutionary spirit and the creativity of the cadres and soldiers, in order to assure that the combat units could become strong forces, which could, although they were short on equipment, go rapidly to anywhere they were needed. To progress from dispersion to concentration, and from small concentration to large concentration, to be extremely mobile and flexible, and to closely unite dispersion and concentration, are also organizational methods of the people's armed forces in the people's war in our country. Building material and technical bases is a very important mission in the work of building the people's armed forces. In general, the material and technical bases of the people's armed forces consist of two principal parts: weapons and ammunition, and the needs of assuring the army's rear-area work. The stage of building our armed forces is a stage of development from the simple to the complex, and is a stage of difficult struggle. In that stage, our Party must gradually affirm correct principles. In order to resolve the matter of equipping our forces with weapons and ammunition, we must make the front lines our principal source of supply; we must kill the enemies with their own weapons, fight with what we have, and make full use of every kind of weapon we have to fight the enemy. In order to resolve the army's rear-area problems we must rely principally on the people. Our Party has constantly taught the people's armed forces to develop their spiritual strength, strengthen their revolutionary spirit and their spirit of self-reliance, and use the spiritual to overcome difficulties in the material. Our Party has also given its utmost attention to mobilizing and organizing the masses to assure the above-mentioned matters.

Armed forces are built up principally to fight. If we are to fight victoriously, we must strengthen our fighting capacity; we must forge for the armed forces strategies and tactics, tactical methods, command practices, fighting practices, and a spirit of always being prepared to fight. We must, therefore, give our utmost attention to the training of troops. The goal of training is fighting, so it must be appropriate to the needs of the combat missions. If that goal is to be attained, the contents of training must be in accordance with the military line of the Party and have correct training slogans. Our Party has clearly confirmed that training must be close to the actualities of combat; the way we fight, we should also train: we should fight with what equipment we have; where we fight we should also train; we should fight while studying; and we should study
between battles or operations. With regard to training methods, we must firmly grasp the principles of uniting theory and reality, uniting leadership with the masses, developing military democracy, and correctly following the mass line. With regard to the training mission we must make the training of cadres the central concern, perfect the work in the military schools, improve methods of instruction and study, and constantly improve the contents of training. Those are basic matters in the leadership principles of training the people's armed forces during the period of resistance.

The above are some of the basic principles of the building of the people's armed forces of our Party. Those principles have been tested in actual combat, are perfected more and more every day, and have assured and are assuring that our people's armed forces defeat all aggressors.

People's war, the strategy and tactics of people's war, and the people's armed forces are the basic contents of our party's military line in the period of resistance. In comparison with the period prior to the August Revolution, the period of resistance is a very long stage of development. Since the restoration of peace our Party has constantly caused that military line to be fully understood in the building of socialism in the north and in the struggle to unify the homeland, and in the building of a modern, regular revolutionary army. If the American imperialists and their lackeys recklessly endeavor to wage aggressive war on the North of our country, the nature of the warfare we will use to resist that aggression will be that of people's war; our strategy and tactics will be those of people's war under modern conditions. The balance of forces between us and the enemy under the conditions of day differs from that of the past. But we will always rely on our absolute political and spiritual superiority in order to defeat the enemy.

Now, more than ever, we must endeavor to study the precious experiences of the emergence and development of the Party's military line. We must positively combine economic construction with the strengthening of national defense, strengthen the North in all ways, always hold high our spirit of vigilance, and mobilize and organize the masses to be prepared to fight and resolutely defeat every destructive, belligerent, and aggressive plot and act of the American imperialists and their lackeys.

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