

Biography
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1. General Nguyen Chi Thanh on the South's Ideological Task *

The celebrated victories by the armed forces and people of our South during the recent dry season were the results of widespread revolutionary activities of fourteen million Southern compatriots who had a high sense of vigilance, a high level of organization, and a spirit of strict political discipline. Without these factors, we would have been unable to win any victory, faced with an enemy who was as cruel and well-armed as the Americans. Our Southern armed forces and people had these traits because they had a firm unanimity in thought and action—a unanimity which was based on a clear awareness of the new situation and tasks of the revolution under the leadership of the correct political line of the NFLSV [National Liberation Front of South Vietnam]. This great unanimity in thought and action could not have been achieved fortuitously and easily. It was achieved only after a long period of education and training—education and training which enabled all our people and troops to acquire a staunch revolutionary stand and a firm determination to fight and defeat the Americans—and by applying scientific ideological methods to concretely analyze the concrete situation, find correct solutions to military and political problems, lead the revolution to progress, and achieve new victories under new strategic circumstances.

In 1965, owing to the defeat of his “special war,” the enemy shifted to regional war. As for our side, after defeating the “special war,” we shifted to fulfilling the task of defeating the enemy’s regional war, liberating the South, and protecting the North. These changes of a strategic character made us happy and enthusiastic. At the same time, they brought forth many new problems and required all of us—no matter what our position—to ponder these problems.

First of all, these reflections were focused on helping our troops and people acquire a staunch stand and find a correct ideological method of assessing the balance between our force and that of the enemy and undertake very revolutionary, and at the same time very creative, military and political actions—that is, actions that were consistent with our political and military line and at

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the same time with the new real situation. In other words, at that time our troops and people endeavored to make their thoughts catch up with and surpass to some extent the real objective situation. They did so because our Southern people were of the opinion that without correct thought, there could not be correct action. The above-mentioned acquisition of a correct stand and ideological method is necessary, very necessary, to the preparation of thoughts and consciousness when one enters a new phase of the revolution, of the revolutionary war. It is necessary to have a sharp ideological weapon in order to have a sharp steel weapon to defeat the enemy. The Southern people are very heroic. They have fought the French for nine years and the Americans and their lackeys for eleven years, with extraordinary endurance, resolution, and courage. They have many experiences in military as well as political struggle. That is why our Southern people have been revolutionized to a high degree, especially in their determination to oppose imperialism. The heroic tradition of a nation that has a glorious revolutionary history, plus the strong and deep assimilation of progressive ideas and a thoroughly revolutionary stand, has created a revolutionary ideological system with a great vitality for our people. That is why the Southern compatriots' patriotism, hatred for the enemy, spirit of national solidarity, internationalist spirit, anti-imperialist spirit, democratic spirit, and so forth, have attained a highly distilled form which in itself has a lasting and relentless power because it has been built on the most revolutionary and progressive ideological stand and viewpoints of the era. Moreover, the important fact that half of our country has achieved independence and is building socialism has exerted a great effect upon the ideological life of the Southern people, created a new vitality which had never before existed, and stimulated the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Southern compatriots.

Especially during the past eleven years, while half of the country was independent, the South was trampled by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. Having to endure many sacrifices, sufferings, and deaths under the very cruel regime of the Americans and their lackeys, our Southern compatriots rose up and resolutely struggled against an enemy who was much stronger than they. In this struggle, the Southern people won victory after victory. Twice they won victories of a historic character: They were the "general uprising" victory, which smashed the foundation of the U.S.-Diemist dictatorial fascist regime, and the victory over the Americans' "special war."

That is why toward mid-1965, faced with a new strategic situation, the Southern people, right at the outset, manifested their determination, calmness, combat readiness, and confidence that they would beat the victors. These were the very fundamental and very important moral advantages for the people and the liberation armed forces when the Southern revolution shifted to a new phase. And those moral advantages were beautifully associated with a strategic and political advantage—an association that has created for us many objectively advantageous conditions, thanks to which we have been able to undertake the ideological tasks among ourselves.

When the U.S. imperialists introduced massive numbers of troops into South Vietnam to save the puppet troops and authorities, the NFLSV launched in time a deep and wide political and ideological mobilization campaign among the people and the liberation armed forces, and raised high the "determination to

defeat the U.S. aggressors" banner so that the people and liberation armed forces could see and follow it and devote all their talents, strength, and intelligence to overthrowing the enemy in order to liberate the South, protect the North, and advance toward national unification at any cost. From this political and ideological mobilization campaign radiated a great strength, a martial revolutionary spirit, and a calm, clear-sighted, and wise common intelligence, which enabled the people and liberation armed forces in the South to win great victories during the historic dry season.

However, according to the NFLSV Central Committee's observations, the ideological evolution inside people's organizations, liberation armed forces, and people in the South was complex, and the solving of ideological problems was not easy. At that time, from the enemy's side appeared a number of new factors that put to the test the ideological stand of the Southern troops and people, such as: [President] Johnson's policy of holding a stick in one hand and a carrot in the other; repeated air strikes by the U.S. imperialists against North Vietnam; large-scale use of U.S. ground forces, air force, and other weapons in the aggressive war against South Vietnam, and so forth. These factors required that our troops and people in the South reassess their ideological stand, raise and analyze a number of problems regarding political responsibility, the balance of forces, the application of the revolutionary line, revolutionary organization, political and military struggle methods, and so forth, in order to assert their staunch stand—the stand underlying all problems. It is necessary to have a staunch revolutionary stand in order to have revolutionary courage and consequently to engage in resolute and creative revolutionary activities. To put it more simply, to fight and defeat the enemy one must have high courage, a strong will, and great patience.

Early in 1965, when the U.S. buildup started, the NFLSV undertook the ideological task among the people and the liberation armed forces on a permanent basis and kept a firm hold on ideological evolution. Thus, the Front set forth the right direction for the ideological task, which was: to understand the revolutionary line fully, resolutely and thoroughly strengthen the revolutionary stand, focus efforts on eliminating rightist conservative thoughts and the tendency to overestimate the enemy and underestimate ourselves, strengthen solidarity and vigilance, and continuously strengthen the determination to defeat the enemy and achieve victories for ourselves.

Toward mid-1965, after reviewing the ideological situation of the people and the liberation armed forces, after analyzing the new situation, and after setting forth new tasks, the NFLSV Central Committee once more asserted that this basic direction of the ideological task was correct and suitable, and that this direction must be followed more strictly than ever. The Front correctly foresaw that in a situation in which the enemy was suffering heavy defeats and we were achieving great victories during the "special war," but in which the enemy forces were increased by tens of thousands of men, there might appear in our ranks at a certain moment and in a certain area, in addition to the correct ideological stand and methods, some ideological wavering caused by the U.S. military buildup. There might appear a mechanical ideological method as a result of an incorrect analysis of the situation.

The Front asserted that the positive aspect of the thoughts of the people and liberation armed forces is very basic and paramount. That is why, faced with the enemy's new challenge, the Front had great confidence in the courage and creativeness of the people, the liberation armed forces, and the cadres in South Vietnam. But at the same time, the Front maintained that on the other hand it was necessary to take precautionary measures against the manifestation of a number of erroneous thoughts that might occur, such as an inferiority complex, underestimating our revolutionary capacity and overestimating the enemy's revolutionary capacity, rightist conservative thoughts, fear of protracted and arduous tasks, a desire to stop when the revolution requires that one continue to progress, overcoming all difficulties in order to advance, and so forth. These negative manifestations were checked and overcome in time; otherwise, they would not only have exerted a bad effect upon a number of concrete matters of the revolution, but they might also have affected to a certain extent the revolutionary line, a number of basic viewpoints of the revolution, and internal unity and unity of mind and action, and thereby weakened the revolution and provided the enemy with a foothold for effective psychological warfare. Throughout the dry season the Front carried out the political and ideological tasks very satisfactorily. That is a success of great significance in view of the fact that starting with the successful performance of the political and ideological tasks within the Front's internal ranks, the Southern people and liberation armed forces won great victories on the battlefield. Experience has clearly shown that in the face of the new situation and revolutionary tasks, it is necessary for the leadership to present the task of carrying out political, analytical, and ideological preparations in a timely and active way, and with a profound and correct content, and to strive to win success in the very first battle in order to gain the impetus for a forward advance. Only if this preparatory work is presented as the central task can many other tasks be carried out satisfactorily. In the dry season the Liberation Front set forth three great requirements: not to fall into an impasse ideologically, not to fall into an impasse strategically and tactically, and not to fall into an impasse organizationally. Thus, in the race of the great changes in the situation, the Front identified and in time settled the new problems, while avoiding wavering, especially ideological wavering; avoiding strategic, tactical, and organizational indecision; absolutely ensuring that the people and the liberation armed forces would move forward and continue to fight and win, and that the existing impetus was not lost but a new and more powerful impetus was created for the struggle movement.

In 1961, when the command of [U.S. General Paul] Harkins was established in Saigon, we also carried out political and ideological work very satisfactorily among our internal ranks and the masses. Yet at the beginning, the work had been carried out indecisively for a month or two before the impetus was gained. That was an undesirable thing, from which our brothers had learned a lesson, and they were therefore able to avoid it during the dry season.

In the dry season, to facilitate memorizing, the Front set forth a formula for their lower-rank brothers to grasp so they could satisfactorily carry out political and ideological work. This formula was: a firm ideological and revolutionary stand and a high determination, plus the correct evaluation of the comparative balance of forces, equal success. And that success had to be demonstrated

concretely on the battlefield by a high tide of political and military proselyting effort that scored more numerous, greater, and more outstanding achievements than those of any previous dry season. Our brothers over there have striven to apply a historical materialistic as well as a dialectical materialistic standpoint, to understand and apply the Front's lines thoroughly, to analyze the actual situation accurately, and to find correct solutions for problems arising from the realities of the revolutionary war. With a serious attitude, they have sought to understand the situation in order to modify it and to advance the revolution; they have studied the lines and policies in order to carry them out better; they have sought to realize favorable conditions in order to develop them; they have sought to recognize difficulties in order to overcome them positively and not to complain about them with mawkish sentimentality; and they have sought to recognize the strong points of the enemy in order to cope with these strong points and limit them, rather than remain inept and subdued. In short, they have thought and acted with a very high sense of revolutionary responsibility.

At that time, if anyone among them lacked a sense of revolutionary responsibility, a lack that usually was caused by a feeble revolutionary determination and struggle spirit, he would be inclined to use empty, illogical arguments; he would refuse to study theories and realities carefully in order to find solutions to problems; he usually would make vague statements to cause others to entertain the same ideas as he; he would point to difficulties, not to overcome them, and would point to the enemy strength, not to cope with it, but to threaten others, thus intentionally or unintentionally spreading pessimism; he would try to arouse nonrevolutionary feelings, which would at the least make others perplexed and less determined to surmount difficulties and hardships and continue to make sacrifices in order to achieve success at any cost. Moreover, he would cite problems without offering solutions and he would cite profuse examples [?from] here and there to demonstrate vaguely that "we can be successful," but would accompany all this with a lot of "but's" – thus making it impossible to understand what he meant and what his purpose was in speaking this way. Our brothers have been able to avoid these errors, which otherwise would have exercised a negative effect and prevented people from thoroughly understanding the steadfastness of the political line and revolutionary standpoint as well as such fundamental viewpoints as the class viewpoint, the mass viewpoint, the people's war viewpoints, the view on violence, the view on an uninterrupted revolution, the view on the need to rely principally on one's own strength, and so forth. These erroneous trends of thought would have prevented one from clearly realizing the rule of revolutionary development, the strength of vanguard theories and a correct political and military line, and the immense strength and limitless skills and abilities of the masses of people and the collectivity. These erroneous thoughts would have made people emphasize enemy strength while making light of enemy weakness, and stress our weak points and difficulties while speaking of our strong points in a lukewarm tone.

The NFLSV not only has correctly propounded the ideological problems requiring solution but also has set forth correct methods—such as those involving the coordination of theories with practice versus empty reasoning; the avoidance

of ungrounded accusations but the use of arguments based on real facts to back explanations, persuasion, and (ideological-ed.) struggle; the avoidance of crudeness and arrogance and the development of democratic discussion, persuasion, criticism, and self-criticism made in a serious, tactful, definite, and incisive manner; the avoidance of a one-way course, but rather the praise and strong development of positive aspects, coupled with thorough criticism of negative aspects, so as to clarify everybody's thought, to achieve greater internal solidarity, to instill in everybody a new enthusiasm, and to heighten their self-confidence, self-respect, and righteous self-pride. In addition, the solution of problems concerning consciousness and thought must not be detached from the methods of thought.

The revolution in the Southern region of our country has an immense vitality for many reasons, a very important one being the fact that the South Vietnamese people have a vanguard theory as a guideline. This theory accurately reflects the requirements of social evolution and serves as a compass for the road followed by the armed forces and people in the South. The Southern people have achieved success precisely because they have given this theory a prominent and well-deserved place, and because they have considered it their duty to employ fully the mobilizing, organizing, and guiding power of this theory. From our viewpoint, evaluating and comparing the enemy's strength and ours, we see that the enemy does not possess this power and that we alone have it. If anyone of us neglects this point in comparing the two sides' strength, he will ignore a huge power of ours, and this will make his subsequent calculations erroneous. The revolutionary masters said: without a revolutionary theory, there will be no revolutionary movement, and once having permeated the masses, the vanguard theory and political line of a vanguard class will turn out to be a vast material force. Therefore, during a revolutionary war, the revolutionary theory and line in themselves contain an immense potential for an uninterrupted supply to the revolutionary war of the material forces necessary to overthrow the material forces of the adversary. Therefore, anyone who does not base himself on this standpoint in evaluating and comparing our forces and those of the enemy in the South will either shrink at or be confused by difficulties or make a myth of revolutionary success. He cannot understand that this success is achieved by the creative struggle achievements of the masses of people that stem from a vanguard theory and a political line that contain in themselves a peerless thought.

For example, we could not have created a new material force to win great success in the dry season had we not relied on our vanguard theory and political line to correctly gauge that success in defeating the "special war" would be a leap forward that would place us in a new strategic position, and would create for us new possibilities, including material ones, that should be immediately mobilized and exploited to defeat the enemy and develop our forces. In this connection, we find that the U.S. imperialists are stronger than we in certain respects, but they absolutely do not have any peerless strength, while we are the only ones who do have a peerless strength — that is, our vanguard theory and system of thought. The armed forces and people in the Southern region of our country took hold of the rule of progressive and leap-forward development in the evolution of things when they evaluated and compared the enemy's strength

and ours in the South in 1965. Bringing dialectics into play, our brothers then assessed things as follows: because of his failure in the "special war," the adversary shifted to the regional war—this being essentially a leap forward in the enemy's passiveness in matters of policy and strategy, although he had multiplied his forces. The fact that we have defeated the enemy in his "special war" is in essence a leap forward for the revolution and the people's war in the South. It has led our people's war to a higher state, both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a result, [we must strive to develop] many new factors and capabilities firmly, improve them in time, and exploit them extensively in order to stimulate and develop the revolutionary war.

Thanks to the method by which they view things, during the dry season our Southern brothers were able to draw the following practical conclusions:

"If we looked only at the quantity of the enemy's strength—which previously amounted to nearly 500,000 puppet troops, 30,000 U.S. advisers, and ten strategic and mobile battalions, and which today amounts to 200,000 U.S. troops and, together with the puppet and satellite troops, to about 700,000 men, including probably about forty strategic and mobile battalions—indeed the comparative balance of forces has clearly changed in favor of the enemy. Yet that was an evaluation made according to formalistic logic, because according to the dialectical mode of viewing things, the strengthening of U.S. forces and the change of the comparative balance of forces in favor of the Americans are two different matters, not just one. It is a fact that the enemy has considerably increased his troop strength, but our strategic position has been much better than before, the initiative on the battlefield is already ours, our [words indistinct] have been much stronger than before, and the enemy's strategic position has become much weaker than before. The enemy's forces have considerably increased, but a large part of these forces has to fill the gaps created by the defeat of his 'special war.'"

"The enemy's policies and strategies are and will be plagued by grave contradictions and so forth. Therefore, the enemy does not have the conditions and basic factors with which to alter the situation. As for us, we are in a position to maintain firmly and take one step further our initiative on the battlefield. We, and only we, are in a position to continue to change the comparative balance of forces to our advantage and to the enemy's disadvantage. Therefore we are in a position to smash the enemy's dry-season counteroffensive, to win successes with a militant spirit and with the determination to attack the enemy continuously, although our revolutionary war still has to undergo many difficulties and hardships, and so forth."

Proceeding from the correct method by which they viewed the comparative balance of forces, our Southern brothers were able to draw correct and practical conclusions. Therefore, they took effective measures to implement these conclusions and thereby won glorious successes.

In a situation where the U.S. forces increase abruptly, as far as the method of viewing things is concerned, beside the correct ideas there may appear erroneous

tendencies. First, one may have a conservative spirit and fail to identify and discover the new factors. As a result, one would devote himself to working in accordance with the "old customs." Second, one may be incapable of analyzing the new concrete situation so as to formulate correct and creative opinions. As a result, one turns his attention to looking for the new factors in the formulas that exist in books, and mechanically copying one's past experiences or the experiences of foreign countries, and then applying to the live revolutionary realities a "forced love," in accordance with a dogmatic tendency. For instance, on learning that the enemy has just increased his troop strength, and without conducting a prior inquiry and studying the practical situation, one hastily jumps to such conclusions as: how many phases our revolutionary war has and which phase we are in; to annihilate one puppet battalion, we must have a troop superiority of two to one, and therefore, to fight and annihilate one American battalion—which is better equipped, which has a troop strength that is double that of a puppet battalion, and whose American officers are better than puppet officers—we must have a superiority in strength of at least seven to one or nine to one, and so forth. In fact, this is but a kind of "divination," not a scientific calculation, and usually the "diviners" are inclined to take regressive steps.

Therefore, in exerting leadership over the war in any situation, especially at times when the situation has just changed or changed abruptly, it is necessary simultaneously to pay great attention to reasoning and experiences and to fully base oneself upon the realities. To repeat exactly what belongs to history in the face of a new reality is adventurism.

Let us cite another example: it would be impossible for one to evaluate correctly the military capability of friend and foe if one failed to fully see the important effect of our Southern people's political struggle. Thus, it is possible that because of a method of viewing things that is detached from reality one would pose and settle in an old-fashioned manner the question of relations between the delta and the mountainous region and between the rural areas and the cities in the Southern revolutionary war. To cite still another example: it is impossible to evaluate the combat capability of a U.S. infantry division in abstract terms, because an abstract evaluation can only lead to a vague or erroneous conclusion. On the contrary, it is necessary to evaluate it in a very concrete manner; that is, it is necessary to place it in a concrete situation, in concrete locations, at concrete times, and in close contact with a concrete adversary. Speaking in terms of simple theory, a U.S. infantry division usually consists of about 15,000 troops and can annihilate one regiment of the adversary in one battle. Yet why is it that in the Southern part of our country throughout the last dry season, although Americans had nearly six divisions and a very strong air force, they could not completely annihilate one company of the liberation armed forces; and why is it, on the contrary, that tens of U.S. battalions were completely annihilated by the liberation armed forces? How could that be?

If one merely counted the number of men and weapons of a U.S. division, one would not be able to evaluate its combat capability correctly, unless one made such an evaluation for parade purposes. Fighting is a different thing. In combat, the actual combat capability of an army depends on many factors. In the Southern part of our country, because it jumped into the South in a losing

position, the U.S. expeditionary army--although we do not underestimate it--has been affected by a great many negative factors, to such an extent that even the U.S. strategists themselves could not anticipate the fact that from the theoretical capability of nearly six mobile divisions to the actual capability [words indistinct] of these divisions on the Southern battlefield during the last dry season there was so great a distance!

Therefore, to base oneself upon the realities is a necessary attitude for a leader. If one did not respect the realities one would deprive oneself of one's creative capability and would render oneself "old-fashioned." Naturally, to respect the realities does not mean to worship them, but to use reasoning, materialist dialectics and historical dialectics, and the revolutionary line to analyze the real situation and try to understand the rule governing the objective development of things, in order to gain control of the realities, to organize the masses for action, and to make the revolutionary movement advance steadfastly and rapidly. That is the significance of reasoning combined with reality, of reasoning guiding practice and practice supplementing reasoning, and of leadership associated with the masses. That is the significance of the "if there is no revolutionary reasoning there will be no revolutionary movement" principle, and of the viewpoint that the masses of the people create history. Therefore, dialectics, concretely the reality viewpoint, has been a key enabling our Southern armed forces and people to solve a considerable number of problems so as to move forward in a complex situation and to solve correctly and creatively the Southern revolution's problems.

Another important point is the fact that our brothers applied the dialectical concept of contradictions to discover the enemy's contradictions, to evaluate the effect of these contradictions on the battlefield, and to sharpen these contradictions in order to weaken the enemy. We are not going to analyze the whole problem of the enemy's contradictions, but we will only point to certain facts, especially military ones, to demonstrate the need for our brothers to apply dialectics.

It would be impossible to understand why the United States and its henchmen, though having as many as 700,000 troops, were defeated by the armed forces and people in the South during the dry season if we did not see clearly that the U.S. military activities on the Southern battlefield were fraught with contradictions bearing on their strategy, tactics, and combat organization and command, which thus threw the Americans and their henchmen into deep confusion. There are two reasons for their confusion: first, they themselves were already very confused; second, their adversary, the Southern armed forces and people, knew how to continuously sharpen their contradictions, thereby making them more confused.

First of all, the U.S. military forces and activities in the South are directed by its political line, about which there are three important and noteworthy points: first, it is unjust; second, the Americans had experienced bitter failure twice in the past ten years;* and, third, they do not believe now, and cannot believe, that they can get the better of us militarily. Thus, naturally, the enemy's strategy has inevitably been passive for three reasons: First, the Americans had to introduce

*Thanh is referring here to the failure of the Diem regime and of the "special-war" strategy.

their army into the Southern battlefield, an act which they previously regarded as inadvisable, which they wanted to avoid, but which they had to engage in reluctantly; second, the U.S. Army plunged into the South at a time when the American-directed puppet armed forces and administration had suffered heavy defeats and were wretched, while their adversary was much stronger than before, both militarily and politically; and third, when the U.S. Army came to the South, they wanted, by this means or another, to fight and settle the war quickly. Yet they failed, and therefore had to prolong the war. What contradictions!

As a result, there were many contradictions in U.S. tactics. For instance, while the Americans were fighting on the ground they had to rely on their air force to settle the war. If they wanted to develop the effect of the air force there should have been clear battlefronts and targets. Yet there was no front, and the targets were scattered and unclear. Thus if the air force's theoretical effect were ten, in actual combat this effect would remain only one. The Americans relied on artillery and mechanized equipment while their army had to perform assault tasks. If the Americans relied on army troops whose combat morale was low, how could these troops launch strong assaults, encircle tightly, divide rapidly the forces of the adversary, pursue actively the forces of the adversary, fight the battle rapidly and neatly in order to annihilate the adversary, and so forth? What contradictions!

Consequently, the results of the combat performance of 225,000 American troops during the last dry season were really tragic. These results made both Washington and Saigon [word indistinct], no matter how optimistic they pretended to be and regardless of what they felt in their hearts. The enemy's defeats during the last dry season were the consequences of a reactionary policy and an erroneous strategy. One could explain the Americans' heavy strategic defeats only when one saw all the contradictions that were tearing at one another in the Americans' political line and strategy, and that are making the Americans undergo an acute, grave, and unending crisis. And the fate of the Americans' neocolonialism in the South has been determined by its own nature.

In their sacred anti-U.S. and for-national-salvation resistance war, the Southern people and liberation armed forces have daily and hourly scored heroic feats, about which a great many more brilliant and eternal lines will be recorded in the history of our people, and perhaps also in the history of the world revolution. In the future, our grandchildren will enthusiastically and passionately relate stories about their fathers and brothers fighting the Americans for national salvation, just as they relate mythological stories, such as "Thach Sanh killing the big eagle to save the princess," and so forth.

However, as Lenin said: "In history as well as in nature, there has never been a miracle, but each sudden turn of history and each revolution manifests a very rich content and develops the coordination of the various forms of struggle in a very unexpected and unique manner, and the relations between the confronting forces make many things seem to be strange to an ordinary mind." (Lenin, *Letters from Afar*, Vietnamese version, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, Vol. I-II, p. 548.) In the last analysis, it is not surprising to note that in the recent past the Americans were defeated and we were victorious, and in the days ahead the Americans will continue to be defeated and we will continue to be

victorious. Our people are not too numerous and our territory is not too large, yet our Southern compatriots have defeated the U.S. aggressors in the first phases and are absolutely confident that they will win total victory.

Why? Because we are led by a correct political and military line. Moreover, we have a firm ideological stand and correct ideological methods. Thus, our people become more numerous, our territory becomes large, our revolutionary armed forces become much stronger, and so forth. The enemy cannot resist the staunchly and thoroughly revolutionary stand of our people. He cannot oppose the heroic bravery of our nation. Let us strike at the U.S. aggressors so that they can understand that they do not have the basic prerequisites for victory. They face only defeat, complete defeat. Our entire Vietnam is standing before a historic opportunity that occurs only once in a thousand years! Our Southern people and liberation troops are being fired with the spirit of victory! Let us resolutely fight and defeat the enemy! Eternal glory belongs to our heroic nation and heroic armed forces!