## AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAM (EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES)

(Cost in dollars)

[Aircraft: None except 3 each C-130A which were exchanged on a 1 for 1 basis (action completed in August 1973) to provide the VNAF with a standard configured fleet of C-130A’s]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft, support, equipment/</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missile equipment/spares</td>
<td>2,779</td>
<td>421,057</td>
<td>21,170</td>
<td>39,536</td>
<td>12,280</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>8,285</td>
<td>403,128</td>
<td>6,148,178</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat vehicles</td>
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<td>361,167</td>
<td>1,492,007</td>
<td>133,451</td>
<td>1,446,720</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
<td>104,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon equipment, equipment/</td>
<td>1,989,272</td>
<td>765,779</td>
<td>1,247,660</td>
<td>171,833</td>
<td>197,152</td>
<td>200,035</td>
<td>222,060</td>
<td>35,457</td>
<td>111,497</td>
<td>51,196</td>
<td>148,675</td>
<td>60,649</td>
<td>5,211,798</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spares</td>
<td>2,900,762</td>
<td>5,712,007</td>
<td>13,188,529</td>
<td>6,332,209</td>
<td>16,699,016</td>
<td>2,260,116</td>
<td>6,398,044</td>
<td>672,800</td>
<td>344,194</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>8,540,122</td>
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<td>63,275,248</td>
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<td>4,534,429</td>
<td>2,904,778</td>
<td>2,504,939</td>
<td>7,382,048</td>
<td>393,480</td>
<td>550,426</td>
<td>671,040</td>
<td>1,022,531</td>
<td>401,323</td>
<td>686,317</td>
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<td>4,168,753</td>
<td>5,365,031</td>
<td>1,482,912</td>
<td>1,590,714</td>
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<td>825,085</td>
<td>661,620</td>
<td>669,483</td>
<td>610,213</td>
<td>336,765</td>
<td>21,068,229</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplies and consumables</td>
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<td>675,617</td>
<td>4,980,701</td>
<td>4,327,545</td>
<td>895,012</td>
<td>319,241</td>
<td>676,393</td>
<td>745,520</td>
<td>10,924,033</td>
<td>1,657,878</td>
<td>451,718</td>
<td>1,403,069</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,719,546</td>
<td>533,576</td>
<td>8,281,715</td>
<td>2,399,556</td>
<td>2,074,555</td>
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<td>761,934</td>
<td>960,903</td>
<td>370,555</td>
<td>18,650,059</td>
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</table>

### Operation (O1)

| Repair and overhaul (R1)    | 38,015,432 | 40,691,088 | 55,385,988 | 32,744,870 | 56,631,575 | 7,998,028 | 18,277,361 | 11,879,059 | 18,380,387 | 6,849,154 | 17,978,764 | 9,230,751 | 310,202,227 |

### Totals

|                | 38,015,432 | 40,691,088 | 55,385,988 | 32,744,870 | 56,631,575 | 7,998,028 | 18,277,361 | 11,879,059 | 18,380,387 | 6,849,154 | 17,978,764 | 9,230,751 | 310,202,227 |
**Question:** Is there any limitation to the amount of equipment that is in excess to U.S. forces' needs and that can be provided to South Vietnam? If so, please explain the limitation.

**Answer:** There is no current limitation placed on the amount of equipment that can be provided to South Vietnam that is excess to the needs of U.S. forces provided such excess conforms to the cease-fire agreement and there is a valid requirement. However, section 6 of Public Law 89-672, as amended, establishes an excess limitation of $150 million which may be furnished in fiscal year 1974 and succeeding fiscal years to all countries and international organizations before being charged against funds appropriated under part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, provided such excess is generated outside the United States. Excesses provided above the $150 million exemption in any fiscal year and excesses generated within the United States and furnished to foreign countries and international organizations will be charged against funds appropriated for military assistance and the required amount of those funds returned to the U.S. Treasury.

**Question:** For the record, explain what Southeast Asian incremental costs are?

**Answer:** Incremental war costs figures reflect the estimated costs being incurred over and above the normal peacetime operating costs of the baseline force. Incremental costs cover manpower added for the war—military and civilian, deployed and backup—and the cost of equipment attrition, munitions, supplies, transportation, and other support over and above what would be required for the baseline force at peacetime rates. All MASF costs are reflected as incremental costs.

These costs, as noted, are estimates to begin with. They include not only costs incurred in the theater but a share of pipeline costs as well, including supplies, maintenance, manpower, and other support provided in the CONUS. These costs have not been prepared on the basis of annual estimates. They have not been developed monthly or quarterly, and indeed this would be extremely difficult if not impossible: instead, as U.S. forces are concerned, costs are not estimated separately by country, nor have the estimates been broken down as between the theater, the pipeline, and the CONUS itself.

**Question:** Please provide a detailed breakout of Southeast Asian incremental costs by year from fiscal year 1966 through fiscal year 1974. Include budget authority, outlays, and function.

The following table presents the Southeast Asia Incremental Costs for Fiscal Years 1966 to 1974:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Military personnel</th>
<th>O. &amp; M</th>
<th>Procurement</th>
<th>R&amp;D, T. &amp; E.</th>
<th>Military construction</th>
<th>Stock funds</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1966:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Authority</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>5,287</td>
<td>152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>5,117</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1967:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Authority</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>4,962</td>
<td>7,592</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>17,866</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
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<td>4,680</td>
<td>8,021</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>18,417</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1968:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5,660</td>
<td>7,983</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>19,294</td>
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<td>7,880</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>20,512</td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1969:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Authority</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>6,491</td>
<td>7,259</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,762</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
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<td>8,757</td>
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<td>494</td>
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<td>21,544</td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1970:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Authority</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>14,401</td>
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<td>Outlays</td>
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<td>5,453</td>
<td>6,278</td>
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<td>219</td>
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<td>17,573</td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1971:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,181</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>9,570</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<td>11,452</td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1972:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,348</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
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<td>2,447</td>
<td>2,467</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1973:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2,111</td>
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<td>5,071</td>
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<td>5,266</td>
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<td>Fiscal year 1974:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Authority</td>
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<td>877</td>
<td>349</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlays</td>
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<td>962</td>
<td>1,525</td>
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<td>2,908</td>
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</table>
Question. Explain why the Department of Defense's quarterly reports to Congress on the MASF program do not necessarily have a direct relationship to actual obligations.

Answer. The quarterly reports to Congress have been on an estimated obligation basis since the inception of the MASF program in 1966. Reporting based on estimates was a reflection in part of the need to support in major combat activity United States, Vietnamese, and other free world forces from a single integrated supply system with integrated programming, budgeting, and funding. Any review of estimates must be seen in this context. As such, the estimates do not rest on the usual, separate, independent, and control procedures under regular foreign assistance programs.

The question of when an obligation is reflected against the ceiling is also pertinent. In subsistence accounts for example, the DOD obligation would be reflected in accounting records based generally on contract award. But for subsistence to free world forces, DOD Instruction 7700.16, dated March 28, 1972, governing reporting under the congressional limitation says:

Military personnel. Support in this appropriation area generally involves the provisions of subsistence for free world forces or local forces. Obligation data reported for this purpose will be based on ration issues for the period reported or estimated issues, where it is not feasible to obtain actual data. In instances, serving U.S. and free world forces, obligation data may be based on a proration of the total obligations to be determined by the number of individuals served.

Similar criteria are spelled out in part for the operation and maintenance accounts in terms of when estimated obligations are reflected under the congressional limitation. For procurement, accounts, statistical pro rata obligations of the MASF program compared to total program have been used for such items as ammunition. The DOD is moving to improve its control and reporting procedures under the MASF program.

Question. What were the total MASF outlays by year from fiscal year 1966 through fiscal year 1973? Please provide a detailed breakout.

Answer. The attached table provides a 8 year consolidation of the estimated amounts reported to Congress as obligated for support of free world military forces in Vietnam. Data are reported by appropriation/account and are on an estimated obligation basis. The DOD is moving aggressively to apply more centralized and uniform administrative procedures to the MASF program for South Vietnam combined with improved coordination and centralized management.

**ESTIMATED AMOUNTS OBLIGATED FOR SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THAILAND AND RELATED AREAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>157.9</td>
<td>176.3</td>
<td>186.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>188.1</td>
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<td>121.6</td>
<td>166.3</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>195.8</td>
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<td>382.8</td>
<td>821.1</td>
<td>620.9</td>
<td>498.8</td>
<td>850.8</td>
<td>843.9</td>
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<td>113.3</td>
<td>165.3</td>
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<td>178.5</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>96.4</td>
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<td>40.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td><strong>Navy and Marine Corps</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.3</td>
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<td>63.0</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
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<td>111.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
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<td>49.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
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<td>142.0</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>134.6</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>76.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>146.1</td>
<td>146.1</td>
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<td>74.7</td>
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<td>155.4</td>
<td>155.4</td>
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<td>79.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>121.5</td>
<td>121.1</td>
<td>121.1</td>
<td>121.1</td>
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<td>177.1</td>
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<td>257.4</td>
<td>318.2</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>276.7</td>
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<td>401.8</td>
<td>422.6</td>
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<td>Total, Department of Defense</td>
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<td>1,287.8</td>
<td>2,227.1</td>
<td>2,878.8</td>
<td>3,941.9</td>
<td>2,417.4</td>
<td>2,712.1</td>
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</table>
Question. What are the total planned MASF outlays for fiscal year 1974 and fiscal year 1975? Please provide a detailed breakout.

Answer. The attached table provides estimated obligations for support of Free World Forces in fiscal year 1974. Planned obligations in fiscal year 1974 reflect a MASF ceiling of $1,126.0 million, pending the outcome of a DOD request for congressional action to raise the ceiling. MASF outlays in fiscal year 1975 are planned in accordance with the $1.6 billion ceiling.

FISCAL YEAR 1974 MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDED (MASF) PROGRAM, DISTRIBUTED ON AN OBLIGATIONAL BASIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Laos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. &amp; M</td>
<td>263.1</td>
<td>266.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo procurement</td>
<td>338.4</td>
<td>288.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>M127</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td>Navv:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. &amp; M</td>
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<td>20.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other procurement</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
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<td><strong>Air Force:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. &amp; M</td>
<td>217.8</td>
<td>186.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft procurement</td>
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<td>161.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other procurement</td>
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<td>399.6</td>
<td>360.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>1,126.0</td>
<td>1,099.5</td>
<td>116.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Difference in obligation objective of $26,500,000 for the Navy and $460,000,000 for the Air Force compared with estimated fiscal year 1974 obligations of $22,500,000 and $399,600,000 respectively. Redistribution of additional $3,900,000 is under review for priority needs.

Question. How much of the fiscal year 1974 implemental request for MASF funding is for Laos and how much is for South Vietnam?

Answer. All of the currently identified additional MASF requirements above the $1,126 million ceiling relate to South Vietnam.

Question. Has the CIA been provided any MASF funds from the Department of Defense for expenditures in Laos or South Vietnam in fiscal year 1974? If so, please identify dollar amounts by country and purpose. Has this ever been practiced in the past?

Answer. Yes; MASF funds in the amount of [deleted] million have been transferred to CIA in fiscal year 1974 under the Laos program to provide for support of Lao Irregular Forces (LIF). Similar transfers took place in prior years.

Question. Does MASF funding pay for all the petroleum products consumed in those sorties?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Is the International Control Commission in Vietnam supervising the delivery of weapons and ammunition for either side under article 7 of the cease-fire agreement which provides for a one-for-one replacement of weapons of the same characteristics and properties?

Answer. Article 7 of the ICCS Protocol specifies that the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission jointly inspect the entry into South Vietnam of replacements of war materiel permitted under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. The Viet Cong has refused to permit the TPJMC to carry out this function, and the ICCS has taken the position that inspections by it alone would not be official. The United States and the RVN have kept records of replacement shipments to South Vietnam and have stated their readiness to provide a full accounting to the ICCS and
to the TFMC whenever those bodies begin to carry out their duties with respect to inspection and replacement materials for the two sides. Having the other hand has introduced alleging into South Vietnam vast quantities of armaments. No offer to allow ICCS inspection of this material has ever been made.

**Question.** According to press articles, approximately 150 F-5E jet-fighters have been promised by the United States to the South Vietnamese air force. In the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request, is Congress being asked to authorize any funds for the procurement of any F-5Es or other aircraft for South Vietnam? If so, what is the amount?

**Answer.** The fiscal year 1974 supplemental request contains no funds for the procurement of any F-5Es or other aircraft for South Vietnam.

**Question.** What is the total number and dollar amount of F-5Es that the Department of Defense is planning to send to South Vietnam in both fiscal year 1974 and fiscal year 1975?

**Answer.** Provided below is the current delivery schedule and dollar value. This schedule is closely tied to production, hence changes in it are possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974–25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>$53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–43</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Question.** In view of the F5E's more powerful engines, greater fuel capacity, improved weapons control system and greater ordnance capacity than that of the F5A, how does the Department of Defense justify replacing the F5A with F5E?

**Answer.** Prior to the cease-fire, plans had already been made and publicly announced to equip the Vietnamese Air Force with F5E's and procurement for the aircraft had been authorized. The F5E qualifies as a replacement item for the F5A in that it is the most similar aircraft to it currently in production and has the same essential characteristics as the F5A.

**Question.** What is being done with the F5A's that are being replaced with the F5E's?

**Answer.** Those F5A's for which F5E's are being provided as replacements and which have not attrited through combat or use in SVN will be returned to their prior owners, that is, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.

**Question.** Please provide for the record the current South Vietnamese armed forces's troop level. Are there any projections on the reduction of this force level?

**Answer.** Current authorized strengths (troop levels) for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) are:

- ARVN
- VNN
- VNMC
- NAF
- RP
- PF

Total: 7,100,000

We are encouraging the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff to make concrete plans for force reductions and one Defense Attaché will actively participate in this review. Implementation of a force reduction plan will however be dependent on the level of hostilities.

**Question.** Do any current Department of Defense contracts in South Vietnam relate in any way with the functions of the police system in South Vietnam? If so, please identify the contracts.

**Answer.** No, there are no current Department of Defense contracts in South Vietnam related in any way with the functions of the police system in South Vietnam.

**Question.** Mr. Doolin, in your letter to me of July 28, 1973, you indicate that the Defense Attaché in Saigon estimated that U.S. nationals employed by Defense-funded contractors would be reduced to approximately 1,000 by the end of calendar year 1973, but that this figure was subject to change. Why hasn't that figure been met?

**Answer.** Does not reflect numbers and funds allocated by program years.
Answer. The reason that the tentative reduction projection to 1,000 U.S. citizen contractor personnel was not met is that the Vietnamese have not reached self-sufficiency in logistical operations as rapidly as we had hoped. The principal problem area is in aircraft maintenance. While the Vietnamese Air Force maintenance manning approaches 95 percent of the number authorized, their skill levels have not yet reached the point when they can fully maintain their organic aircraft. The primary emphasis of our contract effort is in training the Vietnamese technicians in the many diverse skills which are required for the broad range of systems involved.

Question. What are the current projections for phasing out Department of Defense contracts in South Vietnam?

Answer. Department of Defense contracts are geared primarily to the ability of RVNAF to perform adequately. essential maintenance and logistic functions. Our goal is a totally self-sufficient RVNAF and hence a phase out of DOD contracts. The program has not moved as rapidly as we initially hoped and at this time we cannot accurately project a total phaseout date. As of January 31, 1974 there were 2,736 U.S. contractor personnel in Vietnam. We tentatively project a contractor personnel level of 2,130 by June 3, 1974, down from 5,237 personnel as of January 27, 1973.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I have some questions about Diego Garcia.

How long do you assume this construction you are requesting will take?

Admiral MOORE. Most of it will be completed by 1976, Mrs. Schroeder. Perhaps a small amount of it might spill over to 1977.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. When do you contemplate, as far as I have heard a scenario, there is no plans to open the Suez Canal as yet.

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, Mrs. Schroeder, that is not exactly correct. I think in the papers that you have undoubtedly read many different versions about the plans to clear the canal, to open the canal within the time frame of whenever would be possible to bring about the clearance of these hulls and the demolition from the explosives that are in there, and to remove the mines.

So you have a three-step situation here. Until you get into this and really find out what is there and what is going to be required to get this canal cleared, you don't know exactly when it is going to be opened. But a safe guess will be sometime about a year from now.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I think what my question is, is since we don't know when and if the canal is going to be opened, and since the plans with the United Kingdom have not been completely finalized as to what restrictions there will be, etcetera, and since we don't really plan to have this done until 1976 anyway, I don't really understand why this has to be a supplemental. Why the urgency on Diego Garcia?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Because of the delays that would inherently be in there if we went through a cycle I discussed with the chairman earlier. If we did not get the bill approved by December, or January next year, it would delay our accessibility to the facility for up to 8 months.

In other words, that would be perhaps 8 months lost before we could do that.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. We wouldn't finish the construction until the agreement with the United Kingdom, would we?

Mr. CLEMENTS. As soon as we have the funds available through this committee and we bring into final form this draft which we already have—it has gone through several drafts already with the United Kingdom—we would start this construction process immediately.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Before the final agreement was reached?
Mr. Clements. No. The final agreement would be completed with Great Britain, and at the same time we would get the approval of funds out of this committee and the Congress. We would then let contracts immediately. As a matter of fact, contractors are available and ready to start this work. Navy construction battalions will perform the balance of the construction work.

Mrs. Schroeder. How many personnel are in Diego Garcia right now, U.S. personnel?

Mr. Clements. Approximately 150 communications personnel and a Seabee battalion of 800 men.

Mrs. Schroeder. Are there any civilians there?

Admiral Moorer. There are 16 civilian contractors there, and 3 DOD civilians supervising construction.

Mrs. Schroeder. How many would you foresee moving in there, say, by 1976?

Mr. Clements. Another 300 in addition to the communications personnel. The permanent party would total about 400 to 500 people, with quarters for up to about 600.

Mrs. Schroeder. Do you foresee any need to increase the fleet by 1976?

Mr. Clements. Increase what?

Mrs. Schroeder. The naval fleet by 1976?

Admiral Moorer. I already testified, Mrs. Schroeder, that the forces operating in this area would be drawn from either the Pacific or the Atlantic Fleet. This is not a force-building exercise.

Mrs. Schroeder. So your position then is very firm, it is strictly a service-oriented base for people going back and forth through it?

Admiral Moorer. Yes, ma'am. So far as Diego Garcia and the facilities we are asking for are concerned, we need those today. It is far more expensive for us to operate in the vacuum as we are today than it would be if we had that facility. It is not time sensitive exactly to the opening of the Suez Canal. I think it is fairly clear that it will be opened, and I think when it is opened, it will have an impact on the naval activity in the Indian Ocean.

Mrs. Schroeder. Will SEATO be involved in this area?

Admiral Moorer. No; not at all.

Mrs. Schroeder. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hicks.

Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Moorer, when you talk about drawdown of material that went to Israel, was that drawn from the active units?

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, in many cases it was, and that is why we have come in with this supplemental in order to replace this equipment and to build up our stockpiles, particularly the more sophisticated equipments that were used in large scale by the Israelis.

Mr. Hicks. Do we know whether the Soviets did the same thing in their resupply of Egypt?

Admiral Moorer. Well, sir, I think they probably did. The volume of supply was so large, I wouldn't think they had sufficient amounts in warehouses for that purpose.

Mr. Hicks. Their position is no different than ours, relatively at the present time.
Admiral Moorer: They began with a much larger stockpile as far as the ground forces' equipment is concerned. I think, with respect to some of the more sophisticated weapons we mentioned, such as the TOW, SHRIKE, and so on, they are far better off in terms of what I call staying power—having on hand the war reserve stocks. On the other hand, much of our equipment is qualitatively superior.

Mr. Hicks. Mr. Secretary, in your statement here, you mention the long queue of ships we have awaiting overhaul. I wonder how that squares with cutting down public shipyards in Boston and Hunter's Point in San Francisco?

Mr. Clements. Well, historically, the shipbuilding capabilities and the repair facilities for shipyards have gone in cycles. Right now, the yards are generally full, and so we have caught ourselves in a dilemma of having postponed these maintenance items through the Vietnam years, which was a calculated policy. I'm sure your committee was aware of it. At that time we needed our units, and it was a question not only of not spending the money but also using the units and keeping them in service. So these maintenance items were postponed, and this backlog continued to build up.

Now, commercial shipyards are for the most part full with commercial work, and as we have this maintenance come up and we need to do these overhauls, we are going to find it difficult to reduce materially our overhaul backlog through the use of commercial shipyards.

Mr. Hicks. That is my question, Why did we close Hunter's Point and Boston if this situation was there, the Navy can see that far down the road?

Mr. Clements. First of all, those yards are terribly inefficient. We felt like for not only present but long-term usage, those yards would not suit our purposes and were on a very high unit-cost factor basis. That is why we closed them.

Mr. Hicks. Regardless of the amount of work that you could see down the road?

Mr. Clements. Not regardless, because we took that into our planning. It is a question of money, and whether we are in a navy yard or whether we are in a civilian yard, we are still spending money for this purpose. We could do the work at a lower cost elsewhere. It just boils down to that.

Mr. Hicks. But you just got through saying you can't put it elsewhere because there isn't any elsewhere?

Mr. Clements. I didn't say that. I said there is a question—there is a problem in connection with the scheduling of these units into these yards, but we feel it can be done. In the process of doing it, we will do it on a more cost-effective basis.

Mr. Hicks. Mr. Secretary, do you know in the course of this you cut the shipyards down and cut them down and cut them down, taking the one in my own district at Bremerton, for example, from 10,000 down to 6,000 people, now you are going back up to 10,000, and you are out looking for people that you don't have because they, of course, when they were cut loose from the 10, down, they were gone. They are recruiting all over the country right now. That is the sort of thing I'm talking about. What kind of planning goes on over there about the public yards?
Mr. Clements. You know, we have drawn down from 936 ships in 1969, so that today we have 508 ships. That is a reduction in the ship level of about 48 percent. So, certainly if we needed yards at that time when we had over 900 ships, we certainly don’t need the same number of yards when we have about 500 ships.

Mr. Hicks. I could agree with that eventually.

Mr. Clements. That is true today.

Mr. Hicks. What I’m talking about we cut down, now we don’t have any place to put the ships and we don’t have the people there. We have to go out and try to recruit them.

Mr. Clements. On the contrary, Mr. Congressman, it is not a question of being able to put them in the yard. What we are asking for is the money to authorize them in the yard. If you give us the money I assure you we will put the ships in the yard.

Mr. Hicks. I’m sure you will get the money, Mr. Secretary.

The Chairman. Mr. Beard.

Mr. Beard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On page 2 of your statement, something I don’t particularly understand, for example, pay raises occurred in October 1973 rather than as we earlier expected in January 1974. How does that fluctuate?

Mr. Clements. We originally had reason to believe that those pay raises would not take place until January. To the contrary they were put into effect in October. This accelerated the demands on our funds to meet these rates.

Mr. Beard. Who dictates the fact it goes in, in October versus January?

Mr. Clements. I would like for Mr. McClary to respond.

Mr. McClary. That is an estimation we would have gotten in conjunction with discussions with the Office of Management and Budget. Keep in mind the previous pay raise was January 1, 1973. We had anticipated the 1-year interval, there would be another one.

What happened is that Congress accelerated that pay raise and made it effective October 1.

Mr. Beard. In other words, through our legislation, we put it to where you had no choice in the matter.

Mr. McClary. That is right. We were then required to meet that pay increase October 1, whereas we had planned to do it in January. That cost us $257 million.

Mr. Beard. That is what happens when Congress gets involved in a pay raise.

How much—how much is a young man making when he first goes into the service now, what is his starting salary?

Mr. Clements. $326 per month.

Mr. Beard. He has three square meals a day and he has the room there. No matter what happens he has that. How does that compare to a young man that doesn’t have a high school education, have there been any studies as far as the man, the young boy, who didn’t finish high school, and went out to try to get a job, how does this stack up?

Mr. Clements. With this raise we have just been talking about he now makes $326.

Mr. Beard. Do you want to add that in here?
Mr. Clements. In addition to this, of course, on the comparable basis to which you refer, he has a lot of educational opportunities and other benefits would accrue to him in the sense of not only the room and board that you mentioned, but also medical and various other things, which I would be happy to supply to you.

Mr. Beard. I was going to say he probably has got it made, compared to a kid that doesn’t go into the service.

Mr. Clements. We feel like, and we believe this was the intent of Congress when they passed the laws to make our all-volunteer force work like it is, we feel he is on a comparable basis with the outside world, with industry as a whole. Therefore, it represents an opportunity for him to come into the services, and that is why the all-volunteer force is in fact working. If we didn’t have this kind of comparable situation, you can be sure the all-volunteer force would not work.

Mr. Beard. Do you have any plans in the mill now, any studies to increase the pay at all?

Mr. Clements. No, sir, I don’t think we want to do that.

Mr. Beard. I hope not.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman, Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Hunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary. I just want to—

Mr. Clements. I didn’t understand you.

Mr. Hunt. You will, hold there, you’re from the South and I’m from the North. We will get together.

Mr. Clements. No, sir, I’m from the Southwest.

Mr. Hunt. That makes it a little bit worse. [Laughter.]

Mr. Clements. I have an answer for that, too. [Laughter.]

Mr. Hunt. I would expect you would, otherwise you wouldn’t be in the position of defense.

Let’s get back quickly. I want to cover a few points. Mr. Secretary.

Questions have been asked there in regard to Diego Garcia as to why you want to do it now. Then the question came up a little later as to whether or not they were going to clear the canal.

I don’t think there is any question about the fact they are going to clear the canal, is that right, Admiral Moorer?

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hunt. What we now are in is a time frame race to get the facilities into Diego Garcia so as to counteract this operation in case they do get it open. Isn’t this one of our reasons for trying to get the facilities?

Admiral Moorer. I think it is obvious we have a national interest in maintaining a presence and working with our Allies in that area. The sooner we get on with it, the better.

Mr. Hunt. That is right. You don’t intend to build up any huge naval forces in there. What you expect to do is have the forces if and when they are necessary in time of emergency.

Admiral Moorer. Exactly.
Mr. Hunt. You are going to use Diego Garcia as a refueling base and so forth, and communications?

Admiral Moorer. That is right.

Mr. Hunt. All the talk this morning is rather superfluous from some people. They seem to be confused, don't do it now, do it a little bit later. That is our trouble. I think you are entirely right. We do it now. Let's get this thing prepared. Let's get the ship underway.

So we know which way we are going. So the boys over there who are going to do a job will know what they have as backup.

I think people miss some of the intent of foreign nations when we know at the present time there are certain metal factors that will be in short supply in the next few years to come, and there are an abundance of some territorial locations directly adjacent to Diego Garcia, and there will be some maneuvering made in there. I think this is one of the reasons why we should discuss this a little more in executive session and I appreciate your position on that matter.

I was just kidding you, Mr. Secretary, I'm of extraction myself.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Clements. Thank you very much. I appreciate your thought. The Chairman, Mr. Bob Price.

Mr. Robert Price. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer, I appreciate the fine testimony that you have here.

However, I'm a little disturbed this morning we had Russian Embassy personnel present. I think it is mighty decent for us all to put this information before them, there may still be some here.

I have some questions when we go into executive session this afternoon that I would like to know more about.

Mr. Secretary, in your remarks on page 8, you said that we, in your remark, "we would have won but we ran out of ammunition, would not be a satisfying explanation. We do not want another Bunker Hill in our history books."

As I review your remarks, Mr. Secretary, on accelerated modernization, I would like to know more about what we are going to talk about in that this afternoon. I would like to know what we are going to use this communication system for in detail and in depth this afternoon.

And what high priority items that you are talking about to counter the capability of the Soviets.

As I went through your testimony, I see where you have identified about 11 items, or 12, that really I'm surprised that we are in such a position that perhaps we knew about the SAM-6, for instance. We knew about the self-propelled 23 millimeter antiaircraft gun.

We have known about, for instance, you mention here we are going to need certain improvements to aircraft now in inventory.

"Our antitank missile, it seems like that we are after the fact coming on in a 'defensive manner' to counter weapons systems that we have known evidently that have been in existence. I'm not blaming you or anyone, except ourselves, perhaps; and it alarms me that we find out about these systems and we are just now starting to work on them over these so many years.

I know it is not your fault. I know the Congress has fallen down. Hopefully we can do a better job. For instance, our aircraft readiness
down from 74 to 65 percent now. Some people might not think this is very alarming. But here we are coming up with, we find we are short of reserve of ammunition. We are short of air munitions.

Our tanks, armored personnel carriers, from those of us who went on that trip, we see the armored personnel carriers by the thousands over there, which we haven't even started to build them as far as I know to any degree.

We saw the thousands of tanks. But I just would like to know a little more in depth, when we are spending $29 million for construction and communication site on Diego Garcia, I'm sure that is more than just a guidance system for navigational purposes.

I'm glad to know that we are finally moving on the strategic airlift capabilities. We were briefed on that. It is needed vitally.

The Trident, I would like to go into that program this afternoon a little more in depth, to know really what we are trying to do, because I think we would be derelict in our duties as far as I'm concerned I will feel derelict if I don't know the details and know the capabilities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Daniel.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Secretary, since I may not get an opportunity to talk to you any time soon, I want to go back to the point Mr. Montgomery raised a moment ago.

My concern primarily is with this total force concept.

Obviously, we have to have an adequate defense, but we have to have it at an affordable cost.

I believe that that is where we could develop our best strength through this total force concept.

It seemed to me the best way to meet that objective is the full implementation of that program that I believe first came into existence back in 1970.

Based on what I can understand, the primary obstacle to achieving this goal is the locked-in concrete thinking in DOD with respect to the capabilities, the roles, and the missions of the Guard and the Reserves.

All I want to ask you to do is to make sure that this matter, this challenge, as I would like to call it, is given more top management attention than it has been given in the past.

Mr. CLINTON. Mr. Daniel, I will be happy to do this, and you can be sure that I will be in touch with you and Mr. Montgomery, and I would like to have your personal views on this.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Moorer, the committee will excuse you until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. For your information, the first order of business of the committee at that time will be the Chair will entertain a motion to go into executive session.

The committee now, however, stands recessed until 2:30 this afternoon at which time we will hear two outside witnesses, but you do not have to return.

Mr. CLINTON, Mr. Chairman, do you want to have the services here to respond to any questions that you have this afternoon?
The Chairman. No, we have finished with the services now. Tomorrow in executive session, we will go into executive session immediately and discuss these matters.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank both of you gentlemen, very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p.m.]

Afternoon Session—March 18, 1974

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Guy Gran, please come forward. Have a seat, sir.

Mr. Gran, you represent the Indochina Resource Center?

Mr. Gran. This is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Will you please tell us something about what the Indochina Resource Center is and what position you hold with it?

Statement of Guy Gran, Research Associate, Indochina Resource Center

Mr. Gran. I’m a research associate at the Indochina Resource Center. We are a public interest research group in Washington which collects all kinds of material on all aspects of contemporary events in the four countries of Indochina, and to some extent Thailand, analyzes it, distributes it to anybody who is interested in various kinds of formats.

We have a sister organization in Berkeley, which does many of the same kinds of things and then does some longer range studies as well.

The Chairman. North or South Vietnam, which side do you represent?

Mr. Gran. I don’t represent either side, sir.

I’m trying to represent what I believe to be the evidence as it has been collected and analyzed by myself in this particular instance.

The Chairman. Do you speak for the center or for the Hanoi side or Saigon side?

Mr. Gran. I’m not speaking from either side, I don’t see why I should—

The Chairman. You are speaking for this organization, however?

Mr. Gran. I’m speaking for an organization. The organization itself does not have such a position. I mean the evidence doesn’t suggest the organization should be representing one side or the other.

The Chairman. I just want to get the record showing your position exactly. You have a lengthy statement which all members of the committee have.

Can you summarize the statement? Then we will ask you questions from your summarization and the statement. Suppose you take about 10 or 15 minutes?

Mr. Gran. OK. What I was hoping to do was spend about 1 minute summarizing the major arguments, and then read other five passages in the middle.

The Chairman. That will be fine.

Mr. Gran [continued to read from a large document].
supplemental request, both as a financial saving and as a political signal to every party in Indochina.

I am making four basic arguments in various parts of this presentation. One is a more general kind of thesis, that the information about the military aid program to Vietnam that is released by the administration and by others in briefings, in congressional testimony, and to the media is very often distorted, manipulated, and not very well documented—in fact, not documented at all and comes out very close to what I consider propaganda. A great deal of it—that should come out, doesn't come out. It is classified not for reasons of national security, which is in point of fact never argued in any great detail, but it is instead for reasons of political embarrassment.

That is, if critics of a particular program knew about it they would be better armed, which in point in fact is true.

Second, I addressed at some length basic arguments the administration has raised before Congress for the last year in support of this program, apply empirical evidence to these arguments, and conclude that these arguments are supported by reasonable evidence.

Third, in the part that I read, I'm making an argument that the present military air program perpetuates the Vietnam war, and is an expensive, potentially permanent drain on American resources. It is posited upon political goals, the same political goals that have always been there. These goals remain impossible for both the Armed Forces of the Vietnamese and the Armed Forces of the United States to attain.

Lastly, in four or five pages I have collected the best citations by the Department of Defense, its own statements on the legality of this program, wherein the Department of Defense witnesses in Saigon and before Congress have admitted that more than half of the program is not in accord with the Paris agreement. These citations are included in the appropriate places.

I would like to make one comment out of curiosity this morning. I hope the committee will raise this issue in executive session tomorrow. On page 13 of Mr. Clement's statement he says, "We wish to raise the ceiling from $1.126 million to $1.6 billion. We do not require additional funds."

Then, under questions, I believe, of Mr. Runnels, Mr. Clement admitted that the pipeline funds would not be sufficient and he would require $200 million of additional funds. This seems to be utterly contradictory. He may mean in a very loose sense that he is going to reprogram money and that doesn't count as new funds. But I would hope the committee would clarify that statement even for their own use if not for outside use.

Now, I would like to detail, document if I can some basic arguments about the military and political situation. As—

Mr. DANIEL. What page?

Mr. GRASS. Page 14, in the middle of the page.

As presently constituted the MASF program is broken down into three budgetary categories. Under procurement we provide weapons, vehicles, ammunition, air ordnance, and aircraft. Of the aircraft, 116 F-5A's are really for MAP countries from which the F-5A's were borrowed in late 1972, and the rest are 71 new F-5E's for the RVNAF.
Under operations and maintenance we provide diverse supplies, contract operations, training, shipping, and a variety of small programs, including policy support. These two giant categories are each about half of the MASF program; some $40 million in personnel support, uniforms and rations apparently, forms a third category.

The United States is, of course, quite successful in the physical process of delivering equipment. One Pentagon official recently admitted "we shipped so much stuff to South Vietnam in the 2 months prior to the cease-fire, plus what went since, that a large new resupply of tanks, artillery pieces, and planes would only sit around the docks in crates." The problems develop once the material reaches the shores of Vietnam. From there on are the ubiquitous and endless signs of futility, waste, stupidity, and tragedy which indicate as clearly as ever that the present political goals are still perpetuating an impossible task for the American and RVN Armed Forces.

Ammunition is by far the largest component of the MASF program, almost $900 million of the $554.8 million spent on the RVN forces during the first quarter of fiscal year 1974. The high expenditure rate is partly political: if much ammunition wasn't used, it would be much harder to convince the American Congress that there was a war on that still needed support. The high rate is, however, primarily a function of the tactics of Vietnamese commanders who need to look busy without losing men. An illuminating report of the results appeared last summer:

The South Vietnamese were reportedly expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition in what is known here as "H and I fire"—for harassment and interdiction. This is a form of artillery firing in which there is no specific target. But shells are pumped into a general area in an attempt to reduce enemy activity there.

American sources say they have learned that in Indochina, the more guns and ammunition are available, the more the armies in the field will use them.

"After we cut down the ammo supply," one well informed officer said, "we found out that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1, but the overall total was that much lower."

The Pentagon has not, however, imposed any meaningful limits, for it is confident that it can ignore authorized levels and return to Congress later for supplemental requests. The situation has not changed since last summer. James Markham toured PRG areas in mid-February and found random harassment shelling of civilian areas everywhere he went.

About half of the MASF program thus goes to a highly wasteful and essentially meaningless exercise attempting to terrorize Vietnamese who choose to live in PRG areas.

Little territory is won, and the RVN knows that it is incapable of military victory. Instead a vast million man battleship rolls on, filling its institutional imperatives in its most culturally acceptable way—violence. That violence is a cultural norm that children and even young adults have never known peace, is perhaps even more tragic than the incredible waste of resources involved.

Another immense portion of the MASF program is occupied by the supply and maintenance of ever more complex technological hardware. Leaving aside for the moment the legal implications of operation and maintenance, consider the future potential of this opera-
tion. The United States has never Vietnamized logistics; about 1,150 DOD contract personnel still run the basic logistics effort for the RVN forces. It is conceivable that over a decade Vietnamese could handle most of these tasks, given the pay incentive and motivation necessary. But these are unlikely, and the potential for corruption would be so enlarged that the system itself would be severely jeopardized.

It is in the maintenance of aircraft that the basic contradiction of the MASF program is most clearly illuminated. We are supposed to be teaching the Vietnamese how to take care of the extremely complex aircraft engines we have given the RVNAF. A Vietnamese is intellectually as capable as anyone, but the culture of war destroys both ability and interest in learning. New York Times correspondent David Shipler pinpointed two factors: profound war weariness wherein the pressure for peace blankets any other desire, and resentment over wage differentials where Vietnamese get $10 to $35 a month and Americans up to $1,000 a week working in the same plant. These are impossible conditions to overcome, and even under reachable ideal circumstances many of these jobs take at least 5 to 10 years to develop sufficient expertise. The American military aid program is thus a potentially permanent operation.

The MASF program entails a number of other less expensive activities most of which are cloaked in considerable secrecy. One that is both morally reprehensible and politically counter-productive in the extreme deserves brief attention here. That is the ongoing American support of the police and prison system of the RVN. At this point in time the dollar amount of direct support may not be great; AID general counsel says that AID is not longer channeling policy commodities funded by the MASF program—$9 million in fiscal year 1974. Little, however, prevents DOD from direct grants, or from using the CIA. Little also prevents the budgetary subsidies provided by the Public Law 480 and CIP programs to end up as policy support.

Neither the explicit prohibition of the Paris Agreement nor the even more precise language of section 112 of the fiscal year 1974 Foreign Aid Appropriation Act (Public Law 93-240, Jan. 2, 1974) seems to be deterring the administration from this most profound intrusion in internal Vietnamese affairs. The January study mission of the conservative American Security Council, whom I believe you will hear from next, wrote:

A handful of U.S. civilian technicians continue to provide advice in the operation of a newly installed computer system which keeps tabs on more than 10 million South Vietnamese.

David Shipler's research uncovered these current practices:

South Vietnamese National Police continue to receive regular advice from Americans... two high-ranking officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station Chief of the C.I.A. and his staff. Sometimes, they said, the C.I.A. Chief asks the police to gather intelligence for him, and often they meet to help each other analyze the data collected.

A police official confirmed that in some provinces "American liaison men" who work with the police remain on the job... Local police still refer to American police advisers.

This is not an academic issue, for the police are not an apolitical force. They are an essential part of the political and military appa-
The war in Vietnam, and the enormous MASF program which fuels it, are not proceeding on the present tragic and expensive path without guidance. Both President Nixon and President Thieu have equated their personal honor and their national security with the survival of the latter. If there were peace, Thieu would have to demobilize much of his military manpower. This is a dire economic necessity for any real future as an economically independent state. But in so doing, Thieu would lose the tight sociopolitical control he now enjoys over all government employees. If his policies represented the needs of the majority, he could stay in power. But Thieu represents the interests of a wealthy minority; to abandon the economic interests of his closest supporters would end his career abruptly. The only solution is enough war ("no peace; no war") to avoid the dilemma.

The deletion of this $474, million in supplemental aid would not seriously deprive Thieu. It would probably leave him a little short-handed. More importantly, it would communicate a message from the U.S. Congress that the American people are not going to pay $2 to $3 billion a year forever so that Thieu does not have to come to terms with the political and economic needs of his own people. Such a message at this point in the year would give Thieu several months and considerable incentives to prepare for peace. The administration, by its fiscal year 1975 request of $1.6 billion, is quite willing to continue to pay the price; 120,000 Vietnamese casualties a year is not too great a moral burden for the executive branch. I do not think that the American people have the same set of moral standards and fiscal priorities.

The Chairman: Your whole statement, of course, will be put in the record. You understand that?

Mr. Gran: Yes.

[The following information was received for the record.]

"TOWARD PERPETUAL WAR OR A POSSIBLE PEACE," STATEMENT OF GUY GRAN, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

The military assistance service funded (MASF) program is the principal overt and legislated channel through which the United States sends military aid to the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) and to the Royal Laoissan Government. For fiscal year 1974 this program now has a ceiling of $1.126 billion of which $1,022.1 million is for the RVN. In the supplemental bill under consideration the Nixon administration wishes to raise the MASF ceiling by $474 million, using pipeline funds, to restore precisely the amount cut by Congress from the original request.

It would be well at the outset to consider that the MASF monies are only a part of the direct and indirect military aid to the government in Saigon. Additional military support results from all of the plasters generated by $295 million of commodities under the food for peace program and some if not most of the plasters from the $200 million commodity import program. Additional aid is being channeled through excess defense articles, pluster purchases, and military service
money. (1) There is no reason to believe that three decades of covert CIA activities in Indochina; squandering both their own and DOD resources, with and without legal authority or congressional knowledge, has come to a halt in fiscal year 1974. Finally, the RVN benefits from the American military presence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. An early fiscal year 1974 estimate of such costs was $1.1 billion. A recent UPI report contained a DOD estimate that the sum of DOD activities in Southeast Asia would cost $5.4 billion this fiscal year. (2)

The investment of another $474 million requires judgments about political, military, and legal realities in Indochina. It also necessitates judgments about the integrity of information contained in such reports released by the executive branch. I shall argue that the basic political and military arguments advanced on behalf of this level of aid are not supported by empirical evidence. A major portion of the MASF program is not in keeping with the legal provisions of the Paris agreement. The relevant information released by the executive is deliberately distorted and incomplete. In sum, our polices are still designed to seek the impossible, the buying of total and permanent political victory with lavish bribery and military force.

**INFORMATION IS POWER**

These are harsh conclusions. To reach them one must examine both evidence and the manner it comes to light. Most obviously neither the Congress nor the public has much information that should be available. It is monumentally absurd that the justification for this request, for example, should be classified. Classification is necessary to protect the intelligence which would imperil national security. All parties in Indochina have a rather clear idea of how much and what kind of American aid enters Vietnam every year. The enemy this administration is afraid of is the Congress and the taxpayer who pays the bill. That in itself is a damning commentary on the administration's estimate of the value and persuasiveness of its policies in Indochina. By accepting such a system, Congress further weakens its potential for critical examination and effective control. For any critic can thus be dismissed because he "doesn't have all the facts."

One concrete example is quite relevant. DOD would prefer that most of Congress and all independent researchers like myself not know how much MASF money goes to the RVN each quarter. The required quarterly report to Congress is thus kept secret. Woe if the left hand knew what the right were doing. New USAID statistics show that we supplied the RVN with at least $1.5 billion in MASF aid in the 7 months prior to the Paris agreement. (3) By a modest extrapolation, it is apparent that every quarter we perpetuate the present war would cost the taxpayer at least $400 million in direct military aid through the MASF program. The first quarter of fiscal year 1974, however, saw $618.3 million spent, a fact which is much about the Pentagon's scheme toward the MASF program.

Classification depends upon never having to define in an intellectually rigorous fashion the idea of national security. Should that day ever come, the result would provoke a series of legal actions that would make Watergate look like shoplifting from a dime store. In the meantime, the Executive cannot, at least, reduce the issue entirely to a series of pontifications that "I have all the facts and you will have to trust me." Instead, selective information, supportive of official policy, is released through testimony, news conferences and briefings, and leaks to sympathetic journalists. To put it crudely, the intellectual environment is manipulated by propaganda.

Testimony before congressional committees is a very effective weapon for the Executive. The parade of Cabinet officials and bemuddled military officers has a considerable effect on the viewers. It is hard not to take respect for the position with the incumbent and his ideas. Critical reflection is not the result. DOD Vietnamese testimony on the fiscal year 1974 budget can be reduced to an endless series of unproved and unchallenged assertions about what the PRG and DRV could and would do, and what is legal under the Paris agreement.

Occasionally, a DOD witness was indeed pressed for evidence. The replies came "according to intelligence reports," "our best estimates show," or "DOD lawyers have concluded." I'm not privy to closed sessions; doubtless you have been shown classified pictures and documents. One tank does not six hundred make. More importantly, the intellectual value of such reports is limited. Anyone who watched former CIA Cambodian Specialist Samuel Adams testify last summer on the size of the Khmer Rouge force, or who has read news accounts carefully, or studied the literature on the U.S. intelligence community, knows that such estimates are...
often made on extremely flimsy evidence, must travel through often hostile bureaucracies and are used by witnesses for political rather than intellectual purposes. This is not to argue that DOD estimates are inherently or invariably wrong. It is, however, to suggest that they cannot stand alone as definitive proof of any thesis.

The other favorite forum through which the administration manipulates Congress and the public is the media. Far too many stories in the most reputable newspapers are based on backgrounder leaks of material just declassified which journalists accept in abysmally uncritical fashion. For the last year, and doubtless before, the consideration of Vietnam money bills in Congress has coincided with stories of threatened offensives by Hanoi. (4) This bill has provoked a new round begun by a recent story of Drew Middleton in the New York Times. (5)

Middleton, citing “qualified sources,” provides a long list of precise quantities of weapons and supplies supposedly moving from the North Vietnam to the PRG areas. Careful reading indicates, however, that this buildup has been going on since January 1973; if the Pentagon had a historian, he would suggest that the buildup began many years prior. The Pentagon report showed that more than 90 percent of the air defense weaponry and much of the rest are in Quang Tri, a PRG stronghold. That the PRG might be contemplating defending themselves against Thieu’s endless encroachments did not occur to the writer or his sources. In another exercise in double standards, Middleton lists new and improved roads and bridges in PRG areas in a manner that the reader thinks of them as offensive weapons. Why, then, are the roads and bridges we build in RVN areas always considered as economic development and humanitarian assistance?

In 1974, techniques of selective classification, manipulation, and dissembling are not likely to be sufficient. The administration and its supporters have also begun muddling. If the empirical evidence doesn’t support your position, then try to destroy the credibility of the critic. Thus, in Ambassador Martin’s recent trade, New York Times writer David Shipley is a propagandist, using “deliberate and gross distortions” as part of a Hanoi-based plot to bring influence to bear on selective, susceptible, but influential elements of American communications media.” (6) The American Ambassador in 1964 didn’t like David Halberstam, either.

One trusts that Congress is sophisticated enough to notice that the administration provides no evidence to support its slander and that if its Vietnam policies were sensible, it would not be susceptible to substantive criticism. As I shall argue, the choices for Congress are greater and more complex than the two-in Ambassador Martin’s simplistic universe wherein the United States endlessly subsidizes the Thieu government or delivers it into the hands of Hanoi.

THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION

In the course of numerous congressional appearances and public statements since the Paris agreement, administration spokesmen have formulated and re-formulated a small number of basic arguments which serve to justify the MAST program and the present level of military aid to the RVN. All of these themes are designed to paper over two unspoken and unproven presumptions, that without such aid the government of Nguyen Van Thieu would collapse, a result that is not in the national interest of the United States. By not verbalizing such assumptions, the administration does not have to defend them.

Instead, the following arguments are trotted out on each occasion: The PRG move or less directed by Hanoi is endlessly and flagrantly violated, the Paris agreement pays military aid to Thieu is designed to insure the stability of the cease-fire agreement. We must continue to beware of Communist plans for aggression, and the steady infiltration of men, tanks, and other weapons and equipment supplies, services and training provided by the MAST program are indispensable to the final stage of Vietnamization. All leading military analysts agree that the RVN forces stand entirely on their own, and that any reduction in military aid and resultant political transformation would be contrary to the basic U.S. objectives of worldwide equilibrium and orderly change.
I submit that none of these arguments rests on a sound conceptual or empirical base. Each is designed as part of an edifice that serves to protect a series of myths deemed necessary to the political and psychological health of the current administration and the Nation. This is not the time to explore the costs this Government and its citizens pay for such myths. It is, however, apropos to explore the fallacies of the preceding paragraph.

That the PRG violates the Paris agreement far more than the RVN and is primarily (or exclusively) responsible for its failure has been the core argument carefully nurtured by Saigon and Washington spokesmen since January 27, 1973. Such spokesmen have successfully manipulated most uncritical journalists and headline writers and doubtless a majority of the public as well. Few journalists travel out into the rural areas and interview participants to determine the precise circumstances of each incident. Thus more stories than not begin "Saigon spokesmen reported." Restrictions placed on journalists, classification of embarrassing material, and intimidation of potential witnesses by U.S. and RVN authorities also work against an objective record.

Not all Saigon correspondents and American editors can be easily seduced. A careful examination of the last year's press reports shows a consistent pattern. Those stories based on investigative journalism rather than official handouts almost always revealed some evidence that the provocateur of the cease-fire violation was not the PRG but rather the RVN. Excerpts from more than 100 articles were assembled recently in a compendium by the Indochina Resource Center. (7)

The reader can examine the primary evidence and draw his own conclusions. This is not to argue that the issue is black and white, that the PRG never violates the agreement. The PRG does respond with violence to RVN nibbling operations, does move against RVN outposts which intrude in basically PRG areas and does occasionally carry out punitive raids in response, to extreme provocations like the RVNAF terror bombing of Loc Ninh, the PRG capital, in late November 1973. In addition, local PRG units do respond to pressure and do take initiatives with sometimes irresponsible and tragic results; the mortar shell in the schoolyard at Cai Lay comes recently to mind. (8)

But the sum of these military actions is not the coherent plan of aggression Saigon and Washington paint. It is instead the RVN for whom one can document a steady stream of military operations to gain rice, people, and territory. (9) One can also document some remarkably candid comments by Thieu and other RVN leaders outlining their general policies and attitudes toward the Paris agreement; (10) The clearest indication of the absurdity of the administration position is, however, this simple reality. In PRG areas the Paris agreement is disseminated and discussed everywhere; in RVN areas it is forbidden to be printed or distributed.

If it is demonstrably the RVN which pursues the consistent policy of aggression, our aid to Thieu cannot logically be said to be insuring the stability of the cease-fire. Since January 27, 1973, there have been 120,000 to 150,000 Vietnamese casualties. To use a word like stability at all is nothing less than Orwellian newspeak. What U.S. military, goods and services do accomplish was summarized very clearly in a New York Times review article recently, an article of such value that I add it as appendix A to this testimony.

These valuable military goods and services have a sharp political impact. They are indispensable to the South Vietnamese Government's policy of resistance to any accommodation with the Communists. Militarily, the extensive aid has enabled President Nguyen Van Thieu to take the offensive at times, launching intensive attacks with artillery and jet fighters against Vietcong held territory.

Furthermore, the American financed military shield has provided Mr. Thieu with the muscle to forestall a political settlement. He has rejected the Paris agreements' provision for general elections, in which the Communists would be given access to the press, permission to run candidates, and freedom to rally openly and without interference from the police or military.

Mr. Thieu has offered elections, but without the freedoms. (11) This basic statement which has forced the U.S. to military measures to maintain at least modest pressure while waiting to see if Thieu's own internal contradictions destroy him, is the position of the administration.

The administration's third and most ancient argument is that we must guard against preemption of aggression by Hanoi. The evidence is there, contained in Saigon documents on 1972 PRG strategy, a portion of which were leaked to the press in
early January, speak at most of limited military pressure and maintaining unhindered supply routes. (12) The Baltimore Sun article adds a typical fabrication—"A further goal intensified attacks on selected areas in Government-controlled territory." Given the political values of all those who work with the material between their capture of the documents in Vietnam and the publication of selected ideas therefrom in this country, especially the abysmal track records of long-time partisans in the intelligence community like William Colby and George Carver, this kind of presentation is not at all credible. If the administration wants to make a really believable case, let it collect all of the original documents that are relevant in one place and permit independent scholars to make separate studies. Let the administration also lay bare the precise methodology it uses at each step. That neither of these things happen is a considerable commentary on both bureaucratic will to power and the intellectual vulnerability of the administration position.

Even if the administration now produces damning new evidence, as Ambassador Martin threatened to do, it still must deal with physical realities and the conclusions of the North Vietnamese National Assembly. Both the PRG and the DRV are simply too poor in resources to sustain a major attack over any period. The DRV has just made a basic decision in favor of economic reconstruction and social renewal. In this effort they are apparently quite dependent on outside help. Thus, military plans for the South have been limited to enough support to maintain the status quo. In sum, unless conditions change drastically, there will be no major offensive.(13)

If there is not an imminent offensive, what is one to make of the infiltration of men and material the administration is constantly pointing to? (14) Troops have been going from DRV to PRG areas, perhaps as many as 70,000 in the last year if one gives credence to undocumented administration claims. At the same time it was recently revealed that 40 to 50,000—mostly sick and wounded—have been allowed to return north.(15) Given the meager reliability of such figures, one can only conclude that the infiltration rate is far below the rate which presaged the 1968 and 1972 offensives. If there is a surplus going south, it violates the intent of the Paris agreement. However, by the RVN's own recent figures, its soldiers have killed 46,683 Communists in the last year.(16) The agreement permits one-for-one replacement. The administration's position is thus valid only for those who cannot add and those who insist that the PRG alone must abide by a cease-fire that does not exist.

I will agree that the current public evidence would indicate that the number of tanks, antiaircraft installations, and pieces of roadbuilding equipment in PRG areas has increased in a year. Tanks are normally an offensive weapon. One wonders how the administration could document each of the 600 it claims have infiltrated since the agreement, How many of these tanks belong to the PRG predecessor buildup comparable to the billion dollar war chest we lavished on the RVN in late 1972? It does take longer for a PRG tank to arrive than an RVN F5A. Some of the subsequent tanks are surely replacements for destroyed vehicles. The rest are indeed violative of the agreement and designed to provide the PRG with a credible threat, certainly far less than what its opponents are up to.

Given the beleaguered condition of the PRG territory antiaircraft weapons are predictable. Does the administration expect the PRG to suffer daily raids by RVN Skyraiders and A-37's in silence? Given the fractionated nature of PRG territories, would not any normal government begin to consolidate its territories by building roads? Especially given the presence of an aggressively hostile million man army chewing away at one's territory? In any case, where would it forbid the building of roads? Physical evidence, does not, in sum, have to be viewed solely through the political perspective of the administration.

A fourth administration argument, that a drastic cut to Thieu would signal Hanoi and unbalance the situation, is a masterpiece of sophistry. Any level of aid to Thieu sends a plethora of signals to all concerned. The prominent signal to Hanoi now is that the United States is willing to subsidize indefinite aggression by Thieu. A cut in military aid that ended such behavior would be a signal to Hanoi that the United States was really interested in the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese conflict envisaged by the Paris agreement. The delegation of the present $474 million supplemental would be at most an
anger of that policy. In the meantime one cannot speak of and the agreement did not intend, the present as stability. Such a stability may be acceptable to the administration, but 120,000 to 160,000 Vietnamese dead, or wounded in a year, is not a form of stability the Congress should wish to share responsibility with.

The administration raises two further arguments. One is that the MASF program is imperative to the final stage of Vietnamesization. The program is imperative, but it is imperative to the scale and type of war we have insisted that the RVN fight. This was a function of our technological choices and political needs. Total Vietnamesization is a myth. It is very clear from the recent New York Times article, my appendix A, or from any close examination of the RVN budget figures, that the United States will pay $1.5 to $2 billion a year for military aid to the RVN for many years to come if it persists in present policies. RVN personnel will not soon, if ever given their lack of motivation, be able to take over the highly technical military jobs now held by DOD contract personnel. The RVN cannot ever conceivably generate sufficient domestic resources to finance the ammunition and ordinance intensive style of warfare it was accustomed to by the United States. After 50 years we are still trying to make up for lack of political persuasion by military force.

The final and most general administration argument revolves around the notions of worldwide stability and orderly change. As Elliot Richardson put it last year, the United States must honor its obligations because of the “essentially psychological” function of international stability.” (17) Such a world view subsumes too many faulty and self-serving perceptions of modern history to be fully dealt with here, but a few comments are in order. This refurbished domino theory presumes incorrectly that Secretary Kissinger’s idea of world stability is good for the United States and its allies. What is good about it for the penniless slum dweller in Saigon or New York? In a world of finite resources and environment the tiny population of the United States enjoys a vastly disproportionate share of the world’s wealth and struggles to maintain its position. At the same time the MNOs are busy teaching the have-nots the pleasures of having. It is quite apparent that the interests of the MNOs, the United States, and the third world are in many ways mutually antipathetic. If the administration wishes America to become something other than an ever more beleaguered bastion of wealth, it had better put far more resources and effort into the institutionalization of the substance of change rather than the rhetoric of stability.

The Military and Political Situation

If the MASF program can only be justified by such suspect documentation and unconvincing rhetoric, one can well imagine how and to what ends the program operates in the field. As presently constituted the MASF program is broken down into three budgetary categories. Under procurement we provide weapons, ammunition, air ordnance, and aircraft. Of the aircraft 116 F5A’s are really for MAP countries from which the F5A’s were borrowed in late 1972, and the rest are 71 new F6E’s for the RVNAF. Under operations and maintenance we provide diverse supplies, contract operations, training, shipping, and a variety of small programs including police support. These two giant categories are each about half of the MASF program; some $40 million in personnel support, uniforms, and rations apparently, forms a third category.

The United States is, of course, quite successful in the physical process of delivering equipment. One Pentagon official recently admitted “we shipped so much stuff to South Vietnam in the 2 months prior to the cease-fire, plus what went since, that a large new supply of tanks, artillery pieces, and planes would only sit around the docks in crates.” (18) The problems develop once the material reaches the shores of Vietnam. From there on are the ubiquitous and endless signs of futility, waste, stupidity, and tragedy which indicate as clearly as ever that the present political goals are still perpetuating an impossible task for the American and RVN Armed Forces.

Ammunition is by far the largest component of the MASF program, almost $500 million of the $504.5 million spent on the RVN forces during the first quarter of fiscal year 1974. The high expenditure rate is partly political; if much ammunition wasn’t used, it would be much harder to convince the American Congress that there was a war on that still needed support. The high rate is, however, primarily a function of the tactics of Vietnamese commanders who need to look
busy without losing men. An illuminating report of the results appeared last summer.

The South Vietnamese were reportedly expending vast quantities of artillery ammunition in what is known here as "H and I fire" (for harassment and interdiction). This is a form artillery firing in which there is no specific target. But shells are pumped into a general area in an attempt to reduce enemy activity there.

American sources say they have learned that in Indochina, the more guns and ammunition are available, the more the armies in the field will use them.

"After we cut down the ammo supply," one well informed officer said, "we found out that the South Vietnamese were still outshooting the enemy by 20 to 1; but the overall total was that much lower." (10)

The Pentagon has not, however, imposed any meaningful limits, for it is confident that it can ignore authorized levels and return to Congress later for supplemental requests. The situation has not changed since last summer. James Markham toured PRG areas in mid-February and found random harassment shelling of civilian areas everywhere he went. (20)

About half of the MASF program thus goes to a wasteful and essentially meaningless exercise attempting to terrorize Vietnamese who choose to live in PRG areas. Little territory is won, and the RVN knows that it is incapable of military victory. Instead a vast million man bureaucracy rolls on, filling its institutional imperatives in its most culturally acceptable way—violence. That violence is a cultural norm, that children and even young adults have never known peace, is perhaps even more tragic than the incredible waste of resources and labor.

Another enormous portion of the MASF program is occupied by the supply and maintenance of aircraft and other complex technological hardware. Leaving aside for the moment the legal implications of operation and maintenance, consider the future potential of this operation. The United States has never Vietnameseized logistics; about 1,150 DOD contract personnel still run the basic logistics effort for the RVN forces. It is conceivable that over a decade Vietnamese could handle most of these tasks, given the pay incentive and motivation necessary. But these are unlikely, and the potential for corruption would be so enlarged that the system itself would be severely jeopardized.

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The MASF program entails a number of other less expensive activities most of which are clouded in considerable secrecy. One that is both morally reprehensible and politically counterproductive in the extreme deserves brief attention here. That is the ongoing American support of the police and prison system of the RVN. At this point in time the dollar amount of direct support may not be great; AID general counsel says that AID is no longer channeling police commodities funded by the MASF program—$9 million in fiscal year 1974. Little, however, prevents DOD from direct grants, or from using the CTA...Little also prevents the budgetary subsidies provided by the Public Law 480 and CIP programs to end as police support.

Neither the explicit prohibition of the Paris Agreement nor the more precise language of section 112 of the fiscal year 1974 Foreign Aid Appropriation Act—Public Law 93-240, January 2, 1974—seem to be deterring the administration from this most profound intrusion in internal Vietnamese affairs. The January study mission of the conservative American Security Council wrote "a handful of U.S. civilian technicians continue to provide advice in the operation of a newly-installed computer system which keeps tabs on more than 10 million South Vietnamese."

(23) David Shipler’s research uncovered these current practices:
South Vietnamese national police continue to receive regular advice from Americans. Two high-ranking officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station chief of the CIA and his staff. Sometimes they said the CIA chief asks the police to gather intelligence for him, and often they meet to help each other analyze the data collected.

A police official confirmed that in some provinces "American liaison men" who work with the police remain on the job. Local policemen still refer to "American police advisers." (23)

This is not an academic issue; for the police are not a political force. They are an essential part of the political and military apparatus which Thieu uses to suppress all opposition, not simply the Communists. It is not merely that this represents total abrogation of the Paris Agreement. It is not merely the gross inhumanity of arresting and abusing tens of thousands of political prisoners. (24)

It is the political result. With no opportunity for peaceful political resolution of conflicts as the Paris Agreement called for, opponents of Thieu are forced to return to methods of violence.

The war in Vietnam, and the enormous MASH program which funds it, are not proceeding on the present tragic and expensive path without guidance. Both President Nixon and President Thieu have equated their personal honor and their national security with the survival of the latter. If there were peace, Thieu would have to internationalize much of his military operation. This is a dire economic necessity for any government wishing to be economically independent state. But in so doing, Thieu would lose the tight socio-political control he now enjoys over all government employees. If his policies represented the needs of the majority, he could stay in power. But Thieu represents the interests of a wealthy minority, and he could easily be appealed. The only solution is enough war ("no peace, no war") to avoid the dilemma.

The deletion of $474 million in supplemental aid would not seriously deprive Thieu. It would leave him a little shorthanded at worst. More importantly, it would communicate a message from the U.S. Congress that the American people are not going to pay $2 to $8 billion a year forever so that Thieu does not have to share terms with the political and economic needs of his own people. Such a message at this point in the year would give Thieu several months and considerable incentive to prepare for peace. The Administration, by its fiscal year 1975 request of $1.6 billion, is quite willing to pay the price; 120,000 Vietnamese casualties a year is not too great a moral burden for the Executive branch. I do not think that the American people have the same set of moral standards and fiscal priorities.

**THE LEGAL SITUATION**

Thirteen months after the signing of the Paris Agreement, the administration and a majority of Congress, the media, and the public consider it a dead letter. This is a considerable tribute to the administration's propaganda campaign. In operation before the ink was dry, the administration plan proceeded simultaneously along two paths. Secretary Kissinger and other spokesmen created a fundamentally new interpretation of various key phrases and passages which in sum came to mean that the United States could continue any kind of aid or interference it wished that was not explicitly prohibited. At the same time the administration and the RVN orchestrated the charge (previously addressed) that the PRG was continuously violating the Agreement, then when caught in blatant violation, the administration was in a position to say it proved that the Agreement was thus essentially inoperative and the United States was not bound to abide by it.

This successfully disposed of the Paris Agreement in the United States, but not in Indochina. The PRG and its supporters knew that the United States was legally bound not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Viet Nam. How such words applied to the anomalous situation wherein one state is essentially an economic parasite of another was unhappily not spelled out in the Agreement. The only area of precision was in military aid, and it permits piece-for-piece replacement: "of arms, ammunition, and similar material." It is to this phrase and its application to the MASH program under consideration here that I shall limit my legal argument.

Certain international commissions were designated by the Agreement to define the permissible military items and supervise their arrival. This did not happen.
so in the early spring of 1973, DOD created its own list. This list defined 18 categories of "armaments," 8 categories of "munitions," and 5 categories of "war material." Taken together these 29 categories correspond almost precisely to those items which appear under the DOD category of procurement. The Paris Agreement, or DOD's own interpretation, limited American aid to procurement items. This list was picked up in Saigon, Assistance Act). This bill was passed by the Senate but the Vietnam provisions died in conference. It would not be inappropriate to attempt this legislation against an attempt at the Paris Agreement did and did not allow.

His response was a marvel of the bureaucratic mind in an impossible legal dilemma.

Mr. Forman . . . . under the bill passed yesterday (S. 1443), the executive branch would be limited to furnishing only armaments, munitions, and war material. Now that is a category of equipment and supplies far more narrow than the terminology in the statute which applies to other countries, namely defense articles and defense services. The words, "armaments, munitions, and war materials" were taken from the peace agreement signed in January. Those words, as defined by the Department of Defense for the purpose of complying with the peace agreement—the definitions are set forth in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, pages 26 to 27—do not include . . . the contract services which we are providing to the Vietnamese with civilian personnel. It does not include spare parts on consumables. It does not include subsistence. It does not include petroleum products . . . . we couldn't provide overhaul and repair services. (25)

DOD has developed here an essentially schizoid position. In one universe was the Paris Agreement with DOD dutifully supplying a law abiding definition of the parameters of its activity. In another quite separate universe is the actual operation of the MASF program continuing quite as though the Paris Agreement had never happened. Such a clever semantic voyage, linking the bureaucratic imperative of survival and the political goals of the Administration, should not, however, succeed in drawing attention away from the main point.

More than half of the MASF program is not in keeping with the Paris Agreement. Neither are the activities of the CIA or the indirect military subsidies provided by the Food for Peace and Commodity Import Programs. The elimination and or restructuring of these programs cannot be done without political changes Thiou and the Administration are most unwilling to make. The way out of the legal dilemma, the financial drain, the moral vacuum, and the politics of repression are all to be found in the accommodations envisaged in the Paris Agreement. There is no other path to peace.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Administration approaches the issue of military aid to the RVN with an air of inevitability entirely unjustified by the realities in Vietnam. Secretary Schlesinger describes a cease-fire that has not worked as well as he had hoped, as though this process happens in some remote world we have no control over. He speaks of inflation as though the American taxpayer could care less about taking up the further burden. He describes needed program readjustments as though these were justifications for the program. He hopes that Congress will simply push the funds through to get the issue out of the way. I hope that this Committee will accept Secretary Schlesinger's initial challenge early this year to examine critically all of the assumptions and programs in the enormous defense bills now before you. The MASF program would be an ideal place to start.

I would like to close with these formal recommendations.

(1) that the language and the additional spending authority for the MASF program be deleted from the supplemental bill

(2) that in lieu thereof the following language be inserted

"None of the funds appropriated herein, none of the funds heretofore appropriated, and none of the local currencies generated as a result of any legislated program may be used by any department, agency, or employee for the support of military or civil police in South Vietnam, for the support of Vietnamese court and prison systems of any kind, and for the support of surveillance, identification, and computer training activities in South Vietnam related to police, criminal, or prison matters."

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(3) that the appropriate committee(s) of Congress undertake a serious review and field investigation of the aspects of the MAST program raised herein before a decision on fiscal year 1975 funding levels is taken.

REFERENCES

3. These numbers were part of USAID testimony before a House Government Operations Subcommittee during November, 1973.
4. For a detailed study of the nature and timing of these reports, see D. Gareth Porter, “Vietnam—the Strategy of Misinformation,” available from IRO and soon to be published.
24. The quibble over whether there are 40,000 or 200,000 or some other number misses the point that there are more than none. The denial by RVN and American embassy authorities do not account for the malformed remnants of the lucky Vietnamese who crawl out (American POW’s walked) of RVN prisons. An introduction to this topic is Hostages of War, available from the Indochina Mobile Education Project in Washington. Of course, not all prisoners are tortured, not all prisoners are tiger cages, physical conditions have improved over the years, and public attention diminishes abuses. But the political nature and human results of the RVN judicial system are too well documented and too appalling to Ignore, as the Senate Appropriations Committee report noted last December.

APPENDIX A

VAST AID FROM UNITED STATES BACKS SAIGON IN CONTINUING WAR

(February 28, 1974)

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 16.—Ray Harris of Ponca City, Okla., has come back to Vietnam. This time he is not behind the machinegun or an Army helicopter but behind a workbench at the Bien Hoa Air Base, sitting next to South Vietnamese Air Force men and repairing jet fighter engines.
Mr. Harris is a civilian now, safer and better paid. But his changed role in the continuing Vietnam war has scarcely diminished his importance, for as a 27-year-old jet-engine mechanic he remains as vital to the South Vietnamese military as he was in 1966 as a 19-year-old helicopter gunner.

He is among 2,800 American civilians without whose skills South Vietnam's most sophisticated weapons would fall into disrepair. Employed by private companies under contract to the U.S. Defense Department, these men constitute one facet of a vast program of American military aid that continues to set the course of the war more than a year after the signing of the Paris peace agreements and the final withdrawal of American troops.

Whether the United States is breaking the letter of the agreements could probably be argued either way. But certainly the aid directly supports South Vietnamese violations and so breaks the spirit of the accords.

The United States, far from phasing out its military involvement in South Vietnam, has descended from a peak of warfare to a high plateau of substantial support, dispatching not only huge quantities of weapons and ammunition but also large numbers of American citizens who have become integral parts of the South Vietnamese supply, transport, and intelligence systems.

These include not just the Vietnam-based mechanics and technicians but also the Pentagon-based generals who tour airfields to ascertain the needs of the South Vietnamese Air Force, the "Haison men" who reportedly give military advice from time to time, the civilian Defense Department employees who make 2-to 3-week visits to provide highly specialized technical help, and the Central Intelligence Agency officials who continue to advise South Vietnam's national police on intelligence matters.

The total budgeted cost of military aid to South Vietnam is $518 million in this fiscal year, and the Pentagon has asked Congress for $1.45 billion next year, with most of the increase probably going for ammunition, which the South Vietnamese forces have expended at a high rate.

TRUE COST EVEN HIGHER

The true costs of the military support probably rise considerably above the official figures. Some of the aid, for example, comes in through economic programs that dump millions in cash into the Saigon Government's defense budget. And other costs—salaries of Pentagon technicans who make special visits, for example—are hidden in the vast budgets of the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy, and are not labeled "Vietnam."

These valuable military goods and services have a sharp political impact. They are indispensable to the South Vietnamese Government's policy of resistance to any accommodation with the Communists. Militarily, the extensive aid has enabled President Nguyen Van Thien to take the offensive at times, launching intensive attacks with artillery and jet fighters against Vietcong-held territory.

Furthermore, the American-financed military shield has provided Mr. Thieu with the muscle to forestall a political settlement. He has rejected the Paris agreements' provision for general elections, in which the Communists would be given access to the press, permission to run candidates, and freedom to rally support openly and without interference from the police.

VIETCONG MAINTAIN PRESSURE

Mr. Thieu has offered elections, but without the freedoms. The Vietcong, refusing to participate unless the freedoms are guaranteed, have maintained military pressure throughout the country, mostly with artillery and rocket attacks on Government outposts and, from time to time, with devastating ground assaults against Government-held positions. U.S. intelligence officials contend that continuing American aerial reconnaissance, as well as prisoner interrogation and radio monitoring, shows that the North Vietnamese have sent thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces south in violation of the Paris agreements. They have also refurbished a dozen captured airfields and built a large network of roads that threatened to cut South Vietnam in two.

Yet in battle the Communists appear more frugal with ammunition than the Government troops, who have been seen recently by Western correspondents spraying artillery across wide areas under Vietcong control as if there was no end to the supply of shells. This difference has bolstered the view of some diplo-
nats that China and the Soviet Union, unwilling to support an all-out offensive now, have placed limits on the rate of resupply to Hanoi.

Amid the political stalemate, then, the inconclusive war continues.

**KEEPING JETS IN THE AIR**

Ray Harris is at his workbench in the huge engine shop at the Bien Hoa Air Base just north of Saigon. He works for General Electric, which manufactures the jet engine that drives the Northrop F-5 fighter, the mainstay of Saigon’s Air Force.

He hunches over a circular fuser assembly, the last part of the engine before the afterburner. The assembly is invisibly cracked, and Mr. Harris is using a machine about the size of a dentist’s drill to grind down the metal so the crack can be welded.

There are Americans everywhere in the shop, which is devoted to repairing and overhauling fighter and helicopter engines. There is virtually noeworkroom or machine or assembly line where Americans are anything less than essential parts of the process. Although a few are training Vietnamese to take over the work eventually, most are simply doing the work, especially the highly technical jobs, themselves.

The line where rebuilt jet engines are finally assembled, for example, looks more like a factory somewhere in the United States than a shop belonging to the Vietnamese Air Force. Eight or 10 Americans work on several engines, and not a Vietnamese is in sight.

There are 25 Vietnamese assigned here, a technician says with a shrug, but he adds, “I never see them.”

**OUTPUT IS KEPT HIGH**

Ken Martin of G.E. is crouching with another American beside a jet engine that he has just assembled himself in four 12-hour days. Without the American technician, he says, the shop could produce no more than 40 percent of what it does. Another American, asked what would happen if he and his colleagues pulled out, replied, “This would turn into a big Honda repair shop.”

As self-serving and exaggerated as these assessments seem, they underscore the long-term military role that American civilians will have to play if the South Vietnamese are to have continued use of their complex weapons.

Without long training, mechanics in any modern air force probably could not match the skills of the American technicians, most of whom are not young Vietnam war veterans like Mr. Harris but seasoned experts who have been building and rebuilding engines for years on bases here and in the United States.

“Most of our people—this is the only work they’ve ever done,” said Glenn Miller, the 47-year-old G.E. supervisor at the shop. Mr. Miller has 22 years’ experience with company; all on jet engines.

His men are so vital that they—and those working on helicopters for Lycoming Aircraft—were all placed on 12-hour shifts last month during the week before Tet, the Lunar New Year holiday. Their objective was to get as many aircraft flying as possible, Mr. Miller explained, to be ready for any Communist offensive.

**$1,000 IN A LONG WEEK**

Mr. Miller figures that with overtime and other bonuses, some of the men made $1,000 a piece that week.

High pay is cited by many of the civilians as the main reason for their choice of Vietnam as a place of work. After a year on the job, G.E. employees get double their base salaries, bringing the average pay to $20,000 or more, plus $10 a day for food and lodging—an annual total in excess of $25,000.

Since living costs are low by American standards, and since the employees do not have to pay any Federal income tax on $20,000 a year if they are on American soil for at least 18 months, many say they save a good deal of money. Some add, that the money has become a silent source of resentment among the Vietnamese Air Force men, who earn only $30 to $55 a month.

This, plus profound war weariness, has made many Vietnamese men difficult to teach, the contractors say, “They are only kids, all of them—they don’t want to be in the military to begin with,” said Elmer Adams, a former U.S. Air Force man who works for Lycoming supervising helicopter repairs.
"It's a lack of desire," said a technician for Cessna Aircraft working at the Da Nang Air Base. "They've been under so much pressure for so long they just want peace. They're pacifists."

CRITICISM OF AMERICANS

It was said sympathetically, and the Cessna man went on: "All they know is that Americans came over here and tore up their country, uprooted their villages, and now they're looking for food."

Gilbert Walker, another technician, who asked that his company not be identified, observed: "The people I talk to in town care very little about the form of government they have. I guess I don't feel much different. I don't feel too much admiration for the present Government."

In that case, he was asked, why is he helping the South Vietnamese carry on the war? "I work for my company and I try to keep the aircraft flying," he replied. "I'm working on helicopters; that's all I know. Sometimes I sit back and think, what's it all for, what's the good of it all? It seems like an exercise in futility, what I'm doing."

Futile or not, the Americans' work has carried some of them to positions of considerable authority in the South Vietnamese military supply system. The South Vietnamese still call many of them "co van," which means "advisers," and the American office at the Da Nang base has a big sign over the door that reads, "Co Van."

The Americans often come to identify closely with their jobs, perhaps taking more responsibility than their contracts call for. In a revealing slip of the tongue, Mr. Adams of Lycoming looked around the Bien Hoa engine shop and remarked, "We're in the process—they're in the process, rather—of reorganizing the shop."

MANY STILL ON PAYROLL

The fact is that supply and transportation have remained an American operation. "We Vietnamized the fighting, but we never Vietnamized logistics," said a Defense Department official based in Saigon.

That is reportedly the principal reason the U.S. Defense Attache's Office—originally scheduled to be dismantled early this year—still contains about 1,150 people, of whom 50 are military men, according to official figures.

In addition, the reduction in the number of Americans working for private defense contractors has halted, allowing the figure to level off at approximately 2,800, down 2,200 since July, according to a spokesman for the Defense Attache's office.

The logistics effort—provision of maintenance, ammunition, weapons, trucks, fuel, electronics parts, and the like—is now the basis for the Americans' most pervasive and intimate contacts with the South Vietnamese military. Depending on how much terms as "military" and "advisers" are defined, there is evidence that the contacts occasionally cross into areas of relationship prohibited by the Paris agreements.

"The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," article 4 of the cease-fire agreement declares.

TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

Article 5 says: "Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all para-military organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time."

According to both American and South Vietnamese officials, the American civilians—both employees of private companies and those of the Defense Department—who help with supply activities not only see that the South Vietnamese get the equipment and ammunition they ask for but also advise them on what to ask for.

Some of these activities came to light as a result of the capture by the Chinese last month of a former U.S. Army Special Forces Captain, Gerald E.
Kosh, who was aboard a South Vietnamese naval vessel during a 2-day battle with Chinese forces in the Paracel Islands, in the South China Sea.

Mr. Kosh, who was taken prisoner and later released, was described by a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy as a "liaison officer" with the South Vietnamese military whose job was to observe the efficiency of various army, navy, and air force units and report to the Pentagon.

American officials steadfastly refused to provide further details of Mr. Kosh's job. They would not say exactly what he was supposed to observe or whether his reports were ultimately shared with the South Vietnamese. They did say that there were 12 such liaison men based in various parts of Vietnam.

**EXTENT OF ROLE UNCLEAR**

What is not clear is whether they confine their observations to such matters as the condition of equipment and the rate of ammunition expenditure, or whether they evaluate military tactics and strategies and go so far as to suggest alternatives.

What is fairly certain is that their reports end up in the hands of the South Vietnamese, perhaps providing indirect advice of one sort or another.

A South Vietnamese officer in a position to know said recently that normal procedure called for an American and a South Vietnamese to make an inspection or auditing tour of a military unit together. Then they write up their reports, sometimes separately, sometimes together. The reports, he said, are forwarded up the chain of command in the U.S. Defense Attache's Office, which then relays copies of them to Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, head of the Logistic Command for the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

More direct, overt advice is sometimes given by zealous Americans who are still stationed in every province. An embassy official reported recently that an American-based in one province boasted to him about a successful military operation: "I told them to clear the Communists out of there."

Actually, South Vietnamese military men do not seem anxious for such guidance, noting with some pain that their country has suffered for years under American advice. What they want from the United States is military aid.

**SIX GENERALS PAY A VISIT**

Clearly, the Pentagon continues to attach high priority to the success of the South Vietnamese military. Last fall a group of six Air Force generals based in the Pentagon visited the Da Nang Air Base to find out what equipment and aid were needed, according to the base commander, Lt. Col. Nguyen Tan Dinh. He said they were scheduled to come again this month.

A few weeks ago two civilian employees of the Air Force—one based in Hawaii and the other in Texas—were flown to Vietnam for a short stay so they could give advice on the repair and upkeep of plants that manufacture oxygen for jet fighters. One said he had been in and out of Vietnam frequently on similar missions since 1964, the other since 1968.

Although the Paris agreements explicitly rule out advisers to the police force, the South Vietnamese National Police continue to receive regular advice from Americans.

In a recent conversation with this correspondent, two high-ranking officers said they and their staffs met frequently with the Saigon station chief of the CIA and his staff. Sometimes, they said, the CIA chief asks the police to gather intelligence for him, and often they meet to help each other analyze the data collected.

A police official confirmed that in some provinces "American liaison men who work with the police remain on the job. "There are still some, but not so many," he said.

**EPISODE IN POLICE STATION**

Local policemen still refer to "American police advisers," according to James M. Markham, Salgon bureau chief of the New York Times, who was detained by the police late in January after a visit to a Vietcong-held area.

Mr. Markham said that in both Qui Nhon, where he was held overnight, and Phan Thiel, where he was detained briefly while being transferred to Saigon, policemen, talking among themselves, referred to the "police adviser." In Phan Thiel, he said, a policeman who had just flown in from Saigon said he was "in the middle of an emergency" and "to help me along."
names in the South. The issue is not to demobilize all of the million men of the RVN army and of the PNG forces at one time. The issue is to begin demobilization, to talk about demobilizing 200,000 or 300,000. You see, the present state, the present structure of the RVN state itself in Vietnam is not self-sustainable. The people who should be earning the money that should be available for taxes aren't earning any money. They are living on government salaries. Something on the order of a quarter of the entire work force is living off government salaries. That is an impossible situation to sustain in economic terms. We will be dealing with this also in very, very great detail before the Foreign Affairs Committees.

Mr. Hicks. You will ask to come back before this committee and say what you think that the United States should do?

Mr. Gran. Yes.

Mr. Hicks. You are not advocating cutting out all aid to Vietnam?

Mr. Gran. No.

Mr. Hicks. But you do say this supplemental can be cut off?

Mr. Gran. I believe this supplemental is essentially unnecessary to maintain the present political situation.

You see, there is much more money going for military aid for South Vietnam than what is contained in this program. You have $1.126 billion from the MASF program. Almost all of that goes to Vietnam. A little of it goes to Laos.

You have $280 million worth of food-for-peace in the agricultural bill right now. They say $250 million; the administration says $250 million, but the officials of the Agriculture Department says $280 million. It may go up if more commodities become available. In any case, the plasters generated by the sale of the agricultural commodities go for military uses. We also send over $200-$250 million of commodities in the C.I.P. program. That creates plasters. There is nothing to stop some or most of that money from going to military uses.

There are other programs for example, military service money. In one hearing DOD said $100 million was going to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974. Nobody can explain that. I called up DOD. What is military service money? They never heard of it. One man admitted in one hearing there is such a program. Excess defense articles is another example.

Mr. Slatinshek. Mr. Gran, for purposes of the record, I would like to point out that Mr. Gran had written a personal letter to the committee some time ago requesting the opportunity to present his personal views on the question of Indochina, and at that time we did respond and indicated that we would appreciate his personal views in the form of a written statement, but because of committee policy unless he represented an organization we, of course, couldn't take the time to hear his testimony.

Subsequently, a member of the committee did intervene and requested that we contact the organization again, at which time we received a letter from a Mr. Braffman, I believe, who was executive director of your organization, indicating you would be speaking for the organization.

As a consequence, you were invited to appear as a witness.
A high-ranking official of one of the non-Communist delegations, asked recently if he thought the United States was faithfully observing the one-for-one rule, replied, "Of course not."

There is nothing the commission can do about it without permission from both the South Vietnamese Government and the Viet Cong to investigate, and permission is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Saigon side. Similarly, the commission has been unable to audit other incoming weapons and ammunition for both sides. During the first year after the cease-fire, the United States provided South Vietnam with $5.4 million worth of ammunition a week, apparently unaccompanied by pressure to restrain military activities.

Several weeks ago Elbridge Durbrow, who was Ambassador to South Vietnam from 1957 to 1961, came to Saigon and met with Ambassadors Martin and General Murray. Mr. Durbrow, who denounced the Paris agreements and who declares, "I am a domino-theory man," was asked by newsmen whether the American officials had indicated that they were trying to keep South Vietnam from violating the cease-fire.

"Not from anybody did we hear that," he replied. Then, referring to General Murray, he said: "He's not that kind of man at all—just the opposite. If you are not going to defend yourself you might as well give up and let Hanoi take over."

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Price.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Mr. Gran, how did you become interested in Indochina? How long have you had this interest?

Mr. GRAN. Mr. Price, I started as an undergraduate in the academic year 1964-65, at Yale, where Prof. Harry Benda was teaching South-east Asian history.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Have you spent any time there?

Mr. GRAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. How much?

Mr. GRAN. I did some research there during the summer of 1971.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Which countries were you in when you were in Indochina?

Mr. GRAN. Well, I spent almost all my time in Saigon, in the area around Saigon. I did spend a day in Bangkok. I also spent a year in Paris doing research on Vietnam.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Were you in the military when you were in Saigon?

Mr. GRAN. No; in academia.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. How big an organization is the Indochina Resource Center?

Mr. GRAN. Well, in terms of people, actually at the center working in Washington, five to eight plus volunteers. We have a mailing-list of around one thousand.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Are you headquartered in Washington?

Mr. GRAN. There are two headquarters, one in Washington and one in Berkeley.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Are you an employee of the organization or an officer of it?

Mr. GRAN. We really don't look at it in that sense.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. Define your position with the group.

Mr. GRAN. I do research and write, contribute to publications and so forth. We either say staff consultant or research associate.

Mr. MEVIN PRICE. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Daniel.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm perplexed by the title of your testimony, From the title "Toward
Perpetual War or a Possible Peace" it certainly could be inferred the conclusions have been pre-determined.

Why not have given the title "Total Perpetual Peace or a Possible War"?

Mr. GRAN. Well, I don't think there is any total guarantee of peace. I think there is a reasonable guarantee if we continue to fund the Army at the level that we are now at we will continue to have wars.

If we cut them off to the penny, we will have peace and the other side will win. If we find some median level——

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Would that be a desirable result?

Mr. GRAN. In my viewpoint, some 2 or 3 million Vietnamese out of 18 million would be very unhappy. I think at the moment 4 or 5 million Vietnamese out of 18 million are pretty unhappy with the way it is now. The other ten million, unless you line them up against the wall, aren't going to be too politically involved. What I'm arguing for in this testimony and have been arguing for is some median level of aid wherein Thieu does not have the resources to continue what I feel are primarily aggressive military activities in violation of the accord, wherein he would be forced by lack of resources to address himself to the Paris Agreement and begin to make the political compromises that I think are the only way to find any kind of permanent peace in Vietnam.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. The research association—the Indochina Resource Center, who funds them?

Mr. GRAN. Who funds?

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Yes.

Mr. GRAN. Some small foundations and single individuals. We also sell subscriptions to some of our publications, and we occasionally get benefit shows. We subsist. We subsist on a very small level of financing.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Are you a full-time employee of the Center?

Mr. GRAN. Yes. And I live on a subsistence level.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Beard.

Mr. BEARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be curious about the point made:

The United States is, of course, quite successful in the physical process of delivering equipment. One Pentagon official recently admitted we shipped so much stuff to South Vietnam in the two months prior to the cease-fire, plus what went since, that a large new resupply of tanks, artillery pieces, and planes would only sit around the docks in crates.

Was this made in testimony or at a hearing?

Mr. GRAN. No; this was said to a Times or Post reporter in Saigon, I believe. I have the citation. That is the January New York Times story, I think.

Mr. BEARD. I would just be kind of curious who the Pentagon official was. I think at one time or another it might be interesting to have him, too, testify if they have shipped equipment over there that is sitting there now. Are there problems like that now?

Mr. GRAN. From what I have read I believe it worth asking for a congressional inquiry into the precise mechanisms of the MASF program, because I think if you hunted around various bases you would
find an awful lot of material that is indeed sitting in crates. I don’t think you would find ammunition there, which is what they are asking for.

Mr. Beard. I don’t think that is a problem totally related to our allies or the people we are helping because I know they had that problem for a while in Egypt and Syria when the Soviet Union resupplied in such large quantity equipment. It amazes me how we always seem to come out as the bad guys all the time. Have any studies or research been made from your organization regarding the supply of Red China and the Soviet Union toward North Vietnam or the Vietcong?

Mr. Gran. One of my colleagues has done some work on this. He has gone as far as any of the published material we can find. He has not published anything recently on that. It is extremely difficult to come up with reliable figures. I think DOD will tell us also it is extremely difficult to come up with even reasonable estimates of how much aid in a calendar year goes to Hanoi.

Mr. Beard. But would it not be legitimate to say if they slowed down their aid, if they were to slow down their aid, then North Vietnam would probably no longer be able to carry on the war also?

Mr. Gran. Well, the best evidence I have seen, the Far Economic Review and several other publications, suggests that both the Russians and the Chinese have cut down on their aid to all of the countries in Indochina over the past year, hoping apparently to try to encourage the North Vietnamese to get down to the business of making peace.

I think the decisions at the end of February of the National Assembly in North Vietnam was in part a recognition of this. They addressed primarily themselves to the agricultural needs of the country and decided they were not going to be able to sustain any major military ventures in the next year. That was the gist of the speeches there.

Mr. Beard. Does Jane Fonda—has she had any connection or association with your group?

Mr. Gran. Well, Jane Fonda—

Mr. Beard. I know what she is.

Mr. Gran. One coordinator of a group on the West Coast called the Indochina Peace Campaign, which is endeavoring to create a very loosely structured united campaign relating to the issues of peace in Vietnam, of which the Center knows about and sometimes deals with, but I would not say the Center is formally a part of the united campaign. The thing is so loose it is essentially meaningless.

Mr. Beard. I think Jane Fonda is extremely loose, among other things, and I feel very strongly toward her and I would have to think this would destroy any credibility, as far as I was concerned toward your group if I thought she was identified. I would like to see her underneath a jail somewhere, over in North Vietnam, where she belongs. But other than that, that is a different story.

James Markham, who is James Markham?

Mr. Gran. James Markham is the current New York Times correspondent in Saigon.

Mr. Beard. I see. All right, that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman, Mr. Hicks.

Mr. Hicks, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It looks to me, Mr. Gran, like the crux of it is on page 19 here where you say the deletion of this $474 million in supplemental aid would not seriously deprive Thieu, leave him a little shorthanded at worst. More importantly, it would communicate a message from the U.S. Congress that the American people are not going to continue to pay $2 or $3 million a year forever. I concur in that statement.

So that Thieu does not have to come to terms with the political and economic needs of his own people.

Well, now, what terms do you have in mind that he can come to?

Mr. Gran. Well, the Paris agreement does not intend that Mr. Thieu stay in power. It does not intend either that the PRG come to power in their present form. It is instead designed to encourage an evolution away from the present political polarization.

Mr. Thieu is in an extremely unviable economic position. The South Vietnamese state has existed for many years primarily on the resources of the American taxpayer. Something over 85 percent of the total resources spent to keep that government in existence comes from the United States.

Mr. Hicks. It is contemplated by the Paris agreement that there will be a military force in South Vietnam, though, is there not?

Mr. Gran. The Paris agreement addresses itself to the idea of several political parties getting together within a framework which the agreement describes to resolve political differences eventually by holding an election.

It doesn't address itself specifically to what kind of military forces will exist after that. But in the meantime, unfortunately it doesn't say a great deal about the military—indigenous military forces—it says all foreign military forces must leave. That has been one of the sources of conflict between the administration and its critics because the administration says the North Vietnamese are foreigners and must leave.

Article I says Vietnam is one country, which is the way most of the Vietnamese look at it. Consequently, North Vietnamese are not foreigners.

Mr. Hicks. You mentioned a moderate amount. What do you think is a moderate amount that should be furnished? Maybe we should get at it from that direction.

Mr. Gran. All right. We are right now engaged in the study to discover what in point of fact is a reasonable amount and we will request permission to come back to this committee and address the fiscal year 1975 request, and we will have a figure and we will try to defend it in a rational kind of way.

Mr. Hicks. Your objective will be to permit the military forces in being right now to continue to stay in being and to oppose whoever is operating against them?

Mr. Gran. No. The objective is to force the confrontation from the military arena to the political arena.

Mr. Hicks. How can you do that as long as North Vietnam continues to maintain armed people down there? Or do you deny that they are maintaining them?

Mr. Gran. No. It seems reasonable from the sum of evidence at the moment there are someplace between 170,000 and 240,000 North Viet-
The issue is not to demobilize all of the million men of the RVN army and of the PNG forces at one time. The issue is to begin demobilization, to talk about demobilizing 200,000 or 300,000. You see, the present state, the present structure of the RVN state itself in Vietnam is not self-sustainable. The people who should be earning the money that should be available for taxes aren't earning any money. They are living on government salaries. Something on the order of a quarter of the entire work force is living off government salaries. That is an impossible situation to sustain in economic terms. We will be dealing with this also in very, very great detail before the Foreign Affairs Committees.

Mr. Hicks. You will ask to come back before this committee and say what you think that the United States should do?

Mr. Gran. Yes.

Mr. Hicks. You are not advocating cutting out all aid to Vietnam?

Mr. Gran. No.

Mr. Hicks. But you do say this supplemental can be cut off?

Mr. Gran. I believe this supplemental is essentially unnecessary to maintain the present political situation.

You see, there is much more money going for military aid for South Vietnam than what is contained in this program. You have $1.126 billion from the MASF program. Almost all of that goes to Vietnam. A little of it goes to Laos.

You have $280 million worth of food-for-peace in the agricultural bill right now. They say $250 million; the administration says $250 million, but the officials of the Agriculture Department says $280 million. It may go up if more commodities become available. In any case, the plasters generated by the sale of the agricultural commodities goes for military uses. We also send over $200-$250 million of commodities in the C.I.P. program. That creates plasters. There is nothing to stop some or most of that money from going to military uses.

There are other programs for example, military service money. In one hearing DOD said $100 million was going to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974. Nobody can explain that. I called up DOD. What is military service money? They never heard of it. One man admitted in one hearing there is such a program. Excess defense articles is another example.

Mr. Slapinshek. Mr. Gran, for purposes of the record, I would like to point out that Mr. Gran had written a personal letter to the committee some time ago requesting the opportunity to present his personal views on the question of Indochina, and at that time we did respond and indicated that we would appreciate his personal views in the form of a written statement, but because of committee policy unless he represented an organization we, of course, couldn't take the time to hear his testimony.

Subsequently, a member of the committee did intervene and requested that we contact the organization again, at which time we received a letter from a Mr. Braffman, I believe, who was executive director of your organization, indicating you would be speaking for the organization.

As a consequence, you were invited to appear as a witness.
A number of the members have asked you something about the organization but I don't think the record is very clear as to what the objective of your organization really is.

Mr. Gran. I think the closest thing one could say is the objective is simply peace in Indochina.

Mr. Slatinshek. How do you propose to accomplish that?

Mr. Gran. Through the Paris agreements.

Mr. Slatinshek. I don't understand. You certainly are not in any way participating in that. You have no part in its formation. I'm not quite sure what you mean by that.

Mr. Gran. Well, there has been a war in Indochina for 30 years—that is from 1944-45—over basically political issues. It unfortunately has been fought in basically military terms. The Paris agreement sets out the framework and avenue within which those essentially political conflicts can be resolved and in an essentially peaceful manner.

As a Vietnamese historian I would argue that this is the only path wherein one can expect to arrive at peace in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Laos has already shown—in fact, the events of Laos in the last 4 months—

Mr. Slatinshek. I don't want to take up too much of the committee's time; getting back to the organization, it is a nonprofit, independent organization. It has no political objectives apparently.

Mr. Gran. I think peace in Indochina is a political objective. I would disagree with that.

Mr. Slatinshek. Well, in other words, this is your political objective, and you hope to accomplish this by, using your terminology, "educating people as to the facts in Indochina," isn't that it? Is that essentially the way you hope to operate?

Mr. Gran. I think that is a reasonable way of saying it, sir.

Mr. Slatinshek. Well, the reason I asked you that question, you devoted your entire statement to the circumstances, the situation in South Vietnam, and you have given us very little if any reference to North Vietnam.

Could you give us a little of your expertise on that subject?

Mr. Gran. I'm sorry. That doesn't come across as a question. In what sense? I have addressed what I feel to be—

Mr. Slatinshek. The problem of peace in Indochina involves both North and South Vietnam. You concentrated your observations on South Vietnam. There are two parties to this problem and consequently we can't ignore them. Since you are an expert on the subject we would like to know what you know about North Vietnam and what advice you have for us on the subject.

Mr. Gran. Well, I addressed what I feel to be the intentions of the North Vietnamese leaders in the testimony, and I argued that according to the evidence available, captured documents, the meetings of the National Assembly, and from other public statements of the North Vietnamese in the last 2, 4, or 5 months, it appears that the North Vietnamese remain content to attempt to work within the political framework of the Paris agreement. They will continue to exert some modest military pressure on the South, but they are primarily concerning themselves with the agricultural reconstruction of the North. That is really an absolute necessity.
Mr. Slatinsheik. What is your source of information? The news media?
Mr. Gran. For those kinds of reports, yes, sir; primarily.
Mr. Slatinsheik. No other sources of information?
Mr. Gran. Do you mean have I talked to any North Vietnamese diplomats?
Mr. Slatinsheik. Have you any access to any information other than the news media on the subject of North Vietnam?
Mr. Gran. Very, very little.
Mr. Slatinsheik. Can you tell the committee what sort of sources you do have?
Mr. Gran. Well, the embassies of various countries release various kinds of documents, including the Communist embassies in Southeast Asia. Le Monde diplomatic and Le Monde, frequently have correspondents in the North——
Mr. Slatinsheik. We won't take a lot more time on this.
Have you made any visits to North Vietnam? You did indicate you spent considerable time in Saigon and in South Vietnam, but have you made any visits to North Vietnam?
Mr. Gran. Have I? No, some of my colleagues have recently.
Mr. Slatinsheik. Have they been the source of information for you?
Mr. Gran. One source.
Mr. Slatinsheik. Could you identify them? We are concerned with credibility here.
Mr. Gran. OK. Don Luce has visited PRG zones. I don't think he spent very much time in Hanoi.
I think one of my friends and colleagues on the other coast, David Marr, hopes to go fairly soon. He is an historian.
Mr. Slatinsheik. You are acutely aware obviously of the amount of aid we have given to South Vietnam. Have you attempted to measure the amount of aid flowing into North Vietnam from the Russians and Red China? The Chinese?
Mr. Gran. I have looked at this problem, not in great detail. I have not found any material that I thought was really unimpeachable evidence. I could supply for the record, if you like, the best material we have available on that.
Mr. Slatinsheik. What you are saying is you really don't know what level of assistance is being provided North Vietnam?
Mr. Gran. I, of my own knowledge, do not know. I can cite reports showing $400 or $800 million, but the point is——
Mr. Slatinsheik. How can you come here in good conscience, and this is a personal judgment on my part, and recommend that we establish a level of aid to South Vietnam which may or may not be adequate when you don't have any idea of the assistance being given to North Vietnam?
Mr. Gran. Well, there is not a direct correlation. What we are concerned with is the political intentions of North Vietnam. As you heard this morning, from Mr. Clements and also from myself, there appears at this point in time no intention by the North Vietnamese or the PRG of escalating the level of military activity.
Now, should those things change——
Mr. SLATINSHEK. How do you ascertain that?

Mr. GRAN. Primarily, by the captured COSVN documents, and by the 'North Vietnamese National Assembly speeches. And by other sources.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Thank you, Mr. Gran. I have no other questions.

Mr. BEARD. Excuse me a minute. I would like to ask this: We talked about South Vietnam. What is the attitude as far as we talk about military aggression by the North Vietnamese? Apparently now they are satisfied to go through the normal procedures of the Paris agreement, of the guys in the white hats. What is the attitude or have you made any study about their involvement in Cambodia at this time?

Mr. GRAN. At this particular point in time, I haven't looked at the Cambodian problem in 3 or 4 months. I believe they are still providing a fair amount of supply. I do not think that very many North Vietnamese are involved in actual military actions.

Mr. BEARD. How much would be necessary before you feel they would be aggressors? One hundred or 500 or, in other words, you are acknowledging they are playing games in Cambodia. A country that when we go back to article I and all that other that we are able to make reference to, under what guidelines is North Vietnam fighting or playing the role of the aggressor in Cambodia? What guidelines are they able to justify this through?

Mr. GRAN. By their own statements, they would argue that article 20 is the article that refers to Cambodia, which says all foreign forces should leave Cambodia, and they would argue that that includes Americans as well as North Vietnamese. They would argue that it is inoperative since the Americans have not left, which is obviously a very helpful argument from their perspective.

Mr. BEARD. And you are making a fairly helpful argument on their behalf, also, and I think you——

Mr. GRAN. Cambodia is a somewhat different situation. There is a much more clear-cut picture of outside intervention of both the United States and the North Vietnamese.

Mr. BEARD. I will believe for myself. I regret—if I had my way on it, we would not leave them, and we will not leave them holding the bag. You know, I look at our responsibility to Israel, and I would imagine—it is amazing some of the biggest doves and biggest anti-Vietnam, or Far East supporters are some of the biggest hawks, when it comes to another situation.

I think we have a big responsibility over there. I think your information, in some of the areas you are relying too much on the press and what the North Vietnamese have said. How much did you deal with Mr. Thieu? Did you get into the inner workings and see their problems? We have problems here, too, and we aren't perfect over here as you are well aware. Did you get involved with the people that are trying to make it work and get the inside picture of it? There are two sides to every story.
Mr. Gran. I find there are more than two sides to every story. Indeed, you are right; this country and Southeast Asia and all countries have their problems.

I did not deal in any great detail with the South Vietnamese Government while I was in Saigon. I was primarily doing research and my other observations were simply from wandering around looking at the different living habits and living styles and levels of wealth and poverty and so forth in the greater Saigon area.

Mr. Beard. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Gran. Mr. Ichord.

Mr. Ichord. Mr. Chairman, I haven't had time to read the statement of Mr. Gran, but I am curious as to who the Indochina Resource Center is. This is the first time I have heard of the organization. How long has your organization been in being, Mr. Gran? You are speaking on behalf of the Indochina Resource Center?

Mr. Gran. Yes, sir. We were founded in July, 1971.

Mr. Ichord. 1971?

Mr. Gran. Yes, sir, in Washington.

Mr. Ichord. Based where?

Mr. Gran. Here, in Washington.

Mr. Ichord. What do you have, a board of directors? How do you get your financing?

Mr. Gran. We were rounded under the aegis of and we still get our principal financial support from church groups and a board of churches.

Mr. Ichord. Who is on your board of directors?

Mr. Gran. I will have to start—

Mr. Ichord. You are speaking on behalf of an organization, you don't know who is on your board of directors?

Mr. Gran. I'm sorry, I can supply that for the record, and the precise address.

Mr. Ichord. Do you know one of them? What kind of organization do you have?

Mr. Gran. I think I will correct this if I'm wrong, I think Dudley Ward of the United Methodists is one.

Mr. Beard. Who?

Mr. Gran. Mr. Dudley Ward.

I'm sorry, we have very little contact with them in the sense of day-to-day contacts.

Mr. Ichord. You mean the board of directors has no control whatsoever over you as a researcher?

Mr. Gran. Yes, sir, that is essentially so.

Mr. Ichord. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We appreciate your appearance.

[The following information was received for the record:]

The committee was most interested in my personal background and that of IRC.

I went to Yale (a B.A. in history, 1966) where I was most privileged to begin my study of Southeast Asia during 1964-65 under the late Prof. Harry Benda, the premier historian of that area in this country and to be introduced to Vietnam by the late Prof. Paul Mus, perhaps the greatest scholar of Vietnam the West has produced. I then took an M.A. from the University of Washington (1967)
and enrolled in the Ph. D. program at the University of Wisconsin. I am currently revising a dissertation on the transformation of rural Vietnam during the colonial era (1880-1949).

Research was done as a Fulbright-Hays scholar in Paris (1969-70) and on a generous grant from the University of Wisconsin in Saigon during the summer of 1971. I taught 2 years at North Carolina State University and then came to Washington. In the last year and a half I have worked both on and off the Hill, specializing in the American aid programs to Indochina. I have published six articles thus far and made three congressional presentations.

IRC was founded in 1971 by students of Vietnam who felt that the empirical evidence supports positions far removed from the administration positions. It collects evidence from all sources both here and abroad and publishes it in many formats. It is funded by the United Methodist Board of Church and Society here in Washington. The board has many different educational, cultural, and religious projects. It does not give out the names of its donors. IRC exists on a budget of about $30,000 a year which pays 4-5 subsistence salaries, modest rent, and enormous printing costs.

The center's positions are based on the sum of the available evidence. Those who disagree are welcome to come and look at our primary material; one of our main functions is to service any reasonable informational request from groups or individuals of any persuasion. The center would be delighted to see any new and superior evidence on any matter relating to Indochina anyone would care to contribute.

Mr. Slatinshcek, the next witness.

Mr. Slatinshcek. The next witness is former Ambassador Durrow, representing the American Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador.
Identify yourself for the record, please, sir.

Ambassador Durrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here. My name is Elbridge Durrow; I'm a retired Foreign Service officer with 38 years of foreign service, I was Ambassador in Vietnam from 1957 to May of 1961. And I just got back from a fact-finding trip, with a group to Vietnam, 13 years after I had left. We submitted a report to all members of the Congress, the Senate and the House. I think you all have the report.

I would like to for the record here submit another copy, the same thing you all received.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you summarize it.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELBRIDGE DURROW, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Ambassador Durrow. We were asked last October 1, whether we could get a group of mixed people, academic, press, members of Congress, and others, and a group up to about ten, to go over and visit anything we wanted to see in Vietnam, talk to anybody we wanted to talk to, and come back and give our report.

We took some time to get people who could be free to go about the same time—not everybody could go at exactly the same time—a couple of them came a bit earlier or left later. We finally worked it out dur-
ing the academic Christmas vacation time and the congressional break at Christmas to go over there in January, and get back here before the opening of Congress on the 21st.

We sent a list ahead of time of things we would like to see, talk to the people we would like to see, and things of that kind. We requested that we would have the right to go see anybody we wanted particularly, because of the going campaign by various groups in this country about the alleged 200,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam, all allegedly locked up by President Thieu because they didn’t like him, about the cruelty in the prisons, and the fact that the South Vietnamese Government was breaking the Paris accords nilly-willy, and things of that kind. We were sponsored, on the Vietnamese side by the Vietnam Council on Foreign Relations, the same name in New York, but no connection. They were the group that sponsored that side, and the American Security Council did the footwork and legwork here, and got the report out when we came back.

We were over there. We saw a great deal. We didn’t see everything we put in our list. It was a long shopping list, and the time was short. But we saw the principal things we went over there to see. We traveled about 3 days of the week we were in Saigon, we visited various ministries and offices and things like that, in Saigon. But we went from North to South, from the Mekong Delta, to Quang Tri. We visited Cantho, Soc Trang, My Tho, we went up to the North, up to the new cease-fire line, the river at Quang Tri, visited Hue, Da Nang, Quang Tri, Hue and the old Marine base Phu Bai. The trip to the South and the one to the North were on separate days. We saw lots of things, we talked to lots of people. Having been there myself for four years-plus, I knew I would meet a lot of my friends. I found many more than I expected to. It was very pleasurable for me. Some American businessmen who had been there when I was were still there. I could talk to them frankly about things that were going on. We paid visits to villages, and farms, during the harvest down in the Mekong Delta. Incidentally, we had Americans, not just the Vietnamese translating for us. I didn’t learn Vietnamese when I was out there. I was supposed to speak French pretty well, that was the lingua-franca then. We had our own look at things, talking to people, and the most important thing was, we did visit Con Son Island. I didn’t go that particular day, unfortunately I got a rather sore throat, and some fever, so I didn’t visit the Con Son Island Prison Camp. But the rest of our group did. They spent almost a day over there. You will probably recall in 1970 in July, Life Magazine came out with a rather horror story about the “tiger cages” in South Vietnam run by “dictator” Thieu, as he is referred by some—as many of those who write stories like that—how prisoners were in very little cages, were shackled to the top bars, with very little ventilation, etc. The implication was that they were underground in dungeons, more or less like a lot of our own POW’s in North Vietnam, before they were released just last year.

These cages are in fact above-ground. They are 10 feet 6 inches by 6 feet 3 inches, long and wide, and 10 feet high. They have a grille on top, very large barred grilles. They have a large, barred door where these men were let in and out. So they are well ventilated. They are not
being used. I might say for the record. When they were used, they were not cages, so when men came out they were so cramped and paralyzed they couldn't straighten themselves out as implied in the Life story.

Perhaps one of the interesting things we ran into—it was in the record I just gave to the committee, the numbers of prisoners on the island. What they do, for instance—the trustees, the 3,000-odd trustees that are out raising vegetables and doing things in the various factories that they have there to produce things for the prison, and about 500 Vietcong infrastructure cadre we saw there who were still locked up.

Some of the Vietcong cadre had accepted the South Vietnamese offer: Do you want to become a trustee? You can come out and work on the farms. There are five farms from the pictures I saw, a brick factory, a pig farm, a woodworking factory. The Vietcong could come out and do like a majority of the prisoners in the prisoner colony were doing. Few Vietcong accepted.

These 500 said, no, we want to join our revolutionary forces and come back and overthrow the Thiệu government. I presume—I have not tried to check this—that by now the 500 men, the Vietcong infrastructure, VCI, have been released. The final military and civilian political prisoner exchanges have taken place since we left there.

I found, considering the things the South Vietnamese people have gone through, they are doing quite well. They have lots of problems; they have a cease-fire that allows the North Vietnamese to have—I heard many figures—they go from 180,000 to 200,000 North Vietnamese troops in the South. They have no provisions in the agreement that they must leave. And they have been breaking those agreements almost since the first day they were signed on the 27th of January, 1973.

As you recall, the Canadian representatives on the International Control Supervision Committee finally gave up and left Vietnam in July 1973, because they could not make things work and they stated that they could not make it work because basically of the activities of the North Vietnamese.

I would like to read this statement. This is an excerpt from a 43-page report, sort of the “swan song” of the Canadian representatives from the International Control Commission, Control and Supervision Committee (ICCS). This is the excerpt from a report dated July 19, 1973, entitled “ICCS Investigation R7/106”.

From the testimony of the captured North Vietnamese Army soldiers it can be concluded that there never was the slightest indication during the first and one-half years following the cease-fire that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had, in any way, complied with its obligations under the cease-fire, or that the North Vietnamese authorities had put any serious attempt to make this cease-fire observed by the North Vietnamese forces within the Zone of Control. The North Vietnamese authorities had failed to take any serious action to prevent these violations of the cease-fire including the violation of the cease-fire by North Vietnamese forces within the Zone of Control, which were, in many instances, confirmed by the Cambodian representatives when they left the country at the end of the month of April. And it will be difficult to forego the study, in the future, of the activities of the North Vietnamese.

That incident was similar to a statement the Canadians made in my day, or our talk—I mean, when I was Ambassador out there. The ICC, the original arm of the Geneva Accords, when the Canadians and the Indian delegation that committee stated in June 1962:

There is evidence to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, ammunition, and other supplies have been sent from the Zone of the North to the Zone of the South, with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against forces and administration
of the Zone of the South... There is evidence that the PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) has allowed the Zone of the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the Zone of the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration of the South.

That was when President Diem was there, and Hanoi has not overthrown the South Vietnamese Government yet. The two statements by the two Canadians show why in 1973 the Canadians weren't going to be a party to this phony agreement, supposed to assure they had control—they had no control. Infiltration was still taking place—this is rather significant in my opinion.

One thing stated by the misguided or other groups saying we should be out of Vietnam or shouldn't give so much aid, military and other aid, is because President Thieu as a "dictator, a ruthless, hated dictator," different words are used, actually—but it is rather significant to me that this "hated" dictator, if he is that—and I don't think so—he must be very naive, because he has distributed to over 500,000 World War II type, arms to the People's Self-Defense Force, which is the peasant part-time-soldiers force chosen in their village to defend the residents.

President Thieu also distributed to the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, sort of a "home guard" to defend their regions or provinces, another 500,000 arms, and those are M-16's and a M-79 grenade launchers.

They have those arms. They are there in the countryside. If they do hate Thieu and he is such a "ruthless dictator," he has distributed over 1 million arms in the countryside and they can shoot both ways. So far they have not shot the wrong way, and I don't think they will.

I talked to my friends there. I found from them that they all didn't like everything Thieu is doing, but added he can't do everything in a hurry. They don't have all the nuances of American-type democracy. I doubt if they will ever have American type of democracy in that part of the world, in the Philippines, Korea, Cambodia, Laos. So from the moment, you have much freedom and things of that kind. I don't think for a number of decades we will ever see American-type democracy in that part of the world, but there are many freedoms. There is opposition in the Assembly, 50 or 60 men, who raised the devil, by the way, the day we left there, protesting and shaving their heads in protest and things of that kind.

The report of the 200,000 prisoners was based on a study done by a Catholic priest, Father Chan Tin, a Vietnamese Catholic priest. He also has his own organization there. He has been very much against the Thieu regime. He says so and talks against them. He claims he knew where 202,000 political prisoners were, in lockups, in Con Son, and in the prisons like the group saw on the island.

Our Ambassador there made a study. This has been reported in our press; it has been referred to in some detail. He had his staff make a very careful study including a long interview of Father Chan Tin, to find out how he reached his figure and thought he had found or knew about some 200,000 political prisoners being detained in South Vietnam.

Our official representatives have been out there a long time. We know where the prisons and lockups are. We did know before our police advisers had to leave after the Paris accords of 1973. We now have the vice consuls and consuls living out in the countryside, they
know what is going on. That is quite legitimate under the Paris accords.

These consular officers know of no political prisoners in their areas. The Ambassador ran this allegation down. The total capacity of lock-ups, prisons, jails, etcetera, in South Vietnam is no more than 51,000 even under very crowded conditions. Actually, in the middle of last year when he made this study, the record shows there were only 35,000 plus actually locked up in the whole country—crooks, bandits, rapists, murderers, assassins, etcetera. While there may be some political prisoners in prison because they didn't like Thieu and said so, but at least Mr. Martin, our Ambassador, doesn't know of any. This despite the fact he has asked every possible person he could think of—opposition members there, reliable journalists from our side, from the United States, and other countries, representatives of international organizations, if they could give him the name of any or just one political prisoner who has been locked up because he opposed the Thieu regime.

Up to 2 weeks ago he has not yet had anybody say, “Here is the name of one or more political prisoners.” He has checked out some allegations but he has not found one yet. These allegations of hundreds of thousands of political prisoners give the impression that Thieu is a ruthless dictator who locks up anybody who is against him. But Father Tin is not locked up. He is running around, making his charges and talking to anybody. He is not locked up. Big Minh, the famous opposition general—I knew him very well—he is a very nice fellow—he too is not locked up. Vu Van Mao, who was Diem's Minister of Foreign Affairs, is now an opposition senator and has been very vociferous about it. He also is not locked up.

Our Embassy had no evidence of persons locked up solely because they opposed President Thieu.

They do need aid; there is no question about it. It has only been 1 year since we pulled out, and all the money that is naturally spent when you have troops and other personnel in the country, the foreign exchange they earned from these persons has been cut off, of course. But they are pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps, and they are doing quite well—considering what they have to work with. We went down the Delta and watched the harvest, which was quite well along. It is a good harvest this year by the way, the rice harvest. They will not be self-sufficient in rice, but it is much better than in the past. They say they are keeping the Vietcong from stealing much of it and diverting it to their own uses.

They do need military assistance because of the infiltration. I told you the Canadians told the world about in early last year. And there is evidence from aerial photographs of the Ho Chi Minh Trail showing continued heavy infiltration. It looks like the Jersey Turnpike on a busy Monday morning. Bumper to bumper, coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, down through Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam.

You can get all of this from the report, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: May I interrupt there.

Ambassador Dunn: Surely.

The CHAIRMAN: The committee would appreciate very much if you would address yourself now on your feeling of the matter—on the ap-
plication of the supplemental which is before us, whether it is neces-
sary for the supplemental at this time, or should it be delayed until the
regular order of business?
Ambassador Durbin. Mr. Chairman, I will respond to that, but un-
fortunately I don’t know enough about the nuts and bolts. I used to
when I was on active duty follow those things and be able to talk about
them item by item. But I just don’t know enough about it.
But I will say this, from what Ambassador Martin told us, what
General Murray, the Defense attaché told us, and members of his staff,
what the Vietnamese military told us, too: they do need supplemental
assistance for two or three reasons.
First of all, the oil embargo. They got caught on that, too—but it
was lifted from them a short time ago. The added inflation brought on
by the price of oil. I don’t know why so many of our people doubt
almost every American who knows something about that country. Our
record, our acts, are thought by too many to be propaganda, such as
DOD, State, or some other agency trying to get some more money.
But our representatives over there, who are very loyal Americans, say
because of the stepped-up North Vietnamese attacks, they have ex-
changed more of this, that, and the other thing, or lost more of these,
whether they are APC’s or something, and they do need this supple-
mental, to make up for heavy losses.
I cannot talk to the details of how many pounds and so forth.
As an example of apparently misleading news stories, I request per-
mission to submit for the record these two letters addressed to the edi-
tors of the New York Times and the Washington Post by the chair-
man of “Accuracy In Media.”

[The following information was received for the record:]

ACCURACY IN MEDIA, INC.,
1232 PENNSYLVANIA BLDG., 425 13TH STREET, NW.,

Mr. ARTUR OCHS SULZBERGER,
President and Publisher, The New York Times, Times Square, New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SULZBERGER: In his fine little booklet, “How to Get More Out of Your
Newspaper,” Theodore M. Bernstein of the New York Times wrote:

“...The conscientious newspaper and its writers never express opinions in report-
ing the news...”...the newspaper never argues a case in the news columns...;
And the news columns, of course, never advocate anything.”

A little further on, Mr. Bernstein says:

“The news columns purvey information, not propaganda. And suppressing infor-

mation about an unpleasant subject constitutes propagandizing just as much
as do exaggeration and distortion. As a matter of fact, readers would be ill served
if their newspaper did not give them full information about a potential enemy—
Information that might alert them to the nature of the threat and permit them to
appraise it.”

Later Bernstein notes that the basic theory of American journalism is that
facts must be kept rigidly separated from opinion. He says.

“Mixing facts and opinion is like putting ground glass in sugar; once you do it,
you cannot separate them, and you have a highly dangerous concoction on your
hands. The result is bound to be an inability of the reader to determine which is
fact and which is opinion and a perverted press devoted to propagandizing for
causes.”

I do not know whether Mr. Bernstein is with the Times any longer. If not, it
seems that his principles have also departed with him. I wrote to you 10 days ago
about the seriously distorted account that the Times carried of the report of the
I anticipated that this well-documented criticism would bring forth immediate
results and a correction in The Times. It is deeply disappointing to note that this
has not been the case. Surely, suppressing the true facts about the herbicide
report adds up to a form of propagandizing, as Bernstein pointed out. Will you not
insist that a prompt correction be made?

I thought of Bernstein again when I read Ambassador Graham Martin’s criti-
cism of David Shipler’s article on Vietnam in The Times of February 25, 1974.
I have not yet had the advantage of seeing Ambassador Martin’s detailed critique,
but I have looked at Mr. Shipler’s article to see how well it conforms with Bern-
stein’s description of how a conscientious newspaper and its writers behave.

The first thing that strikes one’s attention is that in this lengthy article on
violations of the Paris accords, there is almost nothing at all said about violations
of the accords by the Communists. One short paragraph disposes of this
subject, portraying Communist violations merely as something U.S. intelligence
officials “contend” occur. Strangely, Mr. Shipler discussed U.S. violations with
the International Control Commission, but he says nothing whatsoever about
their views on violations by the Communists. He also quotes Ambassador
Elbridge Durbrow as saying that American officials were not trying to keep
the South Vietnamese from violating the cease-fire. Ambassador Durbrow informs
me that this was stated in the context of pointing out that the other side was
constantly violating the cease-fire and that it would be folly for the South Viet-
namese to honor the agreements unilaterally under the circumstances prevail-
ing. Mr. Shipler ignored that point.

“Suppressing information about an unpleasant subject constitutes propagan-
dizing just as much as do exaggeration and distortion.” Perhaps Communist
violations of the Paris accords is an unpleasant subject to Mr. Shipler. Surely he
could have obtained ample information about it to include in his article and
place it in the American and South Vietnamese violations in proper context.
He chose not to do this. By Bernstein’s definition, he engaged in propagandizing.

In addition, I am impressed by the extent to which Mr. Shipler mixed fact and
opinion in his article. Let’s consider some examples.

Speaking of David Harris, a civilian mechanic, Mr. Shipler says: “(A) a
27-year-old jet engine mechanic he remains as vital to the South Vietnamese
military as he was in 1966 as a 19-year-old helicopter gunner.” That is Mr.
Shipler’s opinion.

“(T)he Pentagon has asked Congress for $1.45 billion next year, with most of
the increase—probably going for ammunition, which the South Vietnamese forces
have expended at a high rate.” That is Mr. Shipler’s opinion.

“Yet in battle the Communists appear more frugal with ammunition than
the Government troops” Mr. Shipler again gives us his opinion.

“(T)he fact that the South Vietnamese are to have continued use of their complex weapons.” More
opinion.

One could go on, but the point is obvious. Mr. Shipler has not written a news
story. He has larded his article with his opinions, omitting the facts that would
enable the reader to understand what is really transpiring in Vietnam, and
creating a thinly fashioned piece of advocacy journalism.

I once told Turner Catledge that the late Jim Lowes had said that the New
York Times had never had a reporter in Vietnam that was not out side. Catledge
replied that that might be true, but he challenged me to produce any published
display from a Times reporter in Vietnam that betrayed the reporter’s symp-
athies. Mr. Shipler’s article would be an excellent example to offer to Mr.
Catledge. Ted Bernstein said the news columns never advocate anything, but Mr. Shipler is clearly advocating precisely what Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda are advocating—terminating American aid to South Vietnam. It is a nicely orchestrated campaign. That is my opinion.

I wonder if you personally approve of this use being made of this great newspaper. If not, do you have in your power to reintroduce the principles of good journalism described by Ted Bernstein?

Sincerely yours,

Reed J. Irvine

Accuracy in Media, Inc.

The Editor,
The Washington Post
Washington, D.C.

Sir: Ambassador Graham Martin concluded his detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph critique of a recent New York Times story from Vietnam by saying that the story was "a case study of propaganda under the guise of investigative reporting" rather than a responsible journalistic effort.

Accuracy in Media has analyzed the Times' story and the Martin critique, and we find that the Ambassador's criticism is fully justified: The Times' reporter, David Shipler, liberally larded his news story with his personal opinions and judgments. He used the well-known device of making other points that he wants to make through the words of others, unfortunately selecting individuals with no obvious qualifications as authorities in the areas in which he employed them. In a lengthy story laden with criticism of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam for violations of the Paris accords, Shipler barely mentions the well-known fact that the Communists have been flagrantly violating the accords, and in the one paragraph in which he alludes to this, he does so in a way that suggests that he is skeptical of the charges of Communist violations. He even implied that Communist artillery and rocket attacks were justified, failing to mention that children and unarmed civilians are often main target of these attacks. Ignoring the continued North Vietnamese and Vietcong attacks and military buildup in South Vietnam which require defensive reactions from the South Vietnamese Government, Shipler charged that it was U.S. military aid, not the behavior of the Communists, that sets the course of the war.

The Shipler article, according to Ambassador Martin's commentary, is replete with factual inaccuracies, innuendo and bald assertions not backed by any evidence or proof. Shipler tries very hard to make the point that American aid to the national police of Vietnam is continuing despite a recently passed legislative ban on such aid. Ambassador Martin states that the legislative mandate is being scrupulously complied with, contrary to Shipler's assertions. He also points out the American people should understand why the Communists are so anxious to see support of the police by U.S. aid eliminated. He states that an effective police force is the most effective deterrent to terror and subversion and is therefore a bar to the achievement of the Communist goals. The Ambassador charged that Shipler's article closely fitted the propaganda line of the Communists.

For having the temerity to criticize a "newsman," Ambassador Martin has been subjected to a vicious attack in the news columns and in an editorial in the Washington Post. Murrey Marder's 18-column inch article on Ambassador Martin's critique of Shipler's story covered only 8 of some 60 points made by the Ambassador. Twenty percent of the space was used to attack Ambassador Martin rather than to report what he had said about Shipler.

This attack was placed at the beginning of the story, apparently to make sure that no reader of the Post would give any credence to the ambassador's criticism. To make doubly sure the readers knew how to react, Mr. Marder called the ambassador's critique an "outburst." The news story omitted virtually all of the facts presented by Ambassador Martin to show how biased, distorted and inaccurate the Shipler article was. Notably, Marder said nothing whatever about the very important point that Shipler had neglected to discuss the thousands of flagrant violations of the cease-fire by the Communists while focusing entirely on South Vietnamese violations and charging that it was American aid, not the requirements of self-defense, that was responsible for them.
If the Shipler article is a good case study of propaganda, as Ambassador Martin charged, Marder's news story is a classic example of advocacy journalism. It was designed not to tell the reader what the Ambassador had said and why he was provoked into saying it, but rather to develop reader antagonism against this ogre who dared criticize the press.

The Post next put its editorial writers to work to finish off the ambassador. The editorialist had nothing whatsoever to say about Ambassador Martin's devastating demonstration that the Times had printed a grossly inaccurate, distorted article. Instead of analyzing the ambassador's critique to see whether his points were justified or accurate, the Post indulged in another ad hominem attack on the ambassador. It characterized his critique as "a throwback to the bad old days of one-sided, self-serving, oversimplified reporting on Vietnam . . . ." Ambassador Martin demonstrated in great detail that Shipler's reporting had been one sided, oversimplified, and inaccurate. He did not charge that it was self-serving, but he did charge that it served the ends of the Communists, who have mounted a very intensive campaign to terminate American aid to Vietnam.

This outraged the editorial writer. It was not clear whether he did not believe that the Communists had launched such a campaign or whether he did not believe that the Times' article fitted in with that campaign, wittingly or unwittingly. The existence of the campaign can be easily ascertained merely from an examination of the Communist press. It is not necessary to know Mr. Shipler's motives to determine whether or not his article supported the objectives of that campaign. However, it can be said that if Mr. Shipler had set out to write an objective article, presenting all the facts that were available to him in a balanced manner, he would have produced a very different article and one that would not have supported the objectives of the campaign nearly as well. His duty as a journalist was for some reason forgotten.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn noted this peculiarity of many of our journalists in his letter to Aftenposten nominating Andrei Sakharov for the Nobel Peace Prize. He said:

The hbestial mass killings in Hue, though reliably proved, were only lightly noticed and almost immediately forgiven because the sympathy of society was on the other side, and the inertia could not be disturbed. It was just too bad that the information did seep into the free press and for a time (very briefly) cause embarrassment (just a tiny bit) to the passionate defenders of that other social system.

Whatever it was that caused the news media to virtually ignore the bestial mass killings in Hue in 1968 by the Communists could also explain the appearance of one-sided, inaccurate, distorted articles such as Mr. Shipler's that build support for termination of American aid to South Vietnam.

Perhaps the Washington Post, with its demonstrated capacity for investigative journalism, could assign a few ace reporters to discover just what this peculiar force that produces such journalistic deformities might be.

Sincerely yours,

REED E. IVERE.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't expect you to, We just wanted the association to the application of the supplemental in that sense.

Ambassador DUNN. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. MR. HICKS.

MR. HICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. Ambassador, is this in your view apt to go on forever?

Ambassador DUNN. No, if it does we will have to give up. My "inexact estimate"—and again I don't know all the details—it will be a few years more—2 or 3.

All the Vietnamese I talked to, and my own friends out there, the Americans, not just the official ones, said the Vietnamese are building up steam and are getting ready for a take-off. With your help we can take off in 1 or 2 years; they insisted. But if the fighting is stepped up, if it has another Easter offensive, or Tet offensive, that would throw everything out of gear again. But at the present level of the aid intensity, they can take off in a year or 2 years.
One thing I forgot to add, in a general sense, is the thing that was so gratifying to me, because I do like the people—I spent 4½ years with them—was that from my American friends, civilians, Vietnamese, and military, all referred to the unbelievable spirit of determination. All said one way or another, "We've got Vietnamization. It is working and we are going to make it work. We have a rough row to hoe. We have 196,000, whatever it is, North Vietnamese here, but we are going to win. We will make it go. If they get out we will gladly work out the inequalities according to the peace accords and go ahead with internationally supervised general elections in which all can participate.

Sometimes it is forgotten, three times in 1973 and once in 1974, the Vietnamese Government has offered a program for general elections but was turned down by the others every time.

Mr. Hixs. Mr. Ambassador, you had a kind of a unique opportunity. How do you compare the present regime with the Diem regime?

Ambassador Durkow. We had the same things thrown at us by American groups that thought the other way when I was there. There was not the heavy fighting going on, only sporadic guerrilla-type operations beginning in 1959. But by 1961 it got pretty bad.

Mr. Hixs. The Government of the country itself?

Ambassador Durkow. Diem was a tough ruler. He didn't lock everybody up because they were against him. But he didn't like some of the things that were going on and he did some things that some of his own people like General Thieu and General Minh didn't like and so they overthrew him in a coup d'état in 1963. But the people, I think, are basically very happy today. Again, neither Diem nor Thieu had or have American-type democracy, but not too many countries in the world have our type government. It doesn't take very well down in Southeast Asia.

But they are comparatively free and comparatively happy. Between the two of them, I would give Thieu better marks. This for one particular reason. Diem had a land-reform program which we helped to set up, the American aid program people. We did the work and the surveying. If I remember the figures correctly, he distributed about 1,200,000 acres to about 650,000 families—farmers, in other words.

It was broken up by the war and the Vietcong and things of that kind. But today President Thieu has a much better program. He has distributed about 3,250,000 acres to about 800,000 families under the "land to the tillers" program. A person who has in the past tilled that land as a tenant farmer for a certain period of time—everybody in the village knows he has been tilling that piece of land—can get his first claim to that land if he will continue to work it until he passes on and his children continue tilling the land, in 10 years he gets full title and doesn't pay a danged cent for it.

That, to me, is a much better plan than Diem's. But Diem had a land reform. People forget that. But this is a better land reform, as I find.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Slatinshek.

Mr. Slatinshek. Ambassador, for the record could you explain what your organization's purpose and objective is and how it is financed and who runs it?