Ambassador Durrow. As I said, I'm with the American Security Council, as a member of its National Strategy Committee. We have another organization called the Institute for American Strategy, which is located in Boston, Va., outside of Culpeper, and we hold seminars, do studies down there and that sort of thing. I am also the director of that Freedom Study Center of the Institute for American Strategy.

The American Security Council, the one that sponsored this trip and statement from the American side, has been going since, I think, 1958. I wasn't around in Washington at that time. They are concerned with the national security of the United States. It is bipartisan.

It is basically concerned with our military posture, our national security posture, politically, economically, and militarily. We put out a newsletter every month. We have a radio program 5 days a week, only a 3-minute spot, on a Mutual program. And we take positions on what we think are matters of concern for the national security of the United States.

I suppose one of the reasons, they asked me to join them, I had the dubious pleasure of spending over 6 years in Moscow on three different tours, beginning in 1934, and my last tour there was in 1948. I also went back and visited Moscow in 1963 again for a short visit. So I have been going through the motions of learning to see through the upside-down language with which they propagandize the outside world.

The chap who just talked about the problems in South Vietnam, I didn't check his name—Mr. Gran—seems wittingly or otherwise to talk somewhat as Pravda does, I am sorry to say. I fellow Soviet developments now for the Institute for American Strategy.

Mr. Slatinshur. How is your organization financed?

Ambassador Durrow. Completely by voluntary contributions. We get some big contributions—one fellow gave us over $100,000 to build our library, which was finished last year. Most comes from “nickels and dimes,” $100 contributions, and so forth. It is nonpartisan—various people, but not any big foundations, like Ford Foundation and others have ever offered anything to us.

Mr. Slatinshur. Is your organization managed by a board of advisers?

Ambassador Durrow. Yes, a board of advisers and an executive committee. I'm on the board of advisers of the Institute for American Strategy, and the same person, Mr. John Fisher, is the head of both organizations. The obvious reason why we have two is for tax purposes. The American Security Council is not tax deductible. It takes positions on national security matters of that kind. The Institute in Boston, Va., about 70 miles away, is an educational organization, a research organization, which runs our seminars, does our research, puts out papers, and things of that kind.

Mr. Slatinshur. That was the next question I was going to ask you, if you take a position on political issues. You do, and as a consequence you are not tax deductible.

Ambassador Durrow. The Council is not deductible. On national security, yes, we do take positions. But it is bipartisan, and we have Members from both sides of the aisle, House and Senate, come down
and talk to our groups. They sometimes get on the radio and express a
point of view on the radio, Republicans and Democrats. That is, the
American Security Council, is bipartisan.
Mr. Slatinshek. Do you maintain a membership list?
Ambassador Durrow. Yes.
Mr. Slatinshek. Could you give us an idea as to the size of the
membership? Could you provide that for the record?
Ambassador Durrow. I could provide that for the record, yes. The
records are down in the Boston office. That is our main headquarters
and I don't follow those things very closely.
[The following information was received for the record:]
[Since testifying I have checked our membership figures. Naturally they are
changing continually, but over the past 3 years they have fluctuated around an
average of about 165,000 member-contributors.]
Mr. Slatinshek. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for your
appearance.
Ambassador Durrow. Thank you very much for the privilege of
being here.
The Chairman. The committee stands recessed until tomorrow
morning at 10 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, March 19, 1974.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F. Edward Hébert (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Members of the committee, the first order of business this morning as you know as I told you yesterday was a motion would be entertained by the Chair for the committee to go into executive session. However, we are missing a few members, and I thought instead of just wasting the time, there were some members yesterday who left before they had an opportunity to ask questions of the Secretary and the admiral in open session.

What members who did not ask questions yesterday, have questions that we can utilize our time now?

Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know what was covered yesterday. I had to leave shortly before we concluded.

Mr. Secretary, I think that one of the members covered the point of whether or not this was just a request for increase in the ceiling, or whether this was in fact additional funds. This was covered.

Mr. Clements. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me add that I have some very real doubts and reservations about the continuing to fund South Vietnam in such large amounts. We all wonder when it is going to end.

With Jane Fonda, and people like her, lobbying against it, I know I must be on the right side if I support it. So I think I will probably have to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, that is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. I have somewhat the same feelings about this. I'm getting a little impatient of winding down the war in South Vietnam. It doesn't look to me like you really don't have to be an extreme left winger to feel like the time has come to get out of this war if we possibly can. I would like to have some reassurance along this line that—when does this thing end? A great many of us people, who like to win wars we are involved in where we put our shoulder to the wheel, are not really very anxious to tax the American people the way we are doing today for a war we have not shown the will to win.

(101)
Mr. Clements. Mr. Bennett, I would like to respond briefly to that, and then with Admiral Moorer's long experience with that situation in the South Vietnam area, I'm sure he would like to comment.

Admiral Moorer yesterday touched upon the fact that the pressures that North Vietnam had exerted on the south, and the South Vietnamese forces, have required them to respond, which in turn means that they have used up some of their stockpiles and their material faster than we had anticipated.

Mr. Bennett. Is that all covered by the agreements of getting out? In other words, we are doing nothing today, and asking for nothing to be done, that we didn't agree to do when this thing was cooled?

Mr. Clements. Mr. Bennett, that is exactly what I was going to say. We are still operating under the Vietnam Peace Agreement, which authorizes a one-for-one replacement of the South Vietnamese stockpiles of war material. As they use those stockpiles and as their matériel is depleted—in airplanes, or artillery, or tanks, or personnel carriers, whatever it might be—our authority to replace this equipment cannot exceed a one-for-one replacement, and that is what we in the Department of Defense are now doing.

Mr. Bennett. That is all you are doing?

Mr. Clements. Yes, sir, that is all we are doing.

Mr. Bennett. Mr. Dickinson, hawks like you and me agree that is logical, but I don't want it extended into another war.

Mr. Dickinson. I think we are on the same wavelength. Speaking for one member only, I very much resent only being involved as a member after the fact. Whether we are talking about Vietnam or whether we are talking about Southeast Asia, you, meaning the Department of Defense, and the executive, draw down our inventory on our supplies and capacity to defend ourselves, and then you come to the Congress and say we have to replenish the stocks. We didn't have anything to do with drawing them down. Then we are hit with the fact, this is for us, we have to put it back in inventory because we are in bad and desperate straits because we have drawn down so heavily on our inventory.

I think somebody in the executive ought to take into consideration the day is going to come when you are going to draw down on the inventory and the Congress is going to say that is just tough, you just live with it because we didn't agree to it in the first place.

Mr. Clements. Mr. Congressman, really that is where we are right now.

Mr. Dickinson. I know.

Mr. Clements. Unless we get the funds that we are requesting, we cannot draw down much further on our inventories, and until we receive from the sense of this committee a different approach to what we have been doing on a one-for-one basis, our instructions are to continue as we have been doing. But we are at the point now where we must have more funds, or we can't keep doing what we have been doing.

Mr. Dickinson. I'm trying to raise a flag for you now, Mr. Secretary. Because if we continue in this way you will find you will come to the Congress one day which won't be too long off, we will say, you drew down, put it back someplace else. We were not consulted
we weren't a part of it. Somebody else made the decision so somebody else can put it back.

Mr. Clements. I want to assure you that our attitude is one of complete responsiveness to this committee; and when you tell us what you just said, that is what we will do.

Mr. Bennett. Well, I would like to kind of put my input on this too. It looked like to me possibly you could tell us in advance from now on that you estimate it will be so much, and we could authorize on that basis. Then you would not be embarrassed with this country, you would know in advance what Congress is going to do. So please give consideration to that line of thinking.

Mr. Clements. We will do that.

Mr. Bennett. One thing is about Diego Garcia. That is, I notice in the press we are building up to a possibility of an awkward international incident if it hasn't already come.

One thing I'm not clear about in my own mind, I thought I was before we had the hearing yesterday, was I thought Diego Garcia was being established because the Russians had now a presence in the Indian Ocean and we wanted to be in a position where we balanced it. But I have been reading in the press the Indians are saying the United States is going to force Russia to have a presence there, and then yesterday I heard in your testimony that this is tied in with the canal in a way much deeper than I thought it was. I thought this was to be something whether or not the canal was ever opened. I didn't know it was contingent on that. Could you respond on that?

The Chairman. Mr. Bennett, if you will indulge me, I suggest that you withhold the answer to that until we go into executive session, so we will be at liberty to discuss it more freely.

Mr. Bennett. My words of wisdom will be taken down and repeated at that time.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Price.

Mr. Bennett. That was a question.

Mr. Melvin Price. I move for the consideration of classified items.

The Chairman. Mr. Price moves the committee go into executive session for further consideration of H.R. 12565.

Mr. Slatinbanks, call the roll.

[Rollcall]

Mr. Slatinbanks: 25 members voting in the affirmative; none in the negative, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. 25 members having voted in the affirmative to go into executive session, a quorum being present, the committee is ordered into executive session and all unauthorized in the audience will please retire.

[Whereupon, at 10:28 o'clock a.m., the committee proceeded in executive session.]

The committee met pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F. Edward Hebert (chairman) presiding.

The Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Now, Admiral Moorer, you may proceed to answer Mr. Bennett's question in executive session.

Admiral Moorer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bennett, yesterday in my briefing I indicated that the requirement for Diego Garcia was to facilitate both our transit of the Indian Ocean and also our operations in the Indian Ocean; in view of the fact that our closest naval base—Subic—is some 5,000 miles away from Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union already has a very significant presence in the Indian Ocean. I outlined the longstanding and quite advanced base facilities that it has, primarily in Berbera in Somalia, [deleted].

Finally, the Soviets are building an airfield nearby, from which they could use Bear aircraft in their surveillance of the Indian Ocean. They also have access to such places as Aden, Socotra and so on. So I did not mean to imply, if I did, that the requirement for Diego Garcia hinged on whether or not the Suez Canal is open, because this is not the case.

The opening of the canal, we think, will bring about accelerated activity on the part of the Soviets in connection with what they have been doing already. From the long range point of view, we see the time coming when the sea lines of supply from the Persian Gulf over which that area's oil resources transit not only to Western Europe and the United States, but also to Japan and China, are going to be of such vital importance in any kind of an emergency that the national interest of the United States, I think, requires that we establish the capability to operate naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

So that is what this is all about. As of today, we have no place in the entire Indian Ocean that we can use without making previous arrangements on a case-by-case basis. I think that is a very unsatisfactory situation.

Mr. Clements. Mr. Chairman, may I comment to Mr. Bennett also?

The Chairman. Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Clements. Two quick points. The first is the one that Admiral Moorer made last, which is that Diego Garcia is the only place available to us at the moment. We do not have alternatives to Diego Garcia that are truly viable and that would give us this kind of support facility. I want to emphasize once more that we are not talking about an operating base. This is a support facility which will be used intermittently as these units come in and out of the Indian Ocean, and they will not be continuously there.

I would also emphasize in this same sense that the runway and the airstrip will probably be used primarily by the P-3 ASW aircraft, which will provide antisubmarine surveillance when our naval units are in the Indian Ocean. These aircraft need this kind of a support facility to protect those units in the Indian Ocean.

[Deleted.]

Admiral Moorer may know.

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, I was going to comment on this, because for a long time they employed their older diesel submarines. Recently they have deployed their most modern models of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indian Ocean. [Deleted.]

If I may backtrack, I would like to associate myself with your philosophy, Mr. Bennett, about winning a war.

Mr. Clements. One further thing about the Russian facilities in this general area—the one that you hear the least about, [deleted] is
the facility they have built during the course of the past 2 to 2½ years, which is right at the head of the Persian Gulf. Iraq made this facility available, [deleted].

Mr. BENNETT. The only observation I would like to make about it, is of course I don't have any objection at all to taking over Diego Garcia and doing with it what you planned as you explained it to me. I think we are coming out on the little end of the horn as far as public relations are concerned. I think sometimes public relations can be as important as anything else in international affairs and winning wars and so forth. I do think if we don't watch this carefully, we may get ourselves in a bad bind, because the press so far has been anti us doing this. This is some new gesture we are making that is going to stir everybody up and start some continuous process.

I would think at this point a great deal of input on the input of thinking with the public relations people as to how to present this, and the regrettable part of this, all you have said to me is secret, and some of it I am sure should be, but also I feel some you have said in secret would be helpful for us to have out, and would not have a defense aspect to it.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I couldn't agree more, Mr. Bennett. The more that we can get the kind of things that we are talking about right here out to the public in a full disclosure sense, so that they have a high degree of understanding of what we are doing and why we are doing it, the better off we are going to be. I heartily agree with you.

Mr. BENNETT. I would like to submit some questions for the record here. Perhaps some of those could be sanitized and made public.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bennett.

Admiral MOORER. May I say one thing, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Admiral MOORER. I have tried my best to do just what you are suggesting in open congressional sessions and in press conferences. But it appears to me that we have a double standard here. No one got exercised at all when the Soviet Union acquired these bases. The British have now announced they are going to send a cruiser and five destroyers to the Indian Ocean by virtue of the change in the strategic situation after the Middle East war. The French assigned a naval chief in the Indian Ocean—that doesn't invoke a comment. But the minute the United States makes a move, we get the most opposition from inside our own country.

Mr. BENNETT. Without objection I will submit some questions for the record that will perhaps help in this.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends.

Mr. ARENDS. I was going to ask the Admiral why do you say that, what is the reason for that? Why do we get that kickback in this country?

Admiral MOORER. I wish I knew, Mr. Arends. I think it is partially due perhaps, to disenchantment over a long, relatively unsuccessful war. Also, I think there is a big effort in this country to degrade anyone in authority or any decision that is made toward defending the country. I think it is a very unhealthy situation. I don't know why people do it. If I knew, I would be much happier than I am now.

Mr. ARENDS. I still believe there are enough Members of Congress who are willing to face the facts and be realists about this whole matter.
Admiral Moor. I agree with you, sir.
Mr. ARENDS. We are not lost yet.
Admiral Moor. I assure you I have not given up by any means.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray.
Mr. Bray. As to the public opinion about the United States having a base in the Indian Ocean, India is apparently the guiding impetus on that matter. I can’t think of a time when in my memory, the United States hasn’t been very friendly to India. They have given India more, far more, than all the other countries in the world. The nicer we treat India, the worse they treat us.
Maybe if we showed a little independence they might like us. I for one am getting tired of American opinion being led by a country that cannot even feed its own people, that we supported, the worst ingrate of all times, and let them determine American public opinion. I am getting sick and tired of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price, you had some questions yesterday I understand.
Mr. ROBERT PRICE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary. I would like to continue some questioning I had on your testimony about the communications system that we are going to put on the island. I would like to know in depth and in detail what this will be used for? We are spending $29 million. Is it going to be used for tracking, possibility of enemy movements, or just what is it to be used for?
Admiral Moor. The $29 million is not for the communications per se. It is for the entire installation, including the dredging, lengthening the runway and fuel storage. There already is an austere communications facility on the island. [Deleted.]
But there is nothing particularly unique about the communications. They would simply be necessary in order to operate and control forces in the area.
In sum, the $29 million is not for the communications, it is for military construction on the island.
Mr. ROBERT Price. Then the communications would be nothing of a classified matter in connection with our satellites or anything of that nature?
Admiral Moor. Yes, sir. I think the total communication equipment expansion for Diego Garcia is estimated to cost about $93 million. We do expect in the near future to connect Diego Garcia, as a matter of fact, the Indian Ocean, into the worldwide network via satellite. Right now, of course, we have the satellite primarily focused on the Atlantic and Pacific. But we expect to expand that as soon as we get the equipment, because we do have times when the communications are not as good as we would like—with ships in the Arabian Sea, for example—and the satellite will correct that. The relay probably will be through Diego Garcia.
Mr. ROBERT PRICE. Admiral, in our Research and Development Subcommittee we were told they wanted some $31 million additional for satellites to upgrade our communications system. I have been told we spent close to $100 million in the services to put a satellite that is still not operational in a sufficient manner to carry out what we need to do. Also, I have been told that there are other companies that have built satellites that are up there presently that we are leasing facilities from until such time as we can put up a satisfactory satellite.
In other words, there are already satellites up there working for Comsat and Telsat, and are operational and have been for 3 years, yet the services have not been able to put up a satellite that is workable and that is satisfactory for the defense of our country.

Admiral Moorer: I am not aware of the details of it. I would be very happy to give you a complete rundown on this, Mr. Price.

Our satellite communications currently in operational use are working quite well, but I am not aware of the specific point you are talking about. I would be very happy to give you the information.

Mr. Robert Price: I think it is real important, Admiral and Mr. Secretary. This is kind of the guts, if you don't have communications, you really don't have good defense.

Mr. Clements: There is no question about this. I will investigate it and be back in touch with you, Mr. Price, and discuss this at some length, because you should recognize and the committee should realize that one of the most important programs we have ongoing in the Department of Defense is our worldwide military command and control system—WWMCCS—the communications installation on Diego Garcia will be an important link in that system.

That is really what we need it for [deleted].

Mr. Robert Price: All right, Mr. Secretary. I will get my information available also, because if it is as questionable as I think it is, I think it is quite serious, if the services have not been able to put up a satisfactory satellite—I don't mean just using a few channels—then I think it is something that really needs to be looked into in depth.

Mr. Clements: I agree completely, and we will be back in touch with you on this. I am not aware of what you are talking about, and I need to check this out.

Mr. Robert Price: Right. I have hardcore information we are leasing space from them until such time that we can put up a satisfactory satellite of our own.

Mr. Clements: All right.

[The following information was received for the record:]

**Military Satellite Communications**

The communications facility at Diego Garcia was implemented to eliminate the gap in high frequency (HF) radio coverage in the Indian Ocean. [Deleted.] This further emphasized the need for the Diego Garcia communications facility to provide HF communications coverage in the Indian Ocean Area. However, it is recognized that HF communications is not the ideal communications capability anywhere in the world. It is disrupted by various atmospheric conditions and would experience complete black out during nuclear burst.

For these reasons, among others, the Navy is presently in the development phase of ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communications capability called FLTSATCOM. We expect to launch the first FLTSATCOM satellite in 1976. In the earlier planning of this program it was anticipated that we would be able to launch the first satellite sometime in early 1975. However, due to various funding and design decisions the program has been delayed. In the interim, the Navy has decided to lease from COMSAT UHF channels in two satellites, one over the Atlantic Ocean and the other over the Pacific Ocean. We expect the first satellite to be launched in December of this year with the second satellite launched three months later.

Since this arrangement is a leased channel arrangement, there is no way we can have the COMSAT satellite moved to the Indian Ocean Area to provide coverage in that vicinity. Even if it was possible to relocate these leased channels there would be no connectivity between CONUS and the Indian Ocean Satellite. This is why the FLTSATCOM Program is following a four in orbit satellite
system to provide worldwide coverage and the necessary connectivity for the various users.

A clear distinction must be made between the leased UHF communication capability, referred to as GAPFILLER, the FLTSATCOM and TELSAT and COMSAT. GAPFILLER and FLTSATCOM will use the UHF band which will allow small type, unsophisticated terminals to be installed on many mobile platforms (ships, aircraft, etc.) to be able to communicate with each other and fixed earth stations. The TELSAT and COMSAT (manager of INTELSAT) uses an entirely different frequency band which requires very complex earth stations. The majority of INTELSAT earth stations in operation today have antennas that are approximately 80 ft in diameter or larger. COMSAT conducted a test putting a smaller satellite terminal on an ocean liner to work in the INTELSAT frequencies; however, the size terminal used was too much to large to be placed upon Naval ships. One additional distinction must be made between the GAPFILLER and the FLTSATCOM satellites.

We also in the military have a Defense Satellite Communications System (DCSC). This Program was started in 1966 with the launch of seven sub-synchronous R&D satellites. A total of 26 satellites were launched to support this R&D effort. There are 12 of these satellites remaining in operation presently supporting long haul communications into Diego Garcia. Although these 12 satellites do not provide 100% satellite availability to Diego Garcia because of the random drifting of each satellite, it was the only communications media available to the military other than HF. [Deleted.]

The random drift satellites have been replaced by DCSC Phase II Satellites. These satellites, like the commercial satellites are in synchronous orbit. We did have design problems with the first two of these satellites that were launched in November 1971. Because of these problems we put a hold on the program until a complete technical evaluation could be made. We have since made a number of design changes and on December 13, 1973 launched two more of the DCSC Phase II satellites. Although we had a few minor problems, both satellites are now operating perfectly, with the Pacific satellite being turned over to operational traffic on February 2, 1974 and the Atlantic satellite on March 18, 1974. However, these two satellites will not give worldwide coverage and therefore cannot support communications into the Indian Ocean. We do have two more of these Phase II satellites that were procured as part of the original contract. These satellites are presently being made ready for launch before the end of this year. When this is accomplished, the DCSC Phase II system would be able to provide long haul, high reliable communications into Diego Garcia.

As far as the question of the military fielding an operational satellite system, I believe we are doing a very good job and when considering the funding limitations and policies, I think it is an exceptional job. The Defense Department started in this field in the early sixties. As we previously mentioned, we developed and launched, commencing in June 1966, 26 sub-synchronous DSCS Phase I satellites. While we were carrying out the R&D program, communications requirements into and out of Viet Nam dictated that we use this R&D system for operational traffic. Although these satellites had a five-year R&D life expectancy, a number of these satellites are still providing service today. In September 1968, DoD launched an ultra high frequency (UHF) R&D satellite-called Lincoln Experimental Satellite Number 6 (LES-6). This satellite also had an R&D life expectancy of five years. Again because of pressing military communications requirements, this satellite was used for operational traffic. The LES-6 satellite provided exceptional communications support to the Mediterranean Fleet—for example, during the recent "Mid-East Crisis." This satellite is still carrying operational traffic today.

On February 9, 1968, the DCSCATCOM satellite was launched and placed in the Pacific Ocean area. This satellite was also an R&D vehicle to test out the concept of a single satellite with both UHF and SHF frequency capability. This satellite was also forced into operational use because of communications requirements for Viet Nam and proved to be a vital link from CINC PAC to the Seventh Fleet. The design life of this satellite was 24 months yet it continued to provide UHF communications capability for 46 months.

Our first system to be fielded as an operational system rather than R&D system was the DCSC Phase II. However DoD went on contract March 24, 1971, for sub-synchronous satellites. This program took advantage of the previous R&D programs and embarked in the development and production of a sophisticated satellite that would meet military requirements of the first. We launched the first
two of these satellites in November 1971 and we did have problems with them. In fact, both satellites failed before their three year life period. However, we took what we considered the necessary steps to identify and fix these problems. Because of the complexity of the problems and our concern to be absolutely certain of the fixes, we did not launch the next two satellites until December 1973. As I previously mentioned, these satellites are not carrying operational traffic in both the Atlantic and Pacific Area. We have two more of these satellites that we intend to launch before the end of this year. We also intend to procure additional satellites of this same design which will maintain our communications posture through 1979. Therefore, in view of the above, I do not see how anyone can criticize the military effort in the area of satellite communications.

In summary, the military satellite communications situation in support of the Diego Garcia area is as follows:

(a) DSCS Phase I provides one voice and four teletype circuits into Diego Garcia. The HF facilities at Diego Garcia are then used to relay this information to ships in the Indian Ocean.

(b) DSCS Phase II—by the end of this year will replace the random drift satellites with a synchronous satellite worldwide. This will improve communications into Diego Garcia and increase the capacity of these communications links.

(c) FLTSATCOM—by 1977-1978 timeframe this System should be in full operational capability. This will allow direct communication to ships in the Indian Ocean from Naval Communication stations such as Guam and Naples.

What is the communications future of Diego Garcia? Although the Navy is turning to higher frequencies such as UHF and SHF to support communication to the fleet, there will always be a need for a very thin line, worldwide, critical HF communications capability. Diego Garcia will continue to be one of those significant locations in support of this thin line system.

Although Defense is implementing its own satellite communication capability, we will continue to use the commercial satellite capability to satisfy many of our operational requirements. There is no intent to eliminate all commercial leases because we now have a military system. We will reduce our leases somewhat but this will only be for those critical command and control circuits that must be under military control and that we feel are more protected in a military satellite because of its anti-jam capabilities.

Mr. ROBERT PRICE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price, I don't know whether you were here the other day when I announced the organization of a Communications Subcommittee, a special subcommittee, Mr. Mollohan, Mr. Jones and Mr. Hunt. I suggest you keep in touch with Mr. Mollohan, and you will be welcome to his committee meetings, too.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, I think the fact that we have established a special subcommittee for this purpose, Mr. Mollohan in particular has been at this business for some 3 years’ time, has been around the world on it, is very knowledgeable. So I suggest, Mr. Price, you talk to Mr. Mollohan, too, and he will welcome you to associate yourself with and work with the committee.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Who are the other members, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mollohan, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Hunt. It is a three-man subcommittee.

Mrs. Holt.

Mrs. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral and Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about this agreement that we didn't go into in great depth, but I have read that we have agreed with the United Kingdom that we would ask them for permission to take any kind of defensive or offensive action from Diego Garcia.

I just wondered if this is true, or has it gone that far?

Mr. CLEMENTS. No, ma'am. It is not true, because the agreement is not in its final form. The draft that had been negotiated with the previous British Government is now being reviewed and discussed at
cabinet level by the Labour Government. Therefore, that agreement
is not final.

We have no reason at all to believe, however, that the arrangements
finally agreed upon will not be satisfactory to both sides because there
will be a joint use of the facilities.

Mrs. Holt. That was the next question I wanted to ask. What use
would they make of this facility, the United Kingdom?

Mr. Clements. It will be a joint use facility, available to support
their ships and aircraft as well as ours.

Perhaps, Admiral Moorer would want to elaborate on this. But,
this generally is the outline of what we are doing.

Admiral Moorer, I would only add, Mrs. Holt, of course the facili-
ties, would be the property of the United States.

Mrs. Holt. Would we keep the P-3C aircraft there? Would they
be kept there?

Admiral Moorer. No, ma'am, they would not be kept there
permanently. They would be sent there intermittently, when we have
ships in the vicinity and it is necessary to conduct ASW patrols in
their operating areas.

Mrs. Holt. I see. Thank you.

What have we done, or what effort is made to get any of our other
allies or any other countries participating in South Vietnam? We seem
to be shouldering this entirely alone, and maybe that is a naive ques-
tion, but is anything being done?

Mr. Clements. Yes, there have been some recent discussions,
which are on a very close, confidential basis, with other countries, and
we have reason to believe that they are looking with some favor on the
possibility of assisting us in meeting the financial requirements of
support to South Vietnam.

Now, this is not in any final state, and it really comes under the
purview of the State Department, but I wouldn't be surprised if
something doesn't come of this.

Mrs. Holt. Does Japan have any concern?

Mr. Clements. Not to my knowledge.

Mrs. Holt. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Jones.

Mr. Clements. Mrs. Holt, excuse me, I thought you were talking
solely in terms of military assistance. With regard to economic
assistance, Japan has had teams in the area, and has indicated that
they will give assistance of a more significant nature.

We have with us Mr. Dennis Doolin, who works in our International
Security Affairs Office in the Department of Defense. He is a deputy
there. This area is under his responsibility, and I would like for him to
comment on this to you, if I may, Mr. Chairman. He has just returned
from a recent trip to the area.

Mr. Doolin. Mrs. Holt, for fiscal year 1974, the projection is
some $50 million in nonmilitary assistance from other countries to
South Vietnam, primarily from Japan and from France, with a hope
that there may be some assistance from the Netherlands, from
Australia and from the Asian Development Bank.

Mrs. Holt. How much of that is from Japan?

Mr. Doolin. About half.

Mrs. Holt. Thank you.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question deals with the European situation. A special subcommittee of this full committee recently returned from hearings in Europe on our NATO commitment. There seemed to be a very solid administration line that now is not the time to have any unilateral withdrawal, et cetera. But the administration line seems to have changed; as the press conference of the President last Friday indicated. Can you shed some light on that situation?

Mr. Clements. No, sir, I cannot.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I would say that closes off the questions. Thank you.

Mr. White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, down at the tail end of a radio announcement or statement this morning, a short synopsis of the news, I heard at the very tail end something to the effect that there was a statement from England, from some source, that there was going to be a resistance to any more expansion on Diego Garcia.

Mr. Clements. Mr. Congressman, I would caution you that sometimes the English newspapers are more reliable than ours, other times they are not.

I would think in my own considered opinion and judgment that the Labour Government will, as I told Mrs. Holt, reconsider, review and approve Diego Garcia. Now I could be wrong about this.

Mr. White. Have you heard of this dissidence?

Mr. Clements. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. White. From what source is it coming?

Mr. Clements. I think that these are no doubt people in the United Kingdom who are in opposition to this just as there are in this country. [Deleted.]

But I am optimistic. I think the Labour Government will, in fact, endorse the plan as did the previous Government, and go forward with it.

Mr. White. Is this dissent from any part of the Labour Government or just from other elements?

Mr. Clements. I can't really answer that. It is really just a newspaper report at this point. We have no official information whatsoever in this regard.

As far as I am concerned, it is strictly a newspaper report at this point.

Mr. White. Thank you very much.

Mr. Jones. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. White. Yes.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, there have also been newspaper reports to the effect that Australia, or some people in Australia were unhappy about this. Have there been any official communications from the Australians in this regard?

Mr. Clements. No, sir. But when Secretary Rush was recently in Australia, there were some people there, both in the Government and outside the Government, who discussed this with him at some length.
But the Australian Government, to my knowledge, has not taken any
official position whatsoever in this regard.

Mr. Pike. How about New Zealand?

Mr. Clements. The same with New Zealand.

Mr. White. What would be the objection from Australia and New
Zealand, assuming there was some dissent?

Mr. Clements. I am not really prepared to answer that, but Mr.
Doolin was with Mr. Rush on this trip through the South Pacific, and
maybe he could comment, with the chairmen’s permission.

The Chairman. Certainly.

Mr. Doolin. Mr. White, Prime Minister Kirk’s present New Zea­
land Government has associated itself with the proposal to turn the
Indian Ocean into a so-called area of peace. [Deleted.]

Mr. White. Has there been some movement for an international
agreement to call it out of bounds, as it were?

Mr. Doolin. No, sir. Mr. Barnard, the Minister of Defense in
Australia, on this trip reaffirmed a statement that he made to Mr.
Clements and Secretary Schlesinger to the effect that [Deleted].

Mr. Dan Daniel. Is it not true, Mr. Doolin, the liberal party has
associated itself with the position of the United States in Australia
with respect to this situation?

Mr. Doolin. The liberal party has, Mr. Daniel.

Mr. Fisher. As long as you are talking about Australia and their
official position on this subject, can you inform us whether there has
been any definitive action policywise by the present Australian
Government regarding our communications base in Australia, which
was some controversy with the present Australian Government, partic­
ularly during the campaign before the last election, in which some of
the Aussie lads are saying we are going to chase the United States out.

Has that been resolved, and where do we stand on that now?

Mr. Clements. Mr. Fisher, it has been resolved in a very satisfac­
tory manner. You might recall that the Minister of Defense from
Australia was in this country in January and met with Secretary
Schlesinger, myself, and Admiral Moorer. This was a matter of con­
siderable discussion between us. It was resolved, but since Mr. Doolin
has just returned from Australia, perhaps he could add to this.

Mr. Doolin. Minister Barnard was here in January of this year,
and we concluded an agreement on the Northwest Cape facility to
make it a truly joint use base with an Australian deputy commander.
The agreement meets with the total satisfaction of both governments
and is concluded.

Mr. Fisher. That is the only change, then, to make it more of a
joint operation rather than a U.S. operation?

Mr. Doolin. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Clements. Mr. Fisher, in this move toward a more joint
endeavor between ourselves and the Australians, I want you to know
that Secretary Schlesinger and myself heartily endorse this. We think
this is a great step forward.

Mr. Fisher. Very well.

Mr. Clements. At least it certainly puts that base in a better position
from the standpoint of the Australians of our operating a base on their
property, so to speak, and to make them a part of the operation is a
much better position for us to be in.
The Chairman. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. Dickinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since we are in a classified session, I had one question I didn't ask before that I would like to put to you gentlemen.

We have seen here in the replenishing of our inventory, we have got to replace considerable quantities of TOW. Also, we are buying additional TOW for South Vietnam. I was under the impression we had a serious 'drawdown' on our supply of TOW in our own inventory.

I read in the paper recently where we have agreed to and have sold TOW missiles to Iran. It is my information that we have sold the TOW to the Netherlands, to Germany, and to Israel and to Iran already. We have agreed to sell the TOW to Denmark, Germany, to Greece, to Iran, to Italy; to Luxembourg; to The Netherlands. We have negotiations going on with [deleted] for additional TOW's.

My question is in two parts: First, are we able to enter into these negotiations and supply the TOW and at the same time replenish our own inventory? Secondly, is there any danger in spreading TOW around that it will fall into Russian hands, for instance, and we do have an advantage over them in their Sagger now,

Is there any danger this weapon which is one of our most sophisticated and newest, will it be compromised?

Mr. Clements. Mr. Dickinson, first let me comment that I think the reported sales and agreements that you mention have been exaggerated, I don't think there has been proliferation to that extent.

'We are in a state of negotiation right now with some of those countries that you mentioned, because of the Middle East hostilities, the TOW received a lot of publicity. I think it should be noted here that during the course of those hostilities the TOW was never used by Israel, although it was reported in the papers many times to have been a great success.

TOW missiles were fired after the hostilities had actually been officially terminated.

'Even with increased demands for the TOW missile and launcher, Hughes has the capability to produce all known missile requirements and Emerson will produce the launchers to meet requirements.'

We do feel that we can meet the demand, and also replenish our inventories which were drawn down, and meet whatever our requirements are.

Admiral Moorer may have some comments in this regard, but I think that really answers your question.

Mr. Dickinson. And also the second part of the question, are we compromising one of our most sophisticated new weapons and would it make any difference if it falls into Russian hands?

Admiral Moorer. I don't think so. Mr. Dickinson, as you know, the TOW was used in Southeast Asia by our own forces as well as by the South Vietnamese, and we think the once you use a weapon in combat, you have, in effect, compromised it.

'The TOW has the great advantage of simplicity. It is relatively easy to train people in its use, as compared to the antitank weapons the Soviets use. It is a very fine weapon. Everyone does want to get his hands on it. I don't think it will be compromised unnecessarily by having it in our friends' hands if you have used it in combat; you have to consider it compromised.

Mr. Storer.
Mr. Clements. Mr. Dickinson, a quick story I would like to share with the committee. After the hostilities had ceased in the Middle East, Jordan asked for some TOW's and we sent them some TOW's, and they arrived one afternoon—

Mr. Dickinson. To Jordan?

Mr. Clements. To Jordan. [Deleted.]

[Laughter.]

Mr. Dickinson. We are supplying TOW then to [deleted] to any country that wants it just about, is that right?

Mr. Clements. No, sir, we don't have any plans to sell these weapons to Syria.

Mr. Dickinson. None to Syria.

Mr. Clements. That is right, and we won't sell TOW's to any country just because it might want them.

Mr. Dickinson. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. Whitehurst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I heard the answer you gave to my colleague, Mr. Jones, with regard to the President's statement last week. I am also a member of that ad hoc subcommittee, and I was also in Europe 2 weeks ago.

Let me see if I can turn the question around another way. The Defense Department, its policy toward NATO, is unchanged, is it not, from what it was, let's say, 3 weeks ago?

Mr. Clements. Yes, sir, there has been no change to my knowledge.

Mr. Whitehurst. I think we ought to have this on the record. I want it put on the record, in my own comments. Frankly, I was dismayed by the President's statement. We have some first-rate people over there who represent you all, whom we met, and we were impressed by their dedication, the sense of mission that they feel. Whereas I can't speak for my other colleagues, I came back firmly persuaded that the pending success of MBFR is that our forces should be retained at the level that they are, and I would repeat what General D'Avino said to us. He said if they were cut, he couldn't perform his mission. There are the people we have got to back up.

Mr. Clements. Let me confirm, Mr. Congressman, because I didn't want to make too short an answer to Mr. Jones, but when he asked me to relate that particularly to what the President said, I don't have any information that will allow me to comment.

Mr. Whitehurst. I understand that.

Mr. Clements. As I told you, there has not been any change, to my knowledge, and I would ask that the committee put into perspective whatever the President said in light of the fact that we have very serious negotiations going on with the Russians in SALT.

We also have MBFR discussions going on, and these negotiations are as complex as the SALT negotiations.

So I would caution the committee to take what the President said in the context of these negotiations that are going on with the Soviets.

Mr. Whitehurst. I wish the President had those things in mind before the President made the speech.

Mr. Stewart. I certainly share the gentleman's concern, and the concern of our subcommittee over the remarks that the President made, and, in fact, I have expressed myself to the White House on it.
But I think we have got to be a little bit realistic about what happened here, and not get in a great tizzy. It is perfectly obvious the policy of the country is still the same. It has been the White House, the State Department, that have been on our necks trying to get some action taken to support the continuation of troops in Europe, and to find some way that the Jackson-Nunn amendment can be met so that we don’t have any massive reduction at a time that is not particularly appropriate, and I think it is quite clear that there hasn’t been any change in policy. I think the President’s remarks were offhand, but frankly, I think he expressed a kind of gut reaction that we all feel that if people are going to fool around with us the way the French have been fooling around, the fact of the matter is the American Congress is not going to support continued placement of troops in Europe regardless of what the Randall committee may recommend, and, if I read the papers correctly, the President’s rather offhand remarks seem to have calmed down the French a little bit. Mr. Joubert, for a change, is talking diplomatically.

So it does seem to me that while I share the concern of the other members of the subcommittee that we don’t need to get too disturbed, I think this may have had a salutary effect.

Mr. Whitehurst. I hope you are right.

Mr. Randall. Would you yield the remaining time?

Mr. Whitehurst. I guess it is mine. I will yield to the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Secretary, would it, at this point, faced with the necessity of report under the mandate of the House, it may very well be with the concurrence of our chairman, we plan to have a report next Monday to ask for some additional time and go on the floor and ask for unanimous consent to give us some additional time to determine, to call in some witnesses to be certain that the Department of Defense position is as it always has been, that there has been no change.

I thank the gentleman for yielding, the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. Whitehurst. Could I just ask one question back on my own time, just one kind of a post script which isn’t related to this?

What is the political relation of Diego Garcia to the United Kingdom? Is it just owned outright? Does it have any kind of status whereby it might change later on, such as some of these small islands in the Caribbean?

Mr. Clements. For over 250 years it has been under British control, originally belonging to Mauritius, then a British colony, and since 1965 as a part of the British Indian Ocean Territory?

Mr. Whitehurst. Is there any indigenous population for example?

Mr. Clements. No, sir; there is not.

Mr. Whitehurst. Thank you, that is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Arends.

Mr. Arends. I am terribly interested in some of those comments made here about the President’s position in the statement he made the other day. I want to say to Mr. Stratton, I think this is something whose time has come, and it had to be said. I thought the reaction of the French indicated that maybe they are going to be a little bit more realistic about some of the problems that we face, and I am glad he said it.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your appearance, and we appreciate your help and cooperation. The committee will continue with the representatives now of the Departments.

I understand you have an engagement.

Mr. Clements. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I am needed, I will be glad to stay. I have this other appointment, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate the offer of cooperation, but I think that we can get along with the other members now because it will all be detail.

Mr. Clements. It has been my pleasure to be with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We are always glad to have you, sir.

The members of the various services come around.

We are still in executive session.

Members of the committee, we have before us the supporting witnesses now for the Army, Director of the Budget, Maj. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom.

General, will you summarize your statement in just a few minutes and put the complete statement in for the record? I will ask the same thing of the other gentlemen.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN A. KJELLSTROM, DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General Kjellstrom. Very well, Mr. Chairman.

The Army's portion of the supplemental totals $1.9 billion. That portion which is subject to authorization is $286 million consisting of $55.0 million within the R. & D. appropriation, and $33.2 million in the Military Family Housing account for pay increases, and $228 million within the procurement appropriations.

Within the Aircraft, Procurement, Army appropriation, we are requesting $22 million with $7 of the $22 million being for flight simulators.

Within the Missile, Procurement, Army appropriation, we are requesting—our initial request to the Congress was for $84.4 million. Our request has now been revised downward to $76.6 million as a result of revised pricing of the TOW system.

We are requesting both TOW missiles, an increase of 6,000, and an increase in launchers.

Within the Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army appropriation, we are requesting approval of 133 additional M-60A1 tanks, 926 armored personnel carriers, 105 mortar carriers, and 11 self-propelled howitzers. Within the R. & D. appropriation in addition to the pay supplemental which I already referred to we are requesting $19 million in readiness-related items.

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes the Army request.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now, the Navy is represented by the Director of the Budget, Rear Admiral Cooke.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. EDWARD W. COOKE, DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Admiral Cooke. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

The Navy's total request for supplemental funds is $1.9 billion. Of this amount, $917 million is subject to authorization. The amount requested is divided into the categories of aircraft, $219.2 million; missiles, $50.9 million; naval vessels, $24.8 million; research, development, test, and evaluation, $67.8 million (this figure includes the pay raises associated with our R & D. appropriation), and military construction, $29 million.

Addressing very briefly each of these categories:

1. AIRCRAFT

We are asking $219.2 million, for procurement of 41 aircraft. The modification of aircraft is to enhance protection of Marine Corps helicopters and Navy and Marine attack aircraft; initial and replenishment spares and flight simulators. The aircraft procurement includes 24 A-4Ms and 5 F-5Es aircraft to replace assets provided to the Israelis. The addition of 6 P-3C aircraft will provide for the earlier transition of an additional P-3A/B squadron into the P-3C. Procurement of 6 KC-103 Refueling tanker aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps will accelerate modernization of the tanker force.

2. MISSILES

The procurement of 400 Shrike at $116 million will provide an all-weather, antiradiation, air-to-surface missile capable of destroying or suppressing enemy radar systems. Also included are 200 standard MR-2 missiles at $17M to provide all-weather, antiaircraft, and antiship armament for destroyers. These procurements will improve our hand assets and provide an increment toward the inventory objective.

To enhance Marine Corps ground forces, 5224 TOW missile systems, at an estimated cost of $223 million, are to be procured, to allow the fielding of all three planned TOW companies a minimum of 6 months to 1 year in advance of current plans.

3. NAVAL VESSELS

$24.8 million is requested for procurement of long leadtime material in support of the second and third Trident fleet ballistic submarines.

4. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

The $67.8 million related to research, development, test, and evaluation is required to improve and accelerate modernization of our weapon systems. The program affects the aircraft, weapon system development and classification; accelerated development of missiles; surveillance, jamming, and countermeasures; and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
m.1~", additional $38.5 million is required for the civilian pay raises approved in January and October 1973.

5. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Included in the amount of $29 million is a single project to improve the facilities at Diego Garcia. The funds will provide for increased fuel storage, expansion of the aircraft parking apron and runway, and other support facilities.

This completes my statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be pleased to respond to questions you may wish to raise.

I have backup witnesses here today and I will identify them as the occasion comes up in questioning. We will be pleased to respond to any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Next is Air Force Director of the Budget, Maj. Gen. Howard M. Fish.

General Fish. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HOWARD M. FISH, DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 1974 supplemental requirements.

The Air Force portion of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental, requiring title 10 United States Code, section 138 authorization, totals $557.8 million. This supplemental is needed to provide accelerated improvement to deploy and fight in a crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount (millions)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increment cost of Middle East operations</td>
<td>$33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmented force readiness</td>
<td>109.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased airlift capability</td>
<td>167.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated modernization</td>
<td>137.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (force readiness)</td>
<td>533.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian pay raise (GS)</td>
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<td>Wage employee pay raise</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal; pay raises</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>567.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As summarized in Table 1, the supplemental request is for essential funding requirements, during the remainder of this fiscal year, categorized in two parts; "Force Readiness" totaling $533.3 million and "Civilian Pay" increases totaling $29.5 million. The "Force Readiness" category includes:

- Unprogrammed costs of operations in the Middle East that will not be reimbursed;
Procurement to provide near-term improvement in the penetration capability and survivability of tactical forces that must operate in a concentrated defensive missile environment;
Improvements in strategic airlift capability to deploy and support air and ground forces in a crisis; and
Research, development, and procurement to accelerate modernization of aging tactical and strategic forces thereby insuring a warfighting capability with present forces until newer, more capable systems enter the force in quantity.

The "Civilian Pay" raises category includes:
The Classification Act (GS) civilian employees pay raises effective January 1, 1973, and October 1, 1973. The pay raises were authorized by Executive Orders 11691, 11692, 11739 and 11740;

Unfunded requirements for wage-employee pay increases scheduled to occur during fiscal year 1974.

Table 2 summarizes the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request by appropriation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.—Fiscal year 1974 supplemental authorization appropriation summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D T &amp; E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Air Force request is for a total of $567.8 million.

**Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

The requirements in the "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation" appropriation are to enhance capabilities and composition of Air Force tactical forces. The recent Middle East conflict reemphasized the importance of guided weapons, standoff attack, and electronic warfare capability in a dense defensive environment. Therefore, the request includes several programs, collectively called PAVE Strike which will improve the penetration capability, survivability, and kill capability of the tactical force. A major objective of this supplemental request for R&D T & E, totaling $83.8 million, is to accelerate the development of essential improvements to tactical warfare capabilities in the near term. The R&D T & E portion of the supplemental is summarized by budget activity in table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.—R&amp;D T &amp; E. BUDGET ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile and related equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other R&amp;D T &amp; E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The $4.4 million for Aircraft and Related Equipment is required to initiate or accelerate essential near-term development of aircraft avionics and equipment. Included are:

- Accelerate engineering of the Wild Weasel surface-to-air missile suppression system for installation in the F-4 to improve the Wild Weasel capability and make a major contribution to defense suppression;
- Development of terrain-avoidance/terrain following radar for search and rescue helicopters;
- Flight tests of the F-113D delivering guided bombs to improve accuracy, night, and all-weather strike capability; and,
- Accelerate development of helmet mounted-laser acquisition device so that the pilot can identify a laser designated target.

The $7.4 million for Ordnance, Combat Vehicles and Related Equipment will improve the effectiveness of various types of ordnance. Funds are required to:

- Accelerate the development of ordnance capable of penetrating hardened aircraft shelters and to develop a low altitude proximity sensor for the short delay impact fuse which will increase the effectiveness of general-purpose bombs against personnel, vehicles and light material targets;
- Develop an air inflatable retarder to enable the F-111 and other aircraft to drop bombs safely from a low altitude at supersonic speeds;
- Complete the design of a bomb suspension system for the F-4 which will reduce aerodynamic drag and increase range;
- Begin engineering development of the fuel-air explosive to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons; and,
- Accelerate development of an alternate warhead for the electro-optical imaging IR, and Laser Maverick to expand the target spectrum.

The $41.8 million for Other Equipment is required to:

- Develop interface between the wing modification kit, auto-pilot, and the electro-optical guidance unit for the modular guided glide bomb;
- Develop alternative guidance systems for standoff weapons between the launch point and the target area to achieve improved flexibility for employment of the weapon;
- Define a development program to provide an improved standoff missile;
- Provide cluster munitions with distance-measuring guidance capability to improve all-weather capability;
- Accelerate development of a visual countermeasure pod to counter the visually directed defenses;
- Accelerate efforts to develop a common Air Force forward-looking (FLIR) sensor in a night target acquisition POD for the F-4 and F-111;
- Accelerate development efforts to provide low cost day and night capability to deliver laser guided ordnance;
- One time R & D costs associated with the purchase of 34 F-4E laser designator modification kits and two additional sets of aerospace ground equipment;
- Qualification of digital scan converter system for production which enhances night attack capability of the F-4 to deliver TV/forward-looking-infrared/laser guided ordnance;
Development of multi-mission remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) for reconnaissance, electronic warfare support, and air-to-ground missions in defended areas;

Integrate distance measuring equipment guidance into the electro-optical glide bomb to provide guidance which is not weather dependent;

Integration of range extension system with the cluster munition dispenser to provide near-term capability in advance of the completed development of the modular glide bomb;

Demonstrate operational effectiveness of moving target indicator radars and the advanced location strike system;

Instrument and test aircraft to determine infrared and other characteristics in a realistic combat situation;

Accelerate countermeasures protective systems;

Improve the advanced location strike system to correct deficiencies found in initial testing and expedite delivery into the inventory;

Initiate a deployable data base that will provide the tactical commander a capability to locate certain targets.

The $1.1 million requirement for program-wide management and support at the Armament Development Test Center is for exploitation of captured weapons.

The Classification Act (GS) pay increases for R.D.T. & E., effective October 1, 1973 and January 1, 1973, total $27.7 million. Pay raises applicable to wage board personnel require $1.8 million. The entire R.D.T. & E. account has been reviewed to determine if this $29.5 million requirement can be absorbed. It would be necessary to delay or cancel ongoing programs considered essential to a viable, well-managed R. & D. program to accommodate any portion of this requirement. Such action usually increases the overall cost of any program which is delayed. Therefore, the supplemental is required to finance properly the R.D.T. & E. program.

Aircraft Procurement

The aircraft procurement portion of the supplemental request totals $445 million. The funds are necessary to improve tactical strike, tactical airlift, and strategic airlift capability as demonstrated by the recent Middle East conflict to replace C-130's and to procure an A-7 and an F-111F simulator to meet training requirements for the crews that will fly the additional aircraft being procured in fiscal year 1974.

The Aircraft Procurement portion of the supplemental is summarized by Budget Activity in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Procurement Budget Summary</th>
<th>(millions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft equipment, parts, and material</td>
<td>108.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack aircraft equipment, parts, and material</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental contract for de novo strike and fighter training systems</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft spare parts and repair parts</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft support equipment and facilities</td>
<td>158.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>445.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The $13.1 million for Combat Aircraft is needed for one A-7D flight simulator—$5 million—and one F-111F flight simulator—$8.1 million—to meet essential training requirements of the Active Force and the Air National Guard.

The $30 million for Airlift Aircraft is necessary to procure six C-130H aircraft to replace six of the 12 C-130's sold. The amount of reimbursement would procure only six aircraft because the sale price—approximately one-half that of current replacement costs—was based on an average fiscal year 1962, 1963, and 1964 acquisition cost plus modifications.

The $145.9 million requested for modification of in-service aircraft is necessary to improve the Air Force readiness posture in critical capability areas of tactical strike and reconnaissance, strategic bombing, and strategic airlift. Included are:

Tactical force readiness requirements of $55.7 million that provide for:

- Update of radar warning receivers on the A-7, F/RF-4 and F-111;
- Air-to-air missile improvements, laser bombing capability, improved infrared reconnaissance, chaff/flare dispensing, and service life improvements for the F/RF-4; and,
- Engine improvements for the F-111 in the first stage turbine and the fuel nozzle supports, to achieve full potential combat capability and to increase the mean-time-between-overhaul (MTBO) and to increase the reliability of the MK II avionics on the F-111E.

Strategic offensive force readiness requirements of $9.8 million that will update the radar warning receiver for the B-52 and the FB-111 and provide an improved jamming capability for the B-52;

Strategic mobility improvements of $96.3 million that include:

- The design, prototype, and test of a modification to lengthen the C-141 to increase capacity 30 percent;
- Engineering design and tools for modification of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (GRAF) to provide cargo capability; and
- High priority updating changes to the C-5A and accelerating a modified wing fatigue article for testing of corrective actions and a preventive fix for wing cracks.

Flight simulator modifications of $14.1 million to provide a full-spectrum flight simulation, permitting fuel conservation, geometric aircraft operating costs, and an improvement in training programs.

The $153.5 million for aircraft spares and repair parts includes:

- The $17.9 million for initial spares in support of aircraft modifications and the C-130H aircraft procurement, and
- The $135.6 million for replenishment spares to procure long lead-time items for war reserve material stock level to increase wartime deployment capability of the strategic airlift force ($103.9 million), and F-111 WRM spares requirements ($31.7 million).

The $102.5 million for aircraft support equipment and facilities provides the essential support for increased tactical and airlift capability. Included are:

- Common aerospace group equipment (CAGE) in support of aircraft modifications and the C-130H procurement;
Electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods and effective warning equipment which can detect and identify a threat in a dense and mixed radar controlled weapon threat environment.

Improvements to defense suppression systems that locate and strike targets under all conditions of weather and visibility, and

An ECM simulator for the electronic warfare training program.

**MISSILE PROCUREMENT**

The requirements in the missile procurement appropriation are necessary to provide adequate inventories based on Middle East experience; procure unmanned aircraft capable of confusing and saturating enemy early warning ground control radars; and modify air-to-air missile to improve and extend the service life of existing inventories. The missile procurement requirements are summarized by budget activity in table 5.

### Table 5 - Missile procurement budget activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Budget Activity (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrike</td>
<td>$9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical drones</td>
<td>$27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidewinder modifications</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles spares</td>
<td>$9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other support equipment</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$39.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The $9.5 million for the SHRIKE antiradiation missile program is necessary to procure an additional 300 missiles for the tactical forces to provide an adequate inventory to meet expenditure rates demonstrated as likely by the Middle East conflict. In the missile spares account, $0.9 million is required to rebuild inventories for the SHRIKE antiradiation missile and the tactical drones.

The $27 million for tactical drone activity is necessary to procure recoverable drones whose mission is to sow chaff and jam radars of terminal threats, and to procure low-cost, expendable decoy drones to saturate enemy early warning systems.

The $1 million requested for missile modifications is necessary to accelerate engineering necessary to regrain rocket motors and to repackage an active optical fuse to improve and extend the life of the AIM9J Sidewinder missile.

**SUMMARY**

Mr. Chairman, in summary the Air Force portion of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental consists of $29.6 million for pay increases, $53.9 million for unreimbursed costs of the Middle East operations, and $504.4 million to improve force readiness.

This completes my statement. I am ready to answer your questions. I also have backup witnesses to address this in any detail the committee wishes.

The Chairman. Next is the International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asia and the Pacific Affairs, Mr. Dennis Doolin.
Do you have a statement?
Mr. Doolin. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. You will be available for questioning?
Mr. Doolin. Yes.
Mr. Chairman. Next is L. & L. Assistant Secretary of Defense Installations and Logistics, Mr. Mendolia.
He is not here so he doesn't have a statement.
Mr. Doolin. Mr. Mendolia departed with the Secretary.
The Chairman. Now, members of the committee, as you understand, it is necessary that we get action on this bill today, because of the emergency and the pressure I have from the leadership of the House, the Speaker, and the leadership of both sides.
In this connection, also, Mr. Mahen, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, has slipped his bill 1 day in order that we can get out our authorization before he presents his bill.
So, without objection of the committee, in order to expedite the bill, the handling of the bill, and a strictly line item explanation of each line item, without objection of the committee, I would like to take it by sections, and if any member has any objection to any section in there, we will discuss it and dispose of that. In that way we can move along.

However, we want the services to put in the record all of the individual justification sheets which are noted here in our committee print of the bill and the line items.

[The following information was received for the record:]
Budget Activity: Spares and Repair Parts

Justification of supplemental requirements.

This request for $15 million reflects increased replenishment costs in FY 76 related to war reserve shortages and increased readiness requirements. The majority ($13.4M) will be used to expedite fill of war reserve shortages. The remainder covers the increase of PMA secondary items required to support expanded aircraft depot maintenance programs which will increase the numbers of operationally ready aircraft in units ($1.2M).

Note: Deletion of $80,100 and shortages of general support equipment (GSE) used in maintenance and test of the M28 Weapons System ($0.3M). Requirements for (GSE) increased due to redeployment of systems from Southeast Asia and their dispersion within CONUS and European Command.
Department of the Army
Aircraft Procurement, Army

(Dollars in thousands)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,700</td>
<td>40,700</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget Activity: Support Equipment and Facilities

Justification of supplemental requirements.

Synthetic Flight Trainer ZB24. This request for $7 million provides 25 ZB24 Synthetic Flight Trainers. The ZB24 Synthetic Flight Trainer consists of four UH-1 trainer cockpits tied to a central instructor/operator console with a computer data system used for flight simulation instruction in instrument flying, emergency procedures, pilot standardization and initial entry student instrument qualification. One B-10 model is presently in use at the Army Aviation School, Ft. Rucker, Alabama. The FY 1973 program provides four trainers and the FY 1974 program an additional three, for a total of seven. The first of the seven production deliveries is now being installed with the remaining six schedules to be in operation at Ft. Rucker by the end of December 1974. 20 flying hours will be saved per initial entry student. The FY 1974 supplemental buy will provide an additional 4 [2] simulators to allow early extension of similar savings to Army pilots with major concentrations of aviators (Ft. Bragg-800 aviators, Ft. Hood-2,000, Ft. Campbell-1,200). Completed studies indicate that savings will be generated by reduction of annual required instrument proficiency flying (20 hours) per aviator, with accompanying reduction in fuel consumption and operating costs at these posts. In addition, the capability of aviators to maintain proficiency and readiness which might otherwise be lost due to fuel shortages will be retained. The established trend is for increased use of simulators by all services to take advantages of reduced operating costs, and improved training.
Justification of supplemental requirements.

This supplemental budget request of $102.9 million for combat aircraft will finance the procurement of 30 additional aircraft — 24 A-4Ns and 6 P-3Cs. These programs will speed the modernization of the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy and increase readiness. The A-4N procurement, combined with the FY 1975 and subsequent procurements, will have the effect of meeting the UEMC goal of an all A-4N light attack force, and equipping the UEMC Reserve squadrons with A-4N/F aircraft.

The P-3C procurement, together with the FY 1975 procurement, will provide assets for the transition of two additional P-3A/B squadrons into the P-3C.
Budget Activity: Trainer Aircraft

Department of the Navy
Aircraft Procurement, Navy
(Dollars in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76,400</td>
<td>86,700</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Justification of supplemental requirements.

The $10.3 million in this supplemental budget is requested for 5 F-5E aircraft. These aircraft will provide the Navy Fighter Weapons School with a MIG simulator to meet the urgent requirement for training of fleet pilots in air combat maneuvering training.
Budget Activity: Other Aircraft

Department of the Navy
Aircraft Procurement, Navy (Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1974 Presently Available 36,200
FY 1974 Revised Estimate 75,200
FY 1974 Proposed Supplemental 39,000

Justification of supplemental requirements.

This supplemental budget request of $39.0 M will finance the procurement of 6 KC-130R tanker aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps. This procurement will speed the urgently required modernization of the Marine tanker force.
## Justification of Funds

The $3.3 million requested for Modification of Aircraft will finance urgent modifications designed to enhance the self-protection of Marine Corps helicopters and Navy and Marine attack aircraft. These modifications include infra-red suppression devices and electronic countermeasures equipment. It will also finance various other accelerated modernization programs to increase near term readiness. A breakdown of line items requiring additional funding follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Activity</th>
<th>Modification of Aircraft</th>
<th>(Dollars in Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FT 1974 Presently Available</td>
<td>285,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT 1974 Revised Estimate</td>
<td>319,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT 1974 Proposed Supplemental</td>
<td>33,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$5.2 million is requested to provide Paveway Knife capability for 12 TA-4F aircraft. This modification is designed to provide precision designation of ground targets for attack by Laser guided bombs. It consists of a pod contained system (with the exception of cockpit controls and television display), employing a Laser designator aligned with a low light level TV camera. An additional $3.0 million is required to modify 21 TA-4F aircraft to the airborne tactical air coordinator configuration. This modification is required to fill operational requirements in support of the Marine combat close air support mission and to replace combat losses.

The FY 1974 supplemental budget request also includes funds for the first increment ($2.0 million) of the modification designed to update the present RECCLE Sensors of the RA-5C aircraft. This modification will increase the quality, maintainability, reliability and general performance of these sensors, therefore increasing the present limited RECCLE capabilities for collection. Included in this modification are update of the APD-7 Side Looking Radar, AAS-21 Infra-red Line Scanner, and AYA-1 Data Annotation System.
Of the $2.8 million requested for modification to the A-6 aircraft, $3.8 million is required to provide Standard Arm Missile Capability for 12 additional aircraft. The Weapons Control System will receive, process, analyze and display enemy radar information to enable the pilot to fire a Standard Arm missile against the threat. The remaining $6.0 million is requested to complete the FY 1974 requirements of the A-6 Condor modification program. This modification will enable attacking aircraft to destroy high priority targets defended by surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft batteries, and heat seeking missiles without paying the penalty of "boring in close."

A modification involving A-7 aircraft requires an increment of $4.9 million in the FY 1974 supplemental request. These funds will provide for non-recurring and long lead time costs for conversion of A-7 B/C's to the TA-7C CRAW Trainer configuration. The two place CRAW Trainer will have most of the A-7 weapon system components. Rear cockpit controls are similar to those in the front, with the exception of the Head Up Display (HUD), which is replaced by a HUD TV monitor display. This conversion will release A-7 aircraft for Fleet use while allowing better utilization of out-dated A-7 B/C's.

$1.1 million is requested for the F-4 Dog Fight Computer Lead/Lag modification. This modification will enable the computer to provide launch information and correct firing solutions for conditions other than boresight.

A total of $6.1 million is requested to provide protection against the threat posed by heat seeking missiles. $1.2 and $1.8 million are required for the CH-46 and CH-53 respectively to provide for air cooled plugs, vanes, and ducts to reduce the acquisition boundary of enemy heat seeking missiles. An additional $3.1 million is required for Infra-red CAIR Pods, an externally mounted active infra-red countermeasures jammer effective against the IR missile threat to attack aircraft.

The supplemental request also includes $1.2 million for update of 2 EP-3B to the EP-3E configuration. This modification is required to install in these aircraft, now largely equipped with mission equipment taken from two obsolescent EC-121 M's retired in FY 1967, the mission equipment now installed in the EP-3E. This update provides the performance capabilities essential to accomplishment of the current mission, while assuring support commonality for aircraft in the Reconnaissance Squadrons.
Justification of supplemental requirements.

The supplemental request of $6.0 million for initial spares relates to the procurement of the A-4M, F-5E and KC-130 aircraft requested. In addition, $9.7 million is requested to improve the current supply system effectiveness of aeronautical, photographic, and meteorological replenishment spares, thereby improving the general readiness posture of the replenishment spares program.
Department of the Navy
Aircraft Procurement, Navy

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>172,917</td>
<td>189,917</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Justification of supplemental requirements.

The supplemental request for $18.0 million for Aircraft Support Equipment and Facilities will finance the procurement of aircraft simulators to enhance training and increase safety. These trainers will maintain and improve the Fleet readiness posture during a period when flying hours are restricted due to limited availability of petroleum products.

The supplemental requirements are depicted in the following table:

**General Training Equipment:**

- Universal Night Carrier Landing Trainer (UNCLT) 1,485
- Missile Fire Control and Early-Warning Sound-Elide Programs 300
- Sub-Total General Training 1,785
- Modification/Modernisation of trainers, including GFE for out-of-production weapon systems:
  - A-3 and XV-5A 200
  - F-14C/GF Visual Attachment Modifications 200
  - EA-5C 600
  - EA-6A 200
  - F-14 KEP (2PB) 5,500
  - F-AV (2P53) to J Mod 1,300
  - F-4 Other Trainer Updates 1,200
  - F-8H/J Trainer Updates 100
  - G-76A/D GFT 1,200
  - K-3 1,500
BUDGET ACTIVITY: Combat Aircraft

Justification of Supplemental Requirements

Readiness and Modernization. The FY 1974 Supplemental budget request includes $13.1 million for procurement of one A-7D flight simulator ($5.0 million) and one F-111F simulator ($8.1 million). Both requirements follow from the FY 1974 authorization and appropriation of funds for procurement of additional A-7D and F-111F aircraft.

A-7D Flight Simulator - $5.0 million

The original A-7 procurement program included three flight simulators for a three location/nine squadron force. The FY 1973 A-7 program included a fourth simulator for increased training requirements resulting from modernization of the Air Guard with the A-7. The Congressional addition of 2% aircraft in the FY 1974 program and the fuel crisis have accentuated and expanded this requirement. The $5.0 million requested in the Supplemental budget will procure a fifth flight simulator which will also be used for training of Air Guard forces.

F-111F Flight Simulator - $8.1 million

The F-111F simulator requested in this Supplemental was originally addressed during the Congressional hearings on the initial FY 1974 budget. The directed procurement of twelve F-111 aircraft in FY 1974 did not include funding for a simulator on the basis that the Congress believed the requirement should be deferred. However, the additional aircraft provided in FY 1974 and the current fuel crisis both emphasize the need to expand the use of simulation devices. The requested simulator will be the second F-111F simulator to be procured. Both will be capable of full system tactics training and will be mounted on a five-degrees-of-freedom motion base.
Department of the Air Force
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

(Dollars in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1974 Presently Available</td>
<td>217,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1974 Revised Estimate</td>
<td>247,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1974 Proposed Supplemental</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BUDGET ACTIVITY: Airlift Aircraft

Justification of Supplemental Requirements

Readiness and Modernization. $30.0 million is requested in the FY 1974 Supplemental budget for procurement of six C-130E aircraft to replace USAF C-130E sold from inventory to the Government of [deleted]. The Foreign Military Sales case reimbursement would only permit procurement of six replacement aircraft because the sales price was based on the lower acquisition cost plus modifications rather than replacement cost.
Department of the Air Force
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force

Budget Activity: Modification of In-Service Aircraft

Justification of Supplemental Requirements

Recent events have highlighted the need to improve force readiness in critical areas of tactical strike and reconnaissance, strategic bombers and strategic airlift. The Mid-East war emphasized the shortfall in strategic mobility to support a major war in Europe. Fuel shortages have made it necessary to curtail flying training; consequently, more of the training must be accomplished in simulators. The Supplemental Request for $185.9 million is based on accelerating modifications to improve the Air Force readiness posture in critical capability areas.

A summary of the major elements of the request and the FY 1974 supplemental costs are:

Strategic Force Readiness (865.7 million)

Update of the radar warning receivers on the A-7, F/NV-4 and F-111 will provide coverage against the selected F/NV-4s will receive the following modifications: Air-to-air missile improvements ($5.0); laser bombing capability ($1.9); improved IR reconnaissance ($6.1); chaff/flare dispensing system ($3.4); and service life improvements ($5.9). Various other modifications will be provided to the F-4 ($1.4). Reliability improvements will be incorporated in the MK II avionics on the F-111D ($8.6). The capability and reliability of engines on the F-111 will be improved ($5.9).

Strategic offensive force readiness ($2.8 million)

The request provides update of radar warning receivers on the B-52 and FB-111 to give coverage against the current threat ($3.4). The B-52 will receive a system to warn the crew of enemy missile launch ($3.0) and electronic improvements to increase jamming capability ($3.4).

Strategic mobility improvements ($66.3 million)

The request provides engineering design, prototype and test of a modification to add 280 inches to the length of the C-141, with a consequent 30 percent increase in capacity, and air refueling capability ($40.0). Engineering design and tools will be procured to modify the B-707/DC-10 aircraft of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to provide cargo capability ($18.5). The acquisition of the third fatigue test article is to be accelerated to ascertain the fatigue life of the C-5A. Funds for high priority updating changes to the C-5A are requested ($7.6).
Flight simulator modifications ($14.1 million)

These modifications range from procurement of visual systems for existing simulators to configuration updates. Emphasis is being placed on conservation of fuel and reduced aircraft operating costs. When modified to provide full-spectrum mission simulation, flight simulators will be able to accomplish these objectives and to improve training programs.

The table below depicts the total supplemental fund requirements for fiscal year 1974, by aircraft category:

(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft/Category</th>
<th>FY 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-32</td>
<td>$ 8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/KF-4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-106</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-111</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-135</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL MODIFICATION OF IN-SERVICE AIRCRAFT $145.9
### JUSTIFICATION OF FUNDS REQUESTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Weapon System Spares</td>
<td>167.1</td>
<td>170.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Modification Spares</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Common AO2 Spares</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Initial Spares</td>
<td>186.6</td>
<td>204.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replenishment Spares</td>
<td>329.1</td>
<td>464.7</td>
<td>135.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Spares and Repair Parts</strong></td>
<td><strong>515.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>669.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>153.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Included in this budget request are funds to finance initial spares required for support of the C-130E aircraft contained in the budget. In addition, funds to finance the initial spares requirements for the supplemental aircraft modification program are requested.

The replenishment spares requirement provides spares support for a C-5A/C-141 wartime utilization rate of 24 hours a day for 365 days to increase the capability of the strategic airlift force to support worldwide mobility commitments. Current War Reserve Material funding for the C-5A and C-141 will only provide a maximum surge of approximately 30 days respectively. After the 30 day for the C-5A and the 40 day for the C-141, backorders will start to build and will require extensive cannibalization to avoid aircraft grounding for lack of parts. Also included are funds for the procurement of a portion of the previously deferred war reserve spares for the F-111 and F-111 aircraft which are required to increase readiness posture and combat effectiveness.
BUDGET ACTIVITY: Aircraft Support Equipment and Facilities

Justification of Supplemental Requirements

Readiness and Modernization. The FY 1974 supplemental budget request for this activity consists of the following two categories.

Common Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) - $1.5 million

Fund requirements in this category are $1.5 million to procure AGE for the modification program included in this supplemental request and $.6 million for AGE required by the procurement of the six C-130H aircraft described in the foregoing Airlift Aircraft category.

Other Production Charges - $101.0 million

The line items affected by this supplemental request are:

(In Millions of Dollars)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDM Pods</td>
<td>$60.9</td>
<td>$135.9</td>
<td>$75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Mission Equipment</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Adv Location Strike System</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECM Simulator</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$106.0</td>
<td>$207.0</td>
<td>$101.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated that potential enemy forces can deploy a dense and mixed radar controlled weapons threat which currently exceeds the USAF countermeasure capability. Israeli Air Force aircraft losses were heavy during the 1973 Middle East conflict and resulted primarily from the lack of ECM pods and/or threat radar warning capability. When these systems were available, losses resulted from system inability to counter threats from Soviet made [deletions] For effective operation in this same type of dense/mixed radar environment, aircraft require electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods and effective warning equipment which can detect and identify each threat. In recognition of this new threat information, the following requirements are requested in the FY 1974 Supplemental budget:

**ECM Pods - $75.0 million**

The Air Force requires approximately 2000 ECM pod systems to provide self-protection countermeasures capability for its tactical fighter forces. The current ECM pod inventory totals only [deletions] of the requirement and contains some [deletions] ECM pods which cannot counter one or more of the following Soviet threats: [deletions] New pods, and updates to the older pod systems, are urgently required to provide viable countermeasure systems which can cope with the current Soviet threat.

**Alternate Mission Equipment - $14.7 million**

A number of efforts have been identified which will improve the self-protection countermeasures and threat warning capability of the USAF tactical fighter and strategic forces. The following items and associated fund requirements are included in this category:

**Chaff Dispensing Pods - $4.5 million**: These funds are required to procure chaff pods to raise the inventory level from its current extremely low position.

**Integrated ECM System for Wild Weasel - $7.0 million**: The ECM systems currently being used on Wild Weasel aircraft require update to counter the newer Soviet threats enumerated above.

**B-52 Missile Launch Warning System - $2 million**: B-52 aircraft do [deletions] The funds requested in this supplemental will correct this interference problem.

**Radar Warning Capability - $3.0 million**: These funds are required for upgrading the present radar warning capability in portions of the tactical fighter force.
Department of the Army
Missile Procurement, Army

Budget Activity: Other Missiles

Justification of supplemental requirements.

TOW Missile System - $65.2 million is requested to provide for early replacement of older antitank weapons for the Active Army and NATO Reserve Roundout Battalions, and accelerated procurement of TOW for high priority Reserve Components. This request provides for the procurement of 6,000 missiles, 985 launchers and associated ground support equipment. Accelerated acquisition would provide 82% of the TOW launcher requirements for Active Forces and three NATO Reserve Roundout Battalions, as opposed to the current program, which would provide only 31%. The accelerated procurement of missiles would provide 51% of the AAO in FY74 (present program - 141).
Department of the Army
Missile Procurement, Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Activity: Spare and Repair Parts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Justification of supplemental requirements:

Required for the procurement of initial provisioning, and replenishment requirements of centrally managed, high dollar value repairable components, assemblies, and repair parts which are not carried in Army Stock Fund inventories. Inventories are replenished to stock levels determined by demand experience.

Other Missiles - $19.2 million is requested for initial provisioning of spare parts to support the TOW system procurement ($4.3 million), non-cancellable funding ($4.9 million) and to improve the readiness of national inventories of replenishment spare parts ($9.7 million). Finally, funds ($0.1 million) are requested for prepositioned War Reserve stocks.
Department of the Navy
Weapons Procurement, Navy

(Dollars in thousands)
FY 1974 Presently Available 800,700
FY 1974 Revised Estimate 829,300
FY 1974 Proposed Supplemental 28,600

Budget Activity: Other Missiles

Justification of supplemental requirements.

Readiness and Modernization

AGM-45A (SHRIKE). SHRIKE is an all-weather, anti-radiation, air-to-surface guided missile capable of destroying or suppressing enemy radar systems. The SHRIKE missile is operational, and all testing has been completed. The $11.6 million requested in FY 1974 will provide for procurement of 103 additional AGM-45A-6 missiles to provide an increment toward the inventory objective.

RIM-66B (STANDARD MR). A supersonic medium range missile which provides All Weather Anti-Aircraft and surface-to-surface armament for destroyers and incorporates advanced solid-state electronic and engineering concepts. STANDARD MR is able to defend against high performance aircraft and missile targets flying at speeds up to approximately Mach 3; altitudes from 0 to 60,000 feet; slant ranges from 100 to 200 miles; kill probability of 75% against single targets and 25% against a single target in multiple formation. It also operates effectively against sophisticated electronic countermeasures.

The additional missiles will provide an increment toward the inventory objective.
Justification of supplemental requirements

Evolution and Modernization. This request is entirely for the TOM missile system and will allow the fielding of all three planned TOM companies a minimum of six months to one year in advance of current plans.
Justification of supplemental requirements.

Modernization. The supplemental budget request will provide funds for the procurement of Shrike air-to-ground missiles and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs).

AMRAAM Missiles - The AMRAAM is an anti-radiation air-to-ground missile that will be used in F-16 and F-4 aircraft to suppress or destroy enemy radars. The FY 1974 supplemental request will provide for the additional production of the AMRAAM for tactical inventory. The improved inventory position is required to enhance the readiness posture of the Air Force to meet combat expenditure requirements as demonstrated to be necessary during the Middle East conflict.

Tactical Drones - Tactical drones are unmanned airborne vehicles used for tactical air missions. Two types of tactical drones are included in the FY 1974 supplemental request, expendable and recoverable. The expendable drones are needed to sow chaff and jam the acquisition radar of terminal threats. The expendable drones are needed as a saturation and confusion device against early warning ground control intercept radars. They have a radar cross section similar to the strike aircraft which will make them effective as decoys. The air tactics employed during the recent Middle East crisis demonstrates the urgent need for improved defense suppression systems.
Department of the Air Force
Missile Procurement, Air Force

<table>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Available/Estimated/Proposed</th>
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<td>FY 1974</td>
<td>Proposed Supplemental</td>
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**Justification of supplemental requirements:**

**Maintenance and Modernization.** The supplemental request will provide for the engineering requirement to regrow
servicing rocket motors with off-the-shelf propellants and to repackage an active optical fuse previously developed
and qualified for the AIM-9A Falcon and the AIM-9L Sidewinder. This effort is urgently required in Fiscal Year 1974
to accelerate the engineering to permit upgrading of the Sidewinder inventory to the AIM-9J configuration at the earliest
possible date to meet combat expenditure requirements as demonstrated to be necessary by the Middle East conflict. This
modification will increase the reliability and effectiveness of Sidewinders when employed in the dog fight.
Justification of supplemental requirements.

**Readiness and Modernization.** The supplemental request will provide for the initial spares in support of the AGM-84 Shrike and tactical drone procurements.
Force M:elle Procurement, Air Force

Budget Activity: 5, Other support

Justification of supplemental requirements.

Readiness and Modernization. The supplemental request will provide for an increased classified drone requirement (Compass Cookie) which requires special access.