by selectively incorporating new elements from other cultures, one is likely to find a way to explain why some implanted administrative features fared well in one country but not in another, or why among several items from one exporting country only some were introduced successfully in one recipient country.

How culture change

The following cases of cultural change, among others, may illustrate the point.

As reported by Peter Farb, the Cheyenne Indians practiced agriculture before the arrival of the white man. The introduction of the horse by the Spaniards led to a new combination of their culture. With horses, the Cheyenne began to exploit the abundance of bison and thus changed the base of their economy from agriculture to hunting. This resulted in new styles of dress, ornaments, and social stratification based on horse ownership in a society which had previously been egalitarian. The horse was precisely the new cultural element that changed the whole way of life of this people. But let us not forget the fact - and this fact is crucial, that the Cheyenne society possessed some peculiar features that permitted it to accept the Spanish horse but not other elements from the Spanish culture and integrated it into its culture. In fact they had hunted bison as a secondary activity to farming but had not had the technical element, the horse, to expand this activity. The Paiute of the Great Basins also obtained horses from the Spaniards, but instead of using them for bison hunting, they simply ate them and no such broad cultural change followed.

Another example reported by Goodenough shows how the introduction of a new fishing method changed the social structure of the Onotoans, a people in one of the Southern Gilbert Islands in the Pacific. This community which had been made up of extended families tied up together by the Kaainga - group of people descended from a common ancestor, was transformed into one based on isolated individuals united by Mwaneaba - the common meeting house of the entire community.
The Onotoans had used big boats for fishing close to shore. This traditional method involved a network of cooperative relationships based on the extended family system. At the beginning of the twentieth century, local people were able to buy the wood with which to construct canoes that permitted deep sea fishing. Because this new method required only two persons for each canoe, it finally broke up the cooperatives based on the extended family, the family system itself, and the social institution of Kaainga. Using a materialistic explanation, one is tempted to admit that it was the introduction of a new technological tool - the canoe which determined the change in social institutions. But if one goes a step further, one will find that it was not so simple. Deep-sea fishing by canoes had existed concurrently with the traditional method. The possession of the outrigger sailing canoe was considered by the local people as a symbol of prestige, and open-sea varieties of fish caught by this method of fishing by canoe were rated as highly desirable food. Though local people valued the canoes, very few could afford to get them. Such was the situation when the British colonizers hired the Onotoans to work on the mines in a neighboring island. At the expiration of the contract, workers returned to their island and instead of spending their savings for other things, used them to buy wood to construct canoes for deep-sea fishing. In the beginning only two persons had owned canoes; fifty years later, in 1951, two-thirds of the population possessed canoes, and this resulted in the transformation of their social structure. It should be emphasized that the same canoe was not incorporated by people in neighboring islands and did not produce any such societal change. 4

The peculiar way in which each society incorporates new elements into its total culture makes it necessary to study the culture of a country to know its people's way of life, what makes them like this but not that, why they solve their problems this way and not that way, in the hope of predicting how they are likely to react to innovations.
How the Public Administration Systems Incorporate New Elements

In the field of public administration, the transferred elements are usually instruments desired specifically to solve problems in the exporting culture in a manner conforming to the total way of life of the people in this culture. Thus, there is also the need to study the culture of the exporting country to identify the purpose served by the administrative feature used there in addition to the function this technique is likely to fulfill in the importing culture. The American executive budget system which serves the cause of efficiency through central coordination and leadership in the U.S. has been transplanted so successfully in South Vietnam, because it has helped strengthen the Vietnam values of social hierarchy and executive leadership.

On the other hand, attempts at introducing the American position classification system into the Vietnamese Civil Service which began in the late 1950's have so far not materialized. This system based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work", "rank in the job not in the man", which is the product of an egalitarian society, has not been accepted in a South East Asian country where the preference for social hierarchy, inherent rank and status still pervades the whole society and its bureaucracy.

The Predominant Role of the Value System

In order to know the role each administrative feature is likely to perform in each culture, one may refer to what anthropologists call the value system which is assumed to govern human behavior in almost every sphere of life. In a certain respect, this value system which is made up of the fundamental relationships found in a culture, may be viewed as the basic logic of the whole society. Since the parts of a whole cannot run counter to this logic, the transferred administrative items appear to be incorporated into the importing culture only when they can fit into its value system.
Hall's Major Triad

The anthropologist Edward T. Hall's distinction between the formal, informal and technical part of the value system seems to be crucial for an understanding of the goodness of fit of imported administrative features because of the different degree of permeability of each part.

Formal behavior is learned by following precepts and admonitions of a yes-no, right-wrong character, language is mostly transmitted this way through generations. The characteristic of the formal system is that it exists at the deepest level of subconsciousness and is thus completely taken for granted. Indeed, an American rarely questions why he says "went" instead of "goed", why he does not marry the daughter of his father's brother.

Informal behavior is mainly learned by taking cues from others as models and is usually less rigid than formal behavior. Sex is mostly learned that way. The same can be said of the rules for social interaction. You just unconsciously imitate the way people greet, address, talk to each other. Intuitively, you call someone by his first name or his position title, you maintain proper conversation distance, but you cannot give any clear-cut rules for these informal manners.

Technical learning is on the contrary, mostly transmitted in explicit terms like from teacher to students. Unlike formal and informal learning, technical learning is fully conscious behavior which happens at the highest level of awareness.

Formal and informal norms of behavior are at times so identified with nature itself that their violations are thought of as impossible and provoke strong emotional reactions, anxiety, or are characterized by a suppression of feeling. For this reason, formal and informal systems are highly resistant to change. On the contrary, technical behavior which exists at the level of consciousness, is under the control of man and thus can be subject to change. In other words, the technical level may be considered as culturally neutral.
In actuality, the boundary dividing the formal, informal and technical systems sometimes becomes very blurred because the systems exist in a relationship of continuous change, shifting one into the other. What is treated as formal at one time may later become informal and then technical. Technical activity also tends to turn into informal and formal ones.

In the American culture, premarital chastity used to be a formal behavior pattern supported by technical props such as manner of dressing, close chaperonage, and limited times and places where young ladies could be seen with a man. With the gradual disappearance of these traditional restraints, the formal virtue has turned toward being treated technically, and unlike people in other cultures, Americans have come to hold the view that the controls exist in the person and not in the situation.

On the other hand, science which is the very essence of the technical, actually is supported by a large number of formal systems which nobody questions, such as the methodology of science, the objectivity of the scientists and their professional honesty. There are procedural rituals in any science that students must learn and later pass on to their own disciples. In the behavioral science, there already develops a tendency to measure the degree to which a paper is "scientific" by the proportion of text to footnotes and the quantity of statistics in relation to text. This is the way methodological rules become formalized, although sometimes there may be nothing scientific in them.

The Hypothetical Framework

In the light of what has been said, the following framework for cross cultural transfer of administrative items is proposed:

The theory, well known in cultural anthropology that each culture is a systematic and integrated whole whose parts are linked together by a central value system will serve as a basic premise for the solution of our problem.
In order to know the function fulfilled by a transferred item in the exporting as well as the importing culture, the value system of each should be studied.

What can be transferred from the exporting country to the importing country is assumed to depend upon whether or not the administrative item devised to solve problems in the exporting culture in accordance with its value system can fit into the value system of the importing culture.

This goodness of fit may take three forms:

1. Those borrowed features which tend to reinforce the prevailing values of the recipient country would be most acceptable;

2. Those that change only the technical part of local behavior would also be easily incorporated;

3. Those that run counter to the formal and informal behavioral systems of the importing culture are most likely to be turned down either by outright rejection at the outset, by gradual disappearance or by increasing the degree of formalism, i.e. of gap between the expected and the achieved.

For the purpose of illustration, the transferability of American administrative systems and techniques to South Vietnam will be studied in the following chapter in the light of the framework.

**Chapter II**

**What Can Be Transferred from**

**The United States to South Viet Nam?**

In accordance with the advanced paradigm, the American and Vietnamese value system and their impact upon the different
behavioral spheres of the two peoples will be dealt with in a first part; and various public administration technical assistance projects will be studied in a second part to support the hypothesis as to what can be transferred between the two countries.

Part 1
Value and Behavior in America and Viet Nam

The value system of any culture is assumed to be made up of specific values centering around focal values which, in turn, stem from the value orientations, as suggested by the anthropologist Cora DuBois. It is implied in this assumption that "no system of values can encompass genuine contraries "and" in any value system where such spurious oppositions exist there will be a strain for consistency."6

American and Vietnamese Value Orientations

Value orientations are defined summarily by Florence Kluckhohr and Fred Strodbeck as generalized and organized principles concerning basic human problems which pervasively and profoundly influence man's behavior, including: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man - nature orientation; (3) time orientation; (4) space orientation; (5) activity orientation; and (6) relational orientation.7 Vietnamese and Americans seem to differ greatly in their orientations to these basic problems.

Human Nature

According to most anthropologists, the American orientation inherited from Puritan ancestors is that of a basically evil but perfectible human nature. Thus, Americans tend to believe,
F. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck put it, that "constant control and discipline of the self are required if any goodness is to be achieved". 8

On the other hand, the Vietnamese, under the prevailing influence of Confucianism, have been led to hold the view that man is inherently good but corruptible. So, he must strive to keep his goodness by constantly self-examining in order to improve his moral self. 9

Americans and Vietnamese appear also to have different conceptions with respect to the relation of man to nature and supernature.

Man-Nature

According to social scientists, cultures tend to hold three main conceptions about this relationship - subjugation to nature, harmony with nature, and mastery over nature. Americans tend to believe that man can control nature which is but a kind of machine - hence the emphasis on technology, 10 whereas Vietnamese are inclined to think that there is complete harmony between man and nature and supernature which are but part of a same whole - hence the strong faith placed upon the scholars' exemplary life, and astrology, horoscope as a means of conforming to nature. 11

Time and Space

Besides the view of nature, every culture must have their conceptions of the past, the present, and the future. While American culture puts a heavy weight on the future which is anticipated to be "better" and "bigger" 12, Vietnamese appear to be more attached to the past. 13

People who are oriented to the future tend to stress movement
and mobility, and in this respect no peoples in the world can compare with the Americans. Whereas dynamism is a key aspect of the American culture, attachment to the ancestors' land and to the primary groups has been a predominant feature of the Vietnamese society.

### Activity

Americans and Vietnamese tend also to differ sharply on their activity orientation. Anthropologists have classified this orientation along a threefold range of variation in solution - "being," "being-in-becoming," and "doing". The "being" orientation is the tendency to act spontaneously to satisfy one's impulses and desires. The "being-in-becoming" orientation is the preference for activities which develop all aspects of the self as an integrated whole. Unlike the "being" orientation, it stresses the control and containment of impulses by means of mediation and detachment - while the "being" and "being-in-becoming" orientations are both concerned with what the human actor is rather than what he can accomplish, the "doing" orientation emphasizes the accomplishment itself and prefers the "kind of activity which results in accomplishments that are measurably by standard conceived to be external to the acting individual." These three orientations are roughly equivalent to the commonly known "Diosyan," "Apollonian," and "Promethean" tendencies.

According to anthropologist, the "doing" orientation is characteristically the dominant one in the American society as expressed in such stock phrases as, "getting things done", and "let's do something about it." The "being-in-becoming" tendency appears to be the characteristic of the Vietnamese, as reflected in the Confucian "Golden Mean" and the Buddhist "Middle Path" as well as in popular wisdom which urge self-control, meditation and caution in one's act.
Relational Orientation

This orientation about man's relation to other men has been subdivided by anthropologists into the categories - lineal, collateral, and individualistic - while all three variations exist in every society, in individualistic - oriented cultures, the autonomy of the individual is predominant, individual goals prevailing over those of collateral or lineal groups. When collaterality is predominant, the individual is not a human being except as he is a part of a social order, a laterally extended group, like the extended family, whose goals and welfare are prevalent. If the lineal principle dominates the "relational" system, group goals again prevail over those of the individuals, but one of the most important of these group goals is the "continuity of the group through time and ordered positional succession within the group."19

The principle of lineality has governed the Vietnam extended family which is but a variation of the Chinese "clan", and is manifested in such institutions as the common house for ancestors' worship, common graveyard, solidarity responsibility, mutual help, authority of the elders.20 As far as American culture is concerned, few would deny that it is government by the principle of individual autonomy.

From these six value orientations serving as basic premises, one can drive the focal and specific values which prevail in America and Vietnam.

American Focal and Specific Values

The following four focal values may thus be identified in the American culture "effort-optimism", "material well-being", "conformity," and "self-reliance." Since there is mutual interaction and reinforcement among the basic premises to produce these central values, it cannot be categorically assumed that each value derives from each specific value.
orientation, but only that some value may be the direct consequence of some orientation more than of others. For example, effort optimism derives mainly from the belief of man's perfectibility; material well-being from the premise that man is master of a mechanical universe; self-reliance from the individualistic orientation; conformity from the premise of man's equality which appears to be the consequence of the combination of the conceptions of man's perfectibility and individual autonomy leading to the belief that all individuals are equally perfectible through their own efforts.

It should be noted, in addition, that these focal values also exist in a state of mutual dependence, and the relationship between each of them and their supposedly derivative values should be understood in similar manners.

**Effort-Optimism**

The belief that man is inherently bad but perfectible induces Americans to make an effort to perfect themselves. This endeavor makes work a specific value in the Yankee culture. This belief that "hard work is rewarding" is reinforced by an extraordinary sense of optimism. Even when faced with unsurmountable obstacles, Americans still believe that "something can be done about it."

The theme of "effort-optimism" appears also to be at the root of the cult of progress, the extraordinary desire for change and the cult of youthfulness.

**Material Well-Being**

If the universe is conceived as a kind of machine that man can subdue and exploit for his use through his hard work, material comfort appears to Americans as a reward for achievement, a "right" due to those who have conscientiously practiced the value of work.
This seems to be consistent with the American love of bigness, the specialization or atomization of knowledge, the high place accorded to efficiency and practicality, and the strong faith in science and secular rationality.

**Self-Reliance**

If individual goals are given primacy, the individual must rely mainly upon himself to achieve these goals and can expect to be rewarded after working hard.

For this reason, personal achievement is particularly emphasized in the American culture. Individual competition, social mobility, and equality of opportunity seem to have reached a degree unequalled anywhere.

**Conformity**

Equality and achievement maximize competition and result in an amorphous social structure in which individuals are uncertain about their social position. Conformity to the standard of the current majority is a way to solve this status of uncertainty.

This focal value may be used in conjunction with others to explain many aspects of the American character such as the so-called "cult of the average man," the devotion to the "underdog," the easy but casual friendship, the extraordinary readiness to join with the anonymous other in voluntary associations, the belief in team work, persuasion, permissiveness rather than authority, and hierarchy as principles of organization, the "missionary spirit" or determination to help others by making the world over on the American model.
From the basic value orientations already mentioned, the following focal values are derived for the Vietnamese culture: self-control, harmony with non-self, social hierarchy, and mutual dependence.

Self-Control

The belief that man is born good but corruptible and the being-in-becoming orientation seem to be the source of the constant concern of the Vietnamese to self-examine, to master himself so as to maintain his inherent goodness, to improve his moral self. This is likely to be the reason why most of the personal virtues are based on the control of the self-moderation, patience, modesty, caution, equanimity, moral probity, resignation, discipline.

This preoccupation with maintaining the internal equilibrium of the inner self goes along with a constant concern for achieving harmony between the self and the environment.

Harmony with the Non-Self

This harmony is manifested in the relationship with nature and with other men. Harmony with the universe is assumed to be realized when man conforms to the existing natural order about him. Thus, this harmonious world order should not be troubled by a too tall building or a too straight street. There are "good" as well as "bad" days for engaging in any kind of activity. Even the sovereign must not trouble world harmony. Any wrong deed on his part may bring about catastrophes for the country.

Harmony should also be maintained in social relationship. The general code of conduct here is to seek the equilibrium by following the "Just Middle", and "Not to fall into the extremes". Besides the virtues already mentioned, the following qualities are required for the maintenance of this just
middle - avoidance of injury to others, concern for not hurting individual susceptibility, compromise, politeness, delicacy, tactfulness; gentleness, suppleness, flexibility.

As a result of this concern for harmony, a high premium is placed on the status quo, and change tends to be considered as disrupting the existing harmonious order of things. This present order is also one in which the rights and duties of everyone are clearly defined according to his position in the social hierarchy.

Social Hierarchy

In the Vietnamese view, hierarchy but not equality is the natural order of everything in the universe. Since inequality is the law of nature, to live in harmony with nature is to conform to his hierarchical system, to know one's position in it and to behave accordingly. Thus, the society is based on a clear hierarchy of statuses which in turn is supported by a body of formal rules governing the relationship between people at the higher and lower levels. These formal conventions must be adhered to by everyone depending upon his position in the hierarchy making conformity a necessary virtue.

Accordingly from hierarchy as a focal value, one can derive specific values such as concern for status, emphasis on ceremonial conventions, and conformity to rituals and etiquettes.

Mutual Dependence

These are in turn reinforced by a clearly delineated network of mutual dependence resulting from the principle of linearity. Solidarity and reciprocity are thus the cornerstone of relationships between members of the family and larger social groups.

Mutual dependence is reflected in filial piety as a cardinal
virtue in family life, and in fidelity to the person of the sovereign as a highly praised quality in public life.

Some Value Change in Vietnam

What has been said are supposed to be the ideal features of the Vietnamese traditional culture. As Vietnam has been in contact with Western civilization for about a century now, Vietnamese have indeed internalized a great many features of new values. But this seems to be only a one-sided internalization or a change in form rather than in substance. There is indeed no "poverty of wants" especially among the Westernized elements in Vietnam. There is instead an omnipresent desire for Western assets.

The value of material welfare does not await foreign pressure to be adopted. But whereas American material well-being is a way to fulfill the need for prestige, a reward for hard work, what has been transferred to Vietnam becomes merely virtuous materialism. This import of materialism without its concomitant feature of hard work does not appear to lead to more economic development but rather more corruption, more black market.

A people who have been subject to rigid social conformity are also very quick to adopt the value of equality. But here again, the imported equality seems to have lost its ideal feature. Those who want to be equal with their superior, tend to ask for an equality in rights and privileges, but not in responsibility. Since everybody wants to be boss, nobody wants to be commanded. Participative management thus tends to become a means to avoid responsibility, to put off rough decisions, rather than to provide more light and intelligence to the decision-making process.

"Fed up" with his poor relative who keeps asking for help, money and favor of all kinds, the Vietnamese is also very quick to become individualistic. But this self-isolation
does not go along with a readiness to join with the anonymous others in solving problems of communal and national interests. Self-reliance has virtually become egoistic individualism. The "individualist" Vietnamese no longer cares for anything except his own personal interest. He is thus apt to pack up and quit his country at war, and to search for a place where he can alone enjoy material welfare, equality and individual freedom.

Value and Behavior

The above mentioned value patterns appear to pervade every sphere of life of the American and Vietnamese people, strongly influencing the way they fulfill their needs of sociability, security, and status. Their impact has been clearly revealed in the way the two peoples organize themselves into groups and in the kind of activity they prefer to pursue. Vietnamese tend to satisfy their social needs within the status-based clans, making the latter the strongest group in the society, overshadowing all others. Americans are more inclined to rely on the contract-based clubs or associations to satisfy the same needs. They also tend to prefer economic activities whereas Vietnamese give primacy to moral and intellectual activities.

The difference in value configurations between Americans and Vietnamese have also led to a great divergence in their respective views of bureaucracy, its role and its relationships with other systems as well as its internal organization. American emphasis on economics has resulted in a relatively low status bureaucracy whose role has been minimized and reduced to that of servant of the people and of the economy. Effectiveness and responsiveness are two main criteria for evaluating bureaucratic performance.

Vietnamese, in contrast, conceive of bureaucracy as a body of elites serving as guides and educators for the common people because of their moral and intellectual capacity.
In its interaction with the private sector, American Public Administration has been strongly influenced by the values of the market, as shown by its emphasis on cost-effectiveness and practical results. Vietnamese concern for social harmony has made for the predominance of the scholar bureaucrats over the businessmen. The relationships between American bureaucracy and the social structure has been mediated by the associations which exert pressure upon, as well as provide support to, public agency. Vietnamese bureaucracy has been a traditional place for the clans to enhance their prestige, status, and privileges by contributing their eminent members to the service of the state. This difference in relationship between public administration and social groups has led to differences in bureaucratic problems such as nepotism, regional animosity in Vietnam; empire-building and sale of influence in America.

The absence of class resulting from American equalitarianism has been reflected in the representativeness of American bureaucracy and the predominant role played by the specialist. The traditional division of the hierarchical Vietnamese society into four classes - scholar, farmer, craftsman, merchant - has resulted in the concentration of the elite in the bureaucracy, the separation of bureaucrats as a ruling class, and the segmentation of public employees into isolated strata.

American equalitarianism has led to the sovereignty of the people and the superiority of politicians over bureaucrats, no matter how expert the latter may be. The Vietnamese view that authority derives from the top has made the bureaucracy all powerful vis-a-vis all other groups, political or otherwise. In practice, Vietnamese bureaucracy has become an arena for political struggle. To keep bureaucrats responsive to the will of the people, bureaucratic weakness has been institutionalized in America by its spectacular fragmentation. In contrast, the strength and superiority of Vietnamese bureaucracy over other sections has been consecrated by its heavy centralization.
Cultural values also exert a strong impact upon organizational and managerial behavior within each national bureaucratic system. American management philosophy has been dominated by vitality, mobility, informality, abundance, and quantity. In contrast, caution, wisdom, stability, formalism, necessity, quality have been emphasized by Vietnamese management. Decision-making in America is widely decentralized. There is widespread delegation and group participation. In Vietnam, decision-making tends to be centralized and individualized. American leadership relies heavily on professional expertise and the ability to reconcile the two conflicting ideologies of success and equality. Moral prestige and general intellectual superiority constitute the primary basis of Vietnamese leadership.

Part 2

American Technical Assistance to South Viet Nam

A review of the literature on public administration technical assistance since 1955 seems to confirm our suggested hypotheses. In the aid projects which are going to be studied, it appears that which was congruent with the Vietnamese value system was readily accepted and implemented successfully. What was incongruent with it was rejected or met with failure, and what attempted to change only the technical system was also welcome and incorporated into Vietnamese administration.

Local Administration Reforms

As already suggested, the Vietnamese view of social and administrative order is one in which authority derives from the top. It is thus not hard to understand why the kinds of recommendations by American advisors that aimed at reinforcing this hierarchical order were readily accepted by the Vietnamese government.
In 1956, the recommendation of the Michigan State University Advisory Group (MSUAG) concerning local administration reforms appeared to be dominated by two main familiar considerations in American public administration, effectiveness and responsiveness. In the view of MSUAG, the most serious problems confronting Vietnamese local administration were those which hampered bureaucratic responsiveness, namely, the lack of contact between the central government in Saigon and the rural people, and the absence of democratic participation in regional and provincial administration. Included were those which stood on the way of bureaucratic effectiveness: inefficient division of responsibility, existence of uncoordinated budgets, absence of an adequate control system, unwillingness to delegate power to the lowest echelons.

To bring remedies to these administration deficiencies, MSUAG proposed the following reforms; abolition of regional administration, consolidation of provinces into localities, suppression of regional and provincial budgets, creation of elected locality councils, and of a political control of appointments.

It is interesting to note that most of those proposals which, in the American mind aimed at achieving efficiency, were congruent with the Vietnamese view of administrative order, and were warmly welcomed by the Vietnamese government. On the contrary, those which pertained to administrative responsiveness - creation of elected councils - were refused under some pretext or did not work as expected.

Abolition of the Regions

The suppression of the three regions of Vietnam was advocated by American advisors because regional administration, in their opinion, was an "unuseful level" between the central government and the provinces, slowed down administrative operations and created confusion in the localization of responsibility and overlapping in leadership. This American concern for
efficiency agreed with the Vietnamese concern for hierarchical order. Indeed, the central government, led by President Ngo dinh Diem, had little control over regional administrations which enjoyed an almost unlimited autonomy as a result of the French policy "divide and conquer". President Diem wanted to abolish these strong centers of power led by regional governors who were in a position to challenge him, in order for the authority of his government to reach the entire country. The reform was implemented successfully within a very short period of time.

Election of Locality Councils and Locality Chiefs

The abolition of the regional echelon left 37 provinces reporting directly to the Department of the Interior. The span of control of the latter being too wide, MSUAG proposed the consolidation of provinces into 14 localities, each having an elected locality chief and an elected locality council.

This attempt to transfer this pattern of local democracy for the sake of administrative responsiveness met only with an agreement "in principle". Vietnamese officials promised to implement this reform at a later date when normal security condition was restored. In fact, the grant of home rule never materialized under the Diem government.

After a change of government in 1963, Vietnamese officials fulfilled their promise and encouraged some kind of mitigated local democracy. Provincial councils elected by village councillors were intended to provide a sort of check and guidance to province chiefs appointed by the central government. It was found, however, that:

... Councillors were inclined to take opportunities for obstruction more often than opportunities for
cooperation. The American faith, which these arrangements honoured, in the power of local self-determination to lead back to the paths of righteousness communities subverted by the Viet Cong during the tyranny of Ngo dính Diem received little confirmation in practice.

Political Control of Nominations

As to the nomination of officials to different posts in the governmental hierarchy, MSUAG recommended a system of direct nomination by which the agent was to be appointed by his direct superior to whom he is responsible. Moreover, the political functions of locality chiefs or province chiefs should be nominated with the consent of elected territorial councils.

These recommendations based on considerations of responsiveness and the so called "principle" of administration according to which authority must be commensurate with responsibility, we discarded sub silentio since they were against Vietnamese culture. It is hard for the Vietnamese superior to accept that his power be checked by his subordinates even though they may be elected councillors.

On the other hand, to leave the matter of appointment up to the direct superior, to give him a free hand to select his subordinates may encourage the centrifugal tendencies. Besides, without a strict hierarchical control, the official may appoint his supporters, friends and relatives to different posts under his direct command. Unlike the American who believes that everyone is eager to improve himself, to attempt to do a better job, and thus tends to delegate his power downward, the Vietnamese assumes that the inherent goodness of man left unchecked would succumb to evil tendencies. All this is found in the Vietnamese culture and escapes the American mind which is primarily concerned with "getting things done".
Budget Reforms

Besides the reforms in local government, MSUAG assisted also in reorganizing the budget system. A survey by the Group suggested that the budget function be strengthened and vested in the Presidency to permit the President to exercise positive policy leadership and formulation. As already indicated, the American concept of executive budget was proposed by reformers as an instrument of presidential leadership, control and coordination, to counterbalance the excessive trends of bureaucratic fragmentation which hampered administrative effectiveness in America.

When transferred to Vietnam, it was like a duck talking to the water. This time, the American concern for efficiency agreed with the Vietnamese concern for centralization and order in the executive budget. President Diem then asked MSUAG to prepare plans for modernizing the budget system. As a result, the relatively unimportant Budget Directorate, the Directorate of Obligation Control and the Administration of Foreign Aid, all of the Department of Finance were merged into a single agency, the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid attached directly to the Office of the President.

Budget implementation has been greatly improved through a redesigned and improved budget document. A modern system of classifying appropriation accounts based on functional use, has been devised. Mechano-electric accounting has been introduced, permitting up-to-date accounting reports. The procedures of budget execution and control have become more effective thanks to a quarterly allotment and speedier pre-audit of proposed expenditures.

The outcome of the reform was such a tremendous success that a United Nations budget expert pointed out that Vietnam has had the most advanced and up-to-date budget system in this part of the world.
In the writer's opinion, the congruence with local values and the technical aspect of the reform seems to be two decisive factors making for its success. If the new budget system has become so well ingrained in the Vietnamese bureaucracy, it is because it has helped bring uniformity and order to a chaotic situation difficult for the Vietnamese mind to endure. Besides, the innovations touched only the procedural and mechatronic sides of administration. In other words, they changed, according to our hypothesis, only those parts of the lives of the local bureaucrats that are treated technically, and that exist at the highest level of consciousness.

Moreover, the change introduced did not violate any formal or informal norms taken for granted by local people. Nor did it attempt to alter the accepted pattern of authority relationship, status, rank or salary of the public servants. In this respect, the innovation may be considered as culturally neutral. Furthermore, it tended to reinforce the accepted administrative hierarchy by permitting those at the top to exercise leadership, which is quite congruent with the Vietnamese view of order.

On the other hand, the suggested hypothesis is likely to be confirmed in another respect. Among the budgetary reforms, only those pertaining to purely procedural or "technical" matters have been ingrained in Vietnamese administration. But performance budgeting, which emphasizes cost accounting and work measurement, has not been able to take root in it. As a specific product of an equalitarian culture concerned with quantitative measurements and getting things done, performance budgeting hardly fits into the Vietnamese setting in which social hierarchy, moral virtues and other human and intangible consideration tend to prevail over a concern for tangible results from government activities.

These human considerations will be discussed together with the case of Civil Service reform.
Civil Service Reform

If budgetary reforms have brought about results beyond any level of optimistic expectations, MSUAG's consulting activities in the field of personnel administration met with dire failures.

Despite the persistent and tactful effort of highly qualified advisors, the successive attempts at introducing the American position classification system have gotten nowhere up to the present. Every successive Vietnamese Government has tried to refuse to apply the new system under a variety of pretexts.

Like performance budgeting, position classification is a specific product of an equalitarian and achieving culture like America. It is an objective merit system, the focus of which is on the job to be done, and the fitting of an individual into that job. It permits the standardization of the renumeration system on the basis of the value of the work to be done, thus realizing the American principle of "equal pay for equal work."

The slogan of the classification movement in the public sector and the job analysis in the private sector is "the job is the thing." Whoever performs the same job earns the same salary regardless of any other considerations. All this seems to be quite congruent with the American concern for achievement, a doing activity orientation, and a concept of equality already discussed.

In Vietnam, there are many other considerations in addition to work - family, political party, academic degree, loyalty to the boss, moral virtues. According to Civil Service laws and regulations, Vietnamese public servants are paid a salary that would guarantee them a standard of living appropriate to their status and rank in the administrative hierarchy. And in accordance with this principle, family allowances earned by high officials until very recently were significantly higher than those earned by lower rank. All this has a great deal more to do with the man, with his status in the social ladder than with the job to be done.
Besides this emphasis on the person, the confusion between politics and administration appears to be the greatest obstacle to the adoption of the American system. Because neither monarchy (tradition) nor democracy (legality-rationality) can provide a source of legitimacy for bureaucratic power in a "primatic" society like Vietnam, the Vietnamese public administration system has become a "bureaucratic polity" in which political forces compete for power. In such an atmosphere, personal confidence must override administrative and technical competence. Experience has, indeed, confirmed that any government which attempted to pursue administrative competence at the expense of political stability did not last more than six months. Such was the fate of the Cabinet of Premier Tho, an administrator, and of Premier Huong, a devoted patriot under the Khanh regime.

In this political environment, the anticipated consequence of position classification would be the strengthening of bureaucratic effectiveness in dealing with economic and social problems. Yet its unanticipated consequence is likely to be political instability and eventually the overthrow of those in power.

On the other hand, the on-going rank system might give room to corruption, nepotism, arbitrariness. Yet its latent functions appear to be many. Its very defects - lack of uniformity, imprecision - can give it much more flexibility than the American system. It gives room for those in power to achieve political stability by dealing with situations and individuals separately. It allows the regime to utilize talents without offending those who are cut loose from their job.

All these considerations make it unlikely for the Vietnamese leadership to adopt a rigid system which would be a burden to the regime. It may endanger the very survival of the government if implemented faithfully, or result in greater confusion or "formalism" if applied in principle but disregarded in practice.
In the field of police reform, MSUAG's efforts also appeared to succeed mostly where they touched only the technical part of local police administration. Indeed, as reported by MSUAG, assistance to Vietnamese police agencies was generally successfully in the field of material aid and its training and consulting activities also brought about good results insofar as they were related to material aid.

Material assistance

With an important and some minor exceptions, the program of material aid to the three local police agencies - national surete, municipal police, and civil guard - was generally successful according to MSUAG. The minor exceptions had to do with the sophistication of some radio equipment and to the fact that the Vietnamese government clearly favored the surete over the municipal police in violation of aid project agreement. This seems easy to understand since a "bureaucratic polity", the national surete which is more involved in politics must prevail over the municipal police, whose role is mostly of a non-political character.

The major weakness of the program resulted from the differences between Vietnamese and MSUAG over the direction of development the Civil Guard should take. The disagreement appeared to bring into focus the differences in value between Americans and Vietnamese. While agreeing on the basic objective - internal security - they differed in the means to achieve it. Americans put more emphasis on "democratic" means to maintain security, whereas Vietnamese gave more weight to the authority of government. While Americans believed that the Guard would become more effective if the role of the specialist, its director general, was strengthened, the Vietnamese tended to put more faith on the generalist - province chief. If Americans were persuaded that the efficiency
of the Guard would be increased by the elimination of its bad elements, Vietnamese were rather convinced that such a purge for the sake of technical efficiency would create social discord and do harm to the cause of internal security.

Political centralization through thirty-six weak province chiefs was deemed more functional to political stability and appeared to be more congruent with the Vietnamese cautious character and conception of social order than technical centralization through one strong man who might constitute a potential challenge to presidential power.

The result of the disagreement was a four year impasse (1955-1959) during which practically none of the equipment was delivered to the Civil Guard.

In short, the case of the Guard being excepted, the material aid program was brought to successful completion since it pertained only to technical matters and did not violate any formal and informal systems in local police administration. The same analysis applies also to police training.

Training

MSUAG found that training activities appeared to be most successful where they are concerned with the use and maintenance of materials, that is with technical learning.

As already suggested, formal and informal behavior is transmitted mainly at the level of unconsciousness. One learns it simply by living in a culture. Technical learning, in contrast, occurs at the highest level of consciousness. It is usually transmitted from teacher to student in explicit terms. Unlike informal learning, it depends more on the intelligence with which the material is analyzed and presented and on the aptitude of the trainee to follow instructions than on his other abilities or on the selection of adequate models.
Thus MSUAG's training in the use of firearms and other equipment was very successful but its introduction of American legal norms and evidence gathering methods resisted and did not produce any effect upon the trainees. Our hypothesis seems to be confirmed again this time since the former was technical learning whereas the latter belong to the realm of formal and informal behavior, which can hardly be learned that way.

Consulting

It was also reported by MSUAG that consulting activities were, in general, most successful in technical areas and where they were connected with material aid. The successful areas included the conversion of the antiquated Posttecher and Parisian finger-print system into the modern Henry system, the introduction of a plastic identity card, the centralization and unification of police records, the improvement of the functioning of the crime detection laboratory, and of traffic police.

In contrast to these brilliant results in the technical areas, MSUAG's attempts to change the formal and informal system of local police administration failed almost completely.

The University Group wanted the Vietnamese Government to specify the legal authority of each of the three police and security services, to eliminate overlapping jurisdiction among them, to delegate adequate authority to and within them, to give them jurisdiction over civil offenses committed by military personnel, and to curtail political interference in their internal administration and law-enforcement operation. These recommendations were no closer to adoption in 1962 than they were first presented in 1957.
MSUG also sought to loosen the control of the province chiefs over the surete and especially over the civil guard but without success; it felt that the province chiefs seriously interfered with the operations of these national agencies.25

Organization and Methods26

Provided MSUAG confined itself to reform that did not run counter to the formal and informal system and change only the technical system, its recommendations in the field of O&M, as elsewhere, were readily accepted and successfully implemented. With its technical assistance, the Department of Health installed a mechanical system of inventory control of drugs, improved its warehousing procedures and records management. The methods of storage, inventory and distribution of medical supplies were later used as models for other agencies. MSUAG's most outstanding achievement in O&M was the design of a Vietnamese standardized typewriter to replace hundreds of varieties of typewriter keyboards used in Vietnam. It was adopted by the government which decreed that after 1963 all imported typewriters would have to conform to its model.

The above mentioned successes and the like in the technical areas were considered as minor ones by MSUAG who questioned whether they were worth the time and effort. However, when their recommendations touched the sensitive political nerves of the bureaucratic system - control of administrative programs, better departmental organization, improvement of government wide management, guidance for inter-departmental relationship - they were overlook or forgotten.

Public Administration Training27

It has been observed by Weidner that in several countries,
training activities in public administration are much more acceptable than any other kinds of aid programs since they "can more easily be ignored." This remark is generally true if the nature of training is compared with other activities, but within the field of training itself, it appears that only the features that are congruent with local culture or confine themselves within the technical areas can be accepted and successfully implemented. The following study of the introduction of pre-service and in-service training in Vietnam apparently confirms this statement.

In-Service Training

Recommendations by MSUAG to establish a government-wide training program for all Vietnamese civil servants, at high as well as low levels, met with failure because the Inter-departmental Council on In-Service Training set up in 1956 to this effect, failed to become an effective instrument - Moreover, the draft of a presidential order establishing such a program was not signed by the President.

MSUAG attributed to failure mainly to the lack of a qualified training staff and agencies, and the unwillingness of higher level officials to submit themselves to training.

In this writer's opinion, the lack of material and technical means did not appear to be as important as the lack of will. Had powerful officials wanted to improve their administrative competence, means could have been found one way or another, especially with the anxious support of foreign aid. But they seemed to be more interested in playing their game of personal politics than in increasing their technical capacity, since the former paid off much more than the latter in a bureaucratic polity. If they were more competent in politics than in administration, to subject them to administrative training was to force them to reveal their ignorance in this field, which would mean a loss of face, of prestige, and perhaps of positions. This inarticulated fear appeared to have a lot to do with the failure of the program.
When MSUAG shifted its strategy and pursued a limited training program for non-political and lower officials, the results were more satisfactory. Yet the program, in MSUAG's opinion, can only be judged as "relatively successful" because the new training techniques - conferences, case method, role playing caused uneasiness among local trainers and trainees which led to indifferences, opposition or only passive support from key government agencies.

In our opinion, the love of education which has been a traditional feature of Vietnamese culture apparently made for the partial success of the training program. Yet some aspects of the latter did not seem to give him a strong motivation to learn.

The features that run counter to the Vietnamese value system appeared to have to do with the assumption about the relationship between teacher and student and among students. The high status and prestige enjoyed by the teacher in a Confucian culture like Vietnam is only second to the sovereign according to the trilogy - king, teacher, father. Thus, in order to be a teacher, one must be a very respectable and correct person and surpass by far the student in the subject matter being taught. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the instructor feels confident to teach and the trainee to learn. Moreover, trainees who attend the same course should possess roughly equivalent educational achievements or rank to avoid loss of face in case high level people should be overtaken or equalled by lower ones. These fears originating in the unconscious tendency to think in hierarchical terms, in the already mentioned "status consciousness" appeared to be the deep causes of the lack of motivation.

This assumption about the relationship between trainer and trainee combined with the Vietnamese cautious character and hence the tendency to "talk only when asked to" and "when
one knows for sure" also explains why the "democratic" techniques of learning, products of an equalitarian society created uneasiness and indifference. The case method, conference, role playing, seminar suppose a lot of talking by trainees, a certain equality between instructor and trainee, and group cooperation among class members. The American who believes that he is "as good as the next man" tends to consider his classmate's ideas as worth paying attention to as anyone else's, including that of teachers and text book writers, and is motivated to listen to, and participate in group discussion.

The Vietnamese who believes that "you can never do any good without the teacher" is inclined to consider his own and equal's opinion as of little value and discussion among "equal heads" as a waste of time. While the American is an independent learner and a team man, the Vietnamese is a dependent learner and an individual occupying a definite status in the hierarchy.

Thus when the seminar approach is used at some schools, it is no longer the give-and-take typical of the American seminar, but is so structured that it rather becomes a means for the instructor to check whether students have learned their lessons. There is very little discussion since the student cannot disagree with or "correct" his instructor without making the latter lose face; the instructor cannot admit his ignorance on some point without seeing his authority or prestige undermined, and the ideas of classmates are trivial.

National Institute of Administration

MSUAG's assistance to the NIA, an organization entrusted with the recruitment and training of high administrative officials has brought about roughly the same results as in other fields of training.
The transfer of the managerial and social science approach to public administration has taken hold in the Institute since the changes have not violated any sensitive ground and have occurred at the highest level of consciousness, under the rational control of local instructors and students. In other words, the innovations pertain to the "technical" area. But this does not appear to be the case with the transfer of new methods of research and teaching. MSUAG has observed, for instance - that the lecture method still remains the predominant one.

The emphasis on lectures and the lack of use of the seminar approach have already been discussed. Let us speculate here a little about the reasons why the case study approach has subsided after American advisors left. This method made some headway when MSUAG was in Vietnam with the NIA Case Development Seminar culminating in the publication of the *Cases in Vietnamese Administration*, under the guidance of Prof. Montgomery. This work required a great deal of cooperation among different government agencies and academic circles. It was Montgomery who served as coordinator to bring the work to successful completion. The book was the result of the cooperative effort of a big team guided by an American Captain. After this Captain left, no such work could be accomplished since the cooperative spirit among equal anonymous others is lacking in Vietnamese culture. This kind of cooperative work could be done in Vietnam through a hierarchical system, and this is difficult to realize in an academic circle and among parallel agencies.

This difference between the American and Vietnamese character may also explain why there has been no more collective field research studies after the departure of the Michiganders. Vietnamese faculty members produced only individual works.

**Conclusion**

In short, it has been found that those American administrative
features that serve the cause of efficiency through central coordination and leadership have been transplanted successfully in Vietnam as was the case with the executive budget and the suppression of regional administration, because these contribute to the strengthening of local values.

Administrative innovations that did not violate any part of the formal and informal behavioral systems, and confined themselves to changes in the technical sphere of local life have also been accepted and implemented with success, as shown by the cases of procedural reforms in O&M, of the use and maintenance of materials, and of the institutionalization of public administration training.

In contrast, those transferred items which run counter to the prevailing local values, such as local democracy, decentralization, position-classification, performance budgeting, participative learning and team research have been rejected either at the outset or through gradual disappearance.

This is so because each social system has its own internal logic which has taken shape through generations of socialization, making it impossible for it to incorporate extraneous elements which may disrupt the whole system and endanger its survival. Therefore, the introduction of change should take into account this logic in order for the innovations to fit into the whole.

The cases of reform seems to shed some light on the controversy over the "incrementalist" and "wholistic" approach to change, by demonstrating that neither one is necessarily doomed to failure or automatically leads to success. The abolitions of the regions, which were like three states in the federation, and their incorporation into the national government, the introduction of mechanical accounting into the entire national budget were large-scale sweeping reforms with far reaching consequences upsetting the whole existing administrative order. Yet these wholistic changes fared
admirably well, while the piece-meal introduction of local democracy or "democratic" training techniques led nowhere. On the other hand, incremental changes like the standardization of the typewriter brought about brilliant success while large-scale reforms such as the government-wide training program failed miserably.

These cases seem to demonstrate that the issue does not lie in incrementalism or wholism but rather in the goodness of fit between the introduced innovations and the whole system. Provided the part can fit into the whole, no matter how large or small it may be, the change is likely to succeed. In this light, it appears that the "mixed-scanning" approach, which reconciles both incrementalism and wholism, may provide an answer to the controversy.

Another conclusion that may derive from this study is that, given the decisive role of the unconscious values in a culture, it would be useless to expect the recipient country to reflect the image of the donor nation in its road to development. Whether a country has developed or not must be judged by the extent to which it can adapt and survive within the world supersystem but not by the disparate applications of certain features of a mirror country.

In final analysis, we may conclude that our suggested hypothesis is conformed. There is no all general formula for the cross-cultural transfer of administrative features. Instead, each case is dependent upon a study of its relationship to the value system of both the giving and accepting culture.
NOTES


8. Ibid., pp. 11-12.


13. This is reflected in ancestor worship, strong family tradition, respect of the rules of the ancients, etc.


17. Ibid., p. 17.

18. Te, op. cit., passim.


25. Scigliano and Fox, op. cit., p. 22.


27. Ibid., passim.

MINISTRY OF STATE (WITHOUT PORTFOLIO)

Decree No. 102-SL/Th.T/QTCS of 12 September 1969
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
(Decree No. 39-SL/TT of April 14, 1970)

MINISTER

CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS

TEAM OF EXPERTS
PRESS DIRECTORATE
RADIO BROADCASTING DIRECTORATE
TELEVISION & MOTION PICTURE DIRECTORATE

ASSISTANT MINISTER

SECRETARY GENERAL
- Administration & Finance Directorate
- Support Directorate

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CORPS AREAS REPRESENTATIVES

Capital City Service
Provincial & City Services
District Branches

INSPECTION TEAM
PLANNING & SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAM
DIRECTOR OF CABINET

PROPAGANDA-MOBILIZATION DIRECTOR GENERAL
- Program & Documentation Directorate
- Cadre & Training Directorate
- Regional Operations Directorate

USAID/ADLD/PA Vietnam, September 1970
MINISTRY OF ETHNIC DEVELOPMENT
Arrete No. 41-PTST/ND of March 4, 1970

MINISTER

Team of Inspectors

CHIEF OF CABINET
Private Secretary
- Security & Public Relations Bureau
- Mail Bureau
- Program Service

MINISTER

Central Organizations

DIRECTOR OF CABINET

Team of Experts

DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR OPERATIONS
- Rural Development of Highlands Directorate
- People's Affairs Directorate
- Training Service
- Research Center for Minorities

SECRETARY GENERAL
- Administration & Legislation Service
- Finance Service
- Logistics Service

DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR OPERATIONS
- Rural Development of Highlands Directorate
- People's Affairs Directorate
- Training Service
- Research Center for Minorities

Dependent Agencies

Regional Organizations

Pleiku Training Center for Highlanders Cadre

Highlanders Students & Pupils Dormitories

Ministry Representative Banmethuot

Ministry Representative
Quang Tri, Da Nang & Quang Ngai

Ethnic Development Provincial Services
Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, Dalac,
Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc & Lam Dong

Ethnic Development Interprovincial Services:
- Quang Tri & Thua Thien
- Da Nang & Quang Nam
- Quang Ngai & Quang Tin

Districts Branches

Districts Branches

USAID/ADLD/PA Vietnam, September 1970
MINISTRY OF OPEN ARMS
(Decree No. 098-SL/CH of August 26, 1970)

MINISTER

CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER CABINET

ASSISTANT FOR PLANNING FUNCTION, STUDY & EVALUATION GROUP

Special Assistants
Controllers
Experts
Coordination Service

DIRECTORATE OF MANAGEMENT

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

CENTRAL OPEN ARMS CENTER

CENTRAL VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CORPS AREAS REPRESENTATIVES

Provincial & City Open Arms Centers
Provincial & City Open Arms Services
District Branches

Saigon Capital Open Arms Service
District Branches

MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY DEVELOPMENT

ADPA - November 1970
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
( DECREE NO. 64-A-TT/SL OF JULY 1, 1970 )

PRESIDENT, SUPREME COMMANDER OF
THE RVN ARMED FORCES

PRIME MINISTER

DEFENSE MINISTER

- SPECIAL ASSISTANTS
- DIRECTORATE OF CABINET
- NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE
- FINANCE & AUDIT DIRECTORATE
- MILITARY JUSTICE DIRECTORATE
- MOBILIZATION DIRECTORATE
- MILITARY PROPERTIES DIRECTORATE
- NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC DIRECTORATE

RVNAF JOINT GENERAL STAFF

- LOGISTICS COMMAND
- PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CD
- TRAINING COMMAND

AIR FORCE COMMAND

ARMY COMMAND (A)

NAVY COMMAND

AIR FORCE COMMAND

ARMY COMMAND (A)

NAVY COMMAND

AIR FORCE DIVISIONS

FLEET

RIVER DEFENSE

SHORE DEFENSE

MARINES

ARMS
- INFANTRY (B)
- RANGERS
- AIRBORNE
- ARMORED
- SPECIAL FORCES
- ARTILLERY
- ENGINEERS
- TRANSMISSION
- MILITARY POLICE

CORPS COMMANDS

- DIVISION COMMANDS
- SECTORS
- SPECIAL SECTORS
- INFANTRY DIVISIONS
- SUB-SECTORS
- UNITS OF DIVISION

GENERAL RESERVE FORCES

IRREGULAR WARS COMMAND

- AIRBORNE DIVISION
- MARINES DIVISION
- OTHER TASK FORCES

(A) JOINT GENERAL STAFF IS CONCURRENTLY
ARMY COMMAND

(B) INCLUDING REGIONAL AND POPULAR
FORCES UNITS.