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Douglas Pike
CONTENTS

Testimony of—

Page

4

III
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Smith; and Thurmond) met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 224, Old Senate Office Building; Senator John Stennis (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Smith, Thurmond, and Miller.

Also present: Senators McIntyre and Pearson of the full Committee on Armed Services; Senator Case of New Jersey.

James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel; Ben Gilleas, Director of Investigations; Stuart P. French, Minority Counsel, and Robert M. Neal and Lt. Col. Everett Harper, Professional Staff Members.

Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will please come to order.

I have a brief statement that I shall read, and then I have a few questions to ask for the subcommittee. We have the entire day, and as much additional time, members of the subcommittee, as may be necessary.

It is highly important that Admiral Sharp, General Ryan, and Admiral Johnson are here. It is highly important to the country. It is rather reassuring, I believe, to the people of the Nation that under our system, these gentlemen who have so much of the responsibility in this growing war can come and talk to the elected representatives of the people, even though they can't talk directly to the people.

I have just spent 2 days away from Washington, and I know there is a growing concern about this war. I don't think your appearance here can be overemphasized, gentlemen. I appreciate your attitude that, even though you are all quite in demand in your posts of duty, you are willing to give us such time as we need.

This is a day, incidentally, where there may be some rollcall votes on the floor, and, if so, we will have to attend to those. I will check into that and see if we can make arrangements to have a meeting place in the Capitol this afternoon.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the first vote will come at 2:15.

Senator STENNIS. That has been arranged. I see. Well, that will be during our recess. We will get a further report on that.

I have this idea: That in this special and important hearing there will be many other witnesses. We will certainly call the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense,
and others. I think it is best that all witnesses be sworn. For that reason I am going to ask you gentlemen to take the oath.

We are a subcommittee, gentlemen, which takes pride in the fact that we do not leak things out. Classified matters do not leak from this subcommittee. At the same time we reserve the right at all times to exercise what I believe is at least a limited right of the Congress to pass on what is classified and what is not classified. At the same time, however, we are now rigidly following the rule that we don't leak these matters.

I think I should read this statement, if the membership would care to follow it. I have already given it to the press.

OPENING STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN

Today we open our hearing on the conduct and effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam with Adm. Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Commander in Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, as our principal witness. He is accompanied by Gen. John Ryan, Commanding General of the Pacific Air Force, and Adm. Roy Johnson, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

This is an extremely important hearing. It could have a direct effect on the war in Southeast Asia. Although it is directed specifically toward the air war against North Vietnam, it will necessarily involve the overall policy and philosophy governing and controlling the conduct of the entire war.

Admiral Sharp is the chief operational commander of our forces in the Pacific. He has overall responsibility for the air war and controls and directs the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aviation forces which carry out the operational missions against North Vietnam. Because of this, and from the wealth of his military experience and professional expertise, he can give us first-hand authoritative information and advice on the very difficult problems and important questions involved in our inquiry.

We are going to inquire into all of the important aspects of the air war, including the processes for the selection and approval of targets, the effectiveness of the air campaign, the lucrative targets which have not yet been struck, the probable consequences of either increasing or decreasing the bombing, and particularly the impact on our fighting men in South Vietnam, and all related matters.

We plan to call on many qualified persons and sources for the information and counsel which we need. Our future witnesses will include Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Adm. T. H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. This is by no means intended as a complete witness list.

My own personal opinion, which I have expressed many times in the past, is that it would be a tragic and perhaps fatal mistake for us to suspend or restrict the bombing. I am gratified by the stepup in the air operations which has occurred since this hearing was announced. It has brought increased pressure on the enemy. I hope this pressure will be further increased and expanded and that it will hasten the end of this unhappy war.
By slowing, reducing, and restricting the flow of supplies to the south the bombing of North Vietnam has saved the lives of many brave Americans. We know from the bitter experience of previous suspensions of the bombing during truce periods that such halts are used by the enemy to build up forces and supplies that are used to kill and wound many valiant Americans.

In my opinion this is a time to reduce or diminish the pressure or to throw away any military advantage.

The effectiveness or impact of the bombing cannot be measured alone by the number of missions flown or the number of bombs dropped. The real question is whether we are doing what we can and should do in the opinion of our military experts to hit the enemy when and where and in a manner that will end the war soonest and thus save American lives.

Admiral, we have a number of reports about what our allies are doing and what they are going to do. We are not expecting you to pass on that, but CBS news from Saigon yesterday morning and again last night said they weren't going to do anything more. Those things disturb me and they disturb the American people.

I made a short statement; members of the subcommittee, this morning on television because I have learned that if someone doesn't speak for the subcommittee, when it is sitting, they will put on someone else and let them speak for the subcommittee, even though they are not members. Therefore, I made a few remarks for the subcommittee.

I said that I thought the question was growing in Congress as to whether it is wise to send more men if we are going to just leave them at the mercy of the guerrillas without trying to cut off the enemy's supplies more effectively. I think that is something that will come within the field of this inquiry.

Gentlemen, this is Senator Case of New Jersey.

WITNESSES TESTIFY UNDER OATH

Now if you gentlemen will please rise and be sworn.

Do you and each of you solemnly swear that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral Sharp, I do.

General Ryan. I do.

Admiral Johnson. I do.

Senator Stennis. You will note the names of the gentlemen that were sworn.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Yes, Mrs. Smith.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have read Admiral Sharp's excellent statement. However, I have been called upon to chair the appropriations for the Commerce Committee until one of the chairmen arrives; so, if I leave and return, I trust you will understand, Admiral, I do have some questions that I want to ask the admiral before the day is over.

Senator Stennis. We are certainly pleased that you are here. We want you to come back as soon as you can. Mrs. Smith has for a long time been a very valuable member of this subcommittee. I am not
flattering her, but she carries a very heavy load here and she is the ranking member of the minority party on the subcommittee, although we don't have a real division along partisan lines.

Shall we ask the admiral to proceed, gentlemen? We do have representatives here from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the four military services, and the Secretary of Defense. They are here as observers. It is like holding an election down in Mississippi. You know the Federal Government sends out observers.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I request that the people in the room assigned to the three leading witnesses rise and identify themselves.

Senator STENNIS. That is a good suggestion. I will start with the Department of Defense. Let's have whoever represents the Department of Defense rise and identify himself for the record.

Colonel GARCIA. I am Colonel Garcia, Mr. Chairman, representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator STENNIS. The Department of the Army.

Colonel CHILD. I am Colonel Child and I represent the Secretary of the Army's Office.

Senator STENNIS. Navy.

Captain KELLY. Captain Kelly, Mr. Chairman, representing the Navy.

General LIGHTNER. General Lightner, representing the Air Force.

Colonel WILSON. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, representing Headquarters, Marine Corps.

Captain SWITZER. Captain Sweitzer, military assistant, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Colonel GARCIA. The remainder are all part of Admiral Sharp's group.

Senator STENNIS. We are glad to have you here and we are glad to have the members of Admiral Sharp's staff.

After the admiral's statement, we will have a question period and I want every Senator to have the chance to ask you all the questions he wants to.

Admiral you are entirely on your own and we want you to feel free to tell us everything. You are not confined to your written statement in making your point. If any point comes to your mind, whether expressly called for or not, you gentlemen just speak right up.

All right, let's proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. ULYSSES S. G. SHARP, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. JOHN RYAN, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PACIFIC AIR FORCE; AND ADM. ROY JOHNSON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

Admiral SHARP. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased and honored to respond to your request that I appear before you in connection with your hearings on the conduct and effectiveness of the air campaign against North Vietnam.
STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As background for my presentation, I believe it would be useful to outline our overall strategy for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. This strategy embraces three interdependent undertakings:

(a) To take the war to the enemy in North Vietnam by unremitting but selective applications of U.S. air and naval power.

(b) To seek out and destroy Communist forces and infrastructure in South Vietnam by offensive military operations.

(c) To extend the secure area of South Vietnam by coordinated civil-military operations and assist the Government of South Vietnam in building an independent, viable society.

STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN THE NORTH

Our Government has repeatedly made it clear that our objectives in the Vietnam conflict are limited. We are not out to destroy the Hanoi regime, or to compel the people of North Vietnam to adopt another form of government, nor are we out to devastate North Vietnam. We simply want North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the Vietcong insurgency in the south and take its forces home. Our strategy for the conduct of the war in the north reflects these limited objectives. Our attacks are confined to military targets and are conducted with tactics which cause least possible injury to civilians and non-military facilities. What our campaign in North Vietnam is designed to do is to speed the day when Hanoi will conclude, on the basis of the situation in North and South Vietnam, that its aggression in the south is both unsuccessful and exceedingly costly—to the point that it is not rational to continue.

Within this framework, there are three broad tasks which we seek to carry out in North Vietnam:

(a) To reduce the flow of external assistance being provided to North Vietnam;

(b) To destroy those military and industrial resources that contribute most to the support of aggression; and

(c) To harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials into South Vietnam.

Within the targeting authorizations provided by higher authority, we plan and carry out the campaign using these tasks as a guide. The history of our campaign has been one of a gradually increasing weight of effort against a gradually broadening, but always carefully limited, range of military targets.

When we first initiated this campaign, it was with the hope that Hanoi would get the message at an early date. Strikes were limited to a small sector in the southern area of North Vietnam and only a small weight of effort was employed. As it became apparent that more pressure would be required, the operating area and level of effort was gradually increased. However, the number of sorties into the more northern areas and the targets which could be struck remained under strict control.

During 1966, attack sorties increased to approximately the current tempo of operations, but strikes in the important northeast area continued to be carefully controlled. Some important targets in this sector, such as petroleum and selected military facilities, were struck. The bulk of our effort, however, was in the southern panhandle of
North Vietnam, against the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam.

Early in 1967, key targets such as the electric power system, the steel industry, three airfields, and some high-value components of the transportation system were authorized for strike. Poor flying weather slowed the tempo of operations against these targets until mid-April. By late May, these targets had all been struck and many of them heavily damaged. Our efforts in the vital northeast area over the last 2 months have consisted principally of armed reconnaissance against elements of the land and water transportation system, operations in the southern areas of North Vietnam continue to concentrate on interdicting the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

Although initiated with modest efforts and slowly expanded under carefully controlled conditions, the growing weight of our efforts has brought extensive destruction or disruption of North Vietnam's war-supporting resources. Approximately half of the country's war-supporting industry has been destroyed or disrupted. Petroleum has been widely dispersed in a costly and inefficient small container storage system. The bulk of primary electric power capacity has been destroyed, with adverse effect on the chemical, rubber, and other power-dependent industries. The country's only iron and steel plant and its single cement plant have been put out of operation. Many of the country's military complexes have been attacked. Strikes on road, rail, and water routes have taken a heavy toll of trucks, rolling stock, boats, and barges, a portion of which have not been replaced. Bombing of the rail lines and truck routes has significantly interdicted traffic and forced a major repair and reconstruction effort. Hundreds of enemy waterborne logistic craft have been destroyed or damaged by bombs and naval gunfire.

The campaign has curtailed the infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam. A complete stoppage of infiltration was never anticipated. However, we have reduced the level of infiltration, especially of material, well below that which would be possible if traffic were left unimpeded. This has served to limit considerably the enemy's ability to conduct major, sustained operations in South Vietnam. We continue to seek improved means of interdicting enemy forces and supplies in this area.

As a result of the increased weight and efficiency of our attacks, the Hanoi regime faces mounting logistic, management, and morale problems. Repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs are consuming increasing human and material resources which otherwise would contribute to the Communist's combat capability in South Vietnam. We believe about 500,000 men have been diverted to such activities. As a matter of fact, the latest estimate that I have been 500,000 to 600,000. The extensive defense programs are heavy users of manpower. The rundown on farm labor has reduced food production, and large amounts of food now have to be imported. The ports are congested by an almost fourfold expansion of sea imports necessitated by disruption or destruction of domestic sources of cement, steel, and other bulky materials. Ship unloading time is believed to have tripled since March.
While many of these effects are reflected in detailed statistical reports of operations, we must bear in mind that statistics alone do not give a clear picture of progress. In fact, pure statistics unrelated to other developments may be misleading. In this time of great travail and pain in Vietnam, U.S. forces have learned lessons important to our security. American ingenuity and the courage and dedication of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen have combined to enable great progress.

In the south, we have frustrated the enemy's offensive actions. We have inflicted heavy casualties on his combat elements—at casualty rates many fold greater than our own. We have freed areas previously under enemy control. We have opened lines of communication denied for years to use by South Vietnamese for peaceful purposes. The Revolutionary Development program is making slow, sure progress—and it was never expected that this program would show rapid gains.

In the north, our air losses per sortie have dropped—and, in fact, never reached the levels which prudent planning forecast. Our targeting in the north is better and there is better cohesiveness to our air campaign. Air tactics have improved—the result of experience and the application of improved weapons in this limited, carefully controlled conflict. These factors have permitted us to inflict heavy losses and severe destruction on the enemy.

At the same time, much remains to be done, particularly in the important northeast sector. This is their main base area for the war in the south. It contains many fixed and transitory targets that have not been struck. Here, 'key' elements of the transportation system, industrial facilities and important military complexes continue to function in support of the aggression. Large quantities of supplies and war material from external sources are moving into and through this area. These movements generate lucrative targets requiring continued restrike to curtail their onward movement. This material is stored in and immediately adjacent to Hanoi and Haiphong, where it is moved out under cover of darkness and bad flying weather. An extensive and continued effort is required to locate and destroy it as it moves southward.

In pursuit of our objectives in Southeast Asia, we find the United States and North Vietnam each engaged strategically in an offensive and a defensive campaign. In the south, we are essentially fighting a defensive action. We are defending the people of South Vietnam from aggression. The enemy is attacking from sanctuaries across the DMZ, from Laos, and from Cambodia, and moves his forces at will across these borders. While we have blunted his initiatives by tactical offensive operations, political restraints rule out ground operations which would deprive the enemy of these sanctuaries.

The opposite holds for the air war in the north. Here we hold the initiative. We are conducting a strategic offensive. The enemy is forced to react at places and times of our choosing. We are attacking his base areas, the sources of his aggression. Large portions of his weapons, material, and manpower, which otherwise would find their way into South Vietnam, are consumed in the process. We must continue these operations in the north. They are the offensive element of our strategy. No war has ever been brought to a successful conclusion by defensive action alone.
During the last 3 months, with an expanded target list but no significant departure from the broad restraints under which we have long operated, we have begun to hurt the enemy in his home territory. He is suffering painful military, economic, and psychological strains. Now, when the enemy is hurting, we should increase our pressures. The best way to persuade the ruling element in North Vietnam to stop the aggression is to counter that aggression in both North and South Vietnam to make the consequences of not stopping readily and painfully apparent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Admiral Sharp.

Gentlemen, I am going to proceed to ask some questions. There will be no strict enforcement of the 10-minute rule but we will follow it generally so as to give everyone a chance to ask such questions as he wishes. We will adopt that procedure this morning, unless there is objection.

Admiral, you have a very good statement indeed. Whatever is said here by anyone will not be in criticism of the way you gentlemen have been handling things out there. We are not here to criticize anyone. Our purpose is to get better results, I want to assure all of you of that. That gives everyone complete freedom in asking questions.

WHEN ENEMY IS HURTING—WE SHOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE

In the final paragraph of your statement, you say this: “Now, when the enemy is hurting, we should increase our pressures.”

Tell us now, if you would, and outline to us specifically what you believe as a professional military man and commander, what should be done to bring about this increased pressure to which you refer.

Admiral SHARP. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, we need to strike certain targets that we have not struck up until now. I would like to say that this morning I received authority to strike certain lucrative targets that I had not been able to strike before, and received permission to restrike some targets that I had wanted to restrike and had been held off on, so that as of right now we have enough good targets to keep us busy about—depending on the weather, of course, for in the neighborhood of, I should say, [deleted]. It is important that we continue to take these good targets and get in there and strike where it hurts.

It is important, in my mind, to have our air presence felt over the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. I think this is very important, and I have stressed this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator STENNIS. I think this is a highly important question. Let me say again to all Senators who were not here earlier that this is a highly classified hearing, and matters that pertain to new and additional targets are obviously very sensitive. As to them, we just have to not ask the questions or just forget them when we leave the room and let that be the end of it, because there would be a possibility that some of our plans could get back to the enemy.

You are here all this distance from your important post of duty. I would like to get more information from you as to what these lucrative targets are, and what you mean by saying that there should be more air presence over Hanoi and Haiphong.

I think that this war has reached a stage where we are entitled to know. I emphasized earlier that we are not military men. We are not
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

trying to substitute our judgment for yours or anyone else's, but this is a policy question that has got to be reviewed and explored.

Would you enlarge on the additional targets that you refer to as "lucrative" and which you think should be struck or restruck?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Good targets.

Admiral Sharp. These targets, and this of course is very highly classified, Mr. Chairman, because to get anything out on these targets before they're hit would just mean that we would lose a lot of our pilots. I would like to give you a general idea of what they are without specifically naming them, if that suits you.

Senator Stennis. All right, give us the general picture.

Admiral Sharp. We are going to hit a naval base [deleted] and we are going to hit [deleted] targets, [deleted] in what we had called the "Buffer Zone."

Now this is very highly classified, and I must say that the people back in the back of the room here must understand that this information, which we don't even normally pass out to our whole staff, sir, must be held closely.

Senator Stennis. I want to leave with you some discretion about how far you go in bringing out the specific targets, because if you are planning to bomb a place, I don't want to know about it frankly.

Admiral Sharp. All right, sir.

Senator Stennis. But give us the general pattern we certainly want to know, if I may put it that way.

Yes, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. I was just going to suggest that there are a number of people in this room, and if he is going into information that is so highly classified, is it necessary for everyone present to be in the room?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Did you hear the question I asked?

Senator Stennis. Repeat it please.

Senator Thurmond. I said if he is going into information that is so highly classified, I just wonder if it is necessary for all these people who are here to remain in the room, because leaks occur, and the Pentagon will want to blame it on the Senate.

Senator Stennis. I appreciate your point. I think you have made a good point. I said to the admiral that I want him to retain some discretion here about identifying even to us too much in specific actual pinpointed targets.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. But go as far as you can on the policy matter and the general pattern.

Thank you for that suggestion. I think if later you want to leave something here further on it you could. All right, Senator.

Senator Miller. Might I suggest that rather than pinpointing the targets, he could indicate the nature of the targets. He has already stated the naval base, and I think it would be helpful to have him identify them by category.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Let's see what the admiral says now.

Admiral Sharp. There will be transportation targets, and then as I said, I told you, Mr. Chairman, I thought it very important that we get into the Hanoi area. We will
NEW TARGETS AUTHORIZED RECENTLY

Senator STENNIS. Is that a fairly recent decision?
Admiral SHARP. Yes, sir. This came out last night, sir.
Senator JACKSON. Timed very well.
Admiral SHARP. As a matter of fact, sir, I had made a request on
these targets last week.
Senator THURMOND. We are glad you came today then.
Admiral SHARP. And this is coming in response to my request.
Senator STENNIS. While we are on this, all this greatly speeded
up number of sorties that you had in the last few days, have they
included any new targets of any appreciable importance?
Admiral SHARP. Yes, sir, what we call [deleted] which came out
about 10 days ago I guess it was, did include some targets, and also
included [deleted] more armed reconnaissance than we had done
before, and the people now are taking advantage of that additional
authority, but the number of sorties that we had up over the northeast
area has been running high, Mr. Chairman, since April, because as a
matter of fact I directed at that time that we increase the pressure,
and the weather got better starting in April, and has remained good.
Now we, had bad weather last week, and I don't attach any great
significance to the number of sorties we had yesterday. It was the
people getting in on a good-weather day is, what it really amounted to,
Isn't that right?
Admiral JOHNSON. Yes.
Senator STENNIS. I have another question here that is related to
what I have already asked. Unquestionably, your statement here
shows the restrictive nature of our air campaign. We already know
about that, I have already gotten the idea that in your professional
judgment the bombing should be intensified and that you have
recommended that already, and that some new steps have been taken
it goes without saying you think that it is necessary to not only protect
the men in the south, but to make this war felt and try to bring
these people to the conference table.
Admiral SHARP. [Deleted.]
I think that increased pressure at a time like this, increased weight
of effort, and I put the weight of effort on it, is very important, and
if we combine that weight of effort with the right kind of targets,
and as I say, we have some very good ones right now, we could make
Ho Chi Minh decide that this is not a very useful war for him.
Certainly, as I said in my statement, this is where we have the
initiative, and we should use this initiative to exert the power that
we have available. We have a tremendous asset in our air power, and
we can use it with no greater losses of planes or pilots than we have if
we hit a target of less importance.
Senator STENNIS. With respect to the phrase you use there,
"available air power," there is no question that you already have the
striking power there and in place.
Admiral SHARP. That is right, sir. We have it there.
Senator STENNIS. All right. Senator Symington, I am going to call
on you.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me express
my appreciation to the chairman for deciding on these hearings. It has long been my conviction that the way our air power over
North Vietnam has been handled, it was being demagnetized before the
people, to a point where one of the great arms of both our services, Navy and Air Force, would eventually be eliminated. That could be serious to the point of disaster from the standpoint of our future security. I felt, in asking for these hearings, that I was representing scores of Navy and Air Force pilots, with whom I have talked in the last couple of years in the war theater, many of whom are now dead.

If I may, Admiral, I would like to compliment you on the magnificent job you and Admiral Johnson and General Ryan and General Krulak are doing out there, Senator Jackson and I had the privilege of being briefed by you last December. Putting it mildly, everything you predicted turned out to be correct.

Based on the superb reports made by the two staff members who went out there, Messrs. Gillespie and French, which reports I have studied, let me ask one question and then turn my time over, if the committee approves, as the hearing gets underway, to counsel for a few questions at this time. Is that all right with the other members?

Senator Thurmond. I would like to ask a question when my time comes.

Senator Symington. I was just saying on my time.


Basis for Classifying Opening Statement

Senator Symington. Many thanks. But there is a question I would like to ask. This is an excellent statement. Why is it classified?

Admiral Sharp. Sir, I thought it could be unclassified actually, and I proposed that it be unclassified. It was decided that it should be confidential. I think it could be easily sanitized. [Deleted.]

Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Symington. Would you take steps to see that whatever should be taken out is taken out of it, and then this most valuable testimony is declassified?

Admiral Sharp. I will take steps to try to get it sanitized. Is that what you would like to have, sir?

Senator Symington. That is right.

Admiral Sharp. All right.

Senator Symington. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Kendall, I think I have maybe 7 minutes left. I would like you to ask questions for 7 minutes and I will watch the clock.

Mr. Kendall. All right, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I don't quite understand this new approval. Is this a new [deleted] program?

Admiral Sharp. It is an addition [deleted]. I mean it might just as well be a new one. But [deleted] is still going on because we haven't finished off all the targets, so they just added to [deleted].

Received 46 New Targets, Day Prior to Hearings

Mr. Kendall. Did you give the number of new targets that you received authority to hit last night?

Admiral Sharp. I can give it to you; 16.
Mr. Kendall: How did that compare with the number you requested last week?

Admiral Sharp: My requests of last week were several. One was a group; a particular group of targets, and all of them were approved. Another request was for a longer overall group, and some of them were in here, in this group.

Mr. Kendall: I am trying to obtain an understanding of your requests compared with the approvals received as far as the total number of targets is concerned.

Admiral Sharp: I would say that my two requests contain enough targets that you wouldn't expect them to be in one particular series. Does that answer your question?

Admiral Johnson: One good way to answer this or one way to answer it is that what we have here will keep us busy [deleted].

Admiral Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Kendall: I believe the Admiral said for [deleted].

Admiral Sharp: I think [deleted], depending on good weather, I would say.

Admiral Johnson: Depending on the weather.

_DID NOT GET ALL TARGETS REQUESTED_

Mr. Kendall: But I take it that you did not get all of the targets that you requested?

Admiral Sharp: No, I did not; and what I was attempting to say was I wouldn't expect to get all of them, because this was a blanket request, let me say.

Mr. Kendall: Did you get all of the restrict authority, you requested?

Admiral Sharp: Yes; I think I did.

Mr. Kendall: What change has been made with reference to strikes within the [deleted] restricted zone?

Admiral Sharp: The restricted zone?

Mr. Kendall: And the [deleted] prohibited zone with respect to Hanoi?

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: Is this a change from the previous situation?

Admiral Sharp: It is a change from before [deleted] which contained that authorization.

Mr. Kendall: Did this new approval make a change in the Hanoi situation and, if so, what was it?

Admiral Sharp: [Deleted.]

Mr. Kendall: Was this request that you sent in last week a routine request or a special request?
Admiral Sharp. Well, I do not think any of my requests are routine. They are all important requests, but I would say that one of them was for a considerable list of targets which I would not expect to get in just one period.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I asked that counsel use my time. He has about a minute left, which I would use myself.

**CAN'T STRIKE PHUC YEN AIRFIELD**

Have you yet been permitted to hit Phuc Yen Airfield?

Admiral Sharp. No.

Senator Symington. What is the reason you have been given as to why you were not allowed to hit it? I ask that because it is the one target so many pilots pleaded with me they be allowed to hit.

[Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. I have not been given a reason.

Senator Symington. You have not been given a reason.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Mrs. Smith?

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, those who would have us cease or curtail the [deleted] program contend that the bombing campaign against North Vietnam is a failure for two reasons. It has failed, one, to stop completely the flow of men and munitions to the south, and two, it can never be a success because all the lucrative targets in North Vietnam have already been struck.

I think it would be extremely helpful to the committee if you would point out the fallacies in these two contentions.

Admiral Sharp. Well, in the first place, the [deleted] program was not intended to completely stop infiltration. It was intended to impede and make the infiltration as costly as possible, disrupt it as well as we could, and it has done that. So I do not think an air program will ever completely stop infiltration. It is just not possible to do, but it certainly has made it very difficult for them and costly for them to infiltrate, and has limited their capability of infiltrating, especially infiltrating material.

**CONSIDERATION OF LIMITING BOMBING**

Senator Smith. It is my understanding that serious considerations either have been given or are being given to limiting the bombing of North Vietnam to an intensified interdiction program in an area south of 20° north latitude. Would you be good enough to tell us all that you know with respect to that proposal, how it was conceived, its present status, and what adverse effects it might have if it were adopted as a national policy?

Admiral Sharp. I do not know how it was conceived, Senator Smith. I have heard about it mostly from newspaper articles. There was enough consistency in the newspaper articles that it certainly must have been under discussion.

It would be a great mistake in my opinion to do this, because you would be creating a sanctuary in the most important area of North Vietnam, and it would just prolong the war, in my opinion.
Does that answer your question?
Incidently, I do not think I did answer the second part to your first question. You said—

Senator SMITH. It can never be a success because all the lucrative targets in North Vietnam have already been struck?

MANY LUCRATIVE TARGETS NOT STRUCK

Admiral SHARP. Yes, ma'am. This is not correct. There are many lucrative targets that have not yet been struck. We have a list of approximately 100 targets that we consider important and that have not been struck, and this list can change as our reconnaissance locates more targets and they adjust and regenerate targets because of our bombing, so there will never be a time when there are not lucrative targets in the northeast quadrant.

Senator SMITH. You said you did not know the status of the program.

Admiral SHARP. I would just say that apparently it has been dropped because we are continuing our bombing clear up to the limit of our usual area.

CONSTRUCTION OF OBSTACLE SYSTEM

Senator SMITH. Admiral, there are also some who advocate the construction of an obstacle system along the borders of South Vietnam as a substitute for the bombing of North Vietnam. [Deleted.]

Would you tell the committee all you know with respect to [deleted] how it was conceived, whether any of the military services recommended it, and whether in your military judgment an obstacle system [deleted] could be an effective substitute for [deleted].

I will ask those separately if you want me to as you go along.

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted.] [Deleted] program is an obstacle system [deleted]. It will be an assistance to stopping the movement of men and material into South Vietnam in that part in which it is emplaced. It will never be a substitute for the bombing.

The most undesirable thing that could happen would be to put this in and then stop the bombing, because immediately everything would flow down there and this obstacle system is only an obstacle system. It is not going to completely stop anything, so that the obstacle system would be very rapidly breached in quantity if we stopped the bombing.

Senator SMITH. It would be of some military value, however?

Admiral SHARP. It would be of some military value. Do we not have a slide that shows that area?

Captain ROBINSON. [Deleted.]

Admiral SHARP. Yes. I think if I may, I could flash on the screen a slide.

Senator SMITH. I think that would be helpful.

You did not tell us how it was conceived or by whom, did you?

Admiral SHARP. It was not conceived in my theater.

[Deleted.]
NO REASONS GIVEN FOR REJECTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator Smith. That is very helpful, Admiral. Thank you.

To what extent, if any, are you given the reason or reasons for not being given authorization to strike targets which you have recommended?

Admiral Sharp. I am normally not given the reason for not striking.

Senator Smith. You would say then most of the time you are not given the reason?

Admiral Sharp. Normally not.

Senator Smith. I am not quite sure what “normally” means.

Admiral Sharp. Well, I say, actually, I cannot think of a time when I was. There have been so many of these things.

Senator Stennis. Would you yield for a short question right there?

Senator Smith. Yes, indeed.

Senator Stennis. If you are not given any reason, how can you plan your future recommendations, Admiral?

Admiral Sharp. I plan my future recommendations by going right on with my line of reasoning, Mr. Chairman, and, if I think it is important, I go in again, and I have done this repeatedly.

Senator Stennis. Thank you.

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Were you informed of the reason why the [deleted] area around Hanoi was made a prohibited area on May 23 of this year?

Admiral Sharp. No, I was not.

Senator Smith. In making your formal recommendations for targets which should be struck, are you influenced in any degree by either the likelihood of having that target approved or by the number of civilian casualties that are likely to occur should a particular target be struck?

Admiral Sharp. I would say yes to both of those. I am influenced by the number of civilian casualties that would occur, because I know what our policy is of trying to avoid civilian casualties, so if I have a group of targets that I want to hit which is larger than I would expect to get, I would eliminate in my own mind, I mean in my own recommendations, (a) a target that would obviously cause a lot of civilian casualties, or (b) a target that I would not expect to get for some other reason.

Of course, I must say, as time goes on, I will ask for targets whether I think I am going to get them or not. I ask for targets when I think the time is ripe to hit the target.

Senator Smith. You ask for it anyway?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, ma’am.

Senator Smith. Whether you think you will receive authorization or not?

Admiral Sharp. I certainly do.

INCREASED CASUALTIES IF BOMBING IS REDUCED

Senator Smith. I realize, Admiral, that an air interdiction campaign is cumulative rather than dramatic, and that it is extremely difficult to determine the support which the enemy in the south may have received, had it not been for the air war in the north.

However, could it not be stated that in all probability that a reduction, or restriction of the bombing of the north would result in
trying to substitute our judgment for yours or anyone else's, but this is a policy question that has got to be reviewed and explored.

Would you enlarge on the additional targets that you refer to as 'lucrative' and which you think should be struck or restruck?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Good targets.

Admiral Sharp. These targets, and this of course is very highly classified, Mr. Chairman, because to get anything out on these targets before they are hit would just mean that we would lose a lot of our pilots. I would like to give you a general idea of what they are without specifically naming them, if that suits you.

Senator Stennis. All right, give us the general picture.

Admiral Sharp. We are going to hit a naval base [deleted] and we are going to hit [deleted] targets, [deleted] in what we had called the "Buffer Zone."

Now this is very highly classified, and I must say that the people back in the back of the room here must understand that this information, which we don't even normally pass out to our whole staff, sir, must be held closely.

Senator Stennis. I want to leave with you some discretion about how far you go in bringing out the specific targets, because if you are planning to bomb a place, I don't want to know about it frankly.

Admiral Sharp. All right, sir.

Senator Stennis. But give us the general pattern we certainly want to know, if I may put it that way.

Yes, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Thurmond. I was just going to suggest that there are a number of people in this room, and if he is going into information that is so highly classified, is it necessary for everyone present to be in the room?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Did you hear the question I asked?

Senator Stennis. Repeat it please.

Senator Thurmond. I said if he is going into information that is so highly classified, I just wonder if it is necessary for all these people who are here to remain in the room, because leaks occur, and the Pentagon will want to blame it on the Senate.

Senator Stennis. I appreciate your point. I think you have made a good point. I said to the admiral that I want him to retain some discretion here about identifying even to us too much in specific actual pinpointed target.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. But go as far as you can on the policy matter and the general pattern.

Thank you for that suggestion. I think if later you want to leave something here further on it you could. All right, Senator.

Senator Miller. Might I suggest that rather than pinpointing the targets, he could indicate the nature of the targets. He has already stated the naval base, and I think it would be helpful to have him identify them by category.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Let's see what the admiral says now.

Admiral Sharp. There will be transportation targets, and then as I said, I told you, Mr. Chairman, I thought it very important that we get into the Hanoi area. We will.
and so forth, and we should spread the target over these six systems until we have them all beaten out.

Senator JACKSON. We have been hitting parts of all six.

Admiral SHARP. We have.

Senator JACKSON. But the trouble comes as to the specific areas involved in the six, that should be hit, is that not correct?

You run into the prohibited areas and you run into the political diplomatic problems?

Admiral SHARP. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. And you run into civilian problems, and so on?

Admiral SHARP. Most of these important targets are now actually within the [deleted] circle of Hanoi and the [deleted] circle of Haiphong, with a few exceptions.

Senator JACKSON. And some are up—

Admiral SHARP. And some in the buffer zone.

Senator JACKSON. Right, so it would be those three areas?

Admiral SHARP. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. Buffer zone, Hanoi, Haiphong?

Admiral SHARP. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. And in general it is your judgment that all of these targets should be hit?

Admiral SHARP. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. I assume you would be reluctant obviously, if it is going to involve mass killing of civilians, to move on some of these targets.

In your judgment, would that factor be a substantial one in any of these targets?

Admiral SHARP. There are certain targets [deleted] would be able I think to knock out some of these targets without any particular civilian casualties.

Senator JACKSON. Without heavy losses?

Admiral SHARP. Without heavy losses.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, they have been trying to take advantage of our policy of not hitting civilian areas, by relocating?

Admiral SHARP. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Some of these key targets, is that not correct?

Admiral SHARP. They certainly have.

Senator JACKSON. In heavily populated areas?

Admiral SHARP. And generally speaking, we think their troops are billeted in populated areas too.

SHORTEST WAR IF SOVIET SUPPLIES WERE CUT OFF

Senator JACKSON. Admiral, how long would the war last in Vietnam if Soviet supplies were cut off?

Admiral SHARP. It would be shortened, there is no doubt about it. I would be reluctant—

Senator JACKSON. I do not ask it in any facetious vein. It seems to me that the key question that we have to face up to is whether or not we are really going to do something about it, because I am convinced that this war can go on forever. In fact, it is made to order for the Soviets. They can keep sending it in; we keep bombing; and it keeps going on down south. Now I think there is an additional deterrent that is needed, not just to convince Hanoi but maybe to convince
the Soviets, after the decade they suffered in the Middle East, and after what they suffered in Indonesia, that maybe they are throwing their equipment, supply, resources, and material into a bottomless pit. Hence, I think there is an additional factor that needs to be put in the philosophy of our air campaign in the north. If we go after these targets on your list, your personal list, what in your judgment would be the impact of Soviet support?

I am talking about their logistic support, not about military support.

Admiral SHARP. Yes, sir. [Deleted]

Senator STENNIS. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted] It is of course quite true that the way to stop Soviet aid the fastest is to mine the harbor entrance, and of course that raises problems [deleted].

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Senator JACKSON. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

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Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted]

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me this whole Vietnamese problem boils down to (a) if we cannot get the Soviets, which we cannot, of course, politically, to stop aiding North Vietnam, then the next logical course is that we have to destroy what they are sending in so they will get the message after a while; if Hanoi does not get it, that this is an unprofitable venture and they cannot afford to go on.

I think Soviet resources, with their problems around the world, are limited. They have taken a real beating, as I mentioned a moment ago, in the Middle East and in Indonesia, and it seems to me that this is a very important factor in trying to bring about a solution of this problem.

Can you give any general indication now as to what portion of the Soviet supplies that are coming in are being destroyed?

I know it is a difficult question, but I would just like to have it in terms of magnitude.

Admiral JOHNSON. I do not think it is a very large proportion that are getting destroyed now. I think that these supplies are by and large getting up the road, or plugging up on the docks around Haiphong.

Senator JACKSON. In your judgment, how much could be destroyed, assuming you could not directly confront with the Soviets by not hitting their ships. How much of a change could you make in this picture?
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]
I am afraid that is not a very exact answer.
Senator Jackson. I am trying to simplify it if possible, maybe too much so, but it seems to me that this is the real gut question here.
Admiral Sharp. It is.
Senator Jackson. Whether or not we are going to be able militarily, without widening the war, without running the danger of the Chinese coming in or of the Soviets making some major move elsewhere, because their vital national interests are at stake—what can we do to step up our bombing and avoid that possibility?
I personally have opposed these restrictions right along. I think we should have hit them earlier. I do not think we have used our airpower wisely in the first instance. Now we are in a situation where the Soviets continue to send in tremendous amounts of supplies, and obviously, these supplies are reaching South Vietnam, because infiltration continues to increase.
While it is true the enemy has not been able to engage in major forays down there, nevertheless, they are pinning down a half million American troops, and we are not doing so well within country. That is why I put this question to you in that context, because I do not want to say: "Well, sure give us 10 thermonuclears and get it all over."
Admiral Sharp. Senator Jackson, I would just say that our increased presence in that area, [deleted] and make it very difficult to get goods through, plus, strikes when we get a lucrative target, I think are going to all combine to choke down on the flow of goods, and I hope destroy some significant percentage of it, but I could not name a percentage right now. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. Have you included in your request hitting their dikes and dams and so on?
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]
Senator Miller. [Deleted.]
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]
Senator Jackson. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that someone has to face up to this problem with the Soviets. The whole war would be over in a relatively short period of time if they were out of this picture, and we kept bombing in the north. Hanoi couldn’t continue under this concept, could they, Admiral?

ROAD AND RAIL IMPORTS INSUFFICIENT:

Admiral Sharp. I think they would have great difficulty. They would, of course, than use the rail lines more and the roads more, and I have seen studies that say that the roads and the railroads have sufficient capacity that even if you mined Haiphong, they would still get enough down. I frankly, don’t believe it.
Senator Jackson. No. I was saying if the Soviets—
Senator Strauss. Let’s be sure we have his opinion. You don’t agree with the study that reached that conclusion?
Admiral Sharp. I do not.
Senator Stennis. Excuse me, Senator. I wanted to be sure we got that on the record.

Admiral Sharp. With the interdictions we can exert on the rail lines and the roads, I think that their total capacity is down considerably below their theoretical capacity.

General Ryan. Your question was without external assistance?

Senator Jackson. That is right.

General Ryan. Could North Vietnam sustain?

Senator Jackson. That is right. How long could they sustain the war? That was my question.

Admiral Sharp. They definitely could not sustain the war over a period. Now what that period would be—

Senator Jackson. Well, the day would be reasonably certain anyway.

Admiral Sharp. They would have to give up.

CONTRIBUTION OF RED CHINA

Senator Jackson. Then they would have to sue for peace. What percentage of material is coming in from China?

Admiral Sharp. We have it, and it is in the neighborhood of 25 to 30 percent comes down the rail lines, and the remainder comes in through the ports.

Senator Jackson. I mean what contribution is China making to the assistance of the war effort?

General Ryan. One of the estimates is to 4 to 1.

Admiral Sharp. Four to one, the Soviets to China.

Senator Jackson. And qualitatively speaking?

Admiral Sharp. It is almost all Soviet. The higher quality war materials all come from the Soviet Union.

Senator Jackson. And the Chinese are sending in what?

Admiral Sharp. They are sending in rifles and that kind of thing.

Senator Jackson. Small arms?

Admiral Sharp. Small arms, ammo, some food.

Admiral Johnson. I think it must be realized of course that even though the Soviet material, the war supplies and so forth, a large part of the import of Soviet material does come down the North Vietnamese rail line.

Senator Jackson. Oh, yes, I understand that. But I was discussing this problem of stopping outside assistance. Assuming that the Soviets were out of the picture, I feel this war wouldn’t last too long, with the continuing effort that we have been making airwise and groundwise in the area.

That was my question. Therefore I ask myself how do you stop it. You can’t stop it politically. You have to stop it militarily with the kind of precision that does not involve a widening of the conflict. That is why it seems to me that this is the issue we must face up to, because this war can go on, Mr. Chairman, ad infinitum. I don’t think there is any question about that. This is a setup for the Soviets.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Jackson. They keep sending in, we keep bombing, they keep losing. It can go on forever, and we are the ones who are getting hurt, so I think all of our efforts have to be directed in that area. It seems to me that we can do this job without widening the war.
It can still be within the definitions that have been laid down; namely, a limited war with limited objectives, but I don't think a limited war of limited objectives implies that you can't hit a lot of the targets that you have requested.

I have been arguing this for 2½ years, and I have yet to find a Far Eastern scholar who will argue against it either, or the good intelligence people who have been on it. The fact is that its other people who come along and say, "Well, we have got this problem, we have got that problem." I think they are living in a dream world, if they think they are going to be able to talk the Soviets out of this business.

They know our vital national interests are at stake out there. They are not about to start a general war in this area, and their national interests are at stake too, because they have an interest in not allowing China to become dominant in Southeast Asia.

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted;]

Senator JACKSON. I know they haven't cried very much about their big losses in Indonesia. I am sure they were happy that the ChiComs didn't take over.

REQUEST FOR MORE U.S. TROOPS.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Senator. I want to ask this question, representing the committee, if I may at this point, Within the present pattern of operations, and within the present restrictions, why are you asking for more troops, and how many did you call for?

Admiral SHARP. Well, General Westmoreland called for more troops, and I went along with his request.

Senator STENNIS. I mean General Westmoreland; yes. What is that situation now, within the present policy of operations?

Admiral SHARP. The more troops you have in South Vietnam, the faster you are going to secure the country, the more flexibility you have to combat the main force units, and I think generally speaking the faster the war is going to get over.

Senator STENNIS. Was there any danger of losing any territory that we now control?

Admiral SHARP. I wouldn't say so; no, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Were they needed primarily for pacification purposes?

Admiral SHARP. They are needed to search and destroy, search out and destroy the enemy, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. That is the top combat purpose.

Admiral SHARP. That is the top combat priority.

Senator STENNIS. Well, we will come back to the number you requested, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Gentlemen, if I may say so now, we propose to make a complete record while the admiral is here. We will have some voting, this afternoon. I have learned, but we will run on until the proper quitting time. I think the vote is going to come between 2:30 and 3 o'clock, so we might recess until 3 when we do recess.

All right, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, we are delighted to have you with us.

Admiral SHARP. Thank you, Senator.
CONTINUED BOMBING VITAL TO OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. I want to say at the outset, that I am of the school of thought that believes that once we are forced into a war, we ought to use our full power, including full airpower and seapower to win it promptly. I have a few questions I would like to propound to you, Admiral.

I believe General Westmoreland told the staff that he considers the continued bombing of North Vietnam as “vital” to his war effort in South Vietnam.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Do you agree?

Admiral Sharp. I do, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Will you discuss the importation into North Vietnam of war material covering specifically the Port of Haiphong and the vital northeast railroad, indicating the daily tonnages flowing and the number of ships in the Port of Haiphong showing national registry and turnaround times. If you don’t have the answer to that with you now, you can supply it for the record.

Admiral Sharp. I think I can expedite the proceeding, sir, I can supply it for the record. I think I probably have it here, but I would have to dig it out.

Senator Thurmond. Would you prefer to supply it?

Admiral Sharp. I think it would be faster if I did, sir. (Information was furnished and is deleted for security reasons.)

Senator Thurmond. It is our understanding that the ship turnaround time has gone up substantially as a result of your strikes on thermal powerplants, and that port congestion of Haiphong is at an all-time high. Would you care to comment, any further other than what you have already said on this point?

Admiral Sharp. I think that the ship unloading time is going up and the Haiphong Port is more congested than it ever has been. This is probably the result of difficulty in moving material out of the port. Whether this was a result of the strikes on the powerplants or not is a matter of conjecture. I wouldn’t want to say that that is the sole reason. I think it is partly the interdiction of the lines of communication going out of the port.

Senator Thurmond. Would it not seem, therefore, that now is a vital time to increase the pressure on the North Vietnamese by hitting additional targets?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINE OR BOMB HAIPHONG

Senator Thurmond. When, and how frequently, have you recommended mining the Port of Haiphong?

Admiral Sharp. I would have to dig that out. I have recommended that it be mined.

Senator Thurmond. Would you place those dates in the record for us?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir. (Deleted for security reasons.)

Senator Thurmond. Will you discuss how this operation could be accomplished, indicating the number of mines and the type of notice
that would be given so that third countries could remove their ships safely?

Admiral SHARP. It is feasible to mine Haiphong. [Deleted.]

Admiral JOHNSON. [Deleted.]

Senator THURMOND. I would like to read a letter addressed to me from Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, U.S. Army, retired. It is written from Anniston, Ala., dated August 7, 1967:

DEAR SENATOR THURMOND: I have just finished talking to you on the telephone on the subject of blocking Haiphong Harbor and enclose herewith my copy of the draft in its original form, plus one Thermo-Fax copy. You will note that both the original and copy are legible.

As I suggested to you by phone, I think it would be well if each Committee member would read this draft which gives a painless and effective method in the No. 6 Plan for blocking the Harbor of Haiphong, that is, sinking the concrete laden LST or more than one if necessary, in the narrow channel, approaching Haiphong Harbor.

Mr. Thorin, whom you recall having met, of our Washington office of the American Security Council, informed me that he has secured a hydrographic chart from the U.S. Geological Survey which shows that the sandy beaches approaching Haiphong are very near the entrance of the mainland, as little as a fathom or two. This means that the Harbor has to be dredged to the depth of ocean going vessels and that it could be easily blocked. He states that the width of this harbor is 30 yards, or 90 feet. It would be a simple matter to have the South Vietnamese block this harbor with our guidance and protection as explained in the article.

I urge that you insure that General Beach be called as one of your witnesses and shall watch the developments of the subcommittee investigation.

Please give my regards to Senator Stennis and indicate to him how interested many people are in this project.

Would you care to comment? I might say this first: That the Washington report he refers to is headed "Death Sentence for 10,000 Americans." The first sentence reads as follows:

Haiphong Our Achilles Heel!

What would happen if the United States should capitulate to the Soviet's summit demand that we stop bombing North Vietnam?

In the third paragraph:

According to the Commander of U.S. Army forces in the Pacific, if we stop the bombing, "we're just condemning another 10,000 American servicemen to death." Four-star General Dwight D. Eisenhower ought to know. Of the 402,800 fighting men in Vietnam, 302,000 of them are Army forces, under his USARPAC Command. His estimate was not given "off-the-cuff," but was the subject of a most extraordinary press conference—the first one called by USARPAC since the beginning of the Vietnam war. Significantly, it was held just four days after the Glassboro summit talks—and General Beach's estimate achieves three significant "firsts" on behalf of combat servicemen in the two major current controversies over the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Then, he sets those forth. I don't know whether you have seen a copy of this Washington report or not, but if you haven't, I would be glad to supply you with one, and I think it would be well that you read it. Would you care to comment on this suggestion?

Admiral SHARP. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. In this Washington report, and also General Beach's statement, it is stated that we are just condemning another 10,000 American servicemen to death.

Admiral SHARP. I think the first thing you wanted me to comment on was the blocking of the Haiphong Harbor.

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Admiral SHARP. [Deleted.] I doubt if this is a feasible operation. [Deleted.]
Senator Thurmond. Which do you consider more feasible and which would you recommend, blocking the harbor or mining?

Admiral Sharp. Mining is completely feasible and a very simple operation.

Senator Thurmond. Does the Navy recommend mining?

Admiral Sharp. The Navy would recommend.

Admiral Johnson. Yes.

Senator Thurmond. As a means of closing the port?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Senator Thurmond. It recommends mining as a means of closing the port. All right, let’s continue. Is it not true that you recommended that the [deleted] restricted area around Hanoi [deleted] and further that the [deleted] restricted area around Haiphong [deleted] and if so, when did you so recommend?

Admiral Sharp. Let’s see, I have recommended. I can’t remember when it was. It has been some time ago.

Senator Thurmond. You did make the recommendation?

Admiral Sharp. And I made a later recommendation.

Senator Thurmond. Was the recommendation acted on favorably?

Admiral Sharp. There has been an easing of restrictions around Hanoi in the recent past, as I have pointed out in earlier testimony, so that there has been.

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.] I think that specifically answers your question.

Senator Thurmond. Those are the figures that I asked you for.

[Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. Right.

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. That is correct, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Now what about the Hanoi and Haiphong areas?

Admiral Sharp. The same thing applies to Haiphong.

Senator Thurmond. The same thing applies there. Thank you.

Senator Cannon. I didn’t hear you. You are permitted to do—what did you say?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. Now, is it not true that higher authority did exactly the opposite of your recommendation, [deleted] around Hanoi and Haiphong [deleted]. You have explained that, I believe.

Admiral Sharp. I have explained that.

Senator Thurmond. Now in early 1967——

Senator Stennis. Excuse me, Senator, but your time is about up.

RECOMMENDATION WAS TO STRIKE SIX TARGET SYSTEMS

Senator Thurmond. I will ask this one question and then stop. In early 1967 you devised a target system including, (1) power facilities, (2) war supporting industries, (3) transportation facilities, (4) mili-
tary complexes, (5) POL, and (6) air-defense targets. Did you recommend trying to disrupt these six systems simultaneously, and if so, when in order to make them ineffective?

Admiral Sharp. The recommendation was, Senator Thurmond, that we strike targets in all systems, instead of concentrating on just one system.

Senator Thurmond. That is the question I asked. And you did make that recommendation?

Admiral Sharp. We did make that recommendation.

Senator Thurmond. And what percentage of damage have you inflicted on the six fixed target systems in North Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. Would you say that one again?

Senator Thurmond. What percentage of damage have you inflicted on the six fixed target systems in North Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. I think I have that here.

Senator Stennis. Members of the subcommittee, the admiral told me this morning he had some highly classified booklets containing material that will be very helpful to the subcommittee. I think it would be well to distribute those to the members now, but with the understanding that they will not leave the room. Let's leave them here when we recess. How many copies do you have?

Admiral Sharp. We have enough for everyone. Senator Thurmond, I don't have those broken out in this particular; although I must say I thought I had them here. I thought it was broken out. Isn't that broken out?

Senator Thurmond. You don't have those figures on the percentages at the moment. Could you supply that for the record for us?

Admiral Sharp. I have it broken out in a little different way; if you would like to hear it.

Senator Thurmond. All right, sir. If you would give it to us that way; but if it is too lengthy, you can just put it in the record.

Admiral Sharp. I can give it quite quickly. Military barracks, 26 percent of national capacity; ammo depots, 76 percent; POL storage, 87 percent; supply depots, 18 percent; powerplants, 78 percent; maritime ports, 12 percent; railroad yards, 56 percent; railroad shops, 22 percent; industrial explosive plants, 100 percent; iron and steel plant, 100 percent; cement plant, 80 percent; airfields, 23 percent; naval bases, 20 percent; bridges, 56 percent; command and control installations, 20 percent. [deleted].

Mr. Kendall. May I interrupt just for clarification? Are you referring to the percent of national capacity?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Mr. Kendall. Of JCS.

Admiral Sharp. Of national capacity.

Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much. I believe my time is up for the moment. I will come back later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to apologize for not being here at the start; but I was involved in presenting a bill to another committee at that time.

Senator Stennis. We are glad you could get here, Senator. We understood you had another matter to attend to.

Senator Cannon. I have read the admiral's statement, and while I note it wasn't classified very highly, I didn't see anything in it that
I couldn't read in the newspaper any day of this week, and I trust that since that time he has gone into much more detail with the committee on matters that we are concerned with. So that I would not be repeating material that may have already been gone over by the committee. Admiral Sharp will just ask you one question.

If you exclude the Port of Haiphong, which you have already stated that you had recommended be mined on previous occasions, I would like to ask you if you are satisfied now, from a military standpoint, with the actions you are now permitted to take, and I am including the most recent actions within the past 24 hours.

In other words, from a military standpoint as of this time, excluding Haiphong, are you satisfied with the actions you have authority to act on to keep the appropriate amount of pressure on at the moment?

CONTINUING NEED FOR APPROVAL TO STRIKE NEW TARGETS

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.] I am satisfied that I have good targets for this period. Now I would become dissatisfied if I don't continue to get targets as time goes on.

Senator Cannon. That answers it generally, but I would like to pin that down a little more specifically. When you say for this period, [deleted], are you talking about for the next [deleted].

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir. I am talking about the targets that were assigned today, together with the ones that were assigned last week, which give my strike forces enough to do to keep them very gainfully employed for about in the neighborhood of [deleted] depending on the weather, sir.

Senator Cannon. When you say giving them enough to do to keep them gainfully employed, do you include in that term the order of priority that you feel should be given?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir. The targets that I have now are very important good targets.

Senator Cannon. And you are satisfied with the priority of targets that you are able to go after now then for the next [deleted].

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. So that to answer my basic question, you would have to say, "Yes," for the next [deleted] when I exclude the Port of Haiphong?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Senator Miller.

WE ARE MAKING SLOW PROGRESS

Senator Miller. Admiral Sharp, I think you know how highly I esteem what you and members of your staff have been doing. I think you know my views, but lest there be doubt, I want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Jackson.

In last evening's Washington Star there was an article by Mr. Kilpatrick entitled "Melancholy Conclusions on the Vietnam War." He says:

So long as the present ground rules obtain in Vietnam, this war will drag along its indecisive way. The condition is a stalemate. Until some major change occurs, either in the ground rules or in the balance of forces, the United States will have to regard this miserable war as a permanent fact of life. These melancholy conclusions
emerge from two weeks spent with officers and men who are intimately involved at the highest levels of command with the war in Vietnam.

This is an article datelined Pearl Harbor. Do you agree with the conclusion that he has expressed there?

Admiral Sharp: Yes. I don't. I do not agree that we are in a stalemate. I think that we are making progress, that that progress is indeed slow, but we are making progress. We are making progress in a Revolutionary Development program. Granted it is not fast. We did not expect it to be very fast.

We are making progress in the ground war. And, as far as the political situation is concerned in South Vietnam, we have made a tremendous amount of progress. The government has shown stability over the time. It has been in that was unheard of in governments in that country. So I don't think it is at all true that we are in a stalemate.

I would even possibly like to comment on Senator Jackson's thought that this can go on forever. It can go on, there is no doubt about it, but I for one feel that we are making progress. We can't expect very fast progress on the ground in South Vietnam. We can expect overall progress. I believe with this intensification of the bombing effort that we all advocate.

Senator Miller. Could you not expect very rapid progress on the ground in South Vietnam if North Vietnam ceased and desisted from directing, controlling and supplying troops, ammunition and other supplies to the South?

Admiral Sharp: Absolutely, very rapidly.

Senator Miller. Now, under the present ground rules, and at the present pace we are going, would it be unreasonable to expect that it would take 5 years for that to happen as far North Vietnam is concerned?

Admiral Sharp: I don't think it necessarily will take that long. There are too many factors involved.

Senator Miller. I know there are many factors.

Admiral Sharp. To make a guess, but if things go as they could go, I don't think it should take 5 years.

Senator Stennis. Pardon me, what were your assumptions in that question, Senator?

Senator Miller. It really wasn't an assumption. I was directing the question at how long, under the present ground rules and at the pace we are going, how long it would be before North Vietnam would cease and desist from directing and controlling and supplying the South, and whether a 5-year timeframe would be an unreasonable expectation. Now the admiral just said, "Well, if things go as they could go." When you say as they could go, are you talking about any change in the ground rules?

Admiral Sharp: I am talking about a continued pace of the air war equal to, at least what it will be in the next [deleted].

Senator Miller. With further authorization to strike additional targets?

Admiral Sharp: With the targets that we are assigned.

Senator Miller. And with more targets opening up according to your recommendations?
Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. So when you say "if things go as they could go"?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. That means a change in the ground rules.

Admiral Sharp. It may mean a change in the ground rules as they were, but as General Ryan points out, ground rules are not static.

General Ryan. They were changed last night.

Admiral Sharp. We have had them changed rather frequently. The last time was last night.

Senator Millner. If the Senator will yield to me.

Senator Miller. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. On that point, we have seen a lot of changes ourselves although we may have a limited understanding of it. We have had a lot of assurances, Admiral.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. From a lot of different people over and over and over, year after year. It still gets worse and more men are necessary. Refer if you can in your thinking to the situation before these more recent changes that you have referred to. Without these changes, you wouldn't expect this thing to end in 5 years; would you? Nobody knows better than you. I ask you for your opinion, as a professional military man.

Admiral Sharp. I wouldn't necessarily say it would take 5 years. There are so many variables involved in this equation.

Senator Stennis. Yes, I know that, but before you get back to Honolulu these changes may be canceled and you will be back in your old pattern of restricted bombing. My question really is whether, if you had to continue under the restrictions you have had up until the last few days, would you envision any completion of this thing in a satisfactory way within 5 years? If you would rather not answer—

Admiral Sharp. That is almost an impossible question to answer, I am afraid, sir.

Senator Stennis. That is all right. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Symington. Would you yield?

Senator Miller. May I just make this statement and then I will. That was not quite the question I asked. It was whether or not the admiral thought it would be an unreasonable thing for someone to expect that it would take 5 years for North Vietnam to cease and desist under the old ground rules. Is that unreasonable?

Admiral Sharp. I would say it is not unreasonable.

Senator Miller. Senator Symington.

MANY LUCRATIVE TARGETS NOT STRUCK

Senator Symington. Thank you. You can see, Admiral, what our problem is. What the chairman is getting at is that the statement made some months ago by people high in the Pentagon that all the targets which meant anything had already been bombed out. Only 2 days ago on the Senate floor, two Senators told me they were privately briefed in March, and told at that briefing that there were no meaningful military targets left to hit in North Vietnam. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Admiral Sharp. I have a chart, Senator Symington, showing some targets if you would like to see it. Do you have that chart?
Senator Miller. We are all going to have enough time to ask questions. I think this might be a good time to have him show those charts if the chairman agrees. I would like to see them. I am sure we all would.

Senator Stennis. These are the new targets?
Admiral Sharp. These are just lucrative targets, sir.

Senator Stennis. Yes. I think it is a good time to show it. We have a good attendance here.

Admiral Sharp. This is a fairly detailed chart. I don’t know whether you can see the legend here, but the yellow—

Senator Symington. Please hold it up so everybody can see it.

Admiral Sharp. The only legend we need to worry about here is the targets with the little white circle are JCS numbered targets, and the targets with the little yellow circle are targets that we think are important that do not have a JCS number. But anyway in this area and in the Haiphong area there is a total in the neighborhood of about 107 targets that are good.

Now I am sure that these ones we are striking, are going to strike now, are contained in this number. But you never run out of targets because these targets regenerate. For example, the Hanoi powerplant, we have hit the thing three times and it needs to be hit again. As a matter of fact we will hit it again soon, because it is regenerated now. It is about ready. They are estimating now it has about 75 percent of generation capacity. We hope to hit it again soon and knock it down, stopping it again.

But you never run out of targets. You always have targets. You have to maintain presence in the area. As a matter of fact, one of the problems we have is that in the bad weather we are not up there enough. [Deleted.] But that gives you a general idea.

Senator Miller. Now, that is Hanoi?

Admiral Sharp. That is Hanoi. There are similar targets in Haiphong.

Senator Stennis. Admiral, if I may interpose here, we have seen graphs of the bombing you have done for a 10-day period, and even though you have excellent men and equipment and new targets, it just looks to me like it isn’t too significant, even though you flew a great many sorties. As some informed person said, it looked like you were just bombing treetops. What is your response to that now?

Admiral Sharp. The targets that I have shown you and the targets that I have authorized right now are valuable targets. Some of them will take quite a few sorties per target to knock them down.

ARAMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

Senator Stennis. Have there been periods in the last 90 to 100 days when you were running a lot of sorties but not against significant targets?

Admiral Sharp. There was a period from the end of May until about July 15, wasn’t it, when we were concentrating on armed reconnaissance against rail lines. We were concentrating on the northeast rail line, the northwest rail line out of Hanoi, and the rail lines between Haiphong and Hanoi.

This covered—well, we are still doing it as a matter of fact, but we had no important what we call alpha targets, specially allocated tar-
gets. We were hitting targets on these rail lines, and to my mind they did a tremendous job. And the reports that would come back from the pilots were 10 or 12 railcars struck, they interdicted a rail yard, they knocked down a bridge. But I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that this causes Hanoi great pain.

Senator Stennis. Well, there has never been any reflection on your men, or their ability to carry out the missions assigned, but one of the things that influenced me to call these hearings—and I wanted you as the first witness—is the very thing that I have mentioned.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. The charts that I have been shown. It looked to me like it was largely a dry run for that [deleted] period anyway.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir. Well, some targets are more lucrative than others. Sometimes people go out on an armed reconnaissance mission. They are not fortunate enough to find anything, and so then they let go on a less important target, in order not to haul the bombs back and drop them in the ocean.

Senator Stennis. Senator Miller, you have more time.

REMAINING UNSTRUCK IMPORTANT TARGETS

Senator Miller. I understand that there are approximately 100 of those targets in the Hanoi area which you just showed us.

Admiral Sharp. Hanoi and Haiphong.

Senator Miller. Combined?

Admiral Sharp. Combined.

Senator Miller. And when you say they are valuable targets, I assume that you mean that they contribute significantly to the North Vietnamese war effort.

Admiral Sharp. That is right; disrupting them would degrade the war effort, that is right.

Senator Miller. So within the Hanoi-Haiphong area alone, there are presently at least 100 targets.

Admiral Sharp. This is Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer zone, generally speaking.

Senator Miller. There are at least 100 of these targets which contribute significantly to the North Vietnamese war effort.

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Case. Would the Senator yield for a definition of what the buffer zone is? I am not clear.

Admiral Sharp. That is the [deleted] zone along the Chinese border, between China and North Vietnam.

Senator Case. Thank you very much.

Senator Miller. How many targets are in that buffer zone?

Admiral Sharp. Oh, there must be in the neighborhood of [deleted].

Senator Miller. Have you been under any restrictions regarding the type of bombs to be used on any of these targets?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. I didn't hear your answer.

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. What is the reason?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. So you have not really been restricted.

Admiral Sharp. No, sir.
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Miller. On the use of any weapons on any of these targets. In other words, you have been able to make you decisions on what the best weapons are to use against these targets, and you have not been hampered by any restrictions whatsoever.

Admiral Sharp. That is correct. We are talking about conventional weapons, or course, not nuclear.

CIVILIAN CASUALTY CONSIDERATIONS

Senator Miller. Of course. With respect to the civilian casualty aspect of some of these targets, couldn't this be handled by appropriate warnings?

Admiral Sharp. Possibly.

Senator Miller. We get into a moral aspect of this?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. And I am sure if I know the military, they are not interested in killing civilians just wantonly, and if appropriate warning is given that civilians in the area are warned that the target is on limits, and they had better get out, then, haven't we satisfied our moral requirements on that point?

Admiral Sharp. I would think that would be one approach; yes, sir.

Senator Miller. What would be another approach?

Admiral Sharp. That would be the only approach, that is right.

Senator Miller. So that we could satisfy this civilian casualty problem, by warning, in your opinion?

Admiral Sharp. I think so; yes, sir.

INDUSTRIAL TARGET DISCUSSION

Senator Miller. Admiral, you stated that the country's only iron and steel plant and its single cement plant have been put out of operation, but I understood that there were four cement plants in North Vietnam.

Admiral Sharp. There is one plant that manufactures cement. There are three other plants that take the cement and, we call them cement products plants, and make such things as pipe and cement articles. But there is only one plant that manufactures cement.

Senator Miller. Are those other three regarded as appropriate military targets?

Admiral Sharp. They are targets, that is right.

Senator Miller. Are they authorized?

Admiral Sharp. No, I don't think they are, no.

Senator Miller. I understood that there were five iron and steel plants, of which three are not authorized.

Admiral Sharp. No, sir. there is only one big steel plant that I know of. There might again be a foundry or something like that, but there is only one big steel plant, and actually it is not a steel plant. It is iron, it makes pig iron.

Senator Miller. Perhaps, it would be iron and steel fabricating plants or something related to the iron and steel industry.

Admiral Sharp. Fabricating plants.

Senator Miller. How many of those are there?

General Peterson. Three.

Senator Miller. Are those authorized to be struck?
General Peterson. One is right next to—
Senator Stennis. Give the reporter your name.

General Peterson. Peterson, sir. The other two are in the Hanoi area.

Senator Miller. There are three of them then, that are not authorized?

General Peterson. Yes, sir.

Senator Miller. How many of the naval bases are regarded as targets?

Admiral Sharp. Well, there is a naval base and two shipyards in Haiphong.

Admiral Johnson. And this one, Hon Gai.

Senator Miller. Four in all?

Admiral Johnson. I would say at least four and probably five.

Senator Miller. And do I understand that, except for the newly authorized one, all the others are not authorized?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir.

Admiral Johnson. The one down south we hit several months ago.

Admiral Sharp. I think the answer to that is we have hit two of them.

BREAKDOWN OF TARGETS BY COMPLEX

Senator Miller. Admiral, do you have available, which you could put in the record, a breakdown of the various types of target complexes, such as military complexes, air defense, industrial, petroleum, showing the number, or could you devise this showing the number of targets within each complex, how many have been taken out or have been struck, how many are not permitted to be struck with any modifications according to your new target list. Could you provide that for the record?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir. You want a detailed listing; is that right?

Senator Miller. Yes; not by location but by numbers. In other words, by number of naval bases, let’s say five, how many have been struck, how many have been authorized, how many have not been authorized. Do you have something similar to that which you could provide?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, that is right. We have something like that.

Senator Miller. I would like to ask the Chairman permission to have that put in the record.

Admiral Sharp. We will have to alter this a little bit, Mr. Chairman, on account of the authorization today.

Senator Stennis. All right, you make your alteration, and it will go in the record at this point. I think that is a very valuable question and answer.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

INFORMATION PROVIDING A BREAKDOWN SHOWING NUMBER OF TARGETS AS OF JUNE 30, 1967, STRUCK, UNSTRUCK, AND UNAUTHORIZED, BASED ON THE CHINAPAC TARGET SYSTEMS CONCEPT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Struck</th>
<th>Not Struck</th>
<th>Not Authorized</th>
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<td>Industrial</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>498</td>
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</table>
It is to be noted naval bases as such are very complex and portions of each naval complex may also be reflected in both POL and Transportation Complexes as targets. As a Target Category, however, we choose to reflect naval bases as a part of the Military Support Complex. Military Support Complex consists of bazaars, troops, headquarters, associated weapons, training areas, etc. Air Defense includes airfields and special air defense command and control targets. Industry is basic heavy type such as iron and steel, chemical and cement. A representative listing of 107 unauthorized targets as of 30 July is attached.

Senator Miller. My time is up. May I just ask one further question?

Senator Stennis. All right.

WHEN ADMIRAL SHARP MADE RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator Miller. Admiral; regarding these targets that you asked for a week or so ago, many of which you have been authorized to strike, had you asked for these targets before, and if so, how long ago, and on how many occasions, approximately?

Admiral Sharp. I think we first made a comprehensive listing of targets in January 1966 and then January 1967.

Senator Miller. As far back as January 1966?

Admiral Sharp. 1966 and then January 1967. We made another comprehensive listing.

Senator Miller. Were these the only two occasions then in which the recommendations have been made?

Admiral Sharp. In which we made those particular comprehensive listings; that is right. We made many other recommendations.

Senator Miller. On specific targets.

Admiral Sharp. On specifics.

Senator Miller. Within the list?

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Miller. Including those that have recently been authorized?

Admiral Sharp. Recently been authorized?

Senator Miller. Yes.

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Senator Miller. Thank you very much.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator Symington. I had to go out, but I don't believe you used all your time, did you?

Senator Symington. Yes, I did, Mr. Chairman. I asked a couple of questions and gave the rest of the time to the counsel.

Senator Stennis. All right. I believe that gives us all the membership.

Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman, I am here with your permission, although a member of the full committee, and I don't want to interfere in any way with the purposes of this hearing.

Senator Stennis. I was just going to say this, Senator. I will give you an opportunity to ask questions. We are glad to have you here and Senator CASE and Senator Pearson as well. I am going to give you a chance to ask some questions, but I think while we have such a good attendance of the membership, that perhaps we ought to let Mr. Kendall ask some questions for the subcommittee at this point. There are a lot of things that we want the record to be filled out on and we are now planning to meet this afternoon and tomorrow if necessary. We will probably meet over in S-128, which is the larger appropriation room.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question at this time?

Senator Steen: Certainly. Let me finish this. We will be glad for you to come this afternoon and will doubtless get to you for some questions.

Senator Miller. Do I understand we will be in room S-128 this afternoon?

Senator Steen: Yes. That is in view of the voting prospects. My best information is now that that vote might come around 2:15. Usually it is a little longer than that. Let's set it for 2:45 then to meet in S-128. All right, Senator.

IF LESS BOMBING, MORE U.S. TROOPS NEEDED

Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, when the committee staff was talking to General Westmoreland, it was felt that if bombing efforts were to be diminished, it would be necessary to increase the troops needed in South Vietnam. Would you agree to that?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Then, conversely, if instead of diminishing the bombing effort you increased it, you could do as good a job or a better job, with less troops in South Vietnam, could you not? Wouldn't that be mathematical?

Admiral Sharp. It would be mathematically possible. I am not sure that I would want to go along with that idea, though. Senator Symington, because I just think we can get this over with faster.

Senator Symington. I now read a short statement in this record that I made at the time of the decision for 45,000 more troops.

I cannot support a decision to send additional ground troops to Vietnam. The new figures mentioned will result in our having over a half-million troops in the Vietnam Theater, not counting the fleet.

As everyone knows, for over two years it has been the considered opinion that we would have the same success in Vietnam with less troops if we would take the shackles off of our air power and our sea power so they could both attack the scores of meaningful military targets in North Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, in the book which you wisely said we should not take from the room, it shows the recommendations from CINCPAC, detailed, three pages. I would hope at some time we could find out how many, if any, of these recommendations were approved up until the last 48 hours, thank you.

Senator Steen. All right. Admiral, you can supply the answer to that question, I am sure.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

(The information requested was furnished and is deleted for security reasons.)

Senator Steen. All right, gentlemen, Mrs. Smith has other questions but she had to leave.

Senator Thurmond, do you have some additional questions?

Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Steen. All right, Senator Thurmond, we are glad to recognize you.
Senator Thurmond. Admiral Sharp, is it true that early in 1966 you recommended a systematic air campaign to attack simultaneously vital targets such as ports, power, and fuel facilities, and that your recommendation was never acted on?

Admiral Sharp. I did make that recommendation. It is not correct that it was not acted on, because subsequently, over a period of time, we have struck targets in those systems, so that it would not be correct to say that absolutely nothing was done about it.

Senator Thurmond. But what you recommended was not totally approved at that time?

Admiral Sharp. What I recommended was not totally approved right then in total, no, sir.

Senator Thurmond. And there has been only a partial approval since then, has there not?

Admiral Sharp. I would say that would be correct; yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Is it correct that the only complete target system authorized for strike was POL, and that it came too late because over the long period of time it was being considered, the enemy was able to disperse his fuel supplies?

Admiral Sharp. POL, there was an authorization that covered almost completely the POL target system. It did come after a long period of discussion in public print, and I think the enemy took advantage of that period and dispersed his supplies; that is correct.

Senator Thurmond. Is our understanding correct that you only received approval early in 1967 to hit targets in the military support area, and further, that none of those targets which were approved were considered critical targets?

Admiral Sharp. I would say that it seems to me that we have hit some military support targets in 1966, did we not?

Captain Wright. Yes, sir.

Admiral Sharp. We have hit some.

Captain Wright. We have hit several.

Admiral Sharp. That are in the military support category.

Senator Thurmond. It is my understanding that you only received approval in early 1967 to hit targets in the military support area, and that none of those targets which were approved were considered critical targets?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir; I do not think so. That is a pretty categorical statement.

Senator Thurmond. Would you list the critical targets that you struck in the military support area in 1967 up until now?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. You will supply that for the record?

Admiral Sharp. We have struck some targets in that area.

Captain Wright. Can I answer that, Admiral?

Admiral Sharp. This is Captain Wright, sir, who is in charge of—

Captain Wright. I think where this probably came from, we had one [deleted] authorized and I do not recall whether it was January
or February, which included only military complex targets. In other words, there were no targets from the other systems.

Admiral Sharp. That could be.

Captain Wright. That was one [deleted] period.

Admiral Sharp. Does that answer your question, sir?

Senator Thurmond. I think it answers it in a way. Is it correct that the only target that you have hit within the [deleted] circle around Hanoi since May 23, 1967, has been a single strike against a Hanoi thermal-electric power plant?

Captain Wright. We have hit Hanoi thermal power plant once since that date. We had two diversionary targets in conjunction with this strike.

Admiral Sharp. We had two other targets inside the [deleted] zone in conjunction with the second strike.

Senator Thurmond. Bearing in mind that you have only received permission to strike 16 targets over and above those previously approved, when should you receive a new [deleted] bombing program which, hopefully, would contain more lucrative—

Admiral Sharp. I have covered that.

Senator Thurmond. You have answered that.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. We understand that approximately 77 percent of all SAM lauches have occurred in [deleted].

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. And more than 60 percent of the antiaircraft guns are located there. Does this not clearly indicate the importance that the North Vietnamese attach to this vital area, and therefore, emphasizes the need to strike the lucrative targets in that area?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir; it does.

Senator Case. What is the area, Senator?

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted] the northeast area.

Senator Case. Part of the buffer zone is located in the northeastern part?

Senator Thurmond. That is right.

Captain Robinson. Senator Case, if you will look behind you.

Senator Case. The red line marks the buffer zone.

Senator Miller. Which is [deleted] now?

General Hutchinson. It is in [deleted].

TARGETS RECOMMENDED

Senator Thurmond. How many targets did you recommend [deleted] be approved prior to July 1967?

I might say the figure I have is 129; prior to [deleted] being approved on July 20, 1967, how many did you recommend?

Captain Wright. Admiral, I believe the figure he is referring to is the January 18 total package that was in the vicinity of 129, as I remember it.

Senator Thurmond. That is the figure I have.

Captain Wright. This was back in January in summing up the whole thing.

Senator Thurmond. How many were approved to strike out of the 129?

Admiral Sharp. We would have to total that up.
Senator Thurmond. Sixteen; was it not?
Admiral Sharp. We would have to look that up, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Sixteen is the figure I have.

Captain Wright. No, sir. In the book that was handed out to you, there is a list of the [deleted] packages and January I believe was [deleted] so the targets that are on [deleted] the total on those is the number that have been authorized, and offhand I would say it is somewhere around 50, the total number.

Mr. Kendall. Captain, the question was with reference to [deleted].
Captain Wright. Yes, sir; but he went back to the 129 targets in January.

Senator Thurmond. I understood they approved 16 out of 129. Admiral Sharp. Since January, that does not sound right, sir. There must be something wrong there. We will have to do some research on that.

Senator Thurmond. Would you check your figures on that and supply that for the record?
Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. And you might go back to the July 20 figure, too.

Admiral Sharp. We are talking about since January; is that right, sir?

Senator Thurmond. The way I asked the question was how many targets did you recommend prior to [deleted] being approved on July 20, 1967.

Mr. Kendall. What was your [deleted] recommendation in number of targets? That is the question, I think.
Admiral Sharp. No; that is not what he said.
Mr. Kendall. That is what I understood him to say.

RESTRICTED AREA PREVENTS STRIKES AGAINST MANY VITAL TARGETS

Senator Thurmond. Give us both figures, if there is any question. Recognizing that the [deleted] restricted area around Hanoi represents over [deleted] square miles, would you agree that many vital targets are not being struck by virtue of this being a restricted area?

Admiral Sharp. That is correct, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Recognizing that you have been denied permission to mine North Vietnam's ports, notably Haiphong, what type of action have you recommended to reduce sea imports, such as repetitive strikes against storage and dispersing facilities in the immediate vicinity thereof, such as hitting close-in railroads and water traffic used to clear the port areas?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. What have you recommended relative to the storage facilities close to the docks?
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. What parts of North Vietnam's primary electric power systems are you authorized to strike?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted] have been authorized. There is a total of 13 that are unserviceable or inactive, and there are five that are unauthorized. These are all, the five are smaller plants generally, because we have knocked out roughly 85 percent of the power system.

Senator Thurmond. As I understood you to say earlier [deleted].
Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.
Senator THURMOND: [Deleted.]
Admiral SHARP: [Deleted.]

Senator THURMOND: Which is your largest facility?
Admiral SHARP: The largest one is the Hanoi plant.

Senator THURMOND: In Hanoi [deleted].
Admiral SHARP: We have it [deleted].

Senator THURMOND: Have you recommended strikes against North Vietnam's air control facilities, which direct their SAM and MiG operations, and if so, when?
Admiral SHARP: Will somebody look that one up, please?

Admiral JOHNSON: We have hit one and knocked it out.

Senator THURMOND: How many bridges in the transportation systems have you recommended that have not been authorized for strike?
Admiral SHARP: We will have to look that one up, sir. I am not sure.

Senator THURMOND: How many rail facilities and vehicle repair facilities have you recommended be struck that have not been approved? If you do not have the figure, you can supply it.
Admiral SHARP: I think that table I was going to give you gives that, sir.

Senator THURMOND: How many industrial targets associated with the war effort that you recommended for strike have not been approved?
Admiral SHARP: That is also in this table.

Senator THURMOND: How many targets in the enemy's air defense system have you recommended that have not been approved?
Admiral SHARP: That is also in this.

Senator THURMOND: That will be given too?
Admiral SHARP: Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND: There are other questions I could ask, but I am not going to take the time now. I want to make a statement, however.

On page 7 you say:

No war has ever been brought to a successful conclusion by defensive action alone:

I heartily agree with this statement, and I am hoping we will soon have authority to wage a more offensive war in order to bring it to a close more promptly.

Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS: Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, I think this is a good point to stop for now. We will reconvene at 2:45 in S-128.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:45 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator STENNIS: The subcommittee will come to order.

You know the situation, gentlemen: We can proceed now. When we must leave to vote in the Senate chamber upstairs we won't be gone long.
I think we have come to the point now where we will ask Mr. Kendall to ask questions for the committee. Mr. Kendall.

Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I think it might be well for the record if you would describe briefly the difference between your designated targets and the armed recce targets.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. ULYSSES S. G. SHARP, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC; ACCOMPANYED BY GEN. JOHN RYAN, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PACIFIC AIR FORCE; AND ADM. ROY JOHNSON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC FLEET—Resumed

Admiral Sharp. The so-called designated targets are targets that are of such consequence that they are authorized normally by the JCS, so that in a normal period, you would have what we call Alpha targets or designated targets in addition to the assignment of armed recce.

When you are on armed recce, you automatically go after railroad sidings or warehouses along railroads or that type of target, or boats.

Mr. Kendall. In recent months would it be correct to say that you have been more satisfied with the armed recce program than with the designated target program excluding, of course, the ones you were authorized within the last 24 hours?

Admiral Sharp. Our armed recce program over the last 3 or 4 months has done very well. We have had a large effort up in the northeast area, and it has been a highly satisfactory program. As a matter of fact, over this period when we had hit all the assigned targets we were working on armed recce alone.

Mr. Kendall. Would I then be correct in assuming that you have been generally more satisfied with the armed recce program than the designated targets?

Admiral Sharp. That doesn’t quite fit my mind into the bill. Our armed recce authorization of course didn’t change until [deleted].

Mr. Kendall. Were you going to add something, Admiral?

Admiral Johnson. I would express it that we are pretty well satisfied with what we have been doing with the armed recce, at the same time trying to get these other targets.

Admiral Sharp. He was thinking of an assignment, armed recce against an assignment of target, weren’t you?

Mr. Kendall. Both, the overall.

Admiral Sharp. We have been doing very well with our armed recce program in the northeast quadrant. I am trying to give you a satisfactory answer.

Mr. Kendall. Would you briefly describe the manner in which the fixed target and armed recce program or missions started out in 1965 and gradually expanded.

Admiral Sharp. In the folder that I gave you, there is a complete history [deleted]. I think it started—this is in tab A.

Senator Symington. Would the counsel yield? You start out with CINCPAC recommendations to the JCS for [deleted] operations. Then you give a list which totals 35. But you don’t say whether they were approved or not. Is there anybody here who could fill this in?
Admiral Sharp. I think we were going to do that. That was part of our job.
Senator Symington. Has it been done?
Captain Wright. Just on your copy, Admiral.
Senator Symington. Go ahead. I would like to see it if you have it.
Mr. Kendall. I think the chart shows generally the progression of the [deleted] and the armed recco program by timeframe.
Admiral Sharp. Does that satisfy your question?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, sir, I think so, if it is understood, Mr. Chairman, that without physically putting these in the record that they become a part of the record for reference purposes.
Senator Symington. You mean the whole booklet?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. All right. They will not be reprinted in the record, but they will be placed in the secret files of the committee.
Mr. Kendall. Yes, sir. Would it not have been better to have mounted an extensive and sustained air campaign against the more vital targets and kept it up from the south rather than have this incremental and graduated progression from a military standpoint?
Admiral Sharp. Militarily, one of the things we seek is surprise and an impact on the enemy, and the way to do that, of course, is to, the first time you hit them, hit them with enough to do the maximum amount of damage, so I think the answer to the question is “Yes.”

SLOW-GRADUATED AIR EFFORT GAVE NORTH VIETNAM TIME TO PREPARE DEFENSES

Mr. Kendall. Would it follow from that that this slowly graduated bombing effort starting from a relatively few sorties against a limited number of targets in South Vietnam, and progressing to the north, including more targets, gave the North Vietnamese time to prepare their defenses and thereby made the major targets more costly to us when we hit them belatedly?
Admiral Sharp. Yes, that is true, also gave them a chance to adjust for the campaign.
Mr. Kendall. They were able to install air defenses, and received experience about our tactics which permitted them to improve their defense tactics. I would assume. When did you first recommend, Admiral, hitting these targets in the vital northeast quadrant?

FIRST REQUESTS FOR TARGETS IN NORTHEAST QUADRANT

Admiral Sharp. Well, unfortunately my recco of recommendations started on March 25, 1966, and that request was to move into the northeast quadrant and to hit petroleum targets. As a matter of fact, in January 1966, I am asking you now, it seems to me that we made a recommendation, is that right?
Captain Wright. Yes, sir, in January.
Captain Robinson. We did, sir, and this started in March 1966, not for any arbitrary reason. We just picked that point and started. We could have gone back to February 1965, with recommendations.
Mr. Kendall. Can you give an approximate time frame as to when you first recommended it?
Admiral Sharp. When we first recommended moving to the northeast?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.

Admiral Sharp. We will have to look that up. I think we have that. I don't know whether it is right here with us but we can give it to you. (The information requested was furnished and was classified.)

Mr. Kendall. What was the result of that recommendation?

Admiral Sharp. Before I could answer that, I would have to research it.

Mr. Kendall. Was it approved when you first recommended it or was there a delay of several months or a year?

Captain Wright. In March we requested to move into the northeast quadrant. We might have requested it earlier, but [deleted] was April 1 to 30, gave us lines of communication in the northeast quadrant for the first time. These are specific lines, the northeast rail line, for example.

Mr. Kendall. What was the date of that?

Captain Wright. That was April 1 to 30. In other words, April 1 it commenced.

Mr. Kendall. 1966.

Captain Wright. 1966, yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Let me interrupt just a minute. Let's get the status of this [deleted] fact sheet booklet. Admiral Sharp, I know you are familiar with all the information contained in this fact sheet booklet that I have referred to. Can you vouch for it being correct? I want to make it a part of the record here.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Without putting it in the printed record.

Admiral Sharp. I haven't actually gone over it in great detail to be sure it is correct, but I think so.

Senator Stennis. In any event, it was prepared by you or your staff, wasn't it not?

Admiral Sharp. Prepared by my staff, that is right.

Senator Stennis. You believe it to be accurate and correct.

Admiral Sharp. I believe it is, yes.

Senator Stennis. It is classified as top secret.

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Stennis. With that identification and your vouching for it, without objection, it will be officially made a part of our record of this testimony, but it will not be included in the reported record.

Admiral Sharp. I would hope that it would remain classified.

Senator Stennis. Yes. It will remain classified and will not be included in the reporter's record, but will be placed on our official files for proper reference.

All right, you may proceed.

PROHIBITED CIRCLE 'AROUND HANOI'

Mr. Kendall. When was the [deleted] circle first established around Hanoi?

Admiral Sharp. I would have to research that one.

Captain Wright. I believe, and I would have to look it up, but I believe also on April 1. This is the first date we went into the northeast quadrant and the lines of communication didn't go any closer than [deleted] to Hanoi.

Mr. Kendall. That is April 1, 1966.

Captain Wright. April 1, 1966.
(Information furnished subsequently revealed that the restricted circle was first established around Hanoi on October 13, 1965.)

Mr. Kendall: As I understand it, the [deleted] prohibited circle around Hanoi was established for the first time in December of 1966, is that correct?

Captain Wright: It was January 1967, but it is either one or the other.

Admiral Sharp: Prohibited circle? No. The prohibited circle was established May 25, wasn't it?

Captain Wright: No, sir; the prohibited circle was established on December 23, 1966, and then we were authorized specific targets within the prohibited area.

Admiral Sharp: Oh, yes.

Captain Wright: And then they withdrew those targets, making it effective again on May 23.

Mr. Kendall: Did you recommend either of those actions, Admiral, or was it directed by higher authority?

Admiral Sharp: No; they were directed.

NO REASON GIVEN

Mr. Kendall: Were you given any reasons why these areas were established or any reasons why you were prevented for a time from striking these targets in the [deleted] prohibited area?

Admiral Sharp: I don't recall a reason. It probably is fairly obvious.

Mr. Kendall: Which would be what?

Admiral Sharp: They didn't want us in that area, because of the reaction, the international reaction.

Mr. Kendall: I would like to make sure I have the time frame correct, about this [deleted] prohibited area during which it is my understanding in April and prior thereto you were authorized to hit certain designated targets in the area.

Admiral Sharp: Yes.

Mr. Kendall: And up until what date did that continue?

Captain Wright: May 23. The prohibited area was established on December 23, 1966.

Admiral Sharp: December 23, 1966, the prohibited area was established, the [deleted] area.

Mr. Kendall: At that time were you authorized to strike specific targets?

Admiral Sharp: That is right.

Mr. Kendall: And that continued until May 23?

Admiral Sharp: Until May 23, and then the targets we were authorized to strike at that time when we were told not to strike again without specific authority.

Mr. Kendall: So from May 23 until what date were you precluded from striking any targets in the [deleted] prohibited area?

Admiral Sharp: That was the next time we went after Hanoi thermal power.

(Captain Wright:) That was about May 30 we were authorized one strike on Hanoi terminal powerplant.

Mr. Kendall: When was the next time that you had a strike in the prohibited area?

Captain Wright: That was today.

Admiral Johnson: We had a second strike.
Air War Against North Vietnam

Captain Wright. I think the first two were authorized before May 23 as I remember it and the second one came in after the prohibited area. And then, of course, today we were authorized again to go in. We have [deleted] targets within the prohibited area.

Mr. Kendall. As of last night.

Senator Stennis. We are going to have to leave now, gentlemen, to vote. We will be back shortly.

(Short recess.)

Senator Stennis. All right, we will resume our questions, gentlemen.

Sanctuary Areas

Mr. Kendall. Now in addition, Admiral, to the sanctuary area around Hanoi and the [deleted] restricted circle around Haiphong, plus the [deleted] prohibited area, there is a [deleted] mile buffer zone running across North Vietnam along the Red-Chinese border.

Admiral Sharp. Correct.

Mr. Kendall. We have been told that the North Vietnamese apparently are fully aware of those sanctuary areas and take advantage of them. What is your information?

Admiral Sharp. I think they are bound to be aware of them over a period of time, so I would say—and of course they do take advantage of them. They stockpile material, and as General Ryan was saying this morning, they stack up the trains in the restricted areas, and then run through the authorized armed recce space at night, so I would say yes, they take advantage.

Numerous Recommendations on Sanctuary Areas

Mr. Kendall. What recommendations have you made with respect to the elimination or restriction of those? Obviously, you have made some recommendations since you told us this morning you did receive authority on some targets in the buffer zone area.

Admiral Sharp. That is right. I have made numerous recommendations on the restricted areas, on hitting targets in the restricted areas. I think I answered this once this morning. On April 12, 1967 we requested [delete] the Haiphong and Hanoi restricted areas.

Mr. Kendall. And what was the action on that recommendation, exclusive of what happened yesterday or last night?

Admiral Sharp. Exclusive of what happened last night, there has been no change I would say. Is that right?

Captain Wright. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Target List Discussion

Mr. Kendall. I would like to go now to the target list we were discussing, Admiral, in order to get from you the number of targets on the authorized list and those which you have recommended for strike and those which have been approved and not approved. I believe we agreed that January 18 would be a good starting date.

Admiral Sharp. Well, we will have to go over that list for you. We will have to compile that, if we may. I don’t have it right at hand.

Senator Symington. Admiral, is there anybody here who could give us a feel of that on your staff?
Admiral Sharp. Of how many of them?

Senator Symington. Yes. In other words, we see the recommendations in the book, for example, 35. I think the Captain said you had one list here, showing whether they were disapproved or not?

Captain Wright. That is sort of a handwritten list.

Admiral Sharp. This is no longer up to date, unfortunately. You can’t sort out, unfortunately, on this list the ones that have been authorized and we have hit and have been rendered unserviceable; so that I wouldn’t want to give you this under oath and say this is a useful list, because it isn’t.

Senator Stennis. You could prepare a correct up-to-date list?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir; and that is what we will have to do. Shortly?

Admiral Sharp. Yes; sir. We will have to get it cranked out here.

[ Furnished and deleted for security reasons. ]

Captain Wright. You get an indication in your folder that we handed out. It is referenced. If you go to the second page there, it states on January 24, you get an idea of how many fixed targets have been authorized since that date. This is what it looks like.

Admiral Sharp. But this is not what they are looking for. They are looking for the list of the targets and how many of them have been authorized.

Mr. Kendall. I understand, Admiral, that the figure presented to the Secretary of Defense was a total of 129 targets that were not authorized. Is that an approximately good figure?

Admiral Sharp. Does anybody have that briefing here?

Captain Robinson. Yes, sir, I have it.

Admiral Sharp. I have given so many briefings, I am sorry to say, over the past 3 or 4 months that I have a little difficulty sorting them out.

Senator Stennis. If you have the information with you, we can certainly give you the time to put it together. If you don’t have it with you, if you will start the necessary motions to get it together, that will be fine.

Admiral Sharp. At this time it was 78 authorized, 105 unauthorized, and those were currently useful targets.

Mr. Kendall. This is over what period of time?

Admiral Sharp. This would be the 7th of July. Now there well may have been some unserviceable or inactive targets—in fact, I know there were—that were good targets at one time. We were authorized to hit them and we destroyed them, so that this doesn’t give you a complete picture of what the Secretary or the JCS or whoever authorized them over a long period of time. This is as of July 7.

Mr. Kendall. I was referring to your list and what you were recommending to the Joint Chiefs prior to the approval of [deleted].

Admiral Sharp. Well, this was prior to the approval of [deleted].

Mr. Kendall. Did you make a specific recommendation of targets with respect to [deleted]?

Admiral Sharp. I don’t believe we did on [deleted]. I think we had a stack of recommendations in by that time, and I don’t think we made one in particular to that. Well, for example, to give you an idea of what volume, you can look in tab E, of your paper that I gave you—that is the second installment—and you can see that in April I made five recommendations; in May, I made five; in June, I made five; so we are talking about a—
Senator Symington. Tab B marked “top secret”?
Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. To be sure, you only have four numbered 28, 29, 30, and 31, is that correct? Not five.
Admiral Sharp. That is right; four for June.
Senator Symington. I think what the counsel is trying to do is to find out whether it was approved or disapproved; and, if so, on what date; and if they were originally disapproved, were they later approved; and if so, on what date.
Admiral Sharp. This, again, I am sorry to say, requires a lot of research, because we have so many recommendations in, and any particular one doesn’t necessarily apply to [deleted] but we have a whole string of things we want to do, and the JCS may pick out some of two or three recommendations and put it into a package for [deleted].

**ONE HUNDRED AND FIVE UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS**

Mr. Kendall. Let’s see if we can get at it this way, then, Admiral. I believe when the subcommittee staff visited your headquarters, they were told that there were 147 targets on your target list, and that you had been authorized to strike 42 of those targets and had not been authorized to strike 105 of them. Is that accurate?
Admiral Sharp. I presume it was. Again, I would have to know exactly what period that was.
Captain Robinson. That was in the briefing we gave you.
Mr. Kendall. This was July 9.
Admiral Sharp. July 9?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Admiral Sharp. I must say that you must understand that under oath I am not going to say that anything is right until I have researched it. Unfortunately, this is just the way it is and it is a very complicated situation.
Senator Stennis. I think the Admiral is correct in saying what he said. He can’t respond immediately. The question really is the information given during the briefing on the 9th of July.
Admiral Sharp. The briefing, to the best of our knowledge and ability, was correct.
Senator Stennis. At that time; yes.
Admiral Sharp. We didn’t hold anything out.
Mr. Kendall. I am sure you didn’t. How many of those 105 targets are in the northeast quadrant? Isn’t it true that all of them are in the northeast quadrant?
Admiral Sharp. I think all are. There may be three down around [deleted].
Captain Wright. There are a few in Route Package [deleted]. I am pretty sure [deleted] are included that are outside the area and there might be a couple over in Route Package [deleted] in the.
Admiral Sharp. I would say out of the 140, or whatever it is, it is probably in the neighborhood of 10 that are not in Route Package [deleted].
Mr. Kendall. At some point in time had you recommended all of those 105 targets for strike, and if not, how many had you recommended for strike?
Admiral Sharp. Frankly, I don’t see how I am going to answer these questions. I am not going to answer a question under oath that I don’t know to be correct. Now I will be happy to do all I can for you, but I can’t answer questions like how many of those out of 105 did I request to be struck. This is just a mathematical impossibility.

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, if I may make this suggestion, why couldn’t the Admiral say “to my best knowledge and belief,” that if this was said at that time this is it. You have protected yourself “to my best knowledge and belief,” that is all.

Senator Stennis. What we want to do is possible is to make your testimony official as far as we can.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. We respect your meticulous care about testifying under oath. I think what Senator Jackson has said is a reasonable approach to it.

Admiral Sharp. At that point in time I had recommended this.

Senator Stennis. To your best recollection.

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Symington. If I may add to that, we have had the staff you briefed come and testify before this committee, a matter of record. What the chief counsel is doing is, in effect, asking you to corroborate what you told them and they told us.

Mr. Kendall. How many of those 105 targets were approved in [deleted] Admiral, 16?

SIXTEEN APPROVED LAST NIGHT

Captain Wright. It was 16 in the first [deleted] and 16 that came out of last night, so there is a total of 32 in the [deleted].

Senator Symington. Weren’t there 17, and then you had one taken out, Phuc Yen?

Captain Wright. If it was taken out, I don’t know.

Admiral Sharp. There could be a total of five to seven targets that were in [deleted] that were not on this list.

Mr. Kendall. Say that again, please.

Admiral Sharp. I say there could be up to seven targets that were in [deleted] that were not on this list of high priority targets.

Senator Stennis. You mean the ones that were approved.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir, because there were a few targets there that we had put in our list of targets that we considered not worthy of strike, on some belated information we had.

Senator Stennis. In other words, you struck them off later.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Yourself.

Admiral Sharp. All right.

Mr. Kendall. In order to obtain the number of unstruck, not authorized targets on your list, you would take 32 from the 105?

Captain Wright. That would be roughly true, but as he says, the four or five might have been targets that we didn’t think were as important. People vary on which is the most important target.

JCS AND CINCPAC TARGET LISTS

Mr. Kendall. In addition to your list, the JCS has a target list, doesn’t it?
Admiral Sharp. That is right. The JCS has a list of JCS numbered targets, targets that they have assigned a number to.

Mr. Kendall. Is your list entirely different from their list or do they overlap?

Admiral Sharp. Our list includes all of the JCS numbered targets, plus targets that we have discovered or put on, evaluated and put on our list as worthy of strike.

Mr. Kendall. So all of the JCS numbered targets are on your list.

Admiral Sharp. That is right. Is that right?

General Peterson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kendall. What I am talking about is with reference to the 147 targets on your list and the JCS list of some 242 targets.

Admiral Sharp. Well, perhaps I should say that all JCS targets that are worthy of strike are on our list, but some JCS targets, of course, have been rendered unserviceable, in which case while they are in our appendix, they are not on our list that we want to strike.

You see, I guess I should probably explain that we categorize our targets into lists that are authorized priority targets, unauthorized priority targets, additional targets that are under consideration, and unserviceable or inactive targets—four categories. And this thing is kept on a computer; and a target committee meets, composed of my staff and my component commanders' staffs, once a week; and they go over this list and they decide which targets should be moved to the unserviceable or which ones should be brought up to the ones requiring strike, so that every week this changes. So that when you say Cincpac's target list, you are really saying Cincpac's target list of targets requiring strike.

General Peterson. And this does include all the JCS's.

Mr. Kendall. This does include all the JCS's.

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Mr. Kendall. You mentioned this morning you classify your individual sorties in six different target systems. Is that right?

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Mr. Kendall. They are transportation, air defense, industrial, war making, military support installations, POL.

Admiral Sharp. Right.

MILITARY PRESSURE MUST BE USED

Mr. Kendall. Is it your recommendation that military pressure by air strikes be brought to bear on all of these targets in a well planned program?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Mr. Kendall. Was that done?

Admiral Sharp. Well, it was done in part.

Mr. Kendall. Will you elaborate on that, sir?

Admiral Sharp. Some of the targets that we recommended have been struck. Some of the targets in each target system have been struck. Not all of the targets in any target system have been struck. Varying percentages of the targets in each target system have been struck. I guess that is the best way to say that, and I gave you a table, I quoted a percentage of targets that have been struck this morning in my testimony.

Mr. Kendall. I understood you to say that 'percentage' was based on the percent of national capacity.