Senator Miller: How many?
General Ryan: I think the Chi-Com is somewhere around [deleted] in China.
Senator Miller: Well, in all of China?
General Ryan: Right.
Senator Miller: But, how many are there in the area where they could be utilized in North Vietnam?
General Ryan: I have not seen any assessment in that particular area.

RAIL ROLLING STOCK SENT FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Senator Miller: We have been hitting boxcars for a year and a half over there, and I read often that boxcars are knocked out or damaged. It would seem to me that they would have exhausted their supply of boxcars long ago.
General Peterson: They have still got a lot of repair shops, a lot of repair capability, and they do repair and replace from outside sources. They send in railroad stock, locomotives from Eastern Europe as well as China.
Senator Miller: Where do the locomotives enter North Vietnam, at Haiphong?
General Peterson: Haiphong.
Senator Miller: Where in Eastern Europe are they obtained? Do you know?
General Peterson: [Deleted.]

REPAIR OF RAIL LINES

General Ryan: As far as the repair, you can interdict. Let’s say you have a four-track yard. What they do is put their resources on to get one through line. Now of late, because of the continual pounding that we have given them, they are not repairing it as rapidly as they did formerly. They are not removing; for instance, the rolling stock that is destroyed, it is still laying around in the yards. But they will put up through track.
Senator Miller: [Deleted.]
General Ryan: [Deleted.]
Senator Miller: [Deleted.]
General Ryan: [Deleted.]
Senator Miller: [Deleted.]
General Ryan: [Deleted.]

MUNITIONS USED IN STRIKING POWERPLANTS

Senator Miller: Now, returning to a question that I asked yesterday on powerplants, I asked if you were inhibited at all by the kind of munitions you could use on these targets. [Deleted.] I am wondering if it were not for the civilian consideration you might not use other munitions, in order to really do a job on it.
Admiral Sharp: Flatten it?
Senator Miller: Yes, sir. And if so, what would you use?
Admiral Sharp. If you were going to do something else, you would use 750- or 2,000- or 3,000-pound bombs.
Senator Miller. In your judgment, you would have used that, I presume, were it not for the civilian aspect of this?
Admiral Sharp. Yes.
Admiral Johnson. Risk of aircraft involved.
Admiral Sharp. That is right.
Senator Miller. That is another point.
Admiral Sharp. You have to consider the other aspect. Maybe we have been lucky, but we have been able to hit this powerplant three times and we have not lost an aircraft. This is very important. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. [Deleted.]
Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Miller. The only way to do that then is to knock it out completely.
Admiral Sharp. You have to flatten it.
Senator Miller. With 750- and 1,000-pound bombs.

PROPAGANDA EFFORTS OF HANOI AND PEKING AND THE UNITED STATES

At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday, I asked if you could provide us this morning with any information regarding the propaganda activities out of Hanoi and Peking, especially with regard to the cessation of the bombing.

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.
Senator Miller. I also asked if you could describe our own efforts at propaganda, such as the dropping of leaflets on North Vietnam, other methods we have been using; how effective our efforts have been and what we propose to do.

Do you have time to give us a brief description of those propaganda efforts?
Admiral Sharp. I asked my staff for this. If you would care to I will read what my staff provided, which I think is very good.
Senator Miller. It is a bit long.
Admiral Sharp. It is long.

Senator Miller. Mr. Chairman, for the sake of time, instead of having the Admiral read that document, and since he thinks it pretty well covers what I asked for at the conclusion of yesterday's hearing, I would like to ask that it be placed in the record at this point.

Senator Stennis. Without objection, it will be put in the record.

(The material follows.)

Senator Miller. Does that cover both aspects?
Admiral Sharp. It covers what we do and what they do, yes, sir.

Senator Miller. Could you give us a brief synopsis of what they are doing regarding propaganda and whether or not this propaganda on the cessation of the bombing is being originated or sided and subjected out of Peking and Hanoi?
Admiral Sharp. Well, it certainly is.

Naturally, one of their big propaganda objectives is to get the bombing campaign stopped by that means, so that there is always immediately a heavy propaganda reaction to any strike that we make in the Hanoi area, for example.
Senator Miller. How are they carrying on this propaganda? Is it getting back to the United States by various routes?

Admiral Sharp. Oh, yes. It goes out over their radio and is picked up by various news media that pick up that stuff.

Senator Miller. What about leaflets and pamphlets going through Hong Kong, for example, for shipment back to the United States?

Admiral Sharp. There is that pamphlet output that lots of people read and it gets into newspapers.

Senator Miller. I have no further questions.

Thank you, sir.

Senator Stennis. Senator Thurmond?

GENERAL WESTMORELAND’S DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. Admiral, as I understand it, General Westmoreland has the power of decision in South Vietnam in that he makes all decisions pertaining to the war in South Vietnam.

Admiral Sharp. Well, he is a subordinate unified commander of mine.

Senator Thurmond. Who makes the decisions in South Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. I give him great freedom of action in South Vietnam, and he generally makes the decisions with regard to the ground war. Does that answer your question?

Senator Thurmond. If he redeployed troops or puts them on the offensive in South Vietnam does he have to come to you?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir.

Senator Thurmond. He has the power to act?

Admiral Sharp. He has the power to act.

Senator Thurmond. You have delegated him the power to act?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. What is his scope to act within South Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. He has complete freedom.

DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY BEYOND SOUTH VIETNAM


Now, does he have any power beyond South Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. Beyond South Vietnam—

Senator Thurmond. Does he make his recommendations to you and then you give the orders?

Admiral Sharp. I have overall policy directives on what goes on outside of South Vietnam, and he adheres to those directives. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. Well, would he have power, for instance, to order that a certain target be struck in North Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. To do what, sir?

WESTMORELAND’S AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. Would he have the power to order planes into North Vietnam to strike a certain target, or would he make his recommendations to you and you would order that it be done?
Admiral Sharp: In route package [deleted] which is the southern route package, and you remember I gave you a chart showing those, he conducts the air war in that one package under my general direction.

In the remainder of the route packages, the air war is conducted by me through my two component commanders, air. Does that answer your question? So that it is a little different situation.

Senator Thurmond. Could you show us on the map exactly where his authority ends?

I understand you are responsible overall and that he is a subordinate commander.

Admiral Sharp: That is right.

Senator Thurmond. On the other hand, you have delegated to him the power of decision within South Vietnam, as I understand it.

Admiral Sharp: Right.

Senator Thurmond. As to ground troops and a certain area of North Vietnam, with regard to the air war. Where is that strip?

Admiral Sharp: That strip is right here in part of North Vietnam right there.

Senator Miller. What is the mileage on that, Admiral?

Admiral Sharp. The mileage? Oh, it is about [deleted] miles.

Senator Thurmond. That is in North Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp: Right.

Senator Thurmond. And you have delegated to him authority with respect to that strip?

Admiral Sharp: That is right. We call that the extended battlefield.

Senator Thurmond. That is beyond the DMZ?

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Thurmond. North of the DMZ?

Admiral Sharp. That is right, because it directly affects the battlefield, you see.

Senator Thurmond. Any strikes above that point could be recommended by him?

Admiral Sharp. Oh, certainly. He can make a recommendation to me on anything.

Senator Thurmond. But you would make the decision on it?

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Thurmond. But he would make the decision up to the DMZ and above the DMZ to that particular point that you outline on the map?

Admiral Sharp. Right.

Senator Thurmond. I have one more question.

We hear that the Soviets want to end the war.

Admiral Sharp. Could I just elaborate on this a little bit?

Senator Thurmond. Yes.

Admiral Sharp. Since you brought this up, We found over a period of time that this is the best way to run the air war in total and you understand that in addition to that division, CINCPAC Fleet has route packages [deleted] and CINCPAC AF, General Ryan here has [deleted] and [deleted].

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. These come together at the conclusion of the air war?
Senator Thurmond. What other authority does General Ryan have besides the area designated [deleted] and [deleted].

Admiral Sharp. He has general authority over the Air Force, the whole Pacific Air Force.

Senator Thurmond. However, he would not make a strike in the particular area just north of DMZ?

Admiral Sharp. General Ryan is air commander out there [deleted]. General Momyer works under General Westmoreland for route package [deleted] and under General Ryan for the other route packages the Air Force has.

In other words, he has a dual responsibility. We found over a period of time, that this is generally the better way to run this war. It is working beautifully.

The Air Force any time they want to can go into the Navy route packages, the Navy can go into the Air Force route packages. All they do is coordinate with each other, but the responsibility is assigned this way in order that somebody is responsible for intelligence production, general coordination, and that sort of thing, and I must say that I am very proud of my Pacific command team.

This unified command is a perfect example of a unified command. My staff is exactly one-third Army, one-third Air Force, and one-third Navy-Marine, and all positions are allocated that way. This is the only staff other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff staff that is so divided.

This teamwork has been absolutely superb in this way. I would not change anything about it for the war.

Senator Thurmond. General Momyer, as I understand it, is the man who would actually give the orders to strike in North Vietnam, but he would take his orders in area [deleted] from General Westmoreland.

Admiral Sharp. Right.

Senator Thurmond. And he would take his orders in the rest of the area from—

Admiral Sharp. No, in [deleted] and [deleted].

Senator Thurmond. In [deleted] and [deleted] from General Ryan.

Admiral Sharp. Right.

NAVY AREAS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Thurmond. Now what about [deleted].

General Ryan. Anything above—

Admiral Sharp. The others are Navy areas.

Senator Thurmond. The others are Navy areas?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Senator Thurmond. The Navy handles that themselves. That does not go through General Momyer.

Admiral Sharp. I see.

Senator Thurmond. Thank you. I wanted to ask this one question that I had started to ask.

Senator Stennis. The Senator has time for another question. I believe you have satisfied us on that point, Admiral. That is very reassuring.
Admiral Sharp. I might also point out that we have a coordinating team down in Saigon sitting with General Momyer, and Admiral Hyland has a representative there. They coordinate these day-to-day actions.

WHETHER SOVIETS DESIRE AN END TO THE WAR

Senator Thurmond. There has been considerable said and written about the Soviets being friendly with the United States; that they want to work for peace, and that they would like to see the war in Vietnam end.

Have you seen any act on the part of the Soviets that would indicate that they wished to end this war in Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir; I cannot think of any.

Senator Thurmond. Do you know anyone else who knows of any?

Admiral Sharp. I cannot answer that one, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Has it come to your attention?

Have you heard anyone else make any such statement that is based on any reasonable facts?

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. [Deleted.]

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

Senator Thurmond. In fact, if it were not for the Soviets providing the supplies and equipment to assist the Communists in fighting this war in South Vietnam, it would come to an end rather quickly anyway, would it not?

Admiral Sharp. I think it would; yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Members of the committee, I am compelled to leave at 12 o'clock. However, that does not mean that the session has to end then.

SENATOR CASE RECOGNIZED

I would like to extend to Senator Case the privilege of asking questions. If you could, Senator, make them fairly brief; I am going to make mine brief and if you gentlemen can make your answers as brief as possible consistent with the subject matter, we will be able to give everyone a chance to ask their questions.

Senator Case, we are glad to have you here.

RESPONSES TO CONGRESSMAN FORD'S STATEMENTS

Senator Case. You have been most generous, Mr. Chairman, I shall not trespass upon that generosity.

You do have, I think, Admiral, questions based upon statements made by Representative Ford yesterday. Do you have the answers for those?

Admiral Sharp. I do have them.

Senator Case. I wonder if we could have them put in the record.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Yes, without objection, those answers will be put in the record.
AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Senator Case. If I may later have the privilege of looking at them—

Senator STENNIS. You certainly will.

What were your questions directed to, Senator.

Senator Case. Mr. Ford made a speech yesterday in the House.

Senator STENNIS. Oh, yes. They will all go in at this point.

(The material follows)

Statement 1: Only one-fourth of the known oil storage targets in North Vietnam have been hit.

Comments: [Deleted] attacks on POL facilities to date have destroyed about 65 percent or [deleted] of the total available storage capacity of [deleted]. All-13 of the JCS targeted POL facilities have been struck. This destruction has forced the North Vietnamese to invest significant material and labor resources in the establishment and maintenance of an alternate, highly dispersed, less efficient system of smaller sites. The distribution of POL through this system has required some reallocation of transport normally utilized to move military and civilian cargoes.

Statement 2: A significant percentage of known oil storage targets remain officially forbidden.

Comments: The unauthorized targets, representing only about ten percent of available capacity, are primarily in the densely populated and built-up areas around Hanoi, Haiphong and elsewhere. [Deleted]

Statement 3: Only three out of every ten significant military targets have been struck by U.S. air power.

Comments: Of the 242 JCS numbered targets, 194 have been authorized for attack as of 8 August 1967, including 7 authorized on that date. In addition as of 30 July there were 108 additional targets on the CINCPAC list of which 51 were authorized and 57 were not authorized. On 8 August, 9 of the 57 unauthorized CINCPAC targets were authorized for strike.

Statement 4: Nearly half the identified top priority targets are officially off limits.

Comments: 242 JCS numbered targets constitute the identified top priority targets for the air attack program against NVN; of these, 194 or 80.2 percent, have been authorized for attack as of 8 August 1967. 108 CINCPAC priority targets (in addition to the JCS targets) are carried by CINCPAC as of 30 July. Of these, 60 or 55 percent have been authorized for attack as of 8 August.

[Deleted]

Statement 5: More than a hundred vital positions, including most of his air defense control centers, most of his major airfields, and all of his naval facilities cannot be attacked.

Comments: [Deleted] The number of unauthorized “vital positions” (validated military targets) varies because of the current dynamic target development; but it is at the present time in excess of one hundred.

Statement 6: One-third of his total power targets and all his hydroelectric generating facilities are forbidden targets.

Comments: Fourteen powerplants, having a combined capacity of 165,000 kw or 60 percent of the national total, including major plants in the principal areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, Hon Oai, Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri, Bao Lang, Thanh Hoa, and Ben Thuy have been struck. All but the Hanoi powerplant, which has been restored to 75 percent of prestrike capacity, are out of operation. The total national capacity has been reduced to 27 percent of the prestrike capacity. Air strikes have also nullified interchanges of power over the extensive transmission network which serves the primary military and industrial installations. Of the 4 hydroelectric plants, 1 has been [deleted] struck.

Statement 7: Sixty percent of the key targets of his transportation network are immune.

Comments: About 75 percent of all road, rail, and inland waterway systems supporting movement of military logistics and the significant LOC-associated targets are authorized for air strike. About 25 percent of all transportation targets that may be categorized as “immune” lie principally in the CHIOM buffer zone and in the prohibited areas around Ha Hoi and Haiphong. Of all known significant transportation targets (amounting to more than 2,600), approximately 60 percent have been struck, with 74 percent to date. However, these unauthorized targets and areas contain key facilities for the maintenance and repair of vehicles, rolling stock, and watercraft, and are the key links for operation of the LOCs supporting the import and distribution of military supplies and equipment from external sources.
Statement 8: Only one-fourth of the priority transportation targets, one-third of his railroad facilities and bridges have been attacked.

Comment: Of the key transportation targets identified over 75 percent have been attacked. Over 50 percent of the significant rail targets have been struck. Out of 492 fixed rail targets in the target data base, over 250 have been attacked. During 1966, over 200 different fixed rail targets were struck. This does not include 285 attacks against the lines and spurs (exclusive of bridges, yards, and sidings). In 1968, there were over 900 attacks against rail bridges and over 250 against yards and sidings. In this same year, over 7,000 strikes were directed against highway targets and at least 5,000 strikes against highway transport equipment. The remaining unauthorized targets located in the prohibited areas are essential to distribution of imports received from external sources and are used as sanctuaries for storage and distribution of this material.

Statement 9: All seaport target and canal locks are off limits.

Comment: The NVN seaports handling foreign maritime shipping have not been struck. All other ports handling coastal shipping in support of infiltration southward have been attacked. [Deleted.] Over 75 percent of the inland waterways supporting movement of military logistics are subjected to interdiction by air attack.

Statement 10: Most of his repair shops cannot be hit.

Comment: Most repair shops of military significance are located within populated areas. Some of the critical LOC-associated repair facilities have been struck, including major military motor vehicle repair installations. The extensive ship and boat repair facilities and maintenance installations in Haiphong are not authorized. Several motor vehicle repair facilities in Hanoi are not authorized.

Statement 11: For more than two years, five out of six of his key industrial targets could not be hit.

Comment: During the first two years of air attacks, two of the six key industrial targets were authorized for attack and destroyed or immobilized. These were the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine and the Lang Chi Explosives Plant. One month later the only cement-producing facility located in Haiphong, was authorized for attack. The [deleted] Plant, the [deleted] Plant, and the [deleted] Plants are not authorized for attack.

Statement 12: Nearly 90 percent of targets in his war-making industrial base remain untouched.

Comment: The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, Haiphong Cement, and the Lang Chi Explosives Plant have been authorized for attack and destroyed. The [deleted] Plant and the [deleted] Plant have not been authorized for attack. In addition, 2 Battery plants, 1 rubber plant, 1 drum fabricating plant, and 2 Cement products plants are not authorized.

b. Statement 13: More than two-thirds of the total targets of NVN's Army, Navy, Air Force, and defense installations have never been attacked.

Comment: Of the total significant military targets in NVN identified for strike during the air campaign approximately 80 percent have been authorized for attack and struck. The remaining unauthorized targets are the most critical military targets in NVN, and for the most part, are located in the prohibited or restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong.

c. Statement 14: Nearly half of these military targets are officially forbidden.

Comment: Of the approximately 480 significant military targets which are currently identified in the CINCPAC priority target list for NVN, 65 percent have been authorized for strike. The unauthorized targets comprising 35 percent of the total, are for the most part, located in the prohibited or restricted areas of the Hanoi/Haiphong complexes.

d. Statement 15: In all of 1966, airmen flew more than 100,000 combat missions without attacking one significant strategic target.

Comment: In 1966, a total of 23 JCS targets were struck. The four most significant targets struck were:

- Hanoi POL
- Haiphong POL
- Van Dien Vehicle Depot
- C. B. Yard

The remaining 18 JCS targets struck during 1966 consisted of seven POL facilities, eight bridges, one rail yard, one barracks, and one radar site. The greater part of the combat sortie effort was expended in armed reconnaissance roles along the enemy's major lines of communication. Targets of opportunity and tactical interdiction points were struck.

e. Statement 16: In 1966, only about 1,000 strikes were directed against top priority pressure points.
Comments: During 1966, [deleted] operations were characterized by gradual encroachment on the vital Hanoi-Haiphong complex, emphasis on armed reconnaissance and interdiction, with a small percentage of effort expended against JCS targets on a route package [deleted]. There were about 1,000 combat sorties against JCS targets out of a total of 106,000 combat sorties flown in SVN during 1966. However, most of the remaining 105,000 combat sorties were down against important pressure points in an armed reconnaissance role. This provided interdiction in depth along major lines of communication with active strikes against targets of opportunity and at tactical interdiction points, thus inhibiting the enemy's freedom of movement along these LOCs.

PRESENT BOMBING ONLY AGAINST SIGNIFICANT TARGETS

Senator Case. Just two more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Suppose the order were given to you to bomb only objectives having a significant effect upon the infiltration of men or supplies into South Vietnam. Would you comment upon that as it might represent a change from your present policy?
Admiral Sharp. Yes, I get the question.
Senator Case. It is a distinction between perhaps that plus a moral purpose.
Admiral Sharp. There would be no change.
Senator Case. There would be no change?
Admiral Sharp. There would be no change. Everything that we are doing now affects, has an adverse effect on infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam.
Senator Case. That is what you are doing now, and if you were given a free hand, it would still be true?
Admiral Sharp. That is right.

SENATOR CASE DISCUSSES DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON BOMBING

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I make one short statement generally to you, sir, and the committee on that point.
Senator Stennis. Certainly.
Senator Case. I have been distressed by what I think is the unfortunate controversy in the public mind about this whole question of bombing. There are differences of opinion.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Senator Case. But I am not sure that they are the differences of opinion that have seemed to be stressed.
I do not think you are an unreasonable man, I do not think that you are an ogre and I do not think the Admiral is, and yet, we get out of yesterday's newspapers, as a result of your statements, an imputation and portrayal of both you and the Admiral as war-mongering ogres.

All I am urging is that we ought to consider whether we could not have more facts brought into the public domain, not targets, not things that are going to hurt American lives or anything else, but more actual facts as to what we are talking about. In the final analysis, are the differences between you, Senator, and me, very great? I think not, and yet they can be made to sound so and the general result is belabored churlish of public opinion and great unhappiness, and I think this should be stopped.

Senator Thurmond. As the Washington Post did, and some extremely liberal newspapers.
Senator Case. I think largely they could not do this if there were more facts available to the public.

Senator Thurmond. I have found they will warp and twist the truth.

Senator Case. That is all.

Senator Stennis. All right, gentlemen, let's proceed on the facts.

**ADMIRAL SHARP'S DEFINITION OF 'SUCCESS' IN WAR**

Senator Case. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I do not think it unreasonable to try to publish additional factual data.

My last question is, what would be your definition of success if you had a free hand and were given the orders to win the war?

What would we be left with if you followed your military—

Admiral Sharp. My definition of success is the time when Ho Chi Minh decides that this thing is not a 'profitable undertaking' and decides to stop it.

**RESULT IN SOUTH VIETNAM IF NORTH VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION CHASED**

Senator Case. As far as North Vietnam's intervention and its use as a means through which Russia and China are now working, but what would be the result in South Vietnam at that point in your judgment?

Admiral Sharp. The whole aggression would stop fairly rapidly.

Senator Case. We could pull out, in other words?

Admiral Sharp. Well, we could pull out after a period of time. There has to be some time allowed to get the guerrillas all calmed down and back into—

Senator Case. Would there be any kind of government there, or would there be chaos?

Admiral Sharp. There is a government there now.

Senator Case. There is a regime there now.

Admiral Sharp. And it is not chaotic in my opinion.

Senator Case. In other words, a military regime probably would be able to maintain itself in South Vietnam, if North Vietnam and other outside interference was stopped?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Senator Case. And without our help?

Admiral Sharp. Without our help?

Well, that help of ours has to taper off gradually.

Senator Case. But it would not be as the chairman suggested yesterday, all undertaking continuing for ever as far as we are concerned?

Admiral Sharp. No, I do not think so.

**Senator Case. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.**

**Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. We are always glad to have you with us.**

**Senator Smith.**

**Senator Smith.** I only have one question.

**Senator Stennis. You may ask as many as you wish.**

**Senator Smith.** With the answer supplied for the record, Mr. Chairman:

**Senator Stennis. Please ask as many as you wish.**
Now, what about the enemy defenses that you run into. Let me ask General Ryan that question. What do you encounter in the way of defenses to your airstrikes? It has not been fully explained.

General Ryan. Thirty-seven millimeter; 77 millimeter; 85 millimeter; 85-millimeter ack-ack; conventional ack-ack; SA-2 missiles. The SA-2 missiles have not caused us a great deal of trouble in the first couple of months; but the ack-ack is real heavy.

Below 4,500 feet, you run into automatic weapons; 7.62, 50 caliber, what have you, shoulder-held weapons.

Senator Stennis. It is a heavy defense.

General Ryan. Heavy defense, that is right. [Deleted]

Those are the defenses we run into.

Admiral Sharp. MIG's.

The MIG's will vary.

Senator Stennis. The MIG's will what?

General Ryan. The MIG's activities, aggressiveness will vary. They will come up, build up their courage evidently, come up, make a strike on us. We will usually knock down a bunch of them. From then on for about 2 months the CGI controller on the ground will keep the MIG's away from you, will not even let them come near the strike force. This will go on for about 2 months, then they will come up again. We will knock down four or five, again they pull them away from us.

Now yesterday I believe the Navy got two Mig-21's. That is the first Mig-21's in about 3 weeks. So the reaction of the MIG's varies according to how many you knock down.

Russia trains pilots.

Senator Stennis. Are the pilots North Vietnamese?

General Ryan. North Vietnamese. [Deleted]

Senator Stennis. Who trains the North Vietnamese and where were they trained as far as you know?

General Ryan. As far as I know, they were trained in Russia, transported back. [Deleted]

Senator Stennis. Is that a continuous process that is going on now?

General Ryan. Continuous, that is right, Mr. Chairman.

Eighty MIG's shot down.

Senator Stennis. How many of these MIG's have you shot down or destroyed?

General Ryan. Since the beginning?

Senator Stennis. Yes; if you have the approximate figures.

General Ryan. Around 80.

Senator Stennis. So it is sporadic. They will withdraw for 3 or 4 weeks.

General Ryan. Yes, sir.
DISCUSSION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

Senator STENNIS. And then come back.

Well, the antiaircraft fire that we read about seems to be devastating in spots, especially in the relatively small areas which are the only places you can bomb. They have a tough time going in there.

General RYAN. [Deleted] the northeast rail line is a hotbed of ack-ack, around Ke‰, Bac Giang.

Senator STENNIS. And, of course, it permits them to concentrate?

General RYAN. That is correct.

ADVANTAGES OF DESTROYING POL STORAGE

Senator STENNIS. Where you have your limitations or restrictions. You have already been asked the question about the POL. Is there a great advantage now in destroying their principal storage capacity and making them disperse, so that you eat up their manpower and slow down their ability to get it delivered, which also slows them down in their movements depending on POL, is that right?

General RYAN. That is correct; yes, sir.

CINC-PAC’S REQUIREMENTS IN MEN, MATERIAL, AND EQUIPMENT

Senator STENNIS. You consider that to be a major factor.

I will address it to all three of you at one time if I may. What do you need now that you do not have either in equipment, manpower, or material to prosecute the land war and also the air campaign against North Vietnam?

Senator JACKSON. And I assume Navy too.

Senator STENNIS. Oh, yes, I address this to all three witnesses. Thank you, Senator, The Navy, Air Force, and Army.

If you want some time to prepare a full list, that will be all right, but I would like to hear each of your responses now.

Admiral Sharp?

ARMY’S REQUIREMENTS

Admiral Sharp. Suppose I take it for the Army.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

You have mentioned already a few of the items.

Admiral Sharp. Helicopters are one of the Army’s problems, lack of helicopters, a shortage of helicopter pilots so that the pilots have to rotate back too fast. There are no ammunition problems in the Army ammo. I think they are satisfactory on their way to being fixed up.

The new rifle has been supplied to all of our troops; has not been supplied yet to some of the South Vietnamese troops. I think the Koreans have it.

Can anybody back me up on this? We are oriented toward the air war here.

Senator STENNIS. You can supply a list of items.

Admiral Sharp. All right, sir.

Senator STENNIS. For the record later.

Admiral Sharp. Thank you, sir.
Additional Equipment, Material, and Personnel Necessary To Prosecute The War in Southeast Asia

Army.—A major area of concern to the Army is the programmed helicopter deployment rate. It is essential that the programmed rate be maintained and desirable that it be expedited. Failure to deploy the required helicopter support would reduce the mobility of Army tactical units and restrict the scope of their operations.

Navy.—Shortages exist in the broad areas of aircraft and funding.

(a) Aircraft: The Pacific Fleet air role in Southeast Asia is directed primarily toward furtherance of the [deleted] Air Campaign in North Vietnam. Shortages of operational tactical aircraft assets, both quantitatively and qualitatively, have been a continuing problem. Although a full carrier aircraft wing is deployed in each CVFA upon departure from the CONUS, it has required considerable drawdown on other essential activities. Squadrons are drawn down in numbers of operating aircraft upon return from deployment to Southeast Asia. Resulting degradation of readiness is evidenced by a substantial reduction in flight hours, reduced weapons proficiency, increased accident rates, and adverse effects on air crew retention and morale. The Pacific Fleet is affected by the Navy-wide shortage of the following specific aircraft:

(1) A-4. [Deleted.]
(2) F-4A. Procurement of additional F-2A's has been cancelled and the follow-on program of E-2B's has not begun.
(3) RF-4. RF-4 aircraft are needed for CVA-41 carrier to improve IH/Photo capability.
(4) F-2. [Deleted.]
(5) Helicopters. Additional armed helicopters are required for Game Warden operations. [Deleted.] An immediate requirement exists for additional heavy and medium helicopters for III MAF. As with the Army, additional helicopter support would enhance the mobility and effectiveness of Marine Corps ground tactical units.

(b) Funding! There is a considerable shortfall in the FY68 Budget for ship maintenance, alterations, and overhauls. M&O funds tentatively allocated to PACFLT for FY68 are less than allocated in FY67; yet force levels and shipyard man-hour costs are higher and the scope of required work per overhaul is increased due to previously deferred maintenance. Despite the adverse effect upon Fleet readiness, it has become necessary to plan deferral of 16 PACFLT overhauls and fund limits all others. There is no flexibility to meet unforeseen requirements such as Forrestal repairs. Funding limitations will also impact on aircraft rework, modification, and procurement.

Air Force.—a. The most important equipment deficiency in prosecuting the air war in Southeast Asia resides in the [deleted].

(b) In addition, an increased capability is still required to [deleted].

(c) [Deleted.]

(d) For the longer term, an increased overall R&D effort needs to be directed toward the development and procurement of a fully integrated modern all-weather attack system employing the state-of-the-art techniques.

Senator STENNIS. But that general question applies for any item that is in need or prospective need.

Admiral SHARP. And I must say that the Army's problem with troop rotation is a very difficult one, but I think the Army should talk to that.

Senator STENNIS. Well, inasmuch as we do not have someone here now from the Army, I asked you the question. You can have the answer supplied, and I wish it would elaborate on the manpower situation, because we are concerned about it.

I know it is part of your morale factor, too.

Admiral SHARP. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. All right, is there anything else you want to mention?

Admiral SHARP. I think that covers the Army, sir. I will let my two components respond.
NAVY'S REQUIREMENTS

Senator Stennis. Admiral Johnson, may I call you next on this question?

I will repeat the question. What do you need that you do not have, either in equipment, manpower, or materiel to prosecute the land war in Southeast Asia, the war in Southeast Asia from the naval activities on the sea and in the air, and in the air campaign by the Air Force against Vietnam?

Admiral Johnson. We have already mentioned the [deleted]. We have already covered the munitions, the selected items of ordnance that we are short of.

Senator Stennis. Yes.

Admiral Johnson. In addition to that, with the expansion of the naval gunfire north of the DMZ, together with what we have to give General Westmoreland in South Vietnam, we are stretched pretty thin in terms of cruisers and destroyers.

As a result of that, some time ago I requested, or stated a need for [deleted], additional 8-inch cruisers, and [deleted] destroyers. This request has since been modified to [deleted] cruisers and [deleted] battleships, plus the [deleted] destroyers that we need in the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Stennis. One battleship has been authorized?

Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, the New Jersey; that is right.

Senator Stennis. How long will it take you to get it in operation?

Admiral Johnson. I have heard the time of [deleted] months. Of course, I think that they can probably accelerate that, and hopefully that she will be deployed on the line in about [deleted] months.

Senator Stennis. All right; go ahead.

Pardon the interruption.

Admiral Johnson. The other shortages we have, which is of a temporary nature now, in other words by the first of the year we should have alleviation of this; namely, that out in Westpacific we do not have any shortage of airplanes in the squadrons.

In other words, we send all of these air wings out with a full bag, a full complement of aircraft. On the other hand, with the shortages we do have, the squadrons that are back in Eastpacific, that is in California and other places that are back, returning from a deployment, many times it takes a considerable length of time before they have their full complement.

Now of course this has an impact on their training. They have to compress the time that they do their training. This naturally would have some impact on their safety and also in the proficiency they attain in weapons delivery. So we have that problem at the moment.

Admiral Sharp. In other words, there is a shortage of aircraft in the Navy?

Admiral Johnson. Right.

Senator Stennis. Well, review your comments on this and give us a complete list, to figure that you have not overlooked anything.

Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.

Those are the two things that I had, the two items.
(Additional information follows:)

ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL, AND PERSONNEL NECESSARY TO PROSECUTE FULLY THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Generally, the allocation of naval resources to PACFLT in furtherance of prosecuting fully the war in Southeast Asia is a Navy-wide management matter. Highest priority has been given to fulfilling on-the-line requirements in Southeast Asia, while maintaining an Atlantic Fleet readiness posture responsive to NATO contingencies and enduring emergency overseas operations.

Broad areas in which requirements/shortages exist are: aircraft; Sea Dragon/NGFS; in-country operations; and funding.

Aircraft Requirements/Shortages:

a. The Pacific Fleet air role in Southeast Asia today, and in the foreseeable future, is directed primarily in furtherance of the Air Campaign in North Vietnam. The CVA/CVW team, together with their supporting forces and equipment, are our primary resources. Shortages of operational tactical aircraft assets, both quantitatively and qualitatively, have been a continuing problem. Although we have always managed to deploy a full CVW in each CVA upon departure from the CONUS, it has not been without considerable drawdown on other essential activities. In order to do this, aircraft assets must be manipulated navy-wide:

(1) Inter-fleet transfers are required.
(2) ATRPAC squadrons are drawn down in numbers of operating aircraft upon return from WESTPAC.

b. Navy-wide Aircraft Shortfalls exist in the following areas:

(1) A-4. [Deleted.]
(2) E-2A. Procurement of additional E2A’s has been cancelled. Also, follow-on E-3B program has not yet begun.
(3) Armed helicopters. Navy has attempted to procure armed helicopters for Southeast Asia (GAME WARDEN). This request was denied. [Deleted.]
(4) RF-4. RF-4 aircraft are needed for CVA-41 class carriers to improve IR/PElok capabilities.
(5) [Deleted.]
(6) ECM aircraft/equipment. Information has been provided to CINCPAC for inclusion in overall PACOM requirements.

b. Aircraft Rework/Mod/Procurement:

(1) Aircraft Rework. Since the budget submission, an additional 60 million dollar requirement has developed to support increased depth in aircraft rework caused by increased aggressions and environmental factors in Southeast Asia operations.

(2) Aircraft Modification. The Navy program was reduced by 100 million dollars during the OSD budget review. This shortage has been further aggravated by new requirements generated in the amount of 150 million dollars for A4 standardization, A6 service life extensions, and J52 engine rework for the A6A.

(3) Aircraft Procurement. The Navy budget submission was reduced in OSD by [deleted]. A6A, [deleted], F4J, [deleted], T2B, [deleted], SH-3, [deleted], C2A, [deleted], CH-53, [deleted], UH-1E for a total of 370 million dollars. Requirements stated here will be recognized as applicable Navy-wide, but are included here for their obvious impact on PACFLT.

C. EMPPAC Requirements: [deleted]

SEA DRAGON/NGFS:

a. The basic requirement for SEA DRAGON and in-country NGFS missions is stand-off firepower. The number and caliber of naval guns that can be brought to bear on designated targets is limited by the types of surface forces available for these missions. In addition to BB’s which may be activated, additional 8-inch gun cruisers and destroyers are needed.

SECDEF guidance has indicated that there will be no supplemental appropriation this Fiscal Year, however, it now appears that new budget action must be considered. It is apparent that there is a considerable shortfall in the FY’68 budget for ship maintenance, alterations, and overhauls. M&O funds, tentatively allocated to PACFLT for FY’68, are less than allocated in FY’67; yet force levels and shipyard manpower costs are higher and the scope of required work per overhaul is increased due to previously deferred maintenance. Despite the adverse effect upon Fleet readiness, it has become necessary to plan deactivation of sixteen PACFLT overhauls and fund limit all others. Even so, there is no possibility to meet unforeseen requirements such as FOWRETTAL repairs or NEW JERSEY activation. The task of prosecuting fully the war in Southeast Asia relates directly to funding actions. If relief is not provided, it may well become necessary to reduce forces.
Admiral Sharp. We gave you the [deleted] yesterday.

**AIR FORCE’S REQUIREMENTS**

Senator Steeniss: Yes.

All right, General Ryan.

General Ryan, The Air Force

Senator Steeniss: The same question applies.

General Ryan. Shortcoming is in the [deleted] capability in our aircraft. [Deleted.

Senator Steeniss: Do you not need it now [deleted.]

General Ryan. We can use it [deleted] now. This is true.

Senator Steeniss: Well, you need it. It is more than “can use it.”

I understood you to say you need it.

General Ryan. We need it.

(Additional information follows:)

**AUGMENTATION REQUIRED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

The following listing represents the additional personnel, not necessarily in order of priority, needed by USAF units in Southeast Asia. This augmentation is required to support adequately the currently approved forces and activity levels. These requirements have been submitted to CINCPAC and the Chief of Staff, USAF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversion of 0-2 aircraft to O-2</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Additional maintenance and support personnel because of increased complexity of the O-2 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Deleted.] Aerial port augmentation</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Additional personnel are required to process cargo and passengers in Vietnam. Computation based on workload forecast by Comusmen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security augmentation</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Provides for 309 security police personnel, 1,099 security police personnel for improving base security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Airlift Command augmentation</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides additional personnel for weather services, aircarce and rescue and recovery units, and other support personnel. Also included are five processing personnel and camera maintenance personnel needed to support the reconnaissance effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion of F-4C to F-4D aircraft</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Additional maintenance and support personnel are required to support the more complex structural systems of the F-4D aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air traffic control centers</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Additional personnel are required to adequately man existing air traffic control facilities. High density of current air traffic requires augmentation to insure flight safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical augmentation</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides needed augmentation for civil engineers, foreign aid workers, and other support personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat support group augmentation</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Provides needed augmentation for civil engineers, foreign aid workers, and other support personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Logistics Command augmentation</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides additional rapid area maintenance personnel. This package includes augmentation for Ground Electronics Engineering/Installation Agency, and additional personnel for round-the-clock coverage of selected radar/communications positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated tactical air control system augmentation</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides additional personnel for round-the-clock coverage of selected radar/communications positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life support augmentation</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides additional personnel for round-the-clock coverage of selected radar/communications positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Provides essential staff augmentation, as well as additional personnel to implement automated combat reporting systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence augmentation</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides intelligence personnel to brief and direct crews in [deleted] duties in Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Additional information follows:)

Air War Against North Vietnam 115
116  AIR WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Springs support</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Provides needed support for high priority reconnaissance effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130 augmentation</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Increase is required to support C-130 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft maintenance augmentation</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Provides additional personnel for essential maintenance of damaged aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft maintenance augmentation</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Additional personnel for support of essential aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commando Squadron augmentation</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Provides additional crew and maintenance personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 support</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Provides additional support for B-52 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward air controller support</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Thailand and Vietnam</td>
<td>Required to process film obtained by forward air controllers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: [Deleted]

**ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT**

Senator STENNIS. All right, General Ryan. And this is the biggest shortcoming I have out there at the present time.

Senator STENNIS. All right, anything else?

What about the large bombs you gentlemen were testifying about a while ago that Senator Miller and Senator Thurmond mentioned. Do you have plenty of those?

General Ryan. We have 3,000-pound bombs at the present time.

You have the 2,000-pound bomb coming in to replace it.

Admiral Johnson. Mr. Chairman, I might mention one other item that was touched on slightly yesterday. The nature of the war out there and the environment you operate in, of course we do need very badly [deleted]. We have some out there now but we do not have enough, and these are the things that you need [deleted].

This is in the research and development stage, but at the moment of course we do not have as much of it as we need.

Senator STENNIS. Mrs. Smith asks why you do not have these items?

Admiral Johnson. It is something I suppose that was not completely foreseen as a need and it just takes a certain length of time, leadtime, for the research and development on it, and then to get it into production.

Senator STENNIS. What is your expectation on receiving it?

Admiral Johnson. Well, we expect in time—[deleted].

Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]

Admiral Johnson. [Deleted.]

Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]

Admiral Johnson. [Deleted.]

Senator Jackson. [Deleted.]

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. That is all right. We have all had a chance. I was just getting ready to call on you.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question.

Senator STENNIS. All right, Mrs. Smith.

Senator Smith. Yesterday, when we were talking about interdicting the flow of supplies, equipment, and so forth, I think one of you gentlemen said that one problem was the lack of [deleted]. Why are we so slow on the [deleted].
We are spending plenty enough, but R & D, certainly. Are we not ready to use that system yet?

General Ryan. May I respond? [Deleted.]

Senator Smith. Are they doing everything that is possible to expedite it?

General Ryan. I think so.

Senator Smith. Is that in the Air Force?

General Ryan. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you. It is not true for more planes?

General Ryan. No; no, [deleted.]

Senator Stennis. It is the need of...

General Ryan. [Deleted] this is a technical development that they are working on at the present time.

Senator Stennis. Senator Jackson.

R. & D. EFFORTS

Senator Jackson. I had the impression that Dr. Foster's office had been working hard on this whole problem [deleted] for quite a long period of time; is this correct?

General Ryan. This is true.

Senator Jackson. So it is not a question of a lack of something being done about it.

General Ryan. A technical breakthrough.

Admiral Johnson. Pushing the state of the art.

Senator Jackson. So they can't come up with the answers and produce these items; is that correct?

General Ryan. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. There is no disagreement about the need for them?

General Ryan. No.

Senator Jackson. The question is the rapidity of developing the necessary equipment so it can become operational without delay.

Admiral Johnson. Pushing the state of the art.

Senator Jackson. Yes, of course. We have a number of scientists out in Vietnam, do we not, who are trying to come up with answers to some of the problems that our operational people have—Air Force, Navy, ground forces?

General Ryan. This is correct.

POSSIBLE USE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

Senator Jackson. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. If it has been asked, I will drop it.

Have you found any evidence following the acceleration in the emplacement of larger, longer range mortars that they are going to surface-to-surface missiles?

Admiral Sharp. We have no indication of that yet.

Senator Jackson. Do you think they will make an effort in this direction either to cope with the increased bombardment by the fleet or the obvious vulnerability that exists with reference to our large bases in South Vietnam?

Admiral Sharp. It is a possibility, Senator Jackson.
Senator Jackson. It seems to me if I were in the enemy's shoes it would be a high priority item.

Admiral Sharp. It is a possibility. I assume that they have to worry about what we would do in reaction to that.

Senator Jackson. Yes; but as we step up our air effort in the north I wonder if they are not going to take some kind of a massive effort to hit our large supply areas where we have our military concentrated. We have seen evidence of this in connection with the 4.2 rockets that are being used.

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

USE OF ARTILLERY NEAR DMZ

Senator Jackson. I would hope so. This has been rumored from time to time. Has their artillery been causing quite a problem on the DMZ?

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Jackson. Quite a problem?

Admiral Sharp. Yes.

Senator Jackson. There is no indication that they are sending in any larger artillery?

Admiral Sharp. There are indications they are bringing in more artillery.

Admiral Johnson. The big rockets.

Senator Jackson. The big rockets too.

Of course, the big rockets they now have can do enough damage. They really do not need to increase their range if they can move in quietly and in an undetected fashion.

Admiral Sharp. The rockets are not as accurate, however, as the artillery.

Senator Jackson. No, but the accuracy at Danang was quite surprising, was it not?

Admiral Sharp. The airbase is fairly large.

Senator Jackson. Of course, they cannot miss within a certain radius.

Admiral Sharp. That is right.

Senator Jackson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

I want to compliment all three officers here today for what I think has been most helpful testimony. Obviously they have been completely candid. I think we owe them a great debt for being able to advise, counsel, and assist us.

Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join in that statement of Senator Jackson, to compliment these officers who have testified.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, gentlemen. I think you both.

Now let's see, gentlemen, if we have any more questions for the committee. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Kendall?

INSERTS FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Kendall. No, Mr. Chairman, except to make sure that we have or will get in the record all of the responses which the admiral has prepared to questions submitted yesterday.

Admiral Sharp. I have a large number of them here.
I would like, if I may, Senator Stennis, to comment on the ratings of the ARVN, the Army of Vietnam, with regard to their combat readiness.

We have a statement here which should supersede what I gave you sort of off-the-cuff yesterday.

Senator STENNIS: Do you want to read it?

We can put it in the record. Tell us what the substance of it is.

Admiral Sharp. [Deleted.]

This shows a marked improvement since September of 1966 [deleted]. That gives you a general idea, sir.

Senator STENNIS: Frankly, it is a pretty general statement, I think your specific statement yesterday was right.

Admiral Sharp. Here, is what General Westmoreland's situations, reports, and messages reveal: [deleted].

There is the expert and what he thinks about it.

Senator STENNIS: I value what you said yesterday, as a sincere, honest effort to give us a hard-core answer.

Admiral Sharp. I do not feel that I was competent yesterday to give you a decent answer, sir.

Senator STENNIS: All right. We hear these rosy reports consistently about what our allies outside of South Vietnam are about to do, we receive reports that it will not be long before they are great fighting people. I do not blame them for not being, but it has grown rather old.

I think you have given us very valuable information. The Koreans are living up to their fine reputation as fighters, are they not?

Admiral Sharp. Yes, sir.

Senator Thurmond. That is what I wanted to ask.

Admiral Johnson. So are the Australians.

Senator STENNIS. Is there anything else you want to comment on, Admiral?

Admiral Sharp. No, sir. I think generally speaking—of course, the Australians are fine fighters. The Koreans are doing very well.

Senator STENNIS. How many Australians do you have in South Vietnam now approximately?

Admiral Sharp. 5,400, I think it is.

Senator STENNIS. New Zealanders?

Admiral Sharp. About 300.

General Ryan. We have a contingent of eight Canberra Australians flying out of Khan Kang.

Admiral Sharp. 5,800 Australians; New Zealand, 269.

Senator STENNIS. The Australians acquit themselves well, do they not?

All right, gentlemen. Senator Miller?

THE M-16 RIFLE PROBLEM

Senator Miller. As long as the chairman brought up some of the problem areas, Admiral, can you give us a picture of the way we have tackled this M-16 rifle problem?

I notice that the Marines apparently want the rifle modified. Has there been any modification of the rifle in the theater?

What is your answer to the difficulties with the M-16 rifle in the field?
Admiral Sharp. From what I understand from people that advise me, there is no more trouble with the M-16 rifle in the field than there is with the M-13 rifle, the rifle that we have been using for a long time. The M-16 has certain very marked advantages in this combat environment, and as far as I am concerned, the flailing around about the Mark-16 rifle is completely unnecessary. The Mark-16, as far as I know, has performed as well as we would expect it to.

Senator Miller. I have read that the Marines wanted some modification on this rifle. Are you familiar with that?

Admiral Sharp. No, I am not.

Senator Miller. Is there anybody on your staff who might be?

General Hutchinson. I believe it is the extractor that needs some minor improvements. It is a little more sensitive, it is my understanding, to dirt and things like that but it is only the sort of thing that develops after it has been in combat use. It is not a major deficiency that cannot be corrected.

Senator Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman expresses appreciation to Sharp.

Senator Stevens. Thank you.

Chairman. All right, are there any other questions, gentlemen?

For the committee and for myself, I want to especially thank you gentlemen for a very fine presentation. We feel we have been able to get all the facts and to determine what the problems are. We have received frank answers from you gentlemen that have wrestled with these problems and will continue to do so.

It is very comforting and reassuring, even though the facts are not all good, to feel that we have your testimony to help us in our thinking as well as the recommendations we may make to our colleagues. I hope some of the things we say will be permitted to be published. I think the people need to know more about this war. They are building up in their minds a larger and larger question mark than there is an understanding. Much of it could be explained.

The American people will accept anything if they understand it. We are indebted to you. We will see that more Members of the Senate as well as Members of the House receive the benefit of your testimony. I express regret that Senator Russell could not be here and hear your testimony.

He will be back about the time you leave.

We are very grateful to you. I think, if I may say so, that the time of everyone concerned has been well spent.

Admiral Sharp. Mr. Chairman, it has been a great honor and a privilege to appear before your committee and to express our thoughts to you. We are all trying to do the same thing—namely, get this war over as quickly and as effectively as we can—but I know that your feeling is the same as ours that we must come out of this war as we come out of all wars; namely, ahead.

Senator Stevens. Yes, sir, that is right.

Admiral Sharp. Oil top.

Senator Stevens. We think the operation of the war, there is in highly competent hands.

Admiral Sharp. Thank you, sir.

Senator Stevens. It makes us more appreciative of you gentlemen and your profession that such men as you are ready in time of national
stress. You have been very cooperative with the gentlemen that have gone out from the staff of the subcommittee during the last 2 or 3 years. Virtually every member of our staff has been there. We have profited greatly by what you did for them, and we want to thank you for that too.

Admiral SHARP. Mr. Chairman, the press, of course, have been bombarding me and I have been putting them off. I do not know whether my statement was cleared. I understand the statement is not yet cleared. I have been saying that naturally it was your hearing and I did not feel that I should be making statements.

Senator STENNIS. Let me amend your comment somewhat. It is not my hearing. My position is that you came here as the commander in chief of the Pacific area to give your best military judgment to the committee. I think it would detract from your testimony to appear now on television or even to make a statement to the press at this time. That is my opinion.

Whatever part of your statement is ultimately released will, of course, speak for itself. For my own part, I am just going to summarize your testimony and state that the committee feels that it has obtained the pertinent facts as to the conduct of the air war.

I will also say that it is certainly clear that there are many lucrative targets which have yet to be authorized for strike, and that your testimony makes any thought of stopping the bombing unthinkable.

That, in substance, is all I am going to say at this time to the news media.

Admiral SHARP. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator STENNIS. With special thanks again, gentlemen.

Admiral SHARP. It has been an honor to be here, sir.

RECESS

Senator STENNIS. The committee will recess now, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)