stalled the movement and increased confusion and chaos among the troops and refugees. In a frantic effort to seek cover and escape, several troops jumped into the river and were drowned. Other accidents added to the troubles and misery of the ill-fated convoy. At Ca Lui and Ai Nu, a river-crossing point, some tanks and vehicles were bogged down and stuck in quicksand while they tried to bypass the road.

At Cung Son, some 40 miles from Tuy Hoa, the convoy was compelled again to cross the Song Ba River to continue the last leg of the journey on Provincial Route 436 on the southern bank of the river. Up to this point, the convoy had been using Interprovincial Route 7B on the northern bank. However, beyond Cung Son, Route 7B had been mined extensively by the Korean forces during the time they manned an outpost here. But here again, the lack of river-crossing facilities stopped the moving column. A M4T6 pontoon bridge meanwhile had been brought to Tuy Hoa from Nha Trang, intended for the river-crossing at Cung Son. But it was impossible to move the bridge to Cung Son by road because of several enemy blocking positions. Efforts at clearing the road by RF units of Tuy Hoa Province were all defeated. Finally, the bridge was dismantled and carried piece by piece to Cung Son by CH-47 helicopters.

On March 22, at last the pontoon bridge was established, and the convoy crossed over onto Route 436 and proceeded cautiously toward Tuy Hoa. Because of the tremendous rush at the start, the pontoon soon collapsed, causing further losses in human lives and vehicles; but it was quickly repaired, and the battered column soon made it safely to the other side of the river.

If it had taken seven days and innumerable casualties for the column of redeployed troops and refugees to progress so far, the remaining and final leg of their odyssey was to be equally slow and even more hazardous. The distance was relatively short, but the blocking positions that the enemy had strewn along its course were hard to dislodge. No sooner had the lead element resumed its march when it was stalled immediately by enemy fire. Efforts at clearing enemy blocking positions were slow and difficult. The sector of Tuy Hoa had run out of reinforcement troops for the effort. So the whole column of
humans and vehicles bogged down again on this side of the river. It was raining and cold. And the enemy relentlessly kept up his mortar bombardments and harassing fire. Because of rain and extremely bad weather, the air force was unable to provide close support. For its survival, the column had to rely on its own strength. Driven to desperation and out of a compassion for the people of their own lot, the gallant troops of the 34th Ranger Battalion (7th Ranger Group of the JGS general reserve) finally resolved to break through or die. Supported by the few remnant M-113's, they stormed ahead and systematically destroyed block after block. As soon as an enemy position was disposed of, the column rushed on, oblivious of all dangers ahead.

On March 27, the final blocking position was destroyed and the column at last moved on freely toward Tuy Hoa. It was 2100 hours when the first vehicles reached the city. No effort was ever made to keep a tally of the vehicles and people that finally made it to Tuy Hoa. How many vehicles and how many people of the original column had really survived the tragic journey, no one knew exactly. It was only known that approximately 300 vehicles, both military and civilian, later drove up to the fuel supply station set up by the 2d Logistic Command and asked for refueling. Also, approximately 5,000 people sought shelter at the makeshift refugee center at Tuy Hoa that night.

On the military side, the redeployment operation was deemed a tragic failure. Almost all units withdrawn from the Kontum-Pleiku area incurred losses amounting to 75% of their original strength. But the gallant 34th Ranger Battalion, later dubbed "block destruction heroes" by the grateful refugees, lost only 50% of its strength. It was retained at Tuy Hoa for the defense of the city.

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3 According to an estimate by the chief of staff, II Corps, Colonel Lê Khac Ly, 5,000 out of 20,000 logistic and support troops were finally retrieved.
Tactically, a retrograde movement is by far a most difficult maneuver. It is prone to disorder, chaos and disruption if command and control fail and if morale and discipline cannot be sustained. Hence, it requires a most minuscule planning and a strong leadership at all echelons. The redeployment of II Corps troops from Kontum-Pleiku was not a retrograde operation in the accepted tactical sense. It was simply a scheduled movement of organized convoys with self-defense capabilities. The movement of the convoys was seriously impeded by the accruing and uncontrollable flow of refugees and civilian vehicles on the one hand and by road conditions and the lack of river-crossing facilities on the other. The 320th NVA Division, which was thrown in pursuit only after the enemy learned of the actual redeployment, could never have caught up with the column if river-crossing facilities had been provided in time and if the flow of refugees had been regulated by a tight control. The element of surprise could have worked. It had indeed for the first few days.

However well justified he was with his concept of tactical surprise, the II Corps Commander could not be spared the censure of having failed to establish a detailed plan with his staff and to exercise his direct control over the entire operation. Whatever planning he had done, it was limited, and only a few trusted subordinate commanders had contributed to it and knew about it. Staff work was entirely non-existent. Colonel Le Khac Ly, the chief of staff of II Corps, himself admitted he was totally in the dark. The commander of the 231st Direct Support Group in Pleiku recalled, in his own words, "I didn't know anything about redeployment orders. Not until an artillery unit nearby hastily assembled its men, equipment and dependents and loaded them on trucks, did I go out and inquire about it. I was briefly told, 'We're leaving town. Withdrawal orders. You'd better hurry.' So I hurried back to my unit, loaded some good equipment on trucks and took off after the artillery convoy. I had no time to destroy anything. I didn't even report my displacement to the 2d Logistics Command. It's supposed to be kept secret."

The II Corps commander's blind trust in his two trusted subordinates to carry out his orders had been misplaced. The entire redeployment
operation lacked unified and effective control from the start. General Tat only looked after his Ranger troops. General Cam took no active part in the whole process. His remote supervision was ineffective. The overall control of the movement turned out to be actually exercised by the II Corps chief of staff but only up to Phu Bon although he had not been given this responsibility. The province chiefs of Phu Bon and Phu Yen had failed to provide road security and protection. They were unable to control their RF and PF units in performing this task. If they had, if the itinerary had been protected and if river-crossing facilities had been provided in time, the outcome of the redeployment would certainly have been different. But excessive preoccupation with a false sense of secrecy had precluded such vital pre-arrangements which could have looked perfectly normal under the pretext of a road rehabilitation project. In fact, such a project had been planned for some time by the JGS, to include mine-clearing on the terminal stretch of LTL-7B from Cung Son to Tuy Hoa.

Finally, the failure was also one of leadership at all corps echelons. Troops had not been informed about the operation and what had been expected of them. Discipline had not been exercised, and constraints had not been imposed in order to avoid disorder and chaos. In particular, they had not been motivated enough to take on the difficult task of destroying enemy blocks, the final obstacles on their way to survival. This failure of leadership had resulted in a rout of strategic proportions. At least 75% of II Corps combat strength, to include the 23d Infantry Division, Rangers, armor, artillery, engineer, and signal, had been tragically expended within ten days. The operation intended to reoccupy Ban Me Thuot never materialized simply because II Corps no longer had any combat troops. And communist forces had taken the Central Highlands without a fight.

Leadership at the Division Level:
The 23d Division's Defense of Kontum

During the NVA Easter offensive of 1972, one of the major battles was fought in the central highlands of Military Region 2. The enemy had carefully planned and prepared and was determined to seize Kontum City.
To meet this challenge, the 23d ARVN Division was moved during early May approximately 160 kilometers from Ban Me Thuot to Kontum. The division commander, Colonel Ly Tong Ba, was given the mission of assuming command of all ARVN forces in the area and reorganizing them for defense. Even though he was a new and of course inexperienced division commander, occupying the TOE position of a major general, Colonel Ba demonstrated outstanding leadership ability during a most critical period.

The deployment of the 23d Division's units around Kontum City were completed during the second week of May. This disposition was essentially a perimeter defense with ARVN infantry and armor units blocking approaches from the north and northwest and territorial forces securing the southern and southeastern approaches, facing the Dak Bla River. The 44th Regiment was positioned astride Route QL-14, about 4 km northwest of Kontum, while the 45th Regiment defended the northern side of the city and the 53d, on the northeastern side, protected Kontum airfield. (Map 8)

At this time, the 23d Division was still untried in large-scale combat and had yet to show that it was superior to its vanquished sister, the 22d Division, which had been soundly defeated during the Dakto-Tan Canh battle just three weeks earlier. But the division commander seemed to make a big difference. Colonel Ba personally inspected the defense perimeter with his staff, encouraged and provided guidance for his troops on tactical details and demonstrated great care for them. The defense, fire support and counterattack plans were coordinated and rehearsed daily, drawing from the painful lessons learned by the 22d Division. All units were given the opportunity to practice-fire the LAW antitank rocket until their troops became confident. More importantly, Colonel Ba's daily round of visits to his units greatly inspired his subordinates, stimulated his commanders and instilled self-assurance among divisional troops.

Finally, in the early morning of 14 May, the enemy began his attack on Kontum. But the defending forces had been alerted since midnight and were ready. ARVN intelligence in the meantime had been able to detect every enemy movement and even knew the precise time of the attack. Therefore, as the NVA troop and tank columns moved down
Route QL-14 toward Kontum, U.S. Cobra gunships, some of them armed with the new TOW missile, were already airborne from Pleiku. A total of four enemy regiments converged on the city. From the northwest the 48th and 64th Regiments of the NVA 320th Division and their tanks formed two columns advancing on both sides of Route QL-14. From the north, the 28th Regiment of the B-3 Front moved south against the 53d Regiment, while the 141st Regiment of the NVA 2d Division attacked territorial force positions along the Dak Bla River south of the city. Despite its combined force, this initial attack was quickly broken up after several leading enemy tanks were disabled by our artillery, LAW and TOW missiles. The reactions of friendly forces had been quick, decisive and successful, and the support of tactical air and gunships most effective. ARVN armored elements, although at greatly reduced strength and purposely kept in reserve, had quickly maneuvered to fill in gaps in the defense perimeter.

At nightfall however, the enemy renewed his attacks at an even stronger tempo against the 44th and 53d Regiments. Due to the confusion of night fighting, which hindered effective coordination, an enemy battalion succeeded in breaking through a gap between the two regiments. The situation became critical when this enemy unit enlarged the gap and exploited its gains with successive waves of mass assaults. Even our concentrated artillery fire failed to stop the assaults, and it looked like our defense would soon meet with disaster. As the situation was becoming more precarious by the minute, Colonel Ba and his staff worked feverishly on countermeasures. The only effective way to turn back the massive penetration of enemy troops seemed to be the use of B-52 strikes, two of which had been pre-planned for the night. But the security margin required that ARVN forces be pulled back one hour earlier and to fill in this void, increased and sustained artillery fire would be necessary. Both ARVN regiments were instructed to hold in place and move back on order. This was a bold and risky move but there seemed to be no other alternative to save Kontum from falling before dawn.

The two B-52 strikes arrived on time as planned. As the rumbling stopped, a dreadful silence fell over the scene of fierce fighting. At dawn, ARVN search elements discovered hundreds of enemy bodies with their weapons scattered all around.
Success in this first contact gave the defenders of Kontum added confidence. They believed that enemy forces were no match for the devastating firepower of our air force and artillery in spite of their numerical superiority and powerful tanks. They had seen for themselves how the NVA "human wave" assault tactic was shattered by B-52 strikes. But Colonel Ba and his subordinate commanders realized that their first success had been close and that Kontum might well have been in serious jeopardy had it not been for the two timely B-52 strikes. In a post mortem examination of the results, Colonel Ba detected that there were several weaknesses in his defense. His units had been stretched too thinly over the defense perimeter, leaving gaps between them and making coordination difficult at limiting points. His staff had functioned well under stress, but some of its shortcomings needed improvement, particularly in the coordination of firepower. So he set about tightening his defense by reducing its perimeter and providing some depth by moving the 44th Regiment into a reserve position and replacing it with the 45th.

By the end of the week following the first push, all efforts by NVA forces to break into Kontum City had been defeated. Several times during this period, the enemy succeeded in breaking through our defense perimeter by forceful assaults against positions held by the 44th and 53d Regiments and penetrations between the 53d and 45th Regiments. The dent made into the defense line of the 53d Regiment on 20 May had been particularly serious and had warranted the commitment of M-41 tanks held by the division in reserve. Colonel Ba proved especially skillful in the maneuver of tanks, his own specialty for many years. His presence on the sites of battle also inspired his troops and helped them drive the enemy back.

His defense line having been stabilized and consolidated, Colonel Ba set about regaining some measure of initiative. With the support provided by U.S. tactical air and gunships, he launched several limited offensive operations in the areas north and northwest of the city within range of ARVN artillery. During these actions, scattered contacts were made as ARVN troops discovered additional evidence of heavy enemy casualties caused by B-52 strikes.
After ten days of holding actions to build up his forces, the enemy resumed his attack on Kontum on 25 May. As the 23d Division commander had accurately predicted, this attack had all the intensity and portent of a decisive, make or break effort. It had become imperative for the enemy to either achieve a quick victory or to withdraw his forces altogether for refitting. For one thing, the drenching monsoon was setting in over the Central Highlands, and its first effect was already being felt in the Kontum-Pleiku area.

The attack began in the early hours with artillery fire pounding all units of the 23d Division in and around Kontum City. The firing concentrated particularly on defense positions near the airfield and south of the city. At 0300, two enemy sapper battalions with the assistance of elements already in place began to infiltrate the southeastern positions held by territorial forces. They moved into an area near the airfield, occupied a school house, the Catholic Seminary and the Kontum diocesan office building. From the north and northeast, enemy infantry and tanks swarmed over and penetrated the city. Throughout the morning and into early afternoon, the division CP and ARVN artillery emplacements continually received incoming artillery and mortar fire. Fighting raged, and by late afternoon the enemy still held onto the areas he had penetrated. The enemy's ferocious artillery barrages during the day had taken a heavy toll of friendly forces. They also neutralized or destroyed a great number of our artillery pieces. The situation had become so bleak that a tactical emergency was declared for Kontum City in order to divert all available tactical air and gunships to the area for the day.

During the next day, 26 May, enemy indirect fire increased, and as coordinated attacks by enemy tanks and infantry pressed against the 53d Regiment from the north, pressure also mounted against territorial forces south of the city. With the support of Cobra gunships, an ARVN task force composed of one battalion of the 44th Regiment and eight tanks counterattacked and successfully contained an enemy penetration between the 45th and 53d Regiments. Still the enemy could not be dislodged from the positions he already held. The situation remained stable for the day, however. Meanwhile, the shortage of supplies
had become critical for the defending forces, since the airfield was closed to fixed wing aircraft. The city's soccer field was used instead to accommodate CH-47 Chinooks hauling in emergency resupply and evacuating the seriously wounded. From the soccer field, VNAF helicopters shuttled supplies to the ARVN units north and northwest of the city. At nightfall, the NVA 64th Regiment attacked again, penetrating between the 53d and 45th Regiments and enveloping the latter. But again, scheduled B-52 strikes diverted on the forces attacking the 45th helped blunt this enemy attack.

In the early morning of the following day, 27 May, the enemy made a surprise thrust with two regiments and one tank company against the 44th Regiment, held in reserve in the city's hospital complex. Fierce fighting ensued in and around this area, resulting in a melee between enemy infantry and T-54 tanks on one side and ARVN troops and TOW missile-mounted gunships on the other. Due to the open terrain north of the hospital complex, enemy tanks were easy prey for the TOW missiles and ARVN LAW rockets. By late morning the enemy advance had been halted, but NVA infantry still held in the northernmost compound and continued to harass the airfield. From these and other positions across the northern part of the city, the enemy fanned out and formed pockets of resistance, particularly in those areas where friendly use of fire was limited. Despite all the efforts of ARVN troops and the firepower of U.S. tactical air and gunships and even the commitment of ARVN tanks held in reserve, it was difficult to dislodge the enemy from his positions. He seemed determined to dig in and exploit this precious foothold in the city.

To prevent further penetrations and consolidate his defense, Colonel Ba decided, with the approval of the II Corps commander, to tighten the perimeter again. This not only helped strengthen his defenses but also allowed for better use of B-52 strikes in close support. But by the night of the 28th, the situation remained critical. NVA forces were still entrenched in the hospital's northern compound, and the territorial forces were being engaged in house-to-house fighting in the southern area of the city where the enemy still held a school and a few houses near the airfield. By this time, however, the enemy
was having serious problems with resupply. Air strikes had forced him to store his supplies at great distances from the city, and his transportation and communication lines were being disrupted. The critical situation around the city had also made friendly resupply and medical evacuation increasingly difficult, but airdrops and CH-47 Chinooks from Pleiku nearby responded adequately to emergency requirements.

The enemy's continued attrition by airstrikes and gunships finally allowed ARVN forces to counterattack and regain the initiative. To dislodge the enemy, they had to resort to bunker-to-bunker fighting and hand grenades. Shortly before noon on 30 May, ARVN forces had regained control of the entire hospital complex, and although there still remained other scattered pockets of resistance in the northeastern area, the city was clearly out of danger. In the afternoon, President Nguyen Van Thieu flew into Kontum City despite sporadic rocket and mortar fire. He praised the endurance and fighting spirit of all ARVN forces defending the city, and there, on the battlefield, he pinned the brigadier general star on Colonel Ly Tong Ba, the defender of Kontum, for "special frontline merits."

Then slowly but surely, during the remainder of the day all the enemy positions were taken back. By midday of 31 May, the battle was practically over, since NVA main forces had retreated. Thousands of NVA bodies lay scattered over the battlefield with dozens of T-54 tanks, some intact, but most reduced to charred hulks awkwardly perched among ruins. The enemy's final attempt to take Kontum had ended in utter defeat.

During the battle of Kontum, the 23d Division commander had proved to be a resourceful commander and fine troop leader. Realizing that unity of command was essential for his task, he had asked for his own regiments to be brought into Kontum to replace the Ranger groups. This greatly facilitated his exercise of command and control. Then he provided detailed guidance for his regimental commanders on defense and counterattack plans and ensured that divisional troops practiced the effective use of antitank weapons. His daily rounds of visits to all defending units were also an important factor that contributed to the high combat spirit of his troops. After the enemy's first attack, the 23d Division commander had the good initiative to reduce and consolidate the city's defense perimeter although the enemy had been driven back. The enemy
had several times attempted to break through this perimeter but failed because Colonel Ba skillfully used and personally commanded his armor and infantry reserve forces to counterattack and effectively seal the breaches. He again proved to be resourceful when he decided to further reduce the defense perimeter after the second attack when the situation had become critical. But most importantly, he had fought hand in hand with his troops and shared dangers and difficulties with them. His fine and strong leadership made it possible for the 23d Division to hold and win the final battle for Kontum.

The Leadership of the Province Chiefs of Binh Dinh, Thua Thien and Khanh Hoa

The years 1969, 1970, and 1971 were the best years for South Vietnam during President Thieu's administration. The country was not only militarily secure, it was well on its way toward full-scale development as a result of spectacular achievements in pacification. This was the main reason why the GVN embarked on an ambitious four-year plan beginning in 1972, setting high goals for community defense and local development.

The success of pacification during this period naturally depended on province chiefs, most of whom were also military officers. With a few exceptions, they had contributed a great deal to this success. One reason for this was their high caliber, the result of careful selection.

The position of province chief was unique among the assignments that a field grade officer might have during his career. It was also a unique challenge that taxed his leadership to the extreme of its requirements. Because of the dual aspect of the war, a province chief had to be first and foremost a good tactical commander, well versed not only in counter-insurgency tactics but also in modern warfare. More often than not, he was required to participate in combined operations with major ARVN and U.S. units, and to earn the respect of these units commanders, he had to show he was an equal. The command and control of RF and PF units in a province was not an easy exercise. Not only

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were they scattered throughout the province, their aggregated strength sometimes exceeded that of an infantry division.

To govern a province effectively, a province chief had to be an able administrator also. He had to supervise a large bureaucracy, prepare and execute the provincial budget, regulate trade and commerce, and protect national resources under his custody. With the advent of pacification, he had to plan for and meet the objectives set forth for security and development, and this required his involvement in countless programs and projects whose implementation needed his constant supervision and guidance. Toward the people he governed, a province chief had to show he was a sensitive leader who listened to their demands and grievances, cared for their lives and welfare, and responded to their aspirations.

Finally, in the exercise of his duties, a province chief was usually required to be a public-relations man and a politician. He had to receive guests, brief visitors and escort dignitaries on tours. He had to juggle among political factions and endeavor not to antagonize any. Whatever his creed, he had to show equal regard for all religious groups and sects, whether they be Roman Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Cao Dai or Hoa Hao. In brief, a province chief had to be many things combined in one.

As a result the province chief was overburdened by his responsibilities. No matter how devoted he was, he simply could not perform all of his duties effectively. So large were the province chief's responsibilities that many had suggested that they be divided between a province chief, who would be solely in charge of administration and development, and a sector commander, who would be responsible for security and operational matters. Perhaps this arrangement would have been more responsive to the dual aspect of the war.

The three examples that I have selected emphasize a simple fact of life: that if there are good men, there are also bad ones, and this is also true of South Vietnamese province chiefs. But by and large, the military officers who also served as province chiefs had acquitted themselves of their role in a most commendable way.
The first example involves a Lt. Col. in the J-5 Division of the JGS, as a plans officer he proved to be an excellent staff officer. With an analytical mind and a talent for organization, he performed his staff duties extremely well. He was also combat experienced, having served successfully as chief of staff of Thua Thien Sector and chief of staff of an infantry regiment. So when he was appointed province chief of Binh Dinh, everybody expected that he would be a successful one by virtue of his ability and experience. Binh Dinh was one of the most difficult provinces of MR-2. The enemy pressure here was strong and the majority of the local population had been subjected to communist influence for a long time. But the provincial territorial forces under the province chief's control were also strong; there were in fact more RF and PF units here than in any other province. During the first few months in office this officer did quite well. Subsequently, however, there arose charges that he allowed his wife to run a gambling den and favored his relatives with many commercial and business privileges to the detriment of local businessmen. There were also reports of selling and buying lucrative positions in the provincial military and administrative systems. These abuses of power were investigated by the GVN Office of Control and Supervision. The colonel was removed from office pending investigation and possible prosecution. Subsequently, his promotion was delayed for several years, and he was finally assigned to an immaterial job in MR-4. This was a typical example of a capable military officer who would otherwise have succeeded in his duties of province chief had he not been tempted by money and material rewards. This type of weakness in character was often impossible to detect during the selection process for responsible positions.

Not all province chiefs were corrupt, however. There were many who distinguished themselves not only by their integrity but also by their devotedness and fine performance. One among them was Colonel Le Van Than, province chief of Thua Thien and mayor of Hue City, who once served as deputy director of the Joint Operations Center, JGS. At first he had a special challenge since he was a native of North Vietnam and not expected by some to fit well into a slot usually earmarked for natives of Central Vietnam. But Colonel Than proved to be an exception
to this rule, and he became one of our finest and most successful province chiefs. A resourceful, hard-working, and highly devoted officer, he learned very quickly the intricacies of local politics and managed to carry out his duties with distinction without offending any political faction. That he had succeeded where others might have failed could be attributed to his adroitness and flexibility, the qualities found only in a shrewd politician. But he was also an excellent tactical commander as well. In close cooperation with the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and ARVN units, Colonel Than greatly improved security in his province and achieved outstanding results in pacification and development. Because of his distinguished service, he was subsequently placed in command of the 1st ARVN Division and promoted to brigadier general.

Many other province chiefs were less successful than Colonel Than. In fact, several among them produced only medium results in their jobs; for example, Lt. Col. Le Khanh, province chief of Khanh Hoa. Originally a Special Forces officer, Colonel Khanh was a man of tact and gentle manners. Perhaps because of this, he remained province chief for several years. His performance was just about average, and he served without distinction, although Khanh Hoa was a relatively secure province compared to others. Despite this, he continued his career as province chief for several more years, being subsequently nominated province chief of Kien Tuong and then Kien Giang. People said he was a man of luck. In retrospect, however, it is clearly obvious that Colonel Khanh was completely loyal to his superiors, dependable, conscientious and devoted in the performance of his duties but did not possess the strong leadership ability required for the more critical areas of South Vietnam.

A Battalion Commander: Tong Le Chan

Tong Le Chan was a Ranger border camp located in the middle of a Communist-controlled area in northwestern Military Region 3. Manned by the 92d Ranger Battalion, its mission was to interdict enemy communications from War Zone C north of Tay Ninh to either Binh Long, Binh Duong or War Zone D. The location of this base caused the enemy many
difficulties because he was compelled to use long detours. Therefore, he initiated a siege of Tong Le Chan Base on 25 March 1973 in an attempt to force its evacuation. As a result all ground supply routes used by the base were interdicted, and our patrols made increasing contacts. The small airstrip near the base also came under constant enemy indirect fire. Helicopters found it hazardous to bring supplies to the base because of the enemy's antiaircraft weapons around it. Although airdrops kept the base resupplied, a substantial part of them missed and fell into enemy hands, to include food and ammunition. During the 16 weeks that followed, the enemy conducted a total of 300 shellings against the base, firing more than 10,000 assorted rounds of artillery. He also attacked the base eleven times with infantry and nine times with sappers. As pressure on the base mounted, the enemy increased his propaganda campaign, promising a way out for the entire garrison. By July 1973, most of the defending forces on the base had become disabled either by wounds or illnesses with 30 dead and seriously wounded. But the 92d Ranger Battalion fought on courageously and was determined to hold this base. But the rainy season was approaching, and the unit had fought long enough under extremely harsh conditions. Orders were, therefore, given for defending forces to fall back on An Loc. The evacuation was well planned and well executed. After destroying all of its heavy equipment, the battalion withdrew safely to An Loc.

There was no doubt that the 92d Ranger Battalion was a tightly-knit unit and well led at every echelon. Under the command of Lt. Col. Ngon, this battalion had fought valiantly and cohesively from the beginning of the siege until it was ordered to withdraw. During these long months of heavy pressure and hardship, the battalion never revealed any signs of weakness or yielding to enemy threats. Despite constant enemy shellings and attacks, its disposition for defense never broke down. On the contrary, the will to resist among the men seemed to grow stronger as the fighting became harder. This showed how well the defense had been planned and how strong Colonel Ngon's leadership had been.

A combat-experienced and courageous commander, Colonel Ngon also proved he was an excellent leader. He kept the morale of his men high even during the most desperate moments by showing constant concern.
for their condition and welfare. He saw to it that the wounded were well cared for, stimulated the able-bodied to fight on and visited them around the clock at their positions with words of encouragement or praise. When supplies ran low, he shared the privations with his men and above all, never showed any concern for his own well-being or life. Inspired by his marvelous leadership, the men of the 92d Ranger Battalion enthusiastically responded to his orders and effectively fought on as a cohesive unit. This exploit was to remain one of the most extolled examples of leadership in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusions

Military leadership was not a continuous Vietnamese tradition. Interrupted and lost during the century of French domination, this tradition was not born again until we regained our national independence.

Traditional Vietnamese society under French colonialism regarded the military as a lowly profession, which it associated with servility and collaborationism. As a menial group serving the occupation forces, the Vietnamese military did not even count as a social class; they were the outcast of society. This contempt for the military, which reflected the passive opposition of the Vietnamese people toward French rule, still lingered until the Vietnamese National Army was formed in 1950. Even Bao Dai meekly admitted this as a fact.

The French presence, therefore, not only served to perpetuate this negative attitude; it also accounted for the complete void in military leadership upon their departure. This was a legacy whose consequences South Vietnam had to bear during its formative years. And the product of that legacy—the infant Vietnamese Armed Forces—grew up and matured only after severing all ties with it.

The examples of RVNAF leadership that I have discussed are superimposed on the political, military, and social background of South Vietnam with which they are intricately entwined. This serves to bring out a point of fact: that military leadership in South Vietnam was shaped by the stresses that affected the nation and that its requirements depended on the political dictates of each major historical period.

During the post-colonial period, which lasted up to 1954, French influence was still predominant as South Vietnam struggled to become
an independent nation. Vietnamese military leadership, in a purely nationalistic sense, was non-existent during this transitory period. The 5-year old Vietnamese National Armed Forces did not have a command and control system of their own. Neither did they possess a clear-cut identity. They were but an appendage of the French Expeditionary Corps under whose leadership they fought against the Viet Minh without much conviction.

High-ranking Vietnamese officers who served in key staff and command positions were all graduates of French military schools, or reassigned from French Union Forces. Several among them even had French nationality and comported themselves in the manner of French colonels from whom they had inherited the major traits of leadership: haughtiness, authoritativeness, and lack of empathy.

But it was during this period that a new generation of Vietnamese officers was born. Those were the graduates of the first classes of reserve officer schools, Nam Dinh and Thu Duc, and the Dalat Inter-Arms Military School. They were to become the backbone of military leadership in the RVNAF. In fact, most of the higher-level commanders discussed in the examples, and Thieu and Ky, belonged to this group. The most distinctive traits that set this emerging generation of leaders apart from their predecessors were: strong anti-French feelings, political awareness, and dedication to the national cause.

The First Republic, which was established in 1955 under President Ngo Dinh Diem, saw the emergence of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as an autonomous and truly nationalistic entity after command and control were wrested back from the departing French Forces. With direct military aid and advisory assistance from the United States, the RVNAF gradually developed into a modern, conventional, tri-service military force. For the first time, Vietnamese officers and NCOs were exposed to new methods of training, a new military doctrine and a new approach to leadership. Some found these innovations too exacting, but most agreed that they worked better and were more consistent with the national objectives.

The challenge posed by dissident religious sects and the Binh Xuyen provided the RVNAF with the first test of military leadership.
Even though some commanders came out of it with high honors, the challenge was localized and deemed not important enough to be a full measure of RVNAF leadership.

As the RVNAF reorganized and consolidated their training base, the selection of officer and NCO candidates became more rigorous, and more emphasis was placed on unit training. The creation of infantry divisions provided a good framework for this type of training and an excellent proving ground to foster military leadership, especially at the battalion level and above.

Military authority, however, was concentrated in the presidency despite the existence of the Joint General Staff. The President exercised this authority either directly or through the Ministry of Defense. Promotions and appointments, especially to key command positions, all came from the palace. As the regime sought to consolidate itself through a monolithic political party, cronyism became the practice of personnel selection, which was based not so much on professional competence as on personal loyalty and political affiliation. Cronyism eventually turned the most trusted but less competent officers of the regime into courtiers who fawned their way up the military hierarchy and created dissension among the RVNAF ranks.

For all its flaws, the Diem administration must be credited with strong national leadership and laudable achievements. It restored national authority, developed the economy, reorganized the armed forces and turned South Vietnam into a nation of world stature in Southeast Asia. To combat communist insurgency activities, which increasingly threatened the nation's survival since 1959, the GVN instituted an antithetic national ideology culminating in the Strategic Hamlet program. Despite criticisms and excesses, this strategic concept was sound enough to provide the foundation for pacification and development in the years ahead.

As an individual, President Diem was widely recognized as a deeply patriotic, highly ethical, honest, and rather austere national leader who abhorred luxury and devoted all of his time and energy to state affairs. The "eminence grise" of the regime, however, was his younger brother, Mr. Nhu. A silent and meditative scholar, Mr. Nhu distinguished
himself by his vast knowledge, sharp intelligence and innovative ideas. He helped President Diem overcome serious challenges and solve thorny problems of national importance. He was consulted on every aspect of government, and no important decision was ever made without his participation. His influence was such that all cabinet ministers sought his guidance before taking action. It was also Mr. Nhu who gave birth to personalism and the Strategic Hamlet program. During indoctrination sessions, he gave lectures to cabinet ministers and high-ranking military and civilian officials on subjects relating to strategy and even tactics. With the death of the Ngo brothers, South Vietnam had lost two prominent leaders whose stature and capabilities had enabled the nation to face its communist foes with self-assurance.

But because of their towering authority, military leadership in the RVNAF had no chance to develop, especially at the higher levels. The military situation also posed no major challenges as the RVNAF devoted all their efforts to reorganization and training. The RVNAF commanders, therefore, did not have good opportunities to assert their leadership qualities and talents.

The period of the National Leadership Committee can be viewed as a period of crisis in leadership. The death of President Diem resulted in such a void in leadership that no one among the victorious generals could take his place. National leadership, therefore, broke down into factions that fought among themselves for ascendancy. The crisis was resolved by instituting collective leadership and a division of power and authority among the generals. But this seemed to satisfy no one, especially the more ambitious. Furthermore, collective leadership weakened the RVNAF command and control, and for some time, confusion reigned throughout the military hierarchy because no military commander was sure to whom he could give orders and from whom he could take orders.

This confusion turned into a serious crisis when some field commanders hid behind the growing power of militant Buddhist leaders to defy central authority. The fact that three successive recalcitrant corps commanders had to be removed testified to the debilitating weakness of collective leadership and the ineffectiveness of military leadership when mixed with politics.
During this period, the RVNAF performed the secondary role of supporting pacification and development, a role that did not lend itself to distinction and prominence. However, because of the lessened combat burden, the RVNAF were able to make good progress in force structure development and training. More emphasis was also placed on leadership training, especially at the small-unit level, and more efforts were expended to further consolidate the training base and improve the selection of personnel. At the same time, however, corruption became an issue of concern and somewhat tainted the reputation of the military. It seemed that in addition to professional competency, a successful RVNAF commander was also required to be honest and incorruptible. Integrity and moral rectitude, therefore, became the foremost traits sought after in military leadership.

The Second Republic was a period of big challenges that thoroughly tested both national and military leadership. The advent of elective democracy removed politics from the RVNAF and strengthened military command and control. Therefore, despite an inflationary economy, social vices, and internal dissent, the period saw the emergence of aggressive and strong military leadership from corps down to small units. This leadership seemed to grow and mature professionally despite great adversity. Throughout the major challenges they had to face, RVNAF commanders successfully carried out increasingly difficult tasks in a most commendable manner.

Despite the RVN-U.S. military success in defeating the enemy's 1968 Tet offensive, an important development occurred which had a far-reaching impact on the conduct of the war. Initiated under the Nixon Doctrine, the Vietnamization program represented an important turn in American foreign policy toward South Vietnam. For unknown reasons, the RVN leadership never took any course of action designed to meet this new challenge, aside from objecting to Vietnamization as a term. The national leadership appeared to adhere to an inflexible, obsolescently orthodox policy and failed to plan for political and diplomatic contingencies that might arise as a result of the new situation. In terms of political wisdom and sagacity, this was a far cry from the period of the First Republic.
Some people may incidentally ask: what would Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu have done had they still been in power and how would they have approached the problem of facing the Communists without Americans? It is a difficult question to answer, but many believed that they would have taken some appropriate action. They remember that during 1963, as Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu realized that Americans were becoming less friendly to the regime and appeared willing to abandon them, Mr. Nhu reportedly contacted the Communists to negotiate a modus vivendi in an attempt to reverse what he saw as an unfavorable situation. Whatever Mr. Nhu did in 1963 still remains a speculation, but it shows that, regardless of the consequences, a national leader must always look ahead of his times, plan for contingencies and meet new challenges in a flexible manner.

The RVNAF leadership, however, proved it had come of age, especially during the 1970 Cambodian incursion, the first major test of Vietnameseization. Strong and dedicated leadership enabled III and IV Corps to achieve great success during the operation and set an example in which the RVNAF could take pride. It was only unfortunate that such excellent leaders as Generals Tri and Thanh had found their promising careers cut short by accidental death. I Corps, however, fared less well during the crossborder operation into lower Laos. The apparent lack of strong leadership deprived this major ARVN command of a chance to prove its full capabilities.

The same lack of strong and effective leadership led to the initial setback of I Corps during the 1972 Easter Offensive. Had I Corps had a better arrangement for command and control, perhaps Quang Tri would not have been lost despite the ferocity of enemy attacks. The example I have provided concerning I Corps during its counteroffensive amply proves that leadership did make a difference. Why else would a corps commander succeed where another had failed if not because of superior leadership? But men like General Truong were rather the exception among ARVN corps commanders. In fact during its entire existence, South Vietnam did not produce very many leaders like him. I believe that if II Corps had been led by someone like General Truong, perhaps
it would not have met with such a tragic fate at the time of its redeployment during the final enemy offensive in 1975.

As a challenge to RVNAF leadership, the 1972 offensive also provided the opportunity for other commanders to prove their talents. An Loc had held against extreme odds partly due to U.S. air support but also because its commander refused to yield to overwhelming pressure. And this inspired his men to fight on despite privations and hardship. Kontum was another example of resourceful and dedicated leadership at the division level. The merit of its successful defender lay in the fact that he was an aggressive commander who knew how to use his resources and trained his subordinates well.

The cease-fire agreement of January 1973 ushered South Vietnam into an unfavorable situation which demanded flexibility and resourcefulness in dealing with an archenemy. But the RVN leadership failed to come to grips with reality and maintained a position which proved untenable as soon as U.S. military aid was cut back. During this period the RVNAF overextended themselves and found it hard to counter intensifying enemy violations effectively without United States support. In spite of their dedication, ARVN commanders felt less self-assured in the absence of U.S. advisers and support. The prevailing mood was one of uncertainty and false hope in the face of mounting enemy buildup.

Internal dissension and growing demands for the elimination of corruption cornered President Thieu into removing some of the better field commanders and replacing them with those of dubious courage and dedication. The choice he made was indeed a hard one and perhaps against his own will. It proved disastrous in mid-March 1975 when a troop redeployment of strategic proportions on which he had relied to save the situation ended in failure because of poor and unreliable leadership. The ensuing collapse of South Vietnam, in the final analysis, was also the accumulated failure of a leadership which did not see for itself all the implications of changing policies and take action in time.

In retrospect, we have to admit that despite this failure, both the national and military leadership of South Vietnam did make serious efforts in the performance of their roles. But these efforts were
impeded not only by the debilitating effect of a protracted war and a divisive society but also by certain external factors beyond their control. To survive, the nation certainly needed unlimited resources and superior leadership. Unfortunately, the ill fate of South Vietnam had wanted that it should have neither.

Of the flaws and vulnerabilities that military leadership in the RVNAF might have demonstrated, the most detrimental were perhaps political-mindedness and corruption. The November coup of 1963 had changed military leadership so completely that the RVNAF were never the same again. Its effect could still be felt even after elective democracy had been institutionalized. Politics had been so ingrained among senior commanders that it was impossible for them to relinquish it and return to military professionalism. The Thieu regime, in fact, feared not so much the enemy from the outside as those who had once been partners and comrade-in-arms. And that explained why, one by one, the politically-ambitious ones had to go, but potential rivalry still persisted.

As to corruption, although it was not directly accountable for the collapse of the nation, its effect certainly debilitated professional competency and by extension, the war effort. The regime eventually accepted corruption as an inevitable vice because, as Vice President Huong had tragically admitted, "we would be left with practically no one to fight the war if all corrupt commanders were to be prosecuted and relieved." This also explained why despite its efforts, the JGS was never able to purge corruption from the RVNAF ranks. Many, therefore, seemed resigned to the idea that between the two evils, the choice had to be the lesser one. Although hard evidence was usually difficult to obtain, the finger seemed to be pointing primarily at the province chiefs who, as a special breed of commanders, enjoyed both military and civilian prerogatives while hardly submitting to the direct control of either.

As a country which was not only underdeveloped but also ravaged by a vicious war and under the constant threat of communist subversion in its own backyard, perhaps South Vietnam needed a special kind of
leadership. Western principles of leadership are tailored to stable, truly democratic societies which usually require of their military leaders little else than professionalism. This presupposes ideological unity and loyalty to the national leadership, which are perhaps taken for granted in Western societies but are the very things that South Vietnam strived hard to achieve without great success. Therefore, steadfast anti-communism and dedication to the national course had always been the primordial criterion in the selection of personnel slated to hold key positions in the RVNAF military hierarchy. In the exercise of leadership, most RVNAF commanders found these guidelines desirable in addition to military professionalism.

What then should be required of military leaders as most desirable traits? Again, the fourteen traits described as most desirable in Western societies and military organizations are perfectly valid, especially when no serious social problems are involved. In the South Vietnamese society where traditions still made up the foundation of social life, such values as moral rectitude and personal conduct were also considered desirable in most leaders. Then, the widespread social vices of corruption and graft also made honesty and incorruptibility equally desirable qualities in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people, much more so in fact than the concept of integrity valued in Western leaders. Finally, a successful leader in the ideological context of the Vietnam war had to be someone who shared the lot of the common people and lived a material life not too far above theirs.

During the decade I served as chairman of the RVNAF Joint General Staff, I had witnessed all the successes and failures of our leadership. Even though this leadership had done its best, it still proved inadequate for this most difficult episode of our nation's history. And this explains to some extent the final failure of South Vietnam. Perhaps the survival of our nation would have required someone like a latter-day Tran Hung Dao or Nguyen Hue. The lack of such outstanding leadership indicates how destructive the long war had been in its heavy toll of young and promising leaders and how ravaging the French repressions against Vietnamese nationalists.
That one generation of leaders had failed does not necessarily mean that the way to success had been irretrievably blocked. Looking ahead into the future, there seems to be less cause for pessimism and despair. According to press reports and refugee accounts, the armed resistance against the new communist regime in South Vietnam is gaining momentum. Although it is a long and uphill struggle, the resistance has earned the respect and admiration of all Vietnamese living in exile. But for this armed struggle to succeed, there is an obvious and urgent need for outside assistance and support in every aspect in addition to the resistance movement's efforts to survive, fight, and expand on its own. Whoever the leaders of that movement may be, they certainly represent a new generation of emergent leadership of unprecedented self-abnegation, sacrifice and devotion. From the lessons learned during the lost war and with support from the outside, this emergent leadership has all the chances to succeed where the old one had failed. In this perspective, perhaps the resistance is not an utopia at all, despite some arguments to the contrary.

I conclude this monograph on a note of hope and with prayers for the reemergence of a free South Vietnam in the not too distant future, a South Vietnam led by men of talent and high morals—the truly great leaders of Vietnamese history.
The long drawn-out insurgency in South Vietnam and the country's troubled recent history as an object of colonial ambitions sometimes leave a foreign observer with the impression that the patriotic spirit on a sense of commitment to the national cause has become greatly attenuated. It is true that national traditions have until recently been neglected in the education of the urban elite in favor of western concepts and that the current encounter with the West has tended to focus attention on the consumer goods and convenience of a modern mass culture, but it would be entirely mistaken to undervalue the sense of nationhood and the national spirit that has imbued the Vietnamese in the course of the nation's history.

It is important for U.S. psyops personnel to show sympathetic understanding and provide assistance where appropriate for the continuing effort of the GVN to foster and fortify among the younger population the kind of patriotic spirit that can be mobilized for national aims. This educational effort is underway in the schools and through the mass media by renewed emphasis on the feats of patriots, poets and national leaders who distinguished themselves in the nation's long struggle for survival and independence. The hardy traits of earlier Vietnamese of whom the nation is justly proud stand out clearly in the two main thrusts of Vietnamese history: the centuries of resistance to powerful and covetous neighbors and the expansion southward to the Gulf of Siam, conquering and colonizing en route the kingdoms of the Champa and Khmer.

A striking manifestation of this indomitable national spirit was the complete defeat in the 13th century of the Golden Horde which had reined unchecked through Europe and Asia and had put much of the known world under the heels of the Mongol Emperor.

Twice in a single generation, in 1285 and in 1288, the Mongol forces commanded by That Hoan, King of Yunnan, son of Kublai Khan,
were decisively beaten by the outnumbered Vietnamese army under Prince Tran Hung Dao, the uncle of the Tran Emperor Nhan Tong. Tran Hung Dao inspired the will to resist the invaders at the national congress called by Emperor Nhan Tong at the palace of Dien Hong to debate submission or resistance to the terrible horsemen from the North. "If your Majesty desires to surrender," he told Nhan Tong, "you will have to cut off my head first!" And to his officers he launched the Proclamation, excerpted below in free translation, which is one of the masterpieces of Vietnamese literature. The violent tone of the appeal combining calculated slurs on the reputation of his soldiers with a heady vision of victory, stirred the army into unprecedented action. His officers and men tattooed "Sat That" (Death to the Mongols) on their forearms and in a series of brilliant victories stopped the Mongol Army of half a million men in their tracks and expelled them from the country. The fate of the Khan's forces was sealed in 1288 at the river battle of Bach Dang in Kien An Province. In commemoration of this victory, the Vietnamese Navy has chosen Tran Hung Dao as their special patron, but his exploits speak to the hearts of all Vietnamese and temples are dedicated to his cult in Saigon (Hien Vuong street) and elsewhere throughout the country.

Tran Hung Dao Day is celebrated every year on the 20th day of the 8th Lunar Month, which in 1967 falls on September 23rd.

Psyops personnel will find it useful in their contacts with Vietnamese counterparts to be informed on Tran Hung Dao and show the respect due the nation-building feats of this medieval hero. Future papers in this series will be devoted to Le Loi, Le Van Duyet and the organizers of the intellectuals' revolt against European colonialism around the turn of the century.
"I have often read the history of our ancient heroes who sacrificed their lives to save their country. Had they been of faint heart and passed from the world under their own windows, their names never would have been inscribed on the rolls of silk to live eternally among us.

But you, the descendants of warriors, are little versed in the history of letters and might not entirely believe the feats of the past. Let me tell you therefore of more recent events:

We have seen the light of day in a time of troubles and have grown to manhood while the country has been in danger. We see the envoys of our enemies prudishly traveling our roads, jabbering in their tongue of owls to insult the Court; contemptible as dogs, they dare heap scorn on our dignitaries. Inflated with the power of the Mongol Sovereign and the support of his son, the King of Yunnan, they incessantly demand our tribute in gold and silver, in silks and precious pearls. Our treasury is limited, but their greed infinite. To appease it is like throwing meat to a famished tiger; it merely postpones the mortal peril.

Smitten by this calamity of our country I eat not in the daytime, nor can I sleep at night; my tears inundate my cheeks and my heart bleeds as if it were cut into pieces. I tremble with rage not yet to devour the enemy, to repose on his skin, to taste his blood. If it were necessary for this end that my corpse be burned a hundred times on the battlefield or a thousand times sewn into horsehide, happily would I consent and without regrets.

You have served for long in the army under my orders. When you lacked clothing I dressed you, when you needed rice I fed you, when your grades were low I promoted you, when your pay did not suffice I gave you silver. When you traveled on water I furnished you boats, on land I gave you horses. In war we shared the dangers, at great feasts our laughter mingled together. None of the ancient generals had more affection and solicitude for their officers than I have for you.
But what of you? You rest at ease while your sovereign is humiliated, indifferent while your country is disgraced. You, officers, serve the foreign barbarians and feel no sense of shame. You listen to the ceremonial music offered their ambassadors and do not burst of rage! No indeed; you amuse yourselves in cockfights, in the gambling tents, you enjoy your gardens and ricefields and the affection of your wives and children. The comfort of your possessions has permitted you to forget your duties to the State; the distractions of the fields and the hunt have made you neglect your military training, and some of you have been seduced by the pleasures of alcohol and the soft music of entertainers.

But will the spur of your cocks pierce the enemy's armor, or your tricks at cards serve to repel him? Will the yield of your gardens and fields suffice to pay your ransom or the affection of your wives and children save you from the enemy army? Your wealth is not enough to buy the enemy's will, nor can he be subdued by your wine and music.

Thus we all, you and me, will be made prisoners. Shame on our heads. And it will not only be my fief that I will lose, but your commissions that will pass into the hands of others. Not only my family that will be hunted down, but your wives and children reduced to slavery, not only the tombs of my ancestors trampled underfoot by the invader, but those of yours that will be desecrated. I will be humiliated in this existence and in a hundred others to come, my name will be sullied forever, but so will it be for yours and the honor of your families will be stained always by the shame of your defeat. Tell me, can you be happy with this in mind, even if you crave happiness?

In truth I tell you: take heed, as you would in stacking wood near the hearth, or in sipping a scalding goblet! Make of your soldiers experts in handling the bow and arrow as the ancient heroes, so that the head of Kublai Khan may be impaled before the gates of the Imperial Palace and the corpse of the King of Yunnan salted in a pannier of straw. Thus not only my fief will be consolidated forevermore, but your appointments assured in eternity; not only my family will enjoy the fruits of peace, but you will grow old surrounded by the warmth of your wives and children; not my ancestors alone will be honored through ten thousand generations; but yours will receive the ordained rites every spring and autumn; not only will I realize my purpose in this existence, but your reputation will survive a hundred centuries; not only will my name live in the memory of men, but yours, also, will pass into history. Can you wish more for perfect happiness?

I have consulted all the tracts on the arts of war to write the "Elements of Strategy". If you make an effort to study them and to follow my teachings, you will be my faithful companions. But if you neglect them and scorn what I have to say, you will become my enemies.

Why? Because the Mongols are our mortal foes. We cannot live with them under the same sky! Not to dream of cleansing the shame they
inflict upon us, not to nourish in our hearts the resolution to destroy them, not to drill our soldiers to vanquish them, is to surrender. If this be your intention, you would leave behind you a name soiled for ten thousand generations, and once the enemy has been defeated, how can you ever carry your head high between heaven and earth?

The purpose of this proclamation is to share with you my innermost thoughts."
SMALL UNIT COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
1966
COUNTRY - HONOR - DUTY

THE RVNAF SOLDIER'S FIVE MORAL CODES

1. I am determined to sacrifice myself for the Country, Honor and Duty

2. I am resolved to defend the law and observe military discipline

3. I sincerely respect the old, love children, and behave correctly towards women; maintain a friendly attitude toward the people, help them, and defend them

4. I am resolved not to debauch myself through drinking, gambling, love affairs, and opium-smoking

5. I will absolutely preserve military secrecy; safeguard military equipment; and behave properly towards prisoners.

COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP DEPEND UPON:

LEADERS
THOSE WHO ARE LED
CIRCUMSTANCES
The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff has distributed this "SMALL UNIT COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK" with the purpose of reminding You of the essentials for improving the art of COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP.

COMMAND and LEADERSHIP, the responsibilities of the CADRE, must be continuously practiced, everywhere, in every circumstance, in every field. In fact, all daily tasks need your abilities for Reasonable and Timely Solutions. The cadre commanding low-level units are the Backbone of the Armed Forces. Each of your authoritative gestures and clear-sighted decisions reflects the Maturity of the cadre, instills Confidence in your subordinates, and certainly brings Success to your unit.

For the objectives mentioned above, the Joint General Staff hopes that this handbook will be always a loyal friend to help You accomplish the Noble and Difficult but Glorious Mission of the Leader on the path of service to the Armed Forces and the Country.
Introduction

Small Unit Commanders,

COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP is an art. This art materializes through the admiration shown by subordinates, when they are skillfully led, towards their leader. It is also the integration of self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s subordinates, planning, clear-sighted action and determination on the part of the Commander.

Each leader is a representative of law and authority. He receives from higher authorities a mission on behalf of his comrades-in-arms under his command and combines his effort with those of his comrades-in-arms in conducting the fight to accomplish this mission under any circumstance and at any place. With this difficult and delicate responsibility, you must exert every effort to win the respect and loyalty of your subordinates, be the motivating force which pushes them to obey your orders to the letter, voluntarily accept responsibility, and carry out the mission until completion, regardless of hardship and danger. Loyalty and Admiration only manifest in your subordinates when they feel proud of and have full confidence in your leadership on the battlefront as well as in the rear area.

Through your attitude, speech, and action—since the day you assumed command of your unit, your subordinates may have been aware of your command capabilities. In time, higher authorities will evaluate your talent and capabilities through the achievement attained by your unit, your care for your subordinates, and their actions and behavior. Therefore, each one of your decisions must be made after careful consideration as a result of your thorough knowledge of the mission and your subordinates. When taking up an action, you must be determined and confident. A leader can decide and act in this way only when he has complete self-control. Self-control of the body will result in an authoritative bearing; Self-control of the mind will result in sound judgement; Self-control of emotion will result in self-confidence, courage, justice and kindness.
Small Unit Commanders,

During more than twenty years of continuous fighting against aggression, with the indomitable tradition of our race, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have gradually reached maturity in war. The cadre, more than anyone else, must prove to be worthy of the duty assigned him, serve enthusiastically with the understanding that "The unit fights effectively only under skillful leadership" in order to achieve the early accomplishment of our mission: exterminate the Communists and save the country.

I wish all of you success.

Lieutenant General Cao Van Vien
Chief of Joint General Staff, RVNAF
Signed and Sealed
ARE YOU WORTHY TO LEAD YOUR MEN?

Reflect upon these points to:

A. KNOW YOURSELF

1. About Your Personality and Attitude

   Ask yourself these questions:

   a. Your outward appearance:

   - Are your head, neck, ears and haircut neat and clean?
   - Are your manners of walking, standing, and sitting imposing?

   b. Your uniform:

   - Are your clothes well pressed?
   - Are your shoes and belt buckle well polished?

   c. Your way of living:

   - Do you lead a dissolute life?

   d. Your manner of speaking:

   - Do you use coarse and curt language?

   e. Your behavior:

   - Are you sincere and understanding?
   - Are you too hot-tempered?
   - Are you too severe?
   - Are you too weak-willed?
   - Have you carefully weighed and pondered over the facts?
   - Do you depreciate other people?

2. About your required qualities:

   a. Do you have **endurance** to bear hardship along with your men in all circumstances?

   b. Are you **fair** in dispensing rewards and punishments?

   c. Are you **determined** when making a decision and then do you carry it out resolutely?

   d. Are you **courageous enough**:

   - To lead an assault when meeting with danger?
   - To accept legitimate reprimands?
e. Are you confident to carry out orders from higher authorities as well as to assign jobs to your subordinates?

f. Do you always seek to improve your learning and military career?

g. Do you have forethought to prepare plans in advance for next tasks?

h. Will you assume responsibility?
   - To carry out the mission faithfully and seriously?
   - To seek and accept other secondary tasks?

B. KNOW YOUR MEN

In what areas and why?

1. Their persons: rank; full name; service number; military occupational specialty; conduct; health; so that you may correctly address your men and use the proper man in the proper place

2. Their family situation and problems, in order to do all you can to help your men solve them

3. Their experience, in order to use them according to their capabilities

4. Their thoughts, in order to use your own ideas to guide them

5. Their knowledge about:
   a. Politics, secrecy preservation, and countersubversive measures,
   b. Duties towards themselves and towards their families
   c. Duties towards their comrades-in-arms; their superiors; their unit; and the country
   d. Punishment for breaches of military conduct and discipline

C. EDUCATE AND ENCOURAGE YOUR MEN

1. You must seek to know all that happens around them every day in order to be able to educate, encourage, and comfort them at any place and at any time
2. You educate them so that:
   a. They may thoroughly understand the national policies
   b. They may have an esprit-de-corps
   c. They may be vigilant against colonialists' and Communists' schemes
   d. They may be fully aware of their responsibilities
   e. They may hold honor in high esteem
   f. They may improve their knowledge
   g. They may perfect their qualities

3. You should always remember that punishment is the last measure to be resorted to. The first measure to reform your men is through education, and the most effective way of educating your men is that you must set good examples.

4. You encourage your men by:
   a. Extolling them before their comrades-in-arms
   b. Praising them
   c. Rewarding them
   d. Urging them

   In fact, encouragement is not limited to any fixed form, but a glance of the eyes, a smile, a friendly gesture of a commander is effective enough to push men under his command to advance with honor.

HOW DO YOU WIN YOUR SUBORDINATES' LOYALTY AND ADMIRATION?

Remember:

A. YOUR SUBORDINATES RESPECT AND ADMIRE YOU:

1. Not because of:
   a. Your leniency, your indulgence
   b. Your partiality
   c. Your tolerance with mistakes
   d. Your leniency towards disobedient persons
2. But because of:
   a. Your knowledge of yourself and your subordinates
   b. Your forethought in working
   c. Your fairness and impartiality
   d. Your sincerity and open-mindedness
   e. Your constant consideration for them
   f. Your care for them

B. HOW MUST YOU CARE FOR THEM?

Look into these areas and ask:

1. Clothing: Do their clothes fit, are they adequate?
2. Weapons: Are their weapons in good condition and properly maintained?
3. Food: Is their food substantial and adequate? Are they on reduced rations?
4. Quarters: Are their quarters hygienic?
5. Pay and allowances: Are they paid regularly on time? Do they receive their additional allowances quickly?
6. Leaves: Are leaves granted at the proper time and equally to all personnel in the unit?
7. Work: Are their assignments beyond their ability? Are they over-tired?
9. Mail: Is mail delivered rapidly and adequately?
10. Rewards: Are their labors and services noted, and are they rewarded appropriately and within the proper length of time?
11. Welfare: Are their families well settled? Have their medical examination cards and commissary (PX) cards been issued yet? Can they easily purchase adequate commissary commodities to meet their needs? Are there schools for their children? Do they receive assistance and is their
grief or joy shared when they meet with misfortune, have
funerals, weddings, births, etc.

C. ONCE THEY ARE LOYAL AND RESPECT YOU THEY WILL OBEY YOUR ORDERS
IMMEDIATELY, VOLUNTEER TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES, AND DO THEIR
JOBS WELL UNTIL COMPLETION.

WHAT SHOULD YOU DO WHEN YOU ARE NEWLY ASSIGNED TO A UNIT?

Whether or not you are successful in commanding your unit, or in
other words, whether you can win the loyalty and respect of your men or
not depends primarily on the first impression you make on them.

So, what should you do?

A. WHEN YOU FIRST ASSUME COMMAND

1. You should pay attention to your manner and bearing, which
   will be reflected by:

   a. Your head, neck, crew-cut hair etc., being trim and neat
   b. Your neat, clean and well-creased uniform
   c. Your polished shoes and shining belt buckle
   d. Your erect posture, your face looking straight forward
      without glancing sideward
   e. Your correct, firm and unaffected way of saluting
   f. Your seriousness, calmness and self-confidence

2. Speak loudly, slowly, clearly and as little as you can:
   Your subordinates will look at you and judge you at this
   very time

B. AFTER ASSUMING YOUR COMMAND

1. You should receive your subordinates according to the order
   of their rank and function. What is the objective of this
   reception?

   a. To learn something about the individual himself. The
      Personnel Roster (QD830) and your notebook will provide
      you with all details (biographical data, family status,
      clothing, etc.)

   b. To learn your men's ideas of what is needed to improve
      the potential of the unit

   c. To know the performance of the unit, its victories as
      well as defeats

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To familiarize yourself with daily activities of the unit
To ensure settlement of pay, posting and delivery of mail

2. You should visit and inspect various facilities: quarters, mess-hall, latrines, dispensary, arms room, ammo pit, barber shop, recreational facilities, common equipment (weapons, clothing, signal equipment), dependents' housing, defense and security system (sentry-box, gun emplacements, etc.)

3. You should draw up a plan for improving the unit's way of life, based on facilities available

4. Then prescribe a daily activities schedule for the unit to include: sleeping, getting up, meals, roll call, order of the day, training, studying, equipment maintenance, recreation, physical training

5. You should exercise control and supervision to have the activity schedule respected and correctly implemented

WHAT MUST YOU DO TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION?

A. PREPARATIONS

You should:

1. Carefully study the Operations Order, the Intelligence Annex and the maps

2. Issue orders to unit commanders to make preparations

3. Distribute a summarized report on the enemy situation and capabilities to your subordinates

4. Re-check all counter-intelligence measures to see whether they are effective or not

5. Issue accurate, concise, and clear orders

6. Check personnel and equipment:
   - Make a roll call, record names in the Personnel Roster (Form QD830) and carry it along
   - Carry along the Loss Report (Form QD831)
   - Clothing, weapons and ammunition of each individual and the unit must be carried along
   - Signal facilities (radio sets, batteries, etc.)
e. Rations and cooking utensils must be carried along
f. Bandages and medicines must be made available to
   individuals as well as to the first-aid station
g. Insure that dog tags are worn

B. MOVEMENT TO THE BATTLEFIELD

It must be made:

1. Secretly
2. Quietly
3. Orderly
4. In a disciplined manner

"TROOPS MUST MOVE OUT TO THE BATTLEFIELD LIKE
A CRAWLING SNAKE"

C. ON THE BATTLEFIELD

1. Always maintain the proper formation (advance guard, flank
guard, and rear guard) to avoid being attacked by surprise

2. Coordinate firepower with troop movement

3. Make spot reports on enemy activities or activities
   relating to the enemy

4. Process captured prisoners of war immediately to collect
   tactical information on the spot

5. Attack forcefully and swiftly, and liquidate the objective
   as soon as possible before nightfall

"TROOPS MUST MOVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD LIKE LIGHTNING
AND THUNDER"

DO YOU KNOW YOUR AUTHORITY?

A. WHAT IS AUTHORITY?

Authority is a means provided you by the government and the
Armed Forces to enable you to accomplish the mission.

B. HOW TO USE IT?

1. You must use it impartially, justly, logically, timely,
   and resolutely
2. You should use it only when all other means such as education and training are no longer effective.

3. Remember that punishment is used to warn others, not only to chastise an offender.

C. YOUR AUTHORITY IN ENFORCING MILITARY DISCIPLINE

How much punishment you can mete out to your men depends on:

1. Your rank
2. Your function
3. The type of violation committed

Study the following Tables 1, 2, and 3 carefully to ensure that you use your authority properly.

D. REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUNISHMENT

In addition to your authority, there are a few regulations you should know to ensure that the punishment is correctly implemented.

1. Concerning those undergoing punishment:
   a. Military personnel punished while the unit is in operation, will undergo their punishment when the operation is terminated.
   b. Military personnel under treatment at a hospital will undergo their punishment upon their return to their unit.
   c. Enlisted men undergoing punishment who must do fatigue-duty will do so in the day-time during and after working hours.
   d. Because of service requirements, officers and NCO's to be punished may be required to do daily work during working hours and undergo their punishment at the Disciplinary Barracks after working hours and at night.

2. If a command authority inflicts a maximum punishment less than the number of days prescribed, the punishment record will be referred to higher authorities for further determination.

3. With regard to breaches of military custom (long haircut, untidy uniform, failure to maintain clothing and equipment, dirty and rusty weapons, etc.) the offender's immediate superior (from squad leader up) will receive a punishment similar to that of the principal offender.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY RECOMMENDING PUNISHMENT (a)</th>
<th>MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT (b) APPLICABLE TO</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers 2</td>
<td>NCO's 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>2 days of confinement to barracks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal 1st Class</td>
<td>2 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>4 days of confinement to barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>2 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>6 days of confinement to barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant 1st Class</td>
<td>4 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
<td>4 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>6 days of confinement to barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>6 days of confinement to barracks</td>
<td>2 days of confinement to room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirant</td>
<td>8 days of confinement to barracks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>6 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>4 days of confinement to room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>8 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>10 days of confinement to barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>4 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>8 days of administrative restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With regard to military personnel of lower ranks who are not his subordinates</td>
<td>6 days of confinement to room</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captain</strong></td>
<td>6 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>10 days of administrative restriction</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to sub-</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ordinate military</td>
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<tr>
<td>personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Field grade officers,</strong></td>
<td>6 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>10 days of administrative restriction</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to non-sub-</td>
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<tr>
<td>ordinate military</td>
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<tr>
<td>personnel of lower ranks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>10 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>12 days of administrative restriction</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to sub-</td>
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<tr>
<td>ordinate military</td>
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<tr>
<td>personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>15 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>15 days of administrative restriction</td>
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<tr>
<td>With regard to sub-</td>
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<td>ordinate military</td>
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<td>personnel</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Administrative Restriction</th>
<th>Close Confinement</th>
<th>Stockade (days)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>25 days</td>
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<td>General Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>25 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>(f)</td>
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<td>25 days</td>
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<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>(g)</td>
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<td>30 days</td>
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<td>15 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>(h)</td>
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<td>40 days</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>50 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>50 days of close confinement</td>
<td>50 days stockade</td>
<td>(1) Of which there may be 16 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With regard to subordinate military personnel</td>
<td>50 days of close confinement</td>
<td>50 days of close confinement</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2 — PUNISHMENT AUTHORITY ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY RECOMMENDING PUNISHMENT (a)</th>
<th>MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT (b) APPLICABLE TO</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers 2</td>
<td>NCO's 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company grade officers assuming the function of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial group commander (c)</td>
<td>10 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>15 days of administrative restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector commander</td>
<td>8 days of close confinement</td>
<td>10 days of close confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military school or training center commandant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field grade officers assuming the function of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop unit commander (c)</td>
<td>20 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>20 days of administrative restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector commander</td>
<td>15 days of close confinement</td>
<td>15 days of close confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison commander</td>
<td>25 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>20 days of close confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military school or training center commandant</td>
<td>20 days of close confinement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander of brigade,division,special sector or DTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CALC commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service branch commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of central or service department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force, Navy commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign commander</td>
<td>30 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>30 days of close confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps commander</td>
<td>30 days of close confinement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Authorities who recommend punishments must apply the authority to punish according to rank as specified in Table 1 and not according to functions as specified in Table 2.

(b) In case there are two or three different types of punishment which may be alternatively applicable the authority who recommends punishment may choose only one of them for application.

(c) Term commonly used to designate any commander of a separate administrative organization or unit, (regimental commander, group commander, etc.)

(d) Of which there may be 3 days of solitary confinement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTZ commander</td>
<td>15 days of confinement under guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Of which there may be 5 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat arm commander</td>
<td>35 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>35 days of close confinement</td>
<td>35 days of close confinement</td>
<td>(f) Of which there may be 6 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, JGS, RVNAF</td>
<td>35 days of close confinement</td>
<td>35 days of close confinement</td>
<td>35 days stockade confinement</td>
<td>(g) Of which there may be 10 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF</td>
<td>50 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>50 days of close confinement</td>
<td>50 days stockade confinement</td>
<td>(h) Of which there may be 11 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>60 days of administrative restriction</td>
<td>60 days of close confinement</td>
<td>60 days of stockade confinement</td>
<td>(i) Of which there may be 16 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 days of close confinement</td>
<td>60 days of close confinement</td>
<td>60 days of stockade confinement</td>
<td>(j) Of which there may be 20 days of solitary confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of offenses and circumstances under which offenses are committed</td>
<td>EM reduction</td>
<td>Pay reduction</td>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Disciplinary Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BREACHES MILITARY CONDUCT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Failure to salute superiors</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Impoliteness toward superiors</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Impoliteness toward superiors in public</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Untidy uniform</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Long haircut</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Illegal fishing or hunting</td>
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<td>30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Assault</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Assault and battery</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Resisting police</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Assaulting police</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<td>11. Collective assault of police</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Seduction of a minor</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Adultery</td>
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<td>30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Rape</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Vagrancy, robbery</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Causing an accident while driving</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Fraud, breach of trust</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Gambling</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Misuse of clothing of other service branches</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Misuse of authority for private gains</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Embezzling POL and military equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Abandonment of family</td>
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<td>15 days</td>
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<td>15 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Fraudulent impersonation</td>
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<td>24. Traffic violation</td>
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**R. VIOLATION OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE**

<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Disregarding chain of command</td>
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<td>20 days</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Disregarding chain of command and addressing to the Chief of State or the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Showing disrespect toward and assaulting superiors</td>
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<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>4. Beating or assaulting inferiors</td>
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<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Repeat of above offense or causing serious injury</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Using EM for personal benefit</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7. Unlawful keeping of weapons</td>
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<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30 days</td>
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<td>8. False declaration of family status:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Self confessed</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Discovered</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Embezzlement of public funds</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Misappropriation of EM mess funds</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Falsifying diploma or certificate</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>12. Absent without leave:</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. First offense</td>
<td>one day</td>
<td>as in</td>
<td>as in</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Recurrence one within a one-year period</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>column</td>
<td>column</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Three periods of absence within a 2-year period</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; 3 &quot;</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Reporting late to new unit without a legitimate reason</td>
<td>One day</td>
<td>as in</td>
<td>as in</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>14. Neglect of duty</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Failure to carry out commander's orders</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Dodging combat operation</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Failure to obey orders during combat operations</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>18. Failure to maintain military clothing and equipment</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Acting as fifth columnist for the enemy (b)</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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</table>

(a) Not applicable to officers
(b) To be handed to national police for proper security measures.
<table>
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<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Failure to report a comrade whom he knows is working for the enemy</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Failure to report to higher authorities when being proselytized by the enemy</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Having a previous record of activities for the enemy (No proof of contact)</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>50 days</td>
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</table>
WHAT SIGNS INDICATE THAT YOUR UNIT IS WELL LED?

Your unit is well led when

A. YOU AND ALL YOUR MEN:

1. Are courteous, cheerful, neat, clean and well dressed
2. Are thoroughly familiar with the rules of individual and team combat
3. Have initiative, pride, a spirit of individual and team competition
4. Work enthusiastically as a team

B. WEAPONS, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT:

1. Are in good condition
2. Are carefully and properly maintained

C. BARRACKS:

1. Are in good order
2. Are clean
3. Are artistically decorated

D. RECORDS OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE UNIT:

1. Are kept up-to-date
2. Are timely prepared
3. Are accurate

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Nr. 4158