ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION IN I CTZ

US

REGIONAL (CORPS) LEVEL

JOINT COORDINATING COUNCIL

North Central Region (GVN)
MACV Advisory Group
I Corps (ARVN)
NSA Danang
CONSUL
JUSPAO
III MAF
USAID

GVN REGIONAL DELEGATE
CG I CORPS ARVN

GVN

PROVINCE (SECTOR) LEVEL

PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

MACV Advisory Group
Province Chief
District Chiefs
JUSPAO
USAID

REGIONAL FORCES
REV. DEVEL. CADRE
PROV. CHIEF
ARVN DIV

USAD

MAR DIV

SECT ADV GRP

SUB SECT ADV GRP

MAR REGT

DISTRICT (SUB-SECTOR) LEVEL

DISTRICT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

MACV Advisory Group
Village Chiefs
District Chief

REV. DEVEL. CADRE
DISTRICT CHIEF
ARVN DIV

REGIONAL FORCES
PAT L. POLICE

MARINE BATTALIONS AND COMPANIES

VILLAGE/HAMLET LEVEL

DIRECT LIAISON

GVN and Local Officials
III MAF Reps
ARVN Reps

COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES OF
BOTH USMC AND POPULAR FORCES

Military
Civilian and Paramilitary
Throughout the month of August, III MAF continued to advance in fulfilling its three main overall objectives; destruction of enemy forces, civil affairs operations, and base defense. Provisions were made to provide substantial security for these areas designated as voting places for the National Elections to be held in September. There was an indication that the Viet Cong would take every opportunity available to exploit and harass the Vietnamese people in an attempt to prevent a large turnout of voters on election day. Intelligence sources revealed by the end of the month that the VC had initiated an all-out propaganda and extortion campaign to prevent success in the election. Viet Cong activity had taken the form of organized meetings and classes to inform cadre members of the procedures to be used in disrupting, propagandizing, and terrorizing the villages and hamlets within I Corps. The VC also carried out overt acts against lines of communication leading to voting locations and increased their terrorist activities. In Quang Nam Province fourteen persons were executed by the VC in what appeared to be reprisals against the people for supporting Marine Corps operations within the area. Along the coastal lowlands in Quang Ngai Province, the VC burned several refugee camps which left over 900 people homeless. In an attempt to gain information about military operations, the VC were disguising themselves as monks, vendors, and other civilians and using women and children in their information-gathering effort.(11)

As a means of countering the increased VC activity during August, III MAF increased its small unit operations throughout the ICTZ. By the end of the month, 10,655 patrols and ambushes had saturated the countryside and had achieved considerable success in destroying the enemy. The estimated kill ratio for small unit operations in I Corps during August was put at five enemy killed for every Marine killed. Other techniques used by III MAF in blocking VC activity during the month were concentrated PsyWar efforts and COUNTY FAIR operations. Every opportunity was taken by the PsyWar personnel to exploit incidents of VC harassment and terrorism against the Vietnamese civilians. The target audience of the PsyWar effort was restricted to the immediate area where the VC incident had taken place so as not to amplify the incident among the villages, thereby minimizing the effect desired by the Viet Cong.

In the COUNTY FAIR operations a new technique was employed by the use of Hoi Chanhs (ralliers) in pointing out and identifying VC cadre. This had been the first time that the Hoi Chanhs had been used extensively for such purposes and the results were excellent. During the screening portion of the COUNTY FAIR operations the Hoi Chanhs were able to select both Viet Cong guerrillas and agents from groups of Vietnamese people collected at different screening locations. The favorable comments from unit commanders concerning the value of the Hoi Chanhs while conducting screening operations encouraged III MAF to incorporate
their use in future COUNTY FAIR operations. Although Viet Cong initiated incidents showed an increase during August over the past month of July, 266 as compared to 256, III MAF was able to counter these incidents in such a way that progress continued to be made in pacification.(12)

During August, the I Corps JCC made considerable progress in extending its influence throughout the ICTZ. At the first meeting on 2 August, Mr. Mark Gordon, Regional Director for USAID, had made such a suggestion that the JCC not concentrate solely on providing services for the secure areas within the Marine TAORs or the major cities within I Corps. He pointed out that the JCC as an overseeing body for pacification could better perform its functions by considering all projects in the context of the whole ICTZ. Mr. Gordon argued that there was a need for a closer integration of the many different types of GVN cadre into the normal functioning of the growing local governments. While the initial pacification efforts by the GVN were the responsibility of the Revolutionary Development Cadre, there was a need for other services to be provided such as agriculture, public works, and social welfare. In an effort to provide the various governmental services which would be needed long after the RD tasks were to be completed, all concerned agencies in pacification should aid in the development of cadre programs to fulfill the future services required.

Members of the council agreed with Mr. Gordon's concept and indicated that future endeavors of the council would be expanded in order that a greater influence could be exerted for the accomplishment of new programs. The first move in this direction was made by General Robertshaw who suggested that one regular monthly meeting of the I Corps JCC be held at a province capital city, where representatives of the Province Team and GVN Province Officials could talk with the Council. Although the I Corps JCC had top-level representation from all agencies involved in pacification, both from the U. S. and GVN, it was felt that by travelling to the provinces each month, the council could better learn of the problems being faced by those people who were carrying on pacification programs at the grass-roots level. It would also provide an avenue for extending the council's influence throughout the ICTZ and hopefully generate an even greater dedication and commitment to the pacification effort by those who were charged with the responsibility of carrying forth the programs in the villages and hamlets.

Since the council was in agreement with General Robertshaw's suggestion, the I Corps JCC convened one of its monthly meetings, that of 23 August, at the Provincial Headquarters in Quang Tri Province. At this meeting Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Am, the Province Chief, invited General Robertshaw to address the group. General Robertshaw told the assemblage that the I Corps JCC was glad to have the opportunity to meet with them and was anxious to learn about their problems and provide help in any way possible. He pointed out that the council planned to work with
the province representatives throughout I Corps in solving their problems and that the council planned to visit each of the five provinces, one each month, on a continuing basis. General Robertshaw assured those present that problems presented in meetings, such as the one being held, would receive careful consideration by the council. After the meeting was over, members of the council agreed that it had been successful and that a significant achievement had been made in extending the influence of the I Corps JCC throughout the ICTZ.(13)

Another milestone was reached by the JCC when on 30 August 1966 it celebrated its first anniversary of operation. At the meeting held that day, the council passed by unanimous vote a revised statement of its mission, composition, and functions which was to supersede any such previous statements.* Although the statement pointed out that the council in no way was a substitute for existing organizations and agencies carrying on pacification in I Corps and that it had no directive-making authority or funds to support programs, the composition of the membership of the council allowed for it to be a powerful and effective instrument for furthering pacification in I Corps. As Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Evans, Jr., the council's recorder recalled, it had "no directive power nor funds," but "its members were able to exert influence in the right places at the right times which made it one of the most effective groups concerned with pacification in Vietnam."**

The committees working under the direction of the I Corps JCC were able to report favorable progress being made in all areas of pacification within the ICTZ. Major construction was being carried on to repair bridges and roads which would improve supply lines to outlying areas and allow for an increased flow of goods and services to these areas. It was important to keep the lines of transportation open, not only for expediting distribution of commodities to the villages and hamlets but also for facilitating movement of the Vietnamese people to and from their market areas. The destruction of roads and bridges by the VC, in an effort to cut off and isolate the people from civil affairs programs was being combated by III MAF and other agencies operating in I Corps. It was a daily occurrence for Marine minesweeping teams to patrol over the major supply routes in an attempt to discover VC mines that had been planted during the night. Engineers from different Marine units throughout the ICTZ provided valuable assistance in bridge repair and road maintenance. With coordination and professional expertise, the Road Committee was able to function in such a way that an increased level of supplies was able to reach the Vietnamese people during the month.

* A copy of the new guidelines governing the I Corps JCC was reproduced from its Minutes, and is found on the following pages.
** Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Evans, Jr., USMC, was the recorder for the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council in South Vietnam during 1966.
1. ORIGIN. The concept of this council was formulated jointly by Lieutenant General L. W. Walt, USMC, Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force, and Mr. M. J. Gordon, Regional Director, U. S. Agency for International Development. The first meeting was held on 30 August 1965. The official name of the council, "I Corps Joint Coordinating Council", was adopted by the Council on 6 September, 1965. The Council unanimously adopted a proposal to install as Chairman, the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing, and to install as Deputy Chairman the Chief of Staff of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, during the Council meeting of 15 November 1965. The Chairman represented Lieutenant General Walt in the capacity of Senior Advisor, I Corps.

2. MISSION OF THE COUNCIL. The mission of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council is:

   a. To be familiar with the Government of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development Program in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region.

   b. To determine requirements for cooperation and support between agencies and to recommend methods or procedures to meet such requirements.

   c. To facilitate the coordination of Revolutionary Development in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region by minimizing duplication of effort and mutual interference between agencies engaged in or supporting the overall effort.

   d. To serve as a forum for the exchange of information and suggestions between all agencies engaged in or supporting the overall effort in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region.

3. COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP. The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council is composed of representatives of the following:

   b. I Corps Advisory Group, MACV.
   c. III Marine Amphibious Force.
   d. U. S. Agency for International Development, 1st Region.
   e. Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office, 1st Region.
   f. U. S. Embassy (POLAD).
g. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang.

h. MACV, Combined Studies Division.

4. MISSION OF COMMITTEES. Each Committee, within its assigned field or area of functional interest, will:

a. Become familiar with the Government of Vietnam's plan for their functional field in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region.

b. Monitor the development of the Government of Vietnam and United States plans pertaining to their functional field and execution of same.

c. Determine problem areas in their functional field.

d. Determine the capability of Government of Vietnam and United States agencies to provide assistance.

e. Promote liaison between Government of Vietnam and United States agencies engaged in their functional field.

f. Keep the Council advised of problems and the overall progress within their functional fields.

g. Prepare and present to the Council at regular or special meetings, recommended lines of action to improve the coordination of United States/Government of Vietnam activity within their functional field.

5. COMMITTEES. Currently the Council has authorized the formation of committees in the following functional areas of interest:


b. Psychological Warfare.

c. Education.

d. Commodities Distribution.

e. Port of Da Nang.

f. Roads.

6. FUNCTIONS. The Council and its committees are not substitutes for the formal organizations now existing in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region. They have no directive authority and no funds. They are strictly a means of coordinating existing plans and programs, and lending support and assistance to the creation or approval of additional programs or projects in order to promote and expedite Government of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development program in the I Corps Tactical Zone/1st Region. The Council can be of material assistance by keeping key personnel apprised of developments in the overall program, by eliminating mutual interference between programs or agencies, by minimizing duplication of effort, and by promoting efficiency and economy of effort.
The Public Health Committee was able to report that public health and medical treatments to the Vietnamese people continued to progress at a desired level. An outbreak of plague in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces had been checked through mass immunization. In Quang Ngai alone, over 3,300 cholera inoculations had been given in one week. With an adequate supply of vaccine on hand, it was felt that incidents of the plague would continue to subside and that health workers would be able to prevent excessive cases of the plague from developing in the future. The need for an increased number of rural health workers was of constant concern to the Public Health Committee during August. They made many recommendations to the I Corps JCC in an effort to alleviate the problem. Increased facilities and personnel for training rural health workers was one of the major problems to be dealt with, along with increased pay for those health workers already in the field. More health workers were trained during the month, as the Quang Tin rural health workers training course convened at the Da Nang Polytechnical School. Although the Quang Tin class was unscheduled for the month, provisions were made and financing supplied by USAID and other agencies, in order that the students could complete their training. Medical and dental treatment to the Vietnamese people through the III MAF Civil Affairs Program increased throughout the ICTZ during August. Large numbers of Vietnamese people were treated for medical and dental problems at collection points during COUNTY FAIR operations and construction was underway on several new medical facilities that would improve and increase III MAF's capability for providing medical assistance to seriously ill Vietnamese. (14)

Educational training and assistance for the Vietnamese continued to reflect the dedication and hard work of the personnel who were working in this civil affairs program. Lieutenant MacDonald, USN, the civil affairs officer of the Naval Support Activity in Da Nang, reported that the Da Nang Technical School was moving forward with its vocational training classes and that the performance of the trainees far exceeded earlier expectations. During the month, nearly 200 students from the refugee vocational class were trained in sewing, typing, auto mechanics, driving, sheet metal and welding procedures, electricity, and carpentry. These students were efficiently trained in their chosen skills so that upon graduation they could become gainfully employed. (15)

Another major achievement for the educational program came on 13 August with the formation of a Joint Religious Scholarship Committee in Da Nang. Three representatives from the Buddhist, Catholic, Cao Dai, and Protestant religions were to constitute the committee. A constitution was drawn up and official permission granted by the Mayor of Da Nang for the Committee to function within the city. The purpose of this Committee was to select qualified candidates for higher education and provide scholarship subsidy. Those students who were to receive scholarship aid would make a commitment to return to their home areas as teachers. Funds
for the scholarships were to be provided by the Chaplains' Civic Action Fund and the committee would also solicit financial support through its own resources. The initial plan called for 25 scholarships to be provided for the 1966-1967 academic year.

In another area of educational support, III MAF increased its school building program in an effort to provide as many classrooms as possible during the new school year. A continued search was carried on by civil affairs personnel to find school teachers who would be available to provide their services once the classrooms were completed and ready for occupancy. In the past, when Vietnamese school teachers could not be found, many Marines had volunteered to devote off hours to provide classroom instruction for the Vietnamese children. It can readily be pointed out that such spontaneous and unselfish acts of kindness on the part of the individual Marines were major assets in advancing the overall civil affairs effort. (16)

In other areas of support to the Vietnamese people, the Port of Da Nang continued to handle and process large quantities of goods being received in shipment for distribution through the CARE, CRS, and HANDCLASP programs. The major problems involved in the unloading of ships, which had created a backlog of supplies on the docks in past months, were being solved, thus allowing greater quantities of USAID agricultural supplies to reach the Vietnamese farmer in time to improve his rice crop. Progress was also being made in providing goods and services to the large number of refugees now living in secure areas throughout the ICTZ. In order to deal more effectively with the growing number of refugees, USAID and the American Red Cross launched a joint program whereby Red Cross personnel joined by their Vietnamese counterparts would work together in ministering to the needs of the refugees. An American Red Cross team arrived during the month, and was assigned to work with the refugees in Quang Ngai Province. A refugee resettlement housing project began in Quang Nam Province in the area of An My (3) that would provide housing for a portion of the Dai Loc refugee population. The construction was being carried on by 130 refugee workmen and by the end of the month, 30 houses had been completed and fitted for occupancy. Plans were made for the refugee families who were to settle in the An My (3) area to participate in the Vegetable Garden Program which was being developed as a source of employment and as a means to provide adequate food for those families who were moving into the area. (17)

As the month came to a close, important progress had been made in the RD programs both in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces. Much of the area which had previously been considered under VC control had been cleared and made secure by U. S. Marine and South Korean Marine combat operations. With the area cleared of major VC activity, RD cadre were able to move in and begin work on behalf of the GVN. Revolutionary Development progress in the Ngu Hanh Son National Priority Pacification Area was considered on the rise, as more Vietnamese civilians living within
the area openly gave support to the RD effort. An economic boost was provided for this area with the contribution of a saw mill assemblage by the World Relief Commission. A site was selected about 7 miles northwest of Da Nang, in an open section of timberland, to put the saw mill in operation. The mill was capable of producing 8,000 board feet of lumber per day when operated by a team of two men and it was anticipated that the mill would become the basis of a new industry for the area. (18)

September 1966

September proved to be an action-packed month for III MAF and other organizations carrying on civil affairs activity in the five provinces of I Corps. Major activity was centered around the National Elections which were held on 11 September, GOLDEN FLEECE Operations, which proved to be the most successful ever conducted in I Corps, and new innovations and progress being made by the I Corps JCC and the Committees working under its direction. There were growing signs of a large North Vietnamese Army (NVA) buildup along the Demilitarized Zone, (DMZ, located at the 17th Parallel). In an effort to inform and educate the civilians in I Corps about the importance of their participation in the elections, III MAF in conjunction with the I Corps ARVN Command conducted a massive psychological campaign. The major emphasis of this campaign was placed on encouraging all eligible voters to go to the polls and vote on election day and countering VC propaganda designed to inhibit voter participation. In a move to provide protection for the Vietnamese civilians against VC propaganda, harassment, and terrorist attacks, III MAF from 1 to 11 September put into the field nine infantry battalions to conduct search and destroy operations. These operations were mainly conducted away from major populated areas in an effort to screen these areas and prevent NVA and VC main force units from moving in and terrorizing the population prior to and during election day. On the day of elections, Marine combat and civic action personnel stayed away from the polling places to prevent any incidents that could be eventually used as VC propaganda. They did, however, assist the ARVN security units located along the roadways leading to and from the polling areas. Marine assistance in providing such security was an important factor in countering the number of VC incidents which occurred on election day.*(19)

* On September 11, the day of the National Election, there were only 34 Viet Cong incidents reported throughout the five provinces of I Corps. While the number of VC incidents may seem excessive for a one day period, it should be noted that these incidents were unsuccessful in preventing a record turnout of voters at the polling areas.
In an area near Da Nang, on 11 September, a combined action platoon with the assistance of the Vietnamese National Police intercepted and captured 12 confirmed VC and detained 60 Viet Cong suspects who were moving to interfere with the elections. As election day closed, there was general agreement among most observers that the election had been a resounding success, and that the NVA and VC had been effectively thwarted in their attempts to prevent the GVN from electing a National Constituent Assembly. The voter turnout in I Corps was most indicative of III MAF's efforts in support of the election process. Out of an estimated 814,000 eligible voters in I Corps, over 710,000 voters went to the polls and cast their ballots. The total percentage voter turnout in I Corps was between 87 and 89 percent. It was reported that the nationwide turnout of voters on election day far exceeded all predictions and that the ICTZ had recorded the highest percentage of voters of any of the Tactical Zones in South Vietnam. The success of the elections and the large voter turnout in the ICTZ was hailed by members of III MAF as a sign of civil affairs progress in pacification and a major defeat for the VC guerrilla and the operation of the VC infrastructure.

After the National Elections were over and throughout the remainder of the month, there was a rise in VC-initiated incidents within the ICTZ, which was essentially attributed to the fact that the VC were attempting to regain their losses resulting from the success of the elections. The VC stepped up their propaganda campaign in a divisive effort to create dissension between Marine and ARVN forces and alienate the civilians from III MAF's civil affairs programs. Many of the VC propaganda leaflets were printed both in the Vietnamese and English languages in order to mark the individual Marine as one of the audiences for the propaganda effort. The VC also launched six terrorist attacks on different refugee camps throughout the ICTZ, seeking and burning the dwellings, which left many refugees homeless. Before the month had ended, the VC reign of terror had accounted for seven assassinations and five kidnappings of village officials within the ICTZ.

In an effort to counter the increased enemy activity and support the Vietnamese RD program, III MAF stepped up its PsyWar, COUNTY FAIR, and GOLDEN FLEECE operations, along with increasing its total number of small unit operations. The PsyWar Operations conducted after the elections were directed toward informing the people of the results of the elections and the importance of these results. Emphasis was also placed on uniting the people behind the GVN's RD programs and the destruction of the VC infrastructure operating within the villages and hamlets. There were 14 COUNTY FAIR operations conducted during September in areas made secure by small unit operations. These operations were responsible for introducing increased numbers of Vietnamese civilians to the III MAF and ARVN civil affairs programs. As usual, food, clothing, medical and dental assist-
Hospitalman 3d Class Louis I. Patetsky of the 1st Marine Division passes out a bar of soap to a tiny schoolchild in Thanh My Trung village. (USMC Photo #A369256)
ance, and entertainment were provided for the people who were brought to collection points. Considerable success was achieved with these operations in identifying covert VC cadre who were operating within the populated areas. (22)

There were three GOLDEN FLEECE operations conducted by III MAF during the month, which afforded rice harvest protection to thousands of farmers and denied the enemy a valuable source of food supply. In past years the VC had counted on their ability to extort from the Vietnamese farmer enough rice during the harvest seasons to refurbish his food supply. Since the arrival of the Marines, this extortion activity had been considerably reduced in I Corps. The month of September produced the greatest denial of rice to the VC since the beginning of GOLDEN FLEECE operations.

From 17 through 27 September, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines under the command of Major Littleton W. T. Waller II, conducted GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1 in an area south of the Song Ve and east of Highway Number One, 23 kilometers southeast of Quang Ngai City in the vicinity of No Duc District. * Prior to the battalion moving into the area, intelligence estimates indicated a considerable buildup of enemy forces. These estimates showed that there were two main force enemy battalions along with two enemy local force companies operating within the rice harvest area. The two enemy battalions were listed as C-19 located within Dam Thuy (2) and C-17 located just west of the district headquarters. Total enemy strength was given as 700 main force and 200 local force troops. Later it was found that a C-18 local force company was also operating in the area. When the Marines from 1/7 arrived in their area of operation, they found that the population which was considered to be under GVN control received them warmly. In the villages and hamlets where VC activity had been strong and where little civil affairs activity had taken place, the Marines were greeted with suspicion and distrust. In many of these villages and hamlets, there were signs urging the ARVN, RF, and PF forces to kill Americans. These propaganda signs were written both in the Vietnamese and English languages.

The results of the 10 day operation in the destruction of enemy forces and protection of the rice harvest indicated that III MAF forces had learned and refined rice harvest protection techniques, which would provide a basis for the expansion of the rice protection program. The overall record of GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1 showed that 244 VC had been confirmed killed, with the probable

* The Command Chronology of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines for September 1966 shows that Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Wood was the Commanding Officer until the 3d of September, at which time Major L. W. T. Waller II, assumed command of the battalion. Major C. A. Folsom was the Executive Officer and Captain R. Savage was the Civil Affairs Officer for the battalion.
kill of an additional 56. There was one VC confirmed and 215 probables in the wounded category, along with one VC captured and 30 Viet Cong suspects detained for interrogation. Material losses to the enemy consisted of an assortment of military weapons and gear recovered from the enemy dead and 727 tons of stolen rice uncovered in an enemy cache. Marine combat casualties consisted of one killed and 19 wounded, but there was no material loss to the battalion during the operation. The mission of the battalion was successfully accomplished as over 8,400 tons of captured and harvested rice, an amount sufficient to support 31,000 Vietnamese civilians for a year, was denied to the enemy.

In the same area during the past four years, Vietnamese officials stated that 90 percent of the rice crop had been confiscated by the VC. As a result of the Marines' protection, the VC had been able to extort only about 30 percent of the total rice harvest, most of which was taken prior to the beginning of GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1. The battalion commander of 1/7 attributed the success of the operation to every Marine in the battalion knowing his job and the concept of the operation, quick reaction to good intelligence, and deep patrolling on the part of the company commanders, close coordination with Vietnamese officials and U. S. Army Sub-Sector Advisors, and daily conferences with all personnel involved in the operation to assure the best possible utilization of the Marine forces protecting the harvesters. It is interesting to note that during the entire operation not one Vietnamese farmer became a casualty, nor did any worker leave the fields from fear of VC attack. The battalion commander also pointed out that the operation was a complete success in the eyes of the men of the battalion and that great benefit had come from the close association with the Vietnamese people. It was believed that the wide variety of tasks performed and the success of the mission would contribute significantly to the combat readiness and morale of the battalion. As the Marines were preparing to leave the area, the people expressed their appreciation for the work and protection that had been provided and presented gifts to the commanding officer. When a Marine truck convoy arrived to transport the battalion back to its base camp area, between three and five thousand people were present, with banners flying, to bid farewell to the Marines.(23)

During September, the I Corps JCC was able to meet four times with one of the meetings being held at Thua Thien Provincial Headquarters. At the meeting in Thua Thien, the Chairman of the I Corps JCC explained to the Vietnamese officials and others present, the mission and policies of the council and its reason for traveling once a month to a different province to hold a meeting. The Province Chief of RD, along with other military, civilian, U. S., and ARVN officials, gave a detailed explanation to the council of the civil affairs activities going on in Thua Thien Province. It was pointed out that the RD program was undergoing a structural revision in the province which would enable the program to put more cadre into the field to enhance
the pacification effort. Problems presented to the council centered around the needs of a training program for village and hamlet chiefs, the need for an increase in the number of rural health workers, and an increase in the supply of construction material. After these problems were presented, General Robertshaw, Chairman of the Council, assured the Province Chief that every effort would be made by the council to assist him in solving the problems that had been put forth. Pacification efforts in Thua Thien Province had been advancing at a steady pace and the council was anxious to provide whatever help it could in order for the progress to continue. The Province Chief assured General Robertshaw that an all-out effort was being made to continue the progress and improve the programs. (24)

A major innovation took place during the month as the I Corps JCC moved to establish joint coordinating councils in each of the five provinces. General Robertshaw, General Blatt, and Mr. Gordon explained at a meeting of the I Corps JCC that the establishment of a joint coordinating council in each of the five provinces was visualized as mirroring the operations of the corps area council. These councils would be structured so that their organization, mission, and functions would provide for a high level of coordination at the province level, similar to that being carried on by the I Corps JCC at the regional level. It was pointed out that the Province JCC would not be subordinate to the I Corps JCC, but rather function independently of the council while performing its task in the province. Membership in the Province JCCs would probably parallel that of the I Corps JCC, since most of the organizations were represented at the province level. Before the month had ended, the members of the I Corps JCC had voted unanimously to approve the establishment of the Province JCCs. A meeting was held on 27 September at the 1st Marine Division Command Post in Quang Tin Province with representatives of the Provincial Teams of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces attending. This represented the first organizational meeting of the proposed Province JCC and initial efforts were directed toward determining the mission, composition, functions, and frequency of future meetings. The meeting held to organize the Province JCCs represented a significant accomplishment in the development of civil affairs and provided an avenue for a stronger coordinated effort at total pacification. (25)

Material assistance and guidance provided by the civil affairs personnel of III MAF continued to improve and increase the services rendered to the Vietnamese people. Major emphasis was continuing to be placed on providing good medical assistance, improved educational programs, and refugee relief. Success was also being achieved by III MAF in influencing ARVN participation in the pacification effort. General Lam, Commanding General of I Corps, and General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, were impressed by III MAF's civil affairs programs. They advised their representative to the I Corps JCC to inform the council that major revisions and reorganization were taking place to improve the ARVN Civil Affairs and RD programs and that command
attention would be brought to bear on all phases of pacification. Evidence of the increased interest in pacification came during the month, as plans were made by the ARVN to provide one special military medical team to work in each of the five provinces. These teams would have two basic missions; to provide MEDCAP treatments while visiting various communities, and to provide training for rural health workers. Such a program would have the effect of extending medical services to the Vietnamese people living in the rural areas, services which had principally been provided by the III MAF Medical Civic Action Program. (26)

There was growing indication during September that the North Vietnamese Army was preparing to make a major thrust across the Demilitarized Zone and enter South Vietnam with massive numbers of combat personnel. Such a move by the NVA would represent its first large scale confrontation with Marine combat units operating in I Corps. It was the opinion of General Walt and other members of his staff that the NVA buildup along the DMZ was a direct result of the successes being achieved in pacification in I Corps. Although other tactical considerations were involved in the NVA moves, reliable intelligence sources had indicated that the III MAF civil affairs efforts had placed a tremendous strain on VC guerrilla operations and that the VC infrastructures operating within the villages and hamlets of I Corps were becoming progressively ineffective. The buildup of NVA was therefore designed, in part, to force III MAF to move large numbers of Marine personnel into the northernmost area of I Corps in order to block a possible thrust across the DMZ. Such a move would draw heavily on the number of III MAF's units and personnel who were actively engaged throughout the five provinces of I Corps in carrying on civil affairs programs. With this move of Marine personnel to the DMZ, the VC hoped to regain the initiative with their guerrilla operations and re-establish control over the villages and hamlets through a strengthening of their infrastructure. (27)

During September, III MAF did conduct several large scale operations and continued others which had begun during the month of August. Operations such as HASTINGS, PAWNEE, MACON, and PRAIRIE produced significant successes in the destruction of enemy forces and materiel. Between four and six Marine battalions operated in the area of the DMZ and continued to counter NVA attempts at entering South Vietnam in mass. These operations drew heavily on the number of Marine battalions available for carrying on pacification as did the need for large numbers of Marine personnel required for base defense. The momentum of the civil affairs programs, however, allowed for continued progress in pacification. (28)

Lieutenant Colonel Evans, drawing on his experience on the I Corps JCC, pointed out that by the time large numbers of Marine personnel began to operate in the vicinity of the DMZ, III MAF's civil affairs programs were well established and continued to
function, despite the reduced number of personnel who remained available to work directly in the programs. Those personnel who remained directly involved in the civil affairs programs, within each of the five provinces of I Corps, doubled up on their workload and dedicated themselves to the success of the programs. While some areas may have suffered from lack of personnel to work in the civil affairs programs, the movement of Marine personnel to the DMZ area allowed for an expansion of the program. As Marine operations began to clear and make secure populated areas within Quang Tri Province, civil affairs efforts were directed at providing services for those Vietnamese civilians who had previously been subject to Viet Cong control.*

(29)

Evidence that III MAF could carry on its total civil affairs effort, despite the movement of large numbers of Marines to the north, was indicated by the monthly account of projects started, projects completed, and services rendered to the Vietnamese within the total ICTZ. Marine MEDCAP teams were able to operate in 222 locations and provide medical and dental treatment to thousands of ailing Vietnamese civilians, many of whom were evacuated to hospitals and other medical facilities supported by the civil affairs program. Informal training was given to a number of Vietnamese rural health workers and nurses and an outbreak of the plague was checked in the Chu Lai TAOR. Effective plans were put into operation which would allow for the inoculation of scores of Vietnamese civilians as a preventative measure against the future spread of the disease. The educational program continued to progress as more schools came under construction and classroom facilities were completed. The refugee relief efforts were enhanced by the completion of 78 of the 90 houses planned in An My (3), which would provide housing for approximately 450 of the refugees located at Dai Loc. In addition, the III MAF civil affairs personnel were providing material and financial support for the planning and construction of increased numbers of houses in order to improve the living conditions of the Vietnamese refugees.(30)

The Marines' civil affairs efforts were not only centered around the large projects which were being organized and carried out, but were also reflected in the many spontaneous acts of goodwill which would lighten the burden of the Vietnamese people. An example of this occurred on 29 September, when the City of Da Nang sponsored a party for 4,000 Vietnamese children in celebration of the Mid-Autumn Festival. At this party, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Band provided entertainment, III MAF provided

* Quang Tri Province is the northernmost province in I Corps, with its northern boundary located along the Demarcation Line (DMZ). It was in this province that the major Marine Corps buildup took place to counter the attempts of the NVA to cross the DMZ. It was in Quang Tri Province that the Marine base at Khe Sanh was subsequently established.
toys and candy for the children, and the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang contributed other material support which made the party a resounding success. Acts of friendship such as those demonstrated at the party served as catalysts for III MAF in its attempts to win the support of the Vietnamese people. (31)

Before the month had ended, additional help was provided to III MAF's pacification efforts and combat effectiveness with the establishment of a ROK Marine base camp in the southern portion of the Chu Lai TAOR.* Upon their arrival in the Quang Tin Province, the ROK Marines established and built a base camp, conducted a GOLDEN FLEECE operation which protected the harvesting of 68 tons of rice, and conducted two battalion search and destroy operations. The ROK Marines also launched programs of pacification which would provide medical, dental and other material assistance to the Vietnamese people living within their area of operation. By the end of September, six villages in the Korean Marines' area of operation were classified 60 percent or higher on the III MAF Pacification Scale, with an additional five villages rating in the 40 to 60 percent category. (32)

The importance of total pacification in South Vietnam was transmitted to President Lyndon B. Johnson in a report prepared by Mr. Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President for Pacification. The September document entitled "The Other War in Vietnam—a Progress Report," reflected the advances and setbacks which had occurred in pacification throughout South Vietnam since the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. A portion of the report which reflected the pacification efforts being carried on in I Corps indicated that significant progress had been made and that the commitments made to the GVN during the Honolulu Conference were being fulfilled. ** The successes in pacification throughout I Corps, as reflected in Mr. Komer's report, were due in large part to the officers and enlisted personnel working in III MAF's civil affairs programs. The prominent leadership and foresight of the members of the I Corps JCC, and the sincere and dedicated concern of the Commanding General of III MAF in providing for the needs of the Vietnamese people, created the necessary impetus for making I Corps during September one of the most pacified areas in South Vietnam.

* ROK is the abbreviation form normally used to identify military personnel of the Republic of Korea. The ROK Marine Corps units serving in Vietnam have proven themselves to be extremely capable in combat against the enemy and in supporting civil affairs programs.
** "The Other War In Vietnam—a Progress Report," can be found in the Department of State Bulletins, v. LV, nos. 1424-25, dtd 10 and 17 October 1966. A copy of the report can also be obtained by writing the Information Staff, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C. At the time of the writing of this report, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge was the U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Mr. William Porter was the Deputy Ambassador, and Robert W. Komer was Special Assistant to the President for U. S. Pacification in South Vietnam.
CHAPTER IV
U. S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps
October–November–December 1966

The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) buildup along the Demilitarized Zone, which had initially begun during the latter part of July, continued to put pressure on III MAF personnel requirements for pacification during October.* Before the month had ended major changes had taken place in the location of Marine personnel throughout the ICTZ. The 3d Marine Division moved from the Da Nang area north to Phu Bai and assumed responsibility for operations in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. The 1st Marine Division moved from the Chu Lai area to Quang Nam Province and located in the Da Nang area, while retaining control of the Chu Lai TAOR under the direction of Task Force X-Ray. With this move, the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for operations in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces. This shifting and redistributing of Marine personnel afforded III MAF a greater flexibility and improved command control for carrying on operations in an expanding ICTZ. In October, U. S. Army units arrived in I Corps and were placed under operational control of III MAF for combat operations. The 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade, was assigned to direct operational control of the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division for deployment within the Da Nang TAOR. This battalion functioned essentially as a Marine battalion in conducting small unit operations within its assigned area of responsibility. Battery A of the 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery Regiment, U. S. Army, which was also assigned to the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, was placed in the Chu Lai TAOR to provide additional fire support for combat operations within that area. The 2d Battalion (-), 94th Artillery Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment were assigned to the direct operational control of the Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division. These units were placed at a 3d Marine Division combat base located at Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province. The movement of these U. S. Army artillery units to the Dong Ha combat base significantly increased the fire support capability available to Marine units operating within Quang Tri Province and along the DMZ. The artillery coverage provided a firing fan which covered the entire area from Laos to the South China Sea and greatly reduced the enemy's maneuvering capability within the area.(1)

* The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is situated at the 17th Parallel and stretches 40 miles across Vietnam from the South China Sea on the east to the Laotian border on the west. It is approximately six miles in width and was established by the Geneva Accords in 1954 to serve as a buffer zone between North and South Vietnam.
While III MAF had been effective in blocking any mass invasion by NVA troops across the DMZ with its own buildup of Marines in Quang Tri Province, the pace of pacification, although not stopped, was definitely slowed down.* Another condition which adversely affected pacification progress during the month, was the arrival of the monsoon season in I Corps. The coastal plain rivers and streams throughout the ICTZ presented flood conditions. In many areas of the ICTZ roadways became submerged and were often unusable as bridge structures were swept away by the flood. The III MAF had to cope with a growing number of refugees whose homes had been swept away by the flood waters in the coastal lowlands. (2)

The III MAF had concentrated the majority of its civil affairs efforts in the coastal lowlands, since this area was the most heavily populated within the ICTZ. The establishment of lasting and solid civil affairs programs had been a chief aim of III MAF while attempting to establish firm U. S. and GVN influence in this area. This concept was based on the premise that successful elimination of the enemy, development of stronger village and hamlet defense systems, stabilization of the economy, and the establishment of functioning local government comprised of individuals who lived in those villages and hamlets and who were responsive to GVN control would enhance the programs.**(3)

The III MAF objective of establishing firm U. S. and GVN control in the coastal lowlands of the ICTZ reflected the six goals set at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, to be accomplished by the end of the year. In an effort to fulfill these goals, III MAF had constantly worked at improving and implementing the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Program.***(4) Unless

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* By the end of October, the III MAF troop buildup in Quang Tri Province and along the DMZ, which had started in July 1966, accounted for approximately 10,000 Marines committed to combat operations within that area.

** The total area of the ICTZ in October 1966 covered approximately 10,440 square miles with the coastal lowlands covering approximately 3,340 square miles of the total area. While the coastal lowlands represented only a small area of the total ICTZ, it was the source for all the salt, fish, and virtually all the 470,000 tons of rice produced within the ICTZ. Living within the coastal lowland areas were approximately 2,400,000 of the 2,700,000 Vietnamese people living throughout the ICTZ. The remainder of the ICTZ is mountainous, with very little food production of any kind, and contains about 10 percent of the Vietnamese population.

*** In brief terms, the six goals set at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, which were to be accomplished by the end of the year were: (1) attrition by year's end of VC/NVA forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field; (2) increase the percentage of VC/NVA base areas denied use from 20 percent to 50 percent; (3) increase the critical roads and railroads open for use from 30 percent to 50 percent; (4) increase the population in secure areas from 50 percent to 60 percent; (5)
the RD program could be made to succeed the possibility of generating popular support for the GVN, especially in the rural areas, was less than promising. There was no doubt that the Marines were generally being well received by the Vietnamese people and were making an important contribution to the welfare of the people through their civil affairs programs. Unfortunately, the attitudes of the Vietnamese people towards the Marines were basically non-transferable to the GVN, which often allowed the Marines to be more accepted among the people than the government they were committed to support. While III MAF was gratified by the favorable attitudes of the Vietnamese people and considered this an indication of civil affairs progress, there was still the realization that if an effective pacification program was to succeed, a greater commitment to this effort was necessary on the part of the GVN. (5)

In an attempt to assess the progress being made in Vietnamese Revolutionary Development, III MAF developed a grading scale similar to the one developed earlier to measure pacification progress. The grading scale was designed to cover five major areas with varying programs worth different value points under each major area. Using the grading scale, III MAF was able to reduce qualitative objectives into quantitative analysis on a monthly basis concerning the RD program. The monthly quantitative analysis was then used as a basis for measuring "firm GVN/US influence" within the villages and hamlets which were undergoing pacification through the efforts of the Marines and the GVN. In supporting the RD program, III MAF attempted to strike a counterbalance between the objectives set forth in the Revolutionary Development Indices.* For instance, the establishment of local government could not proceed satisfactorily within the villages and hamlets unless the destruction of the VC guerrillas and their infrastructure reached a significant level. In order to define a "significant level" of achievement which would indicate RD progress, III MAF established that when a 60 percent level of achievement could be measured on the Revolutionary Development Indices "firm GVN/US influence" had pacify the four selected high priority areas, increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000; (6) ensure the defense of all military bases, political and populated centers, and food production areas now under government control.

* The new grading scale being used during October 1966 to measure quantitatively the progress of the Revolutionary Development program was called the Revolutionary Development Indices For Computation of Progress Towards Goals. This measuring instrument was essentially the same, in areas covered with value points assigned, as the Pacification Progress Indices which were developed and used by III MAF in the earlier part of the year. Both Indices are set up on a 100 point basis with the achievement of 60 points out of the total 100 representing pacification progress. Reference is made to the Pacification Progress Indices on page 14.
been established in the area undergoing pacification. In a move to eradicate enemy base camps within the ICTZ in support of the RD program, III MAF conducted several large unit operations in the Do Xa area located in the western part of Quang Ngai Province. Intelligence sources had indicated that the enemy base camp in the Do Xa area was the largest within the entire ICTZ and III MAF had selected it as a prime target area for fulfilling the second goal of the Honolulu Conference. By the end of October, Marine forces operating in the Do Xa area had been successful in defeating large numbers of the enemy and were continuing to pressure enemy units operating in the area, in an effort to neutralize the base camp. (6)

The decrease in civil affairs activity during the month, resulting principally from the monsoon season and the shifting of Marine personnel into the DMZ area, was felt most sharply in the areas of MEDCAP treatments, food distribution, and project construction. * Although there were diminished or unchanged levels of pacification existing in certain areas of activity during the month, other areas had new innovations and were making progress. The I Corps JCC met four times during October, and continued to concentrate on providing the necessary coordination between all agencies involved in pacification, and the establishment of the Province JCCs. One of the council's regular meetings during the month was held at the Quang Tin Provincial Headquarters in Tam Ky. At this meeting the members of the I Corps JCC were briefed by Vietnamese officials on the state of the province security and the progress being made in Revolutionary Development. The Vietnamese officials also briefed the council on the plans made for carrying on RD during calendar year 1967. At the meeting, the Chairman of the council assured the Province Chief that the council would do all within its power to support the new program of Revolutionary Development. He also stated that the development of the Province JCCs would be a significant asset in coordinating all agencies at the local level in support of the forthcoming RD program for 1967. (7)

General Walt had issued instructions concerning the early establishment of the Province JCCs to the commanding general of each Marine division, the sector advisor in each I Corps Province, and the senior advisor with each I Corps ARVN division. The instructions were to inform those who would be directly involved in providing assistance to the Province JCCs of the importance of the program and the basic concepts of its operation. The GVN decision to strengthen the RD efforts would require closer coordination and cooperation at the province level. Since the

* Compared with September, MEDCAP treatments decreased 21 percent during October, construction projects dropped 91 percent, and food distribution was down 64 percent. Persons living in areas of at least 60 percent pacification remained the same during October as they had been in September, where there had been significant gains during the preceding months.
GVN Revolutionary Development Program was planned and implemented at the province level, III MAF civil affairs personnel felt that the Province JCCs were a necessity. General Lam was in favor of the Province JCC's concept and indicated that ARVN command attention would be directed in support of the program. (8)

The first meeting of a province JCC was held on 24 October in Thua Thien Province. The other provinces were in the process of organizing their Joint Coordinating Councils and General Platt advised all members of the I Corps JCC to provide as much help and encouragement as possible to get the Province JCCs organized and functioning, since the GVN Revolutionary Development Plan for the calendar year 1967 had been promulgated. General Platt also recommended to the council that a briefing team be formed for the purpose of widely disseminating information contained in the GVT Plan. This team was to consist of representatives of III MAF, USAID, JUSPAO, CSD, and possibly any other interested agencies and brief down to the battalion level. Its mission was to foster a greater coordinated effort at the grass-roots level for supporting the future RD program. Major General Nguyen Duc Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development for the GVN and one of the principal architects of the 1967 RD Program, indicated that the new RD Program would receive greater funding to provide for more cadre personnel and the developing of an improved training program. General Thang stated what he considered to be the deficiencies of the 1966 RD Program and disclosed that the Program for 1967 would be directed at correcting those deficits. (9) The points he cited were:

1. Lack of security--1,400 RD cadre killed or wounded during the first nine months of 1966.

2. Lack of peoples' participation--cadre were building in the hamlets without the help of the people.

3. Lack of coordination between GVN programs--GVN programs needed to be closely monitored to prevent:
   a. construction of hamlet schools where there were no teachers.
   b. construction of dispensaries where there were no medical personnel.

4. The program had been too much of a numbers game--quantity rather than quality in the pacification of hamlets in 1966.

5. Weak cooperation between the ARVN, the provincial administrators, and the RD cadre--lack of coordination and cooperation most pronounced at the hamlet and village level.

6. Lack of follow-up--a gap was created when the RD Teams moved on to another village or hamlet, leaving the people in the last village or hamlet feeling deserted.
7. The lack of overall doctrine—no common language for the RD Program—over half of the RD cadre had not been introduced to current RD philosophy and were operating under doctrine received as Peoples Action Teams (PAT) or Rural Political Cadre (RPC).

The candid appraisal of the 1966 RD Program by General Thang indicated that the GVN was facing up to its deficiencies in the area of pacification and in the new year would become more conscious of its importance as a means for defeating the enemy. General Thang laid down four principles of action for the RD cadre to follow. These were:

1. Cadre would be the link between the people and the GVN.

2. The people are the main force and the cadre are their guides.

3. The old life is to be destroyed and in its place a new life is to be created. The result of the creation of a new life would be the New Life Hamlet.

4. The cadre are guided by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development Policy and Doctrine and by the will of the people.*(10)

During October, the Chieu Hoi program continued to make progress as 172 ralliers defected from the VC ranks and came over to the side of the GVN. This number of defections in a single month represented the highest total ever reported in I Corps, to that time. The PsyWar Committee discussed measures on how to improve the Chieu Hoi program and encourage families with members serving with the VC to assist in bringing those members back to support of the GVN.(11) It was important that the Chieu Hoi program provide economic and educational opportunities for the returnees along with aid and security to their families. The PsyWar Committee listed three essentials for a successful psychological warfare program to bring about VC defections. These essentials were:


* It should be noted that General Thang in discussing the RD Program for 1966 was taking into consideration the total RD Program in South Vietnam. The progress being made within the ICTZ by RD cadre was the direct result of the efforts being made by III MAF in eliminating the deficiencies put forth by General Thang.
2. Provisions for security of Vietnamese families whose members are potential ralliers.

3. Availability of training and employment for the returnees.

One of the strongest suggestions of the Committee was for a stepped-up vocational training program for the ralliers. In order to make the initial appeal to the potential ralliers, an information program was suggested which would exemplify the theme of the GVN pursuing a just cause and showing that Communism was based on false theories. Psychological appeals such as home sickness, broken promises of Communist bosses, and exploitation of the VC's fear of hunger and death would be increased in an effort to bring about more defections. Consideration was given to the effectiveness of the drama teams which had been operating throughout the ICTZ. It was pointed out that some of the drama team members had written stories showing the sacrifices of the American and Free World Forces in the war. A proposal was made that these stories should be published in book form for nation-wide distribution. (12)

The value of the Chieu Hoi program and the importance of encouraging defections from the Viet Cong was apparent during the month as Hoi Chanhs (ralliers) continued to provide intelligence information and work with COUNTY FAIR operations. The assistance provided by the Hoi Chanhs on COUNTY FAIRS was considered an important element in their overall success. Since Hoi Chanhs were proving to be reliable and were well equipped to assist the Marines in countering VC activity, a new program was initiated during October which called for Hoi Chanh participation.

Major General Herman Nickerson, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, decided that a trial program should be initiated whereby Hoi Chanhs would join Marine units in the field and work as scouts on patrols and combat operations. Six Hoi Chanhs, all of whom were volunteers who had worked with Marines on past COUNTY FAIR operations, were initially assigned to work with the 1st and 9th Marines. The program called for the Hoi Chanhs to wear uniforms, carry weapons, receive pay, and live, eat, and work with the Marines. They would accompany the Marines on patrols and sweeps to identify VC hiding places and routes of escape. In addition, the Hoi Chanhs would speak with families who had members serving with the Viet Cong and explain the merits of the Chieu Hoi program. In order to develop an atmosphere of esprit de corps, General Nickerson named the Hoi Chanhs working in the program, "Kit Carson Scouts." Before the month had ended, the Kit Carson Scouts were showing that the confidence expressed in them by the general was well founded.* (13)

* In an interview with Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., during August 1968, he stated that from the beginning the "Kit
While the children wait, men of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines open boxes of books and school supplies donated to the school at Le Dong, 12 miles south of Da Nang. (USMC Photo #A187651)

Gunnery Sergeant Lon V. White of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines watches an excited young girl try a dress from a gift of American-style clothing distributed to villages north of Chu Lai. (USMC Photo #A369742)
The Marines in Quang Tri Province were able to carry on civil affairs efforts despite the monsoon rains and the growing NVA buildup. Major efforts at pacification were directed at eight villages around the forward logistic base at Dong Ha. The Marines were able to provide the villagers with medical assistance, food and clothing, and developed construction projects which would materially assist the local populace. A bridge at Cam Lo which was destroyed by the VC in January 1965 was rebuilt by the Marines. Until the bridge was repaired the only means of crossing the river was by ferry boat, and this presented problems during the monsoon season. On the day the bridge was opened, the villagers showed their appreciation by voluntarily clearing fields of fire for the Marines so they could better protect the bridge from VC attack. (14)

As the month was drawing to a close, important gains had been recorded in many of III MAF's programs which would assist the onward movement of pacification. The Combined Action Program grew as two more combined action platoons were activated for operation within the ICTZ. The total Combined Action Program by the end of October showed 50 platoons and 6 company headquarters in operation through the tactical areas of III MAF.

A refugee resettlement project in Thu Bon Hamlet was completed as 300 structures were opened to care for approximately 1,500 people. (15) Other refugee resettlement projects being carried on at Ai Dong, Phung Trung, and Hoa Luc in the Quang Nam Province continued to receive assistance from III MAF civil affairs personnel. Work at the Ai Dong refugee resettlement project was severely hampered by flood waters which resulted in a loss of much of the work previously done. Provisions were made to replace the materials lost at the project through III MAF's civil affairs assets. (16) Medical personnel involved in the civil affairs programs provided innoculations for a large number of Vietnamese civilians in an effort to keep the incidence of plague at a low level. Medication and innoculations were also provided for a variety of other diseases which were on the increase within the ICTZ. The Naval Support Activity in Da Nang completed and opened three deep water piers which would greatly increase the handling capability for supplies being received at the port. It was reported by Admiral Weschler that the new piers, which were 600 feet long, would accommodate ships with a 34-foot draft and would increase handling capacity by 5,440 measured tons per day. (17)

Carson Scouts' proved their worth in assisting Marines in the field. Through the knowledge of VC tactics, the Scouts were able to save many Marine lives as well as assisting in the destruction of enemy forces. General Nickerson stated that the name "Kit Carson Scouts" was given to the Hoi Chanhs working with the Marines because the Hoi Chanhs were good scouts in the tradition of Christopher (Kit) Carson (1809-1868), the U. S. frontiersman, Indian agent, and soldier. The name was also designed to create a feeling of confidence and belonging which would enhance the morale of the Hoi Chanhs.
As October passed into November, 6 of the 18 Marine battalions operating in South Vietnam were located in Quang Tri Province generally along the DMZ. With these Marine battalions removed from the counterguerrilla and pacification campaign in the other four provinces of the ICTZ, the remaining units in those areas were required to extend their own operations to fill in the gaps. The cost of the northward movement of six Marine battalions to the pacification effort was justified as the Marines were able to contain the NVA on the DMZ and provide an adequate level of civil affairs activity which continued progress towards fulfilling the six goals of the Honolulu Conference of 1966. The northward movement of the Marines under the most trying of circumstances demonstrated the great logistic flexibility which III MAF had developed. This capability indicated that an adequate logistic base was available to support all of the activities in which the command was engaged. (18)

November 1966

The I Corps JCC and the committees functioning under its direction were faced with many problems during November, which required skillful decision making for continuing coordinated pacification efforts within the ICTZ. In the area of public health, there developed a shortage of funds to pay rural health workers and provide for the continued training of health workers. The immediate problem was effectively solved by a donation of the required funds from the Chaplains' Civic Action Fund. There was a critical shortage of civilian doctors in I Corps to cope with the growing medical needs of the populace. It was pointed out by the Public Health Committee that in-country training facilities were inadequate to maintain the number of doctors desired and that GVN salaries for working in the government program were inadequate to attract the type of personnel required. It was also pointed out by the committee that out-of-country training of doctors had not produced the desired results because the doctors were not receiving training which was compatible with medicine as it was practiced in South Vietnam. Indications were that temporary relief for the problem would come through a plan devised by the American Medical Association which would send doctors to South Vietnam for the purpose of teaching Vietnamese student doctors a curriculum more compatible with existing in-country medical practices.

In an effort to check an outbreak of the plague in East Da Nang, III MAF medical personnel assisted Vietnamese personnel in carrying on a campaign to inform the citizens about plague protection. Innoculations were stepped up and 1,500 pounds of diazinone dust were dispensed in the area where the plague was most intense. A rat trapping program was developed to encourage the Vietnamese people to destroy the rats in their areas, since rats were the prime carriers of the plague. In several fishing villages in Quang Ngai Province, projects were started whereby villagers would trap rats and turn in their tails in return for 100 grams of rice. Members of the Public Health Committee felt
Title: Bounty on Rats (health poster)
Campaign: Civil Affairs
Target: Civilian Population

1. **REWARD**

2. Prevention is much better than cure.

Flies, mosquitoes and especially rats carry many diseases. Mosquitoes give you malaria; flies give you many kinds of stomach diseases and rats are the cause of deadly plagues.

There have been epidemics already in Quang Nam Province caused by rats. They cause Bubonic Plague which kills men, women, and children by the hundreds.

To save your loved ones from dying a horrible death, as victims of the plague, you must eliminate the rats right away.

A reward of 100 grams of rice is offered for every rat, dead or alive, that you take to your village-chief. So in addition to eliminating the great danger of the rats, you will have rice to reward your efforts.

Help the children, men and women of this community live free of disease. Bring as many rats as you can catch. You will be rewarded 100 grams of rice for every rat you bring to the village-chief.*

29th Civil Affairs Company

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* The above information was extracted from a Public Health poster which was distributed to the Vietnamese people within the ICTZ. The poster was to inform the populace of the growing plague problem and the need for eliminating rats. The poster distributed to the Vietnamese people was published in their native language.
that if the program could be extended to many areas and produce results, the rat problem would be considerably reduced. When the French were in Vietnam, they had required each family living in a rat-infested village to produce and turn in two rat tails weekly. So intense was the French program in attempting to prevent plague outbreaks that the two rat tails required each week from Vietnamese families were looked upon almost as a tax requirement. The rat trapping program may have had its humorous side, but the seriousness of the growing plague threat to the Vietnamese civilians and military personnel constituted a major medical problem which had to be dealt with.

Aside from the medical treatment provided to the Vietnamese people in the hospitals and dental clinics operating under the direction of III MAF-assigned personnel, civil affairs MEDCAP teams operated in 210 locations within the ICTZ, during November. The MEDCAP teams were successful in providing informal on-the-job training to 55 health workers, including nurses, and inoculated over 6,000 persons for various diseases as a preventative medicine measure.(19)

The Education Committee concerned itself during the month of November with developing plans to support needy children, to reduce the increased shortage of teachers resulting from the Vietnamese military draft, and to develop new educational programs. A document was drawn up to be signed by the school teachers which would indicate the students who were deserving of help. The document would also indicate the number of children who belonged to families who were financially unable to support their education. It was anticipated that a Marine battalion would then sponsor one or more schools, depending on the number of students qualifying for aid. The students would receive 250 Vietnamese dollars per month to continue their schooling. A Marine officer would visit each family who had a sponsored child, in order to assure a coordinated effort for the program. The Education Committee brought to the attention of the I Corps JCC the need of a program to exempt trained school teachers from the Vietnamese military draft. The shortage of teachers for secondary schools was reaching the critical point in I Corps and something had to be done to retain trained teachers on the job. The I Corps JCC was able to convince General Lam of the needs existing for the retention of teachers in I Corps and he intervened in a case where 20 teachers had been drafted and requested a temporary deferment. The GVN policy was not to exempt teachers from the three year draft.(20)

Plans were also being made by the Education Committee to set up a model school for public health and to introduce health education to both the teachers and students. It was suggested by the committee that physical education and courses in hygiene be introduced into the educational curriculum in an effort to improve the health conditions of the Vietnamese school children. A program was being developed which would provide for the estab-
lishment of an education camp to care for a number of school age children who were on the streets and running afoul of the law. There was discussion concerning the growing number of refugees in I Corps and how the school needs of the refugee children could best be served.* There was a definite need for establishing refugee schools within the ICTZ and III MAF civil affairs personnel along with USAID personnel were working on solving the problem. (21)

The Chairman of the Education Committee outlined for the I Corps JCC the two USAID-financed scholarship programs designed to provide college training in the United States for qualified students. The Leadership Training Program provided an opportunity for 100 selected students with demonstrated ability to receive from one to two years of college training in specific fields such as Medicine, Law, and Education for approximately 1,200 students. Knowledge of the English language was not a prerequisite since a special six month language training course would precede the college training, if required. (22)

The Commodities Distribution Committee concentrated its efforts during November on improving coordination between the many programs involved in commodity distribution. As the civil affairs programs expanded in the ICTZ, it became increasingly difficult to completely eliminate all duplication of the pacification efforts. In an attempt to prevent uncoordinated and autonomous programs of pacification from developing, attention was given to improving and keeping open the lines of communication between all U. S. and Free World forces and civilian agencies who were carrying on civil affairs programs within the ICTZ. The committee was advised that there was considerable need in Thua Thien Province for gift items for Christmas and Tet which were to be distributed to orphans, poor families, and widows of RF and PF personnel. The III MAF Chaplain also advised the committee that there had not been a Christmas Trains and Trucks (ACTT) campaign during the year to collect items for distribution to the Vietnamese people, but that donations of items would continue coming from the United States through Project HANDCLASP. The committee set into motion plans for collecting food, clothes, toys, and other items for distribution to the Vietnamese people during the coming holiday season. Lieutenant MacDonald, USN, announced to the committee that preparations were under way for carrying out "Operation Foodstuffs" during December. The U. S. Navy would provide 10,000 pounds of canned foods to ARVN troops in outlying areas and the Vietnamese Air Force would air drop

*Major Brantly, Team Leader of the Displaced Persons Team of the U. S. Army 29th Civil Affairs Company attached to III MAF, reported during October 1966 that his team survey indicated that there were approximately 240,000 refugees located within the ICTZ. The obstacles confronting refugee resettlement, according to Major Brantly, was a lack of security and the lack of available land suitable for resettlement.
The I Corps JCC received many reports during November which reflected the overall design of pacification being carried on within the Marines' areas of responsibility. Mr. Earl Young, USAID Military Liaison Officer for I Corps, reported that he had completed a four-day visit to military units located in Quang Tri Province. Mr. Young indicated that he was favorably impressed with the widespread understanding of the concept of civic action which he found during discussions with individuals in lower level units. He also indicated that the techniques being used to insure wide dissemination of information concerning civic action programs were impressive. A report was received from the Region I Field Representative for CARE, which pointed out that CARE operations in the RVN began in 1954, with a program of assistance designed to aid the refugees who moved south of the 17 Parallel. Food assistance, tools for development, blankets and clothing packages had been distributed to refugees since the inception of the program. The groups receiving CARE aid included individual needy, refugees, Regional and Popular Force widows and orphans, welfare institutions, charity and military hospitals, and victims of disasters. The basic food commodities provided by CARE were rice and salt, which were purchased in-country to help the South Vietnamese economy. Tools and equipment were provided to the Vietnamese people through the components of the standard CARE kits. The CARE supplies which were available for distribution in I Corps consisted of:

- Midwifery Kits
- Midwifery Replacement Kits
- Blacksmith Kits
- Woodworking Kits
- Classroom Supply Kits
- Physical Education Kits
- Mason Kits
- Needle Trade Kits
- Sewing Kits
- Elementary School Kits
- Resettler's Kits
- Textile Packages
- Sewing Machines

The report also pointed out that CARE assistance was not intended to stand alone, but rather to be interwoven into the overall assistance effort of other organizations and agencies. The majority of CARE supplies were distributed in coordination with and through the U.S. Military Civic Action Program and III MAF represented this major effort in I Corps.

Mr. Mark Gordon, USAID, informed the council of a critical need to provide 10,000 tons of fertilizer to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces for use on the new rice crop which was to be planted during the month. I Corps was an area deficient in rice and USAID had imported 100,000 tons of rice to the area during the past year to help feed the populace. Mr. Gordon pointed out that one ton of fertilizer would increase the rice yield by three or four times, and by providing the needed fertilizer it would be possible to grow as much as 40,000 additional tons of rice and proportionately reduce the import requirement. Ferti-
lizer had been in short supply in I Corps during the past year for a number of reasons, including lack of sufficient transport means and VC interdiction of roads and the railroad. Port improvement work being conducted at Chu Lai had prevented normal resupply of the two southernmost provinces. Due to the flood conditions in the Delta area, fertilizer which was to have been sent there was still aboard deep-draft ships in Saigon Harbor. Mr. Gordon stated that if USAID could arrange to have 10,000 tons of fertilizer brought to Da Nang, help would then be needed to transport it to Chu Lai and to make distribution to the provinces. Admiral Weschler informed the council that if USAID could arrange for the shipment of the fertilizer to Da Nang, the Naval Support Activity would provide the sea-lift requirements to move the fertilizer to Chu Lai. Before the month had ended large quantities of fertilizer had arrived in I Corps and were being distributed to the needy Vietnamese farmers through the cooperative efforts of the members of the I Corps JCC. (25)

The effects of III MAF's total pacification programs continued to be demonstrated during the month through COUNTY FAIR Operations, combined action growth, Chieu Hoi, and RD support, and the establishment of Province JCCs. The four COUNTY FAIR operations which were conducted enabled III MAF to reach a rural populace which had generally been dominated by Viet Cong influence. The number of operations was far below the monthly level desired by III MAF, but the problem of inadequate GVN support continued to persist. A future increase in the number of such operations was anticipated with the announcement from the ARVN I Corps Commander that 25 of his 32 battalions would ultimately be committed in support of COUNTY FAIR operations. The Combined Action Program, which had also suffered from lack of GVN support in supplying the necessary Popular Force troops, was able to make modest gains. Two combined action platoons were activated during November, which brought the number of platoons operating under the 8 combined action company headquarters to 52. The 55 platoons represented six less than the number scheduled by III MAF for activation during the month. The year end goal of III MAF was to have 74 combined action platoons operating within the ICTZ. (26)

A Chieu Hoi village located in the Phu Bai area continued to grow as the Marines provided assistance in developing new programs which would benefit the Hoi Chanhs living at the village. Efforts were directed at providing an adequate water supply and hygienic improvements, the construction of a dispensary, a school, and an animal husbandry cooperative. The Marines were providing tools, technical assistance, and lumber while the Hoi Chanhs provided the physical labor. By the end of November, a dispensary was in operation, four new wells had been dug, two 160-gallon showers had been installed, a carpenter shop was in operation, and a secondary school was under construction. The Chieu Hoi village also had a fish pond and a pig farm, both of which were stocked, and there were 80 acres of farm land under-
going development for truck farming.* (27) There were many Marines who contributed to the success of the Chieu Hoi village at Phu Bai, but one Marine stood out above all others, Gunnery Sergeant J. L. McDonald. Sergeant McDonald gained permission from his commanding officer to work with the Hoi Chanhs and he completely dedicated himself to improving the living conditions within the Chieu Hoi village. Many of the programs and construction projects carried on in the village were the direct result of his tenacity and exceptional leadership. Sergeant McDonald was able to win the confidence of the Hoi Chanhs through his sincerity, understanding, and a genuine appreciation for their way of life. As his reputation grew among the local populace, more ralliers appeared at the village. So successful were this one Marine's efforts that the Chieu Hoi village was often referred to by the local Vietnamese as "McDonald's Village." A United States Congressional party which visited the village claimed it to be the best and most prosperous in all of South Vietnam. (28)

In order to provide security for the residents of villages and hamlets in the rural areas and to assure protection for civil affairs projects, III MAF provided continuous support for the development of rural communication facilities. For adequate security to exist, it was necessary to have a rapid interchange of information between the hamlets and villages. The villages must also be able to communicate rapidly with military forces in the area in order to assure swift assistance in time of need. During the month, 38 villages were credited with having reliable communications between the hamlets, village headquarters, and district headquarters. In addition, 50 villages had partially completed communication facilities and a number of other villages were beginning the initial stage of construction. (29)

The members of the I Corps JCC who had been diligently working for the establishment of Province JCCs saw their efforts materialize during the month. By the end of November, Province JCCs had been established and were functioning in four out of the five provinces. Quang Tri Province was still in the process of organizing a council, but indications were that a council would be functioning by early December. In general, membership on the Province JCCs follows that of the I Corps JCC. Representatives included the Province Chief who was the Chairman of the Council and his staff assistants for security, administration, and Revolutionary Development, along with ARVN officers. Repre-

* The GVN Chieu Hoi amnesty program allowed for an enemy who voluntarily gave himself up, other than in battle, to qualify as a Hoi Chanh. The Chieu Hoi program consisted of a 45-day curriculum of reeducation and motivational lectures and limited training in a skill, if desired. Following the reeducation and training program, a Hoi Chanh was resettled on a piece of farm land with his family or the GVN would assist him in finding employment in his trade. From January through November 1966, 1,386 of the enemy entered the Chieu Hoi program in I Corps.
sentatives to the council also included the provincial representatives of USAID and JUSPAC, the MACV Sector Advisor, and a representative from the senior Marine headquarters in the province. In addition, a representative from the Combined Studies Division of MACV sat on the councils and in Quang Ngai Province the ROK Marines were represented.* The councils began to develop plans which would be implemented in support of the Revolutionary Development program and established lines of communication between all agencies who were concerned with the RD effort.**(30)

By the end of November, a major reorganization of United States agencies involved in pacification and RD support was taking place throughout South Vietnam. At the United States Embassy in Saigon, plans were being initiated which would bring into being an organizational structure which would be more functional in support of the total pacification efforts going on throughout South Vietnam. Since the initial U. S. military buildup in South Vietnam, the size of the U. S. pacification support efforts had grown to an almost unmanageable proportion. There were literally dozens of organizations, both military and civilian, which were engaged in administering to the needs of the Vietnamese people throughout the entire country. In some areas, a coordinated effort had been established in order to prevent waste and duplication of programs, but in other areas coordination was less than that desired. In order to provide for a more coordinated effort in support of pacification programs, especially the Vietnamese RD program, during the calendar year 1967, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was officially established on 1 December 1966. The organizational structure of OCO included elements from the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA), and United States Agency for International Development and placed all field personnel of these agencies working throughout South Vietnam under the direction of the Deputy U. S. Ambassador and Director of OCO. The Operational Divisions of OCO were: (1) Refugees; (2) Chieu Hoi; (3) RD Teams; (4) Public Safety; (5) PsyOps and Information; and (6) New Life Development. On 1 December, with the official establishment of the Office of Civil Operations, approximately 1,000 U. S. personnel and 128 million U. S. dollars and 4 billion Vietnamese piasters in programs were absorbed by the new organization.(31)

While the Office of Civil Operations had been established to coordinate all U. S. civilian agencies and organizations involved in supporting the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Program, the impact of organization was less in I Corps than in the other Region/Corps areas. The reason for the limited impact

* The Combined Studies Division of MACV was responsible for advising the GVN on Revolutionary Development Cadre matters.
** A graphic portrayal of the organizational structure of the Regional and Provincial Organization for Revolutionary Development in the ICTZ is found on the following page.
was due to the effectiveness of the I Corps JCC which had been operating for over a year. During November, Mr. Gordon of USAID attended the opening session of a meeting called by members of the Country Team for the purpose of insuring that all elements which would support the GVN Revolutionary Development Plan were thoroughly coordinated. Mr. Gordon reported to the I Corps JCC that it was his impression that the members of the Country Team were convinced that the degree of coordination desired had already been established in I Corps, and that the GVN Revolutionary Development Plan for 1967 promised considerable progress during the coming year. Only in I Corps did an organization such as the Joint Coordinating Council exist prior to the establishment of OCO. In one sense, the Office of Civil Operations would attempt to bring to the other region/Corps areas what the Joint Coordinating Council had already brought to I Corps. (33)

December 1966

The beginning of December reflected many of the concerns which had developed during the latter part of the previous month. The I Corps JCC had established a special briefing team for the purpose of informing III MAF units of the GVN Revolutionary Plan for 1967, and emphasis was being placed on seeing that the information was widely disseminated. The team members consisted of representatives from USAID, JUSPAO, I Corps Advisory Group, and III MAF. Essentially the Revolutionary Development plans for the ICTZ during 1967 called for the developing of 110 New Life Hamlets, consolidating 101 hamlets, and constructing 25 hamlets. Plans presented to the Commanding General of I Corps called for two ARVN battalions in support of the RD Programs in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces. In Quang Nam Province there would be four ARVN battalions and one Regional Force Battalion in support of the RD Program. (34) The ARVN and Regional Force troops were to provide a security shield against Viet Cong attacks and produce the necessary safety factor to allow the RD Cadre to concentrate on pacification. If an adequate security force could be provided in all the provinces, the level of success of the RD Programs in 1967 would undoubtedly exceed the progress that had been made during 1966. An evaluation of the 1966 RD Program showed that one of the most pronounced obstacles which had restricted RD advancement was that the RD Cadre had to worry more about their own physical safety in the rural areas where they were working than about the job they were supposed to be doing. The worry was not from an imaginary cause since over 1,400 RD Cadre had been killed or wounded during the first nine months of 1966. (35)

The monsoon rains which had plagued combat operations as well as pacification endeavors during November, continued into the month of December.* The heavy rainfall during the month

* During November, rain and mud were the principle adversaries in Vietnam. The northeast monsoon, more severe than in 1965,
inundated the low altitude rice lands in all of the Marines' TAORs resulting in the roadways becoming impassable to almost all types of transportation except tracked vehicles. (36) The combination of flood conditions and impassable roads was effective in isolating large numbers of Vietnamese people from any contact with III MAF civil affairs personnel. Numerous Marine units which sent out MEDCAP teams reported that once the MEDCAP teams had reached their destination few, if any, Vietnamese would turn up for medical treatment because of the inclement weather. The heavy cloud coverage which was persisting over the ICTZ produced unfavorable flying conditions and adversely affected the resupply capability in the outlying areas. Fortunately, III MAF received a shipment of MEDCAP supplies from Saigon, and by using the vehicles that could move under the prevailing weather conditions, immediate distribution was made to the units sending out MEDCAP teams. The shipment and distribution of medical supplies filled nearly all the requirements of the MEDCAP teams and provided adequate assets for them to continue operating. Even though direct efforts were being made to reach the outlying populace and provide needed services for them, there was a decline in the number of Vietnamese who received such services during December. The indices which were used to indicate trends in the civil affairs activity reflected by the end of the month a decrease of 15.7 percent in medical treatments administered, a 26.9 percent decline in soap distribution, and a 37.4 percent decline in food distribution.*

The downward trends which were recorded in some of the III MAF civil affairs programs during December reflected the existing weather conditions considerably more than they did VC activity. Increased emphasis on small unit operations during the month was effective in preventing the VC from gaining any major initiative within the ICTZ. There was a slight increase in VC propaganda, subversion, and terrorism over the past month, but in general these activities were restricted due to the Marines' quick reaction capability. The ability of the enemy to move about within the ICTZ without fear of Marine engagement was observed during the truce at Christmas. Within this forty-eight hour period, III MAF units reported forty-nine VC truce violations. Another truce period was observed at the end of the month in recognition of the New Year. The New Year truce began on 31 December and on the same day a major sighting of approximately 1,000 well-armed VC, carrying mortars and machine guns, was made in Thua Thien Province. During the New Year truce period U. S. Marine units reported a total of sixty-one VC truce violations throughout the ICTZ. The III MAF maintained its posture of readiness to react to enemy action while maintaining defensive positions during both truce periods.(37)

delivered during the month more rain on the ICTZ than normally falls on Washington, D. C. during a two-year period.

* Percentage totals for any given month were drawn on a comparative basis from the highest percentage totals of any previous month or months.
Major innovations which had occurred and had been implemented by III MAF during the past months continued to pay dividends during December. The five COUNTY FAIR operations conducted in areas made secure by Marine combat operations produced significant results in defeating VC objectives within the villages and hamlets in the outlying areas of the TAORs. These operations were also successful in providing needed medical assistance and other material goods to the Vietnamese people, besides allowing III MAF and ARVN personnel to conduct psychological indoctrination in an effort to gain GVN support among the people. The operations conducted during the month fell short of the established goal of 10 per month which had been set. The failure to reach the desired goal was due not to the unwillingness of III MAF to provide the necessary support for the operations, but to the lack of GVN personnel who were necessary to conduct a successful COUNTY FAIR operation. Laboring under these conditions, III MAF had been able to conduct successfully 88 COUNTY FAIR operations during 1966. (38)

The Kit Carson Scout program which had been initiated within the 1st Marine Division under the leadership of General Nickerson continued to prove to be an ingenious innovation. The Kit Carson Scouts, carefully selected Chieu Hoi returnees who voluntarily participated in Marine counterguerrilla and psychological warfare operations, were successful during December in assisting Marine units in uncovering VC hiding places, identifying guerrillas, and delivering pro-GVN speeches to known VC families. By the end of the month, 19 Kit Carson Scouts were employed by III MAF and future plans called for the number to be increased to 50 by April 1967 and 100 by July 1967. This planned increase was the direct result of the successes of the first 19 scouts. Since the initiation of the program during October, the scouts' familiarity with the terrain and VC tactics had led to the killing or capture of 47 VC, the capture of 16 weapons, and the discovery of 18 mines and tunnels. There was little doubt by personnel of III MAF who were concerned with the selection of Kit Carson Scouts that the projected number of scouts for the coming year could be found. This optimistic view was due partly to the fact that in December alone, 171 of the enemy rallied to the cause of the GVN. This figure represented the second highest during 1966.* The total number of returnees who were repatriated through the Chieu Hoi program in I Corps during 1966 was 1,531. (39)

The principal concerns of the I Corps JCC during the month were directed at providing support for the committee working under its direction, providing information about the newly established Office of Civil Operations, and devising new means for increased support of the GVN Revolutionary Development

* The highest number of returnees for a single month in I Corps during 1966 occurred in the month of October when 172 enemy rallied to the cause of the GVN.
In addition to these concerns, the council was involved in providing assistance to the newly established Census Grievance Office in Da Nang, supporting Christmas programs for the Vietnamese people, and aiding the villagers who were the victims of a Flying Tiger plane crash, which occurred on 24 December in a heavily populated area surrounding the Da Nang Airfield. The members of the council were advised that each corps area would be assigned an OCO coordinator with the rank of Deputy Ambassador, and that Deputy Ambassador Koren would be assigned as the coordinator for I Corps. The council received a report from the Public Health Committee stating that the plague was on the increase in several areas. In order to reduce the plague threat, USAID provided assistance in securing the necessary vaccine to administer to the populace. Continued assistance was also being provided to the Vietnamese farmers by USAID, to insure that they would have the necessary fertilizer to improve their rice yield.

The new plans for the GVN Revolutionary Development Program were discussed throughout the month by the council and plans were drawn up to inform all Marine units of the necessary support that would be required to implement the program. Information was provided to the council concerning the establishment of a Census Grievance Office which was established in the City of Da Nang. This office would conduct the Peoples Aspiration Program in the City of Da Nang and would refer appropriate grievances to the Mayor of Da Nang. The council stated that it was willing to assist the newly established program and considered it to be a worthy addition in fulfilling the needs of the people.

During the Christmas season, every effort was made to insure that the Vietnamese adults and children within the ICTZ would have an enjoyable holiday. A total of 22 children's Christmas parties were sponsored by the Naval Support Activity, on behalf of the Christian organizations located within the City of Da Nang. Approximately 12,000 gifts were distributed to the Vietnamese children at these parties. In addition, III MAF provided approximately 18,700 toy packages plus various other items received from Project HANDCLASP and private donors for similar parties conducted throughout the ICTZ in Marine-controlled areas, excluding Da Nang.

The untimely crash of the Flying Tiger aircraft on 24 December required direct assistance from the civil affairs personnel of III MAF. Immediate efforts were made to provide medical treatment for the injured and food, shelter, and clothing for the destitute. Marine personnel assisted in searching the rubble for bodies and providing a general clean-up of the area. Members of the I Corps JCC assisted the victims of the plane crash by providing, through the agencies they represented, necessary material items which would help in rebuilding homes and resettling families. The council also
directed its efforts at seeing that legal claims obligations owed to the plane crash victims were met. It was the council's desire to have all the claims paid before TET, if possible.

By the end of 1966 the influence of the I Corps JCC had been felt in all phases of civil affairs activity. The council had become directly involved in guiding, supporting, and encouraging the growth of no less than 26 separate programs of pacification throughout the ICTZ. Other civil affairs programs being carried on by III MAF during the month which materially assisted the Vietnamese people centered around the self-help projects which had been developing over the past months, a stepping up of all phases of the academic and vocational educational programs, the initiation of new programs to provide for the welfare of the Vietnamese youth, and an increasing effort at resettling refugees.*

In order to provide for an increased capability at producing necessary material for self-help construction projects, CARE had procured a set of Korean plans for a cement block-making machine. These machines, which were eventually to be locally produced, would not only increase the capability of producing material which would be used in the construction of schools and other structures, but would increase the quality of the material being used. By the end of the month, three machines were in operation and were turning out approximately 400 blocks a day for use in III MAF's civil affairs construction projects. This process was being carried on by Vietnamese refugees through the sponsorship of the 7th Engineer Battalion which was located at Red Beach, near Da Nang. In this capacity the operation was serving a dual civil affairs purpose. It provided needed construction material for building projects and it provided employment for the refugees.(44)

The importance of providing educational opportunities for the Vietnamese youth continued to be of prime interest to III MAF during December. General Walt had long been convinced that the future of South Vietnam ultimately rested in its youth. He was vitally concerned with all civil affairs efforts which were directed toward providing educational assistance to these Vietnamese. General Walt was able to provide the necessary impetus, which had been essential for establishing a wide range of programs directed at improving and increasing educational opportunities for the Vietnamese youth who were living within the ICTZ. The Marines' support for education, other than the school building programs, was being provided by the Marine Scholarship Program. This program called for Marine units within the ICTZ to support from one to seven scholarship students who had been selected on the basis of scholastic attainment and

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* A summary account of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council's activities for the year 1966 can be found attached to the Minutes of the I Corps JCC for January 1967.
financial need. In addition, indispensable funds were being provided by the Marine Corps Reserve project which had begun in 1965 and was being facilitated in cooperation with CARE; it was able to provide on-the-spot financing for many of the civil affairs projects being carried on by III MAF. The Civic Action Fund, which had been set up to receive cash donations from any one concerned with financially supporting civil affairs projects, had continually received praise from the civil affairs personnel. General Walt indicated that it was one of the III MAF's major assets in carrying on civil affairs programs. (45)

In a related area for providing support for the children within I Corps, the Education Committee of the JCC had established a Subcommittee on Youth Activities. This subcommittee was composed of U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from both military and civilian organizations concerned with the civil affairs activity in I Corps. At the December meeting of the subcommittee, plans were discussed for establishing a Boy Scout camp and providing periodic sports tournaments which would increase organized and supervised recreational activities. Plans were also discussed at the meeting concerning the repair of basketball and volleyball courts and the possibility for future construction of additional facilities. The establishment of the Youth Activities Subcommittee represented another avenue through which coordinated and concentrated effort could be directed by civil affairs personnel at providing for the welfare of the young people of South Vietnam. (46)

The refugee population in I Corps, which had been increasing over the past months due to a number of conditions other than those produced by combat operations, showed no appreciable decline during December. By the end of the month it was estimated that over 282,000 refugees were living throughout the ICTZ. In order to provide for the needs of the refugees, III MAF continued to increase its efforts at providing food, clothing, and medical assistance along with establishing self-help projects. In addition to providing services to the 48 refugee camps located within III MAF's areas, major accomplishments had been made at resettling refugees.* Through Marine supervision and assistance, five refugee hamlets had been developed which provided homes for a number of the refugee families. As the new year approached, indications were that the refugee population would continue to grow and III MAF civil affairs personnel began to make plans for assisting the inevitable influx. (47)

As the year 1966 came to a close, III MAF was able to evaluate its many efforts at pacification. There had been a number of setbacks due to the prolonged political crisis which had occurred in I Corps, the constant shortage of Vietnamese troops to support

* There were approximately 100,000 refugees living in the 48 refugee camps within the Marines' area.
the COUNTY FAIR and Combined Action programs, and the unusually severe monsoon season. With all of the adversity, however, there had been significant accomplishments made in providing for the welfare of the Vietnamese people. Not only had III MAF successfully blocked the NVA's attempted advance across the DMZ but it was also able to record major advances in a number of its civil affairs programs. The record showed that many ingenious innovations had taken place during 1966 which had a positive effect on improving as well as expanding the overall civil affairs efforts. As III MAF looked toward the new year, there was an ever growing conviction by all personnel concerned with pacification that many profitable lessons had been learned during the past year and that the problems to be faced during 1967 would not only be met, but would successfully be overcome.(48)
During January 1967, III MAF initiated the largest number of small unit operations that had been launched since the Marines' arrival in I Corps, South Vietnam. These operations were designed to place increased pressure on the Viet Cong and counter his activities in the villages and hamlets throughout the countryside. It was anticipated by III MAF that as more populated areas came under its control, civil affairs programs would be initiated in those areas to provide for the welfare of the people. Before the month had ended, the III MAF small unit counterguerrilla operations had been effective in eliminating VC activity in many areas, allowing for a general upward trend of civil affairs activity to take place.

Another factor which contributed to the upward move was a break in the adverse weather conditions which had hampered progress over previous months. Major supply routes became accessible for travel and roadways leading into the rural areas became sufficiently dried to permit the passage of MEDCAP teams and other civil affairs personnel into their areas of operation. As the flood waters receded and the outlying countryside became accessible for travel, the Vietnamese people became more responsive to the services provided for them. This resulted in a large number of Vietnamese being treated by MEDCAP and DENCAP teams. The improved mobility conditions also facilitated an increase in the number of commodities distributed to the Vietnamese people within the ICTZ. In some areas of civil affairs activity, increases were reported as high as 48 percent while the total number of Vietnamese receiving all types of aid during the month increased by 20 percent over the previous month. In order to improve economic conditions for the Vietnamese people, III MAF introduced new economic programs in several of the village and hamlet areas. These programs included the organizing of farmers associations and hog production. Plans were also underway for establishing fishing projects which would improve the yield of the Vietnamese fishermen. Success of these projects was considered highly probable by III MAF since all sponsoring units were directing command attention toward their implementation. (1)

The I Corps JCC, which had enjoyed considerable success during 1966, moved with renewed vigor during the first month of the new calendar year in support of the growing programs of pacification within the ICTZ. At one of its meetings in January, the council officially stated its composition, mission, and goals to be achieved during 1967. These were essentially the same as those stated during the celebration of the first anniversary of
operation in August 1966. At the request of Brigadier General Hugh M. Elwood, Chief of Staff, III MAF, a chronology of significant events of the past year of operation of the I Corps JCC was compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Evans, the recorder of the council.* This chronology not only indicated the magnitude of the involvement of the I Corps JCC in support of pacification during the past year, but also served as a reference point for the future involvement of the council during the new calendar year. (2)

The endeavors of the I Corps JCC during the month were directed at receiving the many recommendations and progress reports being supplied by the committees which were directly concerned with the different civil affairs projects which were being carried on within the ICTZ. The council was especially concerned with the formation of the recently established Office of Civil Operations, plans which were being developed to support the forthcoming TET Holiday, and the support being provided for the Vietnamese RD Program. Mr. Gordon, who had become the Deputy Regional Director for OCO in I Corps, reported to the council that Ambassador Koren, the Regional Director, would not become a member of the council and that Mr. Gordon would be his personal representative at the council meetings. With the I Corps JCC and OCO working together, an even greater coordinated effort could be directed at fulfilling the total pacification objectives for I Corps. Before the month had ended, the personnel working under the direction of OCO had intensified their efforts in support of programs designed to help the Vietnamese people and win their support for the GVN. Of special significance was the support provided by OCO in facilitating the shipment of coal out of the An Hoa Industrial Complex in Quang Nam Province to the City of Da Nang. Coal shipments had been a major problem during the past months due to the lack of available transportation and weather conditions. In a coordinated effort with U.S. Air Force personnel, OCO was able to secure the services of C-123 aircraft for transporting coal. OCO assured the management officials of the An Hoa Industrial Complex that every effort would be made to reach their goal of moving 60 tons of coal prior to TET. (3)

In order to provide for a concentrated psychological warfare campaign prior to and during TET, the I Corps JCC worked at providing a coordinated effort between all agencies and personnel concerned with PsyWar. TET, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year period, was considered to be the most important holiday of

* General Elwood became the Chief of Staff of III MAF on 7 December 1966. In this capacity, General Elwood had also replaced General Platt as a member of the I Corps JCC. General Platt's last meeting with the council was on 29 November 1966 at which time he expressed his pleasure in having been a member of the council and his faith in its continued success. (JCC Minutes, 29 November 1966).
the year. It was during the TET period that the Vietnamese held their traditional family gatherings with major emphasis being placed on family solidarity and the reverence of ancestors. It was also during this period that the Vietnamese serving with the Viet Cong were most vulnerable for appeals to defect and rally to the support of the GVN through the Chieu Hoi program. In establishing a maximum effort for creating defections within the ranks of the VC, the council supported programs which would assure a wide dissemination of information about the advantages of rallying to the cause of the GVN. This information was not only directed at Vietnamese families who had friends and relatives serving with the Viet Cong, but direct appeals were made to the VC by use of radio and loudspeaker broadcasts and PsyWar leaflets dropped in known VC areas. The PsyWar leaflets were dropped to stimulate the awareness of family separation during TET and create a longing to return to family and friends living within Marine and GVN-controlled areas. In addition to these leaflets, safe conduct passes were dropped which would assure any VC wanting to defect that he could receive safe passage through Marine and GVN-held areas and would be turned over to a Chieu Hoi Center for repatriation. The I Corps JCC also coordinated efforts in establishing enough collection points throughout the ICTZ with the necessary provisions to take care of those VC who would voluntarily return to the control of the GVN. This coordination was vital, since the existing Chieu Hoi centers were inadequate to care for a large influx of returnees. (4)

Although the TET holiday was not scheduled to begin until 9 February, the effectiveness of the PsyWar campaign was readily apparent by the end of January. The total number of ralliers who voluntarily surrendered for the Chieu Hoi program within the ICTZ during the month reached 238. While all five provinces within the ICTZ received ralliers during the month, the greatest number of VC defections occurred in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces with Quang Nam reporting 84 returnees, which represented the highest number of defections in any one province. In order to sustain the momentum of PsyWar which had been attained during January, the Commanding General of III MAF directed all of his unit commanders to expand and intensify psychological operations during the forthcoming period of TET. It was anticipated by III MAF that a larger number of VC defections would occur during that period than had occurred over the previous month. (5)

The importance of providing the necessary support to assist the GVN in carrying out its Revolutionary Development plans for 1967 was a major item of interest to all U. S. agencies and organizations in I Corps during January. Members of the JCC were anxious to see that the RD Program got off to a good start since the initial efforts would probably set the tone for subsequent efforts throughout the year. During January, Dr. Chi, Quang Nam Province Chief, and other Vietnamese officials briefed the council on the progress being made and problems encountered
Several problems had developed which could adversely affect future progress if they were not solved. The problems presented to the council for consideration were centered around a lack of funding by the GVN to sustain important projects underway, insufficient training on the part of some RD Cadre Teams to effectively initiate and carry through New Life Hamlet development, and the inability of many of the village and hamlet chiefs to analyze effectively the needs within their areas and submit the required documents for initiating self-help projects. Problems had also developed in providing enough funds and personnel to deal effectively with the growing number of refugees and ralliers who were coming into GVN-controlled areas. These problems were met head-on by members of the I Corps JCC and assurance was given to the local Vietnamese officials responsible for carrying on RD within I Corps that every effort would be made by the council to alleviate the problem areas and sustain RD progress. Knowing the type of support that had been provided by the I Corps JCC during the past months, the Vietnamese officials expressed their appreciation to the council and confidence in its ability to provide the necessary coordination and support for assuring RD progress throughout the new calendar year. (6)

During January, the many grass-roots civil affairs projects which had been initiated by III MAF in direct support of the Vietnamese people continued to develop and record significant progress. The cement block-making project being sponsored by Marines of the 7th Engineer Battalion was in full operation and turning out a superior quality of blocks to be used for construction in civil affairs projects. Expansion plans were underway which would not only provide for an increase in production but would also increase the number of refugees being used to carry on the project.

The vocational school at Da Nang was making progress in training refugees for skilled employment. Training in masonry and plumbing was to be added to the curriculum and the problem of providing sufficient funds to keep the school going had essentially been solved. By the end of the month, 472 refugees had received enough training in various skills to qualify them for economic employment and a new class of 250 students was due to convene. Assistance was also being provided by the vocational training program through an office which had been established to help the skilled graduates find the employment they desired.

In the area of public health and medical assistance, III MAF medical personnel continued to concentrate on providing preventative medicine in an effort to reduce the plague problem and check the outbreak of other diseases. The medical personnel of III MAF were convinced that for a lasting benefit to be derived by the Vietnamese people from the programs they had
initiated, a greater number of Vietnamese would have to be sufficiently trained to carry on the programs. It was of primary concern to the medical personnel that they get the Vietnamese actively involved in providing for their medical and public health needs rather than solely relying on the Marines' civil affairs assistance programs. Indeed, the entire self-help concept which had been initiated by the civil affairs personnel of III MAF was directed at developing self-reliance on the part of the Vietnamese for carrying on all civic programs and projects which had been started by the Marines and other agencies dealing with pacification in I Corps. Whether this objective could be sufficiently accomplished within the near future was a matter of speculation, since the services and support of III MAF and other agencies were continually being called upon to provide for the crucial needs of the civilian populace. Just how these needs were to be met was demonstrated during the month as plans were developed for the expansion of the Provincial Hospital at Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province. The 60-bed hospital was to be renovated and expanded to a facility which would accommodate between 160 and 180 beds. The primary funds and supplies were to be provided by USAID and the renovating and construction was to be provided by the 30th U. S. Naval Construction Regiment. As indicated by the total civil affairs involvement, this endeavor represented just one of the many coordinated efforts at supporting projects which were underway throughout the ICTZ.(7)

As January was passing into February, the personnel under the command of III MAF continued to put pressure on the VC, both in the field and in the villages and hamlets, through skillfully conducting counterguerrilla operations and effective civil affairs programs. The Marine units in Quang Tri Province were continuing a successful containment of the NVA along the DMZ area, but indications were growing that more Marines would have to be sent into the area in order to counter any major thrust directed at I Corps by the NVA. Increased efforts were also being directed at intensifying the PsyWar program for February, since the observance of TET would be held from the 9th through the 12th of that month. As January closed out, there were changes made in the structure of the membership of the I Corps JCC. At the council meeting held on 31 January, the members unanimously adopted the proposal which would make the Assistant Regional Director for New Life Development, OCO, 1st Region, a member of the council and Mr. Gordon, Deputy Regional Director, OCO, 1st Region, the deputy chairman of the council. It was pointed out by the chairman of the council that two of its regular military members would be changed because of new duty assignments. Admiral Weschler and Colonel Holmgren would be returning to the United States for duty, Colonel John T. Hill would replace Colonel Holmgren as G-5 of III MAF and Rear Admiral Lacy would replace Admiral Weschler as Commander of Naval Support Activity, Da Nang. The new members would assume their responsibilities on the council at its first meeting in February.(8)
Throughout the month of February, III MAF was effective in meeting the Communist challenge both in the field and within the populated areas of the ICTZ. In order to provide the necessary prerequisite for carrying on civil affairs programs, that of security, III MAF launched nearly twice as many small unit operations, patrols, ambushes, and clearing procedures as it had during January. In addition to the numerous small unit operations, which effectively saturated the areas of VC guerrilla activity, III MAF conducted thirteen combat operations, battalion size or larger, which were successful in inflicting severe damage to the enemy's capability of impeding pacification progress. By the end of the month, the U. S. Marines had recorded some of their highest totals in regards to enemy engaged, killed, and captured. These combat operations during February covered the entire month except for a four-day truce period during the TET holiday, 8-12 February, at which time the Marines maintained a posture of readiness to react while holding defensive positions. During the four day TET truce period, which was to be observed by both sides, the Marines recorded approximately 141 VC truce violations within the ICTZ. These violations resulted in casualties being inflicted to both sides and presented demonstrable evidence both to the Marines and the Vietnamese people of the untrustworthy character of the Viet Cong.

In a move to obstruct U. S. pacification and GVN Revolutionary Development progress, the VC increased their propaganda and subversion activity. Much of the VC propaganda was directed towards the Marines as well as the civilian population and carried the general theme of calling on the United States to put an end to the "Johnson-McNamara dirty war of aggression." In efforts to isolate the villages and hamlets and strengthen the influence of the infrastructures, the Viet Cong carried out sabotage activity against lines of communication and acts of terrorism were directed against village and hamlet officials. These efforts on the part of the Viet Cong, however, generally fell short of achieving their desired goals, since the Marines were able to counter many of the efforts while at the same time providing support for Revolutionary Development and increasing their own civil affairs activity. *(9) 

* Two incidents which occurred during February 1967 within the ICTZ, while not directly related to pacification, were of special significance. On 21 February, Dr. Bernard Fall, noted authority on Southeast Asia and particularly Vietnam, was killed by an enemy land mine while accompanying a combat operation east of the "Street Without Joy" in Thua Thien Province. He was accompanying a Marine platoon of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The second incident occurred on the morning of 27 February, with an enemy-launched rocket attack against the Da Nang Air Base. The 140mm rockets used by the enemy in attacking the airbase marked
Over the past months, III MAF had been responsible for the development of many programs and innovations which had considerably enhanced its ability to reach the Vietnamese people and provide for their needs. During this time, however, the civil affairs personnel had come to realize that just providing material goods to the Vietnamese people was insufficient for achieving the type of pacification desired. One ingredient that was sometimes missing, yet which was vital to achieving the desired results, was a positive attitude on the part of the individual Marine toward the Vietnamese people. In order to better understand Marine attitudes toward the Vietnamese people and to change any negative attitudes into positive ones, if possible, the Personal Response Project was initiated. This project was initiated as early as October 1965 by FMFPac, but the project remained in a data collecting stage until July 1966, at which time III MAF began to implement the program within its areas of responsibility. The first stages of the program were characterized by surveys taken throughout the ICTZ which were designed to reflect a representative sample of the Marines' attitudes towards the Vietnamese people. There were also lectures and discussions carried on by the chaplains of III MAF, in an effort to acquaint the Marines with the significance of the Vietnamese culture and style of life. A Platoon Leader's Personal Response Notebook was put together and distributed to small unit commanders. The notebook was to be used by these officers as a guide for instructing the Marines under their command in the ways of the Vietnamese people. (10)

A major advance was made in carrying on the Personal Response Project, when in February 1967 the 3d Marine Division established a Personal Response Council and a Personal Response Contact Team. This council and team were responsible for initiating a variety of programs which were directed at improving the relationships between the Marines and the Vietnamese citizens, essentially through eliminating any negative attitudes on the part of Marines. (11)

The following statement best describes the purpose and objectives of the U. S. Marine Corps Personal Response Project:

The Personal Response Project is a systematic effort toward attitudinal improvement in intercultural relations. By discovering the ways in which people of another culture relate their religious and ethical value systems to daily life the project develops effective anticipation of acculturative problems. Such anticipation and understanding is one of the keys to the elimination of offensive behavioral patterns toward indigenous citizens. It is expected that appropriate mutual assistance between Marines and the citizenry will be a by-product of increased under-

the first occasion on which the enemy had employed that type of weapon against U. S. personnel in South Vietnam.
standing and contributory to the elimination of local guerrilla forces in an insurgency environment.

The objectives of the Personal Response Project are to: assist military personnel to respond to the predisposition of indigenous citizens to act in concert with their social, religious, and cultural value systems; identify the expression of these value systems and the motivation implicit in them; and recognize that the lives, relationships, and actions of indigenous citizens are of the same importance as those of all other human beings. (12)

Although it was during the month of February 1967 that important direction was given to the Personal Response Project by making it a part of the command responsibility of small unit leaders and the development of a Personal Response Council and Team, an evaluation of the results and effectiveness of the project has to be deferred until a later accounting. Marine and Navy personnel, who had been closely associated with the project's beginnings praised it highly, however, and indicated that the project had already fulfilled a major role in advancing pacification within South Vietnam. *(13)

The psychological operations conducted during February by III MAF, ARVN, and OCO personnel proved to be extremely successful in reaching their desired target. One result of the PsyOps was that 279 Viet Cong defected from their own units and rallied to the cause of the GVN. Upon interrogation, the ralliers were consistent in stating that they had heard loudspeaker appeals and had seen leaflets describing the Chieu Hoi program and that these appeals had been effective in convincing them to return to the control of the GVN. It was reported by those who interrogated the ralliers, that the VC who came over to the GVN during February showed a deeper understanding of the advantages offered by the Chieu Hoi program than those who had been interrogated during previous months. This information was considered to be a reliable indication of the effectiveness of

* Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt, USMC, has pointed out that the Personal Response Project was one of the most important programs developed in I Corps to assist pacification efforts. Major General Jonas M. Platt, USMC, has stated that in his opinion, the Personal Response Project is, "the heart of the civil affairs effort." Captain Robert E. Mattingly indicated that at the grass-roots level the Personal Response Project was fulfilling a vital need that had long been present. Lieutenant Commander Richard A. McGonigal, USN, who is a Navy Chaplain and one of the principal architects of the Personal Response Project, has pointed out that the success of pacification in future wars of counterinsurgency as well as the present one going on in South Vietnam will ultimately have to be measured in part by the success of programs such as Personal Response. Commander McGonigal is currently involved in research and study on how to better improve and implement the Personal Response Program.