the coordinated endeavors of those who were carrying out the psychological operations. The importance of providing good psychological operations was reiterated by a report given to the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee by the personnel of OCO. It was pointed out that the existing situation in Vietnam could basically be described as a political war in which every effort had to be directed at assisting the Vietnamese in building a strong and viable nation. The report also stated that the success of the RD and Chieu Hoi programs was of vital importance in the nation-building process and that the success of these operations required the concentrated support of psychological operations. The magnitude of the coordinated psychological effort during February could be seen through the many diversified projects which were being carried on: assisting in the relocation of a number of Vietnamese people; supporting tactical operations in the form of leaflet drops, audio-visual teams, combat loudspeaker teams, and Armed Propaganda Teams; and directing support to the six COUNTY FAIRs conducted. Personnel from the 1st Military Police Battalion conducted movie festivals in which a total of 329 movies were shown to the people and the Vietnamese Cultural Drama Team conducted 59 performances in different locations within the ICTZ. As a result of the PsyOps success that had been achieved during January and February, the initial campaign which had been initiated in anticipation of the TET Holiday was extended until 25 March. (14)

During the four-day TET Holiday, III MAF civil affairs personnel concentrated on distributing food, clothing, and other supplies to the Vietnamese people. These supplies were largely distributed in the form of gifts as a means of showing respect for the cultural and traditional significance of the holiday. General Walt visited several of the ARVN hospitals during the holiday season and distributed numerous comfort kits to the patients. These visits were well received as the patients expressed their gratitude to the Commanding General of III MAF for having taken time off from a demanding schedule to pay them a visit during their most important holiday. The atmosphere during the TET Holiday, throughout the ICTZ, was charged with friendship and respect being reciprocated both by the Marines and the Vietnamese people. (15)

One incident, which typifies the many such occurring during this period, developed on the first day of TET in the Da Nang TAOR. The Vietnamese people living in a village near Company A, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines approached the Marine area on the first day of TET bearing food. The commander of Company A was informed by one of the village officials that people had come with food in a gesture of appreciation for what the Marines had done for them and hoped that they would join them in celebrating their most sacred holiday. Before the holiday season had ended, a number of men from Company A had visited and eaten in the homes of the villagers and the villagers had visited and eaten with the Marines in their company area. The many acts of friendship
First Lieutenant Ellsworth J. Turse, Jr., S-5 of the 7th Engineer Battalion, helps a Vietnamese boy draw water from a newly constructed well built with material supplied by the battalion. (USMC Photo #371518)
and good-will which were being exhibited toward the Marines by the Vietnamese people were taken as a positive indicator that pacification progress was being made at the grass-roots level. (16) They also signified the importance of developing a strong Personal Response Program. For in the final analysis, the success or failure of the Marines' efforts at pacification would ultimately rest on the shoulders of the individual Marine and the attitudes exhibited, day by day, toward the Vietnamese people in the performance of his duties. (17)

As a result of the improved weather, which continued to prevail throughout February, III MAF's efforts at providing medical assistance to the people living in the rural areas continued at a steady pace. The only noticeable reduction of the responsiveness of the Vietnamese people toward the MEDCAP and DENCAP teams was during the four-day holiday period. This lack of responsiveness was attributed to the Vietnamese concerns with carrying on their celebrations during TET, because in all other areas of III MAF's civil affairs endeavors there were marked increases in activity and progress.

In order to provide assistance to the GVN in carrying on their civil affairs programs in I Corps, III MAF increased its activity in providing both physical and moral support for those programs which had been undertaken. There was hope by III MAF that the ARVN lack of interest for carrying on civil affairs programs, which had long been indicated by apathy and resistance at the grass-roots level, would be overcome and that increased pacification progress could be made. Indications of what the future could hold were observed by III MAF before the month had ended as the GVN increased its efforts for participating in civil affairs through the use of its RD Cadre Teams. The Cadre Teams, which had become directly involved in civil affairs projects, proved to be a welcome addition. The Vietnamese people were very receptive to their efforts and communication was much improved since there was little or no language barrier. In another area where the Vietnamese were continually demonstrating their value in support of III MAF, were the ralliers who were serving within the Kit Carson Scout program. During the month, the scouts serving with the 1st Marine Division proved to be invaluable in directing Marine tactical units in the field. They were teaching the Marines how to read trail signs which would indicate whether VC mines or booby traps had been planted in the areas where the Marines were operating. The scouts, for example, taught the Marines that a bamboo tree bent over a trail with a small amount of paint on the back side would usually indicate that the trail had been booby trapped from that point onward. Such information was undoubtedly responsible for saving the lives of a number of Marines who otherwise would have been lost. The mutual respect which was visibly growing between the scouts and the Marines with whom they served was a prime indication of the esprit de corps which the program had developed. (18)
The ingenuity of the field Marines, which had been the mainstay behind the Marines' first efforts at pacification in I Corps had somewhat become overshadowed by the growth of the elaborate and complex organizational structure developed for carrying on pacification, but it remained evident during the month of February 1967. Notable indications of this ingenuity occurred in the Vietnamese village of Hoa Tho, located southwest of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province. It was in this area that the 3d Tank Battalion of the 3d Marine Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson conducted a highly successful and unique experiment in pacification. Through the energetic leadership and ingenious ability of Corson and the enthusiasm of the Marines serving under his command, a rapport was established between the Marines and villagers of Hoa Tho which produced significant benefits for both. One of the major benefits derived by the people living in Phong Bac hamlet, one of the four hamlets of Hoa Tho village, was an improved economic base. This was a result of a fishing cooperative which the Marines initiated and helped to develop through showing the people how to substantially increase their fish catch out of the Song Cau Do.*(19)

Further to the north, in the Phu Bai area of Thua Thien Province, Staff Sergeant Calvin D. Brown was providing the leadership for molding the combined action platoon in Thuy Phu village into one of the most effective CAPs operating within the ICTZ. Sergeant Brown and his CAP Marines were able to win the respect and confidence of the villagers not only by meeting the VC in the rice paddies and defeating them in battle, but most importantly, by demonstrating their respect and concern for the villagers and their way of life. Sergeant Brown pointed out that the CAPs operating throughout the ICTZ were a potent force in reducing the effectiveness of the VC infrastructure. This was accomplished in providing assistance to the PFs by teaching them military skills and in providing day-to-day on-the-spot assistance to the Vietnamese people. Since the Marines who were assigned to the CAPs essentially lived with the people, it became very important that such a close association breed contentment rather than contempt. Sergeant Brown also pointed out, that to do an effective job with the people you had to be willing to devote time to learning and understanding the culture and life style of the Vietnamese. This included the acquired ability to communicate with the people in their own language. The responsiveness of the Vietnamese seemed to increase when

* An informative account of the pacification efforts conducted by the 3d Tank Battalion is found in a document written by Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson, USMC, entitled, "Phong Bac Hamlet: Case Study in Pacification." This is the record and the pacification program of the 3d Tank Battalion of the 3d Marine Division, during the period September 1966 through February 1967 in Phong Bac hamlet of South Vietnam. See also: William R. Corson, The Betrayal, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1968).
they knew you were taking the time to learn and understand their ways rather than presenting yourself as their savior with the gift of the 'American way.' The objective of the Marines serving with the CAPs was "to work themselves out of a job" by providing the type of assistance to the people which would increase their self-reliance, their safety, and their overall well being. The Marines were working to make the villages and hamlets in which they were living and operating a better place to live than before they arrived. Through the understanding and dedication of Sergeant Brown and his ability to communicate this to the Marines under his leadership and to the Vietnamese with whom he lived and worked, significant progress was made in pacifying the village of Thuy Phu and the surrounding area. (20)

The major concerns of the I Corps JCC and its committees during February remained centered upon providing, along with OCO, the necessary coordination and support for carrying on the many diversified programs of pacification which had developed in I Corps. The council's reports indicated that major progress was being made in support of Revolutionary Development and that the Vietnamese had developed a program which would provide the necessary security for the RD Cadre Teams operating within the rural areas. Other reports to the council indicated that the fertilizer problem within I Corps had essentially been solved since the necessary fertilizer had been distributed to the Vietnamese farmers within the various province areas and that the future rice crops would be sufficient for providing for the needs of the people. If, however, the rice crops proved to be insufficient for providing the necessary rice required to feed the people, the program of importing rice into the area would continue.

One major factor, which had improved the handling and distribution of supplies to the Vietnamese people was the increased capability of handling such supplies at the Port of Da Nang. The personnel of the Naval Support Activity had worked long and hard hours at developing programs and projects which would increase the overall performance of its assigned mission. By the end of the month, the work was paying important dividends for all concerned. A record number of vital supplies were handled, distributed, and stored for immediate and future use within the ICTZ.

A representative of OCO informed the council that plans were being developed for establishing three vegetable farms within the ICTZ, which would produce the amount and variety of vegetables required to support the U. S. military needs in the area. From this project, many Vietnamese farmers would receive employment and invaluable training in modern farming methods. Other advantages, which would benefit the people, would be that new food items would be introduced into the area which would undoubtedly be sold in Vietnamese markets, thereby creating a demand by the local populace which would remain after
the military demand had diminished or ceased; that increased use of vegetables by the populace would improve public health; and that prices of vegetables in the local markets should be considerably decreased, since many varieties of vegetables being used had to be imported into the ICTZ from other sections of the country. Thus, the design of the project could produce significant and lasting benefits for the Vietnamese people.

In another area of interest, the council was informed by Colonel Hill that III MAF had completed the draft of a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Emergency Relief which would provide for immediate reaction in the event of accident or disaster situations. It was also announced that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had established an Air-Mobile Contingency Reaction Force for response to emergency situations and that the force would be used as the initial reaction unit in conjunction with the SOP for Emergency Relief. This would provide immediate assistance to those areas which suffered disasters, such as plane crashes within populated areas. By the end of the month, the I Corps JCC had covered a wide spectrum of events which were taking place in pacification and plans were continually being developed by the council for advancing those programs and projects which had been undertaken during the ensuing months. (21)

March-April 1967

The months of March and April placed many new demands upon the resources of III MAF in combating the enemy and providing for the needs of the people. In addition to the new problems which developed and required immediate attention, many of the old problems continued to persist and inhibit certain areas of development. The major problems being faced by III MAF during the two months were centered around an increase in enemy activity designed to disrupt the election of the village and hamlet officials scheduled for April, disasters which occurred in Vietnamese populated areas, the refugee situation which was becoming almost insurmountable, and the confusion and complexity which existed within the GVN's organizational structure for supporting pacification.

The month of April marked the second full year of Marine activity within I Corps and although III MAF could point with pride to many successful achievements which had been accomplished by the Marines over the past two years, there was little time for such reflections in view of the rising urgency of the present. In order to meet the challenge of the increasing enemy activity in all five provinces, III MAF increased its number of small and large unit operations. These operations were successful in inflicting severe losses to the enemy, both in materiel and personnel. Of the 13 large operations conducted during March, 7 of them were conducted within TAORs which had substantial VC activity. Increased enemy activity was most noticeable during March in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Ngai Provinces. In
all of these areas the enemy maintained a consistent attempt to disrupt Revolutionary Development and U. S. pacification efforts. In Quang Ngai, the enemy strenuously attempted to control the populated areas and the high food producing area around Mo Duc. The locations and targets of the enemy activity indicated that the VC, would, in all probability, make even greater attempts in the future at thwarting pacification, particularly in the coastal regions. Such indications were also taken as a sign that the pacification efforts were making progress and curtailing the enemy's plans for taking over the populated and food producing areas.

The enemy had been largely unsuccessful in his open encounters with Marine forces although his ability at conducting propaganda activity and terrorist attacks against helpless civilians remained relatively high. During the month of March, such activity appeared in the form of indoctrination courses directed against ARVN and U. S. military personnel. Over the same period, VC terrorist attacks were mounted in surprise proportions to instill terror in the local populace, disrupt RD activity, and hamper the village and hamlet elections which were to begin on 2 April. These terrorist attacks resulted in the destruction of 117 homes in a refugee camp located in Thua Thien Province and repeated assassinations and kidnappings of former VC who had been employed by the RD program and other Vietnamese who were suspected of betraying the VC cause. Other enemy-initiated activity during the month accounted for 14 VC attacks against subsector and district headquarters. Three of the Vietnamese district headquarters within the ICTZ were completely overrun by the enemy and sustained heavy casualties.

Early in the morning of 15 March, the Da Nang Air Base was hit by its second 140mm rocket attack. An estimated 8 to 10 rounds impacted in an area on one of the runways. A Marine reaction force was dispatched with all speed to seal off the area and attempt to locate the enemy rocket launching sites. Twenty-four rocket firing points were found, with two of the rocket launchers still in position. Later on during the day, an additional 31 launchers, together with 11 140mm rockets and 8 cannisters were recovered in and along the banks of the Song Yen in Quang Nam Province. When the find was made, it was discovered that rockets were still inserted in five of the launchers. The Marines who discovered the enemy launch sites reported that freshly made craters were present and that the initial counterbattery fire by the Marine artillery units had probably created the craters, thereby interrupting the enemy fire mission and causing his hasty retreat from the area. The enemy capability estimate for the month as reported by III MAF indicated that the enemy was able to launch multi-regimental attacks, conduct small unit harassing operations against isolated outposts, interdict lines of communication, and terrorize the local population in many areas of the ICTZ. Although the estimate had credited the enemy with significant attacking and
harassing capability, the fact remained that he had paid a heavy price on occasions when he had challenged the Marines in open battle and had generally failed in attempts to halt civil affairs programs. (22)

By March 1967, the I Corps JCC and the Office of Civil Operations were working in full cooperation to advance the total pacification efforts of the U. S. and GVN. Many of the OCO personnel were members of the council and the committees functioning under its direction, which was resulting in a constant flow of information and interchange of ideas on how best to serve the needs of the Vietnamese people. There were many needs brought before the I Corps JCC during the month which would require its assistance if they were to be solved. The most pressing problems involved transporting a sugar mill from Saigon to Quang Ngai Province and assisting in establishing its operation, repairing a saw mill located within Quang Tin Province and the training of operators to keep the mill running once it had been repaired, and assisting the City of Da Nang with its trash disposal. The council was able to resolve the trash problem by coordinating arrangements for the purchasing of garbage trucks from Saigon, training the drivers for the trucks, and providing a location for a garbage dump.

In other areas of interest to the council, it was reported that OCO had arranged for the establishing of a rock crusher in I Corps, which could be of great assistance in providing material for construction projects, and that the Army-Air Force Exchange system had granted permission for introducing handicraft products from the Hue Vocational Training Center into the post exchange system. In the reports received by the council from its various committees, there were indications that problems continued to persist in checking the plague, which resulted not so much from the lack of medical treatment being provided to the Vietnamese but from the lack of knowledge in identifying their health problems and reporting for treatment in time to reduce infection. All avenues were being explored to reduce the problem and bring it into more manageable proportions.

A problem had developed in the Refugee Vocational Training School in Da Nang. Due to a breakdown in funding from the GVN, the teachers at the school had not been paid for their services since 31 December. As a result of this, the school would be closed on 1 April unless funds could be found to keep the school operating. The problem was taken under investigation by OCO, and it was anticipated that funds would be found to keep the school open. The refugee increases within I Corps had been mounting over several months and during March it continued to present one of the most challenging problems to the I Corps JCC. At the council meeting on 14 March, General Lam was in attendance and requested the council to continue to evaluate the refugee problem and assist him in finding a solution. The chairman of the council informed General Lam that an all-out effort would continue and that all avenues would be thoroughly explored which
might possibly lead to a solution of the problem. (23) By the end of March, the 29th Civil Affairs Company was using its Displaced Persons Team to revise the chart of all refugee camps and the refugee population living within the ICTZ. The project was due for completion during April and statistics had already indicated that 4,992 new refugees had arrived in the ICTZ during the month. (24)

Direct civil affairs assistance to the people, which was being provided by III MAF personnel, continued to rise during the month of March. With the continued good weather conditions, MEDCAP and DENCAP teams provided a record number of treatments in the populated areas. The distribution of soap, food, and clothing was also on the increase. Major construction projects such as building and repairing schools, digging wells, repairing the roads, and constructing livestock pens were increasing on all civil affairs agriculture projects and relief supplies were being distributed to a large number of displaced persons. The U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund, operating in a joint relationship with CARE, continued to be a major and vital source for carrying on III MAF's civil affairs activity. During March, a total of $16,515.00 of these funds was spent in providing for civil affairs activities which were directly aimed at relieving the needs of the people. (25)

The Emergency Relief plans, which had been drawn up by III MAF during February, received their first crucial test during March. Relief was administered to victims of disasters in several locations during the month. Two of the relief operations were of special significance. A seven-man team from Marine Aircraft Group-11 provided immediate relief to the injured and homeless persons of Ap Moi Hamlet, after a fire had destroyed the hamlet. The assistance which was provided consisted of commodities distribution, medical treatments, and temporary shelters which were erected soon after the fire had been extinguished.

The most extensive relief operation took place at Long Vei in the Huong Hoa District of Quang Tri Province. On the evening of 2 March, Long Vei was mistakenly bombed by two friendly aircraft which resulted in a number of the villagers being killed and wounded and the destruction of over 140 homes and buildings. A U. S. Army Special Forces camp, which adjoined the village, also sustained hits as a result of the bombs being dropped. Initial assistance was provided to the villagers by members of the Special Forces Detachment A-101. A III MAF unit, Sub Unit 5, Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division, was notified of the unfortunate attack and immediately dispatched assistance into the stricken area. Approximately 20 minutes after the bombing, 4 Marine Corps helicopters were on the scene and commenced MEDEVAC operations, but bad weather and ground fog in the area halted the helicopters after their initial effort. A KC-130 aircraft was able to land near the village and evacuated 53 of the injured before the weather closed in and halted all
air operations. Although aircraft were unable to provide continued immediate relief, a convoy of Marine trucks from the 12th Marines and Sub Unit 5 of the 3d Division arrived on the scene and evacuated more than 100 of the injured to the base at Khe Sanh. Further evacuation attempts were prevented on 2 March as a result of two VC mortar attacks which were launched against the base at Khe Sanh.

On 3 March, KC-130 aircraft were able to land in the stricken area. By mid-morning, all of the injured who required evacuation were airlifted to hospitals in Phu Bai and Da Nang. On the same day, relief supplies furnished by III MAF began to arrive in Long Vei by KC-130s. These supplies included rice, bags of salt, pots and pans, eating utensils, cooking oil, tool kits, and lumber. Much of this material was furnished to the disaster area by OCO and the World Relief Commission. In further attempts to provide assistance to the stricken area, U. S. Navy and Marine Corps heavy equipment was dispatched to the scene on 3 March to aid in rescue and relief work. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Contingency Relief Force (CRF) also arrived the same day and made a significant contribution to the relief operation. The CRF provided labor and security and assisted in the distribution of food and the burial of the dead. The U. S. Army 29th Civil Affairs Company provided coordination assistance in the area until 21 March. By that time the primary coordination for relief and rebuilding efforts had reverted to the U. S. Advisors for the GVN. Even though a change had been made for coordinating the relief work, U. S. Navy and Marine Corps trucks and heavy equipment, along with their operators, remained in the area and continued the rebuilding of Long Vei village. (26)

The psychological operations during the month remained effective in reaching the people living within Viet Cong-controlled areas. By the end of March, 165 new ralliers in I Corps had turned themselves over to the GVN for Chieu Hoi indoctrination. The ralliers who came into the Chieu Hoi program consistently reported that they had heard loudspeaker appeals and had seen leaflets explaining the advantages offered by the program. Many of the ralliers also reported that some of the Vietnamese who were serving with the VC were anxious to join the cause of the GVN but were afraid that if they defected the VC would kill them or members of their families. An important PsyOps technique, movie festivals, which had been developed for reaching the people within the villages and hamlets, continued to be an effective means for establishing good relations during March. A typical festival opened with a speech by the village or hamlet chief who informed the people attending of the purpose of the festival. The speaker usually told the villagers that the festival was being presented as a means of expressing the appreciation of the local Marine unit for the cooperation the people had given and to provide entertainment. After the speech was given, a cartoon, a feature film, and an educational film were usually shown. During reel changes of the film, traditional
Vietnamese music was played or a short speech made by a local raller. By the end of the month, the movie festival concept had expanded so rapidly, with numerous requests for festivals coming in from many different areas, that it was becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill the requests, due to a lack of audio-visual teams. The OCO PsyOps personnel, who supplied the films for the festivals, were directing their attention to solving the problem, since the festivals had proven so successful. (27)

Many of the problems which had confronted III MAF during March were resolved during April. Throughout the month of April, III MAF continued its stepped-up combat activity to counter the enemy attacks which were becoming increasingly directed at disrupting pacification efforts. It continued to appear that the VC had singled out the RD Program in general and the RD Cadre Teams in particular for intensified efforts at destruction. It was also evident that the VC was giving major attention to disrupting the village and hamlet elections which were being held in I Corps. Although enemy activity was present throughout the ICTZ during the month, the most intensive activity was centered in the northern portion of the ICTZ, specifically within Quang Tri Province.

In an attempt to further the enemy cause, the VC continued a steady program of propaganda and terrorism within the rural village and hamlet areas. Their propaganda leaflets were once again directed against the U.S. and ARVN personnel and the rural pacification program. Many noticeable acts of terrorism were directed against the Vietnamese people. In Quang Nam Province, 12 villagers who were candidates for election were kidnapped. In Thua Thien Province, the VC mortared a Vietnamese village which resulted in several casualties. In other areas throughout the ICTZ, the VC also carried out acts of assassination and abduction of Vietnamese nationals who had announced their candidacy for their village and hamlet elections. These acts indicated the enemy's ability to strike fear in the hearts of the defenseless and unsuspecting, but in doing so, the enemy continued to pay a heavy price for such activity.

The III MAF increased its small and large unit operations during April. The small unit counterguerrilla operations during the month resulted in approximately 1,067 enemy contacts which further resulted in 635 confirmed VC deaths. The large unit operations conducted by III MAF also produced marked results in reducing the enemy's capability for sustaining open combat with Marine forces. One of the most important aspects of the combat operations conducted during the month was the blocking and reducing of concentrated enemy efforts directed at destroying pacification programs. (28)

By the end of April, III MAF and the I Corps JCC had completed the first month of what was ultimately to become the third year of Marine pacification efforts within I Corps. The major civil affairs activity during April was directed toward
improving those programs and projects which had suffered degrees of recession over the past months. The level of MEDCAP and DENCAP treatments remained relatively the same as during the previous month but indications were that in numerous other civil affairs efforts progress was being made. One of the most significant concerns of the civil affairs personnel of III MAF was the extensive planning that was going on to formulate a program for the movement and resettlement of approximately 20,000 refugees within or near the DMZ area to locations further south within I Corps, in order to permit unrestricted military operations in the north. This move was of vital importance due to the large enemy buildup along the DMZ which had been growing over the past several months. In planning for the move of the refugees, III MAF was giving consideration to the construction of temporary housing, wells, medical facilities, transportation, and security. There were also many other contingencies that were being planned for the move and the operation was due to get underway during May. (29)

During the month, there was a change in the regular membership of the I Corps JCC. Of the changes that took place one was the result of a combat casualty. On 19 April, near Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province, Colonel John T. Hill, G-5, III MAF, was wounded and subsequently evacuated to the U. S. on 26 April. On 27 April, Colonel George O. Ross assumed the duty as G-5, III MAF, and became a regular member of the I Corps JCC. (30)*

The important items covered by the I Corps JCC during the month were centered around many of the problems that had been presented to the council during March. The council received word that the problem of payment for the teachers at the Da Nang Polytechnic School, which provided vocational training for refugees, had been solved by OCO. Mr. Gordon advised the council that OCO had taken cognizance of the situation to include the back pay for the teachers and the reestablishment of financial support for the teachers salaries for future courses which they would teach.

As a result of the coordinated efforts which had been established at the Port of Da Nang, and with the completion of the military port facilities, the council passed a motion which dropped the Port Coordinating Committee from its organizational structure. In its place, Brigadier General Robert G. Owens, Jr., Chief of Staff, III MAF, recommended to the council that the functions of the Road Committee be expanded and its title changed to the Transportation Committee. The committee

* Other membership changes that had taken place on the I Corps JCC were: Lieutenant Colonel O'Leary assumed the duties as recorder of the council from Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Evans on 28 February, and Brigadier General Robert G. Owens, Jr., assumed the duties as Chief of Staff, III MAF, from Brigadier General Hugh M. Elwood, and became a regular member of the council.
would have cognizance over land and sea transportation and future port developments within the ICTZ. The committee would ensure that all transportation aspects continued to be coordinated and would fill any void created by dropping the Port Coordinating Committee. The recommendation was taken under advisement and a study was to be made of its feasibility.

In order to deal more effectively with the refugee problem in I Corps and provide assistance to the GVN in solving the problem, the I Corps JCC formed a Refugee Committee, which became a functioning part of its organizational structure. The membership for the Refugee Committee was drawn from the GVN, III MAF, and OCO, and the committee was requested to make weekly reports to the council regarding its activities. By the end of the month, the standing committees of the council had reported on their areas of activity. These reports indicated an overall upward trend in the pacification progress. At the problem areas that did exist, immediate action was being directed at developing solutions. With the arrival of May, the I Corps JCC and its committees were continuing to search for ways that would assist in lightening the load of the Vietnamese people and provide avenues for the development of a viable and responsible GVN. (31)

The psychological operations which were conducted by III MAF during April in support of the pacification objectives were largely responsible for the continued defection of Vietnamese from the ranks of the VC. The 73 ralliers who defected from the VC in I Corps during the month continued to report that their decision to defect was greatly influenced by the leaflets or loudspeaker appeals which described the advantages of the Chieu Hoi program. Many of the propaganda leaflets which described the Chieu Hoi program and reached the VC were distributed by III MAF units which were carrying out daily patrols, and by MEDCAP and DENCAP teams who were performing services within the villages and hamlets. Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET) and Armed Propaganda Teams, which were receiving their guidance and assistance from the U. S. Army 244th PsyOps Company, were able to turn enemy-initiated incidents into positive propaganda in support of the GVN. Although there had been only seven COUNTY FAIRs conducted over the past two months, three in March and four in April, the psychological support for those operations had been highly successful. Another area where PsyOps had been skillfully employed was the Kit Carson Scout program. The program during April continued to move forward with much success, and, by the end of the month, 32 scouts were actively working with Marine units in the field and an additional 31 scouts were undergoing training. Since the inception of the program, the scouts had led over 1,000 patrols and had identified over 100 Viet Cong through facial recognition procedures. In order to increase the Scout program, all ralliers coming into the Chieu Hoi program were thoroughly screened to determine their suitability for the important task. (32)
By the end of April, it was apparent that all of III MAF's civil affairs efforts had made an important contribution to the success of the elections which were held in I Corps. During the voting period, approximately 80 percent of the eligible voters had participated in the elections and III MAF was continuing its efforts to assure at least a similar turnout of voters during the elections which were due to be held during May and June. As the month closed, III MAF received an important document on the refugee situation in I Corps which had been prepared by the Displaced Persons Team of the 29th Civil Affairs Company. This document covered the past history of the refugee problem in I Corps and pointed to the magnitude of the problem which existed at the time the document was prepared. The following is a portion of the document which was received by III MAF in April 1967:

These refugees were civilians who by reasons of real or imagined danger had left their homes to seek safety elsewhere within their own country. The current I Corps refugee problem began in the fall of 1964 when heavy rains and floods drove thousands of the rural people to "safe-havens" near the coast and larger districts. As the combat situation and operations increased in tempo, more and more people used this opportunity to escape from VC taxation, domination, terrorism and harassing activities. The security afforded these people near U.S. military and ARVN camps prompted others, who had heard of their situation, to flow into these same areas. Temporary shelters were built for many, but others were required to seek refuge with friends, relatives, and in abandoned buildings in the area. As of this writing, refugees continued to move out of VC territory into areas secured by the military forces. The estimated number of arrivals each month based on a nine month sampling is 10,000. These people, even though considered a liability by the misinformed, are a true asset to the government of Vietnam. They have "voted with their feet" to accept a more democratic way of life. They have deprived the VC of taxation, laborers, supplies, and food commodities. And finally, the refugees, by being placed in a position to observe for themselves a better way of life, act as the best anti-VC propaganda that we can provide. Today, the total of refugees in the ICTZ is 327,298. However, the refugee figure is extremely fluid. These people tend to move from one area to another, since they are unable to return to their ancestral territories. They continue steadfast in their hopes for this return and even after twenty years of upheaval can visualize a time when they may return again to pursue a peaceful existence. One of our primary goals is to continue to provide a better existence to these "unfortunates of war" than was available to them under the VC. (33)
Providing for the "unfortunates of war" in I Corps, had been one of the major objectives of III MAF since the inception of its civil affairs activity in March 1965. This objective, from March 1965 through April 1967, had faced many trials and challenges and although there had been setbacks, the endeavor had never halted. Thus, with faith in its cause and a determination to provide for an increasingly better life for the people of South Vietnam, the III Marine Amphibious Force continued to push forward its civil affairs efforts.
APPENDIX A

Interviews

The following is an alphabetical listing of those personally interviewed concerning Civil Affairs Activity in I Corps, South Vietnam from April 1966 to April 1967:

Brown, Calvin D., Staff Sergeant, USMC, 2 July 1968, Washington, D. C.
Evans, D. L., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, 2 July 1968, Washington, D. C.
McGonigal, Richard A., Lieutenant Commander, USN, Chaplain, 1 August 1968, Washington, D. C.
Mattingly, Robert E., Captain, USMC, 22 July 1968, Washington, D. C.
Nickerson, Herman Jr., Lieutenant General, USMC, 2 August 1968, Washington, D. C.
Platt, Jonas M., Major General, USMC, 24 September 1968, Washington, D. C.
Robertshaw, Louis B., Major General, USMC, 31 July 1968, Washington, D. C.
Walt, Lewis W., Lieutenant General, 6 August 1968, Washington, D. C.
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APPENDIX B

Abbreviations

ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BLT - Battalion Landing Team
CA - Civil Affairs or Civic Action
CAC - Combined Action Company
CAO - Civil Affairs Officers
CAP - Combined Action Platoon
CARE - Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere
CGC - Census Grievance Committee
COMUSMACV - Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
FEBA - Forward Edge of the Battle Area
GVN - Government of South Vietnam
HANDCLASP - The U. S. Navy People-to-People relief effort since 1962—in June 1965 it became a joint effort between the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps in South Vietnam.
ICTZ - I Corps Tactical Zone
JAC - Joint Action Company
JCC - Joint Coordinating Council (functioned in I Corps only)
JUSPAO - Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office
MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDCAP - Medical Civic Action Program or Medical Civic Action Patrols
MAF - Marine Amphibious Force
MORD - Ministry of Revolutionary Development
NSA - Naval Support Activity
NVA - North Vietnamese Army
OCO - Office of Civil Operations
PAT - Political Action Teams
PF - Popular Forces (South Vietnam)
PsyOps - Psychological Operations
PsyWar - Psychological Warfare
RC - Rural Construction
RD - Revolutionary Development
RF - Regional Forces (South Vietnam)
RVN - Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
TAOR - Tactical Area of Responsibility
USAID - United States Agency for International Development (also AID)
USIA - United States Information Agency
USIS - United States Information Service
USMACV - United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USOM - United States Operations Mission
VC - Viet Cong or Vietnamese Communist
VCS - Vietnamese Communist Suspect or Viet Cong Suspect
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