President Nixon's attention early in his term, when the first Kissinger national security study described the South Vietnamese Armed Forces in the following manner—I quote the exact language from that Kissinger study in 1969 quoted by the President:

RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) faces severe motivation problems. The officer problem is still mixed in politics and little has been done to correct it. Poor leadership and motivation contribute to regular ground combat forces deserting (net) at an annual rate of 84 per cent of their strength. Total RVNAF desertions (net) are equivalent to losing one ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) division a month.

Close quote, from the exact language of that report.

**BOMBING IS NOT DECISIVE**

We know from past experience that bombing is not decisive. In World War II, we dropped two million tons of bombs. In the Korean war, 1 million tons. While in the war in Indochina, we have dropped 6.6 million tons of bombs. Even this staggering total did not prevent the 1968 and 1972 offensives. Increasing bombing means more U.S. prisoners of war, more civilian casualties and refugees, and more planes lost.

The mining and blockading are not likely to be effective because Russian ships can unload at Chinese ports and their cargo can be transported overland to North Vietnam. Increased shipments can be sent by rail from the Soviet Union.

There may be lulls, periods of reduced fighting, accompanied, no doubt, by spokesmen claiming that the other side is "fading away." The current offensive may stall, particularly as the rainy season sets in, but the war will go on so long as Hanoi finds the situation in the South incompatible with its interest.

"Decisive military action to end the war"—I find it by far the most dangerous goal that the administration could seek in Vietnam. It means either further escalation in an effort to save Vietnam by destroying it, or a policy of improvisation designed to stave off defeat for weeks or months, to keep the war going, and to wait for something to turn up so that the President can avoid making the only choice that can truly end the war.

**CLIFFORD PLAN FOR VIETNAM SETTLEMENT**

That choice is a logical four-point plan for settlement which could have extricated us from the war at any time in the last three and one-half years and could extricate us now. The plan is short and simple. It consists of the following:

The United States would agree to two actions:

1. Withdraw all United States military personnel from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia on a date certain.
2. End all ground, air and naval activity by U.S. forces in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by the same date.

North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front would also agree to two actions:

1. Return all U.S. prisoners held by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front as U.S. troops withdraw.
Refrain from attacks that would threaten the safety of U.S. military personnel during the period of withdrawal. It is my firm conviction that if this plan were agreed to, political forces would surface in South Vietnam that would institute negotiations between the Vietnamese leading to an overall settlement. I further believe that by the time of our final withdrawal, the war in Vietnam would have ended.

CLIFFORD: NO BLOODBATH IN VIETNAM

If a settlement is reached in this manner, I do not believe that any so-called bloodbath would follow. I think it would be the disposition of the parties to try to find the means to heal the wounds of 20 years of war. If, however, the end comes while the war is still in progress, then one would expect difficulty as pockets of resistance are eliminated.

Surely, we must keep in mind that the best way to prevent a bloodbath is to stop the one that is occurring daily in both North and South Vietnam.

My deep concern over our policy in Vietnam has led me in the past to make certain predictions. After the Cambodian invasion in April 1970, I suggested, in an article in Life magazine, that such action had merely spread the war and would not hasten its end.

By the summer of 1971, I was even more troubled and stated, in the New York Times, that the North Vietnamese would launch a major military offensive in the winter of 1972, and that, in response, President Nixon would reescalate our military involvement.

My concern now is greater than ever before, so I feel impelled to make the following predictions. These are not cheerful thoughts, but these are not cheerful times.

THE GRIM ALTERNATIVE

It is my conviction that if we follow the path we are now taking:
- The war will continue indefinitely;
- The United States will be involved indefinitely;
- The United States will continue to have men killed and wounded indefinitely;
- More civilians will die in Indochina;
- American taxpayers will continue to spend billions of dollars in support of the Saigon regime;
- Russia and China will continue to supply North Vietnam with the necessary materials of war;
- The United States will continue to lose planes and helicopters;
- We will not get our prisoners back;
- The number of prisoners will increase;
- The administration will have to ask Congress for still more money;
- Our relations with China and Russia will be jeopardized;
- Our standing with the rest of the world will sink lower and lower;
- And if the South Vietnamese Army cannot hold, the President will climb the next step on the escalator.

We must not let this happen.
SUPPORTS RESOLUTION BEFORE COMMITTEE

I support without qualification the excellent joint resolution that is before this committee. Any effort to amend it by including language proposing a cease-fire would emasculate it.

The President’s past negotiating efforts have failed; a major stumbling block has been his demands for a cease-fire that would preserve the present government in Saigon.

There are those who find comfort in the fact that the President’s harsh statement on decisive military action was accompanied by a rephrasing of his settlement proposals. But, as always, our negotiating position takes back with one hand what it offers with the other.

Hanoi is told that we will withdraw, but only 4 months after the complete return of our prisoners and acceptance of an internationally supervised cease-fire. The proposal for a cease-fire naturally strikes a responsive chord in everyone. But Hanoi believes that the institution of a cease-fire, without a political settlement, would be tantamount to their losing the war.

An internationally supervised cease-fire would mean the insulation of the Thieu government from both military and political pressures. It would deprive North Vietnam of the chance to protect its supporters in that part of the south controlled by Saigon. It would give President Thieu’s police a free hand to uncover and destroy his regime’s opponents.

The conditions imposed by the President are thus unrealistic and unrealizable. They make illusory the promise of a date certain for American withdrawal. They only make certain that our men will remain captive and that the war will go on.

“PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM WILL NOT WORK”

The President’s program will not work. His “decisive military action” will not end the war. His proposals for settlement will not bring peace. Neither course will work because they offer the other side nothing but defeat.

The President has never offered the simple four-point program that I have described. It is the way to end the war. It is also completely consistent with the joint resolution before you.

I urge the adoption of the resolution promptly, and without crippling amendment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Clifford. [Applause by audience.]

Under the rules of the House, there will be no applause. You are here as a guest of this committee.

I AMUR OF EXCLUDING “CEASE-FIRE”

Mr. Clifford, I am sure that you are familiar with the fact that the other body adopted an amendment to the Case-Church amendment, writing in the words “cease-fire” and from your testimony today do you feel the words “cease-fire” incorporated in this present draft of the bill would be damaging?
Mr. Clifford. I think it would be more than damaging, Mr. Chairman. I think it would destroy the effectiveness of the joint resolution. If you want to take action that is constructive with reference to bringing the war to an end, or bringing our participation to an end, then I think that what we must do is present an offer to the other side that has some possibility of acceptance.

As soon as we include the cease-fire language, there is, in my opinion, no chance for Hanoi to accept it. Now, the reasons are these:

If you have a cease-fire, as you look at it from Hanoi's standpoint, their forces have to come to a stop where they are in South Vietnam. We know what their aim is. Their aim is, as they have said, to reunify North and South Vietnam. They have to come to a stop at a certain point in Vietnam, at the time of the cease-fire, far short of what their goal is in South Vietnam.

Second, they would understand that with a period of a cease-fire that would be 4 or 6 months or longer, during that period of time the South Vietnamese, with U.S. help, could regroup its forces; mountains of ammunition and ordinance could be built up so that at the end of any cease-fire they might find themselves at a very substantial disadvantage.

At no time in the past, that I can recall, has North Vietnam ever suggested any possibility that they would accept a cease-fire. They have been thoroughly consistent.

LE DUC THO ON CEASE-FIRE

In July 1971, Le Duc Tho, who is the principal North Vietnamese negotiator, said, "If President Nixon tries to hinge his agreement on the fixing of a withdrawal date, with a cease-fire throughout Indochina, there can be no accord."

They have taken that position consistently and without exception; all during that time that the negotiations have been going on, so I submit to you that the first reason we should not add a cease-fire is because it is meaningless. They are not going to accept it, and it destroys what otherwise would be real progress toward ending the war.

The second reason why we should not include a cease-fire is that it gives the Saigon government the right of veto. They must also agree to a cease-fire.

I submit to you there have been a number of times in the past when we thought we might be making some headway, back in 1968 particularly, when the Saigon government, threw the wrench into the machinery.

It is my opinion, and it has been for a long time, that the Saigon government does not want the United States to leave South Vietnam. They like it the way it is. The officials in the Saigon government are in office because U.S. military forces are keeping them in office. If we were not there, in my opinion, they would no longer be in office.

SAIGON WOULD NOT ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE

So, I do not believe that the Saigon government would be likely to accept a cease-fire because it would mean that ultimately we would
leave. I am not sure that they would say specifically, no, but I believe they would attach so many difficult and entangling conditions that we would find it impossible ever to arrive at an agreement.

Also, I have the gravest doubt that you could find the nations who would take on this exceedingly onerous task of supervising a cease-fire in what has become the most difficult and complex area in the world today. I doubt that you could find them. They would have a great responsibility. They would be under an obligation to police the cease-fire.

I do not consider that reason as important as the other two, but I think it is valid.

So, I say, in recapitulation, if you add the cease-fire clause, such as the Byrd amendment was added to the Case-Church amendment, you emasculate the resolution. You destroy any hope of progress.

Also, in my opinion, it clearly constitutes approval of President Nixon's plan. I think that is unwarranted. I believe that the Congress should take the opposite action. I think the American people should have an alternative to the Nixon course of action, which I have suggested has not led us out of the war, but has gotten us in more deeply.

CLIFFORD: PLAN TO END WAR AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE?

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Clifford, you served in the executive branch as the Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1969.

During your service as Secretary of Defense, did you propose to the President any plans to end the war?

Mr. Clifford. During the period of 1968 and 1969, our major problem in the executive branch of the Government was to prevent an escalation of the war. There were constant pressures during that period, particularly from the military, to increase the number of men. The military was not satisfied when we got up to 525,000.

You may recall a request that came from the military, from General Westmoreland, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that 206,000 more men be sent. That led to a great debate within the executive branch during the early part of 1968.

I think President Johnson resolved that debate properly by refusing to send the 206,000, but I might say that the military did not cease their efforts after that. They kept the pressure on during the rest of 1968, in an effort to try to get more troops over there.

Many of us felt that the additional troops would not add anything, that they would not bring the war to an end.

During 1968, a major accomplishment in the executive branch of government occurred in March of that year when the bombing was cut back in North Vietnam and the negotiations were started in Paris. Then in October of that year, another advance was made by stopping all the bombing. I was in accord with those decisions because the hope was that that would lead to meaningful negotiations that could bring the war to an end.

Also, during that period of time, it was suggested that plans should be adopted not to increase the troops, but to reduce the number of troops that we had. Those plans were discussed at great length.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Clifford.

Mr. Mailliard.
TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Mailiardi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was going to ask virtually the same question that the chairman has just asked because I noticed, for some reason which we can only guess at, that you say that this four point plan could have extricated us at any time during the last 3½ years.

How is it that there is a sudden cutoff date back beyond which this plan, I would assume, would not have extricated us?

Mr. Clifford. I think I gave a partial answer to that question. I will give a fuller answer.

During the Johnson administration, there was no disposition, at that time, to find the basis for complete withdrawal of our troops. That was not part of the policy during that period.

Now, also, it was hoped that when President Nixon came in, he had the opportunity of seeing all that had gone on before, and he had the opportunity to evaluate the misunderstandings of the past.

I happen to believe that he had an outstanding opportunity, when he first came in in January of 1969, to take the position, and announce it to the American people, that he thought one of the reasons that he had been elected was that they were dissatisfied with the Johnson policy, and felt that he could extricate us from Vietnam.

CLIFFORD AS POLICYMAKER

Mr. Mailiardi. Mr. Clifford, were you not a part of the policymaking process in the latter days of the Johnson administration?

Mr. Clifford. Yes; when I came into the administration formally, I had a previous relationship with President Johnson during the other years that he was there. I was an outside adviser that would be called in.

When we went into Vietnam originally, I favored that course of action. I continued to favor that course of action for some time. I have no sense of embarrassment in saying it at all.

I was wrong. It is not the first time I was wrong, and I am sure it will not be the last time.

But I thought that it was the right thing to do originally, because we had had the experience after the Second World War with aggressive Soviet expansionism, and I think there was a misvaluation on the part of almost all of us, including the Congress, that what we had to do was stem Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. I think that is why the Congress, with but two dissenting votes passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Now, I continued to support the original policy until I found out in 1967, as a result of trips to Southeast Asia, that our allies in that part of the world did not view the war as we did...

President Johnson sent General Maxwell Taylor and me out to all our allies in the summer of 1967, to get them to contribute more troops. We could not get them to contribute any more troops.

ASIANS DID NOT BELIEVE DOMINO THEORY

I found to my surprise in talking to heads of government and chiefs of state that they did not believe in the so-called domino theory; they
did not believe that their freedom was threatened because North Vietnam was fighting South Vietnam. They did not believe that China was on the march, and this began to cause me concern in the summer of 1967.

By the time I came into the Pentagon, I was in the process of changing, and after the first month in the Pentagon, I changed entirely. For instance, I found in meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when I asked, "What is the policy or program for victory," there was no program. There was no military plan for victory in Vietnam.

Finally, after probing and more probing, the answer finally came out: the plan was merely to keep increasing the application of force on the enemy, build up the attrition, and some day they would capitulate. After a certain time, I concluded that was not going to prove successful.

I might say as the concluding part of my answer, that none of us, perhaps with very rare exceptions, are blameless for getting into Vietnam. I think we must face up to the fact that our leading citizens, in and out of government, all were in favor of it. Mr. Nixon, who was a private citizen during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, constantly criticized the administrations for not doing more in Vietnam. He made a public statement at one time that President Kennedy should be encouraged to send more troops in.

Mr. MAUILLARD. Since the gentleman has already consumed my 5 minutes, I will withdraw the question.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. HAYS.

REBUTTAL ON BOMBING RATE

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I like Mr. Clifford personally as an individual, but I am not going to ask him a question, because if I do, there I go. He will take the rest of the time. So I am just going to make a few statements on my 5 minutes.

Mr. Clifford, you talk about how many bombs we have dropped in North Vietnam, or in Vietnam, as against how many we dropped in World War II, but, you know, there is a significant difference.

We dropped all these bombs on your advice, and your predecessor's advice, and apparently, your successor's advice in some jungle somewhere.

Now, World War II, it only took 2 million tons of bombs, because we dropped them where they would do some good, on places like Hamburg and Berlin and Munich and Cologne and Dusseldorf, and places like that, not in some jungle some place.

So I discount your bomb statement of falling at an awesome rate.

REASON FOR CEASE-FIRE

You are also against a cease-fire, for the reason that it would give South Vietnam a chance to build up its forces, you say. Well, it would give North Vietnam the same chance, and I just cannot get that upset about a cease-fire.

I would like to stop it, and I would like to have a cease-fire so that the North Vietnamese could not kill anybody else, and by the same token, to be even handed about it, so the South Vietnamese could not kill anybody else.
I am sure you don't remember it, because you were in the White House every day. It was not such a daily experience for me. But I remember in the beginning of your tenure as Secretary of Defense, you gave us a briefing down at the White House, and you told us how we were winning the war, and how it was going to be over, you thought, before too long, and I remember you were a little bit upset, I think, at my comment. I said:

Mr. Clifford, I have been hearing the same thing from Mr. McNamara for a number of years, and the only thing I can say is that you have an ability—and I said this complimenting you—to make defeat sound so much better than Mr. McNamara had the ability to make it sound.

Even then, I was predicting that we were not going to win with our tactics.

Now, I am sure your motives are of the highest. I am sure that you want, as I want, and other people want, to see this thing over and done with.

I don't necessarily agree that the Byrd amendment would destroy anything. I think the Byrd amendment in this resolution might insure that we would get it through the House. Without it, I don't know whether we will or not.

Finally—I don't know if there will be any time for you when I finish or not—I say I like you as an individual, I think you have a lot of admirable characteristics, but you were an adviser to two Democratic Presidents since my tenure in Washington, Mr. Truman and Mr. Johnson.

Now, I don't know how much your advice did it, but after Mr. Truman, we had 8 years of Republicanism, and Mr. Johnson was destroyed politically by the advice he got on the Vietnam war, and the Democratic Party suffered a loss.

But I will say this to you, that I think if the Congress follows your advice as outlined in this paper, that we may be in for another 4 years of Mr. Nixon, without very much trouble on his part at all, and that I really don't want, Mr. Clifford, so I am going to have to disagree with you fundamentally.

I wish we had an hour or so to debate it, but we are limited to 5 minutes here, and I suppose my time is about exhausted. If not, I have another speech here.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Whalley.

UNITE BEHIND PRESIDENT FOR WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Whalley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I think that when President Nixon took office January 20, 1969, that you folks had 549,000 U.S. boys there, and he has brought home approximately 500,000 U.S. boys, leaving about 50,000, 55,000 there. I think he is doing everything he can.

He would like to have the opinions of yourself, and all of us, and I think we should unite and do the best that we can to get out of Vietnam.
Many of us believe we should never have been over in Vietnam in the first place. We would like to get out, and we would like to know how to do it without making it a political issue.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fountain.

**EFFECT OF TOTAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL**

Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, what is your opinion as to whether or not the war in Vietnam would continue between the South and the North if we withdrew immediately?

Mr. Clifford. It is my belief that the war would not continue in the south if we withdrew. I believe that if we develop a plan whereby we agreed with Hanoi to get our troops out, and get our prisoners back, that groups would surface in South Vietnam that would insist upon a settlement of the war.

And it is my private opinion that once that plan were agreed to between the United States and Hanoi, that by the time, after 4 or 6 months, that we withdrew our troops, I believe there would be peace in Vietnam, and it is my further opinion that the only way we are going to get peace is by withdrawing.

I might say this, at the risk of lengthening my answer, if we stay in Vietnam another month, I believe the war will go on another month. If we stay another year, I believe it will go on another year. If we stay 5 years, I believe it will go on 5 years.

It is my conviction that there will never be peace in Vietnam as long as American military forces are there, but there will be peace in Vietnam just as soon as we withdraw.

**PEACE GROUPS IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM**

Mr. Fountain. What kind of peace will we have there?

Mr. Clifford. It will be a peace that, in my opinion, will be reached by a number of peace groups that exist in both North and South Vietnam.

Keep in mind that they are the same people, generally. Keep in mind that when the 1954 Geneva Convention was agreed upon, there was created a temporary dividing line, the so-called demilitarized zone.

These people have the same background, the same heritage, the same ancient traditions. There may be a million Catholics in the North, a million Catholics in the South, millions of Buddhists, a number of Cao Dai in both the North and the South. I believe those groups do not want to kill each other.

I don't believe in the bloodbath theory, and I think if we would get out, the peoples of Vietnam would settle their own political disputes.

**INVASION VS. GUERRILLA WARFARE**

Mr. Fountain. Mr. Clifford, what is the difference between the type of invasion which the North Vietnamese are engaging in at the present time, which started recently, and the kind of warfare which they were engaged in before?
Mr. Clifford. The difference is in the manner and the tactics of their conducting the war.

For the last 10 years that the war has been going on, it has been a guerrilla-type war, in which small groups in the jungle and in the towns and districts would attack and then withdraw. Even the 1968 Tet offensive was still a guerrilla type of warfare.

Now, for the first time in the war, there is a traditional, classic offensive with artillery, with tanks, and with troops heavily concentrated in an area. It is a traditional type of offensive as we understand it.

WISDOM OF EXISTING POLICY

Mr. Fountain. Now, I gather from your statement that you do not feel that the President's existing policy will work out.

I think anyone has to judge whether or not the President's policy will work out after a period of time has elapsed.

Do you believe that if the present operations should work out as the President said they will, that the United States will be better off, and the people of South Vietnam will be better off, than if we pulled out immediately at the present time, regardless of the consequences?

Mr. Clifford. Whether we are able to get out by a settlement of the kind that I have discussed, or whether we are able to get out with some other kind of settlement arrangement, possibly consummated by President Nixon, it does not make any real difference, so long as we pull out as the result of some type of negotiated agreement. Then I believe we will find that the war either will end at once, or will end shortly thereafter.

What bothers me is if we adopt a policy which continues the war, I have the strongest feeling, it is a conviction, that when we escalate our participation in the war, it makes it more difficult for us to get out, instead of easier. I think we are digging ourselves more deeply in the hole all the time.

I submit to you that when the President says our goal is now decisive action to end the war, that means, if I understand his language, that he intends to stay at it until he wins the war.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Thomson.

CLIFFORD ON BLOODBATH IN 1969

Mr. Thomson. Mr. Clifford, I am wondering why your testimony today should be any more credible than it was some years ago. You were asked what you recommended to end the war, and after 5 minutes you did not answer that question, and obviously, you did not have any plan to end the war.

Now, in the Washington Star of October 15, 1969, which was 6 months after you left the Cabinet, this statement appears:

Former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford said today Senator Goodell's proposal to withdraw all American troops from South Vietnam by December 1, 1970, is both unrealistic and impractical and would result in a bloodbath in that country. He said that Goodell's plan would result in the collapse of the military and the collapse of the government in that country. The resulting bloodbath, he said, would be on our conscience for a long period of time.

You are reported to have said that October 15, 1969. Now, you tell us this morning, "The situation today is that the South Vietnamese
Army has no doubt improved”—I am quoting from your testimony this morning—“yet it has shown that without massive American air and naval support it cannot withstand the forces of North Vietnam.”

Now, are you not in effect advocating a military conquest by the North Vietnamese? You are not advocating an end to the killing. You are advocating that the South Vietnamese, who you say cannot resist the North, oppose the North Vietnamese, and with the background of the Tet offensive, where they massacred 5,000 people in Hue, where they purged the Catholics in North Vietnam until they moved south, all of them that could move with their feet, where they used as human shields at An Loc the South Vietnamese peasants—are you not advocating a peace of the grave for South Vietnam by the proposal that you are advocating this morning?

If you want to stop the killing, why don’t you want it to stop on both sides?

STILL OPPOSES UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Clifford. I remember very well the statement of October 1969. I believed it then, and I believe it today. I believed then that it was an unwise course of action for us, under the Goodell proposal, to pull out without having reached any understanding with Hanoi, and that was his plan, just pull out by a certain date, and not reach any understanding with Hanoi.

So I am saying to you that I think that situation still exists very much today. I am suggesting that we reach an agreement with Hanoi, and I believe deeply that we can reach an agreement with Hanoi.

As I have said, if we reach that type of an agreement, I think the war will end upon our withdrawal, and I do not believe that there would be a bloodbath.

I said here in my statement today if the parties are still fighting, and we withdraw without having reached an understanding with Hanoi—

Mr. Thomson. That is not in your resolution. The only thing in your resolution is that if our prisoners of war returned, we are going to be out of there. There is no other agreement as to terminating the killing over there.

Mr. Clifford. That is the agreement that I am talking about.

Mr. Thomson. Well, that is not in your resolution.

Mr. Clifford. Yes, it is.

Mr. Thomson. Where is it?

EXPLAINS RESOLUTION FOR WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Clifford. I am saying that what we agree to do is to get out and stop all activity there—land, sea, and air—and then they do two things: They give us our prisoners back, before we get out, and they also do not attach our forces as we withdraw.

I think that constitutes the kind of an agreement that we should try to reach with Hanoi, and if we can reach that agreement, in my opinion, that will bring an end to the war.

Mr. Thomson. Well, that does not stop the killing. We just get out with our prisoners, and the killing goes on, and the blood bath that you predicted, and you still say it will occur.
Mr. Clifford. If you thought I said that, then you misunderstood me.

What I am saying is that if we work out this agreement that is contained in this joint resolution, I believe that peace forces in North and South Vietnam, knowing that the Americans are on their way out, will reach a peace between themselves.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Monagan.

U.S. INTEREST: PROMPT WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Monagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Continuing one further step along, because although I agree in the desirability of prompt removal, I think we should have in mind what the consequences of a decision of this type would be:

You do have the opinion that there would not be a bloodbath, but that, of course, is a matter of opinion. No one can say. But at any rate, it is your belief, as I take it, that whatever the consequences in South Vietnam might be, it is in the national interest of the United States to effect a prompt withdrawal.

Is that correct?

Mr. Clifford. Yes, that is my belief.

Just very quickly, I think after all the years that have passed, and in view of the misevaluations that exist, and have existed over these years, that, as has been suggested by one of you gentlemen, it was entirely possible that we never should have gone there in the first place.

Now, assuming that that premise is correct, then if it was not right for us to go in originally, then it is not right for us to stay on.

I would suggest to you that today, as far as I am concerned, I do not see that our national security is involved, or that our national interest is affected to the point where one more American boy should die in Vietnam. I think that should not happen.

WITHDRAWAL AND U.S. POSITION IN WORLD

Mr. Monagan. Do you totally discount the effect on our position in the world in relation to other countries of the fact that we are pulling back on a commitment that we have made?

Whether it is to the regime as such, or to the people of South Vietnam, does this not have implications in the relations between countries that we must not be unaware of?

Mr. Clifford. It does not have that significance to me, at all.

As you stated, it is very difficult, really, to read into SEATO that we have any commitment at all, because South Vietnam is not a signatory to the SEATO treaty.

We felt, at that time, that communism was on the march, and that we should go in there, no matter what the provocation might be.

Now, we have invested in Vietnam some 55,000 American men killed, we have spent $180 billion. Assuming that there was some kind of commitment, then it is clear we have far exceeded any kind of a commitment that we ever had. We have fulfilled it many times over.

What I think we are doing now is substituting our will for the will of the South Vietnamese people.
If we were talking 5 years from now, and we looked back to May of 1972, I think we would agree, 5 years from now, we should have gotten out in May of 1972. The killing and the expense will have gone on and on and on.

AIMS OF COMMUNIST NATIONS

Mr. Monagan. There is one other long-range matter that gives me some pause, and I would like to hear your opinion on this.

Now, you say that this is not the forward edge of a relentlessly expanding and monolithic Communist bloc.

Well, I would accept the fact that it is not monolithic, but in this same pattern of relationships throughout the world I have spoken about that exists today, this theater is one of significant importance for the U.S.S.R. and for China, as well, and to the extent that their interests are hostile to ours, they have cooperated and they have contributed very, very substantial sums.

In addition, although you say they are not on the march in Southeast Asia, I would think, taking its position in Bangladesh and India, that the U.S.S.R. was on the march so far as influence is concerned in that area of the world, and militarily throughout other areas of the world.

Now, can we disregard that aspect of a decision such as the one which you recommend?

COMMUNISTS NOT "ON THE MARCH"

Mr. Clifford. I must respectfully dissent from the view that the Soviets are on the march in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that.

Mr. Monagan. Well, I know you said they were not, but I am raising some questions. Perhaps the phrase "on the march" requires definition.

Mr. Clifford. I will give my opinion of what I think they are doing in Southeast Asia.

North Vietnam is a sister Socialist state. There is a bond between the Socialist countries in the world. The Soviet Union would like to be the leader of the Socialist community in the world. So would Red China. So when North Vietnam, a sister Socialist state, makes a request on the Soviet Union for war materiel, I think it is only natural, I think we must assume that they are going to supply it, as Red China has supplied it.

I would say to you that in my travels there, and I believe it has been five times, I did not find the type of aggressive expansionism there that we found after the Second World War, when the Soviets, you will remember, started in and took Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and that whole western periphery of nations.

I don't get any awareness of that at all in Southeast Asia. What you do get there is the knowledge of the Soviet Union and China supplying a limited amount of war materiel to North Vietnam, and the United States supplying 10 or 12 or 15 times as much to South Vietnam, as Red China and Russia are supplying to North Vietnam.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Findley.
If we were talking 5 years from now, and we looked back to May of 1972, I think we would agree, 5 years from now, we should have gotten out in May of 1972. The killing and the expense will have gone on and on and on.

AIMS OF COMMUNIST NATIONS

Mr. Monagan. There is one other long-range matter that gives me some pause, and I would like to hear your opinion on this.

Now, you say that this is not the forward edge of a relentlessly expanding and monolithic Communist bloc.

Well, I would accept the fact that it is not monolithic, but in this same pattern of relationships throughout the world I have spoken about that exists today, this theater is one of significant importance for the U.S.S.R. and for China, as well, and to the extent that their interests are hostile to ours, they have cooperated and they have contributed very, very substantial sums.

In addition, although you say they are not on the march in Southeast Asia, I would think, taking its position in Bangladesh and India, that the U.S.S.R. was on the march so far as influence is concerned in that area of the world, and militarily throughout other areas of the world.

Now, can we disregard that aspect of a decision such as the one which you recommend?

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Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Findley.
NOTES POSTURE OF PROTESTERS IN AUDIENCE

Mr. Findley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Chairman, if I may just interrupt, I would suggest that we follow proper decorum here. After all, the ladies and gentlemen in the room are the guests of the committee, and we ought to ask them to sit, rather than lie prone on the floor. This is, of course, an insult, not only to the committee but to the witness.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you request proper decorum, and have these people properly sit in the chairs.

Chairman Morgan. Will the individuals lying on the floor take their seats? If not, you will be removed from the room.

Mr. Rosenthal. I would suggest that people sit in their seats, but I for one had not even noticed it until it was brought to my attention. As a matter of fact, I don't see that Mr. Clifford is disturbed by it.

So if we can just overlook it for a moment, maybe we can finish in the next 30 or 40 minutes without any massive interruption.

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully join my friend from New York in suggesting we simply let these guests stay in whatever posture they desire, and continue the business of the committee.

Mr. Zablocki. I withdraw my suggestion.

CREDIT BELONGS TO PRESIDENT

Mr. Findley. Mr. Clifford, it is my belief that no matter what you said at the White House briefings in your days as a Secretary of Defense, that you nevertheless played a very crucial role in stopping the buildup of troops in Vietnam, and for that, I salute you.

I do think in your appearance here today you have been more than a bit unfair to Mr. Nixon. You leaned very heavily on the word "escalation," in describing what has happened under his leadership in the Vietnam policy, and yet, no one could surely seriously advance the thought that we have escalated our troop commitment, that we have escalated our U.S. casualties, that we have escalated our list of U.S. dead.

While you may have concern about the effect of the flanking operations, as I term them, during this period of withdrawal, I wish that you had given a little more balance to your statement in giving credit to the President for what he has accomplished.

Further, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for opening the room not only to the press and to our visitors, but permitting the cameras to be here. I have long argued that our sessions should be more open, rather than less open.

My only regret is that when Secretary Rogers was here earlier this week, not only the public, not only the press, but the cameras were excluded. Had the room been open to these parties, the American people, I think, would have had a more balanced impression of what has been going on in this committee room.

NATURE OF CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Clifford, on page 14 of your statement, you say any effort to amend the resolution now pending by including language proposing a
cease-fire would emasculate it. Yet, on page 12, one of your four conditions—one which, I might say, is not in the resolution pending before us—is to refrain from attacks that would threaten the safety of U.S. military personnel during the period of withdrawal. I would view that as a form of cease-fire.

How can you really argue that you are not setting forth a cease-fire condition as a part of your plan? I would like to have you comment on that, and also on one further question, and that further question is: What presidential candidate endorses your plan, or candidates, and if none of them does endorse your plan, what presidential candidate do you feel offers the most promising plan for Vietnam policy?

Mr. Clifford. The answer to your first question is that I do not in the 4-point plan recommend a general cease-fire at all.

A general cease-fire means that the war must stop as of a certain date, and then the details of the cease-fire are carried out.

Under this 4-point plan, there is no cease-fire. All that we ask the other side to do in the conduct of the war, which would be continuing, is to refrain from attacking American troops during the period of withdrawal, and that, of course, is not a cease-fire under any circumstances.

CEASE-FIRE AND SAFE WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Findley. You would, then, suggest that certain geographical areas to be set aside as cease-fire areas in order to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces? Would that be an accurate statement?

Mr. Clifford. I still would not say that, because I doubt that the word cease-fire is the right word.

I think what we would do would be to inform Hanoi where the American troops were, after this matter had been agreed to, and we were in the process of withdrawal, and getting our prisoners back. We would inform them of the locations of American troops, and part of the agreement would be that those troops were not to be attacked.

Mr. Findley. But would the information step be adequate? Could we really have assurance that the other side would respond to this information and not attack our forces?

If you were Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces, could you, in good conscience, go along on a vague, indefinite arrangement and a very limited cease-fire, when you had the safety of 50,000 American forces under your care?

Don't forget to comment on the presidential candidate question, please.

Mr. Clifford. I could go along with that proposition with no difficulty at all, because all we would be interested in would be the safety of our troops, within a 3- or 4-month period in which they would be in the process of embarking for the United States, and they would protect them under the agreement that we had.

If there were violations of that, then the deal, obviously, would fall through, and, in that event, we might have to change our whole policy.

POSITION OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

The reason why I think that this program would not fail is because it does gain our major goal—or may I say my major goal—that is,
complete extrication of American forces from Vietnam, and the ending of all air, ground, and naval activity throughout Indochina.

Now, personally, that is what I want in Indochina more than anything else.

It also, I think, would be appealing to Hanoi, because surely they would like to see us leave, and that is why I think it would go through.

As far as the question about presidential candidates is concerned, I do not know that any presidential candidate has used this specific language. I am generally aware that this type of proposition is acceptable to those men who have indicated their Democratic candidacy, with the exception of Senator Jackson.

It seems to me that, in other words, this joint resolution constitutes the position of the candidates that I believe are seeking the Democratic nomination.

Mr. Findley. Which candidate——

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Rosenthal.

CONGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I want you to know that I agree with you completely in your statement. I think it is probably the finest statement we have heard, from my point of view, in this committee for 8 or 10 years. It is precise, to the point, and quite clear.

If we can leave the subject of ground action in Vietnam, I am interested in a statement you make on page 8, which I think really is the central question. You say:

The power thus to make war on foreign countries is not entrusted by the Constitution to the unilateral decision of any one man. For the President of the United States to arrogate this power to himself is a defiance of constitutional principles and provides a clear warning that Congress must act and act immediately to reassert its jurisdiction.

Do you have any other ideas, recommendations, or suggestions for Congress to resume its constitutional responsibility, other than through this kind of a resolution?

Mr. Clifford. Yes. There is the other road, that perhaps is the most effective of all, and that is for the Congress to agree, both chambers, that as of a certain date no more funds would be appropriated or could be used for the conduct of the war in Vietnam. That one would have real teeth in it.

In this regard, if I might take just a moment, the foundation of this country is based upon cooperation among the three branches of our Government, particularly in the foreign policy field. The President is given certain functions, and the Congress is given certain functions. As a matter of fact, the functions given to the Congress appear to be more important than those given to the President; that is, the Congress shall be the only body in the United States with the power to declare war.

Now, in this instance, I feel very strongly that the President should
have consulted with the Congress before he made the decision to mine Haiphong. It is my belief that if he had consulted with the Congress before he decided to mine the harbor, he would not have done so, and that is part of our system of checks and balances in this country.

**AUTHORITY FOR PRESIDENT’S ACTION: SEATO PACT**

Now, if I might get this thought over: The only authority that, in my opinion, that President Nixon has in Indochina flows from the SEATO Treaty, and you will notice that in the SEATO Treaty it says that a country shall take action only after going through its constitutional processes.

Now, that language was put there at the insistence of the Congress at the time the SEATO Treaty was signed.

Now, the Congress gave to President Johnson the authority, under our constitutional processes, when they passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It gave him the right to send troops into Indochina, to defend American installations, and to repel aggression. That is the language of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

President Johnson, in my opinion, acted under complete authority of the Congress. But now, if you please, the Congress has repealed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. There is no authority given to President Nixon.

In addition to that, the Congress has gone further, when it said in November 1971, that it shall be the policy of the United States to gain as expeditious a withdrawal from Vietnam as is possible, and to withdraw from the war there. That is the general language. That is what was passed by the Congress.

So not only does President Nixon not have authority under the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, he has an express declaration of the will of the Congress that we ought to get out.

**MINING OF HARBOR: ACT OF WAR**

Now, I believe that the act of mining the harbor at Haiphong is really an act of war, and I think he did not have the power to take that action without the authority of the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, let’s turn it around. Suppose these were our ships. Suppose we had 12 ships in a British harbor, and the Russians said to us, “we are going to mine that harbor, and you cannot get your 12 ships out.” The fact is those ships are still there: we have sequestered those 12 Russian vessels. They cannot get out; they will be blown up. We have bottled those ships up in that harbor.

Also, suppose the Russians told the Americans, “You cannot send any more ships into that British harbor.”

Now, I am wondering, would we consider that an act of war? I will answer it: I know we all would.

If you stop and think of the trouble that we have gotten into in the last 200 years, time and again it involved an American ship. You will remember the difficulty we had with the Barbary pirates. Toward the end of the 18th century we got into trouble with the French. They were stopping our ships. The War of 1812 had to do with the British stopping our vessels. The Spanish-American War started when they sank the *Maine*. Our participation in World War I started as the
result of submarine warfare on the part of the Germans, and ultimately the sinking of the *Lusitania* with hundreds of Americans being lost. World War II started when they sank American vessels in Pearl Harbor.

**CONGRESS SHOULD REASSERT POWER**

I am saying that a President should not take this kind of action which I believe to be an act of war, and which could lead to dangerous results, without getting the authority of the Congress to do so, and I think the Congress should reassert its power and get into this area.

Mr. Rosenthal. Assuming that the President is acting as I do, without any legal authority, without any constitutional authority, would the passage of this resolution then put into balance the various legal responsibilities, and would it direct the President to terminate the American involvement in Vietnam October 1, 1972, subject to the terms and conditions of the resolution?

Mr. Clifford. All I can say is that it would help.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. Lloyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**BLACKMAIL ON POW’S?**

Mr. Clifford, do you trust the North Vietnamese to accept the proposition presented by this resolution as presented?

Mr. Clifford. Yes.

Mr. Lloyd. On what basis? What evidence do you have that they would accept this baldly as presented to them?

Mr. Clifford. Because it is to their own enlightened self-interest to do so.

Mr. Lloyd. Do you know anybody in North Vietnam that you would say that would accept this on behalf of that government?

Let me put it another way. Do you think they would come back and say before you release our prisoners you have to make reparation—in other words, what I would term as blackmail? Do you think there is any possibility of that, and if so, how great a possibility is there?

Mr. Clifford. I would suggest to you that if this kind of agreement is made, then they must live up to their agreement or they vitiate it. If they do, then there is no agreement. For instance, if I might just make this one point. If we say we are going to get out in 6 months, or 4 months, and we withdraw our troops in groups of 10 percent of our force, then I think we should insist that our prisoners be delivered to us in 10-percent groups consistent with our withdrawal. If at any time they go back on that agreement, if at any time they strike our forces as we are leaving, then the deal is off.

Mr. Lloyd. What should we do then?

**VIOLATION TRIGGERS MILITARY ACTION**

Mr. Clifford. We have no alternative then but to resume military action that we were conducting before.

Mr. Lloyd. Would you advocate military action under those circumstances?
Mr. Clifford. Under those circumstances, if they violated the agreement, we would have no alternative because they would still have our prisoners there. Some of them would be there, and I believe we cannot pull out of Vietnam until we get all our prisoners back.

Mr. Lloyd. Then let us say they did. Let's say they accept the language of this resolution, which would be totally inconceivable to me in view of the past.

But suppose they did, and then they went ahead with military conquest of the South. Would you see any objection to their military conquest of the South?

Mr. Clifford. This plan contemplates that if we reach this agreement the war between North and South Vietnam goes on, and if the North Vietnamese prove to be stronger, then they would end up stronger in South Vietnam. I am suggesting to you that after the 10 years—

Mr. Lloyd. You mean stronger in the way of killing?

Mr. Clifford. Stronger militarily. The fact is, that President Nixon has told us within the past few months, and so has General Abrams, that he thought now the million-man South Vietnamese Army could go it alone, and that Vietnamization was succeeding. Well, now we have grave doubts that it is succeeding, but what disturbs me so is that I think we cannot stay indefinitely in Vietnam, that we cannot continue to have American men killed there and spend billions of dollars. It could go on year after year after year. I think we have to bring it to a stop as far as we are concerned.

REQUIREMENT FOR REPARATIONS

Mr. Lloyd. Let me ask you again, based on your great experience in this field, do you consider it possible or probable that the North Vietnamese would accept the proposition of this resolution without demanding reparation for the prisoners' return?

Mr. Clifford. Yes, I think they would. I feel very strongly they would accept this proposition because it accomplishes one of the major goals they have; that is, the complete departure of American troops from South Vietnam and the end of all American military action in Indochina. That, in my opinion, is a sufficient goal to them, and I believe they would adhere to it because it accomplishes something they want. Also, I like the fact that it accomplishes something that I very much want.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Zablocki.

COMMUNIST RECORD OF KEEPING PACTS

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On page 12 you propose the four actions that would have to be taken on the part of the United States and North Vietnam. In reply to the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Lloyd, you said you do not really have any solid, documentary evidence that the North Vietnamese would keep the two actions that you would "hope" they would keep, except that in your own mind you believe this would be in North Vietnam's interest.
You merely say that they would keep the agreement. Yet, to my memory, I don't know of any agreements that have been kept by the Communists. This sad record of noncompliance causes me and others to pause, especially in view of the fact that you yourself admit, on page 11, that the war will go on as long as Hanoi finds the situation in the South incompatible within its interests. As we all know, and as you said, it is their explicit purpose to unify Vietnam, if necessary by force. I also gathered from your testimony thus far that you indeed expect North Vietnam to continue the fighting even after we withdraw. Isn't that compelling enough evidence to indicate that the bloodbath which you stated in 1969 would result, will in fact take place and will be on our conscience for a long time?

Really, my question is: What documentary evidence do you have that they will keep these agreements? After all, you do realize that the United States has negotiated in Paris in good faith. Can you supply one bit of evidence to indicate that the North Vietnamese are now going to deal from a position of sincerity?

"PEACE FORCES" IN NORTH VIETNAM

You further stated that the "peace forces" in North and South Vietnam would seek to bring about a settlement in Vietnam after our forces were withdrawn. What "peace forces" are you referring to in North Vietnam?

You have also stated, Mr. Secretary, that we could have our prisoners of war released providing we would not have the 50,000 or even 30,000 residual force. You say the only reason that the United States insists on this residual force is to provide indefinite support of the Thieu regime.

As you well know, we have a residual force in Korea. What is your understanding of the role of U.S. forces in Korea? Are they in Korea solely to support the present government in Korea?

Our forces in Germany, are they there solely to preserve or prevent the overtaking of the present government in Germany. Certainly our military presence in these areas is to serve as a deterrent to stop further war and further aggression.

I would like to have your thoughts if it would not take too long, because I intend to yield to my colleague from Ohio, who has a burning question.

Mr. Hays, I don't have any burning question. I didn't know when I was speaking before, in addition to being an adviser to Mr. Truman and Mr. Johnson, I found out from a reporter when I went out that Mr. Clifford was also an adviser to the late candidate Senator Muskie, on foreign policy, and that completes his record right down the line.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. Zablocki. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clifford. Are you ready for my answer?

Mr. Zablocki. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clifford. The first part of the question had to do with why I would believe we could make a deal with the Communists that would be to our advantage.

Mr. Zablocki. It would be most helpful, Mr. Clifford, if you could tell us who the North Vietnamese official is who gave you these assurances.
Mr. Clifford. You mentioned the question of documentary proof. There is no documentary proof with reference to this. We see in writing the 7-point program that they offered back in the summer of 1971. We see President Nixon's 8-point program. The parties have never been able to get together on these points.

What I am saying to you is that it is my belief, based upon my experience, that this proposition here is sufficiently desirable to Hanoi that we could make an agreement with them. Now, I think this same principle must be in President Nixon's mind as he goes to Moscow next week. I think that he feels that he can make agreements with the Soviets which are sufficiently to their advantage, that (a) they would enter into them, and (b) they would keep them. I think he must expect that or he would not be going.

Now, it is my belief that it is sufficiently desirable to them and that they will accept it, and stop this enormous expenditure.

As far as Korea is concerned, after the Korean War was over, the United Nations decided to leave a residual force in Korea, and part of the reason for that force being there is to demonstrate to the North Koreans that the United Nations has a continuing interest in South Korea.

U.S. AID U.N. IN VIETNAM?

Mr. Zablocki. On that point, if we had a United Nations directive for a residual force which would in effect advise the North Vietnamese that the United Nations has an interest in South Vietnam, would you see no objection?

Mr. Clifford. If you are referring to Korea, it is all right with me. I think we have too many troops there.

Mr. Zablocki. As a matter of fact, it may be under United Nations directive, but they are U.S. military soldiers in Korea, so that I see no difference.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Zablocki. One final question.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Whalen.

"PEACE FORCES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. Whalen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I would like to pursue further a question raised by Mr. Zablocki. To me, I think one of the key elements of your speech is contained on the bottom of page 12, and in that statement on the last line you indicate that it is your firm conviction that if this four-point plan is adopted, that there will be political forces in South Vietnam that would initiate peace negotiations.

Do you have any specific forces in mind? What elements of the South Vietnamese society in your opinion would initiate these negotiations?

Mr. Clifford. It is my information that the Catholics in the South are in contact with Catholics in the North, and communications pass back and forth. I believe that they would like to see peace come to their land. Also, there is a substantial number of Buddhists in the North and
in the South and there is contact between them, and I think they would like to have peace. There are a great many military men in both the North and the South that served in the Viet Minh, which was the Vietnamese Army that defeated the French, and there is a considerable bond among those men.

Perhaps to illustrate it best, a year ago I had a man in my office who is a South Vietnamese. He was born in the Delta. As you may know, Thieu and Ky were born in North Vietnam and they moved South, but this man was born and raised in the Delta. He was either a colonel or a brigadier in the Viet Minh that defeated the French. He is a past cabinet officer. He said, "Mr. Clifford, if you want to do something to help South Vietnam and help the United States, please try to persuade your Government to withdraw from Vietnam." And he is a South Vietnamese. He said, "If the American troops will leave, we will work out a settlement in Vietnam, but we will never work out an agreement as long as the American troops are there."

This type of experience that I have had in Saigon with a number of government officials led me to the conclusion that I have given in this paper.

**CLAIMS OF MINE SWEEPING SUCCESS**

Mr. Whalen. Mr. Secretary, did you see Anthony Lewis' article in this morning's New York Times? In this article he reports that Haiphong indicates that they are clearing American mines as quickly as they are dropped. From your experience as Secretary of Defense, is this technically feasible or possible?

Mr. Clifford. I have not had the opportunity to read the piece by Mr. Lewis. I would have to say my experience is that this particular type of mine is very difficult to sweep. The old Second World War mine was on or near the surface and was a contact mine and they were easily sweepable. Some of them were just below the surface, but we didn't have the sophisticated types of mines then that we have now. So even if I were told that the channel into Haiphong had been swept, I would say only that I would prefer to find some other route out of Haiphong.

**HANOI AND A CEASE-FIRE**

Mr. Whalen. Mr. Clifford, you indicated that you would prefer that we not include cease-fire language in this resolution. Would, in your opinion, the North Vietnamese accept a cease-fire along with a political settlement?

Mr. Clifford. Yes; if the political settlement came first. They have said that all along. In the offer that they made in their seven-point program, and I happen to have a piece here that refers to that language. Their seven-point peace offer made in July of 1971, provided that a cease-fire with the Saigon administration would take effect, but only after a government of national concord was agreed upon.

So they have specifically told us that once the parties agree on a political settlement that its satisfactory to Hanoi, then we can agree on the cease-fire. But without the political settlement, they have said, without fail, they won't agree on a cease-fire. So that is why I am
suggesting we engage in a useless act if we insist on a cease-fire, because they have told us we won't get it.

Mr. Whalen. Would it be appropriate or inappropriate, in your opinion, if along with the cease-fire language we also include some terms of political settlement? If so, what political terms would you suggest?

U.S.: NO PARTY TO VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

Mr. Clifford. I don't believe you should do it because I am sure the United States must not be a party to the ultimate political settlement between North and South Vietnam. We have already gotten in this can of worms more deeply than we should have, and my experience is, once you take part in a political settlement in Vietnam, with it comes a certain commitment to support whatever government you have helped set up as a result of such settlement.

Mr. Whalen. Isn't that what we are attempting to do in Paris, to achieve some kind of a political settlement?

Mr. Clifford. Well, it may be. I don't know just what Mr. Porter has been attempting to do, but I have felt for a long time we ought to stay out of the politics of North and South Vietnam, because to do so prevents our extricating ourselves from there. I would like to separate it into the political difficulties which they ought to settle themselves, and the military problems which I think we can agree on with Hanoi and the NLF so we can get our troops out.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Nix.

ASSESSING HANOI'S SELF-INTEREST

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I sat here and listened to your formal statement and I applauded you when you said that you had been wrong in advising the Presidents whom you served and that you thought we should pull out. I thought that was an honest statement of your state of mind. When you said as long as we pull out as a result of some negotiated agreement, then I started on another track of thought and I read the joint resolution and I came to that part subject to the release of all prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam, accounting for all Americans missing in action, and the other conditions set forth there.

Then you said, "It is to their own intelligent self-interest to go along with this." Don't you think that we are placing ourselves in a position where we make judgment for them when we say it is to their own self-interest to accept what we have proposed?

Mr. Clifford. I offered that as my opinion.

Mr. Nix. Yes.

Mr. Clifford. And I believe it very strongly. You cannot have a deal between the two parties that will be a binding deal unless there are benefits to both. Mr. Nixon cannot go to Moscow and make a deal with Brezhnev that is just 100 percent favorable to the United States. It has to be a fairly even deal or they won't take it. Now, that is what I am saying with reference to this offer to Hanoi. I think that we achieve our major goal, that is, we get out of Vietnam and we stop American deaths and wounded and expense and they get something that they want. That is my opinion.
Mr. NIX. I quite agree, but what I am saying is this: What is there to make you think or to make America think that these people are going to accept our judgment? What incentive have they to accept what we propose?

Mr. CLIFFORD. The incentive is that the Americans have been there a long time and the Americans have been a very difficult factor in the war; they are bombing North Vietnam now more than it has ever been bombed before. We are dropping thousands of tons of bombs on North Vietnam. Now, if the North Vietnamese can get the U.S. forces out of South Vietnam and out of Indochina it is not just my judgment they would like that; I know they would. I am sure you would not find a North Vietnamese that would not say, "If there is anything you can do to get the Americans out, please do it." So I am assuming that is what they wanted; they have said they want it.

Mr. NIX. I think it is an unwarranted assumption. They have been fighting for over 20 years. Why then should they now say, "We will accept your terms." They have been suffering all that time, tremendous suffering. Why now would they do this?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I think I didn't make one point clear. When we say, in accordance with this proposition and with this resolution that we will get out, you give us our prisoners back and assure us our safe withdrawal, we are not saying to them you have to stop the fighting. We are not saying there has to be a cease-fire. I agree with you, they never in the world would agree to that after 20 years of fighting.

What we are saying is we are getting out. As far as you and the South Vietnam are concerned, that is up to you two to handle it. If the two forces wish to continue the war, that is your business. If North and South Vietnam wish to settle, that is also your business. All we are doing is withdrawing and getting our prisoners.

Mr. NIX. You are saying that, of course, but you are also saying our actions will depend on your acceding to our conditions.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Exactly, but it is a condition that is highly desirable to them. In every offer that they have made, whether it was their seven-point offer back in 1970 or their five-point offer—every offer they have made contemplates the withdrawal of American forces and the end of our activity in Indochina.

Mr. NIX. Well, in conclusion I will just say this. The position you take of course would bring about a desired result, but I cannot conceive of these people bending to our wishes in this matter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Buchanan.

QUESTIONS WISDOM OF CLIFFORD APPROACH

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, Mr. Clifford, you have had a lot of time on camera, I have just a few minutes off the camera, so I am not going to pause for any answers until I get through with what I have to say and ask a question. I will give you the benefit of the doubt here this morning. I think you honestly, sincerely are trying to serve the interest of your Democratic
Party well in this election year. I concur with the feeling of the gentleman from Ohio, however, there is some question about the wisdom of your approach to this matter. You said, for example, your peace plan had the support of all the Democratic candidates for President except Mr. Jackson. I think you may be forgetting your front runner, Governor George Wallace of Alabama. I don’t believe you speak for him in this matter, and I am willing to stand corrected, but I think what happened in Maryland and Michigan underlines the fact that some of you Democrats are losing touch with both reality and the American people.

Now, when I first heard you begin your testimony I thought I was hearing the voice of the Kremlin, and then I thought no, that is not right. Then I thought perhaps it is the voice of Hanoi, and I thought no, that is not correct. Then just the voice of McGovern, but that was not quite right either. I realize that it was simply the voice of Clark Clifford, Hon. Clark Clifford, before the committee to which before, while Secretary of Defense he sang another song. I thought, here is a man who has been suddenly and wonderfully converted. When he was here as Secretary of Defense, when he was adviser to the President of the United States?

Mr. Clifford, when you were here in that capacity and had responsibility, you held before this committee the mailed fist and the sword. You come here today with an olive branch, and as an apostle of and crusader for peace.

Now, I am sure your conversion is very wonderful, but I must say that men in positions of responsibility such as yourself had this country in a certain situation when the present President came into power, and that situation was more than half a million American soldiers deeply involved in combat in Southeast Asia, and that situation was, as you have testified this morning before this committee, that there was no disposition toward withdrawal at that point by your administration. You have testified this morning that there was, when you became Secretary of Defense, no plan for winning that war either.

So your conversion has been sudden and wonderful and it would have been much more appropriate if we had heard some of these things from you while you were still in a position of responsibility and power in this Government.

Now, as far as I can understand your two-point plan, it is a plan first of all that the killing should go on rather than end, as would be the case of a cease-fire and, second, that the North Vietnamese shall subjugate the South Vietnamese by force. That is what I hear from your peace plan, sir, and if that is unfair interpretation it is much less unfair than your interpretation of what an American President is now trying to do with a bad hand which you, sir, helped to deal him.

Mr. Chairman, I must say that the gentleman has a right to voice his opinion as a private citizen before this committee but I think it ought to be said and underlined very clearly that there is a great deal of evidence that he does not speak for the American people.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fraser.
Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I congratulate you on your statement and on your forbearance in the face of the reactions of some of my colleagues. Often you are on the right track when you get more heat than light from those who are listening.

The important thing for us to do as a committee is to address ourselves to the logic of your reasoning, and I find it persuasive. What I find most important in your statement is your emphasis on what the President said. I listened to him 2 weeks ago, but I really didn't catch the significance of the statement that you reemphasized this morning that the President is now embarked on "decisive military action to end the war."

This, taken together with what Secretary Rogers told us Tuesday, which was that the President did not propose in his peace plan to disengage the United States permanently from Indochina, after we took our troops out, but that we would be prepared to enforce the cease-fire with our naval and air forces—at least, we would keep that option open—leads me to concur that we are clearly embarked on the most dangerous course that the United States has yet taken in an area in which we have no important national interest.

I broke with President Johnson on the war and I broke sharply. I found this to be a most abrasive and unpleasant experience. I can understand the reaction of some of my colleagues on the other side when they find their President under challenge with respect to his war policies. For myself, if the President would get us out of Vietnam and could get reelected, I would delight in it. I think the ending of the war is far more important than who the next President is. I would only wish that he would end our military involvement in that part of the world.

CAN WAR BE ENDED MILITARILY IN 5 YEARS?

Have you any reason to believe, beyond what you have said, that the pursuit of the objective of decisive military action to end the war, as announced in that declaration by the President, can be realized within the next 5 years?

Mr. Clifford. I have the deep conviction that if this remains the policy of our country, we will continue to be in Vietnam indefinitely. Based upon whatever experience that I have had, I am sure that we cannot win the war in Vietnam within the limits of the action that, as a Nation, we are willing to take. I do not believe that as a Nation we are prepared to destroy North Vietnam, and I believe that that is probably what it would take for us to end the war by decisive action.

Now, keep in mind that from the very beginning of our entry in Vietnam the military has said that a certain action will do the job. In the spring of 1965 we went in with 75,000 Marines. The military indicated at that time that that would do the job. It didn't. It got to 140,000 and it went to 300,000. Each time the military felt that this will do the job and it never did the job.

Now, I might also say there were other recommendations—recommendations at that time to go into Cambodia, to go into Laos, even to invade North Vietnam. Now, that last step President Johnson was
deeply concerned about because there is a Mutual Assistance Pact between North Vietnam and Red China. The opinion of all the experts was that if we invaded North Vietnam, we would be in a major land war with Red China, and I could not find a person who thought that would be an improvement over the situation that already existed.

MILITARY FORCE WILL NOT END WAR

What he has now done, in my opinion, is to perpetuate what I consider to be a basic fallacy, that the application of military force in North Vietnam will bring an end to the war. I believe it will not. I say it with deepest conviction—Mr. Buchanan has his views and I have mine. I respect those views. This is part of our system. I am here as a guest, I thought, not to give my views as a Democrat, but to contribute whatever I might to the information that you men have which could help you to make a decision on this joint resolution.

As you consider the joint resolution, I believe you must keep in mind that our military efforts in Vietnam for 10 years have not been successful. We have constantly escalated our efforts. I would like to say, with all the sincerity of which I am capable, this new escalation is not going to end the war. This is going to lead to the predictions contained in my statement. Whether it is a week or a month or a year from now, if we follow the policy that we are following now we not only will stay in the war indefinitely in Vietnam, we will constantly increase the danger of a confrontation with the Soviet Union and with China.

I do not know how long they are going to permit us to keep their ships sequestered. At some point this is going to break loose. Now, it may be that they want the SALT agreement, it may be they want the German and Polish agreements. At some time, I guarantee to you, this is going to come loose, and there is going to be an infinitely more dangerous situation than there is now.

One of the reasons that I am here today is to attempt to bring to your attention what I know in my heart is going to happen in the future, and I would like to prevent it.

Chairman Morgan, the gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Steele.

THE GOODELL PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Steele, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I would like to begin by stating my complete agreement with your statement that our national interest has never warranted the investment in lives and treasure which we have made in Vietnam. Beyond that, I would like to take up the line of thought that you were pursuing with Mr. Thomson when the time cut you off.

You stated in your discussion with Mr. Thomson that you were opposed to former Senator Goodell's proposal simply to withdraw our forces without a prior agreement with Hanoi, because that would not end the war. But you believe that the war would end if we withdrew after first making an agreement with Hanoi to withdraw. What I am wondering is; what difference does it really make if we withdraw with or without a prior pledge to withdraw, particularly in view of the statement you make on page 11 to the effect that the war will go on so long as Hanoi finds the situation in the South is incompatible with its interests. I fail to follow you here.
Mr. Clifford. All right. When Mr. Goodell made his recommendation, all he had in mind was one item; withdraw all American forces from South Vietnam.

Now, I did not believe that that would accomplish any real purpose. One, it would not get our prisoners back, which I thought was a defect in the plan. Two, it permitted us in other areas of Indochina to maintain our forces, possibly to engage in acts of violence in South Vietnam. To me it made no real sense at all because I didn't think it was going to accomplish any real purpose that we had at the time.

Now, I think it is very different when you approach it from the following standpoint: one, we get our prisoners back and, two, we agree with them that we are going to terminate all our military activity in Indochina, which was not part of Goodell's plan.

Now, when I say—and this is my own private view—when the announcement is made that we had reached agreement with Hanoi, I believe that the days of the Thieu regime are numbered from that point. As far as I am concerned, that would be a step in the right direction because I don't think there is going to be a settlement of the war while the Thieu regime is in office. If, of their own volition, the people of South Vietnam push forward to a different government for the purpose of reaching peace with Hanoi, that, in my opinion, would be one of the results that would follow from this plan. That is the distinction I see between the two.

Mr. Steele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Culver.

DEFICIENCIES OF CONGRESS

Mr. Culver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I also would like to express my appreciation for what I consider to be one of the most able and persuasive statements, at least to me, that the committee has been privileged to receive during the 8 years I have been a member of the committee.

I think one of the most tragic lessons of Vietnam has been the institutional deficiency of the Congress to fulfill its proper role in the formulation of American foreign policy. I feel that if you look at the period during the Pentagon Papers from 1965 on you look in vain for the appearance of any nongovernmental witness before this committee. So I think that in a very tragic, yet belated and important way, your appearance here today is at least a step in the right direction. Had this committee been possessed of the kind of analysis and the kind of information and the kind of argumentation that you are advancing here today early on in the history of this war on a systematic formalized basis, I am one of those who believes that we may well have avoided our involvement in Vietnam in the first place. Secondly, we certainly would have avoided its development into the aggravated form and the incalculable risk we are confronted with today.

COMMITTEES: “RATIFICATION CHAMBERS”

I am afraid that most of the committees of Congress charged in the foreign policy field with any degree of responsibility and jurisdiction have only served as ratification chambers to echo any recommenda-
tion that has been advanced by the executive branch of government. I don't think this is in any way compatible with our independent and individual responsibility as a separate co-equal branch of government. I hope that we are seeing an appreciation of that with enough political support to see a fundamental change and a restoration of the historical balance which I think is necessary to maintain the stability and proper purpose of this country.

I would also like to say how much I admire your restraint this morning. I for one feel the only thing you are guilty of is having admitted a mistake and being a messenger of bad news. I commend you for your personal courage in that regard.

Our question really goes to the issue of a cease-fire. As you are aware, the issue of significant disagreement within the committee is with regard to the inclusion of a cease-fire provision, and, as you are aware, the cease-fire suggestion enjoys a very strong superficial appeal. You have addressed yourself effectively, I think, to some of the negative considerations involved in this approach—the failure of the North Vietnamese ever to entertain and accept such a suggestion in the past; the South Vietnamese enjoying the veto power over its implementation; and of course reference to the very protracted and complicated military issues involved in arriving at any mutually acceptable cease-fire arrangement.

Now, the concern in the country and the Congress, as you know, is that the American forces above all be withdrawn safely. I believe it is difficult for most people, even if they acknowledge the complications of achieving a cease-fire, to envision a mechanism or formula whereby we could achieve our purpose of a safe withdrawal in the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement.

WILL CONGRESS ACTION LIMIT PRESIDENT?

My question is, then, would it not be possible for the United States to work out an agreement on a bilateral basis which could be properly monitored to guarantee complete compliance during the period of withdrawal? Secondly, could it not fairly be said that if the President's objectives are now genuinely limited to the return of our prisoners of war and the safe withdrawal of our forces as distinguished from insuring sufficient U.S. military support to prevent the takeover of South Vietnam by force, then the imposition of a normal cease-fire as a condition precedent to our withdrawal unnecessarily ties his hands and limits his options to work out effective modalities to bring about his goals?

So there are really two questions: One, how would you express a bilateral formulation for withdrawal with a sufficient monitoring guarantee to provide the safety of our forces? Secondly, would not the imposition of a formal cease-fire requirement on the President from a resolution of the Congress actually in effect limit his options to bring about the safe withdrawal of our forces?

QUORUM CALL NOTED

Chairman Morgan. Would the gentleman yield to me?

There is a quorum call now in progress, and they are on the J's the second time around. If anyone wishes to answer that quorum call, now is the time to leave.
You may answer, Mr. Clifford.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I will make my answer as brief as possible.

Mr. CULVER. I hope you can make it as adequate and responsive as possible. I think it is a lot more important than a quorum call.

Chairman Morgan. I want to say to the gentleman, I missed the quorum call on Tuesday when the Secretary gave his statement here. I want to discharge my obligations as chairman, but I cannot afford to miss too many quorum calls, I am going to stay with you this time, but I want to say to the committee that in the future when there are quorum calls, the Chairman is going to answer.

Mr. Clifford.

THE CASE-CHURCH AMENDMENT

Mr. CLIFFORD. The Case-Church amendment was a good amendment—what it provided for was that we get our men out and get our prisoners back. Now they have nothing to say in their amendment about the safety of the withdrawal of our troops, so Senator Byrd came along and added the Byrd amendment which provided for a cease-fire; that is, an overall nationally supervised cease-fire. The major argument for that was that if you had a cease-fire, it would protect our men, and that is, I think, the basis on which the Byrd amendment passed. But you don't have to have a cease-fire, in my opinion, to protect our men. As I have said before, as soon as you add that broad cease-fire, then you destroy the entire effort because you are asking them to agree to something that we already know they won't accept.

Now, along your line of reasoning, it is entirely possible that we could agree to what we might describe as a cease-fire just between the United States and Hanoi. Now, that had been discussed some years ago and received some consideration and then got lost, but it is entirely possible that that could be done. I think it probably would not be too difficult. It would mean just a minor amendment in the four-point program that, instead of saying our troops shall be withdrawn safely, you could say our troops should be withdrawn safely under a special cease-fire just between the U.S. forces and enemy forces.

CEASE-FIRE MACHINERY

Now, you could also set up some machinery there. I think they would agree to that. The one agreement they will not make is to stop their war against Saigon, and that is contemplated by the overall cease-fire. So I say in answer to the first part of your question that if we work out a separate cease-fire with Hanoi, with machinery that would guarantee the safety of our people, and agree upon the modalities, I think that could be done.

More than that, if we get into your second question, as to whether or not a formal overall cease-fire limits the President, I must say I cannot quite see it that way because it is not going to be acceptable. At the very best, the details of working out a cease-fire in Indochina would challenge the greatest brains that exist in the world.

Mr. CULVER. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Then it would limit his options if his objectives are limited to the withdrawal of troops and
prisoners of war because it would impose upon him the necessity to actually work out this international cease-fire arrangement.

Mr. Clifford. Yes.

Mr. Culver. That is my point. If you are trying to support the President of the United States, to support his goals, which if they are genuinely limited to the safe return of our prisoners of war and the safe withdrawal of forces as distinguished from indefinite military support to the South Vietnam regime to avoid a military takeover from the North, then it seems to me you don’t impose upon him the complicated requirements implicit in a cease-fire arrangement, but you afford him the earlier option to achieve those limited goals on a bilateral basis.

Mr. Clifford. Again, I would have to say that I am so sure in my mind that Hanoi will not accept a cease-fire, that I believe it is academic to discuss the problems that might flow from a cease-fire. If at any time they should, then I am sure we would all want to go to work on it, but I don’t think there is the least likelihood of that happening.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I am under a misapprehension, but I understood that we asked the Secretary here to answer questions from us rather than have us speak to him, so I would like to use my time to ask questions of you.

On the question of the POW’s, is it your opinion that each day that the POW’s remain in the hands of the North Vietnamese, it further jeopardizes their lives?

Mr. Clifford. That has always been so. Some men do not react well to captivity. Some of them were ill when they were captured, some of them were wounded. The longer that they remain in captivity the less chance they have to get back to their families. That is becoming particularly so now, because of the enormous escalation in the bombing of North Vietnam. I don’t know at what point a bomb might drop and kill some of our own prisoners. It at least constitutes a possibility because we are getting to a point where there is almost a saturation type of bombing. I think this should be a matter of concern to us.

Jeopardy of U.S. Residual Forces

Mr. Wolff. Secondly, on the remaining forces in Vietnam, each day that we remain there puts into jeopardy the lives of the men who are there, as well: What I am getting at is, if our concern be for the POW’s and as well for the safe withdrawal of the men, then the quicker we get out of Vietnam the greater concern we will evidence for both the POW’s and the men that we have there.

Mr. Clifford. Yes, I would like, if possible, to get this point over and even convince some who feel differently. As we have withdrawn our troops from Vietnam—and I applaud the President’s action; I give the President the highest marks for withdrawing American troops; he deserves the approbation of all of us—but, at the same time, as we withdraw our troops, our bargaining position has constantly and steadily deteriorated,
So we get down to the point now where we don't have any real bargaining power with just these few troops. I say if we were unable to win the war militarily with half a million troops we are certainly not going to win it now that we are down to 40,000 or 50,000 or 60,000. We cannot do it, in my opinion, by air and we cannot do it by mining the harbor at Haiphong.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IN VIETNAM

Mr. Wolff. On that question, Mr. Clifford, I might ask you, at any time when you were Secretary of Defense was any consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Clifford. At no time that I can recall was the subject ever discussed in a meeting in which I was present.

Mr. Wolff. Was this an alternative?

Mr. Clifford. I believe that the military had contingency plans in every part of the world for the use of any type of weapon that we have—that is their function—to have contingency plans. I do not recall at any meeting at which I attended a recommendation being made that either strategic or tactical nuclear weapons be used in Vietnam.

Mr. Wolff. Is this not an alternative that was perhaps not under active consideration, however, is this not an alternative that has been advanced by some commanders in Vietnam?

Mr. Clifford. I do not know whether it has been advanced by commanders. I know only I was greatly comforted by President Nixon's statement some time ago that there were two courses of action which he would not follow: One was the reinstatement of more troops going back into Vietnam, and the other was the use of any type of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Wolff. I was also confident when President Nixon said he had a secret plan to end the war.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Bingham. RISKS INVOLVED IN PRESIDENT'S PLAN

Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I would like to join Mr. Rosenthal and others of my colleagues in complimenting you on what I think is one of the most compelling statements that we have ever had in front of this committee. I welcome your support of our resolution but I differ with one part of your statement, and that is essentially what you say on page 15, where it seems to me that you give too much credit to your own critics on this committee and elsewhere in suggesting that the President's plan offers any real protection to South Vietnam. I would like to ask you to assume that a supervised cease-fire is agreed to, and that the prisoners are withdrawn, and that the American troops are withdrawn.

Now, let's look at what the President proposed. He never said anything about permanent guarantees for South Vietnam. He never said anything about North Vietnam withdrawing to where it was before these recent attacks began, and in this respect he overruled his Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird. So I am suggesting that what the President is offering is a terrible risk, a plan that almost certainly is not
going to succeed, but if it did succeed would leave the situation at the end of the 4 months or the 6 months exactly where it would end according to your plan; that is, with North Vietnam free to do as it likes in the area.

Would you comment on that?

DETAILS OF CEASE-FIRE UNCLEAR

Mr. Clifford. We do not know what the details of President Nixon's cease-fire are. At a press conference Dr. Kissinger had the day after the delivery of the May 8th speech, he did not answer questions as to what the details of the cease-fire would be. As I recall, he was asked the question: Does the cease-fire contemplate withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam? He chose not to answer that question. Others have apparently chosen not to give any of the details of what the cease-fire would be.

Mr. Bingham. If I may interrupt on that point, Mr. Laird—and I heard him say this on the radio—said that his prior statement, that they would have to return to where they were before there could be any discussion, had been rendered obsolete by the President's statement. So Mr. Laird interpreted the President's proposal as meaning that Hanoi would not have to retreat, that this would be a cease-fire in place.

Mr. Clifford. Right. Then, if we assume the premise, Mr. Bingham, that you have suggested, that is, at the end of the 4-month period of cease-fire the North Vietnamese are still in South Vietnam and that they still have all their weapons, then they could proceed to do whatever they chose to do at that particular time, and you might end up with a result that you suggest. However, in my opinion, it is still not likely because I cannot see the North Vietnamese, while they have what they consider to be a successful offensive in progress, agreeing to grind to a halt for what would be a minimum of 4 months, but could be 6 or 8 months, or even longer. This is why I think they will never take it.

CEASE-FIRE DOES NOT MEAN WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Bingham. I don't disagree with you that they are not going to take it. It would mean humiliation for them; it would mean humiliation for the Soviet Union, and China. What I am saying is that the President has offered a plan that is not going to be accepted. That is a terrible risk and—for no good reason, for no broad goal would be obtained even if it succeeds.

Mr. Clifford. Yes. However, I do have to take into consideration other statements that the President has made. He in effect has said:

As long as I am President we will continue to defend our brave allies, and we will not permit the imposition of a Communist regime.

So I still have that in mind, you see.

Mr. Bingham. If that is so, then his offer as contained in the points that he made about cease-fire and withdrawal is a fraud, because it does not really mean a withdrawal. It means if the North Vietnamese came back in and started an offensive again after the end of the 4 months and after the United States was out, that the United States would again go back in and defend.
Mr. Clifford. I shall not charge the President with perpetrating a fraud. I will say that at the time the offer was made that conditioned the whole deal on a cease-fire; I believe that he and his associates are just as knowledgable, and more so than I, as to the attitude of the North Vietnamese that they were not going to accept the cease-fire.

Mr. Bingham. Thank you.

If I might just say one final word, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is very indicative of the strength of Mr. Clifford’s statement, the bulk of the statement, that particular remarks have been made about him at this hearing which did not go to the merits of his statement, and have nothing to do with his statement. It is indicative of the power of the statement that it was hard for my colleagues to quarrel with this statement, but, rather, they chose to make other nasty remarks.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Clifford.

The committee stands adjourned until further notice.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned subject to call.)
TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding.

Chairman Morgan. The committee will please come to order.

This is the third day of the hearings on the pending legislation concerning the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

Today we hear from two distinguished representatives of our universities.

We have with us today the president of Princeton University, Robert F. Goheen; and the president of the University of Minnesota, Malcolm G. Moos.

Both gentlemen have brought prepared statements this morning, and those prepared statements are before each member of the committee.

I am sure we all feel it is important that we know the thinking of our leading educational institutions.

Dr. Goheen, if you are prepared, you may proceed as the first witness.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT F. GOHEEN, PRESIDENT, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Goheen. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to speak in support of the objectives of the joint resolution providing for the termination of hostilities in Indochina.

I come before you as a private citizen, representing no institution, in any way claiming to be an expert on international affairs, national defense strategy, constitutional law, or anything so formal.

I am, I suppose, a moralist. Earlier I was a student of history, and especially of the roots of western civilization in the Greco-Roman eras. More recently I have been a concerned observer of our own American society, strained as it currently is by many deep-set tensions.

And it has been my good fortune—albeit a sometimes harassed one—to consider from the vantage point of a university the issues of war and peace and of our national honor vis-a-vis Indochina which today so sharply confront us.

THE UNIVERSITY VANTAGE POINT

Even if not an infallible source of light, a university is, I suggest, a singular and important vantage point for such concerns. On the one
hand, you are there in the midst of people whose job it is to try to take the long view, to try to assess the course of history and the options before us, in as clear-eyed, reasoned, and unprejudiced ways as are possible in this imperfect world.

Yet, at the same time, in a university you are also in close touch with the sentient generations coming on, who, with all their energy and idealism, are the Nation's—and the world's—best hope for a better, less torn, less ravaged future—all their frequent impatience, imper- 

ance, and self-conceit of the young, notwithstanding.

I trust that none of you of the committee are misled to think that among today's students the few wild-eyed protesters, who have again set themselves to obstruction and loud posturing, represent either the extent or full nature of the moral concern which now runs so wide and deep among college-aged young Americans all across the country.

The relative peacefulness of the majority of students this spring should not be construed as acquiescence in national policy. It bespeaks more often deep frustration about the constituted authorities, whom the young seem to feel to be both unresponsive to their humanitarian concerns and apparently powerless to disentangle the country from its protracted, devastating involvement in Indochina.

THE EXAMPLE OF ATHENS

There is, I suggest, much latent dynamite there. There is also immense desire and potential for human good.

Probably most of you recall from your school days the brilliant, swift rise and almost equally swift, tortured, sliding plunge of the city of Athens in the fifth century, before Christ, as depicted by the historian Thucydides. There are in his history grim parallels—especially on a moral plane—to America's still persisting Indochina adventure and to what the nature of our involvement there seems to say about us as a people.

As we seek for peace—now—in Indochina, we must recognize both what our involvement means for the people of that war-torn land and also what it says about us as a people.

Like most of the people of most nations who have had great power, I suppose we Americans have been used to thinking self-righteously about our involvement in wars, even though the record is a mixed and flawed one. It is hard for us who love our country to face up to a candid recognition that as a nation we are engaged in gross wrong-doing, in action that is irreparably damaging and to no good effect.

Instead, we look for villains and scapegoats: the Pentagon, the industrialists, the intellectuals, the politicians, whatever party, those soft on Communism, the right-wing, the hawks, the bleeding-heart liberals.

VIETNAM: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY

Most of us have been slow, terribly slow, to bring ourselves to realize that this nation has unwittingly been caught up in a tragedy which has already cost more than one million lives—some 46,000 of them American; the rest, persons equally human and no less the children of God.

We have been slow to see that almost all of us must in some degree or another share the blame. We have been slow to recognize ourselves as
actors in a drama to which there can be no happy ending—a drama chillingly like the ancient Greek tragedies of human arrogance and catastrophe.

Step by step, with no chief villain, with no architect of evil secretly in control, we and our elected leaders have made, supported, or acquiesced in decisions that have multiplied to now surely unconscionable heights the brutality and the suffering that war always brings.

**NATIONAL POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY**

National policy in a democracy, of course, is a reflection of a people. Piling the arrogance of power on top of our ignorance of a strange and distant land, under three national administrations our country has stumbled and forced its way into the lives and affairs of another people endowed with a culture very different from our own; acting as though their interests were our interests and, if not, that they should be.

In presuming that we have known what was right for them we have helped to magnify manifold their ability to do damage to one another, and involved ourselves in a heavy course of destruction.

Much has been made of our national honor and not enough, I think, of the dishonor we do ourselves when we bomb to save face. It is as though persistence in a grievous wrong could cover up the mistakes which led us into this tragedy. We need now not to save a face that has become arrogant to the world, but to let that face show the deep lines of hard lessons learned and of human compassion.

On our home shores, too, we have been experiencing the infectious spread of violence, and we have begun to see the erosion of this Nation's morale and confidence which has been occurring because of this dreadful war—and woe to the country whose self-respect withers away.

**AMERICA'S CAPACITY FOR MAGNANIMITY**

Yet, there is, I think, hope that a movement of mind and heart may halt that erosion. I mean a movement toward contrition, a stirring of respect and compassion for other people, a candid recognition of former blindness and pride.

Under the grace of God, we Americans still have, I believe, the capacity for that sort of magnanimity, and not to be ashamed to humble ourselves for our wrongdoing. Let us at least pray that we may have that kind of honesty and courage, to face up to the blunt fact that we have gone astray and to seek help in reshaping our lives and our Nation to the great humanitarian ideals of our Judaeo-Christian heritage.

**SET A DATE CERTAIN FOR WITHDRAWAL**

The specific issue before this committee today is whether the Congress should set a date certain for the termination of our country's military involvement in Indochina, subject to release of all American prisoners of war and the safe withdrawal of all U.S. forces. It must be done.

For over a decade, a series of administrations has given us lesson after lesson in the futility of trying to end the kind of conflict in
which we are involved in Vietnam by enlarging and extending it. And, 
in my view, at least, to offset the withdrawal of ground forces by the 
largest air and naval bombardments the world has ever known is not 
escalation.

In any case, surely now the Congress does not need to feel com-
mitted to the bankrupt Thien regime. It is time to recognize that we 
cannot Vietnamize the Vietnamese to our purposes. They must be 
allowed to unravel and put back together their own affairs according 
to their own best interests and as best they can. And if there must 
ievitably be great turmoil and more lives taken, one can be sure 
that the process cannot possibly be more devastating than the course 
of action to which the President apparently still has us committed in 
Vietnam.

I urge on you, then, the critical importance of the Congress acting 
to set a date certain for the end of America’s Indochina expedition. 
As that date is set, I hope that we shall commit ourselves individu-
ally and as a people to the task of reconciliation and renewal with no 
less intensity of spirit and no less expenditure of resources than the 
Vietnamese war has called forth from us these past dozen years and 
more.

I thank you, sir.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE AGREED

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Dr. Goheen, for a very interesting 
statement.

Doctor, I have no questions.

We have two witnesses. I am going to give my time to the gentleman 
from New Jersey, I believe that you are a constituent of his.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. Rosenthal. Mr. Chairman, point of information.

I was just wondering, might it not be useful if we heard from the 
other witness and then questioned them together.

Chairman Morgan. The Chair will proceed any way the committee 
wishes.

Mr. Rosenthal. I, personally, would prefer it that way.

Chairman Morgan. Any objection?

Mr. Moos, you may read your statement now.

STATEMENT OF MALCOLM C. MOOS, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF 
MINNESOTA

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I, too, like 
my colleague, President Goheen, speak as a private citizen and not 
as a representative of the university.

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the committee for giving 
me this opportunity to appear before you as you consider the joint 
resolution for the termination of hostilities in Indochina.

I would also like to compliment the committee for its initiative in 
undertaking these important hearings. Both the execution and formu-
lation of foreign policy are increasingly dominated by the executive, 
and your efforts represent a sorely needed counter to this one-sided 
control.
Clearly a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches must be restored. Your deliberations constitute a significant step in this restoration.

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON THE YOUNG

My remarks today will be confined to a central issue which must concern us all. It is an issue of special concern to me as president of a major university, one that has just been scarred by the first violence we have had in the 5 storm-swept years that have battered campuses across the Nation.

The issue, in short, is the continuing impact of the war on the younger generation.

Nearly 2 years ago, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, headed by Governor William Scranton, reported that an end to the war in Indochina is essential to restoring calm on the Nation's campuses.

Further, the report said, the very survival of our Nation is involved. "A nation driven to use the weapons of war upon its youth is a nation on the edge of chaos. A nation that has lost the allegiance of part of its youth is a nation that has lost a part of its future."

DECEPTIVE CALM ON CAMPUS

The continuing effects of the war upon our youth are in danger of being misunderstood today. A deceptive calm now prevails on most of the campuses, a calm that appears to stand in such marked contrast to the turmoil at the time of the Cambodian invasion and earlier.

But, in a profoundly important sense, that earlier turmoil reflected a belief in our political system and the institutions by which we govern ourselves. The younger generation—the extremist fringe apart—was, in fact, expressing its faith in our system, its conviction that change could be brought about from within. Young Americans were motivated by the premise that the system would prove responsive to their demonstrations to disengage from the war. Their protest against Vietnam was an act of faith in our leadership and our institutions.

What explains the relative quiet of today? What has happened to the fervor of yesterday?

IMPACT OF THE DRAFT

For many the easy and apparent answer is the draft. Barely 3 years ago, the draft menaced the future of every young American male from his 18th birthday until his 26th. Today draft calls have fallen dramatically. The core of uncertainty has been largely removed, eased in great measure by the transition to a single roll of the dice in a national lottery.

Yet, no matter how crucial the draft has been in influencing the outlook of the young, it is not the whole answer to the quieter mood on the campus. Nor, in my view, is it even the most important. Something far more basic is at work—something that hovers over us all like a deadly mist.
What we are witnessing is a generation moving into adulthood, poisoned by the most profound skepticism and cynicism about our institutions and their legitimacy. Credibility and faith in our institutions, including our great universities, are being dismantled daily, and are threatened with collapse. They are so threatened by a growing awareness of the constant collision of theory and reality.

U.S. GOVERNMENT: THEORY AND REALITY

The theory of American government describes a process of electoral change peacefully achieved through the ballot.

The theory of American government describes a system in which Presidential initiatives are carefully reviewed and judged by a legislature prepared to express the will of the people through enactment of laws and exercise of constitutional authority.

And the theory of American government has it that there are limits to the exercise of presidential power, limits mainly enforced by what President Harry Truman called Congress only effective power, “the power of the purse.”

Yet, consider that the average university sophomore, 19 or 20 years of age, has for the full life of his public awareness lived with the fact of an unpopular land war in Asia that Congress, however reluctantly, continues to fund.

It is a war America has fought for a decade and more, the very constitutionality of which continues to be held in serious doubt. A key official of the last administration stated publicly that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. Yet, the manner in which the Nation was taken into war can only be seen as an evasion—in spirit if not in form—of constitutional procedures.

Nor is there any indication in recent years of executive willingness to seek a greater measure of legislative support and authority for the war. On the contrary, through its latest actions, the present administration has made it abundantly clear that it has neither the intention to seek legislative approval for measures that might ultimately lead to a major power confrontation, nor the inclination to accord any deference to a review of these measures by the legislation.

These are only among the more obvious examples of contradictions between theory and reality in the conduct of our foreign policy and the making of decisions that bear upon the lives and fortunes of us all. The young have been rudely shaken by a reality the war has so clearly exposed, and, unfortunately, continues to expose.

A DISILLUSIONED AND DISBELIEVING SOCIETY

Moreover, to the disillusionment that has followed realization of these contradictions must be added the impact of a growing conviction that the will of the people has been manipulated or, still worse, simply ignored by those who conduct the Nation’s foreign policy.

In consequence, what has emerged in the course of the war is what I would call a disbelieving generation—and, more ominously, perhaps—a disbelieving society.
Is it so surprising that this is where we stand today? I think not.

What other result might we have reason to expect, given the cruel deceptions that have marked the conduct of the war and its explanation by succeeding administrations. We can only delude ourselves if we believe this corrosive and pervasive disbelief is a passing phenomenon that will be easily dissipated.

Indeed, it may already be too late to reverse a process that has been at work since the mid-1960's. Clearly, if there is to be any hope of its reversal, it will only be through action that has an unequivocal meaning. While most of us would unhesitatingly favor a negotiated settlement, the terms of which guaranteed the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese, that prospect no longer seems within our grasp—if, indeed, it ever were.

NO ASSIGNMENT OF BLAME

At this very late juncture, it is not my purpose to assign blame. There is more than enough for us all. I simply urge as directly as I can that Congress at long last reassert its proper responsibility in foreign relations and act to terminate the hostilities in Indochina. For, if you do not, the fissure in our national life, opened by the inconsistency between what citizens expect and believe their Government will do, and what, in fact, it does, will widen and rupture.

The war and, in particular, the new and escalatory acts, continue to be defended and explained in terms of America's prestige and credibility abroad. But if we auction that respect and credibility abroad, surely it can only be at the much higher cost of destroying credibility and belief among our youth here at home. Our youth is, and always will be, our most precious resource.

Are we to barter this resource in the endless pursuit of an illusion that only one outcome in Vietnam can uphold America's respect and prestige in the world?

It is my conviction that the disintegrating forces at work in our land, combined with the disillusionment of youth, outweigh the risks of prompt withdrawal from the war.

I fully support the resolution pending before this committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Moos.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

ROLE OF CONGRESS ON THE WAR

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to welcome both these gentlemen here. In different ways they are both old friends.

I am particularly glad to see Mr. Goheen, the retiring president of my alma mater here. He has visited my office and expressed his personal concern about the fact that the war in Vietnam continues. I am sure that he is no more anxious than I to have it end.

No one argues, certainly at this stage, that there is a need to end the war and to end it soon. Both of you gentlemen have expressed very eloquently the effect that it is having on our youth, among others.
I might say that others are concerned, too, that the war still continues.

My questions really revolve around the role of Congress. There has been a sharp needling of Congress by a lot of individuals, most of them writing almost identical letters with respect to the resolution that we have before this committee. I would like to direct my questions to the resolution itself.

Neither of you has mentioned the possibility of including language with respect to a cease-fire. The President, I need not point out, has made the proposal embodied in this resolution but he added to it the importance of an internationally supervised cease-fire.

Dr. Moos has pointed out that Congress should take unequivocal action.

**Questions Language of the Resolution**

I wonder if either one or both of you think that any action by Congress is going unequivocally to end the war, no matter what a resolution says. If we could have legislated an end to the war in a reasonable way, we would have done so.

My concern about the language of the resolution as written is that it makes no reference to a cease-fire. It has been interpreted in its present form as a desire to get our boys home by simply ending our responsibility for wars which we helped build up. It is a war which still continues, in part because of our assistance to one side.

Do you feel that simply by setting a date without reference to a cease-fire there is any prospect for a peaceful settlement? If not, have we discharged our responsibility to Southeast Asia?

Since President Goheen started, would he like to comment?

In other words a number of members on this committee are already committed because they developed the language which we uncommitted members now have before us. I would like to be persuaded about the advisability, or inadvisability, of including language with respect to a cease-fire.

**The Cease-Fire Concept**

Mr. Goheen, Mr. Frelinghuysen, I would like, indeed, to try to answer and I think there are three points you raised. If I might, I shall take them up in order.

First, with respect to the cease-fire, let me say I used to support this idea myself way back when Cyrus Vance and others were advancing it. I now think that it would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve a cease-fire, especially since you are dealing with at least three parties, no two of which are always in perfect agreement—at least, so the record would seem to show—namely, the forces of Saigon, the forces of the United States, and the forces of North Vietnam—and where the Viet Cong may come into it, who knows?

There is also the great difficulty of achieving a cease-fire in a very broken landscape and broken battlefield with different contending parties involved. I have come to believe that the effort to try to secure a cease-fire is an impractical effort.

Also, there seems little reason to believe that at this particular time the North Vietnamese would be interested in such a development,
though they might agree to the safe withdrawal of all American forces.

ROLE OF CONGRESS ON THE WAR

What can Congress do?
I think Mr. Moos put it very well.

One thing Congress can do is to terminate the funding of the war as of a certain date and go firmly on record before the American people that it feels that this fruitless and perhaps unconstitutional war has gone on too long.

That would have considerable effect on any executive, I believe.

Third, when you speak about a peaceful settlement, it is very hard to know what one can hope for. We have sought one for many years now. This administration, like the one before it, came in pledged to try to bring about a peaceful resolution. It looks as though it well may be beyond the American capacity to bring about a peaceful solution and maybe we need to learn that our power is limited and our ability to manage the lives of a different people is very, very limited.

What I was suggesting that we have to do is to let them make their own peace.

RESPONSIBILITY OF UNITED STATES TO VIETNAMESE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is what worries me.

What you suggest as one of our aims, or what we hope would happen, is that the Vietnamese would put back together their own affairs according to their own best interests and as best they can. You advocate that we leave a state of continuing war and do not take a responsibility even to seek for a cease-fire. Granted a ceasefire may be difficult, although I am not sure why you consider it impractical. But surely as a Nation don’t we have a responsibility to seek one if we want to disentangle ourselves from involvement?

By simply pulling out our own military, it does not seem to me we end our involvement. In fact, if we want to give these people an opportunity to lead their own lives and to reach the kind of settlement that seems reasonable to them, I would think a cease-fire would be a minimum requirement for peace.

We don’t have peace in Korea even after so many years, but we have a cease-fire which is certainly a step along the route.

If we leave a state of continuing hostilities in Southeast Asia, it seems to me it could be argued that we are not discharging our responsibilities. And I don’t see how this is ending the war.

Both of you seem to be suggesting that by some unilateral action of the United States we can end the war. I would think this might be an insurance that the war would continue. If the other side, namely the Soviet Union, continues to supply in a major way its ally whether we do or not, the scales might tip in a way that would be disastrous if our aim is to let the people of Vietnam determine their own future.

It seems to me the issue is quite simple. In defining the legislative responsibility it is not a question of a tug-of-war between the executive and the legislative. What we should be doing is trying to help the President end the war, and end it as soon as possible. I would guess that we are not going to end the war if we don’t seek a cease-fire.
RESPONSIBILITY TO CONGRESS AND AMERICA

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Frelinghuysen, I would concur with what you say; this ought not to be construed as a test of wills between the legislative branch and the executive, but I think that what Mr. Goheen and I are saying are two things.

One is that there is an urgent responsibility for an accountability of the executive to the legislative branch.

Second, I think what we are also saying is that the risks of what is happening here at home far outweigh whatever may happen in Vietnam, pending our withdrawal.

I realize you gentlemen, on repeated occasions, have heard testimony about the bloodbath that is certain to occur if there is a withdrawal, if there is not a cease-fire.

I would submit, sir, that we don't have much documentation. We know that some ruthless things have been done, but the scope of them, I think, is not documented.

Also, the price we are paying in the continued losses of the war, it seems to me, again outweighs taking a firm action at this time on the part of the Congress.

PROSPECT OF A VIETNAM BLOODBATH

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, Dr. Moos, the Tet offensive resulted in something like 5,500 Vietnamese dead at the hands of the North Vietnamese. I think that is reasonably well documented. I think we can anticipate, and by indirection at least, Mr. Goheen has said there might be serious retribution against those who have tried to fight for the right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own future.

I don't think we should expect too much charity if the North should be able to dominate the South militarily.

Mr. Moos. I would concede that, sir, about the Tet offensive. I still would feel, though, that we cannot forecast that this is certain to be the outcome. I am certain we all would agree there is going to be retribution, but I think we are faced here with two very uneasy options, and one is preferable to the other.

ISSUE OF A CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, could you direct yourself to the advisability or inadvisability of the cease-fire. What do you consider firm action by Congress?

If we pass this kind of resolution, it is another expression, and Congress has already expressed itself that we think the war should end, and end promptly.

As a practical matter, our problem now is whether to include reference to the advisability of seeking a cease-fire as one of the ways to bring this turmoil to a conclusion.

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Frelinghuysen, let me try and give not a faltering answer to your question.

I am most anxious that this committee make an attempt here and an aggressive one. If the cease-fire measure is the way to get some action, I would support it, even in the face of the fact that apparently the
North Vietnamese would probably reject it. I think if this is the way to get some action, I would go along with it.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you gentlemen know, the resolution provides for three conditions. However, neither of you has mentioned one of them, namely, the accounting of the missing in action. I wondered why both of you would have omitted reference to the accounting of the missing in action in your recommendations or is it just an oversight on your part?

Mr. Moos. Certainly on my part it was an oversight, because I fully support the strictest, most rigorous kind of accounting for those missing in action and all prisoners of war.

Mr. Zablocki. Dr. Goheen?

Mr. Goheen. Yes; I would agree with that myself, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. Zablocki. I shall not comment on such oversight but I wish we as legislators would not commit a similar mistake in propounding or passing on legislation.

Mr. Goheen. I think the setting of a date certain by the Congress is a clear sign to everybody of determination of the Congress, as well as of others, that the war should come to an end and that this could set a basis for more specific agreements on how to bring about the withdrawal of forces.

Mr. Zablocki. What makes October 1 a date certain when the conditions are not met?

Mr. Goheen. In my testimony, sir, I deliberately said I supported the objectives of the resolution rather than every bit of the language.

Mr. Zablocki. Then you would agree that if we set these conditions and say that within 30 days or 60 days or 90 days after there is sufficient evidence of agreement to meet the conditions that the United States should withdraw and terminate our military involvement in Indochina. This would meet with your approval?

Mr. Goheen. I think it would; yes.

Mr. Zablocki. Dr. Moos.

Mr. Moos. I would concur, Congressman, with the point.

Mr. Zablocki. I certainly want to thank you both for endorsing the type of resolution I think is going to be approved by this committee. I intend to propose an amendment to include just that language.

PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

If I may just ask one question of Dr. Moos. On page 7, sir, you say, "While most of us would unhesitatingly favor a negotiated settlement, the terms of which guaranteed the
right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese, that prospect no longer seems within our grasp—if, indeed, it ever were."

Would you care to amplify why you think a negotiated settlement is not possible now and, indeed, perhaps never was?

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Zablocki, forecasting, of course, is a pretty perilous thing for a political scientist to do, and I may very well be proved wrong.

I would say that, by and large, the President ought to be the architect of negotiations in foreign affairs.

I think that certainly the Founding Fathers were wise in their judgment on this. Now, if a negotiated settlement could be made by the executive with the kind of guarantees for self-determination that we would all like to see the South Vietnamese have, he should have that option.

This clearly, I think, would be my preference, but I don't think that is possible, and I am not certain that it ever has been in the last 10 to 12 years. So, that is why I support this resolution.

Mr. Zablocki. I understand your statement, sir, but I wonder if you could give us the reasons why you think it was impossible or is impossible.

Mr. Moos. Well, I think, Congressman Zablocki, as we review the events of the past 12 years, there has been a stubbornness on the part of the North Vietnamese not to negotiate at all.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you very much, I agree, sir.

Chairman Moos. Mr. du Pont.

LANGUAGE OF THE RESOLUTION

Mr. du Pont. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Both of you gentlemen have endorsed the resolution in front of us and I wonder if we could have your thoughts on a couple specific bits of language in it.

Is it your opinion that the resolution stops all U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam?

Mr. Goheen. Does it specifically?

Mr. du Pont. I am particularly concerned about lines 4 and 5 which state, "For the purposes of maintaining," and then the key word "supporting."

I think that could be read to mean support that the South Vietnamese would also seek, and I wonder if you understand it that way.

Mr. Goheen. I understand it to mean the withdrawal of all U.S. support tied to the maintenance of the military activities that we thought were favorable to us. It seems to me it does not provide for American support to the Saigon regime after we are gone, if I read that language correctly.

Mr. du Pont. You read it to say that we still support Saigon?

Mr. Goheen. Not that we could not.

Mr. du Pont. That we could not.

So that, by your endorsement of the resolution you favor cutting off military and economic aid,

Mr. Goheen. I don't say economic aid. It has to do with hostilities.

Mr. du Pont. All right. Just military aid.

Mr. Goheen. Yes, sir.
Mr. du Pont. Do you generally favor the cutoff of military aid to all nations or just to South Vietnam?

Mr. Goheen. I do not favor the cutting off of military aid to all nations. I think we have got ourselves in a quagmire in South Vietnam where our ability to affect events positively by military means has proven to be very limited and even self-defeating in multiple ways, and it is time to stop using that kind of effort in that area.

Mr. du Pont. Dr. Moos, would you care to comment on this?

Mr. Moos. I would not make a sweeping generalization that military aid should be cut off elsewhere. I would agree with Dr. Goheen on this.

As to the language of the resolution, it seems to me that while I would not want further support for military purposes, the resolution would not necessarily preclude some kind of economic aid, depending, of course, on what the result might be, and I don't think anybody can determine or predetermine that at this time.

MEANING OF RESOLUTION ON VIETNAM AID

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. du Pont. I would be happy to.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I don't see where either of the witnesses sees any language that would make it impossible for us to continue military assistance to the South Vietnamese. As I see it, the resolution concerns the involvement of U.S. military forces for the purpose of maintaining support or engaging in hostilities. It makes no reference to our support of Vietnamese forces.

Mr. Goheen. I would expect insofar as support were only in material; that is correct. But if advisers went along with material, it would be incorrect.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. But that is quite a different statement from the one you made. You said that you thought there could be no military assistance to the South Vietnamese. Now you say there should be no U.S. military advisers.

I don't mean to intrude on the gentleman's time, but it seems to me a totally different situation if you are not ruling out the possibility of military assistance to the South Vietnamese.

Mr. Goheen. Yes. I think I would agree to confess to having read my own concerns into the language, and I would say that a strict construction would mean that military matériel could still be sent, but it could not be accompanied by military personnel.

Mr. du Pont. Well, I think perhaps the exchange has made the point that that particular piece of the resolution may need a little homework to clarify just what we are talking about.

Now, second, it seems to me very important that whatever resolution we pass in the Congress, that it set a clear and bright line for the future so that when the date comes that we are supposed to withdraw or supposed to take some action, we and the American public will know whether we have met our commitments and whether the other side has met its commitment.
U.S. OPTIONS IF POW'S NOT RELEASED

Now, if we pass this resolution and the North Vietnamese did not release the prisoners, what do you think we should then do on the morning after?

Mr. Moos. Congressman du Pont, I really have not got an answer to that question at this time, and I would be, I think, remiss with the truth if I said that I had an answer at this time.

Mr. du Pont. Well, I am not sure I have an answer, either, but I think before passing a resolution, that it is very important that we find an answer to that.

Mr. Moos. I would concur.

Mr. du Pont. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fountain.

CONDITIONS ON WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join the others in thanking these two distinguished university presidents for coming before our committee and giving us the benefit of their thinking on this resolution.

I just have one question I would like to ask. Is it your opinion or not that however we get out of Vietnam, we ought to get out under those circumstances which are most favorable not only to disassociating ourselves from the war, but to the ending of the war between the North and the South Vietnamese?

Mr. Goheen. Congressman Fountain, my wish would certainly be that in an ideal kind of world, but it seems to me that we have shown our incapacity over a great many years to effect that kind of a settlement, and I see no reason to believe that we have a greater capacity to effect that kind of settlement now.

Mr. Moos. This would be my own judgment, also, Congressman Fountain, that on repeated occasions we have had really no success in getting the kind of reasonable conditions that as a civilized people we would like to see adopted. Therefore, I think the time and conjunction of events have come when we must take a firm action along the lines of this resolution.

Mr. Fountain. Regardless of whether or not we can foresee the possibility of the ending of the conflict there?

Mr. Goheen. Well, as a person not privileged to information that probably this committee has been privileged to over the years, I find myself tremendously disillusioned, sir, by the number of assurances that we have had in the past that a given buildup of forces or a given new strategy was going to bring an end to our involvement; instead, it has gone on and on and on. So, I am not optimistic about the future.

ASIAN LEADERS ON U.S. INTERVENTION

Mr. Fountain. I ask this question primarily because on a Far Eastern trip with members of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of this committee, we visited a number of countries and talked to a number of their respective leaders and particularly some of the foreign ministers. Most of them agreed that we had overintervened or that we had
become so involved that we had in all probability made it an American war, and that we should do everything we could to bring it to a responsible end; and they appreciated the fact that the American people wanted to get out.

They even discussed the advisability as to whether or not we should ever have intervened on any basis other than a limited basis of military and economic assistance.

Almost in unison, they expressed the feeling that now that we are in it, as a part of the process of paving the way for a future peace in that part of the world and also to be sure that the non-Communist elements in that part of the world do not get the impression that by withdrawing we were making a decision that we would under no circumstances ever again intervene on behalf of any country or in a war involving other countries; that consequently, we should get out under circumstances which were not construed either as a defeat for the United States or as leaving the situation in such turmoil that the war would continue on and on and on.

I got the impression that they thought that having entered the war and having, to a large extent, escalated it, that we now, whether we like it or not, and however much we may want to get out, have a responsibility to get out under circumstances which would bring about an end to hostilities in that part of the world.

OVERCOMMITMENT VS. ISOLATIONISM

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Fountain, I think you are quite right that there is a deep concern on the part of our friends in the Philippines, in Japan, and in other Far Eastern countries that we get out under circumstances that do not seem to lay open a vacuum in that situation.

I deplore any thought that taking an action such as this resolution and getting us out would be construed as a turning inwards on the part of the United States, that we are going to abdicate from any situation where we ought to use our influence.

At the same time, I think the lesson is unequivocally clear that we have been overcommitted there and that we cannot continue to be so without, I think, grave domestic risk and danger for the spiritual health of our younger generation.

Mr. Fountain. Whether or not we agree with it, I think when we, Mr. Frelinghuysen and the others, met with the Foreign Minister of Singapore, he stated that, in his opinion, if the non-Communist forces in Asia ever got the impression that we were going to become isolationists, that—based on his knowledge of the intentions of the Communist powers—both the Communist Chinese and Russia, either one or together, would inevitably overrun all of Asia, and that all of Asia would become Communist.

Was that not his impression, Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I was not there, Mr. Fountain.

Mr. Fountain. I'm sorry, I thought you were in the group.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Whalen.