TWO METHODS OF ENDING THE WAR

Mr. Whalen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would like to pursue further Congressman Frelinghuysen's concern regarding ending the war in Vietnam.

It seems to me that there are two ways of ending the war.

First is through a military victory. We have long since discounted this objective in our country.

The second is through a political settlement.

It would seem to me, further, that if a cease-fire is effected this would anticipate a political solution.

Would you gentlemen agree to that observation?

Mr. Goheen: If a cease-fire could be effected, I would think it could lead to at least further strong talk about a political solution.

Mr. Whalen: In other words, the cease-fire in itself is merely an action, or an absence of action, without leading to a resolution of the differences which apparently exist in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Goheen: Yes.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM

Mr. Whalen: My second question, then, is, in your opinion, does the United States really have a responsibility for effecting a political solution between North Vietnam and South Vietnam?

Mr. Moos: I think you are quite right; it could.

A cease-fire could facilitate a political settlement and I think that—

Mr. Whalen: If I may interrupt, does it not anticipate a political settlement?

Mr. Moos: Yes; I believe it does.

Mr. Whalen: Either that or a resumption of hostilities once a failure to achieve a political determination is determined.

Mr. Moos: Yes; I think it does, and I would say there is a responsibility on the part of the U.S. Government to attempt to help with the political settlement.

Mr. Goheen: I think I would differ on this.

I think that we have really met our responsibility and probably met it several times over in the number of years that we have already given to it. One of the most distressing things about the recent events has been the apparent inability of the current regime in South Vietnam, which we have been supporting, to galvanize the will and the determination of their people.

If the newspaper reports are correct, numerically far larger South Vietnamese forces got pushed around by far smaller North Vietnamese forces. So, I think we have tried. We have tried for at least a dozen years to let the South Vietnamese build a government and a society which could stand on its own feet. I don't think anything we can do now can make them more able to stand on their own feet than they have been in the past dozen years or so.

PRECEDENT IN GENEVA ACCORDS?

Mr. Whalen: Mr. Goheen, isn't there, as a matter of fact, a precedent for the United States seeking to avoid a political settlement?
In 1954, did we not refuse to sign the Geneva Pact?

Mr. Goheen. I believe we did. Of course, then we were not bound by it, either.

Mr. Whalen. Apparently at that time we were anticipating a military victory as a means of resolving the issue.

I would like to make just one more observation. Perhaps you can comment on it if you would care to, or just ignore it.

The witnesses that have been before the committee referred to the three administrations that have been involved in our Indochina expedition. It seems to me there are five.

As I recall in the book written shortly before his death, Dean Acheson pointed out very clearly that the United States, beginning in 1950, financed the major part of the French military expenditure in Indochina.

It seems to me that we are viewed there even today as a nation which has sought to perpetuate colonial rule. I think that when we talk about our involvement in Vietnam we should go back really to 1950 when this involvement began rather than with the buildup of troops in 1961.

Mr. Moos. I would be glad to amend my statement on that. You are quite right, Congressman Whalen.

Mr. Goheen. I would agree with that and almost wrote that paragraph in my testimony to take that into account, but I wanted to keep it short and simple. The three administrations have been the three that involved American manpower.

Mr. Whalen. I was not saying that, Mr. Chairman, in a spirit of criticism, just as a matter of history.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fraser.

**TIME AND CONDITIONS ON WITHDRAWAL**

Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome our witnesses today. Dr. Moos is the president of the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, my home.

I would like to ask this question; Supposing the committee were to report a resolution that made as a condition of withdrawal the securing of a general cease-fire: How long would you gentlemen be prepared to see the United States continue its military bombardment in Indochina in order to secure that objective?

Mr. Goheen. Well, I don’t see how one could be engaged in bombardment and be engaged in the cease-fire, so I don’t understand the question.

Mr. Fraser. I am assuming for the purpose of my question that the committee amended this resolution to indicate that the involvement of the U.S. forces would continue in Indochina until a general cease-fire was obtained.

My question is: How long would you be prepared to see the United States carry on the existing naval and air bombardment of Indochina in order to secure the objective of a cease-fire so that we could bring that bombardment to an end? How many years, I wonder, would be required to secure that objective?
Mr. Moos. I would not like to think in terms of years, Congressman Fraser, Mr. Chairman.

I think this ought to be curtailed and very swiftly.

Mr. Goheen. I would just like to reinforce that and, if I might just take a moment to say how really seriously I think you ought to take Mr. Moos' testimony about the mood and attitude of the young people on our campuses. He was not just speaking for his campus; he was speaking for my campus. He was speaking for campuses all around the country.

I can buttress that by pointing out that last week nine university presidents were in this building and adjacent buildings and we all found ourselves with exactly the same concern; the lack of respect for America's institutions that is developing amongst the young and that seems to be especially apparent in a sense of helplessness about the American political system. That is a tremendous price to pay.

Curtailment in Absence of Cease-Fire

Mr. Fraser. I gather, then, that both of you would be prepared to see the U.S. involvement curtailed even in the absence of a cease-fire. Is that true?

Mr. Goheen. Yes, sir.

I, personally, would. My principal concern would be to get out our troops safely, and I think that can be done short of the cease-fire.

Mr. Moos. I would concur with that, Congressman.

Mr. Fraser. The President has stated that the present U.S. objective—and I am quoting now, I think, almost verbatim from his television address—decisive military action to bring the war to an end.

He set out certain objectives in that connection which include as a centerpiece the securing of an internationally supervised cease-fire, and, in pursuit of that objective, we are now dropping the equivalent of a Hiroshima bomb every week on Indochina and its people.

If we put a cease-fire condition in the resolution, in effect we will be endorsing the President's stated objectives and implicitly endorsing the continuation of this unprecedented level of bombardment, the highest known in the history of mankind.

Do I understand that both of you, if given your preference, would not put that cease-fire objective in the resolution?

Mr. Moos. It would be my preference, Congressman Fraser; yes.

Mr. Goheen. Yes.

Mr. Fraser. You can tell, I think, from the questions of this panel why, to the students of America, it must look as though the political process is one of obfuscation.

I thank you very much for appearing here today. This has been very helpful.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Whalley.

A Bloodbath in Vietnam?

Mr. Whalley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to see you gentlemen.
I think everyone in the United States would like to see the war in Vietnam brought to a close and our troops brought home, and I would think that you fellows probably know more about it after having been here for an hour than you did when you came in.

The former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, stated in 1969 in answer to U.S. Senator Goodell of New York, who had asked that all U.S. troops be brought home within a year without a cease-fire, that there would be a tremendous bloodbath.

Do you believe that there would be?

Mr. GOHEEN. Sir, I do not have the knowledge to know whether there would be or not, but it does seem to me that with the naval and air power we have we ought to be able to cover our beachheads and get our troops out. There are not very many to have to get out.

SAFEGUARDING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

Mr. WHALLEY. What would we do with 2,000 American troops in Hue and about 14,000 troops in Danang and a total of about 55,000 U.S. troops?

Supposing something did happen to them and they didn’t agree to safeguard them?

Mr. GOHEEN. I think we would have the same power of retaliation with our Air Force and Navy that we have and are exerting now. I think if it is absolutely necessary to use that to evacuate troops and not to cut off supplies hundreds of miles away it should be used for the safety of those troops.

PROBLEM OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL

Mr. WHALLEY. If North Vietnam would not negotiate when we had 549,000 troops there and we were prepared to negotiate in strength, I would not think that they would agree now to live up to any agreement that might be made withdrawing troops and then expect them to release some prisoners.

The principal thing is if we didn’t release the prisoners, as Mr. du Pont has said, would you be willing, then, to escalate and go back in strength.

Mr. Moos. Well, I think, Congressman Whalley, if there is a violation of trust and the ground rules that are set forth, that you don’t have much of an alternative then but to go back in and try to secure the safeguarding of the troops you are trying to evacuate.

I quite agree with Mr. Goheen, I think we have the supremacy in terms of force to do it, but if again there is a violation of trust, then I think we don’t have any other option.

VIOLATIONS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Mr. WHALLEY. But if they have violated the trust the whole way through.

In 1968, they agreed to the DMZ providing we agreed to stop the bombing and now, of course, they have this enormous offensive.

Mr. GOHEEN. I have a suspicion that the distrust of us which the North Vietnamese have, and it is very considerable and not without some justification, will diminish as American troops diminish. If they
feel that they don’t have to go up against a half a million troops but against 25,000 or something like that, there is not as much reason to be suspicious of us.

Second, it seems to me that their refusal not to negotiate about the prisoners prior to the end of hostilities is not uncommon in the history of warfare; in fact, it is the normal thing in the history of warfare.

What they want the prisoners for at this stage is to get us out and as long as we insist that they have got to give up the prisoners first they are going to be suspicious about our declared intention to get out. We have to cut through that somehow.

Mr. Whalley. King Solomon was probably wise to live when he did; the decisions are more difficult today.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Rosenthal.

SOLIDARITY WITH PRESIDENT IN CRISIS

Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for enlightening, informative, and very sensible statements.

Dr. Goheen, Secretary Rogers, when he appeared before this committee in opposition to this resolution, stated, that in times of crisis we should support the President. Such a time for solidarity came, he said, after the President made a decision for military action which meant the mining of Haiphong and the continuation of bombings.

How should this committee respond to that position, in your view?

Mr. Goheen. I believe in that maxim as a normal guideline. The trouble is when “the crisis” stretches out over 10 years and more. It seems to me then that one is not being asked to support a particular action or lack of action, one is being asked to support a policy that existed before the recent escalation of fighting by the North Vietnamese and which presumably is going to go on existing as a policy indefinitely as far as one can tell.

Under such conditions, it seems to me that the President can have no claim to uncritical support.

“HEALTHY SKEPTICISM” ON CRISIS

Mr. Rosenthal. Are you saying that after 8 years, when a new crisis develops and a flag was run up, the trumpets blare, and we are told to support the President, one must say, “Hold it just a minute; I want to see what is going on and what caused the crisis”?

Are you saying something like that, that we should have a healthy skepticism by now?

Mr. Goheen. Yes, sir; that is really what I am saying.

I might add that I cannot agree with those who would infer that people who wish to criticize policy in times of crisis are necessarily unpatriotic for feeling it should be questioned.

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on Congressman Rosenthal’s query here?

I think, Congressman Rosenthal, there are degrees of crisis, too, and I would support strongly the fact that we close ranks and support the American presidency in times of great crisis.
The Bay of Pigs I would look upon as a different kind of crisis in which you had a possibility of missiles in Cuba. That is a different kind of a threat and a crisis.

Mr. Rosenthal. Are you saying that one has to define whether the crisis involves a national security matter or some vital degree of the national interest of the United States?

Mr. Moos. If it involves the lifeline of the Nation, that is a very different situation in support of the presidency and crisis. I do think that we ought not to be considered as disloyal or anything when we are talking here about what we hope is a constructive way in looking at this crisis.

**IMPORTANCE OF CAMPUS ATTITUDES**

Mr. Rosenthal. Mr. Moos, let me comment on your statement—not necessarily with my views—but I think some of the others around here might have this view.

You said the college kids are unhappy. Some of the people here would say, well, so what? What do they know about security arrangements, about national commitments, and about the national security of the United States?

I mean, so they are unhappy. Why should we get all exercised because the college kids are unhappy?

How do you respond to that?

Mr. Moos. Quite clearly, Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. Chairman, they are not knowledgeable in the area of military logistics and the areas here of which only those that are privileged and privy to such information are.

But they are knowledgeable, I think, in some of the larger issues and policies of what is troubling the conscience of this Nation, and we are losing them. It is getting, I think, day by day worse and worse here, and I sense at home the kind of a breaking in two which is far worse than any kind of a crisis we would face now in Vietnam.

Mr. Rosenthal. Is it your position that the security of the next generation of Americans and their attitude toward this Government is more important than support for the Thieu regime?

Mr. Moos. I think the belief in the legitimacy of our governmental institutions and the processes and the procedures and faith by which these steps are taken is more important and outweighs the other risk; yes, sir.

**EXAMINATION OF CEASE-FIRE IMPLICATIONS**

Mr. Rosenthal. Let me briefly go over the cease-fire business again, President Moos. In responding to Mr. Zablocki's question to you, you did not complete your response.

This resolution calls for a termination date of October 1, 1972, based on only three conditions. The conditions are: subject to the release of all prisoners of war, subject to an accounting for the missing in action, and subject to the safe withdrawal of American forces.

Adding the cease-fire would be the classic case of permitting the tail to wag the dog as it has for 13 years now.

The present Thieu regime could veto any cease-fire and thus prevent the withdrawal of American forces. One would, I think, be giving them this veto so that the cease-fire would never occur.
It is an unrealistic thing to me to expect the political forces to work in Vietnam with that cease-fire condition, and that is the reason the authors of this resolution didn't put it in.

Now, it would be nice if we could have a cease-fire. It would be nice if this war would go away, but it simply does not go away. So, if one is committed to the total removal of American forces and to permitting the South Vietnamese to settle their differences among themselves, you cannot continue to give the veto power over our side through a cease-fire condition to the Thieu regime in Saigon.

That is the reason why we would like a cease-fire if it were achievable or obtainable, but it would make the goal of the resolution totally unattainable.

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rosenthal, I believe I said I thought a cease-fire provision was unrealistic. Nobody could be omniscient in accepting what could be accepted, but I do think it is unrealistic.

Mr. Rosenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Gross.

COMMUNIST WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Mr. Gross. Mr. Goheen and Mr. Moos, this is not the first war of so-called liberation that the Communists have waged around the world and probably won't be the last. What would be your position in the event of another alleged liberation in some country by the Communists?

Mr. Goheen. I would agree, sir, with what Mr. Moos said earlier, and for myself I believe the United States should not turn itself inward, should not cease to be concerned about the development of free societies and their maintenance around the world.

I think we have learned, however, that if we are to respond to the aid of other governments who need our support against Communists or other hostile parties, we must make sure that what we do will work to help those people help themselves and not take the task over into our own hands.

Mr. Gross. Well, then, you are saying that this war would be all right if we had gotten some help from the other nations, is that right?

Mr. Goheen. No, I am not. I am saying that it seems to me we went very badly off course when we decided that we would step in there and straighten everything out, and we have to avoid that.

PRESENCE OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES

Mr. Gross. You seem to be splitting hairs.

It would have been all right, would it, had we gotten some help in Vietnam other than the token forces supplied by Australia and New Zealand and, of course, a mercenary division from Korea? The war would have been all right if we had gotten help from someone else?

I agree that we ought to have had help if any of the rest of the world was interested in stopping the Communist invasion, liberating countries on the basis of how the Communists think they ought to be liberated. Do you agree with that, Mr. Moos?
Mr. Moos. Congressman Gross, I think it would be a hazardous measure, indeed, for us to say that we were not going to take a posture here of relief when some other nation, free democratic society, was threatened. I don't think that has been the course of the United States in the long line of recent history, at least.

On the other hand, I seem to recall President Eisenhower opposing both the Secretary of State and his Joint Chiefs of Staff back in 1954 when the French wanted 50,000 paratroops and a billion-dollar loan. He was very concerned, and said we ought not to get involved in a land war in Southeast Asia; it would be a quagmire.

I think these things have to be judged on their merits. I think what Mr. Goheen and I are saying above all else, besides the concern of students or the whole younger generation, what we are saying is that there ought to be a proper accountability for those kinds of commitments, and we don't believe there has been a real public accountability in the last 12 years.

RECEPTION FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Mr. Gross. Have you seen any news accounts or any pictures of the villagers and the townspeople welcoming the North Vietnamese "liberation" troops to South Vietnam?

Mr. Moos. I think I am fully cognizant, Congressman Gross, of what you are saying. There has not been a joyous kind of reception, certainly, and we know of the atrocity stories. There is no question about the cruelty that has gone on.

I think we are speaking in terms now of weighing in the balance the options, and I believe what we are saying is that after a dozen years, the whole life of the youth of this Nation is at stake.

Mr. Goheen. I would like, for myself, to say just one thing in support of that, taking it a bit further. It seems to me that in our overseas involvement, we ought to be very careful that we are following our Nation's best heritage. It is a fact that in Indochina we picked up—or certainly by many people have been thought to pick up—the colonial heritage of France. I don't think this country ought to stand for colonialism anywhere.

Mr. Gross. You don't think we covet a foot of Vietnam real estate, do you?

Mr. Goheen. No, but we are there, and in a sense have taken up the white man's burden in our support of Portugal in Angola and other areas of this sort.

REACTION TO "LIBERATION" OF ISRAEL OR MEXICO

Mr. Gross. Well, suppose the Russians and the Arab world decided to "liberate" Israel. Can you express an opinion as to what your position would be in connection with U.S. participation to that kind of a move?

We hear that the Communist-trained guerrillas are now active in Mexico, and we have a common border with Mexico. Would you think that if in either case the Communists attempt to "liberate" either of these countries, that our position would be one of aloofness and should be one of aloofness?
Mr. Goheen. I would think that we would certainly be obligated to respond to the call of Israel if it issued such a call to us. I would think that we would certainly as a government have to take very seriously any request for aid that came to us from the Mexican Government. I would hope, however, that these determinations were made in a truly bipartisan way and with close consultation between the executive and the Congress as did certain years back.

Mr. Gross. What are your qualifications as to military training, Mr. Goheen?

Mr. Goheen. Well, none at a strategic level, sir. I started as a private and ended up as—

Mr. Gross. And yet you say that without a cease-fire we can safely evacuate 65,000 troops from South Vietnam.

Mr. Goheen. I did not give that assurance, sir. I said I thought it was possible, and I have been told by people who know more than I that it should be possible.

WORLDWIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Gross. Both you gentlemen also say that you think we should continue to give military assistance to countries around the world. I am sure you are cognizant of the fact that if we give sophisticated equipment to a lot of countries around the world, that means we must follow the equipment with military personnel, with military advisers, and if we do, we are thereby committed at least up to a point, are we not? So that what you say about nonparticipation in the future—that Vietnam ought to be a lesson to us, and so on and so forth—falls by the wayside, does it not?

Mr. Goheen. I would hope not, sir.

Mr. Gross. Well, you would hope not but that would not be the fact, and both of you gentlemen know it.

That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate both of you gentlemen coming here before us and giving us an outside view of what is happening on the campus.

KISSINGER STATEMENT ON A CEASE-FIRE

I would like to say, having participated in the drafting of this resolution, that I was in favor of a cease-fire, until Secretary Rogers appeared before this committee, as well as reading from a very eminent authority, and I would like to read it to you for a moment—that statement was by a very eminent person. Henry Kissinger.

I would say that the statements that you have made today come from the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs.

Chairman Morgan. Would you like to put that in the record?

Mr. Wolff. Yes, I would.

Chairman Morgan: Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The statement referred to follows:)

* * * negotiating a cease-fire may well be tantamount to establishing the preconditions of a political settlement. If there existed a front line with unchallenged control behind it, as in Korea, the solution would be traditional and rela-
tively simple: the two sides could stop shooting at each other and the ceasefire line could follow the front line. But there are no front lines in Viet Nam; control is not territorial, it depends on who has forces in a given area and on the time of day. If a ceasefire permits the Government to move, without challenge, day or night, it will amount to a Saigon victory. If Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it means in effect partition which, as in Laos, tends toward permanency. Unlike Laos, however, the pattern would be a crazy quilt, with enclaves of conflicting loyalties all over the country.

This would involve the following additional problems: (1) It would lead to an intense scramble to establish predominant control before the ceasefire went into effect. (2) It would make next to impossible the verification of any withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces that might be negotiated; the local authorities in areas of preponderant communist control would doubtless certify that no external forces were present and impede any effort at international inspection. (3) It would raise the problem of the applicability of a ceasefire to guerrilla activity in the non-communist part of the country; in other words, how to deal with the asymmetry between the actions of regular and of guerrilla forces. Regular forces operate on a scale which makes possible a relatively precise definition of what is permitted and what is proscribed; guerrilla forces, by contrast, can be effective through isolated acts of terror difficult to distinguish from normal criminal activity.

* * * In other words, a tacit de facto ceasefire may prove more attainable than a negotiated one. By the same token, a formal ceasefire is likely to predetermine the ultimate settlement and tend toward partition. Ceasefire is thus not so much a step toward a final settlement as a form of it.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RESOLUTION

Mr. Wolff. I would say one other thing at this point, that I am prepared at the proper time to offer an amendment which would perhaps clarify some of the questions that were made before as to the ability to fund military action in the future. On line 3 of the resolution I prepared to insert just two words: "** * that the involvement—and the two words "and funding"—"of U.S. military forces, land, sea, and air.” And so forth.

I would ask the gentlemen who appear before us how they feel about this amendment.

Mr. Moos. I think I had indicated, Congressman and Mr. Chairman, that I would support that insertion “funding.”

Mr. Goheen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wolff. I thank the gentlemen.

I thank the chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Buchanan.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by clearing up an answer by Mr. Goheen which has been a widespread misconception. The North Vietnamese have outnumbered the South Vietnamese. The million-man force of South Vietnam, which is only about half regular, includes all the People’s Militia. A government that is really very oppressive cannot afford to arm the people in the villages, but anyway, about half of it is of that nature. Of the 500,000 or so left, many have been needed to defend other areas in the major battle zone area. So as a point of fact, in the battle zones—that is, in Quangtri Province and Kontum—the advantage of the North Vietnamese over the South has ranged from 2 to 1 and from 4 to 1 in some cases, and in all cases they have very much outnumbered
the South Vietnamese actually engaged against them in battle, I think that point ought to be cleared up.

The attacking force has some 120,000 to 130,000 North Vietnamese regulars and 13 of their 14 regular army divisions.

Gentlemen, we appreciate very much your testimony. I note, however, Dr. Goheen, you speak on the first page of your statement about the moral concern which now runs wide and deep among college age young Americans all across the country, and you go on to say: "The relative peacefulness of the majority this spring should not be construed as acquiescence in national policy."

Dr. Moos, on page 6 of your statement you also speak of the young and of their concern, and I quote:

"... a growing conviction that the will of the people had been manipulated, or, still worse, simply ignored by those who conduct the Nation's foreign policy."

**VIEWS OF NONCAMPUS YOUTH ON VIETNAM**

Now I think it ought to be pointed out here that not all young people in this age group are in college, not all college young people are at Princeton or Minnesota, or even in the group of universities with whom you have made contact. There is substantial evidence of a very heavy majority support on the part of the American people as a whole for the President's recent action. I think there has been substantial evidence to that effect.

I have in my office, for example, a response of one group of young people in communications from an overwhelming majority of students of a high school in my district in support of the President. I have another from an overwhelming majority of students, faculty and administration of a university in my area in support of the President. I think it must be said that to my knowledge, there has been no scientific poll taken of young people of all categories in and out of college and in many institutions around this country, to make certain that all the moral concern is on this one side or that the protest against the actions of the President speak for the overwhelming majority of young people. There can be no question there is great moral concern on the part of Americans of all age groups about this question. There can be no question that many young people have strong questions and deep criticisms but many are represented in the point of view I have expressed.

I thought perhaps that one point ought to be made, and I would be glad to yield for a response.

Mr. Goheen. I would like to say I appreciate the correction about the size of forces. As I said, I was reporting the press, I didn't have knowledge.

**YOUTH VIEWS ON WAR**

It is true that there has been no scientific poll of all students' opinions; it would be interesting to have one. What I can report is that traveling around the country and meeting with university people and college people from other institutions and talking with a group of presidents here last week, some of whom came from quite distant parts of the country, there is this sense of not only moral concern but of helplessness being expressed, being visible, among many students on
many different kinds of campuses around the country today, not just the so-called Ivy Groups, the Big Ten, and so on. I think this is a marked fact, but maybe that is something we ought to get the American Council on Education to run a study on.

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Buchanan, may I add just an additional comment on the second point that you raise. There is no question about it, I think the poll would substantiate the fact that the President has support, wide support, in what he is doing right now, but this illustrates, it seems to me, the very paradox that is troubling us today because this is the situation in which the public has rallied.

On the other hand, we have had two presidential elections that were really waged on a platform to end the war. Neither one of them apparently had that outcome, and now the paradox is that the young people—and I think Mr. Goheen and I are speaking more specifically of those we see the most of in our great universities—say, “We cannot do anything about it: we are being manipulated.”

PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL

Mr. Buchanan. Doctor, the present President was thrust into a situation in which over a half million men were deeply involved in a combat situation in Southeast Asia when he came into office. The former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clifford, who testified the other day, indicated that when he came here there was no disposition on the part of his administration toward withdrawal at that time, nor was there a plan to win the conflict. If you would delineate between that situation which the present President found and the situation where we are down to around 50,000 and whether it is working or not, he at least has a plan in progress for withdrawal.

Mr. Moos. I think that line of demarcation is proper, yes.

DOCUMENTATION ON VIETNAM BLOODBATH

Mr. Buchanan. There is one other area, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to pursue.

Both of you expressed some reservations as to documentary evidence of the bloodbath that would ensue should we accept withdrawing or should the Communists take over. I would call to your attention a recent document from the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate entitled, “The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam,” which was put out on February 16, 1972, and without a minority report. That committee includes such members as Senator Kennedy, Senator Bayh, Senator Tunney, and Senator Mike Gravel.

I just briefly will give you some of the topic heads.

“The Communist Terror in North Vietnam,” and under that “The Elimination of the Political Opposition After the August 1945 Revolution,” “Communist Terror in North Vietnam,” “Land Reform,” and “Terror in North Vietnam.” Then under “Communist Terror in South Vietnam,” “Vietcong Repression,” “A Few Case Histories of Terror,” and “Off With Their Hands,” “The Massacre of Dak Son,” “The Vietcong Strategy of Terror,” and other such subtopic headings. One of these is “A Defector’s View: It Would Be a Bloodbath.”

Now these are fairly documented and it is a rather long publication. I would call it to your attention; I would call to your attention
further a few things from the press, some of which are quoted in this report.

"In 1945 the party made a very considerable effort to eliminate opposition through political murders and arrests," and this goes on. This is from Joseph Buttinger in the publication entitled "Vietnam, The Dragon in Battle."

In 1946 the purge of the opposition reached another peak. The Acting Minister of the Interior destroyed the National Party strongholds, executed hundreds of their nationals and even destroyed old comrades in arms. That goes on and this is from Bernard Fall. Bernard Fall records further that in the period 1954 to 1956 some 50,000 people were killed and a half million placed in labor camps. This is in a publication, "The Two Vietnams." During the Tet offensive of 1968 more than 5,000 citizens of the city of Hue in South Vietnam were murdered and you are aware of that from press reports.

These are just a few of the many evidences, and I think I could pile quite a high stack of documents in evidence of the fact that there have been such bloodbaths in the past and such a bloodbath in the future would be almost inevitable.

GOHEEN: U.S. INVOLVED IN BLOODBATH TOO

Mr. GOHEEN. Mr. Buchanan, at the end of my testimony I recognized that very likely there would be severe reprisals and turmoil and killing, probably in both directions.

The thing I have difficulty with is the fact that nobody I know of estimates that less than a million people have been killed in Vietnam since we have been involved in the struggle there in a big way. That is an awful lot of people.

No one has shown me how we can continue with the policy in which we have been engaged without the continuing cost of many human lives.

Look at the picture of An Loc, that two-page spread in Life a couple weeks ago. Their artillery and our bombs. The place is a desert.

In brief, we are involved in effecting a bloodbath too. One has to finally try to assess one against the other and then assess things back home and decide where you come out.

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Morgan, Mr. Fasell.

EFFECT OF PENDING RESOLUTION

Mr. FASELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I am very happy to welcome you here, to have your testimony and response to the questions.

As a predicate; so that there will not be any misunderstanding of the thrust of my comments or my questions, let me say that I support the pending resolution. I may or may not be for a general cease-fire, I may or may not be for a limited cease-fire without the South Vietnamese in it. I think it is very important as far as I am concerned that we be totally explicit.

What this resolution does, what it does not do, how we interpret it, I think it is vital that people are not misled—certainly not the country and certainly not the students in your case.
By the way, let me say I think as university presidents you are a
darn sight more effective being committed here by pleading for what
you believe in and what your students believe in than you would be
if you were locked up in your freezers. So in that spirit, in your view,
does the resolution anticipate an agreement between North Vietnam,
South Vietnam, and the United States, in your opinion?

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Fasceoll, your question was:
Does it anticipate an agreement between North Vietnam, the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam, and the United States?
It would seem to me that would have to be a presumption upon
which we would proceed; yes.

Mr. Fasceoll. Do you agree, Dr. Goheen?

Mr. Goheen. I am not at all certain of that. I am very uncertain
of an ability to get that kind of tripartite agreement, and I don't think
the language is explicit.

MEANING OF THE RESOLUTION'S LANGUAGE

Mr. Fasceoll. Whether or not we are able to is the next question,
perhaps, but the first question is whether or not just from the reading
of the language in your judgment or your opinion it anticipates an
agreement.

Mr. Moos. I think the language is not clear.

Mr. Fasceoll. Is the language self-executing?

Mr. Goheen. Does not the language speak only to the involvement
of the U.S. military forces? There could be a decision to withdraw
all military forces and discontinue all military action in Indochina
that might not include preagreement by the Government in Saigon.

Mr. Fasceoll. Yes.

Mr. Goheen. Under this language.

Mr. Fasceoll. In that interpretation, then, does the language anti-
cipate an agreement between the United States and North Vietnam?

Mr. Goheen. It anticipates an agreement at least with respect to the
prisoners of war, the safe withdrawal of American forces, and the
accounting on men not accounted for.

Mr. Fasceoll. And if we didn't want to deal with the definition of
"agreement," we could say "understanding" or some other suitable
word?

Mr. Goheen. I would think so, sir; yes.

WILL NORTH VIETNAM AGREE TO TERMS?

Mr. Fasceoll. Now gentlemen, in your opinion why will not the
North Vietnamese agree to the terms of this resolution? I know they
should and I am hopeful they would, but I would like your learned
opinion on why they will not. I have my own bias.

Mr. Goheen. They have a great distrust of us just as we have a
great distrust of them, and certainly one of their questions is going to
be can they trust us? Would we really do it? If they agree to the
release of all prisoners of war, will we in fact get all of our forces out?
It seems to me it is this problem of mistrust on both sides which is
a major stumbling block right now.

Mr. Fasceoll. How do you feel, Dr. Moos?
Mr. Moos. It seems to me, Congressman, that the question of accountability also is involved here. Will they be able to give a rigorous and careful account of all these missing in action and all prisoners of war? This could be a deterrent, perhaps, in their not wishing to make such an agreement at this time.

Mr. FasceU. Isn't it possible, however, it could be done on a phased basis by both sides so that you do then have demonstrable trust?

Mr. Moos. Yes, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT SEEN

Mr. FasceU. And those kinds of details obviously would be left to the President. Do you agree that that is a possibility under the language of the resolution?

Mr. Goheen. Yes, sir; I would agree it is a possibility.

Mr. FasceU. Gentlemen, does the language of the resolution in your opinion anticipate the continued involvement of the United States in hostilities in Indochina if the subject conditions are not met?

You touched on this before but I just think we ought to emphasize it more.

Mr. Goheen. Yes, I think the language insofar as it goes only speaks to the termination of the U.S. involvement if these conditions are met, and if they are not, it means we are in the same situation we are in now.

Mr. FasceU. We are in the same position and nobody has an answer to that.

Mr. Goheen. Yes.

Mr. FasceU. I just wanted to be sure we were in agreement on that.

We are definitely, are we not, in agreement with respect to the language of the resolution that it in no way deals with the issue of military assistance except for manpower and economic assistance to South Vietnam?

Mr. Goheen. It does not deal with those things.

Mr. FasceU. It does not deal with that subject.

POSES "PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS"

Now I would like to discuss two philosophical questions very quickly. As I understand the points you make even though the majority of the people may be in support of a given course of action dealing with hostility, if the majority of the manpower to mount that military activity rebels you really don't have a very healthy situation as far as your society is concerned. Is that basically what we are talking about?

Mr. Goheen. That is part of what we are talking about; yes, sir.

Mr. Moos. Yes, sir.

Mr. FasceU. Given the U.S. society as you see it today, and as you project it, and I suppose we might as well include your view of the assessment of the world, do you believe that military deterrents and use of force are outmoded modalities for the implementation of foreign policy?

Mr. Goheen. I do not.

Mr. Moos. I have the same thought.

Mr. FasceU. In other words, realistically, although war is sick or bad or however you want to express it, the realities of life are we must have a military establishment and we may need to use force.
Mr. Goheen. Yes.
Mr. Moos. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fasell. In the foreseeable future?

USE OF FORCE AND U.S. YOUTH

And you see there is a way of maintaining that modality as far as
the younger generation of this country are concerned in a manner
which would be intellectually honest and yet realistic?

Mr. Moos. It seems to me, Congressman, that they are intellectually
responsible as they see their way clear to having a part, to being fac­
tored into decisions made in a responsible way in case by case, yes.

Mr. Goheen. Yes, I would agree with that.

Mr. Fasell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Steele?

NATIONAL INTEREST DOES NOT WARRANT VIETNAM EFFORT

Mr. Steele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would like to join in welcoming you here.

In the question that I have I start from the premise that our na­
tional interest has never warranted the sacrifice of lives, money, the
national unity that we have made because of Vietnam. At the same
time, I certainly would associate myself with your position that Con­
gress has every obligation to critically review the administration policy
on Vietnam and take action to try to change that policy if we believe it
should be changed.

Now, in your statement you focus on the antiwar mood of much of
the population, and particularly that of the campus or campuses that
you are most familiar with.

REACTION IN UNITED STATES TO VIETNAM BLOODBATH

Now, what I would like to ask is: If we were to withdraw without
insisting on a cease-fire and North Vietnamese forces promptly over­
rann South Vietnam, set up a Communist government and undertook
what I think are inevitable strong reprisals against those who have
opposed them over the years, what then do you think would be the
reaction of the majority of this Nation and particularly the reaction of
the students on your campuses?

Mr. Goheen. Well, it is difficult to say, Congressman Steele. If
there were a deliberate and strong decision by our Government that
we have been in there long enough, that we are really unable to change
the course of events over there markedly for the good, and that now
we should get out as a matter of policy. I think many students on the
campuses would applaud that and would respect it and not look on
it as a matter of weakness. How the wider public would react I am
not so sure, but I think again that the President and the Congress have
an ability to lead the American people in matters of this sort, which
one would hope they would use in this direction.

Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Steele, I don't think
that the reaction on the campus would be one of total disinterest, or
that we would not be really deeply despondent to see a series of atroci-
ties, as so many have suggested will inevitably occur; but I guess what I would say also is that there has been so much brutality, so much force in the entire adulthood of this generation now that they become almost tone-deaf to it. So I would not expect that they would be moved as much as we might have expected people to be at the time of the invasion of Korea.

Mr. Steele. They would be less moved?

Mr. Moos. I think this is possible, but again, I would agree with Mr. Goheen that in forecasting on this one, it is pretty difficult to be definitive.

Mr. Steele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Taylor.

CONCERN OVER PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too welcome you before our committee. I too have met with hundreds of young people and college students and other young people and I know that they are disturbed.

Do you both agree that setting a date for withdrawal should be contingent on the release of the prisoners of war?

Mr. Goheen has said they are holding our prisoners of war to get us out.

Mr. Goheen. For myself, sir, I am really uncertain about that, I really am, for the reasons I indicated earlier.

Mr. Moos. I am uncertain also. Congressman Taylor.

Mr. Taylor. Some have written me and said just to get our troops out and of course they will release the prisoners. I have doubts that that will be the case. I wager that our greatest difficulty is getting our prisoners home. I fear that they will be held as hostages for demand after demand—first withdraw the troops, stop the bombing, get our Navy out, cease all economic assistance, pay reparations for damage that you have done.

Don’t you feel that these prisoners will be held as hostages for those many, many reasons, and that it is most important that their release be secured as part of any settlement?

Mr. Goheen. Mr. Congressman, there is the dreadful distrust on both sides; so, you may be right. My own view is that there have been very few wars in which prisoners or determinations to exchange prisoners have been concluded before there has been a termination of hostilities and, therefore, it seems unusual to expect it to be done in this case. And it just may be that once we are out then they can trust us to be out and the prisoners of war exchange would be no problem.

Mr. Taylor, I guess part depends on your definition of “out.” If we have bombers over there, if we have economic assistance over there, if we have our Navy in those waters, are we out?

Mr. Moos. Probably not.

APPEASEMENT: MUNICH EXAMPLE

Mr. Taylor. Another point I want to mention. I am one that thinks that appeasement during aggression in the early days of World War II, especially during the meeting at Munich between Mr. Hitler and
Mr. Chamberlain, set the stage for World War II. Now do you share my fear that just giving up and coming home without a fair negotiated settlement would be in the nature of an appeasement which might bring about a similar result?

Mr. Goheen. I would not believe it would for the reasons I indicated.

Mr. Moos. I concur with that judgment. I don't think it would.

Mr. Taylor. Do you think appeasement of aggression in the world is safe for us today?

Mr. Moos. No. If your question is: Do I endorse appeasement? The answer is, no.

Mr. Taylor. But you do in this case?

Mr. Moos. I don't think, Congressman Taylor, this is appeasement. I guess it is a matter of definition.

Mr. Taylor. All right. Even though you oppose this war, do you agree that the best assurance of peace in America is for us to remain militarily strong?

Mr. Moos. Yes.

Mr. Goheen. Yes.

Mr. Taylor. We certainly cannot furnish a leadership for the world if we work from weakness. That is, military weakness, economic weakness, or moral weakness.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

VALUES TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to reiterate the value of the testimony that our two witnesses have provided us. I hope it has not only been an education for us to hear them, but something of an education for them to have listened to the very real concern on the part of Members of Congress about the fact that this war still continues.

President Goheen has suggested that educational institutions are a place for taking the long view, a place for assessing options in a clear-eyed, reasoned, and unprejudiced way. Well, we would like to think that Congress is involved in that kind of responsibility too.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH TESTIMONY

I cannot help saying in conclusion that if I were a healthy skeptic on one of your campuses, if I were a member of that dissenting generation that Mr. Goheen talks about, I might find it relatively easy to belittle your testimony, if not ridicule it.

You come here and say that you are uncertain whether the North Vietnamese would accept this offer if Congress should make it. You both, as a matter of fact, are uncertain whether our involvement in the war should depend on an agreement to return our prisoners. This explodes the whole basis on which this resolution, which you, in theory, are supporting is based. You suggest that it is unrealistic to suggest if hostilities are not concluded that the prisoners of war are going to be returned, and yet you resist a cease-fire proposal in the resolution.

Dr. Moos says we must take unequivocal and firm action. I wonder how a skeptic could possibly read that into this proposal? This is an
offer which may well not be accepted. It definitely undercuts a major proposal of the President, which he sees as a reasonable proposition; that is, with respect to a cease-fire. If the prisoners should not be returned, where would we be?

Mr. Fraser asked you a very pointed question, “How long would you be willing to support full military action in support of the South Vietnamese if certain conditions were not met, including a cease-fire? How long would you be willing to support military action if the cease-fire were not included but they refuse to return prisoners?”

Mr. Goheen says the need now is not to save face. Of course, it is not simply a question of saving face, but this resolution could be interpreted, and I think fairly so, as a reasonable way to try to save face.

Wisdom of a Moralistic Approach

He said we should humble ourselves for our wrongdoing. But is a moralistic, Secretary Dulles approach to this problem going to solve it? I don’t suppose it is simply a question of humbling ourselves for our wrongdoing if we develop a resolution that says we will end our involvement in Indonesia if only we get our boys back. I would think a skeptic could describe this as simply an SOS resolution: “Save our skins,” and the devil take the hindmost.

We have touched, and I think realistically, on the fact that reprisals would be inevitable. Both of you despair of negotiations to bring an end to the war, and Mr. Goheen feels that perhaps the United States does not even have a responsibility to try to seek further negotiations. Yet how will a resolution that does not provide for an end to the war, but simply provides an end to our direct military involvement going to do anything but continue the agony that the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese have been suffering?

Tough Questions and Simplistic Answers

All I am saying is that I hope you realize that we are faced with a tough question. Simplistic answers—and this is what disturbs me—are not going to resolve this. I doubt if any legislative action is going to resolve this problem and basically we must hope that the initiatives taken by the President are going to produce results.

Inevitably, whatever we put in this resolution, there must be a cease-fire and they are going to have some kind of peaceful settlement. The difficulty has been, from the very beginning over too long a period, the intransigence of the other side to recognize that they might be able to achieve their objectives by some other method than military. So we are faced with a very serious dilemma, and you gentlemen have dramatized this dilemma that we face. I hope you don’t think, whatever we come up with, that we really are going to pass a resolution to end hostilities. This is not going to end hostilities by our own assertion. If certain conditions are met which we put in this resolution, it might end a direct military involvement on the part of the United States, but presumably it would not end the necessity for us to provide military and economic support for our allies and, tragically, it would not end hostilities.
You don’t even know, as you say, whether you anticipate a settlement as part of the process that would be invoked by this resolution. I can only say that I hope it will result in an agreement between the North, the South, and ourselves to bring this war to an end.

I have no questions. It just strikes me that as the result of 2 hours of discussion we come out, not much wiser, but thankful for the opportunity to have heard you both.

CONCERN OVER U.S. MORAL POSTURE

Mr. Goheen. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say how much I appreciate having the opportunity to be here this morning and to speak to these questions. I appreciate very much, and I know President Moos also does, the difficulties that you face in carrying out your responsibilities in regard to these greatly tangled, longlived issues.

I would admit a certain simplification in what I said, but it was very deliberate. I am very concerned about the moral posture of this country and I am worried about how this country is perceived by many other countries, not only, for example, the Philippines, but India, and people in the Near East, and so on. I don’t think we are perceived very well in many parts of the world.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fraser.

FAVORS FLAT WITHDRAWAL, NO CONDITIONS

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say again that I am grateful for our witnesses appearing, and to indicate as one of those who participated in drafting the joint resolution that I would vote for a flat withdrawal period, no conditions. I think the United States ought to get out and ought to get out as soon as possible.

In terms of safe withdrawal of U.S. forces, there is no question in my mind that we could get out in 2 weeks or a month. We could even get out faster if we really had to, but we don’t have to.

What this resolution does is raise an issue that has been identified and reiterated primarily by the administration, but it has been picked up by the Congress, the problem of the prisoners of war. We are creating more prisoners every day. My view is the same as the one you have expressed. We are most likely to get the men held prisoner released if we get out of the war. And what happens in Indochina after we leave could not begin to compare with what took place about 6 years ago in Indonesia when a half a million people were massacred. And the Bangladesh tragedy, in which we lifted not a finger, was a bloodbath many times greater than what might happen in Vietnam. The horrors of this world are staggering. But what staggers me is the willingness of the Congress to tolerate the continuation of the bombardments we are undertaking in Indochina in the name of nothing that anybody can any longer recognize.

The message you brought today, I think, is an important one. We are doing enormous harm to our country, and somehow we don’t seem to recognize it.
Mr. Moos. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my own weight to what President Goheen has said, that I do appreciate the opportunity to consel with you, and I would like to assure all members of the committee that I have learned much this morning. I was not quite certain, Representative Frelinghuysen, whether you were referring to save the skins of the Nation or presidents of universities trying to save their skins.

I might say one of the reasons we had troubles 10 days ago, and we have had no violence in the University of Minnesota campus in the four and a half years I have been there. The attack on the Army: I have defended ROTC and it is going to stay. I have refused to let the university be struck. Nobody talks about closing down a hospital, but yet it is something that people now think that universities are expendable and we can strike them, I think that is not right. There is not any simplistic approach.

I do think, though, that this is a promising step, and that you are struggling gallantly to do something which can help in this situation.

All I can do is close and say that I was talking with one of our university presidents on the phone yesterday, and he said, "Moos, let me say it this way and sum it up." He said, "The situation on this campus is hopeless, but it is not serious."

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Dr. Goheen and Dr. Moos.

The committee stands adjourned until further notice.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)
The committee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2171 Rayburn Office Building, the Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Chairman Morgan. The meeting will come to order.

This is the fourth meeting of the full committee to hear testimony in connection with the consideration of a draft resolution concerning the termination of hostilities in Indochina.

During today’s session, we are going to hear from some ladies who have a very personal interest in what is happening over there and who are here today to speak for their organizations.

The first witness this morning is Mrs. Richard W. Hawthorne, chairman of the Pensacola, Fla., POW-MIA Committee, accompanied by Mrs. Jacqueline Kent, Pensacola, Fla.

After Mrs. Hawthorne, we are going to hear from three other witnesses.

Mrs. Hawthorne, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MRS. RICHARD W. HAWTHORNE, CHAIRMAN OF THE PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, POW-MIA COMMITTEE

Mrs. Hawthorne. My name is Barbara Hawthorne. I currently reside at 3641 Cherry Laurel Drive, Pensacola, Fla. My husband, Lt. Col. Richard Hawthorne, has been missing in action since September 12, 1967.

With me today is Jacqueline Kent, whose husband, Captain Robert Kent, has been missing in action since December 20, 1968. To have been with us this morning was Mrs. Gneal Trevathan but she could not come this morning because of illness in her family. She is concerned about the fate of the prisoners of war and missing in action and the well-being of their families although she is not involved as a family member.

I do not speak for a national organization but with the support of the national league of families. In addition, I have discussed this question of accountability with the Republican Executive Committee of Escambia County and the Florida delegates to the Democratic National Convention and received an enthusiastic response from both groups.
Of the remaining issues concerning the Indochina conflict one of the most crucial ones facing us is that of our missing in action and prisoners of war. There are only 435 men believed to be prisoners of war. This means more than 1,200 men are carried in that tragic category of missing in action—some for as long as 7 years.

**Problem: Accountability for Missing Men**

The most perplexing problem of this issue is the lack of accountability for these 1,200 men.

The enemy has violated the spirit and letter of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. They have, for example, refused to allow impartial inspection of camps, release of the seriously sick and wounded, a complete list of those held and the seriously sick and wounded, a complete list of those held and the free flow of mail. The inhumanities thus imposed on the men and their families has become an international tragedy and has weighed heavily on the conscience of the American people. The American Government holds as one of its basic national principles that no American prisoner of war will ever be forgotten by his country and that our men who are missing in action must be accounted for.

Yet, after the Korean conflict, there were 944 men unaccounted for but confirmed to be in enemy hands at one time. Although an accounting was agreed upon in negotiations, adequate information concerning these men was never provided. All diplomatic efforts to obtain an accounting have failed. In our haste to leave Indochina, we cannot let this happen again. The brave commitment of our military men demands no less a response from the American Government.

Our present enemies in Southeast Asia must be convinced that the American people will tolerate no less than the accounting of every man whose fate is known to them. This is the undeniable human right of those who sacrificed their lives or freedom in conflict.

We are here neither to repudiate nor to asseverate the latest change in administration policy regarding the Indochina conflict. Rather, we have come to remind you again of the plight of 1,635 men who must be accounted for.

It must be the resolve of the American Government that the humane treatment, release and accounting for our American prisoners of war and missing in action, not only in the Indochina conflict, but also in all future conflicts, shall be a national priority—an uncompromised demand which we are prepared to substantiate.

**Definition of Accountability**

The American Government must demand as a definition of accountability:

1. The identification and physical condition of all Americans held by the North Vietnamese, Viet cong, Pathet Lao, Kmer Rouge, and the Chinese through impartial inspection of prisoner-of-war camps.

2. Official information from the enemy concerning cause and circumstances of death and location of gravesites of those deceased during and after capture.

3. Access by grave registration teams to crash sites and coordinates of battles for remains of men the enemy did not repatriate.
Only when these demands are fulfilled will we have completed our obligation to our men and their families. The American conscience will be satisfied by no less.

LANGUAGE FOR PARTY PLATFORMS

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mrs. Hawthorne.

Mrs. Hawthorne, I want to congratulate you on your statement. We should not let our attention be diverted from the terrible plight of our prisoners of war.

Mrs. Hawthorne, I received a letter from Congressman Sikes of Florida with some suggested language that your organization proposed for inclusion in the Democratic platform. I wondered—you said you had contacted the elected delegates from Florida—whether you had made any suggestions to them about this proposed language.

Mrs. Hawthorne. On May 13 I went to Miami Beach and spoke to these delegates. As I said in my statement, there was a very good response. They seemed very willing, they seemed aware of the fact this needed to be introduced in the platform of the Democratic Party.

Chairman Morgan. Mrs. Hawthorne, I think the members of the Democratic platform committee are making scheduled stops around the country and I anticipate they will be in Florida. I suggest you make arrangements to present your case.

Mrs. Hawthorne. Yes, I have contacted Mrs. Bush and she is going to make this possible.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you.

Mr. Mailiard.

POW/MIA WIVES TO MEET PARTY OFFICIALS

Mr. Mailiard. Mrs. Hawthorne, I want to join with the chairman in congratulating you on a very good statement and I would certainly hope both parties would adopt the kind of proposal that is contained in your statement.

I have not seen the proposed plan.

Mrs. Hawthorne. I have a copy with me, sir.

Mr. Mailiard. I certainly subscribe to the idea that this should be a pledge and both parties should make it.

Mrs. Hawthorne. Yes, we have an appointment this afternoon with Miss Carlson of the Republican policy committee, and we hope to make it possible for us to testify before the Republican platform committee regarding this plan.

Mr. Mailiard. Thank you.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Zablocki.

NO POSITION ON CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Zablocki. I want to join the chairman in congratulating you and in assuring you as one member of this committee, that your recommendations will certainly be seriously considered and hopefully incorporated in the pending resolution.

As you know, the pending resolution does not have any reference to an "internationally supervised cease-fire." Do you or your organization have any views on this?
Mrs. Hawthorne. Yes, this must be a part of this accountability. We must have provisions to inspect these camps; we must have provisions to account for these men who are missing in action.

Regarding the cease-fire, as we say, we are here to testify regarding the accountability of the prisoners of war and missing in action. I feel this is something that I can not make a statement on at this time. This is something that I do not have information that would allow us to make a statement on at this time.

Mr. Zallock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

NO REPEAT OF KOREAN EXPERIENCE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to congratulate Mrs. Hawthorne on a moving statement. Depending on the election result in my State next Tuesday, Mrs. Hawthorne, I may be chosen as a delegate to the Republican National Convention. I have asked to serve on the platform committee and I would personally be interested in having you appear if that would be reasonable. I assume we will be meeting in Miami before our convention in August.

You mentioned in your statement that in our haste to leave Indochina, we cannot let this happen again. That is, a failure to get an accounting for those missing in action or those unaccounted for. There has been some talk that perhaps the best way to end the war would be simply to withdraw with no conditions.

The resolution that we are considering has as a condition for U.S. withdrawal an accounting for the missing in action and return of all prisoners of war.

I assume what you are saying is that we must require action from the enemy before we cease our involvement. Is that what you are suggesting?

Mrs. Hawthorne. Not only must we require this—this was part of the negotiated settlement after the Korean conflict, but they never really gave us enough information on these 944 men.

We must have the resolve to substantiate this accountability.

As I mentioned in my statement, not only in this conflict, but in future conflicts. If an enemy knows it must account for our men, it would seem to me in their imprisonment they would be humanely treated because that enemy would know at the end of the cessation of hostilities they would have to account for each man.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT REQUIRED

Mr. Frelinghuysen. It has been argued—and I do not believe this myself—that the best way we can get information on the prisoners of war is not to try to set conditions but simply to quit, and then there will be a response from the other side.

I gather you are saying we must get some assurances before we pull out.

Mrs. Hawthorne. As I said, we must have as part of a negotiated settlement—however we negotiate that settlement—we must have provisions to account for these men. Our Government asked these men to make a commitment; they did so willingly.
Now, it is up to our Government to commit themselves to getting these men out.

NO PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are assuming there will be a negotiated settlement. The sad part is there has not been any real progress toward a settlement. This is what the President is seeking. He says if we can get an accounting for these men and a cease-fire, we will pull out. That does not assure a negotiated settlement. This is the predicament. I would hope at some stage, soon, that there will be a settlement, a cease-fire and an accounting and return of the POW's. Our problem is how to convince the other side that this is a reasonable way to end this conflict.

In other words, we have a real dilemma, I am not sure what you are asking us to do. Is there some specific legislative action we should be taking?

Mrs. Hawthorne. My suggestion at this point, of course, is to have this definition of accountability as part of this resolution.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Fascell.

DEFINE MIA ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESOLUTION?

Mr. Fascell. Mrs. Hawthorne just asked a question I was interested in. That is, whether definition should be written in the resolution or would it suffice for the conditions now there; that is, subject to the return of all of the prisoners of war and an accounting for all Americans missing in action and leave the definition to whatever settlement may be in the offing, if any. Wouldn't that satisfy your demands rather than writing the specifics in this resolution.

Mrs. Hawthorne. I am afraid, if we are not specific, the same thing that happened in Korea will happen again—we will not get an accurate accounting.

Mr. Fascell. You want the Congress to be specific to the President so that, when the President negotiates a settlement, if he does, this accountability will be part of the negotiation.

That is what this legislation seeks to do. You cannot bind the President by an opinion of Congress.

SEeks BINDING RULES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Mrs. Hawthorne. I believe, for a true accountability, these are the three parts of it.

Mr. Fascell. I would agree as a question of format. But what we are doing is a sense of the resolution by Congress. It has no legally binding effect. Anyway, what you are advocating is writing the specifics of the definition of accountability into the legislation. That is the instruction which you would make binding on the President if and when there were a negotiated settlement or any settlement.

Mrs. Hawthorne. I think we must have something binding regarding this accountability.

Mr. Fascell. Thank you.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Lloyd.
Mr. Lloyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I join in expressing my appreciation to you for your testimony this morning.

At the University of Utah there was an advertisement run in the university paper signed by professors and students at the university which advocated immediate withdrawal without any reference to the safe return of prisoners of war, and as Mr. Frelinghuysen mentioned, there are those who feel that the safety of the prisoners can best be insured if we withdraw first and ask for an accounting later. Would you agree with that?

Mrs. Hawthorne. Sir, as I have said, I do not know what the solution to the war is, whether withdrawal is the answer, or whether what President Nixon is doing now is the answer. I have come here today to make you aware hopefully to help to educate the American people regarding what needs to be done to account for these men and the fact that we have not gotten accountability in the past.

Mr. Lloyd. Thank you.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Wolff.

PIN DOWN "ACCOUNTABILITY"

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join with my colleagues in expressing appreciation for your coming before us and stating the views of someone who has a direct concern in what we are doing.

I, too, share your idea that we must pin down what is meant by accountability.

I would offer, Mr. Chairman, the conditions that have been offered here be part of the legislative history of this resolution to define the accountability for prisoners which I think will help to pin down what we mean by accountability.

Mrs. Hawthorne. Exactly.

TALKS WITH NVA IN PARIS ON POW'S

Mr. Wolff. I think that is quite important.

I would like to get on to another area, however. Congressman Rosenthal and I visited Paris some months ago and we spoke to the North Vietnamese delegation. At that time they said to us—and even this, I, as many other people, I do not believe them—they said that if we set a termination date for our departure from Vietnam that they would make "arrangements"—this was their word—for the return of the POW's.

Now, we talked about the question of cease-fire. We talked about the question of accountability and return of our prisoners. I am very much concerned with the callous disregard of the prisoners in the POW camps and those listed as MIA's. I wonder if those who are concerned with the POW's are concerned as well with how the North Vietnamese are treating the POW's. They have become hostages of the North Vietnamese and in same way the United States is making
political pawns out of the POW's as well. I think this is on both sides a callous disregard of the conditions which exist and the treatment the men are receiving.

Mrs. Hawthorne. Some outside sources have told us that the POW's are receiving good treatment. I do not believe this. I believe the conditions in the POW camps are such today that we are truly jeopardizing the lives of these men who are POW's every day longer they remain in the camps.

I do not feel the POW is being treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. If they are being treated in accordance with the Geneva Conference, why, then, cannot we visit the camps?

PROBLEM OF A CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Wolff. Exactly. This is why I am concerned that there be an end to the struggle because each day a man spends as a POW is another day we are putting him in jeopardy.

On the question of cease-fire, you indicated you would not want to make a determination as to what would be our correct policy. I have in the past favored the idea of a cease-fire as a condition to the peace. But then I was impressed as well with the fact that there might be an interminable period intervening before we reached an agreement on the cease-fire. How would you feel if there were long-drawnout inordinate periods created by the political decisions that had to be made that would again cost the United States some time on getting information on the POW's and MIA's? How would you feel about an extended period of time to make an arrangement?

Mrs. Hawthorne. It has been almost 5 years now, this is an extended period. I would hope, as in President Nixon's speech, we called for the release of POW's and an accounting for the missing in action and a cease-fire. I would hope we could arrange this before getting into a settlement of the South Vietnamese situation.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Whalen.

THE KOREAN WAR EXPERIENCE

Mr. Whalen. I would add my congratulations to those of the other members of the committee.

I have one question that deals with your statement to the effect in the Korean conflict or thereafter there were 944 men unaccounted for but confirmed to be in enemy hands at one time.

The phrase "confirmed to be in enemy hands at one time" concerns me. Is this indeed a fact? Do we know for sure these 944 men were in enemy hands?

Mrs. Hawthorne. I have before me the 1951 hearings on POW's in the Far East and the Pacific, and I quote "Shortly after the official exchange of POW's had been completed in September of 1953 officials of the U.N. command handed the Communist side a list of 3,404 names of missing U.N. command personnel including the names of 944 U.S. servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge."

The reason we believe they should have some knowledge is from debriefings of prisoners, radio broadcasts with names, photos, aircrews.
who saw airmen landing on the ground and then being surrounded which indicated they were taken but never accounted for later.

Mr. Whalen. As I understand it, there are still 400 or 500—

Mrs. Hawthorne. 389 who have not been accounted for.

I wonder, in those figures at one time in these hearings in 1957, in House Resolution 140, we called for the return of 450 men, who were not repatriated or accounted for, but should be the foremost objective of the U.S. foreign policy. We called for them in that resolution as if it was known they were POW's.

There is another document—I do not have it with me, but it would be of interest on this accountability—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, it is the final figures for all casualties of the Korean conflict.

It talks of 5,000 men who died in prison camps but were never accounted for. We are talking of the 944 reduced to 389. How did we reduce it to 389—was it a sort of bookkeeping method? I do not know.

Mr. Whalen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. Thomson.

Mr. Taylor.

FEARS POW'S USED AS HOSTAGES

Mr. Taylor. I welcome you before the committee and I agree release of prisoners and accounting for the prisoners should be part of the end of any war. I fear, if we just withdraw without release of prisoners and accounting for the missing, I feel the prisoners will be held as hostages for demands of “stop the bombing,” “remove the Navy from our waters,” “stop economic aid,” “pay war damages” and so on. I agree release of the prisoners and an accounting for the missing must be part of any resolution we pass in regard to ending the war.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

POW'S: MASS VERSUS PHASED RELEASE

Mr. Zablocki. One more question, Mr. Chairman.

There is some concern as to how the release of prisoners of war and the accountability of the missing in action will be handled. I would like to ask the witness her opinion regarding the desirability of a mass release of our prisoners of war rather than a phased release as has been suggested. For example, a phased release tied to a percentage withdrawal of remaining U.S. troops.

Do you or your organization have a position on this matter?

Mrs. Hawthorne. We really do not except. I am very much afraid, if there were a large number of POW's released, but not a true accountability, that the American people would be satisfied and this would sort of salve their conscience and that we would never get a true accountability.

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you.

Mr. Woff. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Morgan. We have three more witnesses. Make your question short.
Mr. Wolff. I just wanted to find out—was your husband Air Force?

Mrs. Hawthorne. No, Marine.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you.

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mrs. Hawthorne.

We will now hear from the members of the POW-MIA Families for the Immediate Release of Prisoners.

We have as witnesses this morning Miss Shelia Cronin from Pittsburgh, Pa., Mrs. Shirley Culbertson from Virginia and Mrs. Gerald Gartley, from Dunedin, Fla.

Miss Cronin, we will hear your statement first, Mrs. Culbertson next and then Mrs. Gartley.

STATEMENT OF MISS SHEILA CRONIN, PITTSBURGH, PA.

Miss Cronin. Thank you.

I would ask you to withhold your questions until we all make our statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Miss Cronin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak today. My name is Sheila Cronin. I am representing my brother, Navy Lt. Comdr. Michael Cronin, who has been a prisoner of war in North Vietnam for 5½ years. Families for Immediate Release which is comprised of many missing in action and prisoner of war families has authorized me to speak for them, also. We urge you to set a termination date for our involvement in Southeast Asia.

To date there are well over 1,700 prisoners or missing men in Southeast Asia. Over 100 of these men have been captured or missing since January 1 of this year. I have met with many of their families and they have asked me what they can do to bring their men home. I no longer have any answers.

My very presence here today is living proof of the failure of three administrations and five Congresses.

UNIQUE OVERVIEW OF POW/MIA WIVES

Most American families become deeply involved in the Vietnam war only for as long as they have a relative there—approximately 12 months. Some of us have been deeply involved in the war for over 8 years. That is a longer tour of duty than that of Gen. Creighton Abrams and General Westmoreland. Under these unfortunate circumstances, we have had a unique overview of all the positions in the conflict.

We were told to be patient and keep quiet as things were about to break during the 1968 bombing halt.

We were told to be patient and keep quiet when the Paris peace talks began.

We were told to be patient and keep quiet when the Vietnamization began.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the Cambodian invasion.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the Laos invasion.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet when the January 25 peace proposal was announced.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the Haiphong Harbor mining operations.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the Russia trip.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the dry season.
We were told to be patient and keep quiet during the wet season.
We have been told many times to be patient and keep quiet because we are nearly out of the woods and the other side is hurting.

Meanwhile our prisoners are starving, dying, and probably running from our own bombs. Many prisoners, if ever freed, will have no wives to come home to. Many will find that their wives have had nervous breakdowns or have turned to alcohol for comfort and in some cases men will find their parents did not live long enough to welcome them home.

But, this country has not forgotten the prisoners—they have been honored in many ways. But, gentlemen, we do not want your emblems, we do not want your bracelets, we do not want your commemorative postage stamps. We do not want your bumper stickers, we do not want your missing jet formations, we do not want poems in Congressional Records. We do not want your letters and petitions to Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking. We do not want your pity and we do not want your sympathy. We do not want our men used as an excuse to continue the war, and we don’t want them honored as if they were dead. We want our men “home alive—now!”

VIETNAM ISSUE: ONE SIMPLE QUESTION

Year after year, the situation and its solution seems to become more and more complicated. But it all boils down to one simple question: Are we going to leave Vietnam to the Vietnamese and bring all our troops home including the prisoners, or are we going to remain locked into an endless effort to save a government in Saigon which cannot save itself? We cannot do both.

In short, are you going to bring my brother home or leave him there to die? The choice is yours, and, gentlemen, there is no in between.

Thank you.
Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Miss Cronin.
You may proceed, Mrs. Culbertson.

STATEMENT OF MRS. SHIRLEY CULBERTSON, McLEAN, VA.

Mrs. Culbertson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. My name is Shirley Culbertson. My brother, Comdr. Kenneth Coskey, has been a prisoner of war in North Vietnam since September 6, 1968. I know that your time is valuable and you are busy men, so I will get right to the point.
President Nixon has offered withdrawal of troops conditioned upon an internationally supervised cease-fire. A number of Congressmen have offered similar proposals. If the Congress passes a legislative termination by a similar condition, it will thereby abandon the prisoners to indefinite captivity.

CONDITION WITHDRAWAL ON PRISONER RELEASE

As the sister of a prisoner, I feel strongly that withdrawal should be conditioned on simultaneous release of prisoners, and we have every right to insist our withdrawing troops be protected by a cease-fire between our withdrawing troops and the opposing forces. Neither of these conditions creates any problems; the other side has already agreed to them in its seven-point plan.

In my opinion, it is indefensible to insist on a cease-fire, whether internationally supervised or not, between the Saigon troops and the Communists. The other side will never accept it. I have no sympathy whatever for their cause, but I must tell you, if I were in their position I would not accept it, either.

EFFECT OF PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE

A permanent cease-fire would leave the present military regime in power. It would leave American air power in the area, on the aircraft carriers, and on land bases in Thailand. If the other side reopened the fighting, President Nixon would feel free to give the Saigon government full air support for as long as they needed it.

In short, the other side would have two choices under a permanent cease-fire of the type proposed by Mr. Nixon. It could sit back and let the Thieu government have the entire country. That is what the whole war has been about. Alternatively, it could reopen the fighting, we would resume bombing, and the war would continue much as it has now.

Either way, we are offering the other side no incentive to release the prisoners. They are not going to do it.

So I would like to say this: If you want to help the prisoners, legislate a termination for all U.S. military operations in Indochina by some definite date. Do not confine it to withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam; a B-52 raid on North Vietnam or Laos from a base in Thailand prevents prisoner release just as surely as does an American division on South Vietnam soil. Legislate a complete end to all American military operations everywhere in Indochina—land, sea, air, combat logistics, advisers—everything.

CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION

Condition the termination on the safe conduct withdrawal of American troops. Condition it on the release of all known prisoners, on the accounting for all those missing for whom it is possible to account, and on the establishment of reasonable safeguards to see that the other side does in fact release all prisoners and account for all the dead or escaped, of whom they have knowledge. If you care at all about the prisoners, do not tack any greater cease-fire onto the legislation than is required to cover our withdrawal.
This is my opinion. You may disagree with it, but as long as we insist on the cease-fire, the prisoners will not come home. That is not opinion. It is a fact.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mrs. Culbertson.

Mrs. Gartley.

STATEMENT OF MRS. GERALD GARTLEY, DUNEDIN, FLA.

Mrs. Gartley. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I am the mother of Navy Lt. Markham I. Gartley who has been a prisoner in North Vietnam since August 17, 1968.

I thank you for allowing me this opportunity to appeal to you and your consciences to show the courage to vote for legislation which would require the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina with no conditions other than the return of the prisoners and a guarantee for the safety of our withdrawing troops and which would end our involvement in this hideous war.

And I realize it requires courage today for anyone, of either party, to openly disagree with the President's policy.

RESPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS FOR WAR

Unfortunately, today it also takes courage for a Member of the Congress to insist on the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to have a voice in deciding the future course of the country in the great issue of peace and war.

Since the first American went into combat in this undeclared war—since the first American was killed, since the first prisoner was captured, the Congress has given explicit approval by allocating the funds without which the war could not have been conducted.

Only in totalitarian government should one be afraid to speak out, and so I urge you, for the sake of my son and the other prisoners, to have the courage to vote for legislation to take us out of this war.

Presidents have come and gone, Congressmen have come and gone, yet this war goes on. How many more years can sanity, or even life, go on for those prisoners?

From remembrances of quieter times in America, from the safety of middle age and from the comfort of our homes, we listen to talk from the White House, from China, and from Russia of peace for future generations. I wish the President would go to Vietnam and talk of peace for this generation.

As a high school teacher, I am very aware that during the memory span of a whole generation of young Americans, they have not known their country at peace. Since they have been of age to understand, they have heard the daily "body counts" with their evening meals.

SON HAS BEEN POW FOR 1,382 DAYS

My son had been a prisoner in North Vietnam for 955 days and nights the last time I pleaded with the Congress to take a stand on our ultimate relations with South Vietnam and not to sacrifice his life and the lives of the other prisoners in order to preserve a corrupt dictatorship in South Vietnam. By taking no stand, they have allowed him
and the hundreds of other brave Americans to sacrifice more days and nights of their lives. Today, my son has spent 1,382 days and nights in a Communist cell. The most hardened criminal in American prisons are allowed to have mail, and their families may visit them. All except those condemned to death or life imprisonment have the certainty of freedom on some future day. Do you believe our men have faith that their Government is committed to them? Are they smiling when they hear bombs, as one pilot—now perhaps a prisoner himself—said, or are they living in constant danger from those bombs and wondering if all the misery of the years since they heavy bombing in 1967-68 is now to be relived?

Many of the families of the prisoners are frantic with fear that their men have lived through hell all these years only to be in mortal danger from our own bombs. I question the statement of the Department of Defense that they knew the location of the prison camps where these men are held, if this knowledge is based on the same sort of intelligence that resulted in the Son Tay fiasco.

We have been told to be brave, and as late as last month an administration spokesman told the League of Families that we should only work for humanitarian treatment for the prisoners during the “interim.” But the prisoners have been made a part of the settlement of the war by both sides, and the “interim” has now been 8 years for some. Their families are wondering how committed our Government is to these men.

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON PRISONERS

On May 1, 1970, the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Westmoreland; and the Vice President pressed our hands so warmly and assured us that the prisoners were the No. 1 priority. Letters to the families assured them that every effort would be made in the highest levels of Government to secure their release. Always, Members of the Congress have told us, in response to letters, that they “share our concern.” Several have told me that “Nothing is too good for those boys.” And nothing is what they have gotten.

March 16, 1971, Secretary Rogers, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was asked, “Are the prisoners the only reason we would be leaving troops there?” The answer of the Secretary of State on that occasion was, “Yes.”

The next question was, “So, if the prisoners are released, or the North Vietnamese agree to release them, will we get out?” He answered, “Yes.”

Secretary of Defense Laird told the New York Times on June 13, 1971, “** * * the President and I have agreed. I expect us to maintain a U.S. presence in Vietnam until the prisoner-of-war issue is settled ** * * We are willing to take every American out of Vietnam, provided that question is settled.”

We hoped so desperately that the other side would offer to “release the prisoners” in return for an American withdrawal date, rather than just say they would “discuss” their release.

And finally on July 1, 1971; their proposal substituted the word “release” for “discuss.”
Since that time, and almost immediately, it seems our Government's position changed. Now Senator Dole began to say that: "After all, the prisoners represent less than one-tenth of 1 percent of all those killed."

**POW/MIA FAMILIES WERE "FRANTIC"**

The families of the prisoners and missing were frantic last year when the war was "winding down" and when Secretary Rogers testified in a Senate committee hearing that it was a tragic fact that the prisoners could stay there indefinitely if there were no negotiations. And shortly afterward, Senator Dole said on nationwide television that the war could end without negotiations, and that it would be over for us when there were no more American casualties.

We have been led to believe that our Government has offered a withdrawal date, asking in return only for a release of the prisoners and the safe withdrawal of our troops. This is not true. All our offers have included cease-fire and additional provisions which would have the effect of preserving the position of the Saigon regime.

And, what a crushing disappointment to those who seriously believed that the prisoners and missing really matter—for those who believed that President Nixon's promise to raise the question of the prisoners and missing when he visited China and Russia meant that he would, at the very least, make a guarantee of compliance to the Geneva Convention a prior condition to any bargaining with China or Russia. The bargaining was done, the deals consummated. Yet the war intensifies, and nothing has changed for the prisoners and the missing.

Now, we know that no one but us really cares about our men. We alone in this country live constantly, during every conscious moment, with this war. We read every scrap of news, watch every newscast, weigh every word of the leaders of both sides, desperate for something to give us hope. Now, there is no hope except in you.

**"FALSE PROMISES" MADE BY U.S. LEADERS**

No wonder we have lost hope. Americans are all confused as a result of the erroneous predictions presumably based on the highest level of intelligence, and on false promises made by our leaders.

I quote just a few—from a White House statement, October 2, 1963:

"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1966."

October 31, 1963, the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Group said:

"We have completed the job of training South Vietnam's Armed Forces—I feel we should wrap this thing up by the end of the next dry season."

And General Westmoreland, November 31, 1967:

"We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view—the enemy's hopes are bankrupt."

And Richard Nixon, March 5, 1968:

"* * * If in November this war is not over after all of this power has been at their disposal, then I say that the American people will be justified to elect new
leadership, and I pledge to you the new leadership will end the war and win
the peace in the Pacific, and that is what America wants.

All last year we were told the war was “winding down” and as late as April 25 the President said that Vietnamization was a success, yet on May 8 he ordered massive increase of bombing of North Vietnam and greatly increased American involvement because the South Vietnamese could not, or would not, defend themselves.

Just recently the Vice President said that he believed we were about out of the woods. Just where will we be when we come out of the woods? Will we start the Vietnamization process all over again and wait another 18 years until the Saigon regime is able to defend itself?

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT

We have been told that we must stay in Vietnam for how else can we justify the deaths of nearly 50,000 Americans—over 20,000 since Mr. Nixon promised to end the war. I searched my conscience for the answer, and I cannot believe that the deaths of more Americans or the killing of more Vietnamese would make a mother’s loss of her son any less hard to bear. If there is anything that would justify the death of those men and the years of sacrifice of the prisoners, it is that their sacrifices will prevent young men in later generations from being sent to fight wars we cannot win, in places we should not be, and for causes the majority of Americans cannot support.

Gentlemen, you have not “sold” this war to the American people. I do not believe you have sold it to yourselves. If some are in agreement with the present escalation, it is because they have been told that it will end the war. Then what will you tell us when the war goes on? What will you tell the families of the prisoners 5, 10, 20 years from now when our homes are still empty and our hearts still heavy?

CONGRESS SHOULD REASSERT HISTORIC ROLE

The Congress now has an opportunity to reassert its historic role as representatives of the people. Please, gentlemen, at this turning point in history, assert your constitutional rights.

I beg you to set a termination date for our entire military involvement. You have the power to do it. You are our only hope and the only hope for those prisoners who have suffered so much for so long.

End the war—bring all the troops home and the prisoners with them.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mrs. Gartley.

INTRODUCTION OF REPRESENTATIVE MATHIAS

Before we start to ask questions, I want to take this opportunity to welcome our new member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mathias of California. He comes aboard to fill the place previously occupied by Mr. Brad Morse.

Mr. Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NORTH VIETNAM ON PRISONER RELEASE

Chairman Morgan. I have only one question. Page 3 of your statement, you say July 1, 1971, the North Vietnamese said they would release our prisoners of war rather than discuss their release.
Is this their original position, when did they make this statement and where did they make it?

Mrs. Gartley. It is in the seven-point proposal.

Chairman Morgan. You said their proposal substituted the word “release” for “discuss.” When did they say that?

Mrs. Gartley. In their July proposal.

Chairman Morgan. Will you furnish that for the record?

Mrs. Gartley. The release of the totality of military men of all parties and civilians captured during the war so that they may return to their home.

Chairman Morgan. What are you reading from?

Mrs. Gartley. From the seven-point statement by the provisional revolutionary government by Madam Binh at the 197th conference.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Mailliard.

Mr. FLAT WITHDRAWAL: WORTH THE GAMBLE?

Mr. Mailliard. I want to thank these ladies for coming and giving us their views. I have one question for the record and I do not care who answers it.

There are those who propose that we can simply withdraw our military forces and this will result in the return of prisoners of war. I would like to inquire as to whether in your view that is a gamble we could afford to take.

Is it not essential that we get some kind of guarantee and performance on the release before withdrawing all our military power?

Miss Cronin. We would hope any legislation would set a termination date contingent perhaps on the phased release of prisoners along with our withdrawal of troops. However, if this is not possible, a termination for hostilities we feel ourselves offers us better hope than letting them rot there while we decide what to say in it. If they do not give them back, we have article 118 of the Geneva convention which says “All prisoners will be released after the cessation of hostilities.” If necessary, we could back that up with military action. If hostilities end, there would be no reason for them to hold our prisoners if they have a guarantee we are out for good.

GUARANTEES ON RELEASE

Mr. Mailliard. I am trying to get your view. I do not want to put words in your mouth but you pretty much agree with those who feel confident that the total removal of U.S. forces would result in not only the prisoners of war being released, but some accountability for those that we do not know what their fate is.

Relying on the Geneva convention seems to me then to be pretty frail since they have not observed the Geneva convention at all.

Do you feel we can rely on the humanitarian instincts of the part of the government of Hanoi since they have shown none so far?

Mrs. Culbertson. I think there are two trump cards. They held the fate of our prisoners. We have a protracted airpower with which we could annihilate them. If they release our prisoners, they have lost their trump power. We must remove our airpower and our troops in order to give them an incentive to release our prisoners. They have nothing to lose then, and neither have we.
HOSTAGES TO OTHER DEMANDS

Mr. Mailiard. I think Mr. Taylor suggested they could still be used for all kinds of demands, reparations and many other things.

I wish I shared your confidence that they would, in fact, be released without all kinds of demands and conditions.

Miss Cronin. What is our alternative? We have no alternative. That is the last thing we have left to try and get those prisoners back.

Mr. Mailiard. That is the tragedy of the situation, we have no positive assurance, no matter what we do.

Miss Cronin. We know what we have done in the past 8 years has not worked, we think it is time to try the offer they made and said they would accept.

ROLE OF CEASE-FIRE IN PROPOSAL

Mr. Whalen. As I read Mrs. Culbertson’s statement, I think she indicated that withdrawing troops should be protected by a cease-fire between our withdrawing troops and opposing forces. Also she proposes the guarantee of return or simultaneous release of prisoners and accounting for the missing in action. Is that what you are recommending?

Mrs. Culbertson. Yes.

Mr. Whalen. A resolution for a date certain conditioned upon a cease-fire between the United States, North Vietnam, and those forces allied with them, missing in action accounted for and return of prisoners of war?

Mrs. Culbertson. And reasonable safeguards that they will be released.

Mr. Whalen. As I read your remarks, I do not see any statement that we should just pull out and hope we will get our prisoners of war back.

Mrs. Culbertson. No; we also made it contingent on the release of prisoners.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Zablocki.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MIA’s

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you.

I want to welcome the ladies before the committee.

Your frustration and desperation is understandable. My question to Mrs. Gartley is, You do not mention the 1,200 MIA’s unaccounted for. You would not make that a condition?

Mrs. Gartley. I meant to, of course.

Mr. Zablocki. You did not include that condition in your testimony.

Mrs. Gartley. I should have. Release of the prisoners, I assume some of the missing are prisoners and there would have to be an accountability to get all those alive. I would like to comment on the numbers missing, those in the Korean war. I think many people are confused, we are all confused about the reports of those 944 or 386 servicemen.
unaccounted for since the close of the Korean war. There are newspaper reports that these men may still be alive. As late as May 1969 a resolution was submitted to the Senate that a more determined effort be made by our statement to obtain the release of those in captivity as a result of the Korean conflicts. This is inconsistent with the information presented on the fact sheet presented by the Secretary of Defense—Servicemen Unaccounted for Since the Cessation of Hostilities March 4, 1968. “Countless investigation tips, leads, and rumors relating to the servicemen have been made by government intelligence agencies without developing any significant evidence to indicate that they survived the period of hostilities.”

POW RELEASE AND MIA ACCOUNTABILITY

Mr. Zablocki. Therefore you are as concerned as we are that every effort should be made to have a full and accurate accountability.

Mrs. Gartley. Definitely. It goes with prisoner release. If you are going to release prisoners, you have to account for who are prisoners and who are missing.

Mr. Zablocki. If they were lost in action, we should have an opportunity to find out where they are buried or interred.

Mrs. Gartley. I think the terrain and character of this war and length of the war, the terrain and the years they have been missing, the massive bombing and removal of civilian population—I think it would be difficult to ever account for all our men. There is destruction of whole villages and towns and the sooner we get out, the sooner we get busy and make efforts to identify the missing.

ON SETTING A DATE CERTAIN

Mr. Zablocki. If we set a date of October 1 and the prisoners of war are not released, the missing in action are not accounted for, and the prisoners are not released on a phased basis, what do you suggest our Government do, before October 2?

Mrs. Gartley. Do you mean set the date October 1 that prisoners should be released before October——

Mr. Zablocki. If we set a date and we indeed withdraw our troops and then they do not comply with the conditions we set forth, what is the United States to do?

Mrs. Gartley. Well, I thought this date would be contingent upon the release as we withdraw.

Mr. Zablocki. Hanoi does not keep this end of the bargain—which it has not done in the past—what do you suggest we do?

Mrs. Gartley. Then we do not withdraw.

Mr. Zablocki. However, you say we should withdraw in order to give Hanoi an incentive to release the prisoners and account for the missing in action. However, if the date is reached and they do not follow through, what is the United States to do?

Mrs. Gartley. If we set the date contingent on the release——

Mr. Zablocki. That is begging the question. October 1 has been reached and they have not kept their end of the bargain—what do we do?
Mrs. Gartley. Our withdrawing would happen simultaneously with
the release. If we withdraw them with no safeguards for the prisoners
and they do not release the prisoners, I would say we might certainly
go back in.

Mr. Zablocki. I am trying to determine what is the value of a date
certain, October 1, October 12, December 1—you name it.

If no release: return with full force

Miss Cronin. I think it has value to the other side. If we set up
legislation saying we will, in a phased withdrawal, withdraw all our
troops by October 1, with that withdrawal we expect proportional re-
lease of our prisoners. Say by October 1, we have 15,000 troops and
they have not given us what we believe to be that percentage of the
prisoners, if that is not enough, then we threaten to go back full force.
I think they are so sick and tired of this country being in that country
that they would, with a phased withdrawal, release all prisoners. I
do not believe they would want us back.

Problem of MIA accounting

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I want to commend these ladies, I do not know
who has recommended that they keep quiet. I understand you had been
a very eloquent spokesman for your cause. You have every reason to
speak out and it is of value for us to hear you.

I did notice, and Mr. Zablocki touched on this, two of you overlooked
any mention of the missing in action. I assume it is an oversight.

Miss Cronin. About half of our organization, as I said when I
started, are missing-in-action families and I represent their opinions
also. They feel the longer this war goes on, the more chances there are
there can be no accounting. Maybe today a man who is alive can hang
on for only today and not tomorrow. The longer we stay there, the
move discrepancy there is in the list.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is astonishing that you did not mention
those men as part of the withdrawal. I would assume you overlooked
the status of the missing in action.

Miss Cronin. We have always said in our organization statements
that we feel we should get out by a date certain contingent on two
things: A release of the prisoners, complete accounting of the missing
in action.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am not trying to argue that. You just did
not say it in your prepared statement. You and Mrs. Gartley men-
tioned prisoners of war only. I am sure it was oversight. I am not
trying to say it was not. Both of you now say you do think the missing
in action should be accounted for as part of the process, part of the
offer we would be making the enemy?

Miss Cronin. Yes.

Mrs. Gartley. It is an oversight.

Conditions for withdrawal

Mr. Frelinghuysen. All of you are assuming that the prisoners
will be returned if a termination date is set and we offered to pull out
if we got an accounting of the missing in action.
Suppose the enemy did not respond to the offer? Miss Cronin suggests we go back full force. I am not sure whether you are saying this is going to be the key to the resolution of this unhappy conflict but suppose it is not. You seem to assume this is the key, that if we just say we want our boys back, it is going to end the conflict.

Mrs. Culbertson. Isn’t it a way to find out?

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am not suggesting we should not make offers. The President has made an offer which you are criticizing in part. I assume you are saying there should be no other condition except for the prisoners of war and the missing in action. But at least one of you said there should be a partial cease-fire.

THE ROLE OF A CEASE-FIRE

Do any of you feel that a cease-fire should not be included in some form, either partial or total, as part of the conditions needed to protect the withdrawal?

Mrs. Culbertson. We have said we would like a cease-fire to protect our withdrawing troops.

We think that is fair to ask that. I do not think it is fair to ask for a permanent cease-fire between Saigon and the opposing forces.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Are you all saying as part of this condition of withdrawal, there should be a cease-fire between us and the North?

Mrs. Culbertson. Only in so long as it takes to withdraw our prisoners, missing in action, and our troops.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Are you all agreed we should include language for a cease-fire between us and the North during the withdrawal phase?

Miss Cronin. Yes. Only during the withdrawal, it must be stipulated as to what kind of cease-fire.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. That was missing from your statement. You were critical of the proposal for a cease-fire since it would not be of interest to the other side and that such a condition would surely frustrate the offer.

Now, you are saying a partial cease-fire is feasible, in fact, is essential.

"INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED" CEASE-FIRE

Miss Cronin. We wanted to express our opposition to the term "internationally supervised cease-fire" which the President used in his statement when the mining of the Haiphong Harbor was started. That has been one of the stumbling blocks in prisoner release.

We wanted to make it clear how we felt about an international cease-fire because we felt it would prevent the release of prisoners.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. You mean a partial cease-fire should not be supervised?

Miss Cronin. A cease-fire between the United States and opposing forces for as long as it takes to withdraw our troops.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Are you saying it should not be internationally-supervised?

Miss Cronin. Yes, I think it should be internationally supervised. At this point it is a minor point.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. We cannot tell whether any offer will be accepted by the other side. We would like an offer that would be accepted.
Miss Cronin. Let us offer it and see.

Mrs. Gartley. Aren't we strong enough to see that they live up to an agreement?

Mr. Frelighyisen. It is a question, if we pull out, whether we have a bargaining position.

Chairman Morgan. The gentleman's time has expired.

POW/MIA FAMILIES FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Mr. FasceU. Thank you, ladies. Your statements have been forthright and penetrating. I want to clear up something in my own mind. As I understand it, the three of you testifying are addressing separate aspects of the whole proposal but are all in agreement with each of the other statements.

What I did not understand is whether you are speaking individually or for an organization?

Miss Cronin. We are speaking individually and for an organization. The views I express are mine and the organization.

Mr. FasceU. Which organization?

Miss Cronin. Prisoner of War and Missing in Action families for Immediate Release.

Mr. FasceU. All of you are speaking for that organization?

Mrs. Culbertson. Yes, we are.

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES POSITION

Mr. FasceU. Mrs. Hawthorne said she spoke not for the organization but with the support of the National League of Families. I detect there is a difference between those two organizations on how far they are willing to go; is that correct?

Mrs. Culbertson. One of the basic fears in the MIA group is that the accounting for the missing will not be done first. We feel before you get any action whatsoever, you are going to have to cease hostilities. That is stated in the Geneva Convention, and they claim to stand behind the Geneva Convention policies. We do not think any action will be taken until we cease hostilities and give them a complete withdrawal date as an incentive for release of our prisoners.

Mr. FasceU. If I understand the thrust of what you three are saying, it presupposes an offer will be made and acceptance will be achieved before there is any withdrawal; is that correct?

Mrs. Culbertson. Yes.

Mr. FasceU. It presupposes an offer and acceptance by the North Vietnamese.

Mrs. Gartley. Yes; an offer we have not made.

NO UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT CONDITIONS

Mr. FasceU. You are not, as I understand it, suggesting a unilateral withdrawal with no conditions and no safeguards?

Mrs. Culbertson. No; that is not right.

Mr. FasceU. What you are suggesting presupposes an offer by the United States, acceptance by the North Vietnamese Government with the conditions you have outlined?
POSITION OF FAMILIES FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Mr. Lloyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Certainly the communications have been very impressive today. I would like to continue further with the previous questions.
You say you are speaking for the POW-MIA Families for Immediate Release, is that right?
Mrs. Culbertson. Yes.
Mr. Lloyd. What is meant by "families for immediate release," is that release under the circumstances and conditions you have stated this morning?
Miss Cronin. Yes; it is. We feel the only way we will ever see our men again is for a date to be set for total American withdrawal, land, sea, and air from all of Indochina; contingent only on prisoner release, full accounting of the missing, and safety for our withdrawing troops.

MEMBERSHIP OF GROUP

Mr. Lloyd. What percentage of the families of POW-MIA do you represent?
Miss Cronin. I am not sure, some are primary next of kin and some are secondary next of kin; we have approximately 500 members.
Mr. Lloyd. How many families are there altogether, the POW-MIA?
Miss Cronin. There are now 1,700 prisoners and missing men.
Mr. Lloyd. That would be over 3,000 families.
Miss Cronin. Yes, very likely.
Mr. Lloyd. You represent 500 of those families and presumably the others do not have representation?
Miss Cronin. These are families who have been able to get in touch with us. We have never been given a list to communicate with families and many do not know we exist.
Mr. Lloyd. Is there an organization of POW-MIA Families in addition to yours who might express a different opinion or viewpoint that you know of?
Miss Cronin. Not that we know of. Not an organization that takes a particular political stand. I do not know of any.
Mr. Lloyd. What is the composition of the National League of Families? Excuse me. That was the organization represented by Mrs. Hawthorne.
I have no other questions.
Chairman Morgan. Mr. Wolff.

POSITION OF WITNESSES EXPLORED

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am somewhat at a loss, actually these ladies come before us not as lawyers or professionals who have specific language in mind for anything other than concern for their kin uppermost in their minds. I think perhaps if I could read to you some of the things they are say-
ing, the facts, a slogan adopted by some of the POW families, that you want the prisoners of war treated as the No. 1 condition and not No. 2, whether it be spelled two or Thieu. There is a question about reparations right now, even the continuing war is reparations, or whatever you call it. It is ransom for Mr. Thieu, the continuing war that is going on.

I think one of the elements to be considered is we do not have any greater strength today with only 50,000 troops than when we had 150,000. We have not too much strength with the 50,000 remaining. In your discussion of the MIA's, I am certain this was an oversight on your part; you have as much concern for the MIA's and compassion for their families as for your own position.

Mrs. Culbertson: The MIA problem has been paramount in our position.

Mrs. Gartley. When we speak of prisoners, we also speak of those missing in action.

Mr. Wolff. One of the points I inferred from your statement is the fact you want as the only condition for the withdrawal of our troops, the return of the POW's and information on the MIA's. Right?

Mrs. Gartley. And guaranteed safety of our withdrawing troops.

Mr. Wolff. From what I can see from one of the statements you feel that a cease-fire will further jeopardize those who are POW's or we have no information about?

Mrs. Culbertson. Are you including residual airpower?

Mr. Wolff. Including what?

Mrs. Culbertson. We want the release of prisoners and we think that would be enough; but we are conditioning it on the fact the residual airpower would have to be withdrawn to get them released.

Mr. Wolff. You said you wanted to discontinue involvement in Indochina.

Mrs. Culbertson. Yes, we want all our forces out.

Nature of a Cease-Fire

Mr. Culver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to express my appreciation for your coming today and for the excellent statements you have given here. I wish to pursue one question that has been raised in some earlier questioning. That is with regard to the nature of the agreements or understanding governing the withdrawal of American forces. As you know, there has periodically been a suggestion that we have an international cease-fire as a prerequisite for withdrawal. Yet, it is also well known that such an agreement involves very protracted negotiations. In addition, it raises serious additional problems in terms of the opportunities to veto any agreement by one of the parties independent of the North Vietnamese or the United States. Finally, we run into a problem in finding a mutually acceptable party to be a police inspector under an international agreement. The long and short is that this international agreement has become a work of art that is loaded with very important and complicated military and political situations.

I think we should clarify for the record the points made when Mr. Frelinghuysen asked whether you would find an international cease-
fire arrangement governing the bilateral withdrawal satisfactory as far as the supervisory group is concerned. I think this is an important point. Could you address yourself to whether you would necessarily insist the arrangement worked out between the North Vietnamese on the one hand and the United States on the other governing the arrangements would necessarily involve an international cease-fire police agreement?

Miss Cronin. I do not see that would be necessary. It might add more time.

Mrs. Garstle. I do not believe they would accept an international cease-fire. This guarantees the continuation of the present Saigon regime and that is what the war was all about in the first place. I do not think there is any need to talk about an international cease-fire. We know how long it took to decide on the size of the table.

A BILATERAL UNITED STATES-NVA CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Culver. Are you simply advocating an arrangement between the United States and North Vietnam?

Mrs. Garstle. Yes.

Mr. Culver. Which above all would give us the necessary guarantee to assure safe withdrawal of our troops.

Mrs. Garstle. Yes.

Mrs. Culbertson. I think an international cease-fire would be an additional irritant and we are trying to remove those.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Whalen.

OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL: WORTH THE RISK

Mr. Whalen. I want to thank you for appearing before our committee. The comments and statements you have made are excellent.

How many of the 1,700 prisoners of war and MIA families are represented in your organization?

Mrs. Culbertson. About 500.

Mr. Whalen. You are speaking for about 500 of those. I think that Members of Congress often pursue military strategy. That is, we follow the philosophy that the best defense is a good offense. I have been rather amused on occasion with some of the questions addressed to witnesses who have been supporting the thrust of the resolution which is now before the committee—the questions running something like this: Suppose this offer is not accepted by North Vietnam, what are we going to do on October 2?

You are then left with the requirement of answering this particular question. It seems to me that literally hundreds of offers already have been presented to North Vietnam. Do you suspect if this offer is turned down, things will be any different than they are now?

Mrs. Culbertson. Have we ever set a date? That is the one thing that is required by North Vietnam.

Mr. Whalen. Let us go back. Is this your responsibility to come up with the answer to that question?

Mrs. Culbertson. No.

Mr. Whalen. In other words, what you are saying and with what
I would agree, is let us try it. In other words, is the possibility of failure of acceptance a reason not to consider and act upon this resolution in your opinion?

Mrs. Culbertson. No.

A PROPOSED INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRE

Mr. Whalen. I want to ask about a proposed international cease-fire. You are opposed because it contemplates the perpetuation of the Thieu regime?

Mrs. Culbertson. Yes.

Mrs. GAUTLEY. The whole Government setup there, whether Thieu or not.

Mr. Whalen. It is your feeling then that we are linking the prisoners of war and missing in action with the perpetuation of the Thieu regime.

Mrs. GAUTLEY. We have always done it time and time again. The ability of the South Vietnamese to hack it out alone, their self-determination, and elections which would be very much controlled by the present regime in Saigon, all those things I think definitely have kept the prisoners there and they have been sacrificed to that Government too long.

Mrs. Culbertson. As long as Thieu is there we have to support him and the North Vietnamese will not let the prisoners go.

Mr. Whalen. You are speaking to different aspects of the resolution. I think this might explain why only one of you touched on the missing in action. I believe one of you did and as you have already pointed out, this would not indicate the other two witnesses are less concerned.

Miss Cronin. No.

THE RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Mr. Whalen. We do have a resolution before us which states we should have a date certain, October 1, subject to the return of POW's, subject to an accounting for missing in action supervised by the Red Cross or some other international agency.

Subject also to safe conduct of American troops. You have testified that you would be willing to go along with this resolution with one possible amendment and that would be subject to a cease-fire to the extent of the withdrawal between the United States and North Vietnamese.

Miss Cronin. I think that is the safe conduct. I think it is the same thing.

Mr. Whalen. I think it is what was indicated by one of you that you would actually want to assure safe conduct, and would support language which would actually contain the words “cease-fire between the United States, North Vietnam and those forces allied with North Vietnam to assure safe conduct of troops.”

Miss Cronin. Yes.

Chairman Morgan, Mr. Dellums.
WITHDRAWAL: “SUBJECT TO THE RELEASE” OF POW’S

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

The proposed resolution before us states “Subject to the release of all prisoners of war.” I introduced a resolution with the language “Subject to an agreement for the release of all prisoners of war by adversaries” which is quite different. I think the statement “subject to the release of all prisoners of war” is a political statement. But I do not think that it is in any way realistic at this point. We have to “agree upon the release of prisoners of war.” Do you agree with the latter language or the language “subject to release,” that is, “subject to release of all prisoners of war,” or “subject to the agreement for release of all prisoners of war”?

Mrs. GULBERTSON. I prefer “subject to release.”

HOW PRISONERS ARE RELEASED

Mr. DELLUMS. So you think that the condition for withdrawal of troops should be “Subject to the release of all prisoners of war.”

I like to think I am a reasonable student of history and I never recall any time where prisoners of war were released prior to termination of all hostilities. I wonder whether a statement “subject to release of all prisoners of war” is just another political statement to play upon the feelings of the families and friends of prisoners of war or whether it is realistically related to how we terminate a war and how we get back prisoners of war. Everything I have read has indicated there first were agreements to release prisoners of war and then after cessation of hostilities, the prisoners of war were released. This resolution says the United States will not quit until you release the prisoners. And I think that is a political statement.

Based on reality and to be very honest, do you think this is a statement that will release prisoners or that it is a vote-getting mechanism?

Mrs. GARTLEY. I am sure you are right. Until cessation of hostilities prisoners will not be released. You are saying until all American troops are out, I believe. I thought cessation of hostilities could happen if we have a cease-fire between our side and the other side, between the United States and the other side. I would mean cessation of hostilities with the provision that prisoners could be released after cessation of hostilities takes place.

Miss CRONIN. We are realistic enough to know we cannot expect prisoners to be released until we start getting out. We cannot have an agreement saying they will be released and then we will get out, they will not buy it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you.

CLARIFICATION OF POSITION ON RESOLUTION

I want to compliment the panel, each of you, on your excellent statements which I think all of us on this committee deeply sympathize with and understand.

I simply want to go over two points to make certain I fully understand the point you have made. One, you would be willing to see added
to the current resolution that is before us another phrase that would specifically call for a cease-fire between the United States, North Vietnam, and North Vietnam’s allies. Is that right?

Secondly, I am somewhat confused by the latest interchange in talking about this phrase “subject to the release of all prisoners of war.”

It was my understanding until a moment ago that you were talking about a phased withdrawal, as we withdrew they would release certain numbers of prisoners. Is that in fact your position or is it the conclusion of an agreement which would then be carried out at the end of our withdrawal?

I think this is an important point.

Miss Cronin. I think it has to be an agreement. It is really very difficult. So much matters as to the phrasing of the legislation as you well know and the way the President interprets it. If it just said, subject to release of prisoners, we could say, release the prisoners and we will start our withdrawal. We want it clear we feel withdrawal should start also and in turn we expect prisoner release. So it would be more of an agreement.

Mr. Steele. It would be a phased process.

Miss Cronin. We feel that would be the safest way.

Chairman Morgan. No further questions, ladies. Thank you.

The committee stands adjourned until further notice.

(At 11:45 a.m. the committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)