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(III)
OPENING STATEMENT

The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting today to resume its hearings on the impact of the war in Asia on our economy and on our society.

Today's hearings will focus on the impact of the war on America's basic moral values. Since the last hearings in this series on April 29, the situation in Southeast Asia and in the United States has drastically worsened, making the topic of this particular hearing more urgent and timely than I thought it would be when these hearings began.

We have as witnesses today three distinguished theologians: Dr. John C. Bennett, president of the Union Theological Seminary of New York; Bishop John J. Dougherty, auxiliary bishop of Newark, N.J.; and Dr. Irving Greenberg, associate professor of history at Yeshiva University of New York.

Dr. Bennett has been a member of the faculty of the Union Theological Seminary since 1943, and president since 1964, and is the author of a number of books dealing with Christianity and foreign policy.

Gentlemen, we are very happy and delighted that you are here and indebted to you for taking the time to come.

I believe you, Dr. Bennett, are going to lead off. Will you please pull the microphone up close? The technical equipment here is not very efficient, so you have to speak rather close to the microphones.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN C. BENNETT, PRESIDENT OF UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Dr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I think it is bringing coals to Newcastle to say what I have to say to this committee because I think it has been one of the chief educators of the Nation on the issues of the war.
Also, events in the last few days have somewhat caught up with our words and make words not too important.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they make them more relevant than ever.

**BASIS FOR MORAL JUDGMENT OF VIETNAM WAR**

Dr. BENNETT. As background it may be helpful to raise the question as to the point at which the war itself becomes a matter of morality. When do we move beyond the judgment that it is a mistake of giant proportions to the judgment that it is an immoral war? In what I say I am not passing judgment on the personal motives of the various leaders who have initiated or escalated our involvement in Vietnam. However, good intentions based upon illusions can create an objective situation of moral horror and one that leads innumerable individuals into callous or brutal conduct and undermines the moral fiber of a nation and its institutions.

I do not see how we can draw an absolute line between an intellectual mistake and moral failure because when the Nation and its leaders persist in the mistake for years, after its consequences for people in this country and in Vietnam are fully revealed, and when it becomes patent that this persistence in destructive error is a concession to the pride of a nation that has never been defeated, it is time to see even the mistake in a context that calls for moral judgments. How many victims are to be sacrificed to the pride of America?

The traditional thinking about the difference between a just and unjust war in the churches has always placed great emphasis on two considerations and I believe that both of these are relevant to the discussion of this war. The first is really a commonsense view of the degree to which the injury done to societies by the war is out of proportion to the good that can be achieved. One criterion of the just war, which may seem on the surface to suggest a rather craven caution, is that there should be a reasonable chance of success. But seen in the light of the principle of proportionality, this means that a nation should not sacrifice its sons or slaughter the people on the other side or ravage their country when the purpose for doing this cannot be realized. It seems to me that our leaders should have come to see that no amount of firepower from the air or from the land can create a nation in South Vietnam and establish a government around which that nation can rally.

The other emphasis in this discussion of the difference between a just and an unjust war has to do with the conduct of the war by means of policies and acts which are morally wrong in themselves, and here we should have in mind especially the treatment of civilians or helpless persons such as prisoners.

**TWO LEVELS OF IMMORALITY OF VIETNAM WAR**

As we look at the record of what has happened in Vietnam, there are these two levels of immorality. One is the cumulative destruction of persons and communities and even nature itself by acts of war which might in individual cases be regarded as inevitable if there is to be a war at all. The body count, the destruction of towns and vil-
lages, the uprooting of people from their homes, turning them into refugees by the millions, the ecological damage which is now being seen to have long-term effects on the land, these over a period of 6 years, add up to a terrible accumulation of disproportionate evil. This is an evil for both sides but it has a new dimension when we see how the most powerful nation in the world has kept inflicting it on the helpless people of Vietnam and now the people of Laos and Cambodia must be added. The United States seems to be a captive of the momentum of its own destructive power, and there I would want to suggest a philosophical problem, a theological problem, as to the relationship of the fact that we are all captives to the cold-blooded decisions of certain individuals in escalating this war.

When we move from this cumulative evil to particular acts which in any circumstances are immoral in themselves, it is even clearer what the fighting of the war has done to Americans. The recent revelation of the massacres at Song Mai makes vivid the nature of this war as no other single event has done, but it differs only in degree from many less publicized episodes involving the killing of noncombatants and the torture of prisoners either by our own people or by proxy by the South Vietnamese. One of the most significant developments in the discussion of Song Mai was the tendency of journalists to raise the question as to the difference between killing helpless people, including children, on the ground at shortrange when they are seen and the killing of them from the air, at longer range, when they may not be seen in so-called “free-fire” zones. I realize that the psychological difference is very great, but how great is the moral difference when it is well known that there will often be many of the same helpless victims? There is another difference: the air strikes are clearly a matter of policy and the highest policymakers are responsible and all of us who consent to them are guilty.

DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF VIETNAM WAR

The most obvious effects of this war in the life of our country are that it has bitterly divided our people and that it has so diverted our attention and so used our national resources that we make no progress in solving national problems that cry to heaven for solution. The decay of our cities continues and tens of millions of our people remain victims of a culture of poverty and many of these of an oppressive racism as well. At home we seem to be a “pitiful helpless giant” while we try to prove to the world that we are not one by a compulsive aggressiveness.

I shall emphasize here three quite specific effects of the war and I choose these because they are not discussed as often as the two more general ones I have just mentioned.

GOVERNMENT’S EXAMPLE OF VIOLENCE

The first is that our Government has set an example of massive and brutal violence to the Nation. I know no way of estimating the extent to which the violence on the streets and other forms of violence that have been so much noted is the result of the Government’s official violence, but the only question is the degree to which private violence
is the result of the official violence. In this war pictures of violence are brought into our homes, sometimes pictures of such American or South Vietnamese atrocities as the torture of prisoners. Undoubtedly there is a countereffect in that people in large numbers are outraged by what they see. They are made more sensitive, I think. There are a good many such people, fortunately. Who knows how much violence will be brought back to this country by those who have been trained in it in Vietnam? The shooting of students at Kent State University may be a harbinger of this kind of thing.

The effect of the war in increasing violence at home needs to be combined with some less tangible results: all degrees of callousness and brutalization among people who will never become involved in overt violence of any kind. The collection of ears of Vietcong by Americans is a symbol of the effect of the war upon people who would often be otherwise normal. This is connected with a habit of seeing people who are different from ourselves in color, size and culture as “gooks,” as something less than human. This involves a kind of racism. The reports of the attitudes of a majority of Americans—65 percent in a survey reported in Time—was discouraging because they seemed to shrug their shoulders rather than express moral shock. I know that much of this was a self-protective reaction stemming from a desire not to become emotionally involved and I do not believe, I certainly am not cynical about these things, the majority of Americans will be radically changed in character. There may well be growth in insensitivity among a considerable minority to the infliction of suffering although this will be balanced by the moral revulsion that I have mentioned. Sometimes the two may be combined and a small and much publicized minority, in their hatred of the war, may use violence to bring down the system responsible for it.

ALIENATION OF YOUTH IN UNITED STATES

The second effect of the war upon the life of Americans is that more than any other single factor it has destroyed the confidence of a large part of our youth in the best institutions of our Nation. This certainly has been very sensationallly indicated in the last few days.

This effect has been greatly enhanced by the contempt for youth who are critical, expressed by the President and the Vice President. I realize that the widespread alienation of young people has many causes and that some of these are deeply rooted in the culture and sometimes in the nature of the universities, the way they have conducted their educational processes and even without the war these would have produced some degree of revolt. The war, however, has been responsible for the intensity of emotion that unites so many hundreds of thousands of American youth in their alienation from what they think of as the “system.” The feelings of moral outrage against the war on the part of the generation that is expected to do the fighting is by no means a fringe phenomenon, but among students it extends from the left to the center, and I think this is perhaps one of the things that needs to be seen most clearly by those who make decisions. In some of their utterances they speak of it as a kind of a fringe phenomena. The recent editor of the Yale Daily News, Lanny Davis, said recently that “the war changed the whole atmosphere of
It seemed an immoral enterprise." Former vice president Davis Truman of Columbia University at the time of the troubles there in 1968 said that there was a question whether university communities could survive if the war had to continue on. (Cox Commission Report, p. 10.) Moral rejection of the war has led to disillusionment about the institutions that have made it possible. The whole political process is now deeply distrusted because no matter who is elected and no matter how much a presidential candidate may be committed to ending the war, the war continues and processes of escalation continue. This disillusionment has had powerful confirmation because of the extension of the war into Cambodia. I know one other thing, I think to me, of enormous interest and that is institutions that have never before been willing corporately to take positions on a public issue are doing so. My own institution did so yesterday in a very strong statement. I happen to be a member of the senate of Columbia University and the senate voted the other day to suspend classes for 2 days as a demonstration, declaring these 2 days as days of mourning and shock concerning what has been happening about what our Government has done. For a university to do this corporately is a new dimension of activity. Princeton, I think, has done somewhat the same thing.

DILEMMA OF THE DRAFT.

Now, the third effect of the war that is closely related to the second is that so many thousands of our young men have been forced to face an intolerable dilemma in their own lives. Should they allow themselves to be drafted and be sent to fight in a war which they regard as gravely immoral or should they run the risk of going to prison for a period of from 2 to 5 years or should they choose exile in Canada or in some other country? Again this is not a fringe phenomenon. In April 1969, 253 campus leaders, student body presidents or editors, declared that they would not "participate in a war which we consider immoral and unjust." They were on record as choosing either prison or exile. This is an incredible development among those who can be expected to be leaders in the mainstream of American life in the future. There are tens of thousands of exiles in Canada. I think nobody knows the exact number, but I gather it is something like 60,000. What does it mean for America to have so many political prisoners or exiles? It has been all too common in many times and places for a nation to punish its finest and most conscientious citizens as well as its thieves and murderers. Most Christian preachers have Good Friday sermons that stress this point. But we have always hoped that this would never be a common experience in our country. It will greatly increase the alienation of youth and it will undermine respect for our institution. It would help to reestablish confidence in the best of our traditions and ways of life if amnesty were to be declared for all who have been so affected by the war. I suppose this is not possible while the war is on, but I hope it will come very soon after the war ends.

It may be a summary of all that I have emphasized as the effects of the war on our own national life to say that the tragedy of Indochina is also the tragedy of America.

The Crammer. Thank you, Dr. Bennett. I think that is an exceptionally eloquent statement.
Bishop Dougherty is the vice chairman of the Department of International Affairs of the U.S. Catholic Conference and former chairman of the American Catholic Bishops Committee for World Justice and Peace. He is the past president of Seton Hall University and has for many years taken a great interest in the foreign policy matters of this Nation.

Bishop, we welcome your statement.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP JOHN J. DOUGHERTY, VICE CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE

Bishop Dougherty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I address myself to the question of the impact of the war in Vietnam on the moral life of our Nation. Since my experience is preponderantly with the Catholic segment of our society, I shall essentially restrict my assessment to the impact of the Vietnam war on that segment of our population. First, however, I must make reference to the larger context of the question for American Catholics, namely, the teachings of the second Vatican Council on War and Peace, as stated in the "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," and the incessant and increasingly urgent pleas for peace of Pope Paul VI.

DETERIORATION OF MORAL POSTURE OF AMERICAN PEOPLE

The fact of the deterioration of the moral posture of the American people is well documented by every news bulletin, and need not be substantiated here. What is laborious is the interpretation of the fact, the diagnosis of its causes, and the determination of its remedies, I believe that the first assertion of reason is that the causes are multiple and critically complex, and the first conclusion is that simplistic solutions are senseless. The second conclusion might be that since the progression of the moral illness was gradual, health will not be restored to our society in a day. In his address to the United Nations in 1965 Pope Paul declared, "You are still at the beginnings * * * in changing that selfish and bellicose mentality which, up to now, has been interwoven in so much of history."

In any approach to the moral problems of our people we must be aware of their magnitude, their complexity and their gravity. And we must be aware that they are not isolated from the moral dilemmas of the peoples of the world. Technology has made our world a global village and men everywhere find themselves in an extremely complicated web of interaction involving the economic, the social, the political structures with the resultant psychosocial climate that envelopes the globe and the terrifying element pervading that climate is violence.

What I am saying, in sum, is that the moral problems of the United States are bound up with the moral problems of the globe, and that they are staggering in their magnitude, and baffling in their complexity. We need to bring to bear upon them all the expertise that this Nation can summon and even more, we need men of vision with a burning love of justice for all men everywhere.
At the possible expense of burdening you with excessive abstraction, may I add this observation before coming to my specific objective. I think it is relevant to the problem confronting us, especially to our youth. It is this: People do not usually get excited about moral principles directly. They get aroused by issues. Moral principles are abstract. Issues are concrete. I have seen no demonstrations for the just war theory. There have been countless demonstrations, violent and nonviolent, over the issue of Vietnam. Vietnam being an issue, being concrete, has served as a catalyst to bring out in tremendous expression, especially on the part of youth, the moral issue underlying it, the matter of justice to men everywhere.

The relevance of this—I would also second Dr. Bonnett's observation, that war does dehumanize—the relevance of this observation lies in the fact that policy decisions of the Government deal with issues. The issues and the decisions sooner or later dig up the moral principles, and arouse the conscience of the Nation.

SHIFT IN CATHOLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR

The significance of the impact of the Vietnam War on the moral attitudes of American Catholics is comprehensible, through the history, of the Catholic community vis-a-vis war and peace. The distinguished Monsignor John Tracy Ellis, historian of the Catholic church in the United States, has described the attitudes of the leaders of the Catholic church up to the 1960's as "unquestioning compliance" with their Government's policies in regard to war and peace." He observes that "The revolutionary decade of the 1960's brought a marked shift of opinion in this regard." He attributes the shift to the influence of the late President Kennedy and Pope John XXIII.

In the spiritual leadership of the Catholic church this shift of attitude can be studied in the statements of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. In 1966, their statement said and I quote from it, "In the light of the facts as they are known to us, it is reasonable to argue that our presence in Vietnam is justified."

In 1967 they issued a resolution in which they urged the Government to continue with even greater determination and action in the cause of negotiation. They continue, "We extend this plea to the governments of the world and urge them to join earnestly in the search for a just and lasting peace."

In their pastoral letter issued November 1968 we see this shift that Monsignor Ellis has referred to. The pastoral letter discusses conscientious objection, disarmament and other questions relevant to The Family of Nations, which is the title of the second chapter.

Mr. James Finn, author and student of questions of peace, in a little book called "The Family of Nations," describes this: "As one of the most significant pastoral letters to be published by the bishops of the United States."

He sees the special significance in the change of attitude of the Catholic bishops toward the issues of war and peace and specifically Vietnam.
Let me read a few lines from the pastoral letter regarding Vietnam:

There are moral lessons to be learned in our involvement in Vietnam that will apply to future cases. One might be that military power and technology do not suffice even with the strongest resolve to restore order or accomplish peace. As a rule, internal political conflicts are too complicated to be solved by external applications of force and technology.

Another lesson might be the realization that some evils existing in this world, evils such as undernutrition, economic frustration, social stagnation and political injustice may be more readily attacked and corrected through non-military means than by military efforts to counteract subversive forces bent upon their exploitation. In addition, may we not hope that violence may be universally discredited as a means of remedying human ills.

In that same section the pastoral reminds us, "It is the duty of the governed to analyze responsibly the concrete issues of public policy."

I submit this is a significant development in the Catholic attitude regarding Government policies toward war.

Evidence of the shift of the attitude of the Catholic people is especially noted among the youth, and I refer to Catholic youth. Many have taken the position of selective conscientious objectors, thus subjecting themselves to the probability of trial and imprisonment. Evidence is not lacking of changed attitudes among American Catholics generally, although there is a notable segment of strongly conservative opinion still existing.

**MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF CATHOLIC SHIFT IN ATTITUDE**

The moral implications to this country that I detect in this shift of attitude in a numerous segment of our people—I refer to the Catholic population—is that a numerous segment of our people strongly church-oriented, making this shift of attitude, widens the gap in the division of our people. A divided people must be the concern of religious leaders as well as Government officials. A divided people is a political and social problem; it is also a moral problem. A certain measure of unity is indispensable to the survival of a civilization. The preservation of that measure of unity is the responsibility of every American, but especially of the elected leadership of our Nation. We may earnestly beseech them to strive to see the moral principles underlying policy decisions of great moment, because they will eventually emerge for the good or ill of our Nation. The basic moral principle underlying the war in Vietnam is justice, domestic and international justice, and religious leaders would be unfaithful to the prophetic tradition of the Old and New Testaments if they did not ask of our Nation's decisions: Is justice thereby served?

The Chairman. Thank you, Bishop Dougherty. That is a very impressive statement.

Dr. Greenberg is a rabbi of the Riverdale Judiciary Center in New York, a lecturer on Jewish values and ethics, and active in a number of Jewish educational organizations. We are very happy indeed, Dr. Greenberg, to hear you at this time.

**STATEMENT OF DR. IRVING GREENBERG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, YESHIVA UNIVERSITY**

Dr. Greenberg. A discussion of the moral effects of the war in Southeast Asia must start with the realization that public life is the
primary moral example in the United States today. We still turn to clergymen and theologians in some residual notion that they are the teachers and students of the moral questions. But by and large they have little influence compared to the model of public life and behavior in the United States which is set by the President, the members of executive, Congress, the judiciary, et cetera. These actions and these models are broadcast repeatedly and everywhere in the mass media and communication channels. They are perceived by everyone and learned environmentally which means they are more likely picked up, internalized and influence the actions and standards of everyone. All the sermons and classes in America reach a fraction of the people reached by one action of the U.S. Army or one speech of the President. The question I would like to focus on then is public life and the war as the moral pedagogue of America of this generation.

MORAL EFFECTS OF VIETNAM WAR

This realization points up the moral disaster which is the net effect of the tragic error of the Vietnam War. For the past 5 or 6 years the dominant moral message has been the continual futile killing, the body count, the use of napalm and civilian destroying projectiles, the desensitization of countless American boys in Vietnam and countless people here to the human qualities of the enemy and of the innocent civilians who make up so large a part of the casualties.

All wars cause some desensitization and killing of conscience. This is why all wars are at best necessary evils. But in this case, the very terms of the war—a civil war, one in which our base of support in the local population is so tenuous—inexorably drives us to excesses in this area. It was in a deeper sense inevitable that there would be direct personal massacres of civilians and torture and shooting of prisoners. Every image of prisoners pushed out of helicopters, or children napalmed becomes a hideous moral example undermining the moral consensus which has united America and given it great strength and moral significance in the world. Each such incident tempts some people to support or justify it in the hope that this one last excess will somehow break through to end the ghastly situation while driving others to ever deeper moral alienation from our society which tempts them to despair of our system or to join those who merely tear it down and not correct it. Not the least bad moral effect is on those who stand in the middle and savor the significance without committing themselves but whose moral sensibilities are shaped by it. And the long pause before massacres are identified or prosecuted or even condemned is especially debilitating to the moral authority of society—especially when it is noted that unpopular transgressions of far less direct brutality are quickly and outspokenly condemned by major figures.

MORAL SIDE EFFECTS OF VIETNAM WAR

These moral effects, however, are by now sadly familiar to all of us. I would like to point out some moral side effects which are less noticed but are having a profound impact on the moral condition of American society. One is the great distortions in personal lives and continual moral conflicts created in our young people. Those who condemn what they think are excesses of identification with the poor by college stu-
dents should ask themselves some time: is it really because they are spoiled members of an affluent class? Or is it not really because of the crushing burden of the nagging conscience that they were living by draft exemptions while the children of the poor unable to go to college were condemned to serve and die—in a war which the students feel is unjustified and futile? What is the effect on my capacity for objective judgment on people who are dying primarily because of the effects of their poverty when I am alive and sheltered because of the effects of my affluence?

There are also the countless lives distorted by people who stall their careers and development to stay in careers and studies which exempt them although they are of no long range significance to these young people. And what of the effect on young people who feel the war is unjust but cannot bring themselves to stand up to it because of their fear of the consequences of such acts—and therefore feel themselves like moral betrayers? Or of the emotional costs of acts of defiance and resistance which take so great a toll that they may lead to bitterness, or estrangement from all established society? What of selective conscientious objectors driven to lie and claim universal objection, or to silence their qualms and serve, or to jail and/or criminal status—while countless others watch and see these effects? What of the feeling of lack of understanding which alienates parents and children, old and young, intellectuals and workers and corrodes the organic relationships without which no society or law can retain its legitimacy? What of the thousands of ministers who feel their profession demands moral response who then are cut off from congregations—and what of the thousands who remain silent or in conflict and are one with the congregation but feel like moral eunuchs—or who lose the respect of their young people? These side effects will persist long after this war is ended—if it is ended.

Another side effect of this war has been a tremendous blow to the respect for patriotism, democracy, and international responsibility—

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I hope this distinguished witness will omit that last phrase of the paragraph he just read.

The CHAIRMAN. Which phrase?

Senator Gore. "If it is ended."

Dr. GREENBERG. I would be happy to strike that, sir.

Senator Gore. Thank you. It must be ended.

Dr. GREENBERG. It must be ended, correct. This was written under the fear of the headlines of Cambodia.

Another side effect of this war has been a tremendous blow to the respect for patriotism, democracy and international responsibility. Without commitment to such concepts, there can be no healthy body politic. They are the lifeblood of a free society. But these concepts have been invoked for years now in the context of upholding a series of shifting repressive dictatorships in South Vietnam with a weak or nonexistent popular base. They have been used in the context of political figures tried kangaroo style and imprisoned or in the image of a police chief shooting a guerrilla prisoner in the head without trial or mercy. The result is a tremendous cynicism and a loss of faith in areas which are significant and which keep society one. Guilt by association with a policy error leads to a denial of the integrity of the valid
concept itself. And the fact that statistically the more aggressive supporters of the war have been least responsive to the needs of democracy and redemption at home has only compounded the damage.

DISTORTION OF U.S. PRIORITIES

This brings me to another distortion which this war has introduced into our society: the distortion of priorities which spends enormous money and lives in a fight for the most questionable kind of freedom abroad but, therefore, lacks funds and resources to bring true freedom to realization at home. We are going to need extraordinary feats of technology to end pollution at home, extraordinary investments of funds and human help to free millions from the curse of poverty, sickness, inadequate education, broken families and lack of self-respect. When one reads of the extraordinary feats of detection, electronic surveillance, training, destruction achieved by our armed forces and technology—one dreams of these talents and funds used in empathy to free our own sufferers. The contrast in the funding and dedication to the war on poverty and the Indo-China war speaks volumes to people about our moral priorities. And every step deeper into this war has cruelly disappointed the millions around the world who knowing the evils and hypocrisy of totalitarian systems, without romanticizing, looked to the United States as a moral alternative.

U.S. INABILITY TO ADMIT ERROR

The last and not least cost of the war as moral pedagogue to our society is its revelation of our inability to admit error, or accept the tragic and ironic fate which history now doles out to us as it may do to all men. Let me make clear that the mainstream Jewish tradition has not been pacifist. Peace is the highest, the greatest good. But Judaism had the moral realism to recognize that under certain circumstances war is a necessary and justifiable evil.

Even opponents of the war would do well to recreate the moral climate of the early days of our intervention. We can freely confess the role of idealism, the feeling of American responsibility for the world order. There was a phase in which we saw Communist China, then in its commune period which seemed to deny the elemental dignity of man, as expansionist and North Vietnam as purely a Chinese satellite. In this phase the fear of another Munich and the conviction that we dare not sell out or be indifferent lest World War II repeat itself colored the judgment of many. But when the pitiless light of events and facts and growing knowledge of Vietnam revealed the falsity of our assumptions, then our might placed a special burden of responsibility on us to recognize our error and withdraw. We should have admitted that Communist China was rent internally, that North Vietnam historically sought its independence from China, that the South Vietnam Government could not or would not muster popular support. This inability to admit error has been the tragic force that has driven us deeper and deeper into the mire. Jews and Christians alike have idolized David the King of Biblical fame as the eternal dynasty, as ancestor of the Messiah. Jewish tru-
dition points out that between David and his predecessor, Saul, it was David who made greater mistakes, did more tragic evil things. Then why was Saul stripped of the kingship, and David immortalized? Because David could recognize and confess his errors and in most powerful contrition turn from his ways and redress injustice. This is the true strength which a moral leader must have. Saul was too weak; he would only rationalize and justify his errors. Power corrupts and is inevitably abused. Only those who admit mistakes and accept the irony and tragedy of defeat of the assumptions can be trusted with power. Otherwise, the powerful would inevitably destroy the others. Otherwise, we have a “machismo” conception of manliness which places great emphasis on not being humiliated or defeated—as if the greater humiliation is not in resorting to force to cover up error and the greatest defeat is not in pouring good lives and vast resources into an escalating cruelty of frustration seeking one last knockout. Such a conception violates Jewish and Christian ethics of power alike.

JUSTIFICATION FOR HUMAN SACRIFICE SO FAR

It is true, there is one great force for continuing the war. It is the death of over 40,000 Americans and many times that many Vietnamese. Such is the moral order of the world that any human sacrifice—even for mistaken causes—become great forces for these causes and evoke further sacrifice and response lest we betray those who have gone before. Shall we now go to the parents of the 40,000 and say: we have erred and your children have died in vain? Shall all this patriotism and sacrifice mean nothing? I realize the full force of this dilemma. But the only corresponding answer must be: Shall we condemn another 10,000 Americans and another 50,000 Vietnamese to death rather than not admit... This was the moral weakness of a Vietnamization policy designed to purchase time and not admit failure of the dead but cost many more lives in the interim. The problem of repentance is that the person who has gone astray feels he has gone so far and it has cost so much that he cannot turn back. Yet we are told: “turn and live.” The only answer is the moral courage to confess to the survivors of the dead the good intentions and the mistaken assumptions and the genuine patriotism which motivated their beloved ones’ death. And a plea to them, that if we can learn from this tragic error, if we can learn to modulate the use of power, if we can set the moral example of voluntary acceptance of defeat where it is the only honest thing to do, then these people will truly not have died in vain. They will become part of the sacrifice which brought about a deeper international moral order and a United States tempered by tragedy to use its resources to embrace and heal the world—and itself. I believe our bereaved parents and our people are capable of the response of love and understanding and acceptance which such a confession would evoke. We only lack the moral leadership to have it made.

Judaism has never felt that martyrdom or defeat is intrinsically morally superior to righteous victory. But inability to accept the tragic, the ironic, the possibility of mistake and failure is to be less than fully human. Perhaps this is our national problem. Maybe this
explains our lack of empathy for the suffering, deprived and defeated in our own society wherefore we often condemn them to welfare without true charity, deprivation without hope and status without faith or trust in them. Maybe we need to admit error and know defeat before we can triumph over poverty and racism and hatred in our country by confessing our past errors and present defeats in this struggle too.

**DANGER OF GROWING FRUSTRATION AND RADICALIZATION**

There is one last moral danger I want to point to also. There is the grave danger that growing frustration and radicalization may lead to a new isolationism and a rejection of necessary national sacrifices for world peace. I believe that it is the exhaustion of our resources in a mistaken cause and bottomless pit that leads to the weakening of our resolve to help those who want to help themselves. We can avoid the extremes of thoughtless intervention or total irresponsibility by joining together in distinguishing justified help for true democracies seeking their own existence and cooperation with all elements in the world as against inertial support for mistaken causes where there is no moral claim or national interest. What we need in our time is not the dismantling of power but greater and greater precision, calibration, and proper direction in its use.

What has saved us from national moral disaster is the response of millions of Americans of all kinds who have spoken up, taken responsibility, made moral decisions—some right, some wrong. The covering up of error by polarization, setting person against person, even seizing upon actual abuses to arouse hate, suspicion and repression can only raise the risk of moral disaster. Pitiless and uncharitable denunciation is related to thoughtless shooting of students—and to mindless responses of tearing down or blind destruction. The extension of the war into Cambodia now threatens to overwhelm the frail dikes of moral concern and community which have maintained moral legitimacy and democratic consensus in our country. This final moral disaster must be prevented. All of us must cling together against the demonic and the violence which is now unleashed in our society. We can do so only by becoming one community. Perhaps we can learn how to do this from an ancient Biblical model. On the Day of Atonement, the community, led by its leaders, become one by confessing its errors and sins before God and to those whom it had harmed. Then it turned together to new ways of life affirmation to overcome the evils of the past. I believe that only in this way can the demons of war, racism and poverty be overcome in our society.

**COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES**

The Chairman, Gentlemen, I find it very difficult adequately to express my feelings about what you have said. It does raise a question in my mind. With such, to me, unanswerable arguments, how is it that America has gone astray? It is hard for me to believe that in light of these profound thoughts that you three have given to this and with what I had thought was respect for the religious leaders that we have wandered so far from the paths which you have so well described and the advice which you have given.
One of the great opportunities that we have in this committee, and perhaps the principal one, is to give people like you an opportunity to express in a public forum the kind of thoughts and reasoning you have given to us this morning.

I regret that all three of these statements have not been given the kind of exposure to the American people that, as one of you mentioned, is given to the statements of our political leaders. The best we can do in the Foreign Relations Committee is to bring you here. We cannot say we have not given the media and everyone else an opportunity to hear; I think, some of the most profound observations of the present state of our great country that I have heard in any forum.

I feel almost inadequate to ask you questions. Yet I know that it will be beneficial to ask some questions to simply emphasize and underline for the people the importance and significance of what you have expressed this morning.

I cannot help but believe that if their minds could be focused on what you said this morning, there would be a profound change in their attitudes toward our society, toward this war and toward our conduct in all respects.

RESPONSE OF YOUNG PEOPLE TO VIETNAM WAR

There is one thing, since it is so current, that encourages me. It is very difficult for me to find anything that is encouraging about our present situation, but I was thinking particularly of Dr. Greenberg's statements, and about the recent developments among our youth and in the colleges. It occurred to me that perhaps the most encouraging thing about our situation is that today the young people of this country are revolted by the war. How differently our young people have responded to this challenge to their integrity and their moral sense and their sensitivity than did the young people, as I understand it, in 1930 in Germany.

They created the Hitler youth. They banded together under misguided leadership and became a part of the apparatus. Our young people are not doing that. They are refusing to become a part of the apparatus.

It seems to me that this is one aspect of our situation which could be considered very hopeful for the future of the country, if not the immediate present. What do you think about that, Dr. Greenberg?

Dr. Greenberg. Well, for one I think the lesson of the Hitler years and the recognition of how many respectable people stood by, and in a very real sense most tyrannies and oppressions have had silent majorities that stood by and even cooperated with them, and I think very much has affected the thinking and behavior of young people and perhaps that is one of the few consolations that we have learned that lesson, and that there is now a group that is willing to respond so strongly and not say "my government right or wrong." I think that is very encouraging.

On the other hand, I just want to make one other comment, if I may. I think we have to avoid romanticizing young people, too. Nor do I wish to say that, nor do I think that, it would be good morally or for America if it ends up being the young against the old in this question.
One of the contributions the committee has made is to make clear the young are not alone in their feelings in this matter.

**MORAL LEADERSHIP OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH QUESTIONED**

I think here is where we have to point to the failure of leadership, of moral leadership, of the executive branch in this particular sense. I think a vast number of Americans are terribly troubled by the war but who feel legitimately that no society can function without a President, without the authority of the government, who feel legitimately that there is a need to give the benefit of the doubt to the Executive, and so on, who perhaps may see certain excesses in some of the demonstrations and then feel this is not an issue of upholding society, of who may in fact, as I say before, who may feel the loss of the lives and may feel to justify it, here is where political leadership has failed in the political realm.

Had the President or the Executive come forward and said “These things that trouble you are legitimate but here is a case where we must make a very fine case of moral discrimination, without rejecting what is true and what is valid we have to recognize a mistake. We have to make a much finer gradation of support for our country. We have to not let this country be polarized between those who are concerned for continuity and those who are concerned for change, or those who are concerned for morality and those concerned for the realistic problems of the world.” Had our leaders done this I think they could have really united the nation.

Instead by not admitting the truth on the other side and by exaggerating whatever elements of truth are on their own side they have only hardened the hearts on both sides I think that this breakthrough between the two sides has been the one thing that could have really united the Nation.

I think the Presidential fears of withdrawal as leading to a reaction, resentment and polarization was a serious mistake. It underestimated the moral sensitivity and subtlety of our people—if only their potential had been matched by some confession of failure and some willingness to bring people together.

**YOUNG PEOPLE'S CONCERN ABOUT VIETNAM WAR**

The Chairman, I didn’t mean by my question to think about the young people alone and I didn’t wish to romanticize them. It was just a contrast in their reaction.

When I was in school and the same comparable age as the young people now, I wasn’t concerned with great public issues. Of course, there wasn’t this kind of a crisis either. This was during and after World War I, and I wasn’t confronted with the kind of crisis and dilemmas they are. I wouldn’t wish to exaggerate it.

I am encouraged that at least they are concerned. I don’t approve of some of their excesses, of course. None of us do. This comes, I think, from their youth and inexperience, and they are frustrated as to how to express themselves.
We here in the Senate are frustrated too. When some of these young people approached me asking what can we do, I said that is exactly what I am trying to find out, what can I do.

It is true you are a Senator, but you are just a Senator and you are very limited in what you can do to make our political system work except in your opportunity to persuade. Young people too can play a part if we can direct their attentions, and I suspect that they will be willing to do that. It will take work in a nonviolent way, in political ways if you like, in making our system work.

**Young People Are Not Alone in Their Concern**

I want to say I don’t think the young people are by any means alone. Look at the markets today. I would say the young people are being joined by the brokers and the bankers and the businessmen. That is their way of speaking.

A businessman, a corporate manager or a banker, speaks through the markets. He is saying exactly the same thing in his way that the students are saying in their way. I don’t think they are alone at all.

There is some absence of communication in this country, but I feel quite sure myself that all those who have given it any thought at all agree with the point of view that you have expressed. I don’t think they approve of this war. But it is difficult to communicate it. It is very difficult for me.

**Communication with Political Leadership**

You three gentlemen represent the three principal religious denominations of our country. The preceding Presidents and the present one have given great and very pronounced evidences of their devotion to religion, even establishing almost a church in the East Wing of the White House. Why is it that the message which you gentlemen have presented doesn’t seem to be communicated to the political leadership? I can’t understand it. It is a great mystery to me.

Dr. Bennett, you are a leader of the Protestant segment. Would you give us the benefit of your observations about that?

Dr. BENNETT. Well, I think there is a contrast between the leaders of the Protestant denominations, of such bodies as the National Council of Churches, the theologians, and the rank and file membership. The rank and file of the church represent a cross section of the people, and there is, I think, what you might call, blandness, in the churches, and there is a conflict.

One of the sad things for those of us who have responsibility for training ministers is the conflict between the clergy and the laymen, that is to say the rank and file of the laymen in so many places on this very point.

Undoubtedly there has been some movement. As Bishop Dougherty says there has been a shift in the last couple of years, and I am quite sure that some dent has been made upon the religious community by leadership in a very short time as the war has revealed its nature more fully.

But I do think one other thing; we need to recognize that is there is an element of sheer intellectual error in judgments about this
war. Take, for example, I won't mention names, the people who are always trotting out the Munich analogy as though the United States could do for Asia what it was able to do for Europe by cooperating with a strong European society to restore its health. It was assumed that the same thing could be done by using more power in Asia. This was perhaps the greatest single intellectual error that very important people and very honest and sincere people share, and we have to refute some of these views as intellectual errors, along with the other things which may be the result of sheer callousness or national pride and so on.

So I think that some of the people who have now the power today were brought up with these intellectual errors. How these errors can be broken down, that is our problem.

I think your committee has done as much as anybody to break these intellectual errors down.

The Chairman. The committee hasn't done anything. It is people like you who have done it. All we have done is given you an opportunity.

Just a week ago we heard one of the great leaders of our business community. He feels about this much as you do. He expresses it in different terms, but the Chairman of the Board of the Bank of America, the largest bank in the world, came here and testified as to what this war is doing to business.

BREAKDOWN OF MORAL STRENGTH OF AMERICAN PEOPLE

The moral fiber of the country, I think we will all be willing to admit, is the essential cement of the civilization, without which it disintegrates. The bishop made that point, I think, very clearly. His church, being an old and very prominent faith, knows that the moral fiber and the feeling of the people about the validity of their basic institutions and their allegiance to them is absolutely necessary to their survival. This is what concerns us all so much.

There is a horrible story in the morning paper. Every day we are confronted with this. It is on the editorial page of the Washington Post. It is not an editorial. They simply said that it is a news dispatch from the field, printed as an editorial without change. It is absolutely horrifying as to the breakdown of what we believe or used to want to believe was the moral strength of our people, whether they were in a war or at home. Every day we are confronted with new items, which are extremely disturbing as to the survival of the almost essential and elemental moral fabric of our society.

I have a great many more questions, but I wish to defer. I don't like to monopolize the time because my colleagues are very busy men and they sometimes have to leave. I would like the Senator from Tennessee to have the opportunity to say a few words or ask some questions.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have found your presentation a very moving experience. Rabbi, I am particularly impressed with your equation of a political leader as a moral leader. I had never quite thought of the office of U.S. Senator in this light, certainly not to the extent you do.
You place us in a position of moral leadership superior to that of the clergy.

I must say that I am not prepared to accept this, although, for the basis of my questions, let me assume you are right.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH STATEMENTS ON WAR AND PROTEST

Within the last week I have had two very shaking experiences. I sat in the White House and heard the President of my country draw an analogy between the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. forces with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Then he assured us that he would not invade further than 35 kilometers without seeking the approval of Congress. It was a disturbing and a shaking experience.

Then last Sunday I saw the Vice President on national television. He indicated that the silent majority and the frustrated needed a strong spokesman, the implication being he was that strong spokesman.

In the first instance I reject the idea of a silent majority in America, a country of popular government. As the great immortal Lincoln put it, a country of the people, by the people and for the people.

The concept of a silent majority, as it has been portrayed, seems to be of a people who speak softly or preferably not at all, slow on ideas, and soft on ideals.

I don’t think we have a silent majority on this question of the moral values and the moral issue of this war.

Yet, I would like to quote to you what the Vice President said. Later in the program he questioned the motives of what he called “the disrupters,” and said, “I don’t think many of them are really honestly sincere about the cause. I think they are simply utilizing this as a vehicle to continue their antisocial, outrageous conduct. And I think if the war were over, for example, they would find something else... to use as an excuse for throwing firebombs.”

I hesitate to ask you to comment upon either. I only afford you the opportunity to express a view, if you so wish, as to whether or not Vice President Agnew really represents the people who are deeply frustrated and troubled in our land?

EFFECT OF CAMBODIAN INTERVENTION ON U.S. PUBLIC

Dr. Greenberg, I may say one thing. On that question of a silent majority, it is very hard to handle such a term. I agree with your own hesitation and questioning. I want to say this. I work in a congregation, in a community. If there is any consolation in the new Cambodian intervention, it is this. Last intervention, I think, has really opened the eyes of many people. Up to now, there was a kind of inner logic of policy, if one accepted the assumptions of the Administration and didn’t step back and look at them from the outside. If one got involved in the same process of thinking, it somehow made sense and you could go along with it. People wanted to give our Government the benefit of the doubt, and so on. But I think this new step has really made a lot of people aware that the logic is really just a cover. If you step outside of it, you see it has almost a demonic or kind of insanity quality. Cambodia is a kind of loss of judgment. Just when we are about to damp down violence, it rises again. Many people who have
been patient and giving far beyond the benefit of the doubt are now having second thoughts. So if there was ever a silent majority, I think a lot of those people have second thoughts.

**EFFECT OF VICE PRESIDENT’S STATEMENTS**

Second, I want to say that I think the Vice President is in this case again giving a classic example of how not to be a moral leader. I appreciate your point that the man of government does not want to feel he is playing this role ahead of the clergyman. But we are living in an open society, and the moral teaching is simply what people see and hear. Therefore, if they see and hear the Vice President rather than the rabbi or the minister then he becomes the moral teacher.

What is the effect, then on peoples’ minds when a man comes along and grossly simplifies and lumps all people together? Even if we grant there are some people who are exactly like the ones he is describing, he uses this truth for the sake of a big lie.

I think it was Reinhold Niebuhr who once said that sometimes you can use a small truth for the sake of a big lie and big truth for a small lie, and lead up to the opposite of what you want. You take this little truth of those who are abusing and taking advantage of our crisis and lump everyone together, and defame every protestor—including the vast majority whose genuine concern has been aroused, and are our hope of a better moral response in the future. If you lump all these people together and try to arouse hatred toward them in some manner, you are almost corrupting the morals of our population. It is arousing people’s fears to act worse than they are, and, more than that, it is discouraging and threatening those who have to be involved and encouraged.

Here is the tragedy when there was a chance to speak healing words or words against discrimination in the best sense of the word, the word spoken wounds, divides, and debauches.

Lastly I want to say I don’t believe in a silent majority in this sense: no democracy can work by an appeal to those who don’t care. In a true democracy there has to be a special weight given to those who do care because their lives or existence are at stake. They always have an influence out of proportion. A consensus is not arrived at by simply lumping together the concerned and the indifferent but rather by true dialog where those who care less take seriously those who care more because they realize they must feel the urgency. So if there were a silent majority, they themselves would have to listen and take seriously the urgent appeal of those who care deeply. The silent majority would have to recognize that people are exaggerating and even doing evil because their hopes for America are being violated. How many instances which the Vice President can seize upon reflect the ideal and dream of a great America that is defeated and turns to bitterness? I think all these perceptions are lacking in the Vice President’s statement. I think they do moral damage both to those who accept these statements and to those who are driven off and offended and alienated by them. This is a great moral offense to America and weakens our fiber.

Senator Gore. And both are hurt, those who accept and those who reject?

Dr. Greenberg. Yes.
Senator Gore. Lest the statements I have made indicate to you distinguished gentlemen that there is some partisanship in this, I would like to relate another shaking experience and intense conversation that I had with former President Johnson, for whom I campaigned in 1964.

Dr. Bennett, you referred to the disturbing fact in this democracy that people vote for one man for President who promises to keep American boys out of a land war in Asia; yet they are sent. Then they vote for another man for President who promises to end the war and then widens the war.

What do the people do? What do the representatives of the people do, to come back to the question Senator Fulbright raises? How can the people be masters of their own faith in a popular government? This is the principal reason why so many of the young people are now saying that the system breaks down. I have faith in our system; I believe it can work; it must work. How do we make it work; how do those of us, the few of us here, make it work?

But to relate the experience: Soon after the victorious campaign in 1964, I learned that President Johnson was preparing to send combat troops into Vietnam. I went to him and tried to dissuade him, and he related the situation. I will not tell a long story, but he finally concluded that the advisers must be withdrawn or he must send in combat troops, and he said to me very pointedly, "I am not going to be the first President to run."

Now President Nixon says he is not going to be the first President to negotiate a defeat.

I don't think either is the question. I didn't think it was the question then with President Johnson, I don't think it is the question now with President Nixon; but would you comment on this, Dr. Bennett. We are troubled.

Dr. BENNETT. Well, I think we are all troubled. You say that you supported Johnson. The journal of which I am one of the editors lost its tax exemption for supporting Johnson in 1964. This has been true of so many of us.

Now, there are two points I think in what you say that are worth commenting on! One is this fear of being shown to be wrong; this fear of defeat. This seems to be one of the things that a great leader could interpret in a way that would give dignity to America, showing that it is a sign of greatness to be restrained and to admit that there has been a mistake, but you would have to have a great leader to do that interpreting.

But the other problem about the despair that people have, after having had this experience twice in a very short time, I don't think any one of us has the answer to this: We have two more years to wait before we have another chance to decide or a little more than that, but where would we be if this frustration took place a third time. We get the promise that the war will be ended; and then we find the war is escalated in ways that seem more and more indefensible.

I think we would have, certainly among the younger generation and among many more people complete despair about our system.
I think it was disreputable for the Vice President, whom you quoted, to assimilate all the people he addresses with those who throw firebombs, absolutely disreputable. The number of people who would even think of throwing firebombs would be numbered in the hundreds. Certainly there would be very, very few, but the people with whom he disagrees and who really make the difference today are numbered in the millions, and for him to assimilate one to the other is, as I say, something which sets a terrible example of untruth that, I think, cannot be too much criticized.

Senator Gore. Yesterday a young lady sat in my outer office practically all day. Yesterday was an extremely busy day, with rollcalls and with committee meetings. I shook hands with her, but I didn’t have time for a conference. I only learned after she had left that she was a timid little soul who told my secretary that she didn’t want to be a part of a marching demonstration, but she had ridden a bus for 4 hours just to come. She wanted to whisper to me encouragement, and yet she sat there all day and left and she never got to whispering. She didn’t want to wait until this weekend. She didn’t want to be in Washington this weekend. There are millions of people like this.

Dr. BENNETT. That shows the role that some of you Senators have been playing in this country.

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF CATHOLIC COMMUNITY

Senator Gore. Bishop, you referred to Pope John. By quite an unusual chain of circumstances I was in what, as a southern Baptist, I would call the Amen corner at his coronation. It was a moving experience, and I considered him one of the great spiritual and moral leaders of our times.

You referred to the change in attitude of members of your church. A few years ago you accepted without question the leadership of the Government with respect to war and peace, but now there is a questioning. You say the doctrine, the teaching of your church, accepts and encourages independent examination. Is that a correct interpretation?

Bishop DOUGHERTY. That is it essentially, Senator.

The quote that I gave from Monsignor Ellis, “unquestioning compliance with their Government’s policies with regard to war and peace” as describing the attitude generally speaking of the Catholic community prior to the 1960’s. Now, when you use the word doctrinal, this may be somewhat technical, but there would be a consensus in the Catholic community on the basic beliefs of their faith. It is rather the application of these beliefs to specific issues involving, for example, war and peace. So that it is something on which there is room for difference of judgment upon the part of a Catholic as to the application of some of these things, specifically, and if I may illustrate, the theory of the just war, and Dr. Bennett brought out the matter of proportionality, for a war to be just there must be a proportion between the good achieved and the evil that is done, the evil that is perpetrated.

Now in making the assessments of that, judgments obviously can differ, so the application of proportionality might be interpreted thus
by one Catholic and thus by another Catholic and so you allow for
difference of opinion.

What I wanted to bring out was this, that the leadership and the
people and the youth of the Catholic Church had moved away from a
rather markedly conservative position vis-a-vis governmental policies
involving war, and were moving to a greater openness, a more ques­
tioning attitude, some would describe it as a more liberal attitude. In
other words, it amounts to opposition, mounting opposition, among
the leadership or at least reconsideration of the policies of the Gov­
ernt, reexamination of these policies in terms not only in the
self-interest of the Nation but also the welfare of mankind.

Does that suffice for a response?

Senator Gore. Yes.

Just one more question.

Bishop Dougherty. Yes.

Senator Gore. I take it you endorse personally this examination
of the probity, the value and the moral rectitude of policies, par­
ticularly with respect to war and peace?

Bishop Dougherty. Yes, the answer is yes.

If I may take up something that was mentioned before, I think the
chairman referred to the east wing of the White House becoming a
sort of extension of the church. What it suggested to me is that the
east wing has become a center of worship, but worship is not the
whole of religion. In fact the Psalmist condemns sacrificial rite with­
out justice and mercy as displeasing to God; so, what I think the
three of us are trying to bring out is that religion is the base, the base
of the justice we seek for mankind, and this is the great ethos of the
religions that are represented here, that which makes a man truly
basically religious is his quest for justice, and peace is the work of
justice.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, this has been a very thrilling experi­
ence. Thank you.

The CHAIIIRMAII. Senator Case.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Welcome to our distinguished
New Jerseyan old friend from Union and to you, sir; personally.

Other demands of people interested in our current problems kept
me from hearing your reading of your own statements, but I have
read them and, of course, I have been familiar with your writings and
with your views expressed on other occasions, too. We are grateful to
you for sharing your thoughts on the immediate problem, and on
other aspects.

MORAL DILEMMA OF TERMINATING VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT

The only thing I would like, if you feel that you are able to do so
and if you would do so, is to comment on a part of an article by John
zine section last December. I will put the whole article in the record
and then, if I may, just read two or three paragraphs and then pre­
sent it to you.
Moscow and Peking regard Washington as an enemy; Moscow and Washington look upon Peking as an enemy; Peking and Washington view Moscow as an enemy. Each is the potential ally of each of the others against the third.

The recognition of this situation—of the fact that enemies can be allies and remain enemies—was the basis for the strategy of balance of power. In its simplest form, one nation sought to bolster the weaker of two rival states, both of which were adversaries. The object of the operation was to redress imbalance. It was to prevent one of the two from becoming dominant and therefore a more dangerous adversary. It was designed to create a power stalemate, even if only temporarily, thwarting aggression and conquest.

Balance of power was an economical strategy, requiring a minimal commitment of one’s own forces or none at all. Furthermore, it diverted the stronger adversary’s unwelcome attention partially if not wholly from oneself to the rival adversary. And, perhaps, most gratifying of all, it placed its practitioner in a favorable bargaining position with both rivals, often enabling him to extract favors and concessions from them.

Traditionally, the balance-of-power strategy was practiced among more than three states. The classic case, manipulated by Britain in the 19th century, involved a complex of individual states and alliances. The balance was finally upset and World War I resulted.

In our isolation, benefiting from the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere, we looked askance at Britain’s manipulations. When, in 1917, we were drawn into the European war and then its guileful peace settlement, Woodrow Wilson took the high road and proclaimed his determination to create not a balance of power but a “community of power.” He pressed the leaders of the world to establish a League of Nations and, through it, a “reign of law, based on the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”

The American public rejected Wilson’s involvement in such treacherous foreign entanglements and retreated into the womb of isolationism. But Wilson’s ideal of a righteous international order persisted in our Government through World War II, the creation of the United Nations and, most recently, our intervention in Vietnam. Balance of power was scorned as an off-color strategy. And besides, it was argued after World War II, this strategy was impossible. Power was polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union; the necessary third power did not exist. In any event, we were committed to a Wilsonesque strategy of collective security.

Yet we were busily busy after World War II building what amounted to preconditions for a balance-of-power strategy. We helped to recreate secondary centers of power in Western Europe and Japan. But we thought of them either in the context of collective security or as a projection of our own power. Not until recently have we begun to see that they are independent centers of power.

Nor were we aware during the nineteen-fifties that, while Moscow was treating Peking more or less as an ally, it was really using China against us in a typical balance-of-power maneuver. It supported China as a distraction to and drain on Washington. Our Government’s bull-headed pressure against China only served to drive China into dependence on the Soviet Union. This, of course, gratified the Russians, whose objective also was the subjugation of China.

We did not realize that we were being duped. Our Government had accepted the Stalinist contention that Moscow was the sole center of world Communism, to which all Communist parties were blindly loyal. So Washington adopted the dogma that International Communism was a fused monolith in which all nationalism excepting allegiance to the Soviet Union was extinguished. With this gullible conviction, our Government took for granted that Peking was part of Moscow’s domain. As late as 1961 it spoke of the “Sino-Soviet empire.”

* John Paton Davies, a U.S. Foreign Service officer for many years, served in China before and during World War II and in the Soviet Union after the war.
Reality was otherwise. The Chinese Communist party was aggressively nationalist and ideologically particularist. Peking had collaborated with Moscow but in advancement of its own economic and military interests and because American hostility left it with no alternative. However, when Moscow became concerned over Peking's headstrong ways and cut short its aid to China, Mao and company broke with the Kremlin.

Long-pent-up resentment against the Russians burst forth in scolding and abuse. Ideology, which Washington believed to be a binding tie, turned out to be a cause of discord. More basically, age-old Chinese racial pride and xenophobia welled to the surface. Peking went back to Russia's three centuries of eastward expansion into Asia, to its seizure through trickery and force of central Asian and Manchurian territory claimed by China. And just as the Chinese considered the Russians repugnant because they were white "barbarians," so the Russians detested the Chinese because they were yellow and very numerous.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and China was therefore never what our Government neurotically imagined it to be from 1950 into the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. These two powers were never a huge integrated empire directed from the Kremlin, as John Foster Dulles believed. And it was on the basis of this belief that Dulles shaped American policy in the Far East—including the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam.

Is the rift between Moscow and Peking permanent? Will they not rise above their differences and make common cause as fraternal Communist states? Did not the fighting along the Chinese-Soviet border yield in October to negotiations? And has not a Chinese trade delegation gone to Moscow to restore more normal commercial relations?

The answer is that the Soviet Union and China are not likely to combine unless by indiscriminating pressure on both we force them into common cause. Power rivalry is built into the relationship between the two. They are driven by conflicting compulsions, both ideological and nationalist. "There exist," Peking declared in October, "irreconcilable differences of principle between Peking and the Soviet Union."

With persistent rigidity the Kremlin pretends to be the center of a universal belief and the capital of an empire. Peking, in competition, is determined to widen its ideological and political hegemony. Its ambitions, too, are limitless, even to Africa and Latin America. The most ranking cause of enmity between the Soviet Union and China, however, is the quarrel over their common 4,500-mile border and Peking's claim to some 600,000-square miles of Soviet territory. This is a rather impressive bone of contention. Any relaxation of tension that may seem to emerge from border negotiations is likely to be superficial and temporary. The power rivalry and territorial feuding will endure.

In this situation of antagonism between the two Red giants, China is the weaker in important respects. China is at present politically weaker because its central administration is in disarray. Centrifugal tendencies toward regionalism, which have repeatedly fragmented the country, are again at work and might produce some kind of Red warlordism. China is also weaker than the Soviet Union in sophisticated weaponry and an industrial base for the production of modern arms.

Paradoxically, China's relatively backward economy, taken with its enormous, dispersed population, means that it is not as vulnerable militarily as advanced industrial societies. In defensive terms, then, China is a formidable force—provided it holds together politically.

Under the same conditions it also has a powerful offensive potential against the countries to the south of it. For more than 2,000 years China has repeatedly expanded into and withdrawn from these lands. If Peking calculates itself to be strong, its neighbors to be weak and other circumstances to be inviting, it will be tempted to move southward once more. The most persuasive external check on its doing so would be not the United States, but a hostile Russia glowering over China's northern frontiers.

The elementary condition for a balance-of-power strategy—the three-way antagonism among Washington, Moscow and Peking—is complicated by other factors. One is the existence of secondary centers of power; a second is the spheres of influence of the Big Three.

Canada, Australia, Japan and the major nations of Western Europe enter the power equation as allies of the United States. But they are allies in a qualified sense. They align themselves with us for defense, but otherwise pursue indepen-
ent foreign policies. For example, in our Vietnam jihad, none of these allies save Australia showed any inclination to help us “put things right” in Indochina.

In contrast, the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe are not only in defensive alliance with the Soviet Union but also, with the mild exception of Romania, responsive to Moscow’s foreign-policy wishes. As such, they are available to Moscow for balance-of-power maneuvers. Peking, with puny Albania at its side, has neither the advantages nor the embarrassments that go with allies.

Like the balance of power, the sphere of influence is an old-fashioned concept that has undeservedly fallen into disrepute. The idea of a sphere of influence begins with a recognition that the vital interests, if not the authority, of great nations extend beyond their borders. Where these interests exist in an area that is weak or in a power vacuum, the strong nation is inclined to assert a claim that the area is its sphere of influence and insist that others stay out.

As in the case of the balance of power, spheres of influence tend to be stabilizing, provided they are precisely defined, guaranteed by available force and accepted by adversary powers. They are a recognition that, because the power of a strong nation extends outward and collides with the projected power of other strong nations, it is sensible to delineate clearly agreed-upon zones of influence beyond the borders of the major states. This is at least something of a check on rampant competition among the strongest nations.

We profess to be above claiming spheres of influence because, particularly since John Hay, we have held them to be improper. The fact is that with the Monroe Doctrine we asserted a sphere of influence over the whole Western Hemisphere. Since World War II we have extended our vital interests to places in the Eastern Hemisphere, as far eastward as Greece and Turkey and as far westward as Thailand. We prefer to describe what we do in these places as fulfilling our obligations to collective security. Since we believe these obligations to be global, we try to make our influence felt everywhere.

While clinging to this universalist pretension, we have nevertheless respected and demanded respect for areas of special interest. We did not interfere when the Soviet Union cracked down on Hungary. Again we restrained ourselves when Moscow did the same to Czechoslovakia. But when the Kremlin impudently moved missiles into Cuba, inside our Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence, we demanded that they be removed. In these three instances our Government acted sensibly in accordance with power realities.

In Asia, spheres of influence are contested. Moscow and Peking vie for dominance in North Korea, which plays them off against one another to remain pretty much its own master. Southeast Asia is contested four ways. Moscow covets it. Peking assumes that it is a Chinese sphere of influence, if for no other reason than that the peoples to the south were for centuries tributaries to the Dragon Throne. Hanoi, for its part, regards its neighbors to the west and south as within its sphere of influence. And Washington, in struggling to deny any of these three a Southeast Asian sphere of influence, assumes the role of caretaker of the “freedom” of Southeast Asians. Thus the United States asserts a paternalistic sphere of influence over an expanse of Asia.

In so doing, our Government dwells on principles of self-determination and collective security. “What is not negotiable,” said President Nixon, “is the right of the people of South Vietnam to choose their own leaders....” This is the selective application of a moralism. For Washington is silent about the same rights for the people of Burma, Bulgaria and Brazil, to mention but three.

Collective security in Southeast Asia, including our SEATO “obligations,” is still paid lip service, but it has been a disillusioning experience. The system simply failed to work as we had planned, as a broadly shared undertaking. Too many of those who, we thought, should contribute to a collective effort concluded that we had taken it upon ourselves to intervene in Southeast Asia for questionable reasons and to no good end. They opted out; they felt no obligation to make sacrifices in a dubious effort to create what would amount to an American sphere of influence.

Baffled and obsessed by Vietnam, we have lost our strategic equilibrium. To put matters back in proportion, we must recognize that there are gradations of menace to us. Because of its nuclear capacities, the Soviet Union is now our only mortal threat. Although China is defensively strong if it does not disintegrate internally, it is not at present capable of doing significant damage to our terri-
tory. Its menace to us is in the future. As for North Korea and North Vietnam—and the same is true of Cuba—they are of themselves inconsequential threats to our borders.

So our real concern is the two Red giants, with the Soviet Union by far the more dangerous. How to cope with them? We could theoretically withdraw into isolation and ignore them. This is not practicable and, much as we may yearn after it, we are not likely to follow such a course.

Alternatively, we could deal with both adversaries in such a fashion that Peking is encouraged and enabled to act as a check on Moscow so long as the Soviet Union is the greater threat to American security. This is to pursue a balance-of-power strategy.

There is a question whether our Government is competent to engage in a strategy demanding so much perception and dexterity. Nor is it certain that the American people are of the character and temperament to support a balance-of-power policy. Neither the Government nor the public is accustomed to thinking consciously in terms of a balance of power. There still are many Americans who look at the outside world either as amenable to a mobilization of international goodwill and reason or as controllable by crude uses of American force, which they fancy as omnipotent. And if a balance-of-power strategy is beyond us, we should not attempt it. To do so would be to invite mortification and worse.

If, however, we can understand and appreciate the idea of a balance of power, we should begin the practice of that strategy warily. We should slide to the middle of the see-saw between Moscow and Peking. This will cause no great surprise to either camp.

We need not greatly change our attitude toward the Soviet Union. A little less eager anticipation that the Kremlin will help us with Vietnam, North Korea, the Middle East and arms limitation would probably be helpful. For too long Moscow has enjoyed having us in a supplicant position on a wide range of problems over which it has no real control or on which it is not prepared to do business. If Washington remains always open to Soviet overtures and maintains a correct, dignified attitude, that should be enough—and we would probably get along better.

Peking is the key element in our maneuvers. We must not be surprised when its reactions to us are sometimes waspish, sometimes surly and never affable. It has long-standing grudges against us and is, of the haughty turn of mind of the last Ch'ing emperors; For our part, we are not out to make friends with Peking; that is of no real value to us. So our natural inclination to cozy up to those with whom we seek a community of interest must be curbed.

What we should keep our eye on is Peking's relations with Moscow. That is where our real interest lies. We want to do what we can to keep Peking independent of Moscow while occupying Moscow's concerned attention. This may not seem like very much, but if we can do it we shall be far advanced from our present position.

Once we're on the Sino-Soviet see-saw, our first move should be in the direction of neutrality toward China, away from a quarter century of rigid, futile hostility to Mao. We should begin to treat Peking the same way we treat Moscow. This means, first, removing the economic ostracism that we have claimed on China. The Nixon Administration has taken the first step in this direction.

We can also agree to—but we must not initiate—a move for China's admission to the United Nations, which is essentially a matter of indifference to us. Becoming a member of the U.N. is scarcely more significant than becoming a member of the National Geographic Society.

The question of admitting Peking to the U.N. raises the issue of Formosa—whether we recognize Peking or Taipei as the Government of China. Here we are stuck with the World War II blunder of proclaiming that Formosa should be detached from Japan. The best we can do now is to say that, obviously, the Government in Peking is the Government of China. As for the regime on Formosa, we recognize and have treaty relations with it as an independent nation. But should there be a peaceful move to unify the two, as eventually there may be, we ought to make clear that we would interpose no objections.

We do not care what the Government on Formosa calls itself. If it insists on making believe that it is China, we should not boggle. We recognize two Congos. And with a straight face we put up with a greater flight of fancy than Taipei—that of the Ukraine and White Russia as full members of the United Nations, independent of the Soviet Union.
Because Peking insists on its claim to Formosa, our denial of that claim will make normal diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking impossible, certainly for the time being. We need merely state that we recognize the Government of the Chinese People's Republic as the Government of China and that we would welcome an overture by Peking for the establishment of diplomatic relations—at such a time as they can be maintained on a basis of mutual respect and civility. We must not make the mistake others have made, that of pleading for such relations as a boon from Peking.

Unilateral recognition without normal diplomatic relations may be an odd arrangement, but it does not prevent contact and the exchange of communications in a variety of informal ways. Nor will it be an appreciable obstacle to such economic bargaining as we may wish to employ toward manipulating a balance of power.

Certain small political gestures can have a disproportionately large effect. For example, on the Brezhnev doctrine that the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in a fraternal state, our Secretary of State, in response to a question from the press relating the doctrine to China, can declare that we would disapprove of such aggression. And indeed we should. It would be contrary to our interests were Moscow to expand its power into China.

There are other issues on which we could also, in a relaxed fashion, take a position parallel to Peking's. One is the sensitive border dispute between China and the Soviet Union. In historical perspective we could quite honestly commiserate with China over the territorial depredations it suffered at the hands of European powers. If we cannot concede Formosa to Peking, we can at least look with qualified sympathy on its irredentist claims against Russia.

Dispassionate expressions such as these, together with a relaxation of economic restraints, should serve to redress somewhat the imbalance between Moscow and Peking, cause the Chinese to think that there may be an alternative to fighting or buckling under to the Russians and sober the Kremlin, bringing to it a realization that we are no longer its unwitting ally in its campaign to subjugate China.

These measures may not be so imposing as a Tonkin Gulf Resolution, draft call-ups, diversion of the Sixth or Seventh Fleet or appropriations by the billions. But they are, in their modest way, likely to be more responsive to our central strategic needs. And they are, in the tradition of the balance of power, low-cost moves.

How much further we should go must be determined after we see what progress can be made with these measures. This is not a crash program, it is one in low key, intended to catalyze action by others. For a change, the burden is not on us to produce, on our own, results beneficial to us.

Related to and intimately affecting the American-Chinese-Soviet balance of power are spheres of influence. The most inflamed area is Southeast Asia, where each of the Big Three, plus Hanoi, aspires to hegemony.

Our wish to deny anyone else a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia really has little to do with our vital security. It is difficult to envisage how the acquisition of millions of fractious, underdeveloped peoples and their enervating environment could strengthen either of our main adversaries in their competition against us. It is quite as plausible to say that whichever one got Southeast Asia would find its strength undermined and sapped. Perhaps the unkindest thing we could do to both Moscow and Peking would be to leave Southeast Asia for them to compete over, with Hanoi determined to oust both interlopers from its sphere of influence.

What happens in Southeast Asia is not going to speed up the nuclear progress of either Moscow or Peking or better enable either to launch an amphibious armada bound for the Golden Gate.

The fact remains that we are entangled in Vietnam and that the American people are anxious to bring our military involvement to a close. Disregarding a balance of power, our Government wants to disengage in a manner which will deny South Vietnam and the domino countries to Moscow, Peking or Hanoi as a sphere of influence. With this objective, it has three "honorable" courses of action open to it. One is to seek "victory." Another is to negotiate an "honorable peace." A third is to turn over the war to the Saigon regime.

Some still argue that "victory" is attainable. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff are given a free hand to take whatever actions they deem fit. The implication plainly is that we would thereupon widen and intensify the war and crush North Vietnam by our vastly superior force. This formula has the appeal of Stone Age simplicity, into which the North Vietnamese would presumably be bombarded.
Unfortunately, it overlooked the probable reluctance of Moscow and Peking to let us win and the crippling of our war effort by a tidal wave of revolution in the United States and elsewhere. It also assumes that our military high command, which has over the last 30 years variously misjudged the Japanese, the Chinese Communists, the North Koreans and both kinds of Vietnamese, would not fumble the job.

Whatever our Government's reasoning, it seems to have abandoned military "victory" in favor of almost any other "honorable" termination of American involvement in the war. One is a negotiated peace agreement. But what is "honorable" for us is not "honorable" for Hanoi—not to mention what is "honorable" for Saigon—so negotiations are not likely to be productive on that plane. Lowering the goal a bit to face-saving for all might improve prospects, but not much.

As a variant, there is the proposition that the battle losses of Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars could persuade Hanoi to play possum militarily while it sought to negotiate us out of Vietnam, following which it could at leisure have another go at taking over the South. Mutual suspicion—developed with good reason—makes such a train of events unlikely. In any case, Hanoi is for the present hoping that public opinion in the United States will force Washington to pull out of Vietnam in rent.

While talking about negotiations, Washington is concentrating on shifting to Saigon responsibility for the war. This is President Nixon's Vietnamization plan, which was divulged on Nov. 3. Our Government seems to hope that by this process it can rid itself of the onus of intervention, eventually withdraw American forces and delegate to the South Vietnamese the distinction of coping with the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians. Thus we would with "honor" Vietnamese our denials of South Vietnam to any Communist takeover without de-Americanizing our pretensions to a benevolent sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.

This scheme assumes that the American people will understand the strategy, will approve it and will muster the patience to stay the long, still costly course. This scheme also assumes that the Thieu-Ky regime—and its successors—can build a durable nation and at the same time fight a war that has strained the resolution, if not the strength, of the most powerful country on earth. The enemy, we have difficulty in remembering, specializes in 'protracted' warfare.

"Victory," negotiated an "honorable peace" or delegating our white man's burden to General Thieu—none of these choices holds much promise for easing our Vietnamese dilemma. If none of them is workable; we continue in a bind, for they are the only outcomes of the Vietnam imbroglio that permit us to disentangle ourselves with "honor."

"Precipitate withdrawal," President Nixon warned, would be a "disaster of immense magnitude." If by "precipitate" he meant suddenly scrambling out in a matter of weeks, that indeed would represent a "defeat and humiliation." In such a hufid scenario, it is consistent to predict, as the President did, that recklessness and violence would therupon spread to the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere, bringing not peace but more war. But "precipitate withdrawal," like jumping off a barn roof to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, is not a widely recommended solution. Stiff, it is comforting to know that the Administration is against it and rightly considers it "dishonorable."

What is more to the point is that an unprecipitate unilateral withdrawal, executed in a deliberate and orderly manner over as much as a year, would also be "dishonorable." To be sure, it would bring a halt both the havoc that our bombing, artillery and pacification sweeps have visited upon villagers in the South and our self-corrupting involvement in someone else's civil conflict. But it would leave unprotected from Communist vengeance thousands, if not millions, of South Vietnamese whose lives have been endangered, and wreak lasting damage to our own military, diplomatic and economic relations, to compromise themselves by word and act against the Communists. Bungling out would also prevent the expenditure of an incalculable number of American lives to prove that the first 40,000 G.I.'s did not die in vain.

So we are caught between the demands of "honor" and the growing compulsion to be rid of the Vietnamese bugaboo. Being irreconcilable, these conflicting forces produce a massive national frustration, the onset of which we are now experiencing. The continuing build-up of such frustration will lead to a kind of collective schizophrenia.

The outcome of the Vietnam episode is a guess. But whatever it is, 20 years hence—if our embroilment is by then concluded—historians will look back on
the years between 1945 and 1970 with some bewilderment. What possessed a
succession of administrations, they will ask, to so misjudge both American
interests and the situation in Southeast Asia?

Why did Washington calculate that Southeast Asia was a strategically vital
area for the United States, that it should be made an American sphere of influ-
ence? If indeed it was vital and was in fact threatened by either the Soviet Union
or China or both, then why did our Government not see that the Vietnamese
Communists were the natural and potentially most effective counter to Chinese
southward expansion and to Soviet intrusions? Was it not clear that, in wishing
to deny Southeast Asia to Moscow and Peking, Hanoi was potentially our ally?
Or must we first cripple an adversary, as we did Germany, Japan and Italy,
before we can see it as an ally?

One of the large puzzles will be why Washington, which was obviously fright-
ened by the specter of what it imagined to be looming Communist Imperialism,
did everything possible to make that which it feared a reality. Acting against
the most elementary rules of national interest and the balance-of-power strategy,
it pressed Communist paradigm and nationalism toward submission to the
Kremlin. Washington’s policy tended to extinguish localism in the Communist
movement in South Vietnam and force it deeper ‘under Hanoi’s control’. Our
Government’s bludgeoning of North Vietnam pushed Hanoi into dependence on
Peking and Moscow. And its pressure on China compelled Peking to rely on
Moscow and for a decade, until Chinese nationalism and ideological heresy as-
serted themselves so strongly that not even the weight of our enmity could bond
China to the Soviet Union.

Given four adversaries, our Government managed at each level to act so as
to favor the stronger: Hanoi over the indigenous Communists in the South,
Peking over Hanoi and Moscow over Peking. And all of this was done at ex-
orbitant cost to the American people. For a quarter of a century, Democratic and
Republican administrations doggedly pursued a lavish strategy of our own inven-
tion—a strategy of imbalance of power.

Senator Case, It is a discussion of the general philosophy that he
believes we should pursue in regard to our relations with other coun-
tries, and in substance and broadly speaking, it is an argument for
following a balance of power principle, rather than others that have
been suggested. That, however, isn’t the point I had in mind in raising
it with you this morning, but rather its reference to Vietnam. And I
think I shall summarize fairly how he leads into this thing by saying
that he describes our Vietnam entanglement as a dilemma, a moral
dilemma, as well as a dilemma in the conduct of the relationship be-
tween sovereign states in terms of power. And he says that none of
the suggestions for terminating the war, that is to say victory, nego-
tiating an honorable peace or delegating our white man’s burden, to
use his phrase, to General Thieu, holds much promise for easing our
Vietnamese dilemma.

If nothing is workable we continue in a bind because they are the
only outcomes of the Vietnam imbroglio that permit us to disengage
ourselves with honor.

He mentions precipitate withdrawal, warned against by President
Nixon, and he says nobody is for this in terms of an immediate scram-
ble to get out—saying that precipitate withdrawal is like jumping
off a barn roof to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and is not a
wise solution. Still he says with some irony it is comforting to know
the Administration is against it and rightly considers it dishonorable.

What is more to the point, and now I read precisely his words, if I
may, to you is:

‘That an unprompted unilateral withdrawal, executed in a deliberate and
orderly manner over as much of a year, would also be “dishonorable.” To be sure,
it would bring to a halt both the hatred that our bombing, artillery, and pacifica-
tion sweeps have visited upon villagers in the south and our self-corrupting in-
volvement in someone else's civil conflict. But it would leave unprotected from
Communist vengeance thousands, if not millions, of South Vietnamese whom we
naively urged to forsake their native, noncommittal circumspection, to compromise
themselves by word and act against the Communist. Bugging out would also pre-
vent the expenditure of an incalculable number of American lives to prove that
the first 40,000 GI's had not died in vain. So we are caught between the demands
of "honor" and the growing compulsion to be rid of the Vietnamese bogey. Being
irreconcilable, these conflicting forces produce a massive national frustration,
the onset of which we are now experiencing. The continuing build-up of such frus-
tration will lead to a kind of collective schizophrenia.

That is, I think, enough to point up the problem you have when
confronted by a choice between two courses, both of which are dis-
honorable. This, I suppose, you might say is the human condition, and
this is the reason why in our philosophy, in our theology, grace is
provided to relieve us from the intolerable situation which by our
human capacities we have not the ability to redeem ourselves. But be-
yond that, and I don't mean to get this into a theological area, of
course, what do you do when you are faced with a situation like this,
and is Mr. Davies essentially correct, in your judgment?

I wish you would comment on this problem that we face. I think
it is what tears the country apart, not any argument between bad
people who want to be flexing muscles and imperialistic, good people
who know all the answers and want to be pacifistic, but a dilemma
between choices, none of which is honorable in the right sense.

I am not talking again about prestige or the kind of thing which
involves a person showing off or anything like that, but deep moral
questions. I can think of no three people, no one person, better than
any of you to discuss this question in these terms.

Bishop Dougherty. I would suggest that the Rabbi take that up.
He is a historian and he has some very good perceptions and then we
may have, Dr. Bennett and I may have, some reactions to it.

ACCEPTING CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT

Dr. Greenberg. Well, I think, the Senator himself put it very sen-
sitively that the human condition frequently is where you have to
reconcile conflicting claims. Any move will involve some tragic moral
consequences or some suffering or perhaps dishonor. That is true.

I think the first step in handling it is to have a sense not only of
history here but I think a sense of faith and a sense of accepting this:
That sometimes the best, most honorable of intentions can bring one
into a situation from which any exit will involve terrible suffering
or terrible moral anguish.

Senator Case. Not just upon one's self but suffering for others.

Dr. Greenberg. For others.

Senator Case. Caused by you.

Dr. Greenberg. Now having admitted this possibility exists, I think
the first problem is being unwilling to admit this possibility.

Senator Case. I agree.

Dr. Greenberg. If we admit this possibility then we have to stop
and weigh what are our possibilities in terms of getting out. On the
one hand, to continue with this policy and there is the great tempta-
tion, the great moral problem of any path, when I have gone on a path
so much I have invested in it, you know, and I never want to go back. I think at that point I have an obligation to say to myself—

Senator Case. You made that point.

Dr. Greenberg. I have no right to inflict an open end bottomless suffering, that is number one.

Therefore, I have to ask what ending will bring the closest to least suffering, the least moral and legal damage under the circumstances, what way out?

PROTECTION OF ALLIES WITHOUT CONTINUING WAR

Secondly, I would say to argue that those who have suffered for us and sacrificed for us shall not be abandoned and therefore we shall kill not only them—because they too are being killed by our actions—but other people is morally unjust. If you feel so morally outraged you have several options. You can by a massive international effort or by our own cause resettle these people. You can offer tremendous aid, and this would be cheap compared to the cost of the war, to North Vietnam to guarantee that these people not be killed but allowed to resettle in nearby Thailand or other countries. These countries might gain much from settling their frontier areas with these people.

If that would fail then you would have an obligation to bring them to America. If necessary, if you feel this will uproot their cultural life to bring them to this country, then you can give them their own state or locality to live in.

My point is you can’t in the name of not abandoning these millions continue to destroy without limit millions of others as well as them. So I think that is the first commitment you have to make.

Secondly, I think you have to say what does honor mean under these circumstances? I disagree with Mr. Davies’ comment in this sense. It is not dishonorable to make a settlement which may involve a defeat.

Senator Case. I don’t think he means defeat in any sense of national prestige or even humiliation of the United States. I don’t think that is in it.

Dr. Greenberg. Then if the only dishonor is of abandoning our friends and allies—

Senator Case. That is right.

Dr. Greenberg. Then I would say there is the obligation to work out an alternate solution for them. I believe there is within the realm of negotiation and within the realm of resettlement and within the realm of financial payment the possibility of protecting them.

NECESSITY OF ADMISSION OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW OR SETTLE

I think the greatest concern here is not this issue, but really that we have never admitted this possibility. In other words, the possibility of a true negotiation is frustrated by the fact that we have not said we are prepared to withdraw or prepared to settle but “What will you give us as guarantees to insure that those who worked with us will not suffer in vain or will not be now persecuted?” Once you say that, there is a different kind of problem and there are finite solutions that you may get in negotiation. But as long as you don’t make the basic ad-
mission you want to withdraw and you have overescalated and over­comitted yourself and overcaused suffering then you have no way out of this.

Let's consider the alternatives. We don't say this, but we continue to push forward in this connection. Clearly this Cambodia business shows in this direction there is no way out at all. If I may be allowed a moralistic story, there is a story of a man who was wandering in the forest totally lost. He doesn't know what to do, and he doesn't know how to get out of it. He runs into somebody else and he says, "Would you please get me out of here," and the other answers, "I am sorry, I have been lost here also. The only advice I can give you is—the way I have been going on is not the right way out."

STEP AWAY FROM ESCALATION COULD OPEN NEW POSSIBILITIES

I would say if I have no immediate solution I think the answer is with faith you take one step on a certain way. You see the other way, the way of escalation, has no way out. Then you start a step the other way. You may not see a solution now, but when you have taken one step suddenly you see vistas you have not seen before.

You make sure you have a moral resolution of protecting those people. I think such a response would evoke a response in quite a different way than the present situation stands, or a policy that involves none of these admissions that Mr. Davies has set forward.

Dr. Bennett, have you any further observations?

Senator Case. Thank you very much.

NEW VIEW OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT URGED

Dr. Bennett. I think it is important to realize whatever solution one seeks it isn't a full solution and it does involve serious moral problems. I do think, however, that what is needed is a new view of the actual situation that brought us into Vietnam. I think, from what I read of Mr. Davies earlier over the years, he rather accepted pretty much the cold war outlook and the assumption that the extension of communism is the greatest of all possible evils. It seems to me this is something which has to be challenged. What we are dealing with was a civil war, and civil wars are nearly always tragic. Think of what happened in Indonesia where people who were more or less on our side were the ones who massacred 400,000 people in a few weeks.

There will be great suffering unquestionably no matter who is in power and I wouldn't think that there would be such difference between the Thieu-Ky government and the Communists.

I don't think this is so much the problem. The problem is here we have a tragic situation into which we introduce our enormous technological power to destroy, which is out of all proportion, and anything, any solution there, is better than keeping that going. This enormous technological power to destroy gets out of our own view. We forget how powerful it is, and we are just carried along by the sheer momentum of it. I think what the editorial in the Post indicates is that we just do these things without realizing what they mean.

We are there doing that all the time; every day, we are creating these moral problems.
I think if a government, if an administration, had a somewhat different set of assumptions about this, its leaders could use all of their ingenuity and their power to try to find, at least, some alleviating things that could be done, realizing that no solution is going to be without problems or free from serious suffering. I agree fully with what the Rabbi said. We should provide a refuge for some people. We should try to establish some multilateral protections for people. Sitting here I can’t say how this could happen, but I don’t think—unless our Administration really sees things differently—they will use all their ingenuity and power to find these ways of at least alleviating the situation as far as possible.

I am glad that you and Mr. Davies both used the word “honor” in the moral sense, not in the prestige sense.

Senator Case. Yes.

Dr. Bennett. There is a moral problem on both sides and it isn’t just a matter of keeping on, preventing your being defeated in order to preserve your honor. I am glad to see that is completely overcome in what you said.

Senator Case. Thank you very much.

Bishop, have you anything you would care to add?

ASSUMPTION OF DESTINED U.S. HUMILIATION

Bishop Dougherty. I would just add the theological dimension to it which comes under the title of, in this case, divine providence or destiny, and whether or not one of the assumptions that we should accept, at least basically accept, is that maybe it is the destiny of this great Nation to be humiliated.

Now, that is a possible theological interpretation of what we are going through today in this country of ours.

OPEN AND DIRECT DISCUSSION SUGGESTED

Regarding the specific question that you posed, I think it involves a whole lot of judgments, and the Rabbi has referred to those, so that it involves more than our judgments who are making some moral assessment on the situation.

I think pragmatically the Government might be well advised to seek out what I describe as the wisdom of the Nation, and to discuss these things in some kind of openness and directness, so that we can get the best minds and the best hearts to the resolution of what is truly a dilemma. And you can analytically get people to give you some assessment as to which is the least bad of choices and possibly with some of the wisdom of the Nation advising us we might come to making moral judgments.

Senator Case. Let me thank you, all three of you. I did not fail to anticipate what you would say in response to this, obviously. I wanted it said because I think it is worth saying and I think it also reduces a little bit the moralistic self-righteous attitude that many people who are for withdrawal, who are for terminating this thing, have assumed in relation to many others who have seen this rather as a most difficult problem. I think that anything that tends to reduce this kind of attitude, which is dividing the country very much, in-
Deed—nothing is more divisive than for me to call you a crook, a jerk, an evil person, and nothing provokes a response of hostility more directly than that—which is, I think, the real answer to the so-called confrontation approach, not the physical side which I am sure a handful only are involved in or desire to produce damage, but rather this side of it, which involves talking and not listening, and shouting rather than quiet communication.

For all these insights, I am most grateful to all of you and I thank you personally as well as for our side of the committee.

The Chairman. Senator Pell.

**ACTION BY COMMUNITY LEADERS URGED**

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, I think to me it is particularly thrilling to see an interchange of ideas between spiritual leaders and temporal leaders or would-be leaders, and I thank you for arranging this session. It happens too rarely. I think the church has a tremendous responsibility in the forming of real leadership of public opinion in our country. Here I think particularly of my own Protestant faith, where on Sunday the clergyman would usually say some good words each time, but when then he sits down in the vestry with the responsibility for collecting the money and everything else that is necessary for the church, the vestry will follow a rather different role of conduct the other 6 days of the week. We might as well recognize that a great deal of the direction of our country is given by those who occupy leadership positions in the whole community, the establishment as the young people call it. If the chairmen, presidents, directors and major stockholders, of the great corporations of our country just decided per se that this war was wrong and that they would stop producing for it, and even take losses and risk bankruptcy, the war would end tomorrow. I think that the President is probably more responsive to the establishment than he is to some of us in Congress. Sometimes I think the Congress is almost as malleable as the establishment in this regard, I would hope that you, as leaders, would have your clergymen who represent and deal with the community push their vestries. I don't know what the word would be in the Jewish faith or the Catholic faith, but I would hope that they would push these people so that they would take action themselves.

I am struck here with the university students who all want to be in touch with their Congressmen. They have people like some of us here on this platform. We have been doves for some years; we have been anguished and agonized over this war. But it is their boards of directors and trustees who are usually the presidents of the great corporations that are producing for, dependent upon, and dedicated to this war and its extension. They are the ones who could help bring pressure on the President to bring it to a stop. I would like to see the young people suggest that to their boards of trustees. There is no good in bringing pressure upon Congressmen who were opposed to the war in Vietnam long before some of these young people were.

**SOLE U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IS PROTECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES**

I have one point in connection with what the Rabbi raised. Senator Javits and I do, have a concurrent resolution that says we should get
out of Vietnam and that we have a responsibility to give asylum to those South Vietnamese who would be slaughtered if we left because they had sided with us. No matter whether it was for reasons of cupidity or patriotism, it is still wrong to have their throats cut. There has been a singular lack of enthusiasm for this portion of Senator Javits’ and my resolution, a singular lack of response in the Nation as a whole.

This to my mind is the only responsibility we have. We have no responsibility to the corrupt government of Ky-Thieu; we do to the people. If we walk out, but make sure no one is slaughtered because of that walkout, I would think we have fulfilled our moral responsibility.

Would you three gentlemen agree with that or not? Would any of you disagree? I am delighted that you agree.

WHAT CAN YOUNG PEOPLE DO?

We come now to this question of individual action: This is the question I am asked all the time: What can young people do to express themselves? We haven’t yet reached the stage when we go back to the Declaration of Independence and say a time has been reached in the hearts of men when revolution is right. I would hope we avoid that stage, but what can young people do, in your view, that would have a real impact on the course of events? Not just students, but many young people are frustrated. In Southeast Asia people burned themselves up with gasoline; they did that outside the U.N. It had, of course, an effect and yet I would hate to see our young people have to resort to that kind of action.

What do you think our young people can do? What morally correct outlet can they have?

Bishop Dougherty. That is the case at the end. Just let me make a comment relative to your question in regard to youth. I think the hopes of youth are raised rather swiftly by some indication of a change of policy, and I think they are then dampened or almost demolished equally as promptly, when they see no change or change in the opposite direction to their desires, and I think that is what has happened in regard to the expansion of the war in Cambodia.

I think they might have been somewhat willing to wait and see about the Vietnamization policy and their hopes were somewhat lifted. And then came the Cambodian invasion and their hopes were frustrated and demolished and they reacted in this way.

So what will students do? I heard last evening they are going to sit on the bridges and in tunnels entering into New York and prevent all the businesses from having their personnel come in, and this is something they can do. Now, is this a moral decision? Well, whether or not that is a moral decision, it certainly would get the effect that you were speaking of, that is the business people couldn’t do business in Wall Street and elsewhere. But would it be a moral decision?

Senator Pau]. Excuse me, this would hurt the little people. I was talking about the big business leaders because they can stand the shock for a week or 2 weeks, but this would hurt the little businessmen much more.
Bishop Dougherty. Which brings out the dilemma of moral decisions.

Senator Pell. Exactly.

Bishop Dougherty. Now, what can they do morally? I think, I would suggest, that we could all admit that peaceful demonstration in greater dimensions, greater numbers, would be one moral way of expressing their opinion. I don't know; they feel it is not getting the effect.

What I heard last evening was that they felt that if the wheels of industry stop moving in New York that will move the President to reversal of action. That was their viewpoint. Their demonstrations were not getting anywhere; therefore, they would take means that would effect the economic community and thereby, they felt, they would get results. That is my comment on it.

Dr. Bennett. I think the students already have done a good deal just now. They have one member of the Cabinet criticizing the President in the press and there has been something happening already.

I think it is very important though that students do not do things that definitely hurt the people in the middle whose minds can be changed. I feel that there is a danger that some of their activities will be counterproductive in this respect.

They ought to continue the demonstrations, continue to witness, continue to allow their institutions to do this, and this is a new thing I mentioned a moment ago. Institutions are acting as never before. I know our students would be delighted to hear what Senator Pell said about the board of directors because they have been working at this for some time, and it happens that we have a very progressive board in our particular institution. But they realize that to get at those who have the economic power is very important and they can sometimes do this through getting at their boards. That is one of the special interests of our students.

**INvolvement of Young People in Politics**

But, I think, once more, at least, I am sure this is right, once more they should get into the political act again.

If they fail once more in that, I don't know what will happen, but they must do it again. Perhaps it is rather good that the next election is a congressional election because there are so many individual Senators and Congressmen with whom the students can identify, and their election can give them some success. This may well be a good thing.

Dr. Greenberg. I wanted to say not only the students, but the adults, too, are involved in this. America has had too idyllic an existence. I think what makes a nation great in the long run in history is their capacity to come back after defeat. Having been disappointed now after the second President who has promised to stop the war has gone the other way, I think the obvious response of well meaning people is that you start all over again.

It is not true you have had no effect so far. Public opinion is far more ripe now than it would have been had there not been protests all along and I think another round and another round will be even more effective. I don't want to say just this one more round of protest. If
you really feel for people in Vietnam dying in vain, then you had better protest a fifth or even a 10th time.

NECESSITY OF DISCIPLINE IN ACTIVITY AGAINST WAR

I would say the main criteria I offer for demonstration or activity is that it be disciplined. The goal of moral behavior is not to let out my frustrations or my feelings but to help the other fellow. If I will feel better by blocking traffic but it will be counterproductive, then I have no right to do it. If I will feel better by turning down the system, then I shouldn’t afford myself that luxury if thereby a few South Vietnamese more will die. Therefore, my answer would be that all dissenters must be guided in their activity by the recognition that a growing number of Americans are realizing the failures and are ready to be influenced if they will not turn them off by shortsighted or violent or other forms of disruptive reaction. I think there is no reason why students should not discipline themselves if they truly feel the pain and the need of the Vietnamese.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF STUDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Senator Pell. Last fall President Nixon said, “Specifically, there is nothing new we can learn from the demonstrations,” and basically he said that he will not be affected by demonstrations. You have just reflected the quandary we face as temporal leaders in telling the young people specifically what action to take. I so agree with you about political action. Senator Javits made the point in my State a few days ago. It would be far more effective if, instead of the young people striking, they went to class, which is the most important benefit of college. They should fast if they want to or lay down if they want to, but most important would be if the colleges would give them 3 weeks before the election in November to support their beliefs, so they could fan out all over the country. This is what my alma mater thinks.

(Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN. I must say that we appreciate your approval of these remarks, but we cannot conduct an orderly meeting by demonstrating. Although I am in great sympathy with your sentiments, we really must not allow those sentiments to take such vocal or obvious expressions.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would just like to express just verbally, without using my hands, my satisfaction that Princeton in my State is taking this action. I think it is a very sound, constructive, right kind of action, and makes great sense, and I am not surprised it happened in New Jersey.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with the sentiment and the mode of procedure completely, but we can’t conduct orderly meetings if each side is interrupted.

Senator Gore. That is the first time I heard a Senator object to being applauded.

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t object to being applauded, but I have the responsibility for an orderly meeting.

(Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Senator.