Senator PELL. If this were done then I think it could take effect.
In addition to that, to my mind, when the administrations and the
colleges let their students leave before graduation, I think really hop­
ing they will disappear so they won't burn up the campus or some
other reason, it is a sign both of irresponsibility and lack of courage.
I would like to see the students stay around the campuses, learn as
much as they can and gird themselves for political action later on,
but this is the only thing of which I have been able to think.
You gentlemen have not been able to come up with much more and
this is not enough for the people. Yesterday in the main square of my
State there was a demonstration of 5,000 students and my office build­
ing was evacuated. I understand the same thing will happen tomor­
row. You can't blame these young people, and the moral question
comes up of when do you think that the laws of morality, of right and
wrong, surpass the laws that we as constitutional leaders are bound
to defend.

NECESSITY FOR DISCIPLINED ACTION BY YOUNG PEOPLE

Dr. GREENBERG. I think we have to challenge the young people to
do what you suggested, to go into the communities and to organize.
It may be more dramatic and more immediate to force the evacuation
of a State building but the crucial question is what is the effect of your
action on helping those people you want to help. You have to ask
young people to build on their moral perceptions, to be even greater
by disciplining themselves to go out into the community, to reach the
business leadership and the workers and the other elements whom
they are turning off by their behavior and to reach them. I think these
people, too, can be reached.

Senator PELL. In support of that statement I was very struck, as I
said on the Senate floor, with the use of water cannons, truncheons
and tear gas by the National Guard. Those are enough weapons to
handle students. They don't need weapons with live ammunition. One
of the responses I received was, "Tell Pell those troops shouldn't have
had guns; they should have had machineguns." I am afraid you are
right that political America can be turned off. The swing to the right
can happen, and this is one of the real quandaries we face as leaders,
and that the students face.

On the one hand, we know our path in Vietnam is wrong. It is a
dead wrong path. On the other hand, we know if violence happens it
can turn middle America, which is very conservative. In Detroit, they
couldn't get them to sign the Declaration of Independence when it
was passed around. There is the quandary. I am not sure you gentle­
men have really focused enough on what the young people can really
do to lead. You have told us what they shouldn't do and you have
agonized with us. Your statements are terrific. I am going to send them
to the bishops and rabbis in my own State, but I still think you have
not given enough as spiritual leaders, nor have we as temporal leaders.

Bishop DOUGHERTY. May I make a comment related to what you just
said?

Earlier there was reference to the system, and I jotted down this
reaction: that faith in the system, the American system of govern­
ment, is really faith in the people.
Now, the youth today; secondly, may have a more authentic moral judgment on the behavior of men, especially in our own country today. They may have a more authentic moral conscience because it has not been dulled by whatever situations in our way of life dull our consciences, and admitting that this could be true, if they express this moral conscience in demonstrations, it seems to me that as the situation of war becomes more expanded that the dimensions of their reaction are going to become greater and I don't know that we can avoid accepting, God forbid there be any more deaths on campuses, but I don't know that we can avoid accepting what violence may emerge, even though the demonstrations are intended to be peaceful.

**EFFECT OF DEATHS AT KENT STATE ON U.S. POLICY**

Senator Pell. This was the question I asked the President when he wanted to reduce casualties by going into Cambodia. The meeting was on the record, so one is permitted to say what went on there a couple of days ago. I asked if he had weighed the casualties at home. I wondered if those deaths at Kent State were probably not worth more from the viewpoint of the overall benefit to the United States than 6,000 deaths in Vietnam. It is a terrible thing to say, but what would be your moral judgment there?

Bishop Dougherty. Well, I think your question is certainly one that we would have to—in other words, the effect of those deaths—Senator Pell. Can change policy.

Bishop Dougherty (continuing), can have more effect, can be more effective in the change of policy and change of public opinion, because I think we have become hardened to the figures. They are detached unless they are a member of your family; they are just statistics to many.

Senator Pell. Yes.

**DISCIPLINE AND WORK NEEDED IN CHANGING NATION'S COURSE**

Dr. Greenberg. I just say again the crucial question now is that those who understand where we stand will have to tell young people they have many, many opportunities to do things. They have to judge things by historical perspectives which means that a great country isn't turned around in 1 year or 5 years. Therefore, they have to be disciplined and work and work and work. They really have come very close to a major national change of mind and heart, and this is not the time to quit. I think it is clear that this is a national turning point. The President himself had to say this may endanger his political future, and that is a tremendous achievement. You have to ask for sacrifice in having discipline.

Dr. Bennett. I agree with that. I don't really have anything to add to that.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Bishop Dougherty. Of course, the problem of sacrifice is never a highly saleable product.

Dr. Greenberg: Right.

Dr. Bennett. I might add we can't, I think, preach to the young people on this. We have to help them to see that some things they are
inclined to do may be self-defeating, but I think we should be grateful for the great volume of protest that takes many forms, some of them perhaps not too desirable. This protest that comes from them has gained a new lease on life in the last week.

Senator Pell. I do think we have to be more eloquent. Otherwise we will be yawned at or booted off the stage by the young people in their search. The churches, the moral leaders, have the responsibility here. You have the moral responsibility to make the people upon whom you depend for bread and butter take effect in the general community.

Dr. Bennett. But a lot of ministers lost their livelihoods.

Senator Pell. A lot of men are losing their lives.

Senator Case. It is not for Mr. Bennett, but for the young priest or rabbi out in the grounds it is.

Dr. Greenberg. But each act provokes other acts. When I read in the paper the Senator who risks his future in re-election to cast a certain vote, next time I say it to affect my leadership or the board of trustees. I can say if the Senator can do it, how can I look myself in the mirror as a rabbi and not do it.

The Chairman. The Senator from New York.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES

Senator Javits. I would just like to make one brief statement and have the comment of these very distinguished gentlemen. I join with my colleagues in expressing gratitude for their appearance. I think a moral bankruptcy has set in because of Vietnam which is as critical an element in the assessment of what is happening in our Nation as the war’s impact on the economy, our national priorities, and on the position of the United States in the world.

I must say that I was tremendously impressed with these statements, not only their sensitivity but their clarity.

Rabbi, I am very impressed by the fact that you reminded us all in the early days of this intervention, before we really plumbed the depths of what it was all about, it might have been justified even morally on the ground that we were trying to save a small people from the elimination of their nation.

The big questions that strike me, and I would appreciate very much having your view, are these:

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC PROTEST

One, what about this, the morality of violence here in the jeopardy to young lives here, quite apart from its effectiveness? I don’t think young people are very patient about the fact that, well, “Don’t be violent because it is going to have a counterproductive effect.” I don’t think there is any question about it, but they feel deeply moved morally, too.

I am concerned, like Senator Pell and others of my colleagues, with the moralities that are involved on their side as well, the jeopardy to young lives, the jeopardy to the cause, which is greater than any of us, and the depriving of institutions of their power and authority.
When children are not at college, the colleges lack authority. They have jettisoned those as an instrument for their expression, and it seems to me that this is giving up an enormously useful weapon for the very cause for which they are fighting. The integrity, the strength, the structure of the universities and colleges of the country which, with young people there and functioning and fighting for the proper distribution of their time and energies to proselyte the community, to train themselves for political work this fall, to get the time for political work this fall, to organize for political work, to give the institutions the vitality which when they speak will strengthen them because they represent a constituency—it seems to me there is also a moral responsibility here.

In short, I ask whether the morality which we wish to bring to bear upon our Government should not also be brought to bear upon those who are fighting for the same cause and that passion can also be translated, therefore, into infinitely greater progress for that cause than has as yet been realized by the tactics so far pursued.

**Activities of Universities Concerning Protest**

Dr. Bennett. You are referring primarily to the closing down of schools. I have felt myself that it would be irrational to haul down the academic flag and close schools down entirely.

I think two things are justified: One is, a period, maybe some weeks, which becomes a kind of symbol of our outrage. Just as I said a little while ago, Columbia had these suspended classes 2 days as days of mourning and shock. Those were the words that they used; this I think is very desirable.

Then, I think, permission for students to be free from some obligations so they can do something about the war. We did that; we gave people a chance to finish their work before late in September, rather than in May, in order that they may do that.

But, I personally, maybe I am biased because I am an administrator, but I don't think just hauling down the academic flag in itself is a very great advance.

Senator Javits. Bishop?

Bishop Dougherty. Well, I moved out of a president's chair in June, and I would like to say something that may help the understanding. I think you are all aware that this kind of experience that college presidents are having in these times is for them a far cry from the Ivy college tranquility of earlier days, and I would think some of our very distinguished presidents in that older tradition have gone by the way because of their lack of experience, and the lack of a capacity inborn or whatever, to meet a very, very volatile and different situation than they were accustomed to.

I think, secondly, possibly in the ethos of an older tradition, to avoid what they considered greater evils, and sometimes with good motivation regarding civil rights and what not on campus, they have made concessions that literally blew up in their faces.

Now if this is moral weakness, I would be rather slow to make that judgment. It may be just the limitations of our human judgment.

Now, in a constructive way, to aid and abet what the Senator suggests, I think that college presidents have to be willing to sit down as
you have to sit down 8 hours a day and talk to people, and in this case
talk to students, have dialog with students, because the students have a
lot going for them as well as something going against them, not to
stereotype the group because there is a certain minority fringe that
is rebellious beyond reason.

Senator Javits. Rabbi?

Senator Gore. Senator, will you yield a minute for a comment?

Among the other many unique and unusual occurrences of our day,
it is a bit unprecedented for the Senate and the clergy publicly to
wrestle with morality.

Senator Javits. Rabbi?

Dr. Greenberg. Well, I agree as far as what the schools should do
both with the Senator and what my colleagues have said here.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF U.S. LEADERS

I just want to add one other comment. There is such a great gap
between what ought to be and what actually is. Therefore any moral
leader, whether he is temporal or spiritual, must continually be in
conflict with both sides of the argument because we cannot get them
both together for awhile. I think we have to argue continually with
the young people for discipline and self-control so that they will not
turn off the people. And we have to turn around to the people and say,
“You have to not simply condemn violence or extravagance but recog­
nize the tremendous idealism that is behind it.” And we have to con­
demn and pressure the authorities not to allow violence by putting
down violence without restraint.

I was stunned going up this morning to Washington to read that
the Governor of Kentucky not only ordered the National Guard in but
prudently announced they were coming in with live ammunition—
this after Kent State. I feel that is only a mark of the brutalization
which the war is causing in all of us. I was shocked to hear last night
on TV some National Guard supporters say we shouldn’t have used
rifles, we should have used machineguns. I think this kind of language
is inexcusable.

If you are in charge, if you are in power, then you have no right to
allow yourself the liberty of being overreactive. People who are weak
have a right to react—or rather don’t have a right. We have to work
with them to check this. But people who are in power if they over­
react are utterly incompetent to exercise power because they can hurt
people. That is the point of our own Government in Vietnam.

Senator Case. Will the Senator yield? And one step worse than
that, and I think the ultimate evil, is for people to deliberately play
upon those weaknesses and encourage them for advantages.

Dr. Greenberg. Political advantages.

Senator Case. That they are attempting to gain.

Dr. Greenberg. I think years from now we will be ashamed of the
political leaders who exploited the honest fears as well as the dishon­
est fears—just as we will be proud of those who had the courage to
stand up and young people who stood up in such a bad time in our
moral situation.

Senator Javits. I thoroughly agree with all of your opinions which
have been expressed and I have myself expressed the hope that youth,
taking its cue from the martyrdom of these young people in Ohio, would be deeply dug in determinedly, that they would rely on the moral passion and the justice of their cause and their confidence that it will persuade and would not themselves do what would contribute only to inducing more stupid people to these violent reactions.

I had just one other question, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON VIETNAM AND PROTESTERS

I think the panel has helped enormously and I would hope that ministers throughout the country will take up their feeling on this issue of national honor over defeat. To me this is one of the principal roadblocks to a more rational attitude which the Congress, and I am speaking very directly here to our colleagues, and by the people of the country toward getting out of Vietnam, and I believe that this is very much a moral question. We have no right to put the concept of national honor above the concept of humanity under these circumstances. This is a moral question for you gentlemen of the church, and synagogue, because this is essentially still a church-going country, and a very deep question with middle America. We must remember, gentlemen, the President was very moral, too, in his speech. We have no monopoly on morality or moralism. And he said, and I quote from his speech of April 30:

"We live in an age of anarchy both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. . . . Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If when the chips are down the United States acts like a pitiful helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.

Now, that is pretty moral language, and so he says, we who are against the war, we don't have a monopoly on morality. This is a very high moral expression. What do you say about that?

Dr. GREENBERG. Well, I want to say everything the President said was true. But the issue he applied it to was the wrong place, the wrong time, the wrong war.

I hope that as a result of the excessive reaction to this failure in Vietnam we do not withdraw from international obligations of supporting people's freedom. We don't want to have the misapplication of the issue lead to a bankruptcy of the notion, and an illegitimate denial of this concept.

I say patriotism has been set back by those who invoke patriotism in a wrong war. I think our task now is to save these ideas and save these values including what the President said—by pulling out of mistaken intervention and commitments and concentrating on our proper responsibilities, both at home and abroad.

Senator JAIVITS. Do we have any other comments?

Dr. BENNETT. In my prepared statement I indicated that I thought we had made ourselves only a "pitiful helpless giant" in dealing with our problems in the United States and that we are simply compensating for this by our compulsive aggressiveness abroad. This whole thing is turned around, it seems to me, in a false way.

Bishop DOUGHERTY. I think that part of the speech was bad judgment or bad advice.
Senator Javits. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I am bound to want to complete the record on the point of the President's attitude. On May 2 he was quoted in the Washington Post. He said:

"You know, you see these bums, you know, blowing up the campuses. . . Listen, the boys on the college campuses today are the luckiest people in the world, going to the greatest universities, and here they are burning up the books. I mean storming around about this issue. I mean, you name it, get rid of the war—there will be another one."

You can get expressions of this kind on all sides of this issue.

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I would like to ask some questions if I may.

(Laughter.)

Senator Pell. That is all right.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES

The Chairman. I wish to say that I think that you gentlemen here this morning have rendered a very great service. I am bound to say I don't think I can join in the idea that the religious leaders have let the country down. I can understand that they do not feel that it is their responsibility in essentially political matters to take that kind of leadership. It hasn't traditionally been their role, but you have come here this morning and exposed yourselves to these public meetings. Many people are reluctant to do this because there is such a diversity of opinion in this country that undoubtedly there will be people who will criticize you for it. It isn't easy for this committee to obtain the time and efforts and minds of people who are as busy as all of you are. I reiterate that I am very grateful to you for coming.

LACK OF EXPOSURE OF WITNESSES' TESTIMONY

One of the thoughts that occurred to me is what a strange society it is that would not put the kind of statements you gentlemen have made on national television. Yet we devote endless hours to watching a satellite or a missile carrying a person to the moon. I have never quite understood this sense of proportion. I can't imagine a greater service the great networks could render to the country today than to allow the three of you to say on nationwide television just what you have said this morning. I have been here quite a long time and I have never heard statements with the depth of perception that all three of you have demonstrated this morning. I have never seen any such statements that I can recall on public television. It is a great crime that the 200 million people of this country do not have access to the kind of thoughtful analysis that you gentlemen have given. I don't know how to arrange it.

I would have thought that these people would have as much interest in conveying what you have to say on a matter that is disrupting our country as they have in a baseball game or an astronaut's activities.

I have a feeling the young people sense that there is a lack of discrimination in our national activities. I don't mean to pick on the
media particularly, but I do feel that they lack sensitivity to what is really at issue in these movements which are disrupting our country. They will give many hours to a demonstration of these tragedies, but they almost ignore this hearing with recognized leaders of our country in the field of moral concepts. I think it would have been a great service if everyone in the country had been able to hear what you three men said this morning, especially your opening statements. I don’t know what to do about it.

I shall do what I can at least to give your testimony wide dissemination. I shall certainly send copies of what you have said to people in my own State. I wish that everyone in America could have an opportunity to read it.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, may I just say a word in confirmation of your own statement here.

I think one of the most interesting things about this meeting may be the way in which it is reported in the news, if it is reported at all.

The Chairman. If it is reported at all.

Senator Case. If it is reported as a group of which one or the other of you or one of us criticized Mr. Nixon in some personal fashion, that will be somewhat typical, instead of an effort to get out the deep insights of the basic problems that you have unfolded for us.

Thank you very much.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES

The Chairman. You have testified in such a perceptive manner. I have seen bits and pieces of many of the things you have said here and there, but you have brought it together and focused on the real basic matter that is troubling our country. I can’t tell you how much good it will do.

Someone said if a Senator should happen to do something that is significant and proper that this gives you courage. I think what you have done will give courage to endless numbers of other less secure, perhaps, and less prominent leaders. It will give the younger ministers courage to speak out too. I am quite sure it will when this is brought to their attention. That is why it would be so wonderful if it could be brought to the attention of everyone. I know it would give other people courage and reassure them. Because you have all three had exceptional training and background and know how to articulate the moral feelings that I know many people have, you have expressed what I think millions of people are feeling but don’t know how to express.

RECOGNITION OF INTELLECTUAL ERROR

There are so many things here, but one in particular impressed me. I now find it difficult to disentangle what all of you said. One of you said that this requires the recognition of an intellectual error, that our involvement was an intellectual error in the beginning and I completely agree.

I never felt when we became involved in Vietnam, and this was long before this Administration, that it was an evil intent on the part of the preceding Administration or any of their predecessors. The rec-
ognition of intellectual error is essentially, I guess one might say, a moral question.

Is it proper to say that? Which one of you said that?

Dr. BENNETT. I think I said it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to expatiate. I think in connection with that you advanced the concept of proportionality.

Dr. BENNETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am impressed by the idea that what is to be gained by this whole conflict, even accepting the professed purpose, is out of all proportion to what it is costing. It is difficult for me to understand how anyone can believe that the price being paid here at home, among the lives of our people, even given the achievement of the purpose, which I don’t think possible, is not out of all proportion to reason. It is essentially an irrational as well as an immoral act.

Dr. BENNETT. I think one of the problems about intellectual error is that it may be, as someone here suggested, made at a time when there is more to be said for it perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Dr. BENNETT. Then there is no recognition of the change of circumstances. I do think in this equating of what we were able to do in Europe to rebuild Europe with what we could do in Asia by our power, this was something that could have been seen to be wrong at any time. At least this seems to me so. I don’t want again to mention names, but I can think of very important person of great intellectual training who kept saying this all the time, and I think of others who simply say it as a matter of slogans.

But in both cases, you have this way of thinking about the basic situation in this period of history. It is a very broad error about this period of history that is involved.

Now, I think you can get into the moral aspect of it. When people see the consequences of the error as these have been revealed, and it just makes them more stubborn in defending it when they are attacked because of these consequences, that is where the intellectual error tends to become a source of a moral stubbornness.

The CHAIRMAN. That might apply to the one who made the intellectual error, but it is a mystery to me why the successor, who didn’t make it, seems to be compelled to assume the responsibility for the original error. Why is this?

Dr. BENNETT. Well, the successor actually was saying these things in 1954. I mean that his error was earlier; I think, perhaps in some respects.

The CHAIRMAN. I really didn’t mean to personalize it.

Dr. BENNETT. I don’t either.

The CHAIRMAN. There are more than one or two persons involved.

Dr. BENNETT. No; it is a whole mind set.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a whole mind set of this attitude. Surely all of these people cannot assume the kind of infallibility that we associate with only a very restricted area. They don’t assume that and, therefore, I would think that all of us assume that we have not only made errors, but we are likely to make additional errors. It really shouldn’t be very difficult for civilized men at least.
VESTED INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL ERROR

Dr. BENNETT. You get a vested interest in the error sometimes and that is one of the problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that?

Dr. BENNETT. Well, you have spent so much time persuading people, and you kept persuading yourself more and more as you have done it, and then when, as a result of it, your nation has invested so much of its blood and resources, this gives you a kind of vested interest in the error, I think.

FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA

The CHAIRMAN. I am often struck by this. The French were in all Indochina. They owned it in the sense that any colonial power owned it. They not only were occupying it, but they owned the tangible property. Yet when faced with a similar situation, beginning with the war in 1946 through 1954, how was it that the French were able to recognize the proportionality? They could have carried on that war another 8 or 10 years. Dien Bien Phu was a relatively minor conflict. They could have carried on. Did they not by an intellectual process in the spring of 1954 decide that on the principle of proportionality that it simply was against their interest? Whether or not they were particularly impressed with the morality of it I don’t know, but it was clearly against their interest and they proceeded in a very brief time to liquidate the war, beginning in about May of 1954 and completing it on July 20 in a very civilized manner.

What is it that the French have that we don’t have? Why are we incapable of doing the same thing?

Bishop DOUGHERTY. La vie intellectuelle. They are noted for their powers of intellectuality.

Senator CASE. Maybe the answer is the other way around; we have something they don’t have as a nation and which is good for most things, but sometimes—

The CHAIRMAN. I can think of only the fact that we have more guns and money as an example.

Senator CASE. We have the need, Mr. Chairman, only because it is the right thing and moral thing to do and once we have done it that makes it moral and this makes it harder to throw off than the French who are pretty much a selfish group and interested in their narrow interests and intellectually able to take things without moral connotations.

Dr. BENNETT. They can have a quicker change of government.

Senator CASE. That is right.

Dr. GREENBERG. We forget this now, but a big factor was the fact that in 1954, the continuing legitimacy of the Government was at stake in France, and in 1958 in Algeria the Government had all but broken down and faced an actual military overthrow.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Government in France?

Dr. GREENBERG. In France, The lesson we learn then is not that they are intellectually more sophisticated—although I do agree with Senator Case’s point, that America tends to start slowly, invoke more moralizing and idealism and then sticks with the matter longer, still
maybe the real lesson of France unfortunately is that it takes the
achievement of almost total breakdown of legitimacy of institutions
before you pull out. This possibility is what frightens me in the
situation.

The French pulled out in Algeria and Indochina because it was
clear to them that the Government itself was going to fly apart under
the impact of those situations. I hope we don't have to get that far
before it happens to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Aren't you disturbed that this may be what is im­
pending here?

DOMINATION BY MOMENTUM OR EXERCISING CONTROL

Dr. GREENBERG. Yes. There are two choices in history. Either you
let the historical forces dominate you as our Presidents, three of them,
have allowed momentum forces to dominate them instead of exercis­
ing control. Or you have the choice of human will and leadership ex­
ercising a creative momentum of taking charge of destiny. The fail­
ure to take charge and pull out and admit our error raises the real
possibility that the momentum of history will get us out the other
way—through the breakdown of legitimacy of our institutions, I
think that would be a disaster of global proportions, not only to Viet­
nam but to the world.

U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD WORLD ROLE

The CHAIRMAN. This isn't the first time, but let us go back. My
mind goes back to 1963 and the assassination of a President who was
a symbol of youth and progress. I don't like to get into the evaluation
of his political stature, but he was a symbol. We believed it and we
had that terrible tragedy.

Not too long after that you had Martin Luther King; not too long
after that you had Robert Kennedy; and then you get into this. These
aren't purely accidental things that happened. I am always very much
impressed by the strain in our character. This problem of assessing
blame is much too complicated for me to deal with, but it raises very
serious questions about whether we have lost our way. It is not just
Vietnam. The other things that happened were not connected so far
as I know with Vietnam. There is this self-righteousness that all big
and powerful countries have had. I want to make it very clear I don't
think we are the only nation that has gone through this sort of thing.
Big countries that become powerful have a tendency to do this. They
think that they are right, and that they are the only ones who are
right. We are good guys and they are the bad guys.

There was a group of Russian scientists here not too long ago, In a
very casual conversation and in the best of humor, they made this
point: That the United States seems to be of the view that so long as
we have two or three times as much capacity for destruction as Rus­
sia or anyone else, we are satisfied, but if anyone seeks to achieve parity
with us for some reason or other, it is very disturbing to us and we
react by escalating the arms race or in other ways.

We have developed an attitude that is evidenced every now and
then by such expressions as, "We must meet the challenge of world
leadership.” I am not aware that anyone has elected us the leader of the world. This is an assumption of a status which we have to earn, it seems to me, by our own conduct. No one has given it to us. The mere ownership of more destructive capacity and nuclear weapons does not, I would think, confer upon us a leadership which others are to recognize.

Dr. BENNETT. Wasn’t it around the turn of the century when some Senators were making great speeches about our world leadership in the Messianic sense really? Senator Beveridge, I suppose, was the most famous one.

It seems to me that positive kind of Messianism has pretty well faded. Now, anti-communism became a kind of negative form of this. We were the guardian of the world against communism, and we didn’t expect necessarily to be the leader of the world in a positive sense, but just as a guardian against communism. Some new way of thinking about our role in the world is necessary.

SUGGESTED U.S. ATTITUDE IN RELATION TO WORLD

The CHAIRMAN. Go on and elaborate. How shall we think of ourselves in relation to the world?

Dr. GREENBERG. Well, I think by recognizing the significance of our best institutions, trying to improve them at home. At the same time we must have respect for other nations, not thinking we know the answers for all the other nations. At the same time we must be concerned about such matters as overcoming the terrible gap between wealth and poverty in the world.

As to how this is to be done there are all sorts of technical and policy problems. But we must have the will to do something to overcome this terrible gulf between wealth and poverty in the world. This would be a place for leadership rather than simply to assert that we have the answers in terms of ideology and political institutions.

The CHAIRMAN. Bishop?

Bishop DOUGHERTY. I would just like to add to that that I think it might be essential that we have a greater understanding of the religious, political, social traditions of other nations, especially as far off as Southeast Asia, that we may put that whole thing, those people, rather, into a kind of stereotyped pattern, somewhat modeled on our own national experience which I think would be not good.

NATIONAL CONFESSION OF ERROR

The CHAIRMAN. You prompt me to ask you a question, Bishop. As I understand it, in the Catholic Church you have always had this principle of confession. Does that have any relation to this at all? Is it at all appropriate to make any analogy from that?

Bishop DOUGHERTY. Get sort of a national confession?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the purpose of it in your church? Why is this not a very sound proposal for everyone and a nation?

Bishop DOUGHERTY. Yes.

Well, in the church it has two aspects, if you will, the psychological aspect; you know a fellow who has had a bad time and comes back after a long period of the bad times gets a great psychological relief, a catharsis, a psychological effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Why wouldn't America in view of what has happened?

Bishop Dougherty. It may come to that.

The other effect is theological. We believe that through his confession of guilt and his expression of sorrow that he will receive God's grace anew. So those two aspects are the felt effect and the belief effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Your church is a very great congregation in the world with don't know how many hundreds of millions of members. There is no inhibition on them as individuals to admit error, is there? They don't feel a disgrace by admitting error. Why is it that collectively for some reason or other, because we are powerful, we can't do that? What is the barrier against a great nation's doing the same thing? You have hundreds of millions of people. These very same people who do it as individuals apparently reject the idea as a member of a community. What is the difference?

Bishop Dougherty. Well, I would say, the first thought that comes to my mind is that it is without precedent.

I don't know. I appeal to my colleague, who is an historian, whether any great nation has ever admitted its error in this sort of situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The French did in effect, didn't they? They are a great nation.

Bishop Dougherty. Well, as the Rabbi brought out a moment ago, their political situation was such that they really had no alternative.

WHY CAN'T UNITED STATES ADMIT ERROR?

The CHAIRMAN. That is only the mechanics of its immediate implementation, but fundamentally they had to, in a sense, admit it. They may not have in those words, but they had a parliamentary system and could move quickly. After all we have an election next fall and if these students respond to the urgings of the Senators from New York and Rhode Island, they can change the government too. That is not too far off. The French did it, but we can't bring ourselves to make that step. Why can't we? Rabbi, you are an historian. Why is there such a barrier that this seems to be in some way unacceptable?

Dr. Greenberg. Obviously I have no answer to that except to say—

The CHAIRMAN. Not obviously. I thought you would have.

Dr. Greenberg. Leadership would have made a difference. I don't want to get into the psychoanalysis of Presidents now.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? We are analyzing the country, not just the President.

Dr. Greenberg. If I may say so, one key is the character of the last two Presidents—it is hard to say what their predecessor would have done because he didn't live long enough to face the full implications of the mistake that he had made. Our last two Presidents are of very different background, but they have one thing in common which has characterized our country. We have won so often and we have been in the right morally so often, we just are not psychologically and culturally equipped to face defeat and tragedy and mistake. I think this is one big factor. In a sense our Nation has been too blessed by history. Maybe it needs a setback or two until it will achieve that kind of restraint that it needs to have.
We have never lived through military defeat and this now becomes a motive not to have it here when it should be accepted.

Both Presidents had this internal weakness, I think it is a mark of weakness rather than strength—in that they found it hard to admit their mistake.

**QUESTION OF U.S. MILITARY DEFEAT**

The CHAIRMAN. Rabbi, I don't wish to be offensive, but I don't regard this as a question of a military defeat. I haven't the slightest doubt if this country wishes to pursue the military course that we could defeat them. We could kill all of the Vietnamese. We can probably kill half the Chinese, we have so much destructive power. This is not a military defeat with which we are concerned. It seems to me it is wrong to conceive of it in those terms. I like this term of proportionality. I, and I think all Senators, and the President, too, are interested in the preservation and welfare of the people of this country, first, and others too. I mean we don't disassociate ourselves from humankind.

It isn't a question of military defeat. Certainly everyone knows we have the military power to defeat the country. There have been reasons that are involved as to why the preceding President did not and this one does not wish to use the full power. I hope they don't use it. That would be the last thing I would want.

This is a recognition that this started as an intellectual error and it has continued as one. I don't conceive of it as a military defeat at all.

If the President tomorrow made the terms necessary as the French did to conclude the war, and I know of no better pattern to follow than the French, this wouldn't be a military defeat in any real sense of the word. It would be a recognition of having gone down the wrong river, having made an intellectual mistake and recognized it because of the principle of proportionality, because it is not in our interests to pursue that intellectual mistake. It is in our interests, the interests of all your constituents, to recognize that, and to finish it and take a new start and to rebuild and to rebuild ourselves at home, as you say. I certainly agree.

It seems to me we should be thinking in these terms and we should reject the idea that we are militarily defeated because I don't believe that is a fact.

Dr. BENNETT. Can we prove that by military power we could not win a political victory or even a political solution?

The CHAIRMAN. That may be it, but it is not a military defeat in that sense. It is just a military contest, it seems to me.

**RESTRAINT IN USE OF DESTRUCTIVE POWER**

Dr. GREENBERG. I agree with you but there is another problem. It comes in when I cannot step back and say this is not the kind of world to continue this kind of an investment, or to put it another way, since I am moral enough not to blow that country sky high, I should go one step better morally and restrain myself altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. What could be a greater honor a great country could achieve than recognizing this and putting it in those terms. Although we have the power of unlimited destruction, we do not choose
to use it. You are talking about precedents of other big countries. It would be very hard to find any big and powerful country that has ever risen to that height. It would seem to me this would be one of the greatest demonstrations of maturity and of civilized morality, if you like, that any country could demonstrate.

Why wouldn't this appeal to your constituents, if I may call them that, and the constituency of all of you in the world?

Bishop Dougherty. I wonder whether human society has reached that moral level.

The Chairman. I was trying to put it on less a moral level than a pure calculation of proportionality in the most ordinary, if you like, material sense. If you want to argue it on the material level, look at what is happening to our country. Look at the judgment of the economists or the business leaders of the country as they are speaking in our markets. You have your students speaking in a different way; and you have politicians speaking in a different way and you speak in different terms. All agree that this is disastrous to our country.

Mr. Lundborg, the chairman of the board of our largest bank, said this was undermining our economic structure, to say nothing of our moral structure. In this instance it seems to me the moral and material coincide.

Bishop Dougherty. It seems to me that ultimately you come to a stance, a moral posture, internationally. Can we assume that our moral posture has reached a certain degree, a certain measure of moral maturity. I just pose the question whether or not this society of ours that we discussed today, or any society on this globe today, has reached that degree of moral stature. Man has advanced in his moral stature over the centuries; there has been an ascent of conscience, but that was in a different kind of society. It wasn't the technological society we have today.

The world is really a global village. The world has changed historically, culturally and so on. I don't make the judgment. I just raise the question whether or not humanity has reached the moral stature where it is capable of that kind of judgment and in that, of course, America would be involved. I would bring up the question, have we reached the moral stature where we can take this kind of action and have it backed by the Nation.

Popular Support for U.S. Recognition of Error

Dr. Bennett. I think you could count 40 percent of the people who make the judgments you are making here and if it were possible for the religious leaders in their context to give a different interpretation of greatness, and the relationship of greatness to a recognition of an error, and if our political leaders, if our President especially, were able to put this in another frame that would draw still more support, I don't see why a very large proportion of our people couldn't converge at this point.

The Chairman. I am almost certain. I sense that they would do this if it could be properly presented. I think the people are groping for just such a solution. Take this very idea that we are a great people. We are a unique people in a way; we are sort of a manufactured nation. We didn't grow up this way. We are made up of people from
all other nations, and we are in some sense a unique nation. The kind of leadership that your statements gave this morning impressed me. I believe the people want to do what you are suggesting, to recognize the intellectual error, and to be an example in the world rather than dominate it by force. I think this is what is being said in various inarticulate ways in this country.

CRUCIAL ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN CHANGING U.S. ROLE

Dr. GREENBERG. I would just say, here is exactly where leadership plays a tremendously crucial role. There is readiness for what you are saying. This will not be solved purely by moralism, or by purely rational calculation of proportionality. Society is made up of rationality, history, pride, moralism, all of these things coming together. What we need now is some leadership that can pull all these trends together and really formulate this point. If I had to formulate it, I would say: there is a worldwide challenge to authority and to force—but it is not a challenge to the principle of authority. It is asking that authority justify itself, that power justify itself by serving. Authority can no longer maintain itself by simply being there or by using its power because it has it. Once you understand the challenge is to serve, this explains how devout Catholics can ask their leadership to rethink its role, or how devout Jews can challenge their leadership to reinterpret their law to serve mankind. In the same spirit I think there are millions of devout Americans who would follow the notion of reformulating America's role if it wants to have the role of leadership interpreted as service. Service means I don't throw my weight around. It means those who want my help I try to help, and I wouldn't want our solution to be we are going to withdraw because we are too clumsy. There are millions in the world who still need our help desperately. It is a very poor world compared to our wealth and it has a lot of suffering left. The question is to reformulate a national ideal of service—to ourselves and to the world. I think the American public, even so-called middle America, would respond if this would be done while showing them that this would not be a betrayal of those who died or betrayal of America's authority or history. This can be done with sensitive moral analysis and humility.

CHANGE IN U.S. ROLE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR VIETNAM DEAD

The CHAIRMAN. Your point about how to explain to the people who have lost their sons, these 40,000 deaths, is extremely effective. I thought what you said about that was very effective because if as a result of this we should formulate our role along the lines you suggest, it would be a far greater achievement than a military victory could ever be. There have been endless military victories of countries throughout all of time, but there has never been this kind of a victory as a result of that sacrifice. Therefore, in a sense they will have been the most important deaths, if that could be achieved. This would be a real justification and about the only one I can think that would be a justification of what has taken place in Vietnam.

You gentlemen have been most patient. It is nearly 1 o'clock. I have imposed upon your good humor and I know you are getting restless.
Clarification of President's Statement and Witnesses' Testimony

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, two small points of clarification.

One, the Chairman raised the point that the President had characterized the students with the word "bums." I was the one at the White House who took exception to that remark, and his reply was that the student involved would be the one who had burnt the research papers over a 20-year period of another student. He did not characterize all students as bums.

The other point of clarification is of your views, as I understand them from having read your statements and having listened for a good portion of the morning. I apologize for not being here all morning. Basically if we withdrew, providing some sort of sanctuary or asylum for those who might be killed because of our departure, and recognizing the country would be taken over probably under one government, presumably under Hanoi's direction, you would recommend withdrawal. Is that correct, or would any of you disagree?

Dr. Bennett. I would certainly say that.

Senator Pell. Would you, Bishop?

Bishop Dougherty. Yes.

Dr. Greenberg. Yes.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Commendation of the Witnesses

The Chairman. I find I overlooked a great many questions that had been prepared, but the time is too late.

I can't tell you how much we appreciate your coming. I might threaten you by saying that perhaps I will appeal to you again for assistance at a later date.

You have been so kind to come here today and I think you have been enormously helpful to the committee. I think that what exposure your statements will have will be beneficial. I will do my best to give them the greatest possible exposure.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Bennett. Thank you very much.

Bishop Dougherty. Thank you very much.

Dr. Greenberg. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. the committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)
MORAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Aiken, Case, and Javits.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to receive testimony on the situation in Southeast Asia from Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, U.S. Army (retired).

General Gavin has a long and distinguished career of service to his country. He retired in 1958 as Chief of Army Research and Development after 34 years of military service. Later he served with distinction as Ambassador to France. Since his retirement from public life, he has continued to take a great interest in foreign policy and military strategy.

General Gavin is uniquely qualified to discuss current developments in Southeast Asia. At the time of the debate within the Eisenhower administration over possible U.S. involvement in the war in Indochina, he was serving as Assistant Chief of Plans and Operations under General Matthew B. Ridgway, who was then Army Chief of Staff. Under General Ridgway’s direction General Gavin made an in-depth study of problems relating to possible intervention by U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

His report was passed on to President Eisenhower and General Ridgway later wrote in his memoirs that it “** played a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part in persuading our Government not to embark on that tragic venture.” It is to our national sorrow that General Gavin’s sound advice was ignored 10 years later.

We are very pleased, General Gavin, that you found time from a very busy schedule to come before this committee and to share your wisdom and knowledge and understanding with us.

You have, of course, appeared before us before, and I know it is a great imposition upon your time, but I consider this as important a public service as any of you ever rendered while you were in uniform. In many ways it requires more courage. Will you proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

General Gavin. Thank you.

Well, Mr. Chairman, it certainly is with a heavy heart that I appear once again before your committee. There appears to be little doubt that since I last appeared before this committee in 1966 and 1967, our situation has worsened in Southeast Asia and elsewhere abroad.

Domestically the tragic divisions within our country are all too obviously before us to need comment.

I would like to emphasize that I appeared because it seems to me to be a patriotic duty to do so. I have no desire to attack any individual or any past policies. I hope that I can make a constructive contribution to a better understanding of the involvement we now find ourselves in and what can be done to bring the changes that we seek.

As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, I was chief of plans in the Department of the Army in the Pentagon in 1954 and 1955, immediately following the French capitulation at Dien Bien Phu, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the various alternatives open to them at that time.

Now, first of all, I would like to talk about Vietnam and how we became involved there. This discussion will concentrate entirely upon tactics. Then I would like to talk about national strategy, if I may, for it seems to me that our confusion begins with a lack of understanding of strategy in the broadest sense.

As long as we are uncertain as to our national goals, as to the proper meaning and role of strategy in the modern world, we shall continue to make tactical mistakes in area after area.

There is always a military officer somewhere who wants to win a battle by taking one more hill or dropping one more bomb.

That is his responsibility. But when the Nation’s leaders are clear both about their goals and how to bring these goals to reality, when they understand national strategy, then they can know when to say yes and when to say no in any given tactical situation.

1954-55 CONSIDERATION OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to use the blackboard and talk about the situation that confronted us in 1954 and 1955 and talk about the various alternatives and the manner in which we responded to these, if I may.

The Chairman. Please.

General Gavin. First, I would like to do a sketch here of Vietnam itself, the 17th parallel, Hanoi, Haiphong, Hainan Island, the Chinese border, Saigon, and the Mekong River.

Now, when we considered going in there in 1954 and 1955, we could have given the commanding general going in the mission, for example, comparable to the mission given to General Eisenhower in Europe. Let’s call that mission “A.” And that would be to destroy the armies of Giap, occupy Hanoi and Haiphong. That is exactly what we considered, as a matter of fact. That would have cost us the equivalent of about 1.5 to 2 million men.
Now, this was—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that force would have been required to do it?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir; it would have been and we would have had to sustain that force while there so the casualties obviously would have been quite heavy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GAVIN. But in the parlance of the Pentagon this was a simple straightforward mission for which a requirement would be stated and hopefully met by our Government when we commit ourselves to do the job that had to be done exactly in the manner in which we went about not only in Europe but in past wars.

We are in a different kind of world though now and the Nation may no longer stockpile all of its weapons and then use all of them to win a war. Indeed if we were to use all of them, we would destroy the human race.

There is another aspect of this however which was very important to us, and General Ridgway and I worried about it a great deal. It was stipulated in the planning that the Navy to go into Haiphong, must seize Hainan Island. Therefore, we would be going to war with China, and we decided finally, and we had a number of China hands in the Pentagon at that time, people who served in China and knew the Chinese situation quite well. Having gone into it quite deeply we came to the conclusion we are not really going to war with Ho Chi Minh but going to war with the nation providing him with the bulk of arms. Certainly if we were to capture Hainan Island we are going to war with China, so we strongly were against it.

Now there could have been a mission given to the commander that was responsible, and we call this mission B, and this would simply be to seal off and secure all of South Vietnam. That would be envisioned as something like this. Something like the DMZ would be continued all along the frontier. As you realize Laos comes down like this and then Cambodia down below.

We figured this would cost about a million, possibly go to over a million point five, and, of course, this was considered too large a commitment. We either had to go to this mission or something considerably less. So what we finally did, and we did this in a significant way with Mr. Kennedy's administration, we provided trainers to help, we will call it mission C, help South Vietnam establish law and order, and bring into being a viable government chosen by the people. We thought we could do that with 10,000 trainers.

1966 SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Now, sir, when it came before this committee in 1966 in order to meet the various offensives that came from the north this had risen to 225,000.

Each commander, in turn, trying to cope with the frustrations and the problems of a very vague, in a way, mission, kept escalating. I must say I felt considerable concern. I felt a bit sorry for them because I knew how difficult the problem was, and up until the time we established adequate logistical bases, which we had done by this
time in 1966, I was quite worried. Indeed if something like the Tet offensive of 1968 had been launched in those early years of 1965, 1966 we probably would have been wiped out, certainly in, from 1960 to 1965 anyway.

Well, we established a base at Danang, a base at Camranh Bay, another one at Saigon, and I think there is another one down the coast, very powerful logistic enclaves on which we could base our commitments and our strength, and in 1966 I recommended to this committee that we not expend one more man, that we base our withdrawal upon the secure retention of those logistical enclaves. I believe then it was a sound approach for dealing with the problem and I believe today that it was.

**ESCALATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT**

Instead we escalated. I went over there at the invitation of the White House in 1967, and we then had gotten to 525,000 men. That is how this went along and with the Tet offensive in 1968 a request was made, as I understand it, for 200,000 more men.

So, sir, what we had here by this time is a commitment of three quarters of a million men and we were rapidly switching back on this mission, mission B, for we were trying to get enough manpower into that country to seal it off and win a military victory really, and despite the fact that this was, in my opinion, tactically not at all in the national interests.

**CHANGE IN NATIONAL STRATEGY**

Now I say that for this reason, sir. I had postulated a theory about 10 years ago when I was writing about events in the Pentagon, massive retaliation, that the whole concept of warfare had changed in character, and it has changed, in my opinion, in this respect. No longer do the old orthodox theories hold; that is, the nation will stockpile a vast arsenal of weapons and use all these to gain a victory.

Indeed it would have to be satisfied with something less than total victory unless it sought to cause annihilation of the human race and, therefore, the shifting of fleets and armies was not a role of strategy any longer. Strategy was something else entirely. And after studying it a great deal I came to the conclusion that the strategy in affairs among nations was to be that area in which all of the human endeavor committed to our future survival would be applied. Then it had to be dealing with, first, the domestic condition. Now by that I mean everything having to do with the condition of this country, its health care, its education, transportation systems, environmental problems and the well being of our people.

Whether or not this Nation survives for these people will depend on how we take care of our people in the first place. Survival begins right here at home with the condition of this country.

Next, the economy.

Now a number of economists have written about this subject, Mr. Eliot Janeway, for one, that the real strength of the United States rests on its economy. I believe this is true, the real power of the United States is the economic power and the spirit of its people which I referred to as No. 1.
And, finally, in the kind of world in which we live, with an exploding population, very serious food problems, very serious environmental problems, we must aggressively pursue research on a very broad front.

And I would put as the final leg of the tripod of adequate national strategy on technology.

Now, I said before this committee, sir, in 1966, that while I despaired of the loss of lives and the conditions that brought us to a quarter of a million men, what I really was disturbed about was the strategic implications of where we were going. I said, sir, before this committee then we are not going to have victories, but we are going to have victims, and I am sorry to say this is all too true today. When we are spending $30 billion a year to prosecute this war while we neglect our domestic condition, we have a frightfully poor national health care program, our educational establishment is deteriorating, cutting back on our research program, we are on a strategic disaster course. While we may appear to be winning tactical victories we are suffering a grievous strategic defeat that could only be colossal in its implications.

The war has been called unjust, immoral, illegal, all of these. But I think militarily it is nonsense the way it is being carried out. It is contrary to our national interests to continue it this way. This is the way it looks, sir, and these were the alternatives and I have gone over how we dealt with them at that time.

There are some other aspects of the affair I would like to touch upon, if I may.

**CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREA**

For some years I followed the role of China in international affairs closely. I landed at Inchon with the forces of General MacArthur in October of 1950 and proceeded to Kimpo Airfield. I was with the Assault Marine Battalion when it seized that field. As a matter of interest I was with three scientists sent over with me to take a look at what science could help to do to bring that war to a victorious end. I was surprised upon arriving at Kimpo Airfield to find that it had recently been thoroughly prepared for the introduction of modern air power. Huge U-shaped, freshly constructed revetments to house fighter bombers were newly built and scattered around the fringes of Kimpo. Obviously, the North Koreans expected the intervention of a modern air force, and it most likely would have to be Chinese. Impressed by what I had seen, I returned to Tokyo within several days and I hastened to call on General Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, to discuss with him the implications of possible Chinese entry into the war. He was of the belief that they would not enter the war, that they had missed their opportunity to do so at Inchon when the landings were taking place. At that very time Chinese field armies were readying themselves to cross the Yalu and move south, which they ultimately did at great cost to us. I have no doubt now that China continues to watch uneasily and carefully what we are doing in Southeast Asia. She continues to be concerned lest we renew the plans that we had 15 years ago to land in the Haiphong-Hanoi area.
RISK OF CONFRONTATION WITH MAINLAND CHINA

Indeed I am very concerned myself that there may be some who will think that the ultimate confrontation is the one that we should face up to, the real enemy, the real provider of power in this situation, which is Red China.

I recently listened to a discussion between two Chinese experts on the likelihood of Chinese manpower intervention. They seemed to think it not at all unlikely if Hanoi developed serious manpower problems, manpower could be provided and probably would. I read in yesterday's New York Times an article in which a senior officer of our State Department stated that when the Administration decided to send troops into Cambodia and it believed the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention "was remote enough to accept a calculated risk." It seems to me at this point in our efforts to disengage our forces in Southeast Asia that no risk is acceptable, however carefully calculated.

We have been all through this 16 years ago, and there was no point in taking a risk then in a war with China.

What deeply concerns me now is that out of the frustration and dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia, and the inability of our tactical commanders to realize that long sought "victory," there may be those who would be tempted to the ultimate confrontation, the war with Red China. We would then be exactly where we were when General Ridgway made the decision to recommend to President Eisenhower that we not seize Haiphong-Hanoi. The only difference would be, and a very significant one it is, that we already are on land and well established and we could force the confrontation by merely moving north, exactly as we moved west into Cambodia.

From the viewpoint of the American people this would be absolutely catastrophic in its implications.

WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS IN SOVIET INTEREST

To point out but one, I was in Moscow in November to discuss the possibilities of East-West trade, and I discussed the present preoccupation of the Soviets with the Chinese along the southeastern frontier of Siberia through Mongolia and Manchuria. They are quite concerned about it and indeed some feel that a very serious confrontation is inevitable. However, as long as the Chinese are very likely committed to a role in Southeast Asia, there will be little pressure on the Soviet frontier. Indeed, if this condition prevails, the Soviets will be free to pursue their own goals in the Middle East. The war in Southeast Asia is very much in the Soviet interest. And, in terms of the Middle East and what may come of that troubled area, is very much not in our interest. One of the most immediate benefits that would come to us from an extraction of our forces from Southeast Asia would be a lessening of tension in the Middle East, in my opinion.

IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING U.S. STRATEGIC STRENGTH

In summary, I would like to emphasize once again the overriding importance of understanding the strategic strength of the United...
61

States, and of building and maintaining that strength. To dissipate
that strength through ill-advised and poorly thought-out tactical ven-
tures is certainly contrary to the national interest. There will always
be those who will counsel seeking military victory without regard
to the outcome of the war on which we have embarked. They confuse
the means with the end; and leave unanswered the question, what is
the goal we seek in this war? And while we pursue one more tactical
victory after another, we lead the country down the road to strategic
disaster. Our relations with other nations, the state of our economy,
and the domestic condition scream for constructive attention; yet,
everything that we are doing is tearing our country apart and alienat-
ing us from our best friends. We must bring our Southeast Asian in-
volveinent to an end as rapidly as possible, for each day of delay
increases the likelihood of the one confrontation we should avoid at
all cost, a war with Red China.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that the following
steps be taken at this time.

CABINET LEVEL POSITION FOR RESOLVING SOUTHEAST ASIAN INVOLVEMENT.

First, that an outstanding citizen, not now in Government, be des-
ignated by the President, and given cabinet rank, with the respon-
sibility to bring about a resolution of the Southeast Asian involve-
ment. The present situation we are in is unworkable. The Department
of Defense must on one hand support its forces in Southeast Asia
while it develops a plan for their extrication.

And the Department of State must continue to maintain relations
with our Vietnamese allies to assure them of our continuing support
while it seeks to develop plans to bring our Southeast Asian involve-
ment to an end. I personally observed the solution I am proposing in
effect in France in 1960–62. In that situation a minister was appointed
exclusively for Algerian affairs. He was Monsieur Louis Joxe. I spent
hours discussing what he was doing with him. Indeed I spent many
hours discussing the problem with General de Gaulle. It was an ex-
ceedingly difficult problem and I might add our State Department
didn’t think it was a solvable problem. All of those participating in the
Algerian situation reported to him in carrying out his responsibilities
and he finally brought that conflagration to an end. Besides, from a
business point of view, when a problem transcends the interests of
several governmental departments, indeed maybe in conflict some-
times with their interest, it is good business to put one man in charge
of the development of a solution to the problem.

RETENTION OF ENCLAVES DURING NEGOTIATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Second, as a matter of highest priority, we must develop plans for
the extrication of our forces from Southeast Asia and the cessation of
hostilities. Any such plan should be based upon the retention, for
some period of time, of the present logistical enclaves that now pro-
vide the backbone of our defensive structure in Indochina. These en-
claves which I have discussed with this committee before would give
us both a bargaining-counter at the peace table, provide for an orderly
withdrawal of our forces, and would produce an immediate decline in the casualty rate. I would like to point out that in the resolution of the Algerian conflict, France provided for the retention of such base facilities as Mers-El-Kabir until the ultimate resolution of the Algerian problem. I believe the enclave strategy to be even more valid now than when I first proposed it before this committee in 1966.

Certainly, it would have prevented our escalation into Cambodia, and I would be glad at the conclusion of my testimony to answer any questions you may have on this matter, sir.

**RIGHT TO VOTE FOR 18-YEAR-OLDS**

Third, considering the critical condition of our society, the way in which we urge our young people to work within a system, a society in which our young people are sent off to give their lives for this country and yet they are not allowed to vote and yet we urge them to work within the system I think it is of the utmost importance that steps be taken without delay to give the right to vote to those 18 years of age.

**IMPROVING U.S. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS**

Fourth, and finally, as soon as these measures have been taken, an all-out effort should be made to coordinate the measures taken to improve our domestic condition. For the same reason that I recommended that an individual of cabinet rank be appointed to deal with Southeast Asia on an ad hoc basis, I would now recommend a cabinet post for the individual charged with dealing with our domestic problems.

That, sir; concludes my prepared testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Gavin.

I think that is one of the most succinct and clear statements on our present situation that has come to my attention. In view of your past advice and experiences, it seems to me it is unanswerable.

**U.S. OBJECTIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

You have raised a number of very important questions. One that has often been raised before in this committee is the question of our goal. What is the goal we seek in this war? In the original discussions back in 1954, as a military man, of course I assume it was not particularly your decision. It was for the President and the civilians to determine whether or not Southeast Asia or Vietnam was essential to the security of this country. That was another issue. I assume that in the final decision made by President Eisenhower, he decided that holding it was not essential to the security of this country.

Would that be a fair inference to draw from that?

General GAVIN. Yes. I think the language they used was, is it vital to the security of the United States, and I think the decision was, no, it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a military mission. If it had been vital, this was the way you would have had to proceed. This involved the probability of an encounter with China and, as I remember General Ridgway’s book in which he described them, some of these same operations.

General GAVIN. Yes. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that President Kennedy called me in at the time right after I had gone to Paris, and
told me he was very troubled about the problem of Laos. He did not consider Laos vital to our own national interests, and he urged me to see, directed me to see Souvanna Phouma, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and assure him we were interested in the freedom, neutrality and independence of Laos and we would not send troops. They thought that we might at that time, Mr. Harriman worked at Geneva, and I had had five or six meetings with Souvanna Phouma and we solved that problem without sending troops.

The Chairman. I would think this is still a major problem. We used to ask the Secretary of State and other witnesses, if you win this war what do you win. We were trying to elicit the answer from them as to what is the objective, which seems to me to be involved in this question. Is the control of this area by the United States essential to our security? It never has appeared to me that it was.

General Gavin. No.

The Chairman. Therefore, there really never was, and there isn't today, an objective that is worth the kind of effort we are making.

General Gavin. No.

The Chairman. There wasn't then and there isn't now.

What has struck me so importantly is that at the time when, if it had been vital, the job might have been done, you decided that it was not vital. President Eisenhower, after he consulted with our allies, with the British and others, made the collective judgment that it was not vital and, therefore, he declined to intervene. That is about the way it was.

General Gavin. Yes, that is right.

U.S. ALIENATION FROM FRIENDS AND ALLIES

The Chairman. With regard to our present situation, you certainly have made some extremely important statements. There are one or two things I wanted to ask you about your emphasis upon the nature of the strategic catastrophe and disaster, which, in my opinion, we have already achieved and which grows more ominous every day.

You say "everything that we are doing is tearing our country apart and alienating us from our best friends." In this morning's paper there is a newspaper account that struck me in a most forcible way. It is by Mr. John Goshko reporting from Saarbruecken, West Germany, on a meeting yesterday apparently of Chancellor Brandt's Social Democratic Party, which is now in control of Germany, a country which we regard today as one of our friends and as, I guess, the strongest nation in the NATO organization. I want to read you just a bit to confirm what you said about this.

I will put the whole article in the record for the information of others. There was a debate in the party congress that is going on there. I may say Mr. Brandt visited here only recently. As a matter of fact, the committee received him, and, of course, the President did.

The article states: "The Chancellor said he was deeply concerned by events in Indochina and that his government had made this clear. However, he objected to the term 'creeping fascism'"—which had been injected, I may say, by others in this debate—

"In the resolutions, and said the delegates should avoid one-sided judgments as beyond the scope of the convention. He voiced support for the British proposal.
and said the war in Indochina should not become grounds for dissension within the Social Democratic Party.

The debate over Indochina came as the Social Democrats assembled in an annual convention. Party leaders who spoke at the opening ceremonies received only perfunctory applause. Only tonight, when the delegates turned to foreign policy resolutions, did the atmosphere become charged with emotion. It was on the Indochina situation that restive members of the party left wing chose to train their fire. Speaker after speaker rose to denounce the "imperialistic policies" of the U.S. Government, to deliver personal attacks on President Nixon and to claim that he had neither the support of the American people nor the U.S. Congress in his Indochina action. The general tone was summed up by one delegate: Our elders have been criticized for turning their backs on Auschwitz and not speaking out. We are not bound by constraints not to speak out. In our view Vietnam is today's Auschwitz."

(The article referred to follows.)

[From The Washington Post, May 12, 1970]

BRANDT PARTY ASSAILS U.S. ON CAMBODIA

(By John M. Goshko)

SAARBRUECKEN, WEST GERMANY, May 11.—The national convention of Chancellor Brandt’s Social Democratic Party erupted today in an angry debate over Cambodia that resulted in adoption of a resolution "condemning" the escalation of the Vietnam war into "the Indochina war."

The resolution, which called for support of Britain's appeal to convene an Indochina conference, came as a relatively mild climax to the acrimonious debate that preceded it.

Several left-wing Social Democrats had pressed for adoption of resolutions embodying far harsher criticism of the U.S. intervention in Cambodia.

These resolutions referred to "creeping fascism" in the United States, demanded an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Cambodia and Vietnam, called for the Social Democratic faction in the West German parliament to initiate a debate on Indochina and sought an end to offset payments by the West German government that help cover the costs of U.S. troops stationed in Germany.

These demands were rejected in favor of the more moderately worded resolution offered by the Brandt-controlled party leadership.

Adoption of the motion by a show of hands was made by a sizable majority of the delegates.

The resolution condemned the war and expressed deep regret over the decisions of President Nixon to send troops into Cambodia and to resume the bombing of North Vietnam. It then went on to "appeal to the direct and indirect parties to heed the British government in its call for a new convening of the general conference on Indochina."

Brandt had to intervene personally in the debate with a plea for a more reasonable tone.

The chancellor said that he was deeply concerned by events in Indochina and that his government had made this clear.

However, he objected to the term "creeping fascism" in the resolutions and said the delegates should avoid one-sided judgments as beyond the scope of the convention.

He voted support for the British proposal and said the war in Indochina should not become grounds for dissension within the Social Democratic Party.

The debate over Indochina came as the Social Democrats assembled in annual convention with one of their members in the chancellor's office for the first time in more than 40 years.

Today's opening session started at a leisurely, almost bored pace.

Party leaders who spoke at the opening ceremonies received only perfunctory applause. Even the entrance of Brandt into the huge Saar International Fair Hall hardly caused a stir.

Only tonight, when the delegates turned to foreign policy resolutions, did the atmosphere become charged with emotion. It was on the Indochina situation that restive members of the party left wing chose to train their fire.
Speaker after speaker rose to denounce the "imperialistic" policies of the U.S. government, to deliver personal attacks on President Nixon and to claim that he had neither the support of the American people nor the U.S. Congress in his Indochina action.

The general tone was summed up by one delegate: "Our elders have been criticized for turning their backs on Auschwitz and not speaking out. We are not bound by constraints not to speak out. In our view Vietnam is today's Auschwitz."

It seems to me a terrible tragedy of history that now the Germans are accusing us of engaging in what we, during these 25 years, have accused and reminded them of in World War II. It is a very depressing thought, but there it is.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And they are one of our principal friends.

General Gavin. Yes. As a veteran of over 3 years in Europe, and one who participated in the liberation of the concentration camps, it certainly is a sad, sad day when such an analogy must be drawn by the Germans.

DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM WAR IN UNITED STATES

The aspect about it, too, that is so important, is that people should speak up. They really must speak up. Democracy works in strange ways and yet it is difficult to speak up on matters such as this, and I have been criticized.

The Chairman. The other day I said I thought one of the most encouraging aspects of our present situation is that the young people of this country, joined by many adults, are speaking out. They are not becoming members of the kind of youth organization which developed in Germany. This is encouraging that democracy does have some life to it. The young people in recent days have been the focus, but I may say I don't like to limit it to the young people. There are a great many older people.

General Gavin. Well, I might say, sir, as the father of a number of daughters, two teenagers who are here with me today, I think the world of this young generation. The militant, dissident youth of this country are the real hope for our country, in my opinion.

The Chairman. I agree. I remind you the Senate put an amendment on the extension of the voting act to allow the 18-year-olds to vote. That has gone to the House. In the House it was objected to on the floor. They had already passed the extension bill, which necessitated its referral to the Committee on the Judiciary where it now rests. I don't know whether it will come out or not. The majority leader announced the other day that if that amendment was not in it, there would be no voting act, so it may be that still will be developed.

CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

There is another article which I think is quite pertinent and relevant to your testimony by Mr. Stanley Karnow, whom I regard as one of the leading, as they call them, China watchers. He is stationed at Hong Kong and has spent much of his life recently studying the Chinese situation. This was an article in yesterday's Washington Post. I would be interested in your comment on it. This is not the first time that
this thought has been developed. The first time I noticed it was some years ago. There was an editorial in a Chinese newspaper which was picked up in one of our national papers, where the Chinese, in effect, said that not having a powerful navy or air force and no way to confront the United States, they should be obliged and grateful to the then leaders of the United States for bringing our forces over into an area where they could be destroyed. This was based upon the idea that the United States was the principal evil in the world, which they have professed for many years, and that they were quite confident that if we pursued the war in Vietnam we would be destroyed, that we would exhaust ourselves. That was about the tenor of it.

Mr. Karnow revived this theme. I will put the whole article in the record, but here are some excerpts. He says about the Chinese:

Second, they want to curb the influence in the region of the Soviet Union, which they also see as a potential military threat as well as an ideological rival.

Would you agree this is one of the probable attitudes of the Chinese today, in that this war serves their purpose.

General Gavin. Yes.

The Chairman. He says:

Third, they want a future Southeast Asia composed of frail states that pose no challenge to Chinese hegemony but, as in centuries past, pay tribute to the rule of the "Middle Kingdom" in Peking.

In other words, as I take that, in our continued efforts to destroy the strength or the capacity for survival of the Vietnamese, we create a vacuum there in a sense. If and when we leave, they will be much less likely to resist Chinese domination. They have never, throughout history, welcomed Chinese domination. For at least a thousand years they have resisted Chinese domination, but if this war goes on further, not only are we weakening ourselves, we are weakening these states in Southeast Asia capable of resisting Chinese domination.

Wouldn’t you say that is a logical outcome?

General Gavin. There is no question about it, Mr. Chairman. From a strategic point of view clearly China’s ends are being served every day we spend there.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Gavin. And finally the Chinese presence will be such, and right on top of them now, they will be able to do things they never dreamed of being able to do for 25 or 30 years or make it quite possible for them.

From another point of view, that if the impact on our own society, the condition of our economy, and again the commitments of our national resources for this bottomless pit, it certainly is not in our strategic interests to be there and serve the interests of the Chinese the more we do there.

CHINESE VIEW OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chairman. He says:

The American involvement in Vietnam, they perceive with obvious pleasure, has bogged down the United States in a situation it cannot win and refuses to lose. Therefore, they calculate an extension of the conflict will only drain U.S. resources further.
General Gavin. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN (continues reading):

Besides stirring dissent in the United States and thus fulfilling their dogma that the "masses" inevitably rise against their 'fascist masters' the Indochina mess also appears to the Chinese to be an opportunity to 'isolate' America internationally.

I will skip over to the last few paragraphs. He says:

In an unusually candid talk with an American sometime ago, a Hanoi official stressed this point. "You think you are blocking China by fighting us," he said, "but in fact, you are destroying a barrier to Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia if you do destroy us."

Mao himself emphasized a similar point when a few years back a Japanese visitor to Peking apologized to him for Japan's aggression against China in the 1930's. "The Japanese invasion inspired the Chinese people to rise and fight," Mao reportedly told his visitor. "Our army grew by a million men and our support grew to include 100 million people. So, instead of apologizing to me, perhaps I should thank you." It would be tragic if Mao repeated those same lines to an American visitor to Peking years hence. The way things are going, that possibility is not inconceivable.

It seems to me completely consistent with what you and General Ridgway thought a few years ago.

(The article referred to follows.)

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CHINA

[From the Washington Post, Monday, May 11, 1970]

NIXON'S EXPANSION OF THE WAR SEEMS TO DELIGHT CHINESE

(By Stanley Karnow)

Hong Kong—China experts here have finally figured out Mao Tse-tung's whereabouts during his recent long absence from public view. He was secretly ensconced in the White House, advising President Nixon to send American troops into Cambodia.

The circumstantial evidence to support that intelligence is reflected in the fact that nobody has been displaying greater delight at the widening war in Indochina than the Chinese Communists.

Mao and his associates are not crazy. On the contrary, they are tough, shrewd, and, despite their apparent adherence to rigid doctrines, extraordinarily flexible.

Most of all, they are patient enough to have played a cautious waiting game in the hope that Mr. Nixon would accommodate them by stumbling into Cambodia.

For the conflict now spreading throughout the Indochinese peninsula serves their cause in several ways. And, barring the unlikely prospect of its spilling over into China itself, this welcome development is costing them next to nothing.

IN TERMS of their own strategic ambitions, the Chinese have three interrelated objectives in Southeast Asia.

First and foremost, they want to oust American military power, partly because they are concerned with their security and partly because a U.S. presence thwarts their other aims in the area.

Second, they want to curb the influence in the region of the Soviet Union, which they also see as a potential military threat as well as an ideological rival.

Third, they want a future Southeast Asia composed of frail states that pose no challenge to Chinese hegemony but, as in centuries past, pay tribute to the rule of the "Middle Kingdom" in Peking.

The American involvement in Vietnam, they perceive with obvious pleasure, has bogged down the United States in a situation it cannot win and refuses to lose. Therefore, they calculate, an extension of the conflict will only drain U.S. resources further.

Besides stirring dissent in the United States and thus fulfilling their dogma that the "masses" inevitably rise against their "fascist masters," the Indochina
mess also appears to the Chinese to be an opportunity to "isolate" America internationally.

By no coincidence, consequently, they have invited a French cabinet minister to visit China this summer for the first time since France recognized Peking in 1954. Moreover, they are improving their ties with Britain and Yugoslavia, and progressing toward diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy.

In the meantime, just as Mao wished, the specter of a bigger Indochina war is weakening the Soviet position in the area as the Russians waver between trying to promote the moderation they really prefer and backing Communist escalation in order to assert their revolutionary credentials.

One sign of Soviet confusion has been apparent in the Kremlin's delay in recognizing Prince Sihanouk's Peking sponsored government-in-exile. As a result, Moscow has clearly lost ground to the Chinese in Hanoi.

Meanwhile, with no indication from Washington that they can expect to gain anything from 25 years of struggle, the Vietnamese Communists are settling down to "protracted war."

Again, this suits Peking's long-range dreams, since it augurs an exhausted Vietnam that the Chinese are convinced they can eventually dominate.

In an unusually candid talk with an American some time ago, a Hanoi official stressed this point. "You think you are blocking China by fighting us," he said, "but in fact, you are destroying a barrier to Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia if you destroy us."

Mao himself emphasized a similar point when, a few years back, a Japanese visitor to Peking apologized to him for Japan's aggression against China in the 1930s.

"The Japanese invasion inspired the Chinese people to rise and fight," Mao reportedly told his visitor. "Our army grew by a million men, and our support grew to include one hundred million people.

"So, instead of your apologizing to me, perhaps I should thank you."

It would be tragic if Mao repeated those same lines to an American visitor to Peking years hence. The way things are going, that possibility is not inconceivable.

I can't imagine it, but you have indicated there is the possibility of some people thinking that a confrontation and a showdown with China, would be in the national interest. You didn't think so then and, I take it, do not think so now?

General Gavin. I didn't think so then, and while you can't qualify a belief like that, you know, that way, it wasn't valid then and it isn't now.

The chairman. As I remember, the conclusion of General Ridgway was that even though we had a war with China and destroyed many of their cities, it would not be in the interest of the United States. The result would be an enormous area of chaos into which if anyone would move, it would be the Russians. It wouldn't be the United States, because we would be incapable of it.

General Gavin. I might add in that sense and clearly, this is understood, that to recommend a war with China, the fact is when we got through with the exercise in 1954-55 we were very uneasy about Korea. We had just closed down the Korean war within a year. I suppose of that time, and we decided if China were to commit manpower resources we would probably have to—or, they would reopen Korea, and we would be in a two-front war in Korea as well as in Southeast Asia. I think it is absolutely clearly settled if we get involved with China we are in a war with Korea once again as well as in Southeast Asia.

The chairman. It is almost impossible for me to find the word that emphasizes the nature of that calamity. As you say no risk, not even a minimum risk, of involving ourselves in such an endeavor is justified at this time.
Lastly, I was very interested in your reference to Algeria, and the way the French handled that situation under De Gaulle. Often I am asked by various people, "Well, you criticize the war and you say you want out. How do you think we can get out. What is your proposal to get out."

It seems to me the very natural answer to that is how did the French get out. They had been there approximately a hundred years and they recognized that it was no longer in their interests to pursue it. They could have pursued it if they had been as stubborn as we are, couldn't they?

They had the manpower to do it.

General Gavin. Absolutely.

The Chairman. We did give them some $2 billion, I think, in material goods, and they could have continued, but they decided deliberately it was not in their national interests. They proceeded to Geneva, and they had a conference. It lasted approximately 2 months and they concluded it on July 20. Whether or not you negotiate successfully depends entirely upon the terms that you offer. Is that not so?

General Gavin. That is right.

The Chairman. We were told by the previous Administration that the other side wouldn't answer the phone or that they wouldn't come any where, any place, any time to talk for some 3 or 4 years. The reason they don't talk is that we have never offered any terms which are reasonably acceptable under the conditions. Would you think that is true?

General Gavin. The way it strikes me is that we continue to talk about victory. We see this as our ultimate goal and sometimes expressed as not being humiliated for the first time in 190 years of our proud history. But this is not what is involved here. What is involved is common sense and how to extricate our forces without unnecessary loss of life.

The Chairman. I couldn't agree with you more. That is exactly it. To conceive of it in the terms of a military defeat or humiliation doesn't seem to me to be the appropriate way to even think about it. No one denies that if we wished, as you said, to use all our force we could wipe out the country.

If there were nothing involved but a military victory, if it were like Harvard and Yale meeting to decide who is going to win and going all out to win, you could win. But that is not what is involved. It is what you say; it is common sense. To the French it wasn't common sense to continue to bleed themselves white by pursuing this war and to me, and I believe to you, it isn't common sense to pursue this war, especially to enlarge it. You had perhaps some options in the old days, but as of today the only alternative, it seems to me, is a conference, very similar to what the French had, to have a political settlement.

Would you agree with that conclusion?

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S SOLUTION IN ALGERIA

General Gavin. Yes, I might say the French problem was a very difficult one for them. There were 1 million Europeans in a population
of 10 million Algerians. They had been there for a 100 years, as long as most of our people have been in the State of California and they were being asked by the French Government to give up everything and leave, their farms, their homes, their businesses and so on. And it was an exceedingly difficult thing and when De Gaulle came to the Presidency in 1958 Algeria was in a state of revolution, and the choice as was said at that time, was either De Gaulle or the paratroopers. So De Gaulle came in and stipulated provided he could rewrite the Constitution, and there are provisions that are very interesting and I will not go into it, he went to Algeria.

I first sat down and talked to him about that problem in early 1960. Our State Department was of the belief that he really couldn't solve it. It was an unmanageable affair.

Well, in a short time I became convinced that this man not only understood the problem inside and out but that he was going to solve it. I thought perhaps for economic reasons he would be loath to. I asked him about their investments in Sahara, petroleum resources and so on and he hit his fist on the table and he said "if I spend one more franc staying there than I am getting out, I am getting out." I said how about all these million people. He said "if I have to bring everyone back on the dole for the rest of their lives I am getting out," and I so cabled Mr. Kennedy that this man is going to solve this problem. I have been a manager, Mr. Chairman, for some years, 12 years working with business and I know the best way to deal with an exceedingly complex problem, that has within it conflicts of interest from many different people, is to put one man in charge of solving that problem. This is exactly what was done in the Algerian situation. I don't know why this is not given the attention it deserves but this was the way it was solved. One man was told "you will solve it; you will deal with people of State, Defense, whatever, but get the problem solved," and they proceeded to and got it solved. I think we can do exactly the same thing.

The Consultant. I can't believe that we don't have as much resources, if we could muster them, as the French had.

General GAVIN. No.

Consultation with General de Gaulle Recommended

The Consultant. You prompt me to say that since General de Gaulle is not employed at the moment it would be much more useful if he were consulted, rather than General Thompson who is experienced in Malaysia. The President did show great respect for General de Gaulle. I hadn't thought of it before, but it seems to me a very good idea to consult him, because if he hadn't gotten out, I believe the French would have been bled white.

The country would probably have ended up in a really chaotic situation, unable to continue an orderly democratic government.

General GAVIN. Particularly in view of the fact that Vietnam was formerly a French colony, I think General de Gaulle would be a much more useful consultant than General Thompson.
The CHAIRMAN. I think so too. I hadn't thought of it, but I recommend that General de Gaulle be consulted on an informal basis.

I also am very much taken by your idea, which I had not heard before, of appointing someone with this particular responsibility. I have some other observations, but I want to call on my colleagues to give them an opportunity. I think you have made a magnificent statement this morning.

Senator Aiken.

ECONOMIC EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR

Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, your last reference to France and the probability that France would have been bled white had they not found a way out of their troubles leads me to another observation. I believe, General Gavin, that you are now concerned in the field of economic management.

General Gavin. Yes, Senator Aiken.

Senator Aiken. I would like to make a very short statement and then ask you to comment on it. From 1953 to 1961, we had 8 years of comparative stability in this country. Virtually no inflation took place at all during those 8 years. Then in 1962 we began to get more involved in Southeast Asia in a military sense, and we know the rest of that, how we went from a thousand up to 540,000 military personnel in that area. As our involvement in war increased, inflation came into the picture, and it has steadily increased until now we are seeking as desperately to find a way out of inflation as we are to find a way out of Southeast Asia.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

Senator Aiken. The two certainly go together, and the effect on the U.S. economy worries me very much. The costs of production are really rising sky high. Just this morning I read that one of the steel companies has again raised its prices about 6 percent. I forget which one. That doesn't matter. The rest will follow, and so will the producers of other material. Interest rates have risen toward the sky; material costs of all kinds are up for the most part. Labor, management costs, transportation costs, and all the costs which enter into the production of goods have risen.

I am wondering what effect all this inflation due to the war is going to have on U.S. participation in world markets. How long can we compete without doing something rather radical?

Are we going to resort to export subsidies to keep us in the world market? We are receiving demands every day to increase the tariffs on products that are brought into the United States in order to protect the domestic market for domestic producers. We don't know what we will do on that, but it apparently is becoming very serious.

There is the other alternative: Will American industry move to other countries where production costs are less at a faster rate than it is now.

It seems to me that the economic effect of the war could be almost as disastrous as the military effect on the United States unless we find some way to get out of it. We don't expect we can go back, but if we can
level things off somewhat, it would be very helpful. I would like to have your ideas as an economist as to how to get out of this situation.

General Gavin. Yes.

Senator Aiken. It strikes me as being very, very serious.

**EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR ON U.S. ECONOMY**

General Gavin. I think it is an extremely serious situation, sir, and again I would like to say a word or two about it. I would like to point out I am a member of the National Exporters Expansion Council, I am very much interested in international trade, and played a very active role in international business affairs.

I think we are in a very, very serious predicament. There was an article in the yesterday's Wall Street Journal entitled "What is the Market Trying to Tell Us." The market is a very interesting harbinger of affairs. It expresses people's confidence or lack of confidence in the Government. On the day the Cambodian news hit the market, it fell 19 points. I think the market is trying to tell us something. There is a great lack of confidence at the grass roots level as to where the economy of this country is going. I think the youth of this country are trying to tell us something. It is time we listened to them and listened to the market too. It has a message for us. Our economy is in very serious trouble. Our war in Southeast Asia is not helping our economy. On the contrary, it is hurting the economy. Before you came in I talked a bit about strategy and I came to the conclusion about 10 years ago, having through a great deal of discussing in Washington over 5 or 6 years ago of the merits or lack of merits of massive retaliation, that the whole character of war has changed. I had done a great deal of reading and writing on the subject. I decided that strategy, and I might say I spoke at the National War College on this subject last October for 3 hours and discussed it with the class, and my views I think stood the test of their discussion. I think strategy today clearly includes the state of the economy.

When we talk of the United States as a people, vis-a-vis anyone else, we must think in terms of our domestic conditions and the economy of our country. This is the nature of the world in which we live.

We must have an economy that is viable, productive, abundant and thriving, providing the goods that people need, and also competing in the global markets. Right now we are going in just the opposite direction. Our global position has deteriorated. I wondered if indeed our experience in Southeast Asia since 1962 hasn't been a real luxury. We have been able to pay for all of that in U.S. dollars and the business world has been enabled to do so well abroad that we were able to do this without a serious impact on the economy.

Now we are beginning to pay for it. So I look upon this as just as serious as any aspect involving Southeast Asia.

Senator Aiken. I think that you are probably correct in your statement. I realize that the economy of the world does tend to level off as the years, decades, or generations go by, but we had an abnormal increase in costs here in this country——

General Gavin. Yes.
Senator Aiken (continuing), which presents a real problem. Hopefully it is a temporary problem, because in the long run we will work it out, but it is going to be very, very costly while we are doing that.

**MILITARY STRENGTH OF SOUTH VIETNAM**

The Administration so far doesn't seem to put very much stock in the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces of a million men, presumably pretty well armed, and hopefully rather well trained by this time. I noticed that they don't rely on them to cover any American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.

**How do you rate the military strength of South Vietnam?**

General Gavin. Mr. Aiken, I doubt that I am in a position to rate them at all. I spent 2 years, as you know, once with the Philippine scouts and I know Asian troops well. I have always been of the conviction that there are no good or bad troops of any nationality. They are either well trained, well led and they are good or not. So they have the potential for being very fine soldiers. Obviously the soldiers of General Giap fight well. Even when isolated in small units they give a good account of themselves.

The current condition of the ARVN, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, I am not sure about that, sir. I have no knowledge of it. Its potential is high, but I don't know what the real force is.

Senator Aiken. Do you think they have the potential to look after their own country?

General Gavin. I think with adequate leadership they do have, yes, sir. I think they have—for example, we see the obvious example of the forces of North Vietnam. I often wondered, having had a lot of combat experience myself, how they maintain high morale and such high effectiveness frequently scattered hundreds of miles apart in small units operating in vast areas. They can do well, and the South Vietnamese can do just as well given the right leadership. There is no reason to believe they can't.

**RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. RETENTION OF ENCLAVES**

Senator Aiken. I was also interested in your recommendation that we maintain a base or two, I believe you call them enclaves.

General Gavin. Yes, sir, that is the key to the negotiations.

Senator Aiken. It always seemed to me that that would be very important.

General Gavin. I think so, sir.

Senator Aiken. Thank you, sir. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Case.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**CONDITIONS OF PRESIDENT'S WITHDRAWAL POLICY**

General, do you happen to remember a piece in The New York Times up there where Reston usually writes on the editorial page by Matt Ridgway, General Ridgway, about 2 months ago?

General Gavin. Yes, I remember that.

Senator Case. Wasn't that a rather unusual pulling together of a good deal of wisdom. Have you any comment on that because I want
to talk precisely about this matter of how we do it and that is what you talked about this morning and that is what he talked about:

General Gavin. Yes, I remember the piece very well and I think it was unusual because General Ridgway had not written certainly for The New York Times before, nor any other magazine I know of, so I was surprised to see it and I was interested. I know General Ridgway awfully well. We were all through the war together, World War II, in the same organization and I had great admiration and respect for him.

I don’t remember the details of that, line by line of that, at all.

Senator Case. In general.

The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator would tell us what it is. I have rather forgotten it. Would you summarize it at least and put it in the record?

Senator Case. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put it in the record at this point and then I will do my best to summarize it. If any of you later think by some reason I am unfair or incomplete you can tell me if you will.

(The information referred to follows.)

[From the New York Times, Saturday, Mar. 14, 1970]

TOPICS: SETTLEMENT—NOT VICTORY—IN VIETNAM

(By Matthew B. Ridgway)

Many continue to argue that a military solution, or “victory,” in Vietnam has all along been within our reach, that nothing less would serve our interests. I believe such a solution is not now and never has been possible under conditions consistent with our interests.

That would have required, and would still require, resort to military measures unacceptable to most of our people. But regardless of past policy decisions, were such a course to be pursued now the divisive influences throughout our land, comparatively quiescent, would be intensified.

The basic decision, which I believe is irrevocable and which was made and announced long ago, was to reduce our operations and to initiate disengagement and withdrawal according to a plan merely outlined.

Whether or not it includes an ancillary decision to complete withdrawal by a fixed date, I do not know, though I assume it does. For reasons of its own—and reasonable ones are not lacking—the Administration has not seen fit to announce it.

Last Nov. 3 the President set forth three conditions that would, he said, determine the rate of our withdrawal: progress in the Paris talks; the character of enemy operations; and the rapidity with which the South Vietnamese Army can assume full responsibility for ground operations. He warned that “if increased enemy action jeopardized our remaining forces,” he would “not hesitate to take strong and effective measures,” not spelled out but alluded to again in his Jan. 30 press conference.

Adherence to these conditions could result in relinquishing the initiative. Hanoi’s stalling in Paris, or Saigon’s unwillingness or inability to bring its army up to the requisite level of combat effectiveness, or an escalation of enemy action would then compel a choice between resort to “strong measures”—a reversal, it would seem to me, to the search for a military solution already publicly eschewed—or suspending and even reversing our withdrawal.

NONMILITARY OPTIONS

If this reasoning is sound, then it is relevant to examine our options, should events seem to demand dealing “strongly” with the situation.

We could decide: to halt and subsequently reverse the disengagement process; to resume bombing in North Vietnam on the same scale and against the same target systems as before; to widen the bombing to include key points in power grids, port facilities and utilities, even though located in population centers; to
impose a sea blockade of North Vietnamese and Cambodian ports; to invade North Vietnam with ARVN or U.S. ground forces, or both; to use nuclear weapons.

Putting any of these measures into effect could result in: ending hopes for arms control; raising U.S.S.R.-U.S. tensions; causing heavy loss of life among noncombatant North Vietnamese; raising U.S. casualty rates and dollar costs; impairing our capability for quickly responding to other challenges elsewhere; seriously accentuating domestic criticism of Government policy. If there was a land invasion of North Vietnam by U.S. ground forces, the possibility, if not the probability, would follow of massive Chinese ground force intervention as occurred under similar conditions in Korea in 1950; and, if nuclear weapons were employed, world and domestic opinion would revolt.

I question that the execution of any of these options would serve our interests. Most of them, I believe, should be rejected. Certainly we should repudiate once and for all the search for a military solution and move resolutely along the path of disengagement and eventual complete withdrawal.

This will present painful problems, but they must be faced. It raises serious military questions: How long will it take to increase the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army to a necessary level? If a long time, how much U.S. combat and logistic support will be needed, and for how long? If chiefly U.S. Air Force and Navy combat elements are needed, who is to provide security for their bases? And if reliance is to be placed on South Vietnamese forces, who will command them? How will U.S. base commanders and their troops react to such arrangements? These are a few of the military problems, quite apart from the political ones.

FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

A negotiated political settlement, which I think we would all prefer, and which I believe we must ultimately reach, will be unattainable unless we retain the initiative and face up to these problems now.

Regardless of how much this may tax the wisdom and determination of our Government and the patience of our people, our decision is, I believe, the prudent one, and we should channel its execution into the mainstream of our long-range national interests.

General Ridgway, now retired, was U.N. and U.S. commander in Japan, Korea and the Far East and later Army Chief of Staff. He points out that these are personal views without access to classified official studies.

First of all, he makes it clear that he doesn’t believe that a military solution is possible.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. He takes up the President’s proposal for withdrawal, he believes in withdrawal, and analyzes the problem as basically that of disengagement on our part.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. He deals with the President’s three conditions: One, which the President said would determine the rate of our withdrawal, progress in the Paris talks. Two, the character of enemy operations, and three, the rapidity with which the South Vietnamese Army can assume full responsibility for ground operations.

And he said that if the increased enemy activity—he is quoting the President now—jeopardized our remaining forces, he wouldn’t hesitate to take strong and effective measures, but didn’t spell them out.

Then the comment by General Ridgway on these conditions is that, and these are his words, “Adherence to these conditions could result in relinquishing the initiative.”

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator CASE. If one doesn’t happen to state his position, then nobody else is going to state it for him.
My concern about these conditions all along has been that they nullified the main objective which was disengagement and a determination to disengage at a particular time come hell or high water.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. So that if it were possible for the South Vietnamese to shape up they would know they had to do it. This in my judgment was the only way they were going to be brought to it because in my judgment they were quite content to let us do the dirty work for them. And that is what has always made me unhappy with the President's disengagement proposal, that is to say, it was conditional and would, in General Ridgway's words, result in relinquishing the initiative. And it seems to me, General, that this is what has happened.

Hanoi's stalling, he went on to say, in Paris or Saigon's unwillingness or inability to bring its army up to the requisite combat effectiveness or an escalation of enemy operations would then compel a choice between resort to strong measures, that is to say search for a military solution, and he goes into the various possibilities and discards all of them as undesirable, or withdrawal.

PROBLEMS OF U.S. DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL

Soon he comes to the conclusion that what is necessary is a repudiation once and for all of a military solution and for us to move resolutely along the path of disengagement, and eventually complete withdrawal, which is what you said here.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. He said:

This will present painful problems, but they must be faced. It raises serious military questions. How long will it take to increase the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army to a necessary level? If a long time, how much U.S. combat and logistic support will be needed and for how long? If chiefly U.S. Air Force and Navy combat elements are needed, who is to provide security for their bases? And if reliance is to be placed on South Vietnamese Forces, who will command them? How will U.S. base commanders and their troops react to such arrangements? These are a few of the military problems, quite apart from the political ones.

I take it up to now you are in general accord with his analysis of the matter.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. He goes on:

A negotiated political settlement, which I think we would all prefer, and which I believe we must ultimately reach, will be unattainable unless we retain the initiative and face up to these problems now. Regardless of how much this may tax the wisdom and determination of our Government and the patience of our people, our decision is, I believe, the prudent one, and we should channel its execution into the mainstream of our long-range national interests.

That is the conclusion of it.

I take it that the General in general believes, and we can call it Vietnamization or not—I don't care what you call it—that the only way we can do this is to present the South Vietnamese with a reasonable opportunity to shape up and so conduct ourselves in support of that, withdrawing all the time to these enclaves or something of that sort, that they have a chance to do it.
U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND NEGOTIATIONS

Now, I want to come precisely to my question, because, among other things, of the enormous interest that is now evident to us from the colleges, the intellectual community, many other citizens in an immediate withdrawal no matter what, and the urging that all of them are giving us to support the McGovern-Hatfield, or Hatfield-McGovern, amendment which would provide for pulling out completely; that is to say, using no U.S. funds, cutting off all funds for any activities except withdrawal after next December.

Now, is that the correct way for Congress to proceed in these circumstances or is there a better way?

You have indicated, I think, what you think would be a better way.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Putting one man in charge, not now deciding the details of this operation, but the development of a plan based upon a gradual but very definitely scheduled withdrawal. Is that your conclusion as between these two approaches?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

What I have recommended is that we give the responsibility to plan this to one man and give him a Cabinet-level position and he should be appointed by the executive with the advice and consent of the Senate. Now he should be given the responsibility for carrying this out as a matter of doing it as rapidly and as reasonable circumstances will allow.

I am not sure that cutting off funding on any one day is the thing to do. I understand how that came about. I know the frustrations of these people who have been patient for far too long and we have allowed this to escalate. There were a quarter of a million men there when I was here in 1966 and now we have over a half million people and people have had enough of this.

Now whether putting the number on the date when the funding stops is the way to do, while I am sympathetic with what they are trying to do, but I don't think it is a very businesslike way of going about it.

I think the outline that you gave me of General Ridgway's article is a very valid one and I agree with it. Of course, we can't make them do things they don't want to do, and they have had since 1954, 1955 since Diem came in, to shape up, so I think it is time that we based all of our planning on an extrication as rapidly as we can get out of there.

If they haven't been able to make it in this time, in the last 15 years, they are not going to make it in 16 more, so I would say base our plan entirely upon extricating our forces and the things we must have well under control are the logistic enclaves on which to base our extrication.

Senator CASE. Isn't this a fair comment just on that one point—it is a little bit of a side line—but is it quite fair to say that they have had for 15 years the chance to shape up? Didn't we, until about a year and a half ago, in effect, take the job on ourselves without concentrating on helping them to shape up?

General GAVIN. Probably so, sir. But when President Diem—

Senator CASE. Isn't that a fair statement?

General GAVIN. I say this is a very fair observation. When President Diem came in I was over there and I talked to Diem and he