thought he could get the country under control. Of course he had these warring sects that were armed and had sources of their own income, and a great deal of governmental corruption and he had as it turned out an impossible political problem on his hands as you know. So it isn't fair to say they should have started shaping up right then. They had really unmanageable problems on a large national scale, but I do think they had plenty of time to show some responsibility for their own destiny.

We can't continue to support them on the scale we have been, and we simply have to bring it to a halt right now, as quickly as we reasonably can.

**POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL**

Senator Case. Just one other factor I would like to have your comment on. It bears upon the question of whether we in effect run out on them.

General Gavin. Yes.

Senator Case. Rather in a helter-skelter way. I know nobody thinks this ought to be done, but I question with you whether fixing too short a time for this purpose might not result in this, and the point has been made that if this were done we may have to fight our way out. Is that correct?

General Gavin. It is quite possible if we try to do this precipitously we may lose men, lose lives because of our haste. We must go about this in a reasonable orderly way and it can't be done right now. It cannot be done instantly. Moving the resources of a force this size takes time, months and months.

Senator Case. Even if there were no question of any—

General Gavin. No opposition.

Senator Case (continuing). of any opposition on either side.

General Gavin. Exactly.

Senator Case. General, thank you very much.

I am looking forward, as we all are, to your return shortly on another phase of this whole operation. We are much obliged to you for your coming.

General Gavin. Thank you.

The Chairman. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I am just reading the statement. I would like to yield to the Senator from New York.

The Chairman. Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. I thank my colleague from Missouri and I appreciate it very much.

General Gavin. I had one question to ask of you. I think Senator Case has asked an excellent question because this is what all our young friends are zeroing in on. No matter how we assure them that we are on their side in bringing this terrible tragedy to a prompt end, by the best way possible, which may be better in the amendment which he described, they will want us to commit to that particular piece of paper. In terms of the capability and effectiveness of this committee I, like he, have held off from any such commitments.

General Gavin. Yes,
Senator JAVITS. But I have another counterpart question and that is this question of national honor and defeat. The President has told us, implied very clearly, that what is involved here is the national honor, and that our Nation has not been defeated in war for 190 years, and he is not going to preside over the first defeat.

People like myself have argued that this is not a U.S. war, that there is no victory and there is no defeat. We went in with the thought of helping a small people get a chance to exercise self determination. We have helped them all anybody can, more than anybody unhappily should, under the circumstances there, and the circumstances here.

Now we stand in grave danger of destroying our own country in the process. We say now, in all truthfulness, we have helped you all we can and now you have to do it yourself.

Nonetheless, the idea persists that somehow there is some disgrace to our Nation. As a very highly respected officer of our Armed Forces, would you, sir, care to comment upon that whole concept.

General GAVIN. Well, Mr. Javits, I would welcome an opportunity to comment on it. It distresses me to see this frequently brought up. We are not going to be humiliated after 190 proud years of our history and we are not going to be denied victory and all that sort of thing. This is not what is involved here, sir; it is commonsense. We can continue on a present course of action to where we reach the point, in my opinion, where we will have a strategic disaster on our hands.

The condition of our country, the state of every aspect of our daily lives, the condition of our economy will be so deleteriously affected by this involvement that it will be a disaster upon us and indeed it will be a defeat for us in the eyes of other Nations around the world and, in fact, I think the reasonable and sensible course of action that will bring us, in effect, victory will be to extricate ourselves from that area.

Now the French went all through that very thing and I have since been back to France with some frequency and talked about it. France was not defeated in extricating herself from Algeria. Indeed as soon as she got out of there her economy turned around from that same moment. And for this country to be able to do something very similar would indeed be a victory for this country, in my opinion.

Senator JAVITS. I want to thank you, General, because I think that such sentiments coming as they do from such a high place—

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator JAVITS (continuing): to be adequately rebutted need to be rebutted by people who have after all the same motivation and the same frame of reference as the President and others who have made these statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question.

Senator JAVITS. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. The General’s response reminded me of the response made by Rabbi Greenberg the other day as to the significance of what we have already lost in Vietnam. It would be a great achievement and those sacrifices would have contributed more than any comparable sacrifices to the enhancement of prestige and morale of this country.
Senator JVITS. The greatest victory is the victory over ourselves. The CHAIRMAN. The coincidence of the General's reply reminded me of what Rabbi Greenberg said just a few days ago before this committee.

Senator JVITS. I thank the Chair for his very helpful intercession.

**EFFECT ON MIDDLE EAST OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM**

General, just one other point. I notice you said in your statement that one of the most immediate benefits that would come from the extrication of our forces in Southeast Asia would be a lessening of tension in the Middle East.

General GAVIN. Yes.

Senator JVITS. Would you care to expand on that answer?

General GAVIN. Yes, I would be happy to. I have appeared before a number of committees here in the capital over the last 20 years, and when you deal with the problems that have a rather abstract quality like this about them you are at once challenged, I know, and it seems a little intellectually presumptuous to spell this out this way, but I have given a very great deal of thought to this problem. I visited Moscow; I have talked to prominent and responsible Russians about their ideas. There is a deep foreboding in the Soviet Union today that something is going to happen vis-a-vis China. When the Trans-Siberian Railway was put through, the Russians made deals with Chinese warlords that the national government has never recognized, and it does not recognize them today.

They will not tolerate the Soviet presence in Mongolia because it will outflank Manchuria and Peking.

There is very great concern and I don't know except just by intuition, but I would assume today the Soviet Union is preparing for trouble on the Chinese frontier. Of course, it is rather remote as long as the Chinese are down Southeast Asia watching us. Mr. Harrison Salisbury has recently written a very fine book on this subject in which he recognizes certain steps to be taken, recognition of Red China to give them a feeling of having a place in human society, perhaps an aid program to give them some physical help.

The Russians are very worried about this because they feel any such move will signal to the Chinese there we are on their side and they think this because they probably think conflict is inevitable; some Russians do, men of intellectual stature.

I have been to the Middle East; I was in Israel last spring. I have known General Dayan for about 15 or 20 years and I talked to him about his problems and that area worries me more than any other spot in the globe now.

It is a very, very troublesome area. I was alarmed at the Soviet intervention with fighter-pilots. Well, there it is.

Now clearly to me as long as we are in Southeast Asia, and as long as the likelihood exists that someone will force the ultimate confrontation by trying to seize Hainan, Haiphong and Hanoi, the Chinese feel they have to counter our move and the Chinese will be in the field within weeks of our intervention there and they are prepared for that.

The minute they are sure we are moving in the other direction, and we haven't been moving in the other direction despite the small
diminishment of our forces there in any way. Yet the minute they can turn around and pay attention to their own national problems which, in my opinion, are the most serious ones on the Russian border, when that occurs I would think the Soviets would, in their own interests, begin to look back over their shoulders and stop playing games in the Middle East and get back home and pay attention to the real pressing problem of China.

To me clearly there is a cause and effect relationship there.

U.S. SIGNAL OF INTENT TO CHINESE

Senator JAVITTS. The only other thing I would like to ask, General, is what you just said a minute ago, about the Chinese involvement.

You have the distinct feeling that unless we show we are moving the other way and if we say the President's withdrawals do not represent that signal, what in your judgment would represent that signal.

General GAVIN. Well, first of all, with the appointment of one individual responsible for conducting negotiations for the purpose of extricating our forces. At no time have I seen any statement that this Government intends to extricate our forces in any particular time, whether it is 1971, 1972, 1973. We talk about Vietnamization, we talk about humiliation. We talk about sometimes victory, avoiding defeat. What we want to see is a declaration of plan and purpose to extricate ourselves and get our forces out of there. So far this hasn't been made.

CABINET LEVEL POSITION TO DIRECT U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND NEGOTIATIONS

Senator JAVITTS. And part of that might also be appointing a higher level negotiator in Paris, might it not?

General GAVIN. Yes, I think so, Mr. Javits. As I pointed out earlier, I had a long talk with President de Gaulle when I first got to France about his problem, and it was a very interesting management problem. He had his own Minister of Foreign Affairs opposed. The army was in revolution. Indeed General Salan had led a revolt in Algeria and all these conflicting forces were in play and he couldn't ask any one cabinet member to solve the problem. So he appointed Minister Louis Joxe ad hoc Minister for Algerian Affairs and he then picked up all the loose ends with the Defense Department, State Department wherever they were and carried on negotiations. A negotiator would then be appointed. Our negotiator in Paris would report to such a man, but it would be a cabinet level man, but he would have responsibility for carrying out negotiations and carrying out the plan.

This I think can be done.

Senator Javits. I thoroughly agree with you, General, but wouldn't such an official have a one line directive: "get out of Vietnam at the earliest date."

General GAVIN. Exactly.

Senator JAVITTS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator JAVITTS. I want to thank Senator Symington for his courtesy.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

It is a pleasure to see you, General.
General Gavin. It is good to see you, Senator. It has been a long time.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Senator Symington. I would like to say to the best of my recollection I am under no obligations to you except friendship.

General Gavin. That is right, sir.

Senator Symington. And with that premise, I think you have been the clearest and most farsighted member of the Military Establishment in the last 15 years.

General Gavin. Thank you very much.

Senator Symington. Sometimes confessions are good for the soul. At first I was worried about your presentation to this committee, in 1966 or thereabout. The more I think about it the more decided I am in my own mind that you were right, but I am surprised at the degree of the accuracy of your prophecy as to what would happen.

EFFECT OF U.S. EXTRICATION FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA ON MIDDLE EAST

I read your statement. It is a superb statement. I want to be sure I understand certain parts of it. One of the most interesting, thought provoking aspects of what you say is where you say one of the most immediate benefits that would come to us from an extrication of our forces in Southeast Asia would be a lessening of tension in the Middle East.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. In my opinion you are right.

General Gavin. Thank you very much.

WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS IN SOVIET INTEREST

Senator Symington. You say the war in Southeast Asia is very much in the Soviet interest. I am sure everybody would agree to that, even if it was only economic warfare.

General Gavin. Yes. It is a very interesting point of view. One of the most noted authorities in the English speaking world on the Soviet Union is Alexander Werth; he used that very statement, the war in Southeast Asia is in the Soviet interest. What interests me is the comparative performance of our society. It is a social concept. Clearly the Leninist concept is shattered. It is no longer effective as such in the Soviet Union. They need far more productive enterprises than they now have, and they are having problems.

The emergence of Brezhnev makes that quite clear, and I followed their activities very closely. They are having very, very serious troubles.

Now the United States potentially had a potential for just great stature in this world. If we could only bring our national health care up to about a 50 percent better performance, if we could improve our educational standards, if we could have a better environment, better housing, if we could have done all these things, things that our Founding Fathers thought this country had the potential for doing, there would be no comparison of the two systems.
But instead we are making some mistakes of major magnitude now, and the country is in serious trouble over this, and the most hopeful sign is the dissident military youth but they shouldn't have to be this way. They should have something in sight that is more reassuring to them than they now see. So we have got to turn this country around.

So vis-a-vis the Soviet Union clearly as long as they can keep us floundering and making the mistakes, we are making them, they can keep pointing out in their literature, “just look at them.” I received this new publication from the Institute of American Affairs. It is called “U.S.A.,” and my daughter, who is studying Russian, had given me an excerpt from it last night. They use the language and polemics and so on about the imperialists and the troubles we are having and all the things we are doing now are playing into their hands while they can point out all over the world “look what they are doing, look what they are doing in Vietnam,” and this sad reference of Mr. Brandt to Auschwitz is disturbing. It is clearly, in my opinion, it is in the Soviet interests, in their, economically and psychologically it is in their interests.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Then you say in terms of the Middle East and what may come of that troubled area is very much not in our interests. That simply emphasizes the point you are making.

General GAVIN. Yes, the cause and effect relationship; yes, sir.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR ON U.S. ECONOMY

Senator SYMINGTON. After leaving the military service you became the head of one of the great companies for overall analysis. The critique by one of your people on the Congress is one of the most informative I ever read; and I know you know considerable about finance and business as well as about the military.

We had a witness here who was the biggest banker in the world. He made two statements, one as chairman of the board of the Bank of America, in which Mr. Lundborg pointed out that this war was operating exactly opposite to the Marx concept of capitalism needing war to preserve prosperity. Some of his figures showed that during the 4 years preceding the escalation of the war, the profits of our corporations increased 71 percent. After escalation, over 4 years they increased 9 percent.

In addition to testimony he gave as the head of the greatest bank, he added testimony as an individual which corroborated without reservation the position you have taken today about what all this is doing to the moral fiber of this country.

You mentioned General Dayan. I had dinner with General Dayan here in Washington in 1966 and was very disturbed about his pessimism about the Vietnam war. Then he went out and spent weeks with our troops in the field in South Vietnam. I met him again early in 1967, back in Israel, and he also wrote articles. One article published here, stated that if they went to guerrilla warfare, this country could never beat them. That is almost a direct quote.

Would you agree?

General GAVIN. Yes. As a matter of fact, I talked to General Dayan before he went over and after he came back also and he was very disturbed about what he found over there. Yes, I agree with that entirely.
He thought that we should have gone about it differently. But, gentlemen, I agreed with his conclusions at that time. I might say, Senator, I agree with the bank officer of the Bank of America about the state of our economy. This war has been disastrous.

Senator Symington. It is interesting to hear you say that. A professional economist called me up from New York this morning and said "I trust you realize the danger that the U.S. economy was in yesterday, when for a while it looked as if the Treasury could not refund its securities." I notice in the afternoon's paper, or an earlier paper last week, an article which pointed up the fact the Treasury nearly had a failure in its borrowing operation, and that the only thing which saved them was the Federal Reserve buying the Treasury securities.

This is sort of like eating your own tail, economically speaking; is it not?

General Gavin. That is right.

GROWING DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Senator Symington. This economist also pointed out that it wasn't the budgetary aspect of the situation which was affecting the people's faith in the purchasing of bonds, in his opinion, rather growing distrust on the part of the people as to the policies of the Administration, which distrust had reached some kind of a peak as a result of the invasion of Cambodia. Do you get that feeling in business and banking circles?

General Gavin. Yes, there was an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal entitled, "What Is the Market Trying To Tell Us." It is trying to tell us the people no longer have confidence in the Government and how it is being run. They saw this as a result of our Southeast Asian involvement, that they totally lack confidence in it,

EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR ON MILITARY MORALE

Senator Symington. General, you left the military some years ago under circumstances none of us will ever forget, but you must still have many friends in the military; have you not?

General Gavin. Oh, I do have.

Senator Symington. Would you care to comment on what this kind of operation, direction of detailed tactical operation, and cetera, from people not trained in the military, along with the whole idea of fighting this kind of a war, is doing to military morale; or if you don't want to answer that question, I will withdraw it.

General Gavin. Yes, I will be happy to do it. I think it is devastating from this point of view.

Senator Symington. Devastating?

General Gavin. I think so. I think young officers don't see it as a career they want to stay with now. Some of the midcareer and senior grades are retiring in large numbers.

I was asked by the National War College to speak on national strategy last fall. They usually give you a half hour. Then you talk to a committee. I talked on modern strategy and followed the outline
I have on the board here pointing out all the aspects of the domestic conditions, the state of our economy, and the technological changes, analyzed, starting with Brody, Liddell-Hart, and several other strategists, and so on, and they kept me on the stand discussing this.

My feeling about this is that the younger officers in the service agree with me, most of them now, and they understand what is wrong about Southeast Asia, but they are committed to part of an establishment that they have got to win this or lose a victory, they are so committed to it. It is difficult to generalize in this way, but an awful lot of the senior officers of World War II experience who were brought up in a different kind of military establishment, a military establishment that knew victory was inevitable, inevitably had to be won in war. There is no substitute for victory was the slogan. They are having a hard time with this and the quicker we let the younger ones get to the top and then get a different way about what this country needs in the way of military establishment the better we will be.

But right now the impact is very, very serious.

I might say I had several phone calls from the Air Force War College at Maxwell Field asking me to come down and talk to the same subject, but I got all mixed up with time schedules and couldn't do it.

The people in the Armed Forces want answers to the current dilemma; it deeply disturbs them.

I might add one more thing. I spoke at West Point last summer to a group of people for a summer session and spoke on national strategy and they asked me because they wanted to hear a different point of view. They are all searching for answers to this problem. The sort of thing they asked me, “General, we came back from World War II; we were told education was so important. Now we have more Ph. D.'s and yet we are in trouble. What is wrong with what we are doing?” I think it is very devastating on their morale and their attitude.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR ON U.S. ARMED FORCES

Senator Symington. As you know, I have had a little experience, nothing remotely comparable to yours, in the military field, and there was something which worried me a great deal in Mr. Lundborg's testimony. It is a fact that our youth fight most of the wars, in the main. That is correct; is it not?

General Gavin. That is right. Absolutely. It is a young man's game.

Senator Symington. It is a young man's game. Of all Mr. Lundborg said, perhaps the most startling piece of his voluntary testimony was that he would hate to see the United States get into a real crisis with the youth of the country feeling as they do about the Government. Would you agree with that broad apprehension, or do you think he goes too far?

General Gavin. Yes, I would share that. I was asked about a week ago to speak to the ROTC at Tufts University, which I did. The impact of this on the ROTC system alone is frightful. You know the ROTC system provides for a democratic armed forces. This is one of the most significant contributing factors to the Armed Forces and if
they are all going to come through the regulars or Officers' Candidate School, or some other, we won't have a very democratic establishment. In fact we might get into far deeper trouble than the present establishment is.

I would like to say I have a very deep affection for the Armed Forces. I put in 35 years of my life and went to a three-star general, and I love the Army and I want to help them any way that I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. It could have been a four-star general, but you would not take the star under the circumstances, and I would like the record to so show.

General GAVIN. Well, you are very kind, sir. Well, we remember those days all too well.

Senator SYMINGTON. We do.

General GAVIN. I would be very concerned lest the morale and fighting efficiency of our Armed Forces are lowered if it deteriorates much lower than what they are because of misunderstanding of what they do. I have been to Vietnam and I have never seen troops fight better and doing a better job, and they come up to me and say, "General, what is going on, we are out not to win and we haven't known victory since 1945," and you have to explain this to them and they need better leadership than they are getting. I mean from the top, not at the lower level.

U.S.-Soviet Reactions to Each Other's Policies

Senator SYMINGTON. You were close to President Kennedy.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You represented him as an Ambassador, knew the inside of his Administration fairly well, and knew how apprehensive we were when we found the Soviet Union was putting missiles into Cuba, 90 miles from our shores; correct?

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wonder what reason we think we have to ring the Soviet Union with missiles, now that they are, with the theory of the premise of "overkill," just as strong as we are, and we, of course, are just as strong as they are. Why is it we believe we can ring them with missiles, but if we, for example, woke up and found they had put them in Canada or Mexico, wouldn't that create grave apprehension in the minds of the American people; and if it would, don't they have the right to have the same type and character of apprehension about our current programs?

General GAVIN. They have exactly the same rights, sir. In fact I was a little concerned lest this Cambodian venture would bring a halt to the SALT talks. This is our last great hope.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was going to ask you about that.

General GAVIN. Yes. Now they have cut out the tour of the educational group in Moscow. That isn't terribly serious, but I wouldn't be surprised if we don't get this thing over with promptly we are going to have the SALT talks brought to an end and we will find Soviet missiles much closer than they have been.
VIETNAMIZATION POLICY

Senator Symington. Another question, when the new policy was announced it had two facets to it, Vietnamization and negotiation. I have been skeptical of Vietnamization because we didn’t have 550,000 people working on Vietnam, Americans. Actually, we had closer to 800,000, 65,000 Americans in Thailand, over 60,000 in the fleet, plus thousands of Americans in the Philippines, Japan, Guam, and Okinawa who were exclusively devoted to helping us do whatever it was we were trying to do in Vietnam.

If the Thieu-Ky government can’t win with the assistance of 800,000 of the best we have, do you see any logic in saying we can turn over these billions of dollars of war equipment to them, and they can then do it by themselves?

General Gavin. No, no. No, sir. If they can’t demonstrate the ability to do better, this shouldn’t be of too great concern to us. The overriding thing is extricating our forces.

Senator Symington. But we are not going to extricate our forces if we actually plan to stay in Vietnam, are we?

General Gavin. No, we have got to get them out of there.

Senator Symington. Do you think the plan really is to get them out of there?

General Gavin. Well, Senator Symington, to begin with, I was disturbed with Mr. Lodge’s selection because, after all, he was close to the Thieu-Ky government. I felt that his sympathies were with that government, and I don’t think they are thinking in terms of our extrication. They want us there so they can continue on their ventures in any direction they want to go as long as they want to go.

I read in yesterday’s paper that President Thieu said there will be more forays into Cambodia. Of course, he couldn’t do that unless we were there and he had our arms, our equipment and our training. So I am very uneasy about his government and I think that our negotiations have been conducted with the object, I don’t know, I am just guessing this, I was told, but with the object of getting enough time so that Thieu can bring about an army in being and a government that satisfies him that it is viable and long lasting and it is what he wants.

This we will consider the victory we have been seeking, I think this is the object of negotiations, where the object should be to get our forces out of there as promptly, as sensibly as we can.

Senator Symington. Thank you. I am sorry to be late this morning, but there was an appropriations committee executive session I was
anxious to go to, and they arranged so the first witness was one I wanted to ask a few questions.

I was intrigued with the line of questioning that Senator Case asked you.

General GAVIN. Yes.

POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO END U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. To me all this is hurting our country militarily, politically and economically. And now it becomes clear to me that it is hurting the moral fiber of the United States.

General GAVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You would agree with all four, would you not?

General GAVIN. Absolutely.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then as I see it it is our duty to get out of all this as soon as we can, and utilize our position in the Congress, as one of the branches of the government, to that end.

What kind of an amendment hitched on to a bill, in addition to a long look at appropriations, which is sometime off, what kind of an amendment do you think would be the best to help us move towards getting out of this situation, facing the real challenges in the world of today?

General GAVIN. Yes, yes.

Well, Senator, I hesitate to come right back in terms of your business that you are so good at. Of course the appropriations are critically important. I am aware of that and I know these people can't operate without money. But I would think that the Congress of the United States would ask the President to appoint a senior Cabinet rank individual to develop a plan for the extrication of our forces, not for the Vietnamization of Vietnam, not to do better than we are now doing, but for the extrication of our forces and bring back that plan to Congress.

Lacking that appropriations would then be cut off. Money shouldn't be appropriated for the prosecution of the war. Money should be, from here on in should be, appropriated for the extrication of our forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could we say a pacification program over here instead of over there. [Laughter.]

General GAVIN. Yes.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to again see General Gavin. He happens to be to me one of the truly great Americans it has been my experience to know and so many of the prognostications he has made about the future have turned out to be right. Thank you, General.

General GAVIN. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to join the Senator from Missouri in that, particularly that last statement. General Gavin has an unusual combination of experience in the Army, in diplomacy, and in business. He has known the military and political leaders of this country and many other countries for the past 20 or 25 years. I think his testimony is extremely valuable.
LACK OF PUBLIC EXPOSURE OF TESTIMONY

I must say I can’t help but regret most deeply that what he said this morning, especially his opening statement and other comments, cannot under our system be given the same exposure to the people of the United States that a Presidential address is given.

Here is a man with tremendous experience and prestige. His own statements of 15, 20 years ago, particularly with regard to that period when he and General Ridgway surveyed for General Eisenhower essentially the same problems we have in Southeast Asia, have been proved by what has happened. It is a peculiar thing that more attention is not given to his testimony.

I don’t know how to do it. The only way I have, General, is to hold these hearings and to give the people an opportunity to see and hear you. I have great attachment for the democratic process, but the democratic process cannot work unless the people are given the opportunity to know the truth.

I think you have spoken the truth this morning in the light of history and based upon the most extraordinary, almost unique, experience of any man I know in the country. Yet I know of no way to bring what you said to the attention of the public of this country. Only the office of the President has that capacity; no matter who is in that office. It is so frustrating to have the kind of testimony we have had this morning and have it buried here within the confines of this room with an occasional small notice of it in the back pages of a few of the papers and on the television. There no doubt will be at least a minute or two in one of the news columns that you appeared here today, but they can’t possibly convey the significance of what you said because they do not do it that way.

I don’t know how to accomplish it. All I can do is give the opportunity. If I knew how to bring what you have said this morning to the attention of the people, I would do it.

PUBLIC REACTION TO VIETNAM WAR

I think you might be interested in the reaction of the people. I asked my staff this morning and in the last 10 days I have received approximately 50,000 letters and about 20,000 telegrams, totalling nearly 70,000 communications in 10 days. Of course, even trying to open them has completely demoralized my office.

They are trying to ascertain the trend, and they estimate that somewhere around 90 percent of them are protesting the expansion of the war into Cambodia. Most of them also say get out of Vietnam. In effect the thrust of those 70,000 communications is in support of what I would say is your position this morning. Of course obviously a great many of these have been inspired by the activities of the young people, plus what has happened in Cambodia and the press conferences that have taken place. But it is a tremendous response; I have never seen anything like it.

No one on the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, many of whom have been around here 20 years, has ever seen anything like it on any occasion. As someone said here the other day, the nearest
thing we have ever had to this kind of a disturbance was the Civil War when we fought among ourselves a hundred years ago. Nothing like this occurred all during World War II. Do you think so? You went through that war.

General Gavin. Nothing quite like this.

The Chairman. Have you ever seen anything like this in your experience?

General Gavin. Never.

NECESSITY OF DECISION TO END VIETNAM WAR

The Chairman. Yet you come here and you have elucidated in the most clear language, that anyone could understand, I think, the essentials of this proposal. Yet I don't know how we can bring it to the people. It is a shame they don't have it. They are confused. They say how do you get out. I am asked this question of, "well, all right you don't like the war, what do you do about it," and I repeat over and over the same thing "well, the French did it and this is generally the traditional way to end a conflict like this. If a military victory or unconditional surrender as in World War II is not in the national interests, which you and others have made, I thought, quite clear, this is the way to do it. This doesn't impress anyone. I will say it and the next day when I see them the same people will say, "well what is your answer, how can you do it?" It can be done.

The question comes down to the will to do it, the decision, such as you have suggested, that it is not in our national interest to pursue it. Once they make the decision, the ways and means, the details, I am sure could be worked out. It is the decision to conclude the war that seems to me to be lacking.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri for a brief statement because I have a number of other things I want to say.

RECENT U.S. TREASURY REFUNDING OPERATION

Senator Symington, I would put in the record at this point a statement I intend to make on the floor later today with respect to the bond market. This statement is headed "Government Bond Market Buckles Under Pressure of Treasury."

For the first time in modern financial history the U.S. Treasury suffered a near miss in its latest refunding operation in which by the skin of its teeth and after a good deal of admitted arm twisting by the Treasury, it managed to wring $3.6 billion out of a demoralized and dried-up market at the rate of 8 percent.

More alarming still, the entire financial press is unanimous in reporting that the issue was absorbed only thanks to the most energetic Federal Reserve market supporting operations. The highly respected credit market commentator of the New York banking firm of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler reports in its May 8 edition that the Treasury marketing problem was compounded when it appeared that in the pricing of the new offering the Treasury had not taken into consideration the impact of the United States military campaign in Cambodia.

Clearly the market has been unsettled by its discovery of a disconcerting failure on the part of our strategic policy makers to coordinate their decisions with their financial policy makers.
Meanwhile, back in our all important credit markets it appears that we have an inflationary Fed support operation in an 8 percent market, which is clearly a throw back to the days when the Fed was an admitted engine of inflation supporting the market at the less costly level of 2 percent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection didn't that article state that about three quarters of the total amount was bought by the Federal Reserve?

Senator Symington. The article here says that the Federal Reserve bought about a billion and a half, this article by Lee Cohn in the Star.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Federal Reserve buys it, it has exactly the same effect as printing money. I mean it is highly inflationary; isn't it, General?

General Gavin. Sure, 8 percent is pretty high Federal money; isn't it.

The CHAIRMAN. They talk about controlling inflation. This is exactly the opposite when you start printing money to buy Federal bonds.

Senator Symington. The last time I was in Vietnam they were having a hard time persuading General Ky to buy his own securities. He said he wanted dollars, and he wanted them fast. [Laughter.]

EFFECT OF EXPANSION OF VIETNAM WAR ON SALT

The CHAIRMAN. General, on some of the questions, I believe you have already commented. If not, I invite your comments. The Russians are not reassured in the negotiation at Vienna by our incursion and expansion of the war into Cambodia. Would you agree with that?

General Gavin. Yes; absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very disturbing to the Russians as to our intentions.

General Gavin. Yes, those talks are terribly important and I was distressed to find the MIRV system was being deployed in the middle of the talks which seems to me to signal them that we are still going on. This is the pattern of how we have done these things so often. Talk about approaching Thieu, see what he can do with Hanoi and at the same time we step up the bombing. So one hand doesn't know what the other is doing.

This Cambodian business certainly must have some impact on their thinking, and makes them very distrustful of it and yet we ought to be maximizing every possible national effort to get those SALT talks to succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kosygin gave his first press conference, I believe, in the 5 years since he became premier. I believe I saw it in the paper.

General Gavin. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He was quite positive in his attitude toward it.

Someone said, "Well he has to do that. That is for purposes of appearances." But this is attributing a motive to Kosygin that has no justification whatever. These are very serious people and very suspicious people.
I have an article which, I think, confirms your assessment. I would like to read one paragraph of it for the record. This is by one of the most thoughtful and most famous historians in the world, Arnold Toynbee. I will put the whole article in the record, but one paragraph is sufficient to give you the thought of it. I think it is quite appropriate, and I quote:

The American home front is more crucial than the ports in Vietnam and Cambodia and Taiwan and Korea and the Middle East. The decision on America's home front is going to decide the fate of the world, and the rest of us can do nothing about it. We have no say, but we, too, are going to be victims of America's domestic agony.

I think that is the thrust of your own statement.

General Gavin. That is what we were talking about.

The Chairman. Of course, he is speaking of that from the point of view of the British and what they can do about it, like the Germans. I think what inspired that very acrimonious debate in Germany, which is extremely embarrassing to all Americans, is their concern. They count on us as one of their most stalwart friends and supporters. To see us going down this road is extremely disturbing to them.

(The article referred to follows.)


A DIRE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ABROAD

How does the United States look to the rest of the world these days? The Times put the question last week to the eminent British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee. The following is his reply.

LONDON.—To most Europeans, I guess, America now looks like the most dangerous country in the world. Since America is unquestionably the most powerful country, the transformation of America's image within the last 30 years is very frightening for Europeans. It is probably still more frightening for the great majority of the human race who are neither Europeans nor North Americans, but are Latin Americans, Asians and Africans. They, I imagine, feel even more insecure than we feel. They feel that, at any moment, America may intervene in their internal affairs with the same appalling consequences as have followed from American intervention in Southeast Asia.

For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the bogey that Communism has been for America. Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has a hand in it. Our phobia about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastic and excessive as America's phobia about world Communism; but, in this case, too, there is just enough convincing evidence to make the phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of America and Russia have been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become the world's nightmare.

Like Communist Russia, America has committed atrocities in the cause of truth and justice, as she sees them. We believe that American fanaticism, too, is sincere. This makes it all the more alarming.

In terms of the number of lives taken and of lands laid waste, America's score is, unhappily, far higher than any other country's since the end of World War II. Would I rather be a Vietnamese who was being "saved" by the American Army, or be a Czech who was being "saved" by the Russian Army? Of course I would rather be the Czech. The number of lives taken and the amount of devastation caused by the 1968 Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia were small, measured by the standard of America's record in Vietnam.

How is America dealing with her problems? As we see it, she is failing to deal with them, and this is the most terrifying feature of American life today. The American people seem to us to be moving rapidly toward civil war; middle-aged
noncombatants against young men subject to the draft; the affluent against the poor; white against black; students against the National Guard; (the most immediately perilous of all these multiple confrontations).

The American home front is more crucial than the ports in Vietnam and Cambodia and Taiwan and Korean and the Middle East. The decision on America's home front is going to decide the fate of the world, and the rest of us can do nothing about it. We have no say, but we, too, are going to be victims of America's domestic agony.

With growing anxiety, we watch a spectacle that we never expected to see. Who would have foreseen that America would repudiate George Washington's warning against entangling alliances? Or that America would cease to be a land of hope? And who would have expected to find himself wishing that America would box the campus, for a second time within one lifetime—wishing, I mean, that America would retreat again into the isolation from which we were once so eager to see her emerge?

Is there, then, no hope of reconciliation on America's home front? I catch a gleam of hope when I recall some words that I heard an American officer let fall two years ago in a discussion on the international situation. "There are going to be many more Vietnams," this officer said, "though the mothers of America won't like it."

The mothers of America: This representative of the Pentagon had detected the great power that was going to be the Pentagon's most formidable adversary. The Pentagon versus the mothers of America. In Cambodia we now already have a second Vietnam.

The mothers of America have still to go into action, and I believe this is a battle that the Pentagon cannot win. In the mothers of America I do still see some hope for the world.

NECESSITY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO SETTLE VIETNAM WAR

I am not sure this isn't somewhat repetitious, but so be it. I would like you to comment on this kind of statement.

Would you not agree that prior to the question of how to get out of Indochina is the need for a decision that we want to get out? The real problem now is not whether to leave by means of enclaves or a cutoff date for funds but whether the Administration is willing to recognize the war is not now and never has been in our interests.

Now it appears they want a victory in the sense of assuring the survival of the Thieu and Ky government or a similar government. As long as they want this kind of a victory, they will not accept recommendations such as those you have made this morning. This being the case, the Congress has no choice but to cut off funds by one means or another. It is the only real power that Congress has. We passed a resolution, for example, 72 to 6, just a couple of weeks ago about missile deployment. You are familiar with that. It had had no effect whatever. In other words, the sense of the Senate, with a majority of 72 to 6 does not seem to be at all impressive.

This is why the resort to these various proposals seems to be forced upon us. I recognize that this is a very drastic and clumsy way to do it. In my view, the purpose and the effect of these, if we do it convincingly enough, is to persuade the President that the majority of the Senate no longer supports this policy, and if he recognizes that then he must seek another policy. It seems all the various proposals about what to do about it require fundamentally the President to make such a settlement in his own mind. If he does want to settle, all of these various proposals could be worked out, not easily, but they wouldn't be insuperable problems.

Wouldn't you agree with that?
General Gavin. Absolutely, absolutely.

I agree. This is exactly in line with my early testimony, Mr. Chairman. What we need above all is a declaration, a firm declaration, of our intent to extricate our forces.

The Chairman. And actions that are consistent therewith.

General Gavin. That is right, absolutely.

The Chairman. We often say don't judge us by what we say but what we do and what is being done is what causes the trouble; isn't it?

General Gavin. That is right.

The Chairman. It isn't what is being said. The function of the Congress, the Senate and these hearings is really ultimately to be persuasive upon those who do determine the immediate policy. I think you have contributed tremendously to this.

I have supported and will support the proposal yesterday voted by the committee. There are other alternative proposals that I could support. All of them, however, have as their objective persuading the President to come to the decision that it is not in our interest to continue and, therefore, negotiate a settlement. When he said his Administration would be directed toward negotiation, not confrontation, that was accepted with acclaim. All of us, including myself, applauded this statement, but I am bound to say it doesn't seem to me the actions since that statement are consistent with it.

General Gavin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. At least that is the way it seems to me.

General Gavin. Yes.

POSSIBILITY OF EXPANSION OF U.S. ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chairman. With regard to Cambodia, do you think that the rationale used to justify attacking the bases in Cambodia would apply to bases in Laos and North Vietnam as well? If that were an effective justification, do you think it couldn't be used just as well concerning the bases in Laos and North Vietnam? As a military man you have given us a very good lesson here of how you considered it.

General Gavin. Well, Mr. Chairman, I devoted so much attention to the China problem this morning, particularly earlier on the blackboard, that I wanted to get this point across.

I was as startled as most Americans by the incursion into Cambodia. This one took me really by surprise and now I suppose any prudent-thinking person would ask themselves, "well, are we going to have another one up north to Hanoi," because after all, that is the real source of management of the war by Giap and his army. So this troubles me very deeply; because then we will get involved in the ultimate confrontation.

I don't see how one can say that we are not likely to do that since we surprised everybody by going into Cambodia. This bothers me very, very deeply.

UNEXPECTEDNESS OF U.S. ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA

The Chairman. Yes. You know it did surprise a lot of people. There has been much questioning in the committee because of the fact that just a few days before the action took place this committee heard
the Secretary of State in executive session. Our feeling is that he wasn’t aware of the impending action. I can’t speak for him, but if I had to, judging from the way things developed, he apparently didn’t know about it, which is rather unusual.

General Gavin. Yes.

The Chairman. We have had a preliminary report, from two staff members who were in Saigon just a few days ago. They are today in Phnom Penh. I hope nothing has happened to them. We lost, as you know, three reporters, one of whom I knew very well. Dick Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch has apparently been captured by the Vietcong or at least he disappeared. Three of them did. I only knew one of them personally. Two of our staff men are in Cambodia now and they reported that most of the men they saw in Saigon were completely taken by surprise. They didn’t see the Ambassador, I don’t believe, but the lower level of our own people in Saigon.

General Gavin. Yes.

The Chairman. They had no advance knowledge. This does not include, of course, the Ambassador or General Abrams, but some of the lower echelon people.

General Gavin. Yes.

JUSTIFICATION FOR EXPANSION OF U.S. ACTIVITIES

The Chairman. There is an account in The Washington Evening Star of yesterday. The headline is “U.S. Ground Attack Urged by Laotians.”

You are free until just before 1 o’clock, I believe. I wasn’t sure whether I would go on with you, but this is from Pak Se, Laos. It says:

Laotian rightist leaders here said the United States should hit the Ho Chi Minh trail in South Laos at the same time it is attacking Cambodian sanctuaries. They said as long as the Communist Vietnamese are using the Ho Chi Minh trail in Eastern Laos to send reinforcements and material to Cambodia and South Vietnam, the U.S. effort in Cambodia cannot be fully effective.

So the logic applies to Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail if the justification is to save lives of our soldiers in South Vietnam. If that is correct, and I emphasize the “if,” the logic would apply to Laos.

General Gavin. Yes.

The Chairman. Someone said the other day in discussing that, that if it really is that significant and would justify this action, the real source of much of the material which injures and kills our men comes from Peking and Moscow. Would this justify bombing Peking if you want to extend it out to its ultimate? This is the way you finally end up if you take that to its logical conclusion.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I want to put into the record, Mr. Reporter, some excerpts referred to earlier. These are excerpts from “The Korean War” by Matthew Ridgway published in 1967. I am quite sure you are familiar with that book.

General Gavin. Yes, I am.

The Chairman. There is one paragraph in it. I won’t read it all, but I have it in a book. These are excerpts which I used in a previous hear-
General GAVIN. Yes, I do, well.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, I think he agrees with all the important points that you made this morning.

General GAVIN. Just about, I think he does.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to make the record. I will put all of the excerpts in, but one excerpt from page 250 reads as follows:

While I am, as I said, not at all convinced that our political objectives in Southeast Asia—manifold, tenuous and imprecise as have been those set forth by our government officials—really harmonize with our national interests, I do not believe that these misstatements should be our primary concern. Rather we should ask ourselves now if we are not, in this open ended conflict, so impairing our strength through overdraining on our resources—political, economic and military—as to find ourselves unduly weakened when we need to meet new challenges in other more vital areas of the world. For there surely will be threats that bear more closely on our true national interests.

I think the thrust of that confirms and agrees completely with what you said this morning.

General GAVIN. Yes, I believe it does, Senator.

(The information referred to follows.)

EXCERPTS FROM "THE KOREAN WAR" BY MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY,
(DOUBLEDAY & CO., INC., GARDEN CITY, N.Y., 1967)

"Yet, under today's conditions, when men have control of machines capable of laying a world to waste, there must be a close interweaving of political and military goals, lest some misstep set us suddenly beyond the hope of salvaging more than a few scraps of our civilization. Civilian authorities, therefore, need to work closely with military authorities in setting attainable goals and in selecting means to attain them. A war without goals would be most dangerous of all, and nearly as dangerous would be a war with only some vaguely stated aim, such as 'victory' or 'freedom from aggression' or 'the right of the people to choose their own government.' Generalities like these make admirable slogans, but authorities today must be hardheaded and specific in naming exactly what goal we are trying to reach and exactly what price we are willing to pay for reaching it. Otherwise, we may find that, in spite of ourselves, the whole conduct of the war will be left in the hands of men who see only victory as the proper objective and who have never had to define that word in terms plain enough to be understood by all the world's people." (p. 232)
Individual freedom, solutions must be sought through combined political, economic, and military efforts." (p. 245)

"While I am, as I said, not at all convinced that our political objectives in Southeast Asia—manifold, tenuous, and imprecise as have been those set forth by our government officials—really harmonize with our national interests, I do not believe that these misstatements should be our primary concern. Rather we should ask ourselves now if we are not, in this open-ended conflict, so impairing our strength through overdrawing on our resources—political, economic, and military—as to find ourselves unduly weakened when we need to meet new challenges in other more vital areas of the world. For there surely will be threats that bear more closely on our true national interests." (p. 250)

GENERAL RIDGWAY’S VIEWS ON U.S. ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chairman. Have you by any chance discussed with General Ridgway recently his views about it or would you be at liberty to say anything about General Ridgway’s views.

General Gavin. Well, no sir. I did talk to him. In fact I talked to him earlier, talked to him last week on the phone. We have had so much experience together in dealing with these problems that I would rather prefer that he come here and speak for himself. He did express concern, as any soldier would, for the fact that we have in the past gone into places like A Shau Valley and Hamburger Hill and other places and lost hundreds of lives and then we have relinquished them and we may end doing something of this sort in Cambodia too once again and it seems to be a rather fruitless quest from a tactical point of view, either short or long term.

This would suggest more discussion, without the personnel loss on the part of either, of just what is actually taking place and it would appear as though Cambodia casualties are not very serious as reported upon. As a tactic, one professional talking to another, you worry about loss of life in seeking and destroying operations when you relinquish what you already seized.

The implications of this endlessly piled on are very, very serious. The loss of American life can be very, very serious if one just continues doing this sort of thing. We had this sort of conversation.

The Chairman. Just for the record, I have in the past asked General Ridgway to come and testify, but he was not feeling very well. He felt that he didn’t want to come. I believe he wrote me a letter sometime ago that indicated he is very much in sympathy with the same thought. I wouldn’t want to commit him, but I didn’t want to let it pass that we had ignored him. I have invited him in the past to come before the committee.

General Gavin. Yes.

The Chairman. Of course, we would like to have him any time he is willing to come.

There are just one or two other things. You covered nearly everything I had on my list.

[INTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA]

I am not sure that this hasn’t been covered, but do you think that these actions in Cambodia, and the bombing of North Vietnam are
likely to make the North Vietnamese, and/or the NLF more willing to negotiate a settlement or less willing.

General GAVIN. I would say less. I guess that this is a very moot point, but I don't see why it is. I would say less. They are doing pretty well.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not as experienced as you, but as a layman I had thought that the decline in the casualties and the lessening of the general activity in Vietnam was in the expectation that Vietnamization would result in the withdrawal of our forces. It seems to me this incursion into Cambodia has completely reversed any such expectation that may have been in the mind of the enemy. I don't know whether it was in their mind or not. If they had relinquished the intensity of their attacks in the expectation that we meant to withdraw our forces, why now that expectation has been certainly brought into question if not destroyed.

General GAVIN. Yes; if we were to read our rhetoric, you know I read an article in which our Secretary of State was quoted as saying about a week before we went in if we did go into Cambodia, for example, it would be considered a failure of our Vietnamization program. So if we are to believe this then I would assume they would see this move in there as an evidence of a failure to accomplish what we were trying to accomplish in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of State did make a very positive statement to that effect before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House which was quoted widely in the press.

General GAVIN. Yes; I read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Here again it leaves one with a question in one's mind as to what is the intention of the Administration in going into Cambodia.

AGREEMENT OF WITNESSES

I think that is all I have. You covered nearly everything I had in mind. Your testimony in nearly all respects is completely in agreement with the three religious leaders we had. This is what interests me in summary. It is the coincidence of experienced, capable, and recognized military leaders, such as yourself and General Shoup, and others, with the young people, with the business leaders. We have had testimony from prominent bankers and economists. It is the coincidence of all these views about the interest of this country in Vietnam. I don't know how much more persuasive to make the case. All of these men are most reputable people.

They are thoughtful people and responsible people. It is true there are a great many people who feel that we should follow the leader regardless of what the policy may be.

INABILITY TO ADJUST TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

I think this tends to go back to the ancient cavemen days when the only way to survive was to gather around the leader and ask no questions about purpose.

It was survival; and they confuse survival in this case. Instead of this being designed to accomplish our survival, as I think you made
very clear this morning, if we follow this course it is to accomplish our destruction! This comes about from these strange developments in technological fields and other things that have come recently. I think one of the major problems is our inability to adjust our minds to the changes that have occurred in the world because of technology. So long as there weren't any nuclear weapons about or even machineguns or even ordinary explosives, you could go into these exploits and do things like the British did in the Opium War and get away with it.

The world is no longer like that, but it seems to me that the mentality that inspired the Opium War in 1840 still persists. Would you agree with that?

General Gavin. It is a very interesting point that one could philosophize about at some length. I sometimes think why we have a generation gap right now is because of the rapidly changing technology and people don't keep up with change. But if we have one, the young people in my age, are going to really have a generation gap unless they study and stay abreast of things.

I have been before you gentlemen and for 20 years I guess, and being afraid to appreciate and understand change is at the very basis of a lot of our problems. The whole character of war has changed, let me say that once again, and people still think of, you know, you must win a victory and you must use all of your weapons. And the world isn't going to stand for a thermonuclear demonstration any more.

Senator Symington. Will the chairman yield, that is the forward of the new book of John Gardner, "The Importance of Change."

General Gavin. It is a very good book. Failure to understand change is at the very heart of our problem.

SIGNIFICANCE OF YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROTEST

The Chairman. Don't you think one of the reasons why the younger generation senses the significance of this question without being completely intellectually informed is that they are not burdened with ideas which grew up in the days before this new technological development? They do sense there is something wrong with this and they are interested in surviving. They are interested in living and not dying. I don't know how to explain the vigor of their protest if they don't sense something of this character that is very ominous. None of us really knows exactly how to read these great movements, but there is something extremely important about it. It is a terrible disservice to represent them as being irresponsible beatniks who are only raising Cain.

I think there is something very significant about it, and it relates, I think, to the problem of the recognition of change and that we can no longer go on in the same old way.

General Gavin. Oh, yes.

You know, the younger people aren't the captives of the vast experiences that we have had. They are free and fresh in their views. I have had five daughters, and two of my daughters are here today. We have many teenagers at home, and I understand what they have been doing. They are antagonistic toward the establishment, and they have sought symbols of expression, whether it is in their clothing, or how they cut their hair, or their music, that identifies them with another gener-
tion. I am all for it. They have a very wholesome, honest, inquiring attitude toward the establishment. They see something is wrong about it, and they have something to tell us; and we had better start listening. They are dedicated Americans, and good citizens, and they are far from what they have been described by some people in recent weeks.

The Chairman, I certainly agree with you, and it is remarkable. Of course, one of the remarkable things about you is that having grown up in the establishment and being in the military you have been able to recognize these changes. That capacity to see the significance of new changes I expect arises from the very breadth of your experience, but your experience lends it greater credence. I come back to what I said in the beginning. I think it is absolutely unanswerable, and these young people should be heard. They have been heard, of course, recently, and if they can pursue this activity within the political system that they now say they will, I predict they will have a great impact upon changing the system.

General, we are greatly in your debt. Do you have anything further you would like to say?

General Gavin. No, sir, again I consider it a patriotic duty to be here and I hope I have been of some help.

The Chairman. You have and we are greatly in your debt. You performed a great service. Thank you very much.

General Gavin. Thank you very much.

WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

(Subsequently the chairman placed the following articles in the record.)

[From Life magazine, May 22, 1970]

SET A DATE IN VIETNAM. STICK TO IT. GET OUT.

(By Clark Clifford)

On the evening of April 80, I heard President Nixon inform the American people that in order to "avoid a wider war" and "keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum," he had ordered American troops to invade Cambodia.

My mind went back to a day in April 1961 when I received a telephone call from President Kennedy. He asked me to come to the White House to discuss the Bay of Pigs disaster which had just occurred. He was agitated and deadly serious. I shall never forget his words: "I have made a tragic mistake. Not only were our facts in error, but our policy was wrong because the premises on which it was built were wrong." These words of President Kennedy apply with startling accuracy to President Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia. Unfortunately, it is clear that President Nixon's action is an infinitely greater mistake than President Kennedy's because more than 400,000 American boys remain involved in Vietnam, and far graver damage has already been done to our nation, both at home and abroad.

Like most Americans, I welcomed President Nixon's promises to end the Vietnam war and bring our boys home. Like most Americans, I applauded the President's action in withdrawing 150,000 of our troops so far, and have noted his intention, with some qualifications, to withdraw 150,000 more in the next 12 months. Like most Americans, my sincere inclination is to support our President in times of crisis. However, I cannot remain silent in the face of his reckless decision to send troops to Cambodia, continuing a course of action which I believe to be dangerous to the welfare of our nation. It is my opinion that President
Nixon is taking our nation down a road that is leading us more deeply into Viet-
Nam rather than taking us out.

George Santayana once said: "Those who cannot remember the past are con-
demned to repeat it." In my personal experience with the war in Vietnam, I have
learned certain basic and important lessons. It has been my hope that the present
administration would study the past and determine not to repeat certain actions
previously taken. However, I must express the deepest concern that it is now
apparent that President Nixon has not grasped these vital lessons which seem
So blazingly clear as we look back at the last five years of our substantial par-
ticipation in the Vietnam conflict.

I have learned three fundamental lessons from my personal experience with
Vietnam and I shall present them in this article. I shall then discuss how these
lessons apply to the Cambodian situation. Finally, I will suggest a specific plan
for our extrication from Vietnam.

The national security of the United States is not involved in Vietnam, nor
does our national interest in the area warrant our continued military presence
there.

The basis of our original participation in the conflict in Vietnam was the gen-
eral acceptance of the so-called "domino theory." If South Vietnam were per-
mitted to fall, then other nations of Southeast Asia, and possibly even in the
Asian subcontinent, might topple, one after the other. If this occurred, it was
alleged, the national security of the United States would be adversely affected.
At one time, I accepted the reasonableness of this theory, but my own personal
experience has led me to the conclusion that it is now unsound.

One of the major reasons for the change in my own thinking has been the
attitude, evidenced over the last five years, of the nations in Asia that would be
most seriously affected if the domino theory were applicable. These nations are
infinitely better acquainted with the political, military and diplomatic facts of
life in that part of the world, for they have lived with them for hundreds of
years. As one looks at the map of the area, it is interesting to fan out from
South Vietnam and ascertain the number of troops that these countries have
sent to help South Vietnam because, in the final analysis, that is the most ac-
curate test of the degree of their concern.

Burma, Laos and Cambodia, to the west have sent no troops to South Vietnam,
Singapore and Malaysia have sent no troops, while Thailand has sent only token
forces.

The Philippines have sent no combat troops. The personnel of the engineering
units and hospital corps it did send have been largely withdrawn. Indonesia,
India and Pakistan have sent no troops.

These are the closest dominoes, and should be the first to fall.

As far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned, their behavior hardly justifies
any sacrifice of American lives or treasure on their behalf. The situation exist-
ing in these countries is incredibly sleazy, and should be known and understood
by all Americans.

Most of the men and materiel of war used to fight against American forces in
South Vietnam come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. Is Laos pre-
pared to make any sacrifice to prevent the use of the trail? Certainly not! In
fact, the exact opposite is the case. On March 6, 1970, Souvanna Phouma, prime
minister of Laos, had a press conference and said:

"I told the ambassador from North Vietnam last year that we will accept the
use of the trail by North Vietnamese troops with the condition that those troops
draw from the important regions of Laos."

While American pilots, on a sharply escalated basis, are fighting and dying in
support of Laotian forces engaged with Communist troops, the ruler of Laos
suggests a deal that would permit the North Vietnamese free use of the trail
through Laos to transport troops, guns and ammunition to kill Americans in
South Vietnam.

In Cambodia, for years, enemy supplies have come into the port of Sihanouk-
ville and have been transported across Cambodia into South Vietnam, to be used
Against American forces.

Laos and Cambodia have not been prepared to jeopardize their own interests
to prevent North Vietnam from conquering the South. In fact, at least until
Sihanouk's recent fall, both countries have been helping the North Vietnamese,
and maneuvering to make their own deals. The United States has become in-
volved in the age-old intrigue and chicanery that are traditional in the area.
I feel strongly that we have met, many times over, any obligation or commitment that we had in that part of the world, and I believe that the developments of the last five years should persuade us that the time has come to disengage in Southeast Asia and bring our men home.

I believe most Americans agree, but from what he says and does, President Nixon continues grossly to exaggerate Vietnam's importance to our national security.

In giving thought and study to this enigma, I have reached the conclusion that President Nixon has a curious obsession about Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Back in 1954, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in the East Room of the White House, then Vice President Nixon said: "If in order to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and particularly in Indochina, if in order to avoid it we must take the risk now of putting American boys in ... I personally would support such a decision." This is particularly startling because Mr. Nixon was recommending that we send American troops into Indochina to help the French who were engaged in war there to retain their colonial territories.

In 1965, President Nixon, then a private citizen, wrote a letter to the New York Times. In that letter, he declared that "victory for the Vietcong ... would mean ultimately the destruction of freedom of speech for all men for all time, not only in Asia but in the United States as well." In his speech of Nov. 3, 1969 he referred to the "great stakes involved in Vietnam," and asserted that they were no less than the maintenance of the peace "in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere."

I want very much for the President of the United States to be wise, mature and to exercise good judgment, but a statement of this kind shakes my confidence to its very core. I cannot remain silent when President Nixon acts as though he believes that a certain political result in a small underdeveloped country of 18 million persons in Southeast Asia is somehow crucial to "the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world."

I have learned these past years that the war in Vietnam is a local war arising out of the particular political conditions existing in Southeast Asia. I consider it a delusion to suggest that the war in Vietnam is part of a worldwide program of Communist aggression.

President Nixon continually argues that we must fight in Vietnam now to avoid "a bigger war or surrender later." But it is clear to me that the only real danger of a "bigger war" would come from the continued escalation of the rapidly widening conflict in Indochina.

We cannot win a military victory in South Vietnam, and we must, therefore, cease trying to do so.

The goal of winning a military victory in South Vietnam has proved to be a will-o'-the-wisp that has led us from one military adventure to another. I have reached the clear conclusion that we are not winning such a victory, nor can we win it in the future.

Certain restraints have been placed upon our military activity by the political realities that exist. We have been unwilling to invade North Vietnam, or to engage in indiscriminate bombing or mining of its harbors. As a result, we have been occupied in the most difficult type of guerrilla war and probably what is the most difficult terrain in which to fight. Our enormous firepower and our airpower are seriously limited and restricted by the fact that most of the fighting takes place in the deepest jungles in Southeast Asia.

In warfare, a nation has three major goals. The first is to kill as many of the enemy as possible on the field of battle. The second is to destroy the enemy's war-making potential and the third is to seize and hold enemy territory. In the present conflict, a substantial number of the enemy have been killed, but the troops from the North continue to come down in an uninterrupted flow. The enemy is well armed, well equipped and well trained, and is expert in guerrilla warfare. And Hanoi has made clear beyond any reasonable doubt its willingness and ability to accept substantial casualties for as long as necessary.

As the second goal, we have been unsuccessful because we are wholly unable to destroy the enemy's war-making potential. The factories turning out guns, rockets, mortars and the material of war are not located in North Vietnam, but in Red China and the Soviet Union. We cannot destroy the factories in those countries. We attempted instead to impede the flow of weapons into South Vietnam by a bombing campaign in the North. In my opinion, the results did not warrant the enormous cost to us.
We have been no more successful in pursuing the third goal of seizing and holding territory. The enemy does not operate along a battle line; his objective is not to hold territory. When we attack, the enemy yields but he returns when we move out.

In the pursuit of these goals, we have lost the lives of close to 45,000 Americans, had more than 275,000 wounded, spent over $125 billion, lost close to 7,000 planes, and we have dropped more tonnage of bombs in this conflict than we did in World War II and the Korean War combined.

Our problem in Vietnam is due not only to our inability to attain the military goals, despite our great effort, but to the fact that the struggle is basically a political one. The enemy continues to symbolize the forces of nationalism. The regime which we support is a narrowly based military dictatorship.

President Nixon has repeatedly asserted that the only alternative to his Vietnamization program is the "defeat and humiliation" of the United States. He has announced his determination not to accept this "first defeat" in our nation's history. The President's view constitutes in my opinion a complete misreading of the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam, of our role and purpose there and of the American national interest. The alternatives in Vietnam are not military victory on the one hand, or defeat and humiliation on the other. We did not intervene to conquer North Vietnam, but solely to extend a shield for South Vietnam. We did not intervene to impose any particular government on South Vietnam. The interests of the South Vietnamese people will be served and our objectives will be achieved by a realistic political settlement. A program for orderly disengagement will create the conditions in which productive negotiations become possible. Such a program is the only way to peace, and peace in Southeast Asia is the only victory that we should seek.

One of the deepest concerns I have about our present policy in Vietnam is that President Nixon, while he proclaims his dedication to a political settlement by his actions still seeks to gain the military victory that cannot be won.

We cannot continue to fight the war in Vietnam without doing serious and irreparable injury to our own country.

The effect of the war on the young people in the United States is a virulent one. They feel especially affected by the war because they are the ones who have to fight it. Many of them do not believe in it and they are at a loss to understand why they must fight and die in a remote corner of Southeast Asia when they know their country is in no peril whatsoever. One of the poisonous effects of the conflict is the disunity and bitterness, and in some instances violence, it has brought about in our country.

The war has confused many Americans and has caused a continuing loss of confidence because the institutions of our government have not dealt with the pressing problem of national priorities. Every domestic problem we have, including poverty, inadequate housing, crime, educational deficiencies, hunger and pollution is affected adversely by our participation in the Vietnam war, and I do not believe these problems will be brought under control until we have disengaged from that conflict.

The war is a major contributor to the inflation that is hurting every citizen in our nation. We are also in the midst of a serious setback as far as business is concerned. The effect of the war on our economy is dramatic. Almost immediately after our foolhardy entry into Cambodia, the Dow-Jones Industrial average declined over 19 points.

What troubles me is that President Nixon continues to give priority to policy in Indochina and to ignore its consequences at home. His actions are dividing the nation when we need desperately to be united and to devote our energies to our critical domestic problems.

The Cambodian invasion ignores these three lessons. The President ordered up to 20,000 American troops into Cambodia, and has now promised to have them out by July 1. I know already, in my own mind, that the operation will achieve little. The enemy will fade into the jungles of Cambodia, which, are just as impassable and impenetrable as those in Vietnam. Any military gains will be temporary and inconsequential.

This is not an idle prognostication upon my part but is an opinion derived from past experience. Time and again in South Vietnam, the recommendation was made that a sweep be conducted through the Ashau Valley on the grounds that a vital blow could be struck against enemy forces. Time and again, thousands of American troops would sweep through the valley and find practically no enemy soldiers. The same will happen in Cambodia.
Also, there is a curious psychology I cannot understand that attaches importance to capturing territory even though it is held for a temporary period. A perfect illustration is Hamburger Hill. We drove the enemy off Hamburger Hill at great loss of life to our troops, and then later on withdrew. As soon as we pulled out, the enemy reoccupied Hamburger Hill and we went back and repeated the process. I do not know who holds the hill today, I am sure it doesn't matter.

After the adventure is concluded and our troops have been pulled back to South Vietnam, I predict the enemy will quickly reoccupy the areas that we have cleared. Even if the decision were made to remain in Cambodia, then I predict the enemy will develop new bases and staging areas just outside the perimeter of the area we occupy in Cambodia. In either event, the military effect is negligible and not worth the effort.

President Nixon, in his address to the nation of April 30, informed the American people that the invasion of Cambodia is indispensable to the withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam, that it will serve the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam, that it will keep our casualties at a minimum, and that it will win a just peace.

These contentions violate every lesson that we have learned in the last five years in Vietnam. The bitter experience of those years demonstrates clearly to me that our incursion into Cambodia will delay the withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam because it spreads the war and intensifies it. This decision will not end the war, but will lengthen it because of the reactions of the enemy to this new development. It will not keep our casualties down but will increase them, not only because of the men killed in Cambodia but because of the increased level of combat which I predict will be the other side's response in Vietnam. It will not achieve peace but will postpone it or destroy entirely the chances of obtaining it. Even though we pull out, the damage has been done, and the bankruptcy of our present Vietnamization program has been exposed.

The thrust of President Nixon's position in his speech of April 30 was that if we escalated our efforts into Cambodia, it would aid our program of Vietnamization.

How unfortunate it is that President Nixon did not heed the congressional testimony of Secretary of State William P. Rogers when he testified on April 29, just one week before the President spoke. Secretary Rogers said:

"We have no incentive to escalate. Our whole incentive is to de-escalate. We recognize that if we escalate and get involved in Cambodia with our ground troops, that our whole program [Vietnamization] is defeated."

I anticipate that in the period of the next few weeks glowing reports will flow back from Vietnam regarding the outstanding success of the drive into Cambodia. Figures will be proudly presented showing the number of tons of rice captured, bunkers and staging areas destroyed, substantial numbers of weapons and quantities of ammunition found. A determined effort will be made to portray the entire adventure as a success, even though no major engagements will have taken place and the number of enemy casualties will be woefully small. This has happened time and time again, and our hopes have been raised only to be dashed by new enemy offensives. The capture of supplies and equipment, in the past, has been met by an increase in the supply of such equipment by the Soviet Union and China, with resulting increased flow down the pipeline from North Vietnam.

I fear that in the near future we will have a whole new set of problems. The open violation of Cambodian neutrality on the part of our troops could well constitute an open invitation to the North Vietnamese to expand their efforts further over Indochina on the pretext of defending independence. Our march into Cambodia now jeopardizes the ancient capitals of Phnom Penh and Vientiane. I do not have the prescience to visualize what may take place in this regard, but I know that we have greatly expanded the danger of the conflict spreading throughout Cambodia and Laos, and even further.

Although I consider the attack on Cambodia to be fraught with the most serious military consequences, I attach even greater danger to the diplomatic results that will flow from it.

"Many of our friends around the world are shocked at this imprudent expansion of the conflict. They had hoped that they would see a contraction of the area of conflict and instead they learn, with deep apprehension, that it is being widened. The Cambodian adventure ignored the request of Foreign Minister Malik of Indonesia that no action be taken to extend arms support to Cambodia pending an regional conference to find ways of preserving that country's neutrality.
The decision appears to have been made precipitately that the proper consideration was not given to the effect of the action on Communist China. The action was taken just after the recent conference of Communist representatives from China, Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. This conference ended with an agreement of mutual support and cooperation in combating American and other enemy forces in Indochina.

The predictable Soviet reaction was also apparently discounted. Premier Kosygin, on May 4, called a special news conference to warn of the worsening in Soviet-American relations. Mr. Kosygin stated that the Cambodian move raised serious doubts about President Nixon's sincerity in seeking an "era of negotiation." Mr. Kosygin went so far as to suggest that President Nixon's statements could not be trusted. This does not mean that either China or Russia will intervene directly, but it does mean that they will give North Vietnam all the aid it needs to neutralize our action.

Another unfortunate result of our action is to imperil the success of the strategic arms talks now being held in Vienna. Mr. Kosygin stated that our actions put the Soviet Union on guard and decrease their confidence, without which it is difficult to conduct negotiations.

Domestically, the re-escalation of the war has gravely increased the disaffection of young Americans, and the disruption of our society.

The active invasion dramatizes another facet of President Nixon's statements on the war which has caused me the deepest concern. In his speech of April 30, President Nixon again warned the North Vietnamese that, if they accelerated the fighting, he would take stern action in response. He has done this on at least four or five occasions and, in each instance, the enemy has responded to some type of military action. I suggest that this is the road to utter chaos. While announcing the withdrawal of a limited number of troops on the one hand, the President keeps threatening the enemy by assuring him that we are perfectly willing to raise the level of combat. This is not the path to peace. It is the path that will lead to more and more fighting and more and more dying.

It is time now to end our participation in the war. We must begin the rapid, orderly, complete, and scheduled withdrawal of United States forces from Indochina.

President Nixon has described his program of Vietnamization as a plan for peace. I believe, however, that it can never bring peace in Southeast Asia, and that it is, in fact, a formula for perpetual war.

This war can only be ended by a political settlement. Nothing that the Administration is now doing holds any promise of bringing one about. Our present program for indefinite military presence in Vietnam makes such political settlement impossible. So long as our withdrawals are conditioned on the ability of the South Vietnamese to assume the combat burden, Hanoi cannot be expected to believe that we are genuinely interested in, or would even accept, the kind-of political compromise that a peaceful settlement would require. The present Saigon government, on the other hand, will never make the necessary accommodations so long as it is secure in the belief that American forces will remain in sufficient numbers to keep it in power.

It seems clear that the Administration believes it has proposed in Paris a genuine basis for compromise. In my opinion, however, these proposals are not realistic, nor will they lead to any progress.

Accordingly, what we need is a program that will Vietnamize the peace rather than prolong the war. In July 1969, in an article in the magazine Foreign Affairs, I recommended the definite, scheduled withdrawal of our ground combat forces from Vietnam by the end of 1970. I now propose to go further, and set a final date for our complete disengagement. Such final date might even be advanced if certain agreements are reached. The following is my specific three-point plan:

1. Announce publicly that all U.S. forces are to be removed from any combat role anywhere in Southeast Asia no later than Dec. 31, 1970, and that all U.S. military personnel will be out of Indochina by the end of 1971, if the latest provided only that arrangements have been made for the release of all U.S. prisoners of war.

2. Move promptly to end B-52 attacks, all search-and-destroy missions, and all other offensive operations, except as necessary to protect the security of U.S. forces. As disengagement proceeds.

3. Inform Hanoi and Saigon that we are prepared to negotiate an even more rapid withdrawal if the safety of our forces is assured by a cease-fire or other
arrangements in South Vietnam, and if there is an understanding regarding the cessation of military pressures in Laos and Cambodia.

President Nixon has maintained that, were he to announce a withdrawal schedule, Hanoi would lose all incentive to negotiate a settlement. It is abundantly clear, however, that Hanoi feels no incentive to negotiate at the present time. The President has also asserted that North Vietnam would then simply wait until our troops have been reduced in number and launch attacks. But this potential exists whether a withdrawal program is announced in advance, or simply in installments. A third objection has been that the South Vietnamese forces may not be ready to assume the full combat burden and that a military conquest and bloodbath may ensue. But our objective should be to establish the conditions that will lead, not to the continued necessity for combat capability, but rather to a political compromise that will bring peace and stability to that troubled land.

On a number of occasions, President Nixon, in arguing that it would be improper for us to leave Vietnam now, has used the so-called "bloodbath" argument: He has suggested that the massacre of many South Vietnamese, including a million and a half Catholics who fled from the North, would occur when our forces withdrew.

I find this position difficult to understand. In the first place, the figure of one million and a half Catholics who fled to the South, referred to by President Nixon in his speech of Nov. 3, 1969, is incorrect. A study of this subject, published in 1966, by the South Vietnam Department of Education and the National Commission for UNESCO, discloses that the number is not 1.5 million but 754,710. This is significant because the President overlooked the fact that there are still living in North Vietnam today approximately 800,000 Catholics. There are also Catholics among the leadership of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam.

The President bases his claim of "bloodbath" on his charge that when the Communists took over North Vietnam in 1954, they slaughtered thousands upon thousands of North Vietnamese. In fact, the records of the International Control Commission disclose that in the two years following the armistice of 1954, only 19 complaints were filed covering political reprisals in all of North Vietnam. Later, in 1955 and 1956, a peasant revolt was harshly repressed, and the best estimate are that 10,000 to 15,000 may have died.

It is my firm belief that, when it becomes apparent that the Americans are in fact leaving, all parties seeking power in South Vietnam will have a strong incentive to negotiate a compromise settlement. All will recognize that compromise is their one assurance of a share in political power. The contending factions must now be aware that, in the absence of compromise, they can look forward only to continued conflict and disruption. The need for peace must now be apparent to all but the very few whose power and profit depend on war. We should not forget that, in South Vietnam's election of 1967, and under circumstances that could hardly be described as favorable, a candidate advocating accommodation for the purpose of peace secured 17% of the votes counted, while the winning military ticket fell far short of a majority.

The North Vietnamese negotiators have indicated their willingness to talk seriously if the United States declares the total and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam. Their suggestion of a six-month period of such withdrawal need not be accepted, but their acceptance of the principle should not be ignored.

The obvious advantage of the three-point plan proposed herein is that it will specifically and unequivocally have all U.S. forces out of Indochina by the end of 1971, at the latest. It also frees the President from military pressure to slow or stop the withdrawal process. The plan takes 'account of the plight of the Americans now held captive and gives them and their families the hope of early release. No such hope can exist while the war continues and even intensifies. It offers also an immediate reduction in the level of violence throughout Vietnam. The ending of B-52 raids and search-and-destroy missions so long as the other side does not act to jeopardize the security of our troops, will lower casualties and create a climate far more hospitable to the process of political settlement. This approach could serve to get negotiations started again, and as they progress, this diminution in hostilities can develop into a complete cease-fire.

The time has come for us to grasp the initiative in making the necessary and vital decisions. President Nixon's policy of making our withdrawal dependent
on his three criteria is a grievous error. These criteria are: (1) the level of enemy activity; (2) progress at the peace talks in Paris, and (3) the speed with which the South Vietnamese take over the fighting. Even a cursory study discloses that items one and two are controlled by Hanoi, while item three is controlled by Saigon.

We should no longer allow our own perception of our own interests to be distorted or deflected by our apprehensions as to what may occur politically in Saigon. American national interests require American disengagement from South Vietnam. I am convinced that, as presently enunciated, the Nixon program will not bring this about.

We should, instead, decide now to get out of Vietnam on a scheduled and orderly basis no later than the end of 1971. We should, at the same time, make known our readiness to negotiate a much earlier withdrawal and we should move now to scale down the level of violence. Only in this way can we achieve the peace that all Americans want, and that American military might can never win.

The present policy must be changed. The only effective method to accomplish this is sustained pressure from the public. The enormous upswing in antiwar sentiment, following the Cambodian transgression, must be maintained and strengthened and continuously brought to the attention of our country's leaders.

The solution is within our hands—if we will but use it.

(The following information was subsequently submitted for the record.)

Policy Statements of Mr. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, and Mr. Michael Stewart, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in the House of Commons on May 5, 1970:

Winding up the emergency debate on Cambodia in the House of Commons on May 5, the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, referred to the concern over recent events in Cambodia and Vietnam that had been felt in Britain. Emphasizing the need for immediate action, the Prime Minister listed five points on which he said the British Government intended to base its efforts to find a solution. These he asked the House to endorse.

"First, that the House gives its full backing to the actions of the Government, in this perspective of danger, aimed at convening a conference capable of ensuring that all these questions can be resolved round the conference table.

"Second, that, as a matter of urgency, all the efforts of (the British) Government, together with all those whom we can influence or persuade, should be directed to securing the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the soil of Cambodia.

"Third, ... the withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign intervention from Vietnam itself as soon as we have secured the element of a lasting and honorable settlement which assures to the people of Vietnam their own inalienable right to decide for themselves their own future ... .

"Fourth, that the Indo-Chinese territories, areas from which peace has been a stranger now for the whole of a quarter of a century since war ended in Europe, should have the right of peaceful development free from foreign interference. For this purpose they should have the right to declare their neutrality free of foreign interference and to have that neutrality respected by international agreement.

"Fifth ... that the conflict of Southeast Asia, and every manifestation of that conflict, cannot be decided on a world scale without the representation on a world scale at the United Nations of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people."

At the start of the debate the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, reiterated his views on the need for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

"... I will go this far ... It is right for us to draw the attention of the American Government to anxieties in this country, indeed the whole world, that the action which they have taken might have the result of hindering rather than helping the policy of withdrawal ... I do not believe that it is right for us to pronounce ... judgment ... It seems to me that the task of this country
is to assert and to continue to work for a policy of an agreed and negotiated solution, which has been ours from the start.

"We have also felt, throughout all this dispute, that it should be possible to bring this within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. So far, the hostility of North Vietnam and others has prevented this."

The Chairman: The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)