The Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable F. Edward Hebert, chairman, presiding.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Members of the committee, we are meeting this morning on a resolution introduced by the gentle lady from New York, Mrs. Abzug, H. Res. 918. You have the resolutions asking for certain information, and Mrs. Abzug is here to testify. We will put the resolution in the record at this point.

(H. Res. 918 reads as follows:)

A RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING THE BOMBING IN VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

[HA.G.C. No. 92-44]
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 11, 1972

Mrs. Anzue submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the President and the Secretary of Defense be, and they are hereby, directed to furnish the House of Representatives, within ten days after the adoption of this resolution, with full and complete information on the following:

1. (a) The number of United States military personnel in South Vietnam at the present time;

2. (b) The number of these individuals who are combat personnel;

3. (2) (a) The number of sorties flown by United States military airplanes, for bombing purposes, in and over North Vietnam during the first ten days of March 1972;
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(b) The number of sorties flown by United States military airplanes, for bombing purposes, in and over North Vietnam during the first ten days of April 1972;

c) The number of sorties flown by United States military airplanes, for bombing purposes, in and over South Vietnam during the first ten days of March 1972;

d) The number of sorties flown by United States military airplanes, for bombing purposes, in and over South Vietnam during the first ten days of April 1972;

3 (a) The tonnage of bombs and shells fired or dropped into North Vietnam by the United States during the first ten days of March 1972;

(b) The tonnage of bombs and shells fired or dropped into North Vietnam by the United States during the first ten days of April 1972;

c) The tonnage of bombs and shells fired or dropped into South Vietnam by the United States during the first ten days of March 1972;

d) The tonnage of bombs and shells fired or dropped into South Vietnam by the United States during the first ten days of April 1972;

5 (a) The cost of all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in or over North Vietnam during the first ten days of March 1972, including the costs of bombs and shells, ships and airplanes employed in the transportation
and dropping or firing of such bombs and shells, maintenance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of United States military personnel involved in operating and maintaining such ships and airplanes, and all other expenses attributable to such bombing and shelling;

(b) The cost of all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in or over North Vietnam during the first ten days of April 1972, including the costs of bombs and shells, ships and airplanes employed in the transportation and dropping or firing of such bombs and shells, maintenance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of United States military personnel involved in operating and maintaining such ships and airplanes, and all other expenses attributable to such bombing and shelling;

(c) The cost of all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in or over South Vietnam during the first ten days of March 1972, including the costs of bombs and shells, ships and airplanes employed in the transportation and dropping or firing of such bombs and shells, maintenance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of United States military personnel involved in operating and maintaining such ships and airplanes, and all other expenses attributable to such bombing and shelling;

(d) The cost of all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in or over South Vietnam during the first
ten days of April 1972, including the costs of bombs and
shells, ships and airplanes employed in the transportation
and dropping or firing of such bombs and shells, mainte-
nance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of United States
military personnel involved in operating and maintaining
such ships and airplanes, and all other expenses attributable
to such bombing and shelling;
(6) List separately the number of United States mili-
tary personnel (if any) killed, wounded or reported missing
in action during (a) the first ten days of March 1972 and
(b) the first ten days of April 1972, specifying how many
in each such category were killed, wounded or reported missing in action in or over South Vietnam and how many in each
such category were killed, wounded or reported missing in action in or over North Vietnam;
(7) Whether there is a target date for the achievement
by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam of complete mili-
tary independence of United States air, naval, and ground
support and participation and, if so, what date;
(8) Whether there has been any bombing or shelling
carried on by the United States in or over Laos or Cambodia
since January 1, 1972, and, if so, the number of sorties flown
by United States military airplanes, for bombing purposes,
in or over Laos or Cambodia, since that date, the tonnage of
bombs and shells fired or dropped by the United States into
or over Laos or Cambodia since that date, and the cost of
all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in
or over Laos or Cambodia since that date, including the costs
of bombs and shells, ships and airplanes employed in the
transportation and dropping or firing of such bombs and
shells, maintenance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of
United States military personnel involved in operating and
maintaining such ships and airplanes, and all other expenses
attributable to such bombing and shelling;

(9). Whether there has been an increase in the move-
ment of military airplanes, military ships, other military
equipment, military supplies, or military personnel of the
United States to Southeast Asia, including the islands of
the South Pacific Ocean, since March 15, 1972 (relative
to the thirty-day period immediately preceding that date),
and, if so, the nature and extent of the increase in each such
category; and

(10) What actions, if any, have been taken to comply
with the provisions of section 601 of Public Law 92-156,
approved November 17, 1971.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rules of the committee, in accordance with the procedure, we usually recognize a member of the committee who desires to testify on a bill first. However, Mr. Harrington has asked to testify but has waived his request in deference to the fact that Mrs. Abzug has introduced the bill.

So, Mrs. Abzug, will you come around?

You have appeared before the committee before, you will be allowed to present your statement without interruption after which the members will ask questions as they desire.

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, I was awaiting distribution of my statement to the committee, Mr. Chairman. Do you want me to proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. BELLA S. ABZUG, REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you for having me appear before you on H. Res. 918 which is a resolution of inquiry concerning the bombing in Vietnam by the United States Government.

Four days ago, the Nixon administration carried out massive B-52 and jetstrikes against Haiphong and Hanoi. Hitting late at night in the most densely populated areas in Indochina, these sneak attacks constitute the most dramatic proof yet that the Nixon administration is entirely committed to a fullscale and longterm U. S. air war in Indochina instead of negotiating a full withdrawal in return for the release of our captured pilots.

I do not know if you will agree with me that such highlevel saturation bombings of heavily populated areas must necessarily have killed and maimed thousands of civilians.

Nor do I know if you will concur that these bombings serve no useful military end as we have learned from previous experience; that they lead to the capture of more of our airmen, the prolongation of the captivity of those already interned and endanger their physical safety, and that far from protecting our ground troops in the southern part of Vietnam, the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will increase the danger to them.

And finally, I do not know if you accept my belief that these bombings—and the war in general—represent a totalitarian indifference to the clear desire of the American people to withdraw from Indochina if our captured pilots can be released; that by continuing these acts of indiscriminate aerial slaughter the Nixon administration will irrevocably split this country apart in the months to come.

But I am certain that we can agree on one basic point; the American people have a right to know what administration officials are doing in their name.

There is no principle more basic to our democracy than the separation of powers between the Executive, legislative, and judicial branches, undergirded by a fully enlightened electorate with the right to select leaders who will represent their desires. Yet this concept of democracy absolutely demands that all branches of our society have access to the information on which policy is made. If Congress and the public are kept in the dark about matters of high policy, how can they participate in democratic decisionmaking?
One of the most dramatic examples of the horrors that can occur when this democratic process breaks down is the Vietnam war itself. The vast majority of the American people and their Congressional representatives are now agreed that our original involvement in Vietnam was a tragic error. The Pentagon Papers make it unmistakably clear, however, that our involvement in Vietnam did not arise out of the acts of Congress or the American people.

It was, rather, top officials of the Executive branch who unilaterally plunged this country into Vietnam by systematically hiding the real facts of our intervention from the rest of the country.

Can anyone doubt that had Congress and the people been informed about the real nature of the regimes we supported in Vietnam, the facts of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the popular appeal of our adversaries there, that we might well have avoided the Vietnam quagmire?

Of all the Executive deception about the war over the last decade, however, none has been more catastrophic in its consequences than the Nixon administration's blatant management of information about its air war.

Since taking office, the Nixon administration has dropped over 3.2 millions tons of bombs on Indochina, bombing more than any government has done in the history of warfare; it has doubled the bombing of Laos; it has initiated a fullscale air war in Cambodia; it has already bombed North Vietnam on 328 admitted occasions before the recent counteroffensive began in South Vietnam; it has spent well over $10 billion on this bombing; well over 300 airmen who are alive and well when the administration took office are now listed as captured or missing in action.

The evidence is overwhelming that this air war under President Nixon has destroyed hundreds if not thousands of villages, killed and wounded tens of thousands of other civilians, underground, or into refugee camps, and that it has altered the very land of Indochina itself. (See appendixes). There can be no doubt that far from winding down the war, the administration has simply substituted highly sophisticated automated war for the ground warfare of the Johnson years.

Despite the massive dimensions of President Nixon's air war, however, few of us in Congress and even fewer of the general public have received more than the scantiest of information about it from official sources.

On the contrary. The Nixon administration has made strenuous efforts to keep the facts about the bombing hidden from the American public so as to diminish its effect on domestic opinion.

Some of the means it has used to manage news about the air war include the following:

1. It has prohibited newsmen from going out on bombing raids or being flown to the front outside of South Vietnam. Until recent months, the vast majority of U. S. air sorties, and some of the bloodiest fighting, has taken place outside of South Vietnam. Newsmen, however, are prohibited from going out on bombing raids in these countries, or from flying to the front when U. S.-supported Asian armies retake bombed-out villages.

*Not received at time of printing.
As a result, the war has been largely taken off the front pages and TV screens, thereby deluding many Americans into thinking it has been “winding down”.

This prevention of newsmen from observing the war does not appear to be for fear that they would violate military security. Reporters had always been allowed into the air and to the front in South Vietnam under President Johnson.

Rather, it is clearly an attempt to muffle domestic dissent by waging an invisible war. And a recent New York Times story revealed that this policy is notably continuing, but being extended; that the Nixon administration is even now attempting to limit access of reporters to the war in South Vietnam.

2. It has classified much important information, most of which is already known to our adversaries, out of public reach. Such crucial issues as the amount of bombing going on outside of South Vietnam in any given month, the incidence of use of antipersonnel and incendiary weapons, the real cost of the air war, the locations and circumstances surrounding our aircraft and pilot losses in the skies over Indochina, and a host of other air war information such as that requested in my resolution of inquiry has been kept secret by the administration.

Once again, this is not information which would help our adversaries. They know what kind of weapons are being used against them, when attack are escalated, how and where they shoot down our pilots. The only people to whom this information is “classified” are the American people. This policy, too, continues until this very moment. On April 12 the New York Times dispatch revealed that the administration had extended its “classification” policy to any details of the bombing of North Vietnam, even the few that had been revealed under President Johnson.

3. It has deliberately created a false image of a sterile and antiseptic air war conducted solely against military targets—time and again administration officials tirelessly proclaim before Congress, the American people and the world, that they do not bomb civilian targets in Indochina, that the only targets hit are military.

They refuse to reaw any estimates of the civilian casualties bombing causes, although the Pentagon Papers reveal that such estimates are available—as when Robert McNamara estimated that the bombing was causing 1,000 civilian casualties a week in North Vietnam. They create such Orwellian terms as “protective reaction strikes”, implying that losing hundreds of tons of bombs on the rural society of North Vietnam is somehow defensive in nature.

Even the massive Christmas 1971 bombings, involving several hundreds aircraft striking at North Vietnam for five days in succession, were classified as just one of these protective reaction strikes, termed a “limited duration protective reaction strike”.

An authoritative study of the air war by the Center for International Studies of Cornell University noted that “in a strategic bombing campaign, strategic targets are located near predominantly civilian areas”. For the administration to claim, as it has, that the recent saturation bombings of the Haiphong area, a region inhabited by over 300,000 people, were carried out only against military targets is more than just a half-truth. It is part of a conscious and Orwellian pattern.
of thought control about the air war which once again continues until the present moment.

I believe it is clear that such management of information about the air war is antithetical to the principles upon which this country was founded: that such information control is not only unworthy of a great democracy, but presents a clear and present danger to it; that unless the American people and we in Congress can receive far more information than we are now getting about the air war, it will lead not only to even greater physical destruction of Indochina, but to an increasing trend to the destruction of democracy here at home as we now know it.

Accordingly, I am today submitting to this committee a number of questions about the air war which I hope it will in turn submit to the executive branch for public answer.

These questions are simple and straightforward. They do not ask for information that could be of value to our adversaries. They do not reveal future plans that could endanger our pilots.

Indeed, these questions in and of themselves are but a minimal beginning to fuller public understanding of the air war. They deal primarily with the physical dimensions of our bombing and shelling and the areas in which they are being carried out. Far more important questions—such as the incidence of use of antipersonnel and incendiary weapons, the numbers of villages, schools, and hospitals we have bombed, the estimated numbers of civilians who have been killed and wounded by the bombing and shelling—could and should be asked. But I have decided to begin with the rather basic and elemental questions appended to this statement.

I hope that you will assist me in attempting to get answers to these questions, not only for the sake of the people of Indochina, but for the sake of the continuation of democracy in this land.

Every word of every chapter of every book on totalitarianism that has ever been written stresses that totalitarian control begins with the management of information. It is my belief that the present secrecy concerning the Nixon administration’s air war in Indochina is the most dramatic example of growing domestic authoritarianism in the history of this Republic.

Let us put aside partisan judgments today and take this one small step to reverse this trend, this beginning step toward the freedom of information of which this country has been so justly proud.

Let us realize that if history may well pass a harsh judgment of those of us who have supported indiscriminate aerial slaughter in Indochina, it will surely have no forgiveness for those who would not even fully inform the American people about it.

If we cannot agree that this bombing is wrong, let us at least all agree that the secrecy surrounding it is wrong.

This is the least we owe our country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Abzug, I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, in the consideration of this resolution which was submitted on April 11th, that the committee consider bringing it up to date by amending sections of it to include a new 2(e), the tonnage of bombs and shells fired or dropped into North Vietnam by the United States during the second ten days of April 1972, and that a new 5(e), which would add the cost of
all bombing and shelling carried on by the United States in or over
North Vietnam during the second days of April 1972, including the
cost of bombs and shells, ships, and airplanes, employed in the trans­
portation in dropping and firing of such bombs and shells, mainte­
nance of such ships and airplanes, salaries of United States military
personnel involved in operating and maintaining such ships and air­
planes, and all other expenses attributable to such bombing and shelling in section 6, section 11, add second ten days of April 1972.

If the committee is to act on this I think in view of the events that
occurred since the filing of this resolution 918 that the information
that this committee should act upon should be brought up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. We will consider that when we consider the resolu­
tion. Will you pass your proposed amendment to Mr. Slatsinshak? The
committee will consider it when we take action on the resolution. Mr.
Arends?

Mr. Arends. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price.

Mr. Price. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray?

Mr. Bennett.

Mr. Bennett. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pike.

Mr. Pike. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. King?

Mr. King. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson?

Mr. Dickinson. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence?

Mr. Spence. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Powell?

Mr. Powell. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nichols.

Mr. Brinkley, Mr. Mollohan, Mr. Daniel, Mr. Montgomery, Mr.
Harrington.

Mr. Harrington. I wonder if you would state whether the efforts
with the gentleman behind you, with Mr. Doolin—on the question of
getting information from the Department of Defense prior to intro­
ducing this resolution?

Mrs. Abzug. No, there wasn't enough time. I frankly was quite
shocked at the continuing and accelerating bombing that was taking
place and brought this resolution on immediately when the House re­
turned from its recess, and as is sometimes the practice after a resolu­
tion is filed, there is some effort made to offer information, but no one
has been offered and I have not had the time; frankly, in order to expedi­
te the information for the use of the resolution of inquiry I felt
that it was within the province of this committee to secure that
information.

Mr. Harrington. Are you familiar with Mr. Doolin's response to
your request before the committee this morning?

Mrs. Abzug. No, I am not.

Mr. Harrington. If I could, I would like to read it for both your
benefit and for the benefit of the committee. This is addressed to our
chairman, Mr. Hébert, dated April 14th, and it isn't Mr. Doolin, it is
Mr. Buzhardt's, the language is so remarkably similar, I was in error.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN. Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense with respect to H. Res. 918 which would direct the President and the Secretary of Defense to furnish the House of Representatives full and complete information concerning the specifics of various military operations in Southeast Asia.

In view of the fact that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam are now actively engaged, with United States assistance, in repelling an armed attack in force across the Demilitarized Zone, it would in the judgment of the Department of Defense be incompatible with the public interest to provide the information in the manner directed by the resolution.

We will, of course, continue to provide briefings to your Committee in order to keep them current on all military operations including the matters which are the subject of H. Res. 918.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

(signed) J. Fred Buzhardt.

That, I think, speaks for itself, but I thought it would be helpful for you to know this.

MRS. ABZUG. Thank you, Mr. Harrington.

MR. HARRINGTON. It is very similar to the treatment received by Congressman Aspin and myself to date, attempting to get similar information.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aspin.

Mr. ASPIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ichord.

Mr. Ichord. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Hunt. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Runnels.

Mr. Runnels. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask what the provisions of section 61 of Public Law 92-156 are, that you are requesting in this bill?

MRS. ABZUG. The provisions provided under the Military Procurement Act that the President should set a date negotiated withdrawal of our troops solely upon release of our—contingent solely upon the release of our prisoners.

I submit that that was the policy of the Congress of the United States. It was a law which was signed by the President and I see no evidence that the President has in any way carried out the law as provided under section 601, and as a matter of fact, my comments on that have been the subject of another motion, previous to this time.

If you want me to read it to you it provides—

Mr. Runnels. No, I think you have answered the question, and I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gubser?

Mr. GUBSER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Whitehurst?

Mr. WHITEHURST. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fisher. Mr. Young. Mr. Clancy.

Mr. Fisher. No questions.

Mr. Young. No questions.
Mr. Clancy. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. Abzug, thank you very much for your appearance this morning.
Mrs. Abzug. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit some accompanying material to my statement.
The CHAIRMAN. You may. Without objection you may submit it at this point in the record.
Mrs. Abzug. Thank you, sir.
(The material had not been received at the time hearing went to press.)
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harrington, you asked to be recognized as a witness.
Mr. Harrington, you may proceed as a witness.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Harrington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the chance to testify this morning. I come without a prepared statement, simply because I decided at the last moment that as futile as it may be, that it was worth, at least attempting to do something that I think this committee particularly but the Congress itself has been remiss in doing.
Let me, if I can review my concern, and make some observations which I feel, at least momentarily based on my limited service on this committee I have a right to make.
From the last public pronouncement of the President on January 25th, which I thought in its candor was both desirable and healthy in outlining the efforts at secret negotiations, and the failure of those negotiations, I become increasingly concerned that we were committed in Indochina in general to a long, indefinite, and very costly commitment.
The dimensions of this commitment the American public were not aware of. The dimensions of which the Congress, to its own discredit, were not aware of. And I become concerned enough to begin to try to reflect on what might be done, given the limitations of both my own presence in the Congress, but more importantly the inordinately broad subject matter, to broaden the awareness.
I say it because I think whether it be by design or it be by an effort in the usual political sense to create optimism where none should exist, or to take credit where perhaps there should be an effort made at more balance, there had been an effort to encourage the brief that with a diminution of our force level from approximately 655,000 in the Johnson administration, which the spokesmen are always careful to point out, to approximately 69,000 by May 1st, that somehow our effort in Vietnam was going to come to an end, and the public was encouraged to believe that Vietnamisation at least measured that way was successful.
It seemed to me, with the knowledge that I had, that came from both this committee, and in general, the existence of five air bases in Thailand, with the presence of anywhere from two to four carriers off the coast of South Vietnam and North Vietnam, that that
was not necessarily in keeping with the dimensions of our involvement, and that efforts ought to be made if this is the course we are embarking on, to get both the Congress and the people of this country to face the consequences of this policy.

Accordingly, in the course of the hearings that we have had to date, I asked both Secretary Froehlke and General Westmoreland what portion of the total Army budget, including that which we have before us and in general the total overall request for fiscal 1973 was to be committed to South Vietnam.

Neither at the time professed to know, but agreed to provide it for the record—which they did, classified as usual "secret".

The Navy has given me in classified fashion the patently absurd figure of about 25.3 million dollars of incremental cost which they attribute to the cost of their presence in Southeast Asia for the next calendar year.

I have not yet received a response from the Air Force.

In keeping with this I wrote to Secretary Laird, I would say approximately six weeks ago, and in general ask general information about the magnitude of the bombing, the costs of it, where it was going, and received a letter which I believe Congressman Aspin had received prior to mine and which others have received since that time, which cited an inability to be precise and in general a reference to the sensitivity of the material being such that it could only be given perhaps to this committee in a secret session or a closed session.

I therefore reluctantly, because I did not think it was responsibly answered, ask the chairman of this committee to call for a closed session at which Mr. Doolin or others might be present to provide us with the information.

A reasonably lengthy period of time expired from that request, and while I was traveling in Southeast Asia—which is another story I hope to relate to this committee and to the Congress at some point in the future—a letter was received from the chairman of the committee, and from the Department of Defense indicating that both in terms of my traveling in Asia to the areas affected, and in addition the material that was sent me by the Department of Defense at the request of the chairman, I should be in general satisfied they had been responsive.

I obviously am not. I don't think that sending me testimony from the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Seamans, which was given in this committee, and other material which was mimeographed with pencil markings on it is responsive to certain specific questions.

I say these things not because they are new to you people, and perhaps new to those who follow the Congress, but I say them only because I think they have to be said again and again. If the policy we pursue makes any sense, then I don't know why those who defend it with vigor don't open up the closed doors of this committee, don't make an effort as was suggested during the course of one of those briefings that is supposed to be so substantial which in my opinion are not—and I am referring specifically to the Admiral Moorer briefing last week—don't make an effort to take their case as they profess they want to behind the closed doors of this committee to the American people.
If they are made to understand the costs which are so far, I think, concealed to a degree, and if they are made to understand the dimensions of the risks that are involved, and in general the stakes that I think we have committed ourselves to, not only in Vietnam, but in Laos, in Cambodia, and more interestingly in Thailand, then I think perhaps there will be a degree of vindication on the part of what is the obvious majority view of this committee. But I can’t help but feel—and I say this not because I occupy a very, very minority point of view on the committee but because I share, I hope, an institutional concern where an increasing lack of identity on the part of this Congress, that perhaps the other requisite equipment that should come with service in the committee is a bucket of whitewash and a brush.

I say it because I think that we are regularly too responsive and I cite this as a particular example, to what the Department of Defense wants done. They know it. And they use it that way. And that we legitimize perhaps not only to the disadvantage of those who share the Department of Defense view, but certainly from the point of view of the broad public which is not aware of this day-to-day nature of our committee, actions which I think just in the course of adversary proceedings deserve more substantial treatment than they are given.

I don’t expect that this morning I am going to change the way of life. I don’t expect this morning that all of you all of a sudden are going to agree with me on the committee or perhaps in the House, but I would suggest we have a broad obligation and one that I don’t think we do a very good job meeting day to day to inform people. That we have a broad obligation, also, to be independent of the executive branch and not refer by mail and not refer other requests to the Department of Defense for response. But to have that healthy adversary nature of the proceedings which might lead to enlightenment on the part of this Congress if they want that enlightenment, and more importantly awareness on the part of the public.

I am not here this morning contending for the point of view that what Bella Abzug is suggesting is all that is needed or that is correct or that I endorse her language in every respect. I just suggest it is endemic to what is wrong with the institution we are a part of and I suggest further that this committee reflect that to a greater degree than it should.

And again, if the committee majority wishes to endorse what was said to the committee and what I can sense its general feeling is about what we should be doing in this area, then let’s adopt the suggestion Mr. Lennan made last week of opening up this process to broad public exposure and not join with each other behind closed doors regularly railing against the Senate, in railing against the people in the media, and the peace forces that somehow are blamed for the disruptions that occur in the country.

I think it would be healthy from every respect and I think it might frankly bring the Congress and bring this committee to the point where we can make a substantial contribution and not be a pale carbon copy of what DOD wish to have the American people believe is an endorsement of their point of view.

Mr. Doolin is here this morning and I assume—or Mr. Baghardt, I am not sure—and can speak for himself.
But I hope whether you agree with my position, or whether you agree with the position of the committee as stated by some of its spokesmen, we can have more substantiality attached to what goes on. This war has been very costly. The dimensions of it have been spelled out. My concern is only that we contribute in misleading the American people, that somehow we are getting out when the opposite is the case, and I think we have that obligation that exists independent of the executive branch to inform them as fully as we can of the nature, the scope, and the cost of this involvement.

It is for this reason that I join with Mrs. Abzug in asking this committee to give more than pro forma consideration to the request and to force the executive department to do something more than ritualistically invoke national security for the reason for not giving this information. I think the time has long passed where stamping something confidential, will suffice on the part of the Congress and the people of this country, to keep them from knowing what their business is. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Harrington, for your observations and your criticism of the committee.

Each man is a keeper of his own conscience, of course.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I am aware of that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure while we may disagree in philosophy, and may disagree in objectives, those who agree in the democratic form of government do believe in the rule of the majority.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I never disputed it, and I appreciate your administration of it with the fairness that characterized my service on the committee, and that has never been the subject, I hope, of any implied or direct criticism I made of the function of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee is run by the rules of the majority. Any time the majority changes its views the Chair will change his position with the rule of the majority. I may say, too, this is no way personal or anything, but you seem very uncomfortable on the committee. Remember you came on this committee as a supplicant, pleading, crying, begging to get on it. And any day you don't like the way the committee is run, or it makes you uncomfortable here, you have the same privilege of leaving the committee.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I appreciate the directness of the message, Mr. Chairman. I didn't realize it was going to be a——

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have been on the committee long enough to know I am direct.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I informed or propagandized in general on this subject. I don't know I would characterize my discomfort as being personal but more perhaps institutional as to what I think the committee does not do. I have really never had a quarrel with the formal extension of equality to me, and have never been in doubt as to the outcome of most of the situations we find ourselves in would be either. I enjoyed the experience, it has been interesting to me, representing that section, the Eastern liberal fringe of the body politic, and I think it has been very healthy for me to be exposed to other points of view, and I expect to have at least through the rest of this year an enjoyable tenure on the committee and hope to return to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, as I say, this committee, as you have heard us say so many times, is a nonpartisan committee and ruled by
the majority, and if there is any criticism, I am not going to get out of the kitchen. I can stand the heat.

Mr. Harrington. You demonstrated that, Mr. Chairman. I won’t get out of the kitchen.

The Chairman. Every member of this committee is treated as any other member, whether they agree with the position of the chairman or not. I follow the rules here.

Mr. Harrington. I am only puzzled because in private conversation and in general you made it clear you do. My criticism, I hope, is not construed to be directed to that facet of the committee. I made it clear we operate in my opinion as an extension of the Department of Defense. That is very subjective and perhaps unpopular. But I think to a degree, in terms of at least my observations, something that I have a substantial point of view.

The Chairman. Again the Chair is constrained to respond. That seems to be the hew and cry of those who have nothing else to say without foundation or documentation. As the gentleman knows right now, we are sitting in a very critical situation as related to the Department of Defense. I don’t think the interest we have demonstrated in the condition of the Litton contract in particular, in the shipbuilding contract, indicates we are rubberstamping the Department of Defense. I don’t think the 8 months’ conduct of the My Lai investigation was a stamping of the Department of Defense. I don’t think that the double amount of money which this committee gave the troops was a position of the administration. It was contrary to the position of the administration, and before you got here to the Congress, you were probably still in college at the time, this committee gave the Polaris submarine to America.

Without this committee against the opposition of those in the Pentagon, you would have had no Polaris submarine.

The Investigations Committee of this committee made a name for itself long before those on the other side of the Hill even knew the word “waste” or what it meant, or knew where the capital was. So the whole history of this committee is not one—it is one of understanding and partnership.

But as I say, this is a matter that you address yourself to the whole committee, I don’t take it as being addressed to the chairman. But if the majority think like you think, maybe you will sit in this chair.

Mr. Pike.

Mr. Pike. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions, but I would like to make a couple of comments.

First of all, I think personally that the presence of Mr. Harrington on this committee has been a great blessing to this committee. He has brought—

Mr. Harrington. I wouldn’t want to submit that to a vote, Mr. Pike.

Mr. Pike. I wouldn’t want to submit it to a vote either, Mr. Harrington, but I submitted so many kinds of votes on this committee, that I have lost, that it wouldn’t come as any shock to me to play it either way.

I would simply like to say that the general comments which you have made regarding secrecy in the Pentagon and “closed doors” in the committee, are items with which I agree with you completely. I think we are far too secretive. I think we are just painfully defensive. And I think that the business of using the phrase “national defense” as an
adequate justification to keep from the American people about 90 percent of what we do keep from them, is a great mistake.

After the generalizations, however, we have before us a resolution, and it is a specific resolution, and I am probably going to vote for it, but I am concerned about this resolution because I think that first of all, while it would be perfectly feasible for the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, to answer parts 1, 2, and 3, thereof—for some reason there is no part 4—when you get down to part 5, I think that the answers would be, first, "impossible to deliver", and second, "would not give an accurate statement of what apparently we are trying to get at."

We are talking about, in part 5, the cost of all bombing and shelling. I happen to agree that there is no reason whatsoever that the Pentagon couldn't provide the number of sorties, and the tonnage of bombs and the tonnage of shells.

But if we try to say that the cost of the bombing and shelling includes, quote, "the costs of bombs and shells, ships, and airplanes, employed in the transportation, and dropping or firing of such bombs and shells, maintenance of such ships and airplanes, salaries ** **", et cetera, and all other expenses attributable to such bombing and shelling, I think we are not being fair to the Pentagon.

I don't think that you can say that the cost of bombing and shelling includes in each case the cost of not only the ship that fired the shells, but also the ship that transported the shells to the ship that fired the shells.

We are getting into a situation here where if we would do it this way it is going to cost a million dollars to fire each shell. I just don't think that happens to be the case. I think, as I said, I am going to vote for this resolution, but I think that as to this part of it, first it would be just impossible. What it would mean is that you would have to know when you dropped a shell, the name of every ship which had transported that shell up to the time that it was fired.

You would have to keep books on every ship that touched the shell. You would have to do all kinds of things in trying to compute these figures that I think would be impossible to do, and second, when you got all done, I think you would have an inaccurate, rather than an accurate picture of what you are trying to accomplish here.

I would be happy to hear your comments.

Mr. Harrington. No, I fully concur with you. I appreciate your initial comments, Mr. Pike, but I would like to get into the substance of what you just said. I think it is very important. My concern is not as I said, indicating I was endorsing everything Mrs. Ahzug was seeking. It is a general feeling we have not even begun to get the general dimensions with all the constraints that you feel and I feel should be imposed in attempting to arrive at them, to the point where we, in the Congress, and where more importantly those who send us here, can fully appreciate the dimensions of this activity.

And I think concurrent with that, there has been an effort on the part of the administration in the repeated use of media to suggest somehow the absence of an American ground presence is also concurrent with the absence of any American costs of a substantial nature.

And I think that the important part of this is not necessarily whether each of the sections bear proper attention or could be responded to fairly, but that overall we have an obligation on us and on the
Department of Defense to be far more candid and more obviously open than we have been in outlining the dimensions of the overall cost.

Mr. Pike. I would agree with you, but I think the end result ought to be to get an accurate cost figure rather than as I read this language an inaccurate cost figure.

The Chairman. Mr. King.

Mr. King. No questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Brinkley.

Mr. Brinkley. Yes, sir, I have a question.

Mr. Harrington. I appreciate the statement which you made, certainly it ought to give all of us room for reflection, and of course you know the views of many of us which are fairly counter to yours in many respects.

But I would like to ask one question. You say we should proceed in an adversary manner with the executive branch.

Mr. Harrington. I don't mean that in a partisan sense. Have you finished the question? I will try to respond to it.

Mr. Brinkley. I was going to ask you about that.

This committee, and the executive branch, I do not believe, should proceed in an adversary manner. I think we have the same good goals, and I think it is our opportunity not only to question those witnesses who might reflect a particular point of view, but other witnesses, which we try to do, I believe, in the procurement hearings—and in the classic legal sense I don't believe we proceed in an adversary manner.

Mr. Harrington. If I could I would like to respond briefly to that. I perhaps could have chosen a different word, but let me use the analogy if I could of sports. It seems to me if there is a vigorous degree of opposition on the other side, and I say other side in an institutional rather than a partisan sense, that both partners, are both parties to the arrangements, are strengthened rather than having one so preponderant and the other is never able to prevail and never able to really make a meaningful effort at prevailing. I am not suggesting that everything we do, and I don't want to have it construed as Republican versus Democrat or this committee versus the Congress or the executive, I just think that it is healthy in the form of government we have to have as much strength accrue independent of what the executive branch can provide for us as possible. And I don't blame the executive branch. If I were there I would be doing exactly the same thing. I blame us when it comes to failure frankly to not equip ourselves properly to be independent of the executive branch for information.

I don't mean this committee either. I think there is a broader culpability. We should do much more to have independent sources of information either individually or institutionally than we do. That is the adversary proceeding I am talking about rather than a legalistic one. One that might end up making us a better prepared able branch of government, not one rooted in the past, but I don't see that really happening.

Mr. Brinkley. I thank the gentleman.

The Chairman. Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. Montgomery. Mr. Chairman, I just have a brief comment. The year and a half I have had the privilege of sitting next to the gentleman that is a witness today, and probably know him as well as anyone on the committee, as some members have said you all certainly talk a lot together, I might say the gentleman does more talking and I do
more listening. I don't agree with most of his philosophy, but I have enjoyed serving with him on the committee.

Mr. Harrington. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery. I hope that that guilt by association doesn't impair your effectiveness here or elsewhere.

(Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harrington, do you have any questions to ask yourself or your conscience?

(Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN. You are next on the list.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Those have all been asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aspin.

Mr. ASPIN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gubser.

Mr. GUBSER. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Harrington, have you read the report issued by a subcommittee of this committee having to do with the Aerospace Corporation?

Mr. Harrington. Not by that description, Mr. Gubser, I haven't.

Mr. Gubser. Have you read the report issued by a subcommittee of this committee on the Sheridan-Shillelagh weapons system?

Mr. Harrington. Parts of it, Mr. Gubser; to my memory that would be over a year ago.

Mr. Gubser. Have you read the report issued by a subcommittee concerning the main battle tank?

Mr. Harrington. No.

Mr. Gubser. Have you read the report by the Marine Corps—on the Marine Corps generator procurement?

Mr. Harrington. I suppose we can go down the list.

Mr. Gubser. I intend to. Have you read the report on the M-16 rifle procurement?

Mr. Harrington. Yes, some time ago.

Mr. Gubser. Have you read the report on the light observation helicopter procurement?

Mr. Harrington. Again, some time ago, last year.

Mr. Gubser. Have you read the report on the My Lai incident?

Mr. Harrington. Yes.

Mr. Gubser. I think you will agree with me, particularly if you read these reports, that every one of them places this committee in a distinct adversary position with the Department of Defense.

Now, some people, I am sure, not the gentleman currently in the witness stand, but some people make a profession out of presenting a puristic image of themselves by besmirching the image of those around them, and I am sure that doesn't apply to the gentleman in the witness stand.

Mr. Harrington. I hope it doesn't, Mr. Gubser.

Mr. Gubser. But I would respectfully suggest before this gentleman comes before the committee and says all the rest of us are intellectual prostitutes for the Department of Defense, he ought to read the reports put out by this committee.

Mr. Harrington. I read the book directed to the recent remarks directed to me. Those come to mind, the innuendos used rather indiscriminately by yourself.

Mr. Gubser. If the shoe fits, I hope you wear it with comfort.

Mr. Harrington. That was a shoe directed toward you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Whitehurst. Mr. Nedzi.
Mr. Nedzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take this opportunity to concur in the remarks made by Mr. Pike with respect to Mr. Harrington's service. And as I read this resolution, I think it is regrettable that such a resolution even has to be introduced. I don't see anything in it that shouldn't be available routinely to every Member of Congress, indeed to the press. And when the Department of Defense witness takes the stand, I would like to have him respond just as to what part of this resolution should not be disclosed to either Members of Congress or members of the press. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Harrington. We appreciate your remarks and advice and consent and counsel.

The next witness, Mr. Slatinshek.

Mr. Slatinshek. The next witness represents the Department of Defense, Mr. Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense.

Mr. Doolin, would you come forward?

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS J. DOOLIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Doolin. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Mr. Harrington has already read into the record the letter from our general counsel, Mr. Buzhardt. I would like to give the original copy to Mr. Slatinshek for the chairman.

Mr. Chairman, if it meets with your approval, I would like to address items 7 and 10 in Mrs. Abzug's resolution, and then read into the record some correspondence that I have had both with yourself and with Mr. Harrington on the subject of available information.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Doolin. Thank you.

Section 7 of the resolution under consideration, requests the information, "Whether there is a target date for the achievement by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam of complete military independence of United States Air, Naval and ground support and participation, and if so what date?"

Mr. Chairman, one of our major goals in Indochina has been the transfer of military responsibility to the Republic of Vietnam, in a way that provides the South Vietnamese with a realistic capability to defend itself from aggression.

Our activity in Indochina has been and will continue to be in consonance with that goal.

To achieve our goal, the Vietnamization program was planned in three phases. Phase 1, assumption by the South Vietnamese of the ground combat role against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces.

Phase 2, the development by South Vietnam of those capabilities, air, naval, artillery, logistics and other support necessary to maintain security.

Major progress was made last year notably including the turnover of in-country naval operations and a very substantial portion of the in-country air combat responsibilities.
Phase 3, reduction of American presence to a military advisory mission, with whatever small security forces are needed to protect this mission, and then further reductions as South Vietnam becomes capable of handling the threat with no U.S. military presence required. We are closer now to meeting these goals than at any time in the past, as evidenced by our major reduction in the U.S. force levels. Specifically, phase 1 of Vietnamization is completed, with only a small U.S. ground combat force remaining in a security role to protect U.S. forces as phase 2 progresses.

Phase 2 is progressing ahead of schedule as the Vietnamese themselves work hard to complete the complex training required before they can fully assume an effective support role.

Phase 3 has begun with the reorganization of our corps and field force headquarters to assistance commands and with the reductions contemplated in our military headquarters in Saigon.

In sum, the major part of our Vietnamization program has been accomplished and we are ahead of schedule on the tasks that remain.

Turning now, if I may, to item 10 in the resolution under consideration, and I think that this will also, Mr. Chairman, be responsive to Mr. Runnell’s question directed to Mrs. Abzug, namely, what actions, if any, have been taken to comply with the provisions of section 601 of Public Law 92–156, approved November 17, 1971.

The following actions have been taken.

With regard to withdrawal, on 31 May, 1971, at one of the secret negotiating meetings in Paris, the administration offered “A total U.S. withdrawal in return for a prisoner exchange and an Indochina cease fire.”

On 16 August, 1971, the administration tabled a new 8 point proposal offering “To withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 9 months of the date of an agreement.”

“We suggested a terminal date of August 1, 1972, provided an agreement was signed by November 1, 1971.”

On 25 January, 1972, the President publicly offered a new 8 point peace proposal which provided and I quote the President, “That within 6 months of an agreement, there shall be a complete withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam and exchange of all prisoners throughout Indochina.”

On 9 February, 1972, in his report to the Congress, the President stated that “The U.S. and the other countries allied with the Republic of Vietnam offer a fixed date of 6 months for total withdrawal either as part of an overall agreement or an agreement on military issues alone.”

With regard to negotiation for a cease fire, on 7 October, 1970, the President presented a five point peace plan that included “An internationally supervised cease-fire in-place throughout Indochina, governed by principles which would make it acceptable and credible to both sides.”

On 25 February, 1971, in his report to the Congress, the President stated and I quote “We will not be content until all conflict is stilled. This sentiment was the driving force behind our proposal for a cease fire. It is still at the core of our policy.”

On 31 May, 1971, at one of the secret negotiating meetings in Paris the administration offered “A total U.S. withdrawal in return for a prisoner exchange and an Indochina cease fire.”
On 25 January, 1972, as I indicated earlier, the President publically offered a new 8 point peace proposal which provided for "a cease fire throughout Indochina."

On 9 February, 1972, in his report to the Congress, the President again stated that "We remain willing, as we proposed secretly last May, to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to be resolved separately. Under this approach we would withdraw all U.S. and Allied Forces within six months in exchange for an Indochina-wide cease fire and the release of all prisoners."

With regard to negotiations for withdrawal and the release of prisoners of war, I have already covered this in some detail. This administration has demonstrated periodically its intent to withdraw its forces from the Republic of Vietnam. This intent has been made unmistakably clear, highly visible, and openly evident, thus demonstrating on the basis of deeds the credibility of the United States policy.

Specifically, since the period of peak authorized strength in July 1969, or 549,500 men, U.S. force reductions now stand at over 450,000 and are continuing. As of 1 May, 1972, when we are down to a new ceiling of 69,000 we will have effected a 87.5 percent reduction in the U.S. forces and the President has stated that another announcement will be made regarding the further withdrawal of U.S. forces before May 1.

If I may now, Mr. Chairman, turn to the question of availability of information: On the 15th of March, I received further correspondence from Mr. Harrington: I responded to Mr. Harrington on the 30th of March, which I hope the Congressmen will allow was not in my view an unreasonable length of time. And I would like to say, Mr. Harrington, that we do give full consideration to your requests and we are trying to provide you with the best information that we can in an open manner.

If I may, I would like to read my letter to Mr. Harrington of 30 March.

"Dear Mr. Harrington: Secretary Laird has asked me to reply to your letter of March 15, 1972, concerning the public release of statistics on the bombing in Southeast Asia.

We share your objective of providing the public with "full information" on the air war in Southeast Asia so long as the public release of this information is not detrimental to the safety and security of our Armed Forces and is not of value to the enemy. You may not be fully aware of the numerous reports that have been made by the Department of Defense on the scope of U.S. air activities.

These include periodically-released testimony we have provided to Congress, public press conferences, and television appearances by the Secretary of Defense, Laird, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans and other government officials have also discussed air operations in Southeast Asia. For example, on March 2, 1972, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., in his presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, discussed in detail the declining role of U.S. air assets and activities in Southeast Asia. I would like to invite your attention to the discussion and accompanying charts on pages 3 through 6 of Secretary Seamans' attached statement (enclosure 1). This testimony updates statistics provided to the press and the public by Secretary

1 See subsequent pages for statement.
Seamans at a 16 December 1971 Pentagon news conference (enclosure 2).

"In addition to such comprehensive statements, the following specific information is regularly and routinely released to world news media and through them to the public:

1. The number of attack sorties flown in South Vietnam, where enemy air defenses are minimal, are announced daily in Saigon (enclosures 3 and 4) and are also available in a regular monthly format for all types of missions (enclosure 5).

2. Air operations in Laos and Cambodia are announced daily in Saigon, although specific numbers of sorties are not given (enclosures 3 and 4). These sortie statistics are classified to prevent the enemy from discerning trends, tactics, and capabilities which U.S. commanders feel could endanger the American crewmen flying those Laos and Cambodia missions, where enemy air defenses are stronger.

3. Protective reaction strikes in North Vietnam are announced in Saigon (enclosures 3 and 4). Numbers of escort aircraft flying with unarmed reconnaissance aircraft in this high-threat environment are classified and never have been announced. The mission of these escort aircraft is to deter enemy action against the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft which help us guard against enemy buildups and surprises and to protect the U.S. airmen in the event they are fired upon. The U.S. Command does not intend to provide useful information to the enemy on exactly how this protection is afforded.

4. Munitions expenditures in Southeast Asia are regularly and routinely available to the media on a monthly basis (enclosure 6).

Announcements of aircraft losses and crew losses are also regularly made in Saigon. MACV announces, when it is safe to do so, all aircraft downed by hostile action (enclosures 3 and 4). In order not to jeopardize rescue operations, such announcements are withheld until the search and rescue has been completed. Throughout the war U.S. news correspondents have voluntarily adhered to this reporting ground rule. Additionally, a weekly summary of aircraft losses in Southeast Asia is announced each Friday in Saigon (enclosure 4). This summary is also available to media representatives in Washington. The status of crew members associated with these losses is announced in Saigon when it is safe to do so (enclosures 3 and 4) and, by name in Washington after next-of-kin have been notified (enclosure 9). A weekly casualty summary released each Thursday in Saigon and in Washington covers losses reported to the Department of Defense during the previous weekly reporting period (enclosures 3 and 9). Cumulative statistics on personal missing and captured are also available in a monthly format (enclosure 5A).

You are, of course, aware that the North Vietnamese have deployed an extensive and sophisticated air defense network to protect their forces and infiltration operations located outside of North Vietnam. The Department of Defense feels it is essential to protect data concerning specific sortie statistics by country, rates against specific target areas or other detailed data about our airmen who are facing these strong air defense units. U.S. commanders feel that such information would fill gaps in the enemy's intelligence collection efforts and confirm some data which he may already have obtained but which remains still unverifiable. These confirmations could be used by the enemy to
increase the danger to our airmen because such data would provide more refined planning data for enemy air defense commanders.

"I hope that this letter has indicated to you that our Department does make a considerable amount of unclassified information available to the Congress and to the public on the air war in Southeast Asia. Also, I hope that we have provided you with a satisfactory explanation as to why we believe the release of additional data on the bombing in Southeast Asia would be useful to the enemy and detrimental to the safety of our forces. Sincerely, (Signed) Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary."

That is the end of the letter. I sent a copy of this letter, together with a cover letter to you, Mr. Chairman, the same day, which I would also like to read into the record.

"Dear Mr. Chairman: Congressman Michael J. Harrington has informed us that he has written to you asking that a classified briefing on United States air activities in Southeast Asia be requested from the Department of Defense during an executive session of the Armed Services Committee (Tab A).

"On this date, I have responded to Congressman Harrington's letter with a detailed accounting of the data on the air war that are regularly and routinely released to world news media and through them to the public. Also, I have provided him with additional rationale as to the necessity of keeping these data classified in order to preclude any possibility of compromising the security and safety of our forces and to preclude assisting the enemy in devising his counter-actions (Tab B).

"There are other aspects to consider in not releasing additional data on air activities in Southeast Asia. Generally, we cannot provide information on the air activities of other countries since we do not have the permission of those governments to do so. Furthermore, certain statistics on our air activities are misleading. A significant number of sorties, flown in support of operations over North Vietnam, have not involved overflight of the North Vietnamese land mass. For example, many of the CAP sorties are flown offshore over the Gulf of Tonkin as are a considerable number of A-4 refueling missions. We are taking steps to assure that future information retrievals will allow discrimination of all flights which actually overfly the North Vietnamese land mass.

"We understand that Mr. Harrington is currently in Southeast Asia and possibly his visit to that area will obviate the need for a briefing. Sincerely, Dennis J. Doolin."

Mr. Slatinshek. Mr. Doolin, at this point in the record there were several enclosures attached to the letter that you sent to the chairman.

Mr. Doolin. Yes, sir.

Mr. Slatinshek. Could you provide these to the reporter for inclusion in the record at this point?

Mr. Doolin. I will.

(The following information was received for the record:}

Hon. F. Edward Hebert,
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Congressman Michael J. Harrington has informed us that he has written to you asking that a classified briefing on United States air activities in Southeast Asia be requested from the Department of Defense during an executive session of the Armed Services Committee (Tab A).
On this date, I have responded to Congressman Harrington's letter with a detailed accounting of the data on the air war that are regularly and routinely released to world news media and through them to the public. Also, I have provided him with additional rationale as to the necessity of keeping these data classified in order to preclude any possibility of compromising the security and safety of our forces and to preclude assisting the enemy in devising his counter-actions (TAB B).

There are other aspects to consider in not releasing additional data on air activities in Southeast Asia. Generally, we can not provide information on the air activities of other countries since we do not have the permission of those governments to do so. Furthermore, certain statistics on our air activities are misleading. A significant number of sorties, flown in support of operations over North Vietnam, have not involved overflight of the North Vietnamese land mass. For example, many of the CAP sorties are flown offshore, over the Gulf of Tonkin, as are a considerable number of A-4 refueling missions. We are taking steps to assure that future information retrievals will allow discrimination of all flights which actually overfly the North Vietnamese land mass.

We understand that Mr. Harrington is currently in Southeast Asia and possibly his visit to that area will obviate the need for a briefing.

Sincerely,

(signed) DENNIS J. DOOLIN.

Attachments:
1. TAB A—Ltr from Mr. Harrington
2. TAB B—Ltr to Mr. Harrington, w/enclosures

TAB A

HON. F. EDWARD HEBERT,
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

"Dear Mr. Chairman: I have become concerned at the refusal of the Defense Department to release statistics on past bombing activities by our armed forces in Indochina. On February 26th I wrote to Secretary Laird asking that he release biweekly bombing totals broken down according to country—Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. In return, I received a letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary Doolin declining to make the figures public, on grounds of national security. Secretary Doolin did not explain the reason for his invocation of the security argument, but he did say that the Defense Department would be willing to discuss the matter in an executive session of the Armed Services Committee.

Therefore, I am writing to ask that you invite the Defense Department to a session of the Armed Services Committee to review with us the pattern of bombing activities in Southeast Asia.

I wish to stress that I made this request to you only because there is no other way for me to receive any information on the subject. Secretary Seymour had offered to provide me with a briefing on the matter and General Bray of his staff and made an appointment with me for that purpose. But on the day before he was to come, General Bray phoned to say he could not discuss the subject of my letter to Secretary Laird and Secretary Doolin's letter explicitly says, as you see, "that is could only appropriately be discussed in an executive session of the Committee . . . should the chairman so desire." I do not understand the reason for this unduly restrictive decision, but I have no choice but to abide by it at present.

I wish to stress that at no time have I requested any information about prospective bombing activities, for I fully concur that to divulge such information could violate security considerations, But I am most eager that the Committee have the opportunity to discuss this subject with responsible Defense Department officials, since it represent by far the most important military activity in which we are currently engaged.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON.
Mr. Chairman: For your information, I enclose this list which illustrates the kind of information I am seeking, although, of course, it is not exclusive and related matters might also be relevant.

INFORMATION REQUESTED ON THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

(All data by month and year, 1965-1971)

1. Fighter-bomber attack sortie rates, broken down by theater.¹
   (a) United States (broken down by service).
   (b) VNAF.
   (c) Royal Lao Air Force.
   (d) Royal Thai Air Force.
   (e) other 3rd nation (indicate by country).

2. B-52 sortie rates.

3. Gunship sortie rates (by type of gunship):
   (a) United States.
   (b) VNAF.
   (c) other 3rd nation (indicate by country).

4. Reconnaissance sortie rates:
   (a) United States.
   (b) VNAF.
   (c) other 3rd nation (indicate by country).

5. Helicopter sortie rates:
   (a) Attack.
   (b) Nonhostile.

6. Tonnage of aerial munitions:
   (a) Total S.E. Asia.
      (1) United States.
      (2) VNAF.
      (3) Royal Lao Air Force.
      (4) Royal Thai Air Force.
      (5) Other 3rd nation (indicated by country).
   (b) Broken down by category (e.g., high explosive, antipersonnel, fragmentation, napalm, white phosphorus, strafing), other, (specify): 
      (c) Broken down by delivery vehicle (e.g., fighter-bomber, B-52, gunship, helicopter).

TAB B

MARCH 30, 1972.

Hon. Michael J. Harrington,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Harrington: Secretary Laird has asked me to reply to your letter of March 15, 1973, concerning the public release of statistics on the bombing in Southeast Asia.

We share your objective of providing the public with full information on the air war in Southeast Asia so long as the public release of this information is not detrimental to the safety and security of our armed forces and is not of value to the enemy. You may not be fully aware of the numerous reports that have been made by the Department of Defense on the scope of U.S. air activities. These include periodically-released testimony we have provided to Congress, public press conferences, and television appearances by Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of the Air Force Seamsans and other government officials have also discussed air operations in Southeast Asia. For example, on 2 March 1972, Secretary of the Air Force, Robert C. Seamsans, Jr., in his presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, discussed in detail the declining role of U.S. air assets and activities in Southeast Asia. I would like to invite your attention to the discussion and accompanying charts on pages 8 through 6 of Secretary Seamsans' attached statement (enclosure 1). This testimony updates statistics provided to Congress by Secretary Seamsans at a 16 December 1971, Pentagon news conference (enclosure 2).

In addition to such comprehensive statements, the following specific information is regularly and routinely released to world news media and through them to the public:

¹Theaters: South Vietnam (including DMZ and DMZ separately); North Vietnam; Laos (Ho Chi Minh Trail region only); Laos (all except Trail—usually called Northern Laos); Cambodia.
1. The number of attack sorties flown in South Vietnam, where enemy air defenses are minimal, are announced daily in Saigon (enclosures 3 and 4) and are also available in a regular monthly format for all types of missions. (enclosure 5).

2. Air operations in Laos and Cambodia are announced daily in Saigon, although specific numbers of sorties are not given (enclosures 3 and 4). These sortie statistics are classified to prevent the enemy from discerning trends, tactics, and capabilities which U.S. commanders feel could endanger the American crewmen flying those Laos and Cambodia missions, where air defenses are stronger.

3. Protective reaction strikes in North Vietnam are announced in Saigon (enclosures 3 and 4). Numbers of escort aircraft flying with unarmed reconnaissance aircraft in this high-threat environment are classified and never have been announced. The mission of these escort aircraft is to deter enemy action against the unarmed reconnaissance aircraft which help us guard against enemy buildups and surprises and to protect the U.S. airmen in the event they are fired upon. The U.S. Command does not intend to provide useful information to the enemy on exactly how this protection is afforded.

4. Munitions expenditures in Southeast Asia are regularly and routinely available to the media on a monthly basis (enclosure 6).

Announcements of aircraft losses and crew losses are also regularly made in Saigon. MACV announces, when it is safe to do so, all aircraft downed by hostile action (enclosures 3 and 4). In order not to jeopardize rescue operations, such announcements are withheld until the search and rescue has been completed. Throughout the war U.S. news correspondents have voluntarily adhered to this reporting ground rule. Additionally, a weekly summary of aircraft losses in Southeast Asia is announced each Friday in Saigon (enclosure 4). This summary is also available to media representatives in Washington. The status of crewmembers associated with these losses is announced in Saigon when it is safe to do so (enclosures 3 and 4) and, by name in Washington after next-of-kin have been notified (enclosure 9). A weekly casualty summary released each Thursday in Saigon and in Washington covers losses reported to the Department of Defense during the previous weekly reporting period (enclosures 8 and 9). Cumulative statistics on personnel missing and captured are also available in a monthly format (enclosure 5A).

You are, of course, aware that the North Vietnamese have deployed an extensive and sophisticated air defense network to protect their forces and infiltration operations located outside of North Vietnam. The Department of Defense feels it is essential to protect data concerning specific sortie statistics by country, rates against specific target areas or other detailed data about our airmen who are facing these strong air defense units. U.S. commanders feel that such information would fill gaps in the enemy’s intelligence collection efforts and confirm some data which he may already have obtained but which remains still unverifiable. These confirmations could be used by the enemy to increase the danger to our airmen because such data would provide more refined planning data for enemy air defense commanders.

I hope that this letter has indicated to you that our Department does make a considerable amount of unclassified information available to the Congress and to the public on the air war in Southeast Asia. Also, I hope that we have provided you with a satisfactory explanation as to why we believe the release of additional data on the bombing in Southeast Asia would be useful to the enemy and detrimental to the safety of our forces.

Sincerely,

(Signed) DENNIS J. DOOLIN, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Attachments
Enclosure 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE PRESENTATION TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Air Force Authorization Request, FY 1973

STATEMENT OF: HONORABLE ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR., Secretary of the Air Force

March 2, 1972

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you again. In the course of three years as Secretary of the Air Force, this is my fourth appearance to testify concerning the Air Force Budget.

During the last three years, President Nixon has taken a number of important peace initiatives. He has announced withdrawal of nearly 90% of the American forces that were in Vietnam when he took office. Through the on-going Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, we hope to achieve an effective agreement that will improve the security of both nations. With our NATO allies we are hoping to pursue negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

But as we move further in our negotiations, we must continue to maintain adequate defenses as a necessary foundation for peace. In structuring our military forces we are implementing the Nixon Doctrine, which calls for a more balanced partnership with our allies. And we are following a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence— one which involves a continuing evaluation of the military threat together with the Total Force capabilities of the United States and its allies. Under this strategy we have helped our friends in
Asia strengthen their forces and take over more of their own defense. And in Europe, our NATO allies have agreed to increase their defense efforts.

With respect to our own Air Force, we have gained considerable strength in the past year. In the strategic area, the first wing of MINUTEMAN III missiles became operational, and our FB-111 force was fully deployed. In the tactical area, we completed our F-111A and E force and deployed an F-111E wing to England in support of NATO. Almost two-thirds of the A-7 force was deployed, and our new AC-130 gunships went into service in Southeast Asia. And in the airlift area, the C-5 force was doubled in size, with 41 aircraft now in operational airlift units.

We have adopted policies designed to achieve more effective use of our people and equipment. We are improving our personnel management and human relations programs. We are also providing more modern equipment and better manning for our Guard and Reserve units. And most important we are emphasizing the need for steady, step-by-step modernization that should provide more ready and stable defense, at less cost, than stop-and-go defense programs geared to emergency situations.

In my statement today, I will briefly cover the Air Force role in Vietnamization and then focus on four critical areas of resource management: (1) organization and personnel policy, (2) weapons procurement; (3) research and development, and (4) installations and logistics.
In Vietnam we believe that we are successfully meeting the first test of the Nixon Doctrine. We have moved steadily toward full South Vietnamese responsibility for their own defense. For example, last December, I participated in a ceremony which turned over Phu Cat, one of our most modern air bases, to the South Vietnamese Air Force, thus reducing the number of U.S. Air Force bases in South Vietnam from a high of 10 in 1968 to the present level of four.

During that latest trip, I concluded that the South Vietnamese have made a great deal of progress. The growth of their Air Force can be seen from CHART I. In the past year they activated 12 new squadrons -- meeting or exceeding every operational ready date. They now have over 40 squadrons with more than 1,000 aircraft and 2,500 pilots. As they improve their capabilities, they are assuming more of the combat role. Since November 1 they have been flying about 90% of the attack sorties in South Vietnam and nearly 70% of the sorties in Cambodia and South Vietnam taken together. And during FY 1973 they should reach a strength of over 50 squadrons and more than 50,000 airmen.

And as the Vietnamese Air Force has increased, the number of U.S. attack aircraft in Southeast Asia has steadily declined. The drop in U.S. attack aircraft and sorties flown can be seen from CHARTS II, III, and IV.
U.S. attack sorties in South Vietnam allegedly reduced in 1970 and 35% in all of Southeast Asia, and the latter includes a drop of 17% in B-52 sorties. The reduction in air munitions delivered by all allied forces in Southeast Asia in shown by CHART V.

At the same time our interdiction efforts have increased in effectiveness. This is due partly to the use of gunships with rapid firing cannon and advanced optical and electronic sensors. We now have 18 of our AC-130 gunships in operation. Our laser-guided bombs are also making an important contribution to the interdiction effort. And our ground sensors and aircraft control systems are playing an important role.

CHART VI shows the effect that interdiction is having on the flow of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In the last year, we estimate that only about 9,500 tons got through of the 68,000 tons that entered the trail. Of course, this does not mean that enemy troops are completely out of supplies. In fact, at times they have been conserving supplies for possible offensives this year. But there were no major attacks in all of 1971, and our interdiction efforts must have been an important factor in bringing that situation about.

Before leaving the subject of Vietnam, I again want to express the Air Force's concern for our prisoners of war and
Chart V

Allied Air Munitions Delivered in Sea

(in thousands of tons)

1966 67 68 69 70 71

Chart VI

Ho Chi Minh Trail

(in tons)

Time periods are:
1 November to 1 November;
men missing in action. We will continue to assist the families here at home in every possible way, and we will see to it that the men will not be at a disadvantage when they resume their careers. These men deserve and will receive all possible help and consideration when they return.

Except for this brief review of progress in Vietnamization, I will leave the subject of military operations and force structure to General Ryan and subsequent witnesses, and will focus on the four critical areas of Air Force management that I mentioned earlier. How well we manage these four areas will largely determine whether we can continue to provide adequate security with the resources available. The broad tasks before us can be summarized as follows:

-- Improve our organization and personnel policies. We must tighten up our organizational structure and individual assignments so that our mission can be accomplished with minimum manpower. And we must improve our Service living conditions and human relations techniques so that our personnel will be able to carry out their assignments in the best possible manner.

-- Manage our research and development programs in such a way that necessary weapon systems are available to meet our security needs and that these weapons are properly tested and provided at minimum cost.

-- Provide research and development programs that will
make available an adequate range of new capabilities that can be selected, if necessary, in order to maintain our security in future years. Research and development should be a steady, step-by-step process, managed in a way that will make best use of available resources.

- Implement installations and logistics policies that will permit us to support our operating Air Forces in the most efficient manner possible.

In carrying out each of these tasks we are stressing improved management of resources. Emphasis on economy is increasingly important at this time in view of budget trends.

The Air Force FY 73 budget of $24.4 billion is actually about $900 million lower than the FY 72 budget when the effects of increased pay and price inflation are taken into account. The following table shows that our funding reached a peak in FY 68, but has fallen back well below the pre-war FY 64 level when corrected for past inflation.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR FORCE BUDGET (Billions of $)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FY 64</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant FY 73 Dollars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes $.4 billion for estimated FY 73 pay increases carried in DOD totals not distributed to Air Force appropriations.
The authorizations requested for FY 73 are shown in TABLE II, along with those approved for FY 71 and 72.

**TABLE II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Actual FY 71</th>
<th>Estimated FY 72</th>
<th>Requested FY 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Procurement</td>
<td>$3,589.5</td>
<td>$3,196.5</td>
<td>$2,612.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Procurement</td>
<td>1,492.1</td>
<td>1,683.7</td>
<td>1,722.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>2,827.2</td>
<td>2,960.4</td>
<td>3,193.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,908.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,840.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,578.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For FY 74, the Council has recommended a program of approximately $7,200.0 million, which has not been included in this presentation.

I would now like to discuss each of the four critical management areas that I mentioned earlier.
I. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL POLICY

With respect to organization and personnel policy, I want to outline our progress in streamlining our headquarters and discuss our need for adequate grade authorizations; then touch upon our Personnel Plan as a management tool and our related recruiting efforts; next cover some of our important human relations efforts; and lastly mention the increasing role of our Air Reserve and Guard forces. In each of these areas our primary goal is to further increase the effectiveness of our people.

Headquarters Organization

Throughout the Air Force we have already completed or are now completing the broad Air Force initiatives undertaken in late 1970 to streamline our headquarters management structure. This effort entailed fundamental restructuring of each of our principal command and management echelons. Our intermediate headquarters are being realigned to emphasize their operational mission, eliminating support staff functions wherever possible. While some degree of centralization at Major Command headquarters will result, the projected net savings should be approximately 1,800 manpower spaces. Our overall headquarters streamlining actions will produce dollar savings well in excess of the $5.6 million directed by the Congress last year.

10
Table III shows that even with reduced personnel strength, personnel costs are increasing. The pay raises to achieve comparability with the private sector have greatly increased the cost of personnel during the past few years. As a result, our projected military end strength for FY 73 is 21% below the 1968 level, but the estimated cost is 28% higher.

**TABLE III**

**Military Personnel Strengths and Costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 64</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End Strengths (thousands)</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost (millions of current dollars)</td>
<td>$4,423</td>
<td>$5,687</td>
<td>$6,524</td>
<td>$7,028</td>
<td>$7,251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian Personnel Strengths and Costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 64</th>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
<th>FY 73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End Strengths (thousands)</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost (millions of current dollars)</td>
<td>$2,256</td>
<td>$2,667</td>
<td>$3,299</td>
<td>$3,514</td>
<td>$3,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are requesting authorization for a FY 73 end strength of 717,210 military personnel.

**Officer Grade Authorizations**

In addition to the numerical strength of our forces, we must maintain the high experience levels, technical competence, and military expertise of our Air Force people.
To do this we need to obtain new grade legislation. The Grade Limitation Act of 1954 provided lower authorizations for the Air Force than for the other Services, reflecting the fact that the Air Force was a younger Service with lower experience levels. Congress has recognized the growing needs of the Air Force through the years by providing grade relief, which will expire this year. Without new legislation, during FY 73 we will have no promotions to Major, Lt Colonel, or Colonel, and we would also have to demote, retire early, or involuntarily separate some 3,000 field grade officers whom we need.

Increases in the percentage of field grade officers during the 25 year history of the Air Force are directly related to greater responsibilities, more sophisticated weapon systems and difficult logistical support functions, and a need to provide promotion opportunity comparable to that of the other Services. In view of the importance of national security tasks and decisions in terms of national resources expended, it is clear that we need highly qualified and experienced people to fulfill these responsibilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>END FY</th>
<th>TOTAL OFFICERS</th>
<th>PCT OF TOTAL A.F. PERSONNEL</th>
<th>PCT OF OFFICER STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GENERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>42,745</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>130,769</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>133,763</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>139,600</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>125,726</td>
<td>16.66%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>121,462</td>
<td>16.63%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our total field grade officer needs stem not only from the technological changes that have occurred in our mission, but from the requirement to provide unified direction of the Services through joint staffs, both in the Pentagon and in the field. And the Air Force provides officers for many responsible positions in international organizations, especially NATO which did not exist in 1947. At the present time we have a total of about 5,500 officers assigned to other than Air Force activities, with approximately 4,400 of them being field grade personnel. This represents over 10% of the total Air Force field grade authorizations.

I have attempted to characterize an Air Force that has matured significantly since the original Officer Grade Legislation was passed. We have taken great care in the preparation of the requested new grade authorizations. The latter are based on our need for management skills and experience necessary to carry out the Air Force mission as well as providing our people with reasonable and predictable career opportunities.

The Air Force Personnel Plan

The need for responsive personnel management takes on ever-increasing importance as we move further toward a zero-draft environment. In this connection the Air Force has
developed a comprehensive long-range plan as its principal management tool. Our Personnel Plan, developed with the extensive use of computer analysis and simulation over the past four years, includes both qualitative and quantitative objectives for each element of the force -- officer, airman, civilian and reserve. This document constitutes a breakthrough in our personnel management and gives us a basis for evaluating the effects of strength and policy changes on the total force long-range goals.

Our personnel managers can use this new management tool to help determine Air Force needs and assist the individual to more accurately plan his career. We are convinced that this capability, which General Ryan will discuss further, constitutes one of the most important steps toward achieving a truly all-volunteer force.

Recruitment and Retention

To successfully implement our planning, however, we must make the Air Force more attractive and thus improve our recruitment and retention. Among our important goals are better family housing and expansion of in-service education.

The provision of adequate housing for our families is a prime factor in attaining all-volunteer military forces. Unfortunately, families of approximately 70,000 lower grade
personnel are not eligible for military housing under current rules. These young airmen are now getting married and having families at an earlier age than in the past. A large percentage of these families are unable to find adequate homes in local communities. In addition, we have a shortage of over 40,000 family housing units for eligible personnel. These combined shortages have a marked adverse effect on progress toward all-volunteer military forces.

In the last six years, we have programmed only 11,310 new housing units. However, we are most pleased that Congress has set aside 3,450 units of Public Law 236 housing for our lower grade airmen. We also have 3,168 new family housing units in our FY 73 housing program which I will discuss later in the Installations and Logistics section of my statement.

Next I would like to mention our education and training programs, which provide key incentives for service in the Air Force. Many thousands of our men and women have taken advantage of a wide range of off-duty educational programs to complete the requirements for high school or higher educational levels. Moreover, our formal military training provides about 90% of our Air Force people with a skill which has direct civilian utility. For example, we are emphasizing the development of various para-medical capabilities to complement the unique skill of our doctors, and we hope that these skills also will
prove valuable to the civilian community. To provide the individual airman with the full advantage of his training, we are seeking further affiliation of our technical schools with regional college and university accrediting associations.

In our recruiting efforts, we also hope to bring more women into the Air Force. We have already made considerable progress, having more than doubled the number of Air Force women in the last five years, and we anticipate additional increases. The rank, responsibility, and assignment opportunities for women in non-combatant roles will be commensurate with that of our male personnel. Toward this objective we have opened the AFBOTC program to women, and now have more than 900 women enrolled.

Human Relations Programs

Ultimately, proper treatment of each individual is the critical factor in both retention of good people and achieving effective job performance. We are trying to improve all facets of our human relations programs. Here are some of the things we are doing.

First, we are broadening communications within our Air Force units. We now have a Social Actions office at base and major command levels, and at Headquarters USAF. The Social Actions officer is directly responsible to the wing


The Social Actions program promotes the welfare of Air Force personnel through the provision of social activities, services, and support that foster a positive work environment.
commander, who chairs a Human Relations Council. Some commanders have telephone HOTLINES to enable their men to get immediate responses to problems. In addition, Junior Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, and Airmen Councils are becoming increasingly active with respect to many social action programs.

One of our most crucial goals is to achieve racial harmony. To reach this goal, we are relying heavily on effective leadership at all levels, backed up by strong education programs. But we know that we have more to do.

Racial incidents have increased, and surveys indicate that some of our Air Force people believe racial discrimination is a serious problem in the Air Force. Young minority group members are becoming increasingly intolerant of what they perceive as racial injustice. We have established Air Force standards for command which emphasize the critical importance of sensitive leadership in improving race relations. And the performance of our commanders and supervisors will be judged, in part, on how effectively they promote equal opportunity for all of their people. This includes not only recognizing such problems, but heading them off whenever possible.

An important part of our race relations program is the commissioning of additional black officers. At the present
time our black officer strength is still less than 2% of our

total officer force. Our objective is to increase the number

of black officers in both our active and Reserve forces. To

help achieve this goal, we added three AFROTC detachments

last year at predominantly black colleges, and we will add

another this year, making a total of eight. Still, we need an

across-the-board increase in the number of black and other

minority group officers from our commissioning programs: the

Air Force Academy, Air Force ROTC, Officer Training School,

the Airman Commissioning Program, and the Bootstrap

Commissioning Program. And we are emphasizing recruitment

and individual personal contacts in minority groups.

Another human problem we share with our civilian society

is drug abuse. The Air Force measured worldwide drug abuse

test rate is only about one-half of 1%, as indicated by urinalysis

for narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines. We,

nevertheless, recognize that any drug usage constitutes a

serious matter. Therefore, we have taken a number of

steps in accordance with Department of Defense and other

Administration efforts to deal with this social problem

confronting our nation.

Drug abuse committees have been established, and drug

abuse personnel at all levels are active in prevention and
education programs. A five-phase rehabilitation program has recently been developed with a one-year follow-on support phase subsequent to successful completion of the initial treatment and rehabilitation training.

Our human relations efforts are part of a long-term, continuing program to face our problems in a responsible manner. We recognize that a better Air Force must rely upon people who understand and respect each other — certainly all of our people have a key role to play in building a better Air Force.

Relationship With the Civilian Sector

The Air Force, along with other agencies in the Department of Defense, recognizes that a responsibility exists not only to perform our assigned military missions, but to contribute whenever we can to domestic improvement. This is a most exciting area and much could be included in my statement in this regard if the time permitted.

The Air Force is a large community with one half of 1% of the total U.S. population. We have within the Air Force all the aspirations and concerns of the country: the need to improve training, education, health service, housing and to reduce air and water pollution. As a result, much of what we learn from our military programs is also
useful in the civilian sector. Some domestic benefits result from exchange of information with other departments of government, some through our people as they leave military life, and other exchanges result from specific projects for which we may be reimbursed.

Our Domestic Action Programs also contribute to a better society. In these we stress summer youth employment and recreation, as well as providing additional training for underskilled workers. Military programs also on our joint welfare.

Most of these programs directly benefit our equal opportunity goals. Over 80% of the youths participating in our summer activities are from disadvantaged homes and our educational and vocational training is geared to improving minority skills in adjacent communities.

We believe that our nation is stronger for these domestic contributions.

Air Reserve and National Guard

As my final item in the area of organization and personnel policy, I want to emphasize the increasingly important role of our Air Guard and Reserve forces. The Personnel Plan which I discussed earlier integrates planning for these components with that for our active units under the Total Force Concept.