The U.S. in Vietnam

...A critical look at the basic arguments supporting America's Vietnam policy...
When U.S. government spokesmen seek to justify the war in Vietnam, they argue from a version of recent history in Southeast Asia that is peculiarly their own. Considerable evidence in contradiction to this official version has arisen from statesmen, political scientists, commentators and newsmen knowledgeable in Southeast Asian affairs.

This pamphlet examines, in light of the contradictory evidence, fourteen arguments frequently used to defend American policy in Vietnam.
Following World War II, the French launched a massive military campaign to reassert their authority in Indochina. In the midst of this campaign, on May 8, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced a seemingly innocuous decision: to send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

Four months later a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group of 35 men was sent to Indochina to advise on the use of American equipment. Slowly at first, then with gathering speed, the number of U.S. military personnel increased. In 1960, the number stood at 685; by 1962 it had risen to 4,000; by 1963, to 16,575, and by February 1965, to 23,000.

In December 1965, 181,392 American soldiers were stationed in South Vietnam with 20,000 more scheduled to arrive within the next month. At the beginning of 1966, South Vietnam had become the largest single recipient of U.S. aid, accounting for 20% of the total. The war was costing the U.S. approximately $7½ billion per year or $20 million per day. American casualties had risen from 146 in 1964 to 1,365 in 1965.
Fourteen arguments used in defending and advocating this involvement are set out below.
A rebuttal follows each.

I. Following the 1954 Geneva Conference, hundreds of thousands of refugees “voted with their feet” by moving from North to South Vietnam, clearly indicating the unpopularity of the Hanoi regime.

This argument omits the fact that of the 860,000 refugees who left the North, 600,000 were Catholics. Of the non-Catholic population, more than 98% remained.

According to Bernard Fall,* the Catholic migration was:

“... admittedly the result of an extremely intensive . . . very successful American psychological warfare operation. Propaganda slogans and leaflets appealed to the devout Catholics with such themes as ‘Christ has gone to the South’ and ‘The Virgin Mary has departed from the North.’” (The Two Vietnams, p. 153)

Furthermore, a large number of the Catholics had actively collaborated with the French against the Vietminh. When the Hanoi government took power, many Catholics feared reprisals and fled to the South.

In his book, Vietnam Divided, Chapter VI, Dr. B. S. N. Murti, Deputy-Secretary General of the International Control Commission, describes a variety of other reasons for the migration to the South: rumors that the U.S. would drop atom bombs on the North, seasonal migration to the South, strong pressure by “the French on the one hand and the priests and various political agents of the South on the other . . .”

This evidence may show that Catholics, 10% of the South Vietnamese population, dislike the government of North Vietnam. It does not prove the unpopularity of this government among the large majority of the Vietnamese.

* Bernard Fall is a Professor of International Relations at Howard University and a noted authority on Vietnam; he has written several books and articles on Vietnam.
II. Due to disturbed conditions in the South and the unwillingness of the North Vietnamese Government, it was impossible to hold elections in 1956 as specified in the Geneva Accords.*

South Vietnam’s refusal to hold these elections—a refusal supported and even advocated by the United States—rather than the instability of the South or the refusal of the North was the primary reason for the failure to hold elections.

In May and June 1956, in July 1957, in March 1958, in July 1959 and 1960, North Vietnam called repeatedly for free general elections by secret ballot, under the supervision of the International Inspectors. She also explicitly announced support for the principle that:

“All Vietnamese citizens, whether from the North or the South, have the right to canvass freely through the country through conference, leaflets, press, etc. The Government of the North and the authorities of the South should ensure the liberty and security for all citizens during their activities for elections.” (Nhan Dan, November 17, 1956**)

South Vietnam however refused all such offers on the grounds that it was not bound by the Geneva Agreements. As the Fourth Report of the International Control Commission, October 1955, observed:

“The programme for settlement of political problems, (as) outlined in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Powers, cannot be carried out in view of the categorical opposition of the Government of the State of [South] Vietnam both to the Agreement and to the Final Declaration.” (Para. 44, majority opinion)

This refusal was based at least partly on the belief of the United States and South Vietnam that free elections would result in a victory for Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party. As the U.S. State Department’s 1961 Blue Book on Vietnam, “A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnam’s Effort to Conquer South Vietnam” put it:

“It was the Communists’ calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the accords for 1956 would turn all of South Vietnam over to them . . . The authorities of South Vietnam refused to fall into this well-laid trap.”

* See Appendix A, point #7.
** Nhan Dan is the official party newspaper in North Vietnam.
President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, concurred with this belief:

"I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held . . . possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh." (Mandate for a Change, p. 372)

Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, described the U.S. role in the failure to hold elections as follows:

"It cannot be denied that there have been mistakes over the years in our policy in Vietnam, not the least of which was the encouragement given in the mid-fifties to President Ngo Dinh Diem to violate certain provisions of the Geneva Accords." (The Times, June 17, 1965)

III. The present war basically began with a decision in 1959 by North Vietnam to intervene militarily in the affairs of South Vietnam.

The majority of Western experts on the subject disagree with this view. They affirm rather, that the guerrilla movement in the South began in 1957 or even earlier and was primarily due to the following factors:

(a) The complete banning of all opposition, communist or non-communist, by the Diem regime. Diem's presidential Ordinance No. 6 of January 11, 1956 provided for the indefinite detention in concentration camps of anyone found to be a "danger to the state." By a presidential decree of June 1956, Diem abolished elected village councils and mayors. One eyewitness has written:

"This repression was aimed in theory at the Communists. In fact, it affected all those, and they were many—democrats, socialists, liberals, adherents of the sects—who were bold enough to express their disagreement with the line of policy adopted by the ruling oligarchy . . ." (Philippe Devillers*: "The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam"; China Quarterly, No. 9, 1962)

* Devillers is a French journalist; his book, Histoire du Vietnam, is considered to be a classic on Vietnamese history.
Bernard Fall notes in this context:

"In the absence of any kind of legal opposition, even for the staunchest anti-Communists, all opposition to the Diem regime had perforce to be conspiratorial, and sooner or later of a true Resistance nature." (New Society, April 22, 1965)

The outcome of the elections of 1959—the one and only attempt to hold a democratic election in the South—exemplifies this type of policy:

"Doctor Dan, a firm anti-Communist of impeccable background, was triumphantly elected to a legislative seat, over the bitter opposition of Diem. He was thereupon disqualified for office and jailed by Diem." (Jean Lacouture*: "Viet Cong—Who Are They? What Do They Want?" The New Republic, March 6, 1965)

(b) Reprisals against former resistance members and “mopping up” operations against Vietminh villages.

In March 1957, the Diem regime began to openly violate Article 14c of the Geneva Agreement** with regard to reprisals against former resistance, i.e. Vietminh, members. According to Lacouture:

"The authorities began to define as Viet Cong anyone who participated, either actively or remotely, in the activity of any organization inspired by the Vietminh. Under this definition, four out of every five South Vietnamese were automatically suspect and subject to imprisonment." (The New Republic, March 6, 1965)

On the theory that wherever the Vietminh had operated there were bound to be Communists, traitors, spies, etc., systematic and savage “mopping up” operations were launched against hundreds of villages that had long been quiescent. In 1958, writes Devillers:

"... the situation grew worse ... A certain sequence of events became almost classical: Denunciation, encirclement of villages, searches and raids, arrest of suspects, plundering, interrogations enlivened sometimes by torture, deportation, and “regrouping” of populations suspected of intelligence with the rebels, etc." (China Quarterly, No. 9, 1962)

Dr. Murti writes that:

"The mopping up operations and various repressive measures taken

---
* Lacouture, head of the Overseas Department of Le Monde, was in Vietnam for several years.
** See Appendix B.
by the Government against the former resistance workers drove them to
the jungles and to guerrilla activities against the government.” (Vietnam
Divided, p. 178)

In the opinion of Jean Lacouture and of Devillers, the guerrillas simply banded together for survival, in the face of physical extermination by the Diem regime:

“... the overriding needs of the world-wide strategy of the Socialist camp meant little or nothing to guerrilla fighters being hunted down in Nam-Bo [South Vietnam].” (Quoted in New Society, April 22, 1965)

(c) Failure to hold elections for reunification (see point II above).

(d) The virtual undoing of land reform in the Mekong Delta and repressive measures against the peasantry.

Before 1954, many landlords in the Mekong Delta fled to the safety of French-held towns. Wherever possible, the Vietminh broke up large estates, distributed land to the peasants without compensation to the former owners, and cancelled debts and rents. Diem’s apparently progressive program of land reform therefore, was in fact retrogressive. It purported to “reduce” rents which the Vietminh had abolished, to sell land which the peasants thought they now owned, and to re-establish estates which had been broken up.

Furthermore, when the landowners returned under Diem, they demanded back rent for the last eight years. Rent had been 50% of the crop, so the peasants were forced to pay 400%. (Bernard Fall: “The Truth About the War the U.S. is Losing,” U.S. News & World Report, September 28, 1964)

Another journalist writes:

“. . . the peasants regarded the land reform program as an added tax, or worse . . . The political subtleties of the situation were beyond the peasants. All they knew was that Diem had brought the landlords back.” (Denis Warner: The Last Confucian, p. 140)

To conclude, the present resistance movement in South Vietnam has its roots in the disaffection caused by Diem’s social, economic and political policies from 1954 onwards. As Edgar Snow sums up:

“It was not North Vietnam, or even local communists, but Ngo Dinh Diem who finally drove the whole countryside into rebellion.” (The Other Side of the River, p. 701)
IV. North Vietnam is the Viet Cong's main source of supply for weapons and men.

That North Vietnam is lending its support to the National Liberation Front is not disputed by either side. Such support however, must be quantitatively evaluated and must be assessed in the context of the mainly indigenous nature of the Viet Cong.

i. The following information regarding infiltration into South Vietnam was compiled from official U.S. sources:

"confirmed" total of military personnel infiltrated from North to South from 1959 to Feb. 1965 ................. 19,550
(State Dept. White Paper)
"estimated additional" figure ........................................ 17,550
Total infiltration figure ........................................... 37,100
Total Number Viet Cong ............................................. 95,000-115,000
(State Dept. White Paper, p. 3)
Viet Cong casualties, 1961-65 ...................................... 75,000
(Gener. Harold Johnson, U.S. Army Chief of Staff)
Total Number Viet Cong operating in Feb. '65 or killed since 1961 ......................................................... 170,000-190,000

\[
\frac{\text{Total number of infiltrators}}{\text{Total number of Viet Cong}} = \frac{37,100}{170,000-190,000} = \frac{1}{5} \text{ at most}
\]

ii. Most infiltrators originate from the South. According to Colonel Nguyen Van An (Chief of Staff of South Vietnam's mission in charge of relations with the I.C.C.):

"... the majority of the infiltrated contingents were drawn from the former units of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam regrouped in North Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Agreement." (Letter to the I.C.C., published in their February 13, 1965 report, p. 24)

The State Department's 1965 White Paper, despite its attempt to do just the opposite, confirmed this when it was able to specify, after six years of fighting, only six infiltrators who were born in the North.

iii. Following the publication of the White Paper, I. F. Stone's Weekly obtained the following figures from the Pentagon press office:
According to the Government of South Vietnam, a total of 179 Communist-produced weapons were captured from the Viet Cong from June 1962 to January 1965. (Appendix D of White Paper)

From these figures, it is reasonable to deduce that the great majority of Viet Cong weapons are captured from U.S. and South Vietnamese units.

V. North Vietnam was the first and most frequent violator of the Geneva Agreements.

The International Control Commission, a tripartite (Canada, India, Poland) commission, was set up by the Geneva Conference to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Accords. As a part of its supervisory work, the I.C.C. has issued a series of reports which record the cooperation or non-cooperation of the North and South. These reports show the following:

(i) that the Government of South Vietnam continued its refusal to enter into negotiations with North Vietnam for the purpose of holding free elections toward reunification.

(ii) that in 1954-56 (when the Commission was able to investigate in South Vietnam since the French—who honored the Geneva agreements—were still there) a large number of specific violations of Article 14c occurred in the South as against a very much smaller number in the North.

Article 14c provides for an undertaking: “to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.”

In the first year of the Diem regime, the I.C.C. itemized 319 losses of human life resulting from reprisals in the South, and commented that it was able to investigate only a small minority
of the large number of incidents brought to its attention. There are no Commission reports of reprisals in the North.

(iii) that after 1956, the Government of South Vietnam refused to extend any facilities to the I.C.C., as required under Article 25*, thus preventing the Commission from investigating complaints relating to Article 14c. The I.C.C. was allowed to operate freely in North Vietnam until February 1965 when U.S. bombings against the North began.

(iv) In their 7th Report of July 12, 1957, the Commission in a majority decision with Canada dissenting, recorded a number of substantive violations of Articles 16 and 17* by South Vietnam, starting with the introduction of U.S. arms and military personnel from November 1955 onwards.

The June 1962 Report found the following:

"Taking all the facts into consideration, and basing itself upon its own observations and authorized statements made in the U.S.A. and the Republic of Vietnam, the Commission concludes that the Republic of Vietnam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid from the U.S.A. in the absence of any established credit in its favor. The Commission is also of the view that, though there may not be any formal military alliance between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Republic of Vietnam, the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S. military personnel beyond the stated strength of the M.A.A.G. (Military Assistance Advisory Group) amounts to a factual military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19* of the Geneva Agreement."

VI. U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam, which began in February 1965, are necessary in order to (a) force the North Vietnamese to end their support of the NLF (b) force Hanoi to the negotiating table and (c) increase the morale of the Saigon Government.

If these three points are taken as the criteria of success, then our bombing policy has failed in almost all respects. Considering each in turn:

* See Appendix B.
(a) Senator Mike Mansfield stated last spring that, despite the bombings, infiltrations from North Vietnam had increased.

On January 2, 1966, Walter Lippmann commented in the *San Francisco Chronicle* that:

"After a year of increasing escalation, the area controlled by the Viet Cong is larger today than it was a year ago, and the North Vietnamese have replied to the bombing not by ceasing to intervene in South Vietnam, but by doing what it was plain that they would do if we bombed them by sending in more and more of their trained troops."

(b) Max Frankel, writing from Washington, D.C. in November 1965, described official U.S. statements which confirmed:

"... indications that Washington had no interest in negotiations until last April and that Hanoi had shown little interest since then. This apparent switch in positions coincided with the start of heavy American bombing in North and South Vietnam in February and March." (*New York Times*, November 18, 1965)

John Gittings, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, sees a similar connection:

"The immediate effect of the bombing of the North was to stiffen the resolve of both [Hanoi and the NLF] and to make them unwilling even to talk of negotiations." (*A Basis for Negotiations Exists*, *The Nation*, September 6, 1965)

Even if the bombing could produce a desire for negotiations in Hanoi, it is doubtful if this would create the same desire in the NLF which is doing the major portion of the fighting. As George Kahin has stated:

"If over the last five years the doctrine of uncompromising resistance and the real expectation of victory have been so assiduously nurtured among the southern-rooted Vietcong, is it sensible to assume that Hanoi can abruptly call off their opposition—or enforce such compliance? ... The Vietcong has suffered casualties for years in its struggle against Saigon; and it seems unlikely that it would call off the fight just because the North had also begun to feel the sting of war." (*The United States in Vietnam*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1965)

(c) John Maffre, writing from Saigon on February 14, 1965, had this to say about the effect of the bombing on South Vietnamese morale:

"The air strikes have had no noticeable or beneficial effect on public thinking as far as Saigon is concerned. The average Vietnamese in Saigon
if he paid any attention at all to the war has long felt that it was something that has been taken out of the Vietnamese hands anyway. In most countries the threat of national disaster is enough to make rival factions put aside their differences and form a unified front. Things do not work quite that way in Saigon. The greater the threat, the greater the in-fighting . . .” (Washington Post, February 14, 1965)

A concrete indication of improved morale would be a drop in the rate of desertions from the South Vietnamese army. Yet, in November 1965, an AP dispatch from Saigon reported that the number of such deserters had been steadily rising. It says there were 87,000 in the first ten months of this year as against 72,000 in 1964. (Washington Star)

Such failures are not surprising in light of the lessons history has to offer. In Korea we had total air control, and the Chinese had few roads to march on. “In little more than a month,” says the official Air Force history of its role in the Korean war, “the FEAF (Far East Air Forces) Bomber Command had neutralized all but one strategic bombing objective contributing support to the North Korean People’s Army.” (The U.S. Air Force in Korea, Futrell, Moseley & Simpson, p. 184.) Yet the war continued for three more years and we were pushed out of North Korea and back beyond the 38th parallel.

A strategic bombing survey, taken by the U.S. after World War II, showed that bombing during the war failed to achieve either military or psychological objectives.

Perhaps even more important however is the fact that the bombing raids appear to be actually working against American objectives. As Senator Mike Mansfield stated on May 6, 1965:

“The predictable effect of the raids has been to harden the resolve of the North Vietnamese without impairing their fighting ability. It is forcing the Soviet Union into a more hostile role in South East Asia. It is alienating our friends and aiding our enemies in Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America. It is probably a major force in preventing a solution of the Vietnamese problem around the conference table.” (Congressional Record—Senate, May 6, 1965)

Regarding the effect in South Vietnam, Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, stated on September 21, 1965:

“When you bomb a village of 3,000 people which perhaps 5 Viet Cong have infiltrated, you are going to create a lot more than 5 Viet Cong by the time you are finished bombing.”
VII. In South Vietnam, refugees are now pouring into the towns from Viet Cong areas as a result of Viet Cong terrorism and general oppression.

The reasons behind the growing number of refugees in South Vietnam (close to 900,000 according to recent estimates) are many. That Viet Cong terrorism exists, and that it may be one of these reasons, is not questioned. That it is the sole or even the major reason however is highly doubtful in light of the military realities. In evaluating the effect of this terrorism, it is important to realize that, as Bernard Fall states, the Viet Cong's "...ability to do harm is immeasurably smaller than that of the other [our] side, and there is no doubt in anyone's mind, and that includes the Intelligence specialists in Saigon, that the VC are deliberately keeping terrorism at a low level because of its psychologically adverse affects. If the VC set its mind to it, it could go on a rampage that would leave most Vietnamese urban centers a shambles, but it has not thus far." (New Republic, October 9, 1965)

Our side's greater "ability to do harm" refers primarily to the almost continuous bombing raids that have been carried out in South as well as North Vietnam for some time now. Not only has this bombing been intensive, it has, in all too many cases, been haphazard and indiscriminate in its targets. The New York Times, on March 7, 1965, reported that officially registered civilian Vietnamese deaths from bombing rose from 276 in January 1964 to 1,329 in November 1964 and have exceeded 1,000 in each month since. "For some time," the dispatch continued, "the attitude has been that if a village supports the Viet Cong, the population is culpable."

This bombing strategy was further described by Stephen Cary, following a three month visit to Vietnam:

"The 'no sanctuary' policy that is now being followed by the U.S. and ARVN (South Vietnamese Government) forces means that air support can be called on instantly to destroy any village or hamlet from which sniper fire is reported, or which is suspected of harboring Viet Cong troops. This policy is complemented by another which designates certain large enemy-held regions as 'open target areas' where an aircraft unable to dispose of its explosives on the planned target may drop them at will on village, rice paddy, man, or beast, wherever it suits the pilot's fancy." ("Three Months in Vietnam," The Progressive, October 1965)
Reason alone would seem to indicate that these policies of indiscriminate bombing have been a far more important factor behind the increasing number of refugees than have the individual acts of Viet Cong terrorism.

VIII. North Vietnam demands the withdrawal of United States troops before negotiations can begin.

Several reports from foreign correspondents and visitors to North Vietnam strongly indicate that Hanoi does not require withdrawal before negotiations.

The belief that this is Hanoi’s demand is usually based on the Four Point Proposal put forward by the North Vietnamese National Assembly on April 10, 1965. The proposal enumerates the following points which Hanoi regards as the only proper basis for a political settlement:

(1) "... the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, (etc.) . . .

(2) "Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam . . . the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining in any military alliance with foreign countries.

(3) "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam NLF without any foreign interference.

(4) "The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam." [emphasis added]

John Gittings explains Point Number 1 as follows:

"The eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam has to be recognized as the basis of a settlement; it does not have to be carried out before negotiations can begin. It has been made quite clear that the method of withdrawal is negotiable, but that the principle must be accepted in advance." (The Nation, September 6, 1965)

In other words, the U.S. is required to recognize that the purpose of negotiations should be the implementation of the
Geneva Agreements, and that this will entail the eventual withdrawal of America's military presence in Vietnam.

William Warbey, British Labor M.P., following a visit to Hanoi in January 1965 when he met with President Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, reported a similar interpretation:

"Mr. Pham Van Dong was emphatic that this [American withdrawal] was not a precondition." (I. F. Stone's Weekly, April 12, 1965)

Does the NLF differ from Hanoi on this point? Its public position seems to be much more rigid than that of North Vietnam’s. In private, however, the NLF attitude is slightly more conciliatory:

"On the major point of American withdrawal, its [the NLF] President, Nguyen Huu Tho, told one journalist that ‘withdrawal of all American troops with all their arms and equipment’ need only be the ‘basis of any eventual agreement' Sunday Times, 27 June 1965." (Quoted in "A Basis for Negotiations Exists," The Nation, September 6, 1965)

IX. North Vietnam and the NLF demand immediate reunification of North and South Vietnam.

According to the Four Point Proposal of Hanoi:

"The peaceful re-unification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference."

The North Vietnamese proposals for reunification were spelled out in detail to William Warbey during his January visit to Hanoi:

"... International recognition of the existence, during the transitional phase, of two separate and equal political administrations in Hanoi and Saigon... The right of the people of Vietnam to solve through free and equal negotiations between the two administrations the problems of reunion of divided families, of the reopening of trade, communications between North and South, of free access to homes and lands, and of eventual political reunification under a possibly federal government." (I. F. Stone's Weekly, April 12, 1965) [emphasis added]

The program of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, first issued on December 20, 1960, calls for:
"... the peaceful reunification by stages on the basis of negotiations and through the seeking of ways and means in conformity with the interest of the Vietnamese nation." (Article IX of the NLF Manifesto)

Sanford Gottlieb states that, in his meeting with NLF representatives in Algiers, he was told that "reunification can be worked out step by step over the next twenty years." (Sane World, October 1965)

I. F. Stone, on October 28, 1963, reported that:

"A representative of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in a clandestine interview with Georges Chaffard of Le Monde (August 24, 1963) during his visit to Saigon last summer also set forth a program for an independent South Vietnam to be established in free elections. 'We have not fought all these years, in the worst conditions,' he told M. Chaffard, 'to end by replacing one dictatorship with another. None of us can accept a relation of dependence on the North.'"

According to John Gittings:

"There seems little doubt that if reunification ever did take place, it would do so along these lines [a relatively cautious and long term approach], and that it would not assume the form of a simple North Vietnamese 'take-over' of the South."

X. **North Vietnam and the NLF demand that South Vietnam be turned over to the Viet Cong.**

This charge is usually based on Point Three of North Vietnam's Four Point Proposal (see point VIII above) which reads: "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam NLF."

The State Department has interpreted this as requiring "the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Vietnam whether the South Vietnamese want it or not." (Memorandum prepared for Vice President Humphrey's trip abroad, quoted in I. F. Stone's Weekly, January 10, 1966.)

The actual substance of this program to which our State Department is so opposed, has been given little coverage in the U.S. press. According to Philippe Devillers:
It calls for the overthrow of the Saigon government and its replacement by ‘an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral government’ which would provide for the economic welfare of the whole population, land for poor peasants, autonomy for minorities, and negotiations with Hanoi leading to the peaceful reunification of Vietnam.” (“The Struggle for the Unification of Vietnam,” The China Quarterly No. 9, 1962)

As I. F. Stone has stated:

“After 12 years of financing dictatorships in South Vietnam, the U.S. government does not enhance its reputation by trying to make it appear that the NLF program is somehow undemocratic. The NLF program is so broad and general in its principles of democracy, land reform, neutrality and amnesty as to allow ample room for honorable negotiation and guarantees of a free regime if we were looking for real negotiations.” (I. F. Stone’s Weekly, January 10, 1965)

XI. President Johnson has made it clear that the United States is willing to enter into “unconditional negotiations” to end the war in Vietnam. Only the intransigence of North Vietnam and China has prevented such negotiations from taking place.

(a) Until April of 1965, the U.S. had consistently refused to admit the possibility of negotiations on Vietnam. It is now known that, as of December 1965, the United States had turned down seven North Vietnamese proposals for discussion. Three of these offers were described as early as February 23, 1965:

“North Vietnam recently urged France to intensify her efforts for a negotiated settlement of the war. In Washington, officials said that they had refused to give the French a ‘mandate’ as mediators, and that they were not interested now in reconvening the [Geneva] conference. [emphasis added]

“The North Vietnamese have used the French mission in Hanoi . . . for overtures to the U.S. before the one disclosed today. Diplomatic sources have reported Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville as having said, as early as last December, that President Ho Chi Minh had told France that he wanted to discuss the basis for an accommodation with the U.S., either directly and privately or through a third party, presumably in France.

“An even earlier indication of President Ho Chi Minh’s desire to negotiate developed at the first meeting between President Johnson and
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, after the assassination of President Kennedy.

"At that encounter, according to diplomatic sources, Mr. Thant gave Mr. Johnson a message from the North Vietnamese President suggesting talks on a settlement." (New York Times)

Nine months later, Eric Severeid described the U.S. reaction to this latter offer in an article in Look. Severeid's statement, based on information received in an interview with Adlai Stevenson shortly before the latter's death, was quoted in the New York Times, November 15, 1965:

"In the early autumn of 1964, U Thant . . . had privately obtained agreement from authorities in North Vietnam that they would send an emissary to talk with an American emissary in Rangoon, Burma. Someone in Washington insisted that this attempt be postponed until after the Presidential elections. When the election was over . . . Defense Secretary Robert McNamara flatly opposed the attempt."

After initial denials, the State Department admitted that such an offer had taken place. The official explanation for the U.S. refusal was that the proposals had been "procedural" rather than "substantive" (James Reston, New York Times, November 17, 1965), and, furthermore, that the United States "did not believe at any time that North Vietnam was prepared for serious peace talks." (Robert J. McCloskey, State Department Press Officer, quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle, November 16, 1965)

Ten days later, Secretary of State Rusk reiterated these reasons and stated further that there had "never been a period when it [the U.S.] has been unwilling to talk." (New York Times, November 26, 1965)

Secretary Rusk's assurances, however, conflicted with two previous Administration statements: On February 26, 1965, Press Secretary George Reedy issued the statement that: "The President has not authorized any negotiations. We are not contemplating any negotiations."

In September of 1963, a State Department official stated, in response to French suggestions for negotiations, that:

"It would not appear to be in the interest of South Vietnam, or ourselves or of other free-world nations, to consider negotiating away what has been accomplished by the courage and heavy expense in life and effort of the Vietnam people." (New York Herald Tribune, September 19, 1963)
(b) President Johnson’s Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, is seen as the first public indication that the attitude of the United States towards negotiations had changed. In reality, however, this speech indicated more a change of tactics than a change of attitude:

The speech contained a number of explicit conditions which were known to be unacceptable to Hanoi and to the National Liberation Front.

The President stipulated clearly that peace demanded “an independent South Vietnam,” thereby implicitly excluding the reunification of Vietnam. This directly contravenes the Geneva Agreement which provided (i) “that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.” and (ii) that the political problems of Vietnam should be settled “on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity.” (Paras. 6-7)

Hanoi, who has repeatedly insisted that the Geneva Agreement must be the basis of any settlement, had made it clear that she would not accept any negotiated settlement which perpetuated the division of Vietnam.

The President’s offer to discuss was made to the “governments” involved—a very pointed exclusion of the National Liberation Front.

Hanoi has long insisted that the NLF is the true representative of the people of South Vietnam and that it is not Hanoi but the NLF with whom the U.S. must negotiate.

Thus the President managed to offer “unconditional” discussions while simultaneously ensuring the impossibility of such negotiations ever occurring.

(c) Has the United States become more lenient in its policy on negotiations?

Since the April 7th speech, the U.S. appears to have slowly removed some of its conditions. On July 31st, Ambassador Goldberg presented a statement to U Thant describing the United States’ new position on negotiations:

“Washington now is prepared to envisage reunification of North and South Vietnam via internationally supervised elections, as envisaged in the Geneva Accords of 1954, even though, as many diplomats believe, this could lead to a Communist take-over . . . The U.S. is willing to find
some face-saving formula for including the Viet Cong, or the National Liberation Front, at a peace table." (San Francisco Chronicle, July 31 1965)

Statements made since July 1965 have been somewhat contradictory on this issue, leaving it unclear whether we are in fact willing to "envisage reunification." Reunification however becomes a moot point in the face of the continuing refusal of the U.S., to date, to:

"... deal with the NLF, to assure it a place in a future government of South Vietnam or recognize its military hold on a large share of South Vietnam. In Hanoi's four-point peace plan, the one condition Washington finds unacceptable is the demand that the NLF have a role in any new South Vietnam government before elections. As for Ky [Premier of South Vietnam], he has set his face against any negotiation." (San Francisco Chronicle, January 6, 1966)

The effect of this refusal on the possibilities for negotiations was described in October 1965 by the New York Times Saigon correspondent, Neil Sheehan:

[The United States] "has made clear to Hanoi through neutral intermediaries and in the fine print of its public pronouncements that it will not countenance a Communist South Vietnam or the creation of any coalition regime in Saigon which might lead to a Communist seizure of power. What Washington thus seems to mean by negotiations is a conference at which Hanoi would agree to cease its activities in the South, abandon its attempt to unify the country under Communist rule and acquiesce in a permanent partition of Vietnam. As this would amount to abandonment of everything for which the Vietnamese Communists have fought for the last 20 years, no one here expects the North Vietnamese, as one senior diplomat put it, 'to ratify their own defeat'..." (New York Times, October 23, 1965. According to I. F. Stone's Weekly, November 22, 1965, "The Washington correspondent of a leading metropolitan daily checked this with the White House and was told it was accurate.")

Senators Frank Church (D., Idaho) and George McGovern (D., S. Dakota), on their return from Vietnam in early January 1966, expressed concern on this point. Said Senator McGovern:

"... the basic flaw in United States efforts to negotiate a settlement is the exclusion of the primary antagonists—the Saigon government and the rebel National Liberation Front... Since the fundamental issue in the war is the political question of what group will exercise power in South Vietnam... the negotiations ought to be primarily between the two competing groups in South Vietnam." (San Francisco Chronicle, January 6, 1966)
Senator Church expressed agreement with Senator McGovern, and stated further that:

"The United States can back Saigon at the negotiating table as Hanoi can back the Viet Cong, but neither the American government nor the government of North Vietnam can end a revolution in South Vietnam without the participation of those engaged in it." (San Francisco Chronicle, January 6, 1966)

As Walter Lippmann sums it up:

"There is no reason to doubt that President Johnson is sincere in proclaiming to the whole world his desire to negotiate a peace in Vietnam. But sincerity is not the crux of the matter. The question is whether he recognizes the strategic realities of the military situation and is prepared to negotiate a truce which conforms with them. It cannot be a glorious truce." (San Francisco Chronicle, January 4, 1966)

**XII. The United States is honor-bound to uphold the commitment, made by three administrations, to defend South Vietnam.**

It is interesting to note that the first official commitment made by the U.S. to Vietnam was contained in the unilateral declaration of the United States read at the close of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, by the then Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith:

"The Government of the United States of America Declares with regard to the aforesaid [Geneva] Agreements and paragraphs [1 through 12 inclusive of the Final Declaration—see Appendix A] that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them in accordance with Article 2 (Section 4) of the Charter of the United Nations . . ."

Understandably, this commitment is not normally referred to in justifying our present policy in Vietnam. What then were the commitments made by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy?

In a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem on October 23, 1954, Eisenhower gave Diem a pledge of aid "provided that your [Diem's] Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid
were supplied." The letter went on to add: "The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms." (Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI, November 15, 1954)

The reforms were not made and the government to which we made this commitment was overthrown with, at the least, our tacit approval, to be followed by a series of military dictatorships.

Furthermore, Eisenhower has recently stated (New York Times, August 18, 1965) that his administration had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever."

President Kennedy's conception of our "commitment" was equally conditional. In a CBS interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1963, he stated:

"I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government of South Vietnam to win popular support, that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war... We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government has gotten out of touch with the people."

Perhaps more important however, is the relationship of this commitment to other commitments the United States has made:

**SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION:**

It is frequently asserted that U.S. actions in Vietnam are consistent with and sanctioned by U.S. obligations under the treaty creating SEATO. This treaty—the South East Asian Collective Defense Treaty—was signed in 1954. It requires as a prerequisite to any intervention by any of the signatories that "the parties [to the treaty] shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken..." (Article IV, paragraph 2) The consent of all eight SEATO nations is required before any military action under Article IV can be undertaken.

The United States has not consulted with the other parties to the treaty, nor has it obtained their consent to its actions in Vietnam.

Furthermore, the SEATO treaty states in Article IV, that this treaty:

"... does not affect the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."
The Charter of the United Nations, to which the U.S. is a
signatory, is a presently effective treaty binding upon the Gov­
ernment of the United States. The treaties to which the U.S. is a
signatory are a part of the fundamental law, binding upon all
officials and all governmental institutions. Article VI, Clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution provides that such treaties together with
the Constitution and the laws of the United States made pursuant
thereto, are "the Supreme Law of the Land."

Four provisions of the U.N. Charter are particularly relevant
to the Vietnam situation:

(a) "All members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde­
pendence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." (Chapter I, Art. II(4) )

(b) "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall decide
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international
peace and security." (Chapter VII, 39)

(c) "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members
of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present charter shall prevail." (Chapter XVI, Article 103)

(d) "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or peaceful means of their own choice." (Chapter VI, Article 33)

"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article
33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer
it to the Security Council." (Chapter VI, Article 37)

On the basis of these and other facts, the Lawyers' Com­
mittee on American Policy Toward Vietnam came to the follow­
ing conclusions:

"It is plain that signatory members of the United Nations Charter are
barred from resorting to force unilaterally and that only the Security
Council is authorized to determine the measures to be taken to maintain
or restore international peace . . . We have concluded that the U.S. Gov­
ernment [in its actions in Vietnam] is in violation of its treaty obligations
under the United Nations Charter." (Congressional Record, September 23,
1965)
In addition, the memorandum goes on to state:

"... the frequent citation by President Johnson of the pledges given by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and himself to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In the first place, these pledges or commitments do not even have the status of treaties, for these Presidential pledges have not been ratified by the Senate. And even if these Presidential pledges had been solemnly ratified by the Senate, any obligations thereunder must yield to the obligations imposed under the United Nations Charter by virtue of the supremacy clause embodied in Article 103. Nor would the illegality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam be altered by the circumstance that the Saigon regime may have invited the United States to assume its role in the Vietnam conflict. The supremacy clause of the Charter manifestly prevails and cannot be annulled by mutual agreement of third parties."

Arthur and Don Larson, in their booklet, *Vietnam and Beyond*, note that:

"If one examines the major documents, speeches ... (etc.) bearing on this subject since 1950, it is a curious fact that one cannot find the words 'commitment,' 'obligation,' or 'pledge' used to describe our relation to South Vietnam until the Johnson administration ... With the advent of the Johnson administration, 'commitment,' 'obligation,' and 'pledge' begin to blossom with increasing profusion in public statements, especially those of Secretary McNamara and of President Johnson himself. But the significant thing is that the 'pledges' are usually referred to as having been made in the past, with the now familiar refrain that the whole policy has come down unchanged since 1954 ... What President Johnson has done is to convert imperceptibly a diplomatic statement of policy based ultimately on considerations of American security, into an unconditional obligation to another country, suffused with overtones of national integrity and honor." (*Vietnam and Beyond*, p. 27)

**XIII. If South Vietnam falls to the Communists, it will, like the first in a row of dominoes, lead to the fall of all the neighboring countries.**

Hans Morgenthau, writing in the *New Republic*, described the Domino Theory as:

"... a slogan born of fear and of misconception of history and politics. It is unsupported by any historic evidence." ("Russia, the U.S. and Vietnam," *New Republic*, May 1, 1965)
In an earlier article, Morgenthau stated:

"The triumph or defeat of Communism in a particular country is not simply a by-product of what happens or does not happen in another country. What will happen in Vietnam can be no more than one factor among many, and most certainly not the decisive one, that will influence developments in other countries." ("The Case Against Further Involvement," *Washington Post*, March 15, 1964)

One of the many factors referred to by Morgenthau is the strong traditional rivalries existing between Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia, Vietnam's next-door-neighbor, has been a frequent victim of both Vietnamese and Thai invasions. As a result, her relations with both, quite apart from the war, are something less than amicable. As C. P. Fitzgerald* has stated:

"... if all Vietnam, reunited and potentially again strong came under Communist control, Cambodia would almost certainly seek other alliances, and would certainly oppose any policy that encouraged Vietnamese domination." ("The Fallacy of the Dominoes," *The Nation*, June 28, 1965)

The strongest argument against a policy based on the Domino Theory however, derives from the results of our application of this theory. Franz Schurmann, Chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, argues that:

"The so-called domino thesis may indeed become true if the war continues in Vietnam, and even if America should, temporarily, win it. Since socio-political instability and not direct military invasion have been the main causes for the breakdown of existing institutions, and since the continuation of the Vietnamese war directly contributes to proliferating such instability one can argue that America is doing its best to make the thesis come into being." (Open letter to Congress, January 1966)

For some time now, we have applied increasing military force to prevent the "first domino" from toppling. Yet, as Hans Morgenthau has stated:

"The threat here [in Asia] is not primarily military but political in nature ... Military containment has no bearing upon such a threat."

Furthermore, this military application of the Domino Theory indicates an appalling ignorance of the racial implications of any

---

* Fitzgerald is a professor of Far Eastern History at Australian National University; he lived in China for over 25 years.
caucasian intervention in Asia. Walter Lippmann has stated:

The Asians “regard our war in Vietnam as a war by a rich, powerful nation, a war by white men from the West against non-white men in Asia.” *(The Washington Post, April 22, 1965)*

The result of this attitude, based largely on years of Western colonial domination, is that:

“... the presence of Western forces immediately justifies the activity of all who oppose them under whatever banner. This has been the great strength of the Communist parties in these countries. Where the West has wholly withdrawn, the Communist party soon loses ground.” *(C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Nation*, June 28, 1965)*

---

**XIV. The “Tonkin Resolution” gave the President full authority from Congress to take whatever steps he felt necessary in Vietnam.**

In the face of growing Congressional criticism of the current Vietnam policy, the Administration has, with increasing frequency, pointed to the Tonkin Resolution as justification of any action the President deems necessary.

In actual fact, Congressional attitudes at the time of the resolution were much more complex than either the wording of the resolution or the President's use of it imply.

The resolution was requested by the President in August 1964 in the midst of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in which North Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked two U.S. destroyers. U.S. naval planes retaliated with 65 sorties against North Vietnamese bases. It was later concluded that the whole episode may have been due to miscalculation and confusion and that the North Vietnamese may not have been “attacking” but “retaliating” for what they assumed to be a U.S. attack on two of their islands. The islands had actually been shelled by South Vietnamese vessels which were backed up by U.S. ships.

Although only two Senators voted against the resolution, several expressed serious concern that it should *not* be taken as a blank check:
Senator George McGovern expressed concern that the resolution would allow expansion of the war to the North. Senator Daniel Brewster wanted reassurance that the resolution would not "authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China." Senator Gaylord Nelson seconded this concern.

Senator J. William Fulbright, who acted as floor manager for the bill, stated that, in his opinion, the resolution "would not rationalize carrying the war to North Vietnam," and that "I personally feel it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian continent."

Since August 1964, Fulbright's misgivings have grown rather than diminished. A *New York Times* article on January 31, 1966, disclosed the following:

"Senator Fulbright said later in an interview that he regretted he had not been as 'foresighted or wise as I should have been' in 1964 when he pushed through, after perfunctory hearings, the resolution . . . Mr. Fulbright says he did not realize then the 'implication' of that resolution and had not expected it would be used by the President as a mandate for some of the steps he has taken in Vietnam."

The most important factor in judging the validity of President Johnson's use of this resolution as a blank check is the context in which it was passed. According to Walter Lippmann, the Senate had little choice in passing the resolution, for:

"... when the blank check was voted, it was voted to a man engaged in a campaign for the presidency against Senator Barry Goldwater who was advocating substantially the same military policy that President Johnson is now following." (*San Francisco Chronicle*, February 6, 1966)

In addition, James Reston argues, the Congress "had no choice but to give him [Johnson] whatever he requested publicly or repudiate him and thus help the enemy." (*San Francisco Chronicle*, February 6, 1966)

On this basis, Lippmann concludes that:

"... if laws are to be interpreted in the light of their legislative history, the President is without legal and moral authority to fill in the blank check of August 1964 with whatever he thinks he ought to do in 1966." (*San Francisco Chronicle*, February 6, 1966)
CONCLUSION:

The situation in Vietnam is a highly complex one that does not lend itself to simple conclusions or attitudes. Yet, the dangers implicit in the rapidly increasing U.S. involvement in the war demand of us, as citizens, an attempt at some sort of conclusion, some sort of attitude. In urging this attempt, we would echo the hope of former Senator Maurine Neuberger of Oregon:

“It is annoying to learn that it is the Viet Cong who believe in and fight for something, whereas the South Vietnamese have few sophisticated notions of freedom and democracy. After being told that guerrilla forces are extremely difficult to defeat, it is jarring to hear that such wars can be won—in countries where the people themselves do not shelter the enemy. It displeases us that the Viet Cong grows stronger instead of weaker and that the South Vietnam government is a source of jokes and despair rather than pride. After being told that it is not a civil war and that North Vietnam is the aggressor in open and cynical violation of the 1954 Geneva accord, it is inconvenient to be reminded that the 17th parallel is an artificial boundary separating peoples who have no racial or cultural differences.

“I hope that we are not so committed in South Vietnam that we cannot see some of these unpleasant realities. How ironic it would be if, in ‘defending liberty,’ we lost the freedom to control our own policies and our actions became ‘irrelevant and irrational.’” (Senator Neuberger's Newsletter, February, 1965)
APPENDIX A

The essential provisions of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference are as follows:

Article 4 prohibited "the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions."

Article 5 provided that "no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the re-grouping zones of the two parties" and that "neither zone shall constitute part of any military alliance."

Article 6 stated that "the military demarcation line (the 17th parallel) is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."

Article 7 provided that political problems should be settled "on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity" and that "general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission."

Article 9 prohibited "individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families."

APPENDIX B

Partinent articles of the Geneva Accords:

ARTICLE 16: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited . . . ."

ARTICLE 17: "(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons, and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

ARTICLE 19: "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

ARTICLE 25: "The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Control Commission and its Inspection Teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement."
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUGGESTED READING MATERIALS ON VIETNAM

° "A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS EXISTS"; John Gittings; reprinted from The Nation; September 6, 1965.

° "CAN WE PLAY GOD IN ASIA?"; D. F. Fleming; reprinted from The Progressive, June 1965.


° "HOW TO TELL WHEN THE REBELS HAVE WON: REVOLUTIONARY WAR­FARE"; Egbal Ahmad; reprinted from The Nation; August 30, 1965.

° "LOWER MEKONG"; Gilbert White; reprinted from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; December 1964.

° "MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND LAWYERS' COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM"; a Congressional Record Reprint; September 23, 1965.

° "THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM"; Philippe Devillers; China Quarterly, No. 9, October-December 1962.

° "THREE MONTHS IN VIETNAM"; Stephen Cary; reprinted from The Progressive; October 1965.

° "THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM"; George Kahin and John Lewis; reprinted from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; June 1965.

° "VIETNAM DIVIDED"; Dr. B. S. N. Murti; Asia Publishing House; 1965.

° Available from the

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
2160 Lake St.
San Francisco, California
Copies Available from . . .

National Office
PHILADELPHIA 2, PA.
160 North 15th Street

Regional Offices

CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138
44-A Brattle Street
(P.O. Box 247)

CHICAGO, ILL. 60605
431 S. Dearborn Street

DAYTON, OHIO 45408
915 Salem Avenue

DES MOINES, IOWA 50312
4211 Grand Avenue

HIGH POINT, N.C. 27261
1818 S. Main Street

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77004
4714 Crawford Street

NEW YORK, METRO-N.Y. 10003
15 Rutherford Place

PASADENA, CALIF. 91103
980 N. Fair Oaks
(P.O. Box 991-91102)

PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19102
1500 Race Street

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 94121
2160 Lake Street

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98105
814 N.E. 40th Street

Quantity prices:
25 for $5.00
100 for $15.00