Communist terrorists have assassinated Mr CAO VAN NANG, an active member of the anti-communist Confederation of Labor Organization at Vinh-Binh province on Feb. 22, 1973.

The funeral procession of Mr CAO-VAN-NANG
NGUYEN-TIET-HUNG, a member of 'the people's self-defence force' assassinated by the communists at Bến-Cam hamlet (Biên-Hoa province) on Feb. 15, 1973
C.- ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION FROM NORTH VIETNAM OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WAR MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM
From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Article 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

From the entry into effect of the cease-fire Agreement to April 26, 1973, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is known to have infiltrated military personnel, ammunition and armaments into South-Vietnam in a steady manner and in direct violation of Articles 7 and 20 of the 1973 Paris Agreement on Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam.
Throughout this period, more than 50,000 North Vietnamese troops moved from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam either directly or through Laos and Cambodia. New North Vietnamese anti aircraft and artillery units were progressively deployed in South Viet-Nam, well after the cease-fire. Four hundred (400) tanks and armored vehicles, three hundred (300) artillery pieces, and a vast quantity of ammunition, were among the supplies detected as they were conveyed into South Viet-Nam from North Viet-Nam.

The airstrip at Khe-Sanh has even been equipped with new SAM 2 missiles the purpose of which is obviously hostile to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam continues to expand and extend the road and drainage system on Highways 7, 4 and 4/7. There are also indications that a road is being constructed to join Southern Laos with the two South Vietnamese provinces of Quảng-Trị and Quảng-Ngãi, across the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.

The above mentioned efforts of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to build a series of road network, nowhere near an entry point, can only be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to smuggle military supplies into the Republic of Viet-Nam, in blatant violation of Article 20 of the Paris Agreement.
INSTALLATION OF SAM 2 MISSILES
AT KHE SANH
(This picture was taken on February 2, 1973)
NEW SAM POSITIONS AT KHE-SANH
(The above picture was taken on 18-02-1973)
NEW SAM POSITION AT KHE-SANH

SA.2 MSL ON LNCHR CMFLGD : Sam 2 missile on launcher camouflaged
SPT VAN : Support Van
PROB FANSONG : Probable Fansong Radar
(The above picture was taken on 31-03-1973)
NEW SAM POSITION AT KHE-SANH

SA.2 MSLS ON LNCHRS : Sam-2 Missile on Launchers
SPT BLDGS : Support Buildings
PROB FANSONG : Probable Fansong Radar

(The above picture was taken on 7 April 1973)
ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIAL

Photo shows two armoured personnel carriers (APC's) moving south on the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' two nautical miles northwest of Choiavieng in Laos; geographic coordinates 16 degrees, 11 minutes, 55 seconds North Latitude, 106 degrees, 31 minutes, 57 seconds East Longitude; UTMG coordinates 48Q XC 638913. Lead vehicle in photo is a type K-63 APC manufactured in Red China. The second APC is a type BTR 60PB manufactured in the USSR.

(Photo was taken on March 11, 1973).
ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
AND WAR MATERIAL
ENCROACHMENT UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE KINGDOM OF LAOS

Photo shows 10 North Vietnamese trucks heading south on the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' near Cholavieng in Laos; geographic coordinates (approx) 16 degrees, 10 minutes, 05 seconds, North Latitude, 106 degrees, 32 minutes, 02 seconds East Longitude; UTMG coordinates (approx) 48Q 640880. Photo was taken on March 12, 1973.
ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WAR MATERIAL

Photo shows 43 North Vietnamese trucks at a recently constructed truck park near Ban A Choc, approximately 17 nautical miles northwest of Khe Sanh, geographic coordinates 16 degrees, 52 minutes, 58 seconds North Latitude; 106 degrees, 34 minutes, 30 seconds East Longitude. (UTMG coordinates 48Q XD 67756710).

(Photo was taken on April 10, 1973)
ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WAR MATERIAL

Photo shows total of eight North Vietnamese trucks moving South at a point 100 miles Northwest of Pho Lai, South Viet-Nam; geographic coordinates 16 degrees, 50 minutes, 15 seconds North Latitude, 107 degrees, 05 minutes, 25 seconds East Longitude; UTMG coordinates 48Q YS 227625.

(Photo was taken on April 6, 1973)
ILLEGAL INTRODUCTION OF

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WAR MATERIAL

Photo shows 25 North Vietnamese trucks and what are probably two trailers parked and in transit at a point 5.5 nautical miles west of Cam Lo, South Viet-Nam; geographic coordinates 16 degrees, 02 minutes, 15 seconds North Latitude, 106 degrees, 54 minutes, 20 seconds East Longitude; UTMG coordinates 48Q XD 027569.

(Photo was taken on April 11, 1973)
D.- COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.
EXCERPTS FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT

ARTICLE 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.
The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the other South Vietnamese party, by refusing to release all military and civilian prisoners within the sixty days stipulated by the Paris Agreement, have shown their lack of goodwill in an issue which should have been spared all political controversy.

Out of 31,818 military personnel of the Republic of Viet-Nam captured by the Communist side, only 4,608 have been released up to this date. The release operations were in fact extremely slow and difficult, mainly because the Communists wanted to exploit the issue, most of the time as a means of political warfare, sometimes as an insidious military maneuver. Thus, at the two release sites of Bau-Cañ (Pleiku) and Đức-Phọ (Quảng-Ngãi province), the Communists used the release operations as an opportunity to seize territories which were under RVN control.

On the issue of civilian personnel of the Republic of Viet-Nam captured by the Communist side, whose numbers are conservatively estimated at 16,798, the figures originally given by the Communists were 140, then raised to 200, 400, 428 and finally 637. The few hundred already released suffered very grave maltreatment in Communist prison camps. In this case, the Communists' attitude seems noteworthy both for its lack of any humanitarian concern and for the absence of any seriousness, not to mention the fact the Communist side has altogether ignored Article 8 of the Paris Agreement.
E.- HINDRANCE TO THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE ICCS, FPJMC AND TPJMC.
ARTICLE 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam shall immediately designate representatives to form of Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties...

(b) ..................................................

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement...

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

ARTICLE 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties...

(b) ..................................................

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Viet-Nam.
(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) ........................................

(c) ........................................

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) ........................................

(e) ........................................

(f) ........................................

(g) ........................................

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.
There was systematic obstruction by the Communist side at the Four-Party Joint Military Commission as well as the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Procedural matters were allowed to hinder the work of both Commissions; the National Liberation Front even sent abroad General TRAN VAN TRA, its Chief Delegate to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, immediately after its inaugural session on 29 March 1973 and replaced him only on May 13, 1973.

When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission began its work, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam not only refused to deploy all its regional teams but also withdrew its personnel from the Hue and Danang Regions. As for the National Liberation Front its representatives were present only in 4 Regions out of seven. Neither of the two Communist delegations had any representative in the 26 sub-regional teams.

At the present time they do not have any personnel outside of Saigon, even though the two parties had agreed to have altogether from 1,200 to 1,500 personnel of which the Two-Party Joint Military Commission Central Delegation was to comprise 240.

But the most serious violations by the Communists are related to the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).

The Communist Armed Forces have used anti-aircraft weapons to shoot wantonly at aircraft on supply, liaison or evacuation missions for the ICCS:

1. At 1630 hours, 28.02.1973, a helicopter carrying ICCS members was shot down 6 kms NE/Diên-Bàn, Quảng Nam province.

2. At 0740 hours, 02.03.1973, a helicopter marked
FPJMC on a liaison mission was shot down 25 kms NW/Càñ-Thò.

3. At 0928 hours, 02.03.1973, a C.123 aircraft, on a supply mission, was shot down West of An-Lộc, Bình Long province.

4. At 1445 hours, 02.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission was shot down 12 kms SW/Bến-Cát, Bình-Dương province.

5. At 1630 hours, 03.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission was shot down 10 kms NE/Tây-Ninh.

6. At 1740 hours, 03.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission was shot down 10 kms NE/Cai-Lây.

7. At 1120 hours, 07.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission, was shot down 5 kms ES/Dực-Thanh - Phước-Tuy province.

8. At 1325 hours, 07.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission was shot down 8 kms SE/Khiêm-Hanh - Tây Ninh province.

9. At 1325 hours, 07.03.1973, a helicopter on a supply mission was shot down 10 kms NNE/Phủ Dực - Hậu-Nghĩa province.

10. At 1410 hours, 09.03.1973, a helicopter, on an evacuation mission, was shot down 6 kms SW/Cai-Lây.

The above mentioned shootings resulted in a number of crew-members killed and wounded and caused heavy damage to the aircraft.
In one dramatic case, Communist forces on April 7, 1973 fired small arms at two ICCS helicopters and brought one down with a heat-seeking missile, in the Lao-Bào area, (Province of Quảng-Trị). All passengers and crew were killed. They were:

- Lt. Col. Gunawan, Indonesia
- Capt. Charles Laviolette, Canada
- Capt. Dylszki, Hungary
- Lt. Cziboly, Hungary
- Capt. C.K. Osterman, ICCS Air Services
- F/O T.O. Clark, ICCS Air Services
- Flight mechanic, V.P. Rosales, ICCS Air Services
- NLF Liaison Officer
- NLF Interpreter

Since then the investigation has been deliberately hampered by the Communist side.

In this situation, it could be said that the whole peace-keeping machinery established by the Paris Agreement and its Protocols has been ignored by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. This is a clear indication of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam's unwillingness to respect the Paris Agreement and its Protocols.
Bodies of the Canadian and Indonesian ICCS's members, victims of the Communist savagery, were flown back to Saigon on the 10th of April, 1973, in order to be repatriated.
F.- ENCROACHMENT UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS
EXCERPTS FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT

REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

ARTICLE 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao people's fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
The territories of the Kingdom of Laos and of the Khmer Republic continue to be used by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, which has steadily reinforced its own manpower and supply potentials there. During the first three months of the cease-fire, over 26,000 tons of military equipment were moved from North Viet-Nam into Laos, and of the 17,000 truck movements noted during that period, 7,000 were direct movements into the Republic of Viet-Nam across the Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel, in violation of Articles 7 and 20.

Moreover, the attacks by pro-Communist forces in Laos and the Khmer Republic, such as Paksong (February 23, 1973), Tha Vieng (April 13, 1973), the provincial city of Takeo and the Pochentong Airport (26 and 27 April 1973), to quote a few cases, were directly supported by the North Vietnamese Army.

These facts, which are already widely known, show the little concern that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam attaches to the respect of the independence sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia, as stipulated in Article 20 of the Paris Agreement.
PART THREE

INTERNATIONAL OPINION

ON

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT
CAN VIET NAM BREAK ITS
25-YEARS-OLD HABIT OF WAR?

After 25 years of continuous fighting, war in Indo-China is a habit that is hard to break. It was three months yesterday since the ceasefire was signed in Paris and the day when both sides in Viet-Nam should have been celebrating national reconciliation and concord and generally spreading sweetness and light all around.

A pious hope, no doubt: yet even here, where peace has been so elusive for so long, it might have seemed a little shocking three months ago to suggest that the casualty figures for this period of supposed peace would now be nearing 50,000.

At a thinly attended daily press conference on Friday afternoon the routine details were given by South Viet-Nam's military spokesman: 18,144 North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers killed in action and 209 captured; 311 South Vietnamese troops and 702 civilians killed; 21,124 South Vietnamese troops wounded and 1,148 missing; 1,196 civilians wounded and 1,101 abducted. Total, excluding an unknown number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong wounded, 48,735— or nearly 550 a day.

As pointed out in the American Note of protest, published last Tuesday, they also have reinforced their troops in the South with more than 30,000 men (the figure most quoted is 50,000) and large supplies of weapons, including more than 400 tanks and armoured vehicles. They have maintained their forces in Laos and Cambodia and
have used the old Ho Chi Minh Trail through those territories as the Channel for supplies to South Viet-Nam.

They are said now to the building air strips in the territory they control as well as metalled supply roads. The anti-aircraft missiles placed around the airfield at Khe Sanh, just south of the so-called demilitarised zone, in February have reappeared again, I understand, after a temporary disappearance during the first furore over their introduction.

VIOLATIONS

All this and much more directly contravenes the ceasefire agreement, and there appears to be no serious dispute as to the facts outside Communist ranks.

The North Vietnamese allegations against the Americans and President Thieu of the numberless violations on their side were repeated again yesterday by Viet Cong spokesmen, but they remain largely unspecific and unsupported.

Inevitably the Polish and Hungarian delegates turn a blind eye to Communist violations. They have totally destroyed their own credibility and added to the general atmosphere of cynicism.

SAIGON STRENGTH

They may also be getting the message that South Viet-Nam alone is no longer a pushover. Certainly the fear that Hanoi might be bent upon a fullscale military offensive next month has receded as the South Vietnamese have continued to hold their ground and the Americans have continued to assert their interest. Military observers now believe that although Communist strength in the South has probably been restored since January
to somewhere near the level of last year's spring offensive, with as many 200,000 North Viet-Nam's territory, they are still unable to count on military victory even without American intervention.

On the other hand, they appear to be remote from any early chance of political victory. President Thieu undoubtedly has difficulties with political critics inside his own system, but he has shown a confidence and shrewdness lately that has surprised and impressed many people. The fact that his forces control 90 per cent of the population and that there has been no sign of defection to the other side since the ceasefire, has enabled him to grasp the political initiative.

There is, however, no sign that it does. On the contrary, the rejection of President Thieu's proposals by the Viet Cong suggests that the Communists will seek to avoid elections as long as possible while they rebuild their cadres in the South and seek to re-infiltrate the government's territory and services. At present they appear to have no southern figures of any public stature and little organisation outside their areas of entrenched control.

Some close observers of the Communists who have been seen in Saigon since the ceasefire--although usually restricted to a spartan compound at the airport--and of their Polish and Hungarian allies on the ICCS, believe that this political weakness may have surprised and embarrassed them. 'They really don't seem to know how to play this game,' one western diplomat said this week.

(THE SUNDAY TIMES, APRIL, 29, 1973, DAVID HOLDEN)
OBSTACLES TO HANOI'S AMBITIONS
SINO-SOVET RIVALRY AND THIEU'S POWER

The 'peace' that was supposed to come to Vietnam when the cease-fire was signed in Paris on January 27 has not, as I thought at the time, been anything normally recognisable as such. Indeed, in all three of the former Associated States of French Indochina - the others being Laos and Cambodia - fighting has gone on as though no one had mentioned the word 'peace', still less signed documents undertaking not to open fire.

The only real change has been the departure of the American forces and the repatriation of many, if not all, of the US prisoner-of-war. On the ground, the North Vietnamese Communist leadership has pursued, without a break, its unwavering plan to conquer and absorb the whole of the French Indochina empire into a Greater Vietnam controlled from Hanoi.

Will this plan be completed with the final victory of North Vietnam? Certainly the position on the ground must be encouraging to this small group of men who, alone, in the Communist world, have stuck together through two wars and more than 30 years of partnership in conflict. But two factors could well conspire to deprive them of the final fruit of their aggressiveness: the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and the extraordinary hold President Thieu of South Vietnam has managed, in the face of all odds, to secure in his half of the divided country.

Let us run over the latest news before returning to this analysis. Here are some relevant items:
• The International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) is virtually paralysed, both by the continuing fighting and by the inevitable rift between its Communist and non-Communist members. (A similar rift nullified the work of the earlier Control Commission set up after the Geneva settlement of 1954.) On April 7, for instance, an ICCS helicopter was shot down at Lao Bao in northern South Vietnam near the Laos border. The Viet Cong prevented Canadian ICCS officials from visiting the site. More recently, the Hungarian and Polish members drew up a joint report condemning the South Vietnamese Army for alleged cease-fire violations - to the anger of the Canadians and Indonesians, who were not consulted.

• On May 3, President Thieu opened an exhibition in Saigon of Communist 'atrocities' in violation of the cease-fire.

• In Cambodia, fighting is in progress, sporadically, east of the Mekong opposite the capital, Phnom Penh, and 15 miles to the South and to the west. On May 15, Communist frogmen deposited an explosive plastic charge on a ship unloading tanks off Phnom Penh docks. More seriously, perhaps, the previous day, 500 armed government soldiers demonstrated in Phnom Penh to draw attention to the fact that they had received neither pay nor food. Money and food were promptly provided, but the cause of the demonstration and the event itself were bad for morale.

• In Laos, the Ho chi Minh trail to South Vietnam is still dominated by the North Vietnamese; and in South Vietnam, there has been fighting lately around Hue, north of Binh Dinh and in the Saigon river delta.
APPROXIMATION IMPOSSIBLE

Conservely, the Viet Cong are believed to have captured 16,000 government official and about 50,000 other civil civilians. But the Communist figure is 637. In these circumstances, even an approximation to the truth is impossible.

Indeed, the South Vietnamese showed during the great northern spring offensive last year that they can outfight the formidable North Vietnamese regulars.

Looking back to the disastrous situation at the time of the fall of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, it is clear that - admittedly at an enormous cost in men and money - the American intervention in Vietnam has brought an extra-ordinary change. As time went on, the Americans discovered, as the French did before them but too late, that the South Vietnamese can fight as valorously as the northerners - given a cause. Vietnamisation saw to it that they had the ultimate cause: the defense of their soil against an invader. In this lies their brightest hope in the threatening times ahead.

BRIAN CROZIER
Forum World Features, May 21, 1973
'We are assigned here to protect the interests of the PRG'.

(Remarks by a Hungarian Army Officer on Hungarian National Day in Saigon, as reported by Rowland and Robert Novak in the Washington Post, April 26, 1973)
We have strong reason to believe that in other parts of South Vietnam, as well as in the area where the helicopter incident took place, non-South Vietnamese troops are stationed, or are infiltrating South Vietnam for the purpose of supporting militarily one of the two parties in South Vietnam.

Ambassador Michel GAUVIN,
Head of the Canadian Delegation to the ICCS

The Washington Post
Started briefly, what we sought to ensure was that the new International Commission would be an impartial, fact-finding body supported by the parties to the Peace Agreement, with sufficient freedom of access to enable it to ascertain the facts about any alleged breach of the Agreement and reporting quickly not only to the parties to the Agreement but also to the international community as a whole. While we did not achieve all our purposes, I think it is fair to say that we helped to effect some improvements, at least in form. What we could not ensure, and what the ICCS could not ensure was peace in Vietnam. That depends on the parties to the Peace Agreement and not on the ICCS. Nor can Canada alone ensure that the ICCS fulfils its function of peace observing and reporting as provided for in the Peace Agreement. That too depends on the parties to the Agreement and on the other member delegations of the Commission.

STATEMENT MADE BY THE HONOURABLE MITCHELL SHARP, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR CANADA, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON MAY 29, 1973.
The Cease-fire Agreement is basically a good agreement that will work, if the parties who signed it abide by it. In the long run, I think they will. It is my hope that the many violations of the Agreement by North Viet-Nam will cease when the Communist leadership realizes they have more to gain than to lose by adhering to the terms of the Agreement.

Ambassador ELLSWORTH BUNKER
U.S. News and World Report Interview

THE UNEASY PEACE IN VIETNAM

People deeply concerned about world peace are naturally disturbed by persistent reports of Communist ceasefire violations in South Viet-Nam. The grave danger to the uneasy peace in Viet-Nam posed by these violations is like a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the people of that once beleaguered country.

Every peace-loving citizen has every reason to feel apprehensive over this latest development. The Philippines which, for many years, maintained a civic action group and medical contingent in South Viet-Nam, has been watching closely the developments in that country.

When the last American soldier pulled out of Viet-Nam last March 29, formally marking the deactivation of the US military forces in that Southeast Asian country after 11 years of involvement, everybody hoped that this was the beginning of a lasting peace and that the regular and irregular forces in that country would respect the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Paris last January 27.

But the fragile peace that followed the peace treaty was shattered barely a month after it came into effect. The Communists, according to a communique of the Republic of Vietnam, continuously shelled and assaulted Tống-Lê-Chân Base from February 26 to April 2, killing 14 and injuring 109 soldiers. The Republic of Viet-Nam denounced this attack before the Four-Party Joint Military Commission which is claimed has not