With a view to ending the war, restoring a just and lasting peace, terminating the suffering inflicted upon this country by the Communists and contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, along with other parties, signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973.

Although the Paris Agreement has been in effect for 90 days, and in spite of the Republic of Vietnam's determination to seriously implement the Agreement, the Communist side has not yet renounced its schemes of conquering the Republic of Vietnam by force and has consistently violated its commitments clearly mentioned in the Paris Agreement and in the Final Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.

I.- CONCERNING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES - WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS:
1. Immediately after the Agreement took effect, the Republic of Vietnam Government ordered all its regular and irregular Armed Forces to strictly observe the Cease-fire on all battlefields by remaining in place and stopping all hostile activities.

On the other hand, the Communists have been violating Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement. Their named forces have continuously shelled and launched large scale attacks throughout South Vietnam. From January 28, 1973 to April 26, 1973, they have perpetrated 12,180 violations, including 6,097 shellings and 2,756 land-grabbing attacks by units ranging from battalion to division size. Typical cases were the attacks on Cửa Việt (Quảng Trị) Sa-Huỳnh (Quảng Ngãi), Tồng Lê Chân (Tây Ninh), Tân Châu sector (Châu-Dố), Núi Gió base (Thừa-Thiên), Tri-Tôn district (Châu-Dố). These violations have inflicted upon both sides heavy casualties - thousands of men killed, wounded and captured.

2. Of extreme concern was the fact that the Communist, instead of withdrawing the 300,000 North Vietnamese soldiers from South Vietnam, were conducting a vast plan to launch new mainforce attacks by moving troops and war material into South Vietnamese territory.

Since Jan. 28, 1973, more than 50,000 North Vietnamese troops have been sent to South Vietnam with equipment including more than 400 tanks and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of various types and over 52,000 short tons of military supplies. In addition to these troop movements, over 17,000 military truck movements from North Vietnam into Laos and over 7,000 military truck movements through the Demilitarized Zone into South Vietnam have been detected.

Moreover, there is evidence that new North Viet-
namese Army elements such as anti-aircraft artillery units have entered South Vietnam after Jan. 28, 1973. For example, the Khe Sanh airfields complex has recently been ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly were not present prior to the Cease-fire.

3. The Communists have also made substantial efforts to improve their road system within Laos and in the border areas of South Vietnam, from Southern Laos into Quảng-Trị, Quảng-Ngãi provinces and the Central coastal regions of South Vietnam. These cross-border roads are not close to any indicated points of entry and can only be intended for the clandestine supply of arms and equipment.

The Communist movements of military personnel and military equipment in and through the DMZ are direct violations of Art. 7 and 15 (B) of the Paris Agreement and of Art. 7 of the Cease-fire Protocol.

4. In addition to expanding attacks upon the security forces of the Republic of Vietnam, the Communists have also mined and attempted to destroy the communication system throughout South Vietnam, causing the death of thousands of travelers.

5. Innocent civilians living in populated areas and refugee camps have been murdered and abducted by the Communists. Typical examples are the cases of hundreds of civilians killed in Tân Châu, Phan Thiết and Ninh-Thuận. Even places where the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) teams are located such as Tri Tôn and Hồng Ngự have not been spared by the Communist wanton shellings.

II.- CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL;
The Communist side has also seriously violated Article 8 of the Paris Agreement and the provisions of the protocol concerning the release of captured and detained military and civilian personnel.

1. RVN records prove that 31,818 of its military personnel have been captured and instead of releasing all of them to the RVN Government within 60 days after the signing of the Agreement, the Communist side has returned to the RVN only 4,608 (i.e. 26,800 people are unaccounted for). The return was conducted by the other side in a piecemeal fashion. On several occasions they intentionally and blatantly delayed the return and changed the release site that they themselves had chosen. The Communists still refuse to release the 410 RVN captured military personnel at Duc Nghiep as they have promised.

At the same time, the RVN has strictly implemented Art. 8 mentioned above by releasing to the Communist side all the 26,508 captured military personnel it had detained. All prisoners were returned by March 25, 1973, three days before the deadline, except for 238 persons who had freely chosen to rally to the national cause. The RVN Government is still detaining only 3 persons who, because of their illness, are under hospital treatment. They will be returned at once to the Communists upon request.

2. To show its determination to observe scrupulously the Agreement, the RVN Delegation has been bringing up the issue of the return of captured civilian personnel for discussion in every meeting between the chief Delegates of the 4-party and the 2-party Commission as well. Right from the beginning, the RVN Delegation has presented a list of 5,081 NLF civilians detained by the RVN. On April 24, 1973 - in spite of the stubbornness of the Communists and their adamant
refusal to accept the number of 67,501 RVN civilians (including 16,754 GVN civil servants and cadres of all level) detained by the Communists - the RVN Government declared its intention to unilaterally and unconditionally release 750 captured civilian personnel in a preliminary phase. Then, on the morning of April 27, 1973, the RVN Government decided to set free 500 more in a second phase, bringing the total to 1,250.

Meanwhile, the Communist side only released an initial list of 140 people and after 4 successive additions, this number was parsimoniously raised to 200, 400, 429 and finally to 637, less than 1 o/o of the total number of civilians actually detained by them.

Recently, confronted with the initiative of the RVN Government, the Communist side was compelled to promise the release of 637 RVN civilian personnel. However, the Communists claimed that that is the total of RVN civilian personnel being detained in their hand.

This figure shown by the Communists makes us think that a great number of civilian personnel of the RVN would have been either massacred and buried in mass-graves or taken to the battlefields as war coolies or still detained in Communist concentration camps.

The RVN Government rejects such a false argument and accepts this first release only as the beginning of more exchanges to come concerning the civilian personnel detained by the Communists.

III.- CONCERNING THE EXERCISE OF THE SVN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION;

In a spirit of national reconciliation and concord and pursuant to Art. 12 (a) of the Paris Agreement of Jan. 27, 1973, the RVN Government has
designated a delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien to negotiate with the NLF delegation with a view to reach an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam. But from March 19, 1973, the date of the inaugural session of the Conference between the two SVN parties in Paris, the Communist side has, up to now, rejected all the concrete and constructive proposals concerning the agenda as well as the working procedures made by the RVN delegation.

Once again, to demonstrate the maximum goodwill of the RVN to implement seriously the Paris Agreement, the Delegation of the RVN at the eighth session of the conference at La Celle Saint Cloud proposed to the other side a draft preliminary accord aiming at resolving the basic problems pending between the two parties and a timetable to carry out all the agreed provisions.

If the other side also shows its goodwill to carry out seriously the Paris Agreement as it has proclaimed is its intention and accepts the RVN's initiative, the South Vietnamese people will be able to exercise their right to self-determination which the parties to the Paris Agreement as well as the signatories of the Final Act of March 2, 1973 have solemnly pledged to respect.

The Communist side, with its stubbornness and shamelessness, has rejected the RVN's concrete and constructive proposals and put forward a vague one instead. It is regrettable that the day set forth in Art. 12 (a) has passed without the people of South Vietnam reaching any of their aspirations for peace, independence and democracy. If the South Vietnamese people cannot exercise their right to self-determination, it is because of the intransigence of the Communists who have to bear full responsibility before history.
IV.- CONCERNING THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS (JMC):

In implementation of Art. 16 and 17 of the Paris Agreement and the provisions of the related Protocol concerning the Joint Military Commissions and in exercising, guaranteeing as well as consolidating a real and lasting peace, the RVN Government has designated a Military Delegation to the 4-Party JMC and to the 2-Party JMC with sufficient personnel at all levels.

The RVN Military Delegation has always shown an attitude of active cooperation by offering various positive and concrete proposals at the sessions of the 4-Party JMC as well as 2-Party JMC in order to coordinate and devote all their efforts to put an end to the bloodshed on the battlefields. However, the Communists who have plotted and instigated this war of aggression have shamelessly and stubbornly held in disdain the unconditional and active cooperation of the RVN Military Delegation, thus preventing the JMC from carrying out efficiently its functions.

While the RVN Military Delegation has, immediately after the Cease-fire came into effect, deployed in full its 825 members to its central headquarters, 7 regions and 26 local teams; the Communist Delegations, on the contrary, have deployed to the Regional JMC only for the first month and withdrawn afterwards on their own their personnel from Hue and Da Nang, in spite of the protests by the RVN and the advice of the ICCS. More seriously, the Communist Delegations did not dispatch any personnel to the 26 local teams.

Since the 2-Party JMC began operating, the Communist side, instead of correcting their mistakes by quickly and fully deploying its teams to the regions and local areas, has withdrawn on its own all its personnel in the regions back to its headquarters in
To worsen things, right after the opening session of the Central 2-Party JMC on March 29, 1973, the Chief Delegate of the NLF has been absent from the meetings and has not returned since.

Deputy chiefs or low-level officers who have no competence to make decision on important issues, were instead assigned to attend the 2-Party JMC sessions.

The Communists' systematic un-cooperative attitude at the JMC has caused this body to become ineffective and is possibly part of a stratagem designed to undermine the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

V.- CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS):

With regards to the ICCS, the RVN Government has always maintained an attitude of respect and cooperation and provided it with available means and facilities to the effect that this body can discharge its tasks in accordance with Art. 18 of the Paris Agreement and the associated Protocol. The Communists have, on the contrary, shown their non-cooperation, disregard and sabotage towards the ICCS.

The Communist forces have ventured to open fire on ICCS's team at Tri Tôn, Hồng Ngự. They even shot at ICCS's helicopters and cars on which their members were on the way to discharge their duties.

On April 7, 1973, on a flight corridor led by two Communist officers, two ICCS's helicopters flying on duty from Gio-Linh to Lao-Bao were downed. This claimed the lives of several ICCS's members. The event was con-
demned by the peace-loving people throughout the world.

VI. CONCERNING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Instead of benefiting from the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have been victims of the Communist cynical aggression.

1. From the time of the Cease-fire through April 18, 1973, over 26,000 short tons were moved from North Vietnam to Laos. Also during this period, over 17,000 military truck movements in this direction were detected.

2. The Communists' intention to persist in violation of Art. 20 of the Agreement was evidenced by their substantial effort to upgrade the road system within Laos. Bridges and ditches have been constructed on Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of Jars from North Vietnam, and on Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the Northern Plain in an East-West direction.


4. In Cambodia, the Communists have blatantly launched massive attacks to several military locations and towns and shelled populous areas, causing heavy casualties in human lives and material to the people of the Khmer Republic.

5. The Communist military pressure upon the Khmer Republic has obstructed the negotiation between the opposing factions for a political solution to settle the conflict.

By not withdrawing their troops from the Cambo-
dian and Laotian territories and by increasing, on the contrary, infiltration of troops and war material, the Communists have seriously violated Art. 20 of the Paris Agreement and threatened the Peace in the Indochinese peninsula.

The above-mentioned facts revealed the Communists' intention of violating the Paris Agreement and its associated Protocols on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Besides, not having respected the Articles on the cessation of hostilities (Chapter II, Art. 2 and 3) and on the exchange of detained military and civilian personnel (Chapter III, Art. 8), the Communists have also disregarded other stipulations pertaining to the organization and the activities of the JMC and the ICCS (Chapter VI, Art. 16, 17, 18).

Once again, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam strongly denounces before public opinion the serious violations perpetrated by the Communist side and its intention to prolong the war for the purpose of buying time to conquer South Vietnam by force. The Government of the RVN solemnly asks the Communists to end their hostile activities and their massacres of innocent people, to be conscious of the supreme interests of the Nation, to respect the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, to negotiate seriously and achieve soon an adequate solution that fulfills the aspirations for peace and freedom of the South Vietnamese people.

We regret the recent decision of Canada to withdraw from the ICCS.

Thanks to her impartial attitude as well as her valuable experience from the years sitting in the Geneva ICC, Canada has in the past months contributed greatly to whatever achievement the ICCS has performed.

We fully understand the Canadian decision. The Canadian Delegation has been faced with unsurmountable obstacles which have frustrated her efforts to transform the ICCS into an effective organization.

1. Whereas the GVN has cooperated fully in the ICCS and has done its best to facilitate its activities, the Communists have exhibited an obstructionist and destructive attitude towards this organization. An example of this is the April 7th shooting down of two ICCS helicopters which were on official mission, causing the death of several ICCS personnel on board. Moreover, the Communists have not permitted the ICCS to conduct investigation into areas they temporarily control.

2. In addition, within the ICCS itself there are certain delegations which have displayed an uncooperative and prejudiced attitude. This has prevented the ICCS from effectively fulfilling its mission in accordance with the spirit and provisions of the Paris Agreement.
The Communists must bear full responsibility for these destructive attempts to undermine the activities of the ICCS. These actions have delayed and obstructed the realization of the thing most desired by everyone, which is the restoration of peace in Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

May 30, 1973
APPENDIX 10

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The Parties signatory to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, signed on January 27, 1973,

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Viet-Nam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,

Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement):

1. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:

   (a) The United States shall resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué and shall successfully complete those operations within thirty days thereafter.

   (b) The United States shall supply to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers.
(c) The United States shall announce when the mine clearance in each main channel is completed and issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed.

3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South Viet-Nam beginning at 0400 hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its Protocols.

4. The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam which read as follows:

"Article 2"

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber
and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

Article 3

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Viet-Nam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties."
5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force on January 28, 1973.

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Viet-Nam.

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept
the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Viet-Nam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the Agreement, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agreement regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, military equipment may transit the Demilitarized Zone only if introduced into South Viet-Nam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry.

(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the area controlled by that party.
8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:

(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 9(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(c) In conformity with Article 9 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in
determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead.

(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement, the parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. For this purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi.

9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

--achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

--ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

10. Consistent with the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement.
(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible, and shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through consultations on the institutions for which the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

"The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effective and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible."

11. In implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement...
(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam shall immediately be implemented with respect to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That Commission shall also immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other places in South Viet-Nam as required for the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh.

(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the Regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determined by that Commission within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be changed at any time as determined by the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be selected from among those towns specified in Article 11(b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam.
and those places where an area controlled by one South Vietnamese party adjoins an area controlled by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the Commission.

(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined.

(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of such movement.
13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.

14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States–Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Joint Economic Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and this Joint Communiqué, the undersigned representatives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement have decided to issue this Joint Communiqué to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.

For the Government of the United States of America:

Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President of the United States of America

For the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam:

Nguyen Luu Vien
Representative of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam
For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:

Le Duc Tho
Representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam:

Nguyen Van Hieu
Minister of State of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam
In implementation of Article 3 of the Joint Communiqué signed on June 13, 1973 in Paris, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has issued orders to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout the territory of the Republic of Vietnam effective 12:00 hours June 15, 1973.

The Communists however, have not respected the cease-fire and have continued their attacks or shellings against ARVN units. From June 15 to June 18, 1973, the Communist side has committed 289 violations of the cease-fire, causing to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam 60 killed, 228 injured, 60 missing, and to the population 18 killed, 34 wounded, 6 kidnapped. These violations have occurred throughout the territory of the Republic of Vietnam, the most typical of which were the shellings and attacks at Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Kontum and Chuong Thien. Even the planes of the International Commission of Control and Supervision itself were shot at on June 17, 1973.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam denounces to world and domestic opinion the Communists' ill will in implementing the provisions which have been
signed and their deliberate violations of the Paris Agreement and the Joint Communiqué on the Cease-fire.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam believes that an effective cease-fire is required for the implementation of political solutions for South Vietnam. As long as the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are still fired at and the orders for the cease-fire are not observed by the Communists, it would be difficult to carry out those provisions as prescribed in Chapter IV of the Paris Agreement on the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

DECLARATION

On July 20, 1954, regardless of the aspirations of the whole population, the interests of the fatherland and the opposition of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Communist authorities of North Vietnam signed the Geneva Agreement which partitioned the country at the 17th parallel, causing separation and sorrow to the Vietnamese people since 19 long years.

The North Vietnamese Communists thereafter have been continuously waging a war of aggression against South Vietnam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement which they themselves have solemnly signed.

Over the last 19 years, the People and Armed Forces of South Vietnam have decidedly and bravely fought against the North Vietnamese communists' scheme of conquering and communizing South Vietnam with a view to protecting their free way of life, their respect of the fundamental human rights and to reaching the ultimate goal of a peaceful national reconciliation and concord.
Blinded by their dark intention and ignoring the aspirations of the entire Vietnamese people, the North Vietnamese Communists have stubbornly conducted large scale attacks throughout the territory of the Republic of Vietnam.

By their action going from subversive and terrorist activities to the Mậu Thân 1968 uprising and 1972 Winter Spring offensive, they have taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of young men, spread mourning and sorrow to thousands of families and wiped out several cities as well as thousands of houses.

On several occasions, the South Vietnamese People and Armed Forces have shown their indomitable spirit. The more stubborn the Communists were, the more they indulged themselves in betrayal and destruction, the more severely they were defeated. Exhausted by the punishment inflicted upon them by the South Vietnamese People and Armed Forces during their high point spring offensive of 1972, they were obliged, together with their tool, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, to sign on January 27, 1973 the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in South Vietnam.

This agreement was precisely the result of the victories scored by the population and Armed Forces of South Vietnam and of their determination to protect their freedom and right to self-determination.

Hardly have the people had time to enjoy the prospects of peace, hardly has the Communists' signature on the agreement once again had the time to dry, the North Vietnamese Communists and their Southern organization labelled the 'National Liberation Front' started their land grabbing operations. From the day the Paris Agreement came into effect up to this date, the Communists
have violated 19,114 times the cease-fire, causing 1,204 dead, 3,300 injured and 1,361 missing among the innocent civilian population. The Communists have also deliberately crippled the International Commission of Control and Supervision so that they could easily continue to violate the cease-fire.

Furthermore, instead of contributing constructively to the reunification of the country, in accordance with the aspirations of the people, the Communists are actively maneuvering for a partition of the territory South of the 17th parallel, to the end of creating a second state in South Viet Nam. With this objective in mind, the 'National Liberation Front' has evaded to negotiate seriously with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam at the Conference of the two South Vietnamese parties. They have stubbornly rejected the constructive and concrete proposals put forward by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and made hazy counter-proposals, as well as inconsistent charges in order to delay intentionally a political solution and to avoid democratic and free general elections agreed upon in the Paris Agreement. For them, ending the war and restoring a lasting peace for the country are no ultimate goals. They want to gain time with the help of their big communist brothers in order to pursue their future political and military ventures.

The above acts have seriously violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement, as well as the spirit and the letter of the Paris Agreement. They are being condemned by the people of South Viet Nam and world opinion.

In face of the Communists' obstinacy, the Government and People of the Republic of Vietnam have always demonstrated their good-will and their love for peace. They want to end the fratricidal war which is destroying the energy of the nation. That is why the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has continuously appealed to the
Communist authorities of North Vietnam to renounce the use of force, and to rapidly negotiate with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam with a view to solving together the problem of a progressive and peaceful normalization of the relations between the North and the South, to laying the ground for the reunification of the whole country in accordance with genuinely democratic and peaceful procedures and with the spirit of national reconciliation.

On several occasions in the past few years the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has proposed the above solution to the North Vietnamese authorities.

Now in order to solve the conflict between the North and the South, the Paris Agreement, signed on January 27, 1973 also confirms that formula. It specifies indeed in article 15c that 'the North and the South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields'.

The North Vietnamese Communists cannot evade their responsibilities by vaguely pretexting that they do not know who represents South Vietnam.

Everyone knows that in the South, there is but one constitutional and legal government elected by the people, which controls almost all the population and territory.

On this year's Grief Day, with the signing of the Paris Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly appeals to the North Vietnamese authorities to give up their stubbornness, to negotiate with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam with a view to speedily solving the problems between the two zones according to the agreement.
At the present time, Germany and Korea, two other nations divided like Vietnam, while waiting for their reunification, have started negotiations to search for a solution of peaceful coexistence as well as the possibility of participating in the activities of the international community, so that they will not remain absent too long on the international political scene because of their temporary partition, and that the tensions threatening world peace could be eased off.

In that setting, East and West Germany have agreed to join the United Nations in a near future. For its part, the Government of the Republic of Korea has announced that it will not oppose the simultaneous adhesion to the United Nations of both the North and the South.

In Vietnam, especially after an Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace has been signed, there is no reason why our people cannot adopt the solution accepted by the opposing parties in Germany and in Korea which will allow us to take part in the activities of the international community while awaiting the day of peaceful reunification. We could at the same time proceed to the progressive normalization of the relations between the North and the South by way of serious negotiations based on the spirit of national reconciliation.

After many years of perpetual war, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam hopes that the North Vietnamese authorities will soon realize the facts, renounce their dream of aggression and respond to the constructive proposals set forth by the Republic of Vietnam in order to restore peace and to build a brighter future for the Vietnamese people and nation.

DEPLOYMENT OF TPJMC & ICCS

REFERENCE

- CENTRAL TPJMC/RVN MILITARY DELEGATION
- TPJMC/RVN REGIONAL MILITARY DELEGATION
- TPJMC/RVN TEAM
- RVN POINT OF ENTRY

- CENTRAL TPJMC/NLF MILITARY DELEGATION
- TPJMC/NLF REGIONAL MILITARY DELEGATION
- TPJMC/NLF TEAM
- NLF POINT OF ENTRY

- ICCS HEADQUARTERS
- ICCS REGIONAL TEAM
- ICCS OPERATIONAL TEAM
- ICCS POINT OF ENTRY TEAM
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