REASSESSMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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(III)
PREFACE

One year ago today the Hansen amendment was passed (H. Res. 988) requiring each congressional committee to undertake futures research on a continuing basis without regard to specific legislation. Herein the name and scope of the Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations was established.

When precisely does the future start? If the scope of the subcommittee starts the moment after the present and extends into the next century, at which point on the continuum does one grasp at the essential principles and problems. To distinguish between those issues and principles that belong to history and those that are now beginning to emerge as the problems of the seventies and beyond, we decided to look over the shoulder at our past. In our opening hearings, through the eyes of key political advisers from the Roosevelt to the Johnson eras, we have tried to review the historical experience and its specific relevance to the future. What elements in our past could be gleaned as the prologue to our future?

The testimony of the witnesses sharpened our realization that we have indeed left the cold war if only to have entered a precarious peace. Our reperceptions of the Vietnam experience have clarified the nature of our commitments abroad; future relationships will engage us—as they have already started—into a more profound examination of foreign governments and the nature of their peoples. Perhaps at this very moment we have embarked on a new level of international accord, one of pragmatic cordiality based on interdependent needs and necessities, thereby softening the edges of traditional relationships of “friends” and “enemies”.

Most important, the reassessment of our commitments and relationships has forced us to a deeper understanding of the nature of our own society. If our democratic institutions can only be preserved through an open foreign policy—“open covenants openly arrived at”—and the price for secret negotiation abroad is an erosion of our own values, then the American public must make that genuine choice.

We wish to express our particular appreciation to the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for their invaluable assistance in preparation for these hearings.

Lester L. Wolff,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development.

October 8, 1975.
with precision the long-term purposes and world-wide priorities of the United States.

However, those engaged in day-to-day operations or in jurisdictions tend to neglect or resist these needs under the pressures of the moment. The reason for planning strategic thinking is precisely to overcome this deficiency and to compensate for these deficiencies in the system as a whole. We believe that planning under the most advanced systems has not been exploited to its full potential and that much greater use as a separate function will be necessary in the future.

Testimonies will be Governor Harriman, who sits before the subcommittee, former Secretary of State Morgenthau. Former Secretary of State Morgenthau is supposed to be with us on Thursday. However this is delayed because of a meeting with the President on Thursday. He will be with us on July 22. Following him will be Dean Acheson on the 23d and William Bundy.

I will be George Ball and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge starting with an overview we hope in the course of open and public hearings to study more specific areas. There are economic and technological developments which today appear on the horizon but which might well within this decade totally change the nature of international relations. We shall be calling upon the assistance of scholars, scientists, and writers as well as makers to help us understand these vastly complicated issues from them a variety of ideas. We shall ask: "Where do we stand today and to what extent can the United States influence the course of future developments?" To all our distinguished guests, we shall be asking for your help in understanding these vastly complicated issues. May I say, Mr. Chairman, to our distinguished guests.

I know Governor Harriman's career spans a broad range of state and Federal governmental affairs. Those of us involved with international affairs over a period of time have the benefit of the knowledge and opinions of the outstanding and influential figures of this century. Morgenthau is particularly noted for his writings in the field of politics.

I would like to turn the hearing over to the chairman of the full Committee on International Relations, Mr. Morgan.

Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chairman in welcoming Governor Harriman and Mr. Morgan. I too would like to join the distinguished chair-
Mr. Wolf, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our first witness, as I indicated, is Gov. Averell Harriman, who has been a foreign policy adviser to Presidents since Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In his long and distinguished career he has served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943 to 1946 and to Great Britain in 1946. He was Under Secretary of State from 1963 to 1965 and was Ambassador to the Vietnam peace talks in Paris in 1968, one of our senior diplomats and great statesmen of this Nation. Gov. Averell Harriman. We are very happy to have you here today, Governor Harriman.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, CHAIRMAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE, DEMOCRATIC ADVISORY COUNCIL OF ELECTED OFFICIALS; FORMER AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW AND LONDON

BIOGRAPHY

W. Averell Harriman, whose distinguished career of public service began in the early 1930's, was born in New York City and was graduated from Yale University.

During the Roosevelt administration, Mr. Harriman was appointed the President's Special Representative in Great Britain with the rank of Minister. He also served as Special Representative of the President and Chairman of the President's Special Mission to the U.S.S.R. with the rank of Ambassador. In 1943 President Roosevelt appointed him Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Under President Truman he was appointed to such posts as U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Secretary of Commerce, and U.S. Representative in Europe under the Economic Cooperation Act with the rank of Ambassador. Mr. Harriman was named Director of the Mutual Security Administration in 1951.

A former Governor of New York State (1955-1958), Mr. Harriman was appointed by President Kennedy as Ambassador-at-Large in 1961. He next served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and became Under Secretary for Political Affairs in 1963. President Johnson named him Ambassador-at-Large in 1966, and in 1968 appointed him U.S. Representative to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris. He resigned those posts in 1969.

Mr. Harriman is the author of Peace With Russia and of America and Russia in a Changing World.

Mr. Harriman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

May I congratulate the initiative of the House Committee on International Relations on the appointment of this highly qualified subcommittee to consider future U.S. foreign policy research and development, especially in the wake of the Vietnamese tragedy, I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, which you have afforded me to appear before this committee.

I want first to express the hope that the committee will not be unduly influenced by emotions engendered over Vietnam. Loyal Americans have differed deeply in our past policies in Vietnam and for widely different reasons, whichever side of the question they may be. Scars should be permitted to heal. I have been much impressed by opinions expressed to me by foreigners whom I respect that the manner in which we recover from Vietnam is of worldwide importance.

It appears therefore appropriate to examine today our position in the world and to review our national interests. This is such a broad subject that I will limit myself in this statement principally to our relations with the Soviet Union as it appears clear that Soviet rela-
tions will be for some years to come one of our most absorbing concerns. Of course I will be glad to answer any questions in the minds of the committee members on any subject anywhere else in the world. Then too I have dealt with the Soviet Government for nearly 50 years both as a private business man and a public official and have known personally many of the important leaders from Trotsky on.

I don't intend to bore you with a historical recital but rather to discuss the situation today, the opportunities and the difficulties, the possible and the improbable.

In May of 1945 in San Francisco at the meeting founding the United Nations I told a group of publishers, editors and columnists in an off-the-record talk that we had to understand that the Kremlin's objectives and our objectives were not capable of reconciliation. The Kremlin wanted then and now a world of Communist governments—dictatorships of the proletariat, as they called them—whereas we believed that man's interests and our own could best be served by governments responsive to the will of the people. However I stated at that time that we should do all in our power to settle our differences in situations around the world in order to avoid war on this small planet.

In other words I believed then in détente, as I understand the proper use of the word, the relaxation of tensions wherever possible in specific situations and I still do. Unfortunately today many people seem to give that French word a much too broad meaning, confusing it with another French word, rapprochement. It is also used too loosely. It is high time, Mr. Chairman, that we say what we mean in plain English.

In the intervening years although the situation has changed materially within the Soviet Union I have maintained much the same views. It is interesting that at times I have been called a warmonger, cold-war warrior and at others, soft on communism, all for the same views.

I have continued to believe that there would be changes within the Soviet Union brought about largely by internal pressures from the demands of the 250 million Soviet peoples of different races and backgrounds. The Government, the Communist Party, in my opinion, would be forced to relax its rigid pressures and to give greater respect to human rights. Unhappily changes have taken place unevenly and far too slowly.

In addition to internal pressures, statements and outraged reactions from abroad by concerned groups do have an influence as the Soviet Government pays some attention at least to world opinion. On the other hand the influence of our Government and other governments can usually be most effective if exercised privately and not by attempting to link publicly ideological with practical considerations in our negotiations. There is of course natural linkage between some types of trade and arms control.

I have visited Russia twice in the last 16 months. Last year I went as a private citizen but I did have the opportunity for a 3-hour talk with General Secretary Brezhnev as well as meetings with other Soviet officials and journalists.

Incidentally I found that Chairman Brezhnev's view of détente is the one I have expressed: relaxation of tensions in specific situations.
He spoke of agreements on a step-by-step basis. He looked upon the moves of the President coming to Russia and his coming to the United States as opportunities for agreements in new fields, sometimes making real progress, at other times not so much. But there is no idea in his mind that it is a broad relaxation of relationships in all fields, which it seems to me some people assume it to be by misuse of that word.

This year, Mr. Chairman, you will recall President Ford appointed me to head a delegation to attend the ceremonies in Moscow commemorating the 30 years since VE Day.

The emphasis in these ceremonies was on the 30 years of peace that the tragic wartime sacrifices had brought. In the Red Square a youth demonstration was held, no victory parade of soldiers and tanks and guns. At the ceremonies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses General Secretary Brezhnev's keynote address outlined peace as the primary objective. In his hour-long speech he of course paid tribute to the heroism of the Red Army and the long suffering and loyal support of the people. He also recognized the assistance of the United States and Britain in the war.

The speech was addressed largely to the Russian people. It emphasized the solidarity of the Socialist bloc for peace and was critical at times of capitalist imperialism, in a manner to which I took exception when I had an opportunity to talk about it the next day. Yet he expressed confidence that the Soviet call for "peaceful coexistence" was being—and I use his phrase—"met with serious response in many capitalist countries." Referring to our successful wartime collaboration, he spoke of our present negotiations for and I quote him, "for cooperation in order to prevent another world disaster."

For this hearing today I would like to quote specifically from two paragraphs. In one, after referring to, and I quote, "the struggle for ending the arms race," he stated: "Meanwhile, this stockpiling of weapons, particularly mass destruction weapons, is becoming evermore absurd. The starting of a nuclear missile war would spell inevitable annihilation for the aggressor himself," end of quotation.

In the other paragraph I want to call to your attention he stated, and I quote, "The high-principled and constant Leninist support of the liberation movement of the peoples—and the working class movement in all countries invest our peace policy with even greater strength, influence and popularity all over the world," end of quotation.

I am prompted to call these paragraphs to your attention, Mr. Chairman, as they should be carefully considered in connection with our own policies. I believe on the one hand we are spending too much money on our new nuclear weapons systems, perhaps giving too little attention to our conventional military equipment and strength. On the other hand we are neglecting the need to face Soviet support for so-called liberation movements.

The functions of the CIA are now under critical review. All abuses at home and abroad must be protected against in the future. However the continued activity of this agency is, of real importance to our security both in its intelligence activities and in its ability to help nations counter subversive actions against them.
I urge, Mr. Chairman, that this subcommittee give appropriate consideration to these vital aspects of our foreign policy and national security.

I have made my statement very brief, Mr. Chairman, in order that I can direct my attention to whatever you gentlemen have in mind.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Governor.

DéTENTE

Mr. Wolff. Governor, after having been one of the architects of our present policy of détenté, having been with President Roosevelt at the time of Stalin, do you feel that détenté as we know it today is working or can work?

Mr. Harriman. I don't like the word. I think we ought to forget the use of the word. In my mind we ought to do what I suggested. In 1945 we attempted to come to agreements about the critical areas of the world that may lead to conflict between us. I don't see how anyone can be opposed to that. This idea that we can isolate the Soviet Union and pretend that it doesn't exist is not very sensible.

I don’t know what you mean by Mr. Roosevelt's policy. But he tried his best to come to agreements. Unfortunately, Stalin broke those agreements. He is blamed for Stalin's breach of those agreements because few have ever taken the trouble to study what those agreements were.

NUCLEAR TEST BANS

Mr. Wolff. In 1963, the year of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union stated their commitment to a comprehensive test ban agreement. Really, no substantive progress has been made however. Do you think such a comprehensive test ban is still possible?

Mr. Harriman. My friends who know the situation say if we had only made a comprehensive test ban agreement at that time we would have been way ahead of the Soviet Union and the dangers of their breaking it were relatively slim. But it was impossible to get such an agreement through the Senate at the time when there was so little understanding of the situation.

While that limited test ban agreement has not reduced the arms race, as it was hoped that it would have some influence. But it was the first ecological agreement that was made. People forget that we were worried about our children drinking milk because of the fact that it was being contaminated by nuclear fall-out. It was an ecological agreement if it did nothing else. On the other hand it was a first step. Other steps have been taken. I think the ABM agreement was a great agreement, a very important agreement. The Vladivostok agreement, if it can be brought to a conclusion, is an important one.

The limitations in my opinion are too high. I think we should try to end this unnecessary and reckless continuing advance in the nuclear field and to protect against a proliferation of nuclear information because that is a very real danger.

The danger of the Soviet Union starting a nuclear war is, I think, relatively limited. The danger in the nuclear field comes from proliferation of nuclear knowledge.
Mr. Wolfr. Governor, I have one final question. On page 50 of your testimony you say "the functions of the CIA are now under critical review. All abuses at home and abroad must be protected against in the future."

In your high-level capacity within the State Department throughout your career were you privy to any information that alluded to the fact that there have been abuses by the CIA?

Mr. Harriman. That is a pretty broad question. We are not here to review the CIA as such. The work in which I was involved with the CIA I thought was constructive. I was in charge of the Marshall plan in Europe. The CIA was supplementing the work that was done. There was no secret about it. It was affirmative, excellent work.

For example we helped the non-Communist labor unions. Stalin declared war on the Marshall plan. He did everything he could to take control of the unions in Europe and the international unions. We helped in some cases through the AFL-CIO to help the non-Communist unions. We also helped the non-Communist newspapers. We didn’t care what they wrote, We helped them access to newsprint, which was in short supply. The Communists saw it that the Communist newspapers got full support—that sort of thing. I am accustomed to working with the CIA and doing this sort of thing. It led to a constructive program.

What people call dirty tricks, I am opposed to. I have never been involved in any of the decisions that related to them. I cannot contribute to the abuses which took place. After all, I think one of the worst things the CIA did, with the approval of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, was the Bay of Pigs. I think everyone agrees now that that was a colossal mistake, But it was done with the approval of the Presidents.

Mr. Wolfr. Thank you, Governor.

Dr. Morgan.

Chairman Morgan. Governor, if I may, I would like to ask you a very general question. As we approach the country’s bicentennial year what role in world affairs do you see the United States consistent with our actions in the last quarter of this century?

Mr. Harriman. May I say one more word to Mr. Wolfr in answer to his question about the CIA? It has been my experience that the information coming from the CIA has been more balanced and more accurate than that coming from the Pentagon. I think the lack of the dispassionate information that comes from the CIA is of vital importance for the Congress and the American people to have to protect against intelligence which builds up rather recklessly the needs for expanded military expenditures. I think that is an area of intelligence in which the CIA has proved to be in my experience of very vital importance to the President and the policymakers of our Nation.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Wolfr. U.S. influence abroad. How do you see this influencing our views of our place in the world?

Mr. Wolfr. On your question, Chairman Morgan, the broad position of the United States in the centennial year, this centennial year is an emotional one for us. It is a year in which we should look back at what our
Founding Fathers had in mind. When the United States sticks to its principles in international affairs it has a very great influence. The principles on which our Nation were founded are very highly respected, the world over by people the world over. The Presidents who have articulated those principles are the ones who have had the greatest influence.

When we throw our weight around either economically or militarily we are hated. Speaking of Presidents who have had an influence, I was in Moscow when President Roosevelt died. Women wept in the streets. They had lost a friend, a friend whom they thought would bring the world to peace.

President Kennedy, even the brief period he was President, talked to the people in the developing nations particularly in Latin America and Africa. I have been told that his picture was tacked up in the little shacks after he died because he was a man that these poor people had hoped would take an interest and have concern for their welfare.

I am only mentioning that to indicate that we can have great influence. The bicentennial, Mr. Chairman, should bring home, to recall to us the principles on which this Nation was founded.

I think foreign policy has to be realistic in carrying out our influence. I can assure you that my experience that the people of the world want us to live up to those principles and want us to give leadership to the world so that mankind can have the benefit of these same principles of freedom and human dignity that are spelled out in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

BALANCE OF BENEFITS IN UNITED STATES-SOVET RELATIONS

Chairman Morgan, Governor, one further question. The current status of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union has brought about a number of agreements between the two countries such as the well-known wheat deal, such as today's historic experiment in outer space.

Critics of détente say that such procedures are very beneficial to the Soviets but have little if any value for the United States. Do you agree or disagree with this view? How would you like to see Soviet-United States relationships develop over the next 25 years?

Mr. Harriman. That is a long period of time, Mr. Chairman. I would like to see develop in the immediate future our taking advantage of the present situation. Brezhnev as Secretary General has committed himself and the Russian people to improving relations with the United States. He would be very much embarrassed politically in my judgment if we failed to make further progress.

The first area of that is in the nuclear field. I can see no undue advantage on either side. The control of nuclear weapons can only help both sides and the people of the world. It helps particularly the two countries in eliminating unnecessary expenditures.

The most important one under détente was initiated by Willy Brandt, although we were responsible for the agreement in Berlin. It has taken Berlin out of the critical area which has bothered us for 20 years before. It seems to me that that agreement is also mutually beneficial.
Another aspect, the Russians have traded for billions of dollars with Europe for years and we have declared ourselves out of it. We have had the extraordinary idea that we were damaging the Soviet Union because we weren’t trading with them. I think it is high time that we begin to trade with them in a normal way as other countries do. We have gained nothing by isolating them from our trade.

When I was Secretary of Commerce I was the first one to establish controls of our trade to the Soviet Union. Every deal ought to be looked at by the Department of Commerce and the Export-Import Bank to make sure that it is in our interest. Trade is a two-way street. I can see no gain by declaring ourselves out of trade.

You mentioned the wheat deal. I think of all the deals the United States has been involved in, our Yankee forefathers would turn in their graves to think of how we were outtraded. We had no business to let the negotiations be handled in the way they were. The reality was that we sold twice too much grain at about half the price.

I understand there is a new trade in wheat being considered and if we have a surplus there is no reason why we shouldn’t sell wheat to the Soviet Union or to anybody else. Trade is a two-way street in my judgment. The idea that we keep the Soviet Union from developing because we don’t trade with them doesn’t make any sense. Europe and Japan can give the Soviet Union practically everything that we can give. In 1946 I was against giving them all of our latest technology. I am still against giving them our latest technology in certain fields which they can’t get elsewhere.

I believe in the agreement which was made in Paris between the OECD countries. That should include important technology as in the computer field, in which the Soviets are way behind. But in most other fields they are getting everything which they would get from us almost as well if not as well from the rest of Europe or Japan. I think we are naive to think that we are damaging the Soviet Union by not trading with them. I think on balance we are losing. Because this trade bill didn’t go through we have probably lost some hundreds of millions of dollars of machine tooling, machinery business, which would now be very useful in furnishing employment for people in manufacturing in our country.

Chairman Morgan, Thank you, Governor.
Mr. Wolff. Mr. Guyer.
Mr. Guyer. Thank you, Chairman Wolff.

Governor, Congress is proud to have you here today. A few of us probably should have been here sooner. We were listening to a gentleman from Russia, Mr. Solzhenitsyn. I am sure we have some varying views:

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

I would like to ask you a question. I think this Congress in general and this committee and in particular, under the leadership of Congressman Wolff, is establishing a new kind of identity. As a matter of fact this is one of the first times that Congress has become vocal and focal in determining foreign policy. Do you think this is a good sign?
Mr. Harriman. I think it is a very good thing. I have said for years that no foreign policy can succeed without the support of the American people. That can be felt through the support of Congress.

In the Truman days the cooperation between the Truman administration and the then Republican-controlled Senate. Senator Vandenberg, was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. We used to talk over every proposal that was made in advance before it was proposed to Congress. His views were obtained. They were not in favor of some things and that went for some Democrats as well as some Republicans. But he insisted on some changes which would give more power to Congress and the American people and so served a very useful role. Senator Vandenberg would only go as far as his committee would go. Of course he discussed it with the members of his committee. That was an example of close cooperation between the Congress of the United States and the administration. I think it was one of the most constructive periods in our foreign policy.

U.S. INFLUENCE THROUGH "PERSONALITY"

Mr. Guiter. You indicated, I think by reference and also by your statement, that we had a great number of giants in those days who were respected around the world, in their fields, irrespective of their political labels. Do you think we need more dynamic figures, people who are internationally esteemed and whose qualifications for diplomatic ability would help us with credibility?

Mr. Harriman. It is an abstract question. Mr. Truman was very highly respected. But I think the actions of our nation really helped create the image of the President rather than the President entirely himself. I think the actions of our Nation are the ones that damage us today. I think on many of the Dulles policies we lost ground throughout the world. The unleashing of Chiang I thought was probably one of the most unfortunate actions. The world thought we must be crazy to think that Chiang could go ashore again, and that we were going to support him. There were many things in the Dulles period which set us back.

In recent years there has been a large body of opinion throughout the world which has been against the Vietnamese war. I think we have a bit of a problem to rebuild the kind of image in the world that is really truly American, the image of America as being a Nation which is ready to help people achieve the kind of human dignity and independence that we believe in.

PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD U.S.S.R.

Mr. Guiter. Mr. Harriman, how do we explain to people on the street level the intricacies of how we deal with other countries, such as the Soviet Union? We hear everything about the Soviet Union—that there are still people in labor camps, that they have 400,000 people in espionage alone, whether this is true or not. I don’t know. They claim there are 2 million spies. Whether or not this is an exaggeration, how do we explain to people out there on the firing line and on the campuses and in our cities?
Mr. Harriman. As I mentioned in my statement, I think that our objectives in the ideological field are irreconcilable. I read from Mr. Brezhnev’s statement. He himself says that they are supporting liberation movements and working class movements, as he calls them.

Mr. Guyer. Yes.

Mr. Harriman. They say that they are. We don’t like communism. I don’t like any part of it. I dislike it intensely. I would like nothing better than to see it obliterated from the world. But is exists and the Soviet Union is a powerful Nation. We want to avoid war. I believe there is going to be a change within the Soviet Union itself. I believe that by doing business with them and associating with them in other fields as well as in the expression against what they are doing and in opposing their support for liberation movements throughout the world, I think we will do better to live with them rather than to try to isolate them. We don’t show a liking for communism in any way just because we have to do business with them.

It is to our advantage to get agreements which are mutually useful in working for peace in this planet.

Soviet Credibility

Mr. Guyer. What is the performance record of the Soviet Union in keeping their word as to treaties they have signed? Is it good or bad?

Mr. Harriman. I think it depends on an interpretation. Stalin, we thought, did not live up to the agreements that he made at Yalta. On the other hand, in recent agreements, we have mentioned one agreement, the nuclear limited test ban; they have kept that agreement. They kept the Austrian State Treaty made under Eisenhower. That has been kept. I think we have got to be very careful in the agreements that we make, that there are no holes in them, that they are self-enforcing; I would never make general agreements with them of a general nature. Specific agreements they have kept when it was in their interest to do so. We have to be careful and cautious. But when it is in our interest to make agreements we ought to go forward and do it.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Mr. Guyer. One final question. Is there a real genuine fear and mistrust between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China? Or is this something that comes and goes?

Mr. Harriman. Oh, no. There is a real, very real, fear between Peking and Moscow. When I was in Moscow 3 years ago the word “yellow peril” was openly spoken of. That is a word I remember I heard as a child. We haven’t used it in this country for years: They are very much afraid of the pressure of this enormous population on their territory, some of which was owned by China in the old days.

In Peking they have been very much concerned that the Soviet Union would start a preventive war and they build air-raid shelters and that sort of thing. I have found however that in the last year there has been some relaxation of tensions between them. Maybe that is because Mr. Mao is getting old and the people are waiting for change.
I didn’t find this during the last year the same kind of fear in Moscow as that expressed 3 years earlier.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Harriman, you have said in the past that one way the Communists operate is to use Communist parties that are legalized and which function within constitutional procedures in existing governments.

COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Why is it that recent Communist efforts of this nature in countries such as Portugal, France, Chile, Italy, have been more successful than similar democratic efforts? Are the Communists more realistic?

Mr. Harriman. There was very strong Communist pressure in Europe immediately after the war in my opinion. Stalin broke his agreements at Yalta because he felt there was an opportunity to expand Communist influence in Western Europe and the Atlantic. I am sure he got reports from France and from Italy that those countries possibly could take over the government, popular fronts or otherwise. That was stopped by the Marshall plan by the initiative of the United States in helping Western Europe gain its economic independence. After the war there was no money to buy food or raw materials. There would have been vast unemployment. It was the kind of situation upon which communism breeds. The Communist movement was halted and set back.

ITALY

The only countries in which a strong Communist Party remained was in Italy and France. In recent years the Communist parties in those countries, particularly Italy, have shown much more independence from Moscow than they were at that time. In the immediate postwar years they looked to Moscow. More recently they have been more independent. For instance, the Italian Communist Party came out against the Czechoslovakian invasion by the Soviet Union in 1968. They have become more nationalist in their actions and therefore because of the economic difficulties, the failure to make social progress that people had hoped for, they have gained undoubtedly in recent years.

PORTUGAL

Portugal is a separate situation. It is one in which I don’t know enough about. There is obviously a small group of Communists financed by somebody, presumably the Soviet Union. For some time now, they have been planning to take over from the defunct dictator-ship. Only 18 percent of the people voted Communist. That is a take-over by a minority. If it is taking over, what will happen in Portugal I don’t want to judge.

To answer your question, there are two things. One is that a number of these Communist parties are more independent of Moscow than they used to be. They are still helping to finance so-called liberation
movements which are Communist fronts in many parts of the world and will continue to do so if they are not blocked from doing this. I think we will find this sort of thing happening, if we continue to fail to take the measures that are necessary to help our friends combat subversive actions.

Mr. Wolff. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Yatron. Yes, I will yield.

COUNTERFORCE TO COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN ITALY

Mr. Wolff. Having been an architect of the Marshall plan, how do you feel today about Italy? Should we institute a new Marshall plan?

Mr. Harriman. I haven't been an architect of anything. I have served certain Presidents in certain responsibilities. I have given some advice, some of which has been taken, some of which hasn't. But the Marshall plan, it is true, I did manage it in Europe. But it was a national affair. As far as Italy is concerned you will probably remember the fact that we were quite open in the manner in which we tried to help overcome the Communist influence. There was a letter-writing campaign which we publicly sponsored, urging Americans of Italian descent to write to their friends. There was a popular front of the many Socialists and Communists joining together. Instead of them winning the Christian Democrats won and have been in control since.

I understand that the Communist Party in Italy—I mean the Communist labor unions in Italy—are far stronger today than they were in 1948. Moscow still is helping to finance those Communist parties. We bowed out of giving any assistance to the non-Communist labor movements in Italy.

Neglect is a positive action as a policy as well as action.

TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WHEAT DEAL

Mr. Yatron, Governor, I am concerned about the problem that is felt by many Americans regarding U.S. policy toward the Russians. We spend billions of dollars on weapons and military supplies, presumably to defend ourselves from Communist aggression. Then we turn around and sell them precious food and supplies at the expense of the American public. How is this rather contradictory action explained to the American public?

Mr. Harriman. Trade is a two-way street. The seller gains as well as the buyer when a trade is made. That was a stupid deal made very recklessly, the wheat deal in which the Russians were allowed to buy twice as much as they should have at about half the price.

But trade is a two-way street. The rest of the world is trading with the Soviet Union. I think we just explained that. They are trading billions and billions of dollars worth annually. Germany, France, Italy, England, Japan. We have had no part of it because we have been under the idea that our neglect of them somehow does them harm. We are the only ones who have lost. I think it would be a very good thing today to have a few hundred million dollars of matching tool and machinery orders from the Soviet Union in our factories in this country. There are credits in connection with those trades. But
interest is paid on those credits. This is part of the deal we make in much of our export trade to help finance capital expenditures to add to our employment in this country.

Mr. YATRON. But it was a bad deal for the American consumer and the American taxpayer?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Which ones?

Mr. YATRON. The wheat deal.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The wheat deal was appalling. Just because we were very stupid and our Government was stupid and made a foolish deal doesn't mean that we should never deal again.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Governor.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The wheat deal was appalling. Just because we were very stupid and our Government was stupid and made a foolish deal doesn't mean that we should never deal again.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Governor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wolff.

I want to take this opportunity to congratulate our chairman and the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy for undertaking this series of hearings in probing our Nation's objectives in foreign policy. The House certainly needs this sort of discussion and debate during these critical times.

I want to join in welcoming Governor Harriman to our hearings, my former constituent. I hope he will return to Orange County one day.

Mr. WOLFF. If the gentleman will yield, he shares our constituency. The Governor maintains a residence in my district.

Mr. GILMAN. I think the Governor still votes in my district as well.

INTERNAL OPPRESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Governor, some of us have just heard Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the great author and humanitarian, fighter for freedom, whose spirit has given so much courage to those oppressed peoples in the Soviet Union. I came away with some concern about what is still happening in the Soviet Union and other people in the captive nations and the Soviet Jewry and others who are still being oppressed there.

As we seek new ways to trade and do business with the Soviet Union, how best can we help them to live up to their humanitarian concerns and their humanitarian responsibilities?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No one is more aware of the appalling character of the Soviet repression than I am. I defy anyone to claim that they have more knowledge of it or more emotion against it.

LINE WITH TRADE

On the other hand it is a question of what you do. We do not gain by isolating them from the world. We tried to do that for 30 odd years and the rest of the world recognized them. We gain nothing by it. I think we can best gain by treating their government as a government which we try to do business with and do business with them when it is to our interest, business interest, to do so. We do not gain by preventing trade.

We cannot achieve an improvement in my opinion, by tying trade to a change in their system. No intensely ideological group will change their ideology for money. I think we ought to keep money out of it.
I think private groups, statements by Congressmen, Congress groups, about what they think about what is being done, both in the United States and all countries, does have an influence, as I said in my prepared testimony:

It does have at least an influence to some extent in its effect on world opinion. Linkage, government to government, might get relief for a few people. But it will in no sense change the fundamental system that communism is based on.

There have been changes from the extremes of Stalinism. There is a certain relaxation of controls. It is nothing like as much as it should be. It is far too little.

I think they will be more apt to continue if we bring them out into the world rather than to try to isolate them from the world. Isolation tends to contribute to the control of government, of people. Contact with the world generally tends to at least a small softening influence.

CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Gilman. Governor Harriman, there has been some criticism of late of the more recent active role of Congress in foreign policy. What is your opinion of the recent congressional initiatives?

Mr. Harriman. I think it is a splendid thing for Congress to act. I think this committee's raison d'être is a most appropriate action. I mentioned the important role that Congress played in the Truman days, which was a period of the best of our foreign policies. Senator Vandenberg was then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. He played a very important role in the development of those programs which set a pattern for America's position in the world.

I am all for it. I don't think Congress ought to take snap action without hearings. I think having amendments to bills, voted on without a hearing such as was taken the other day with regard to Panama is rather reckless. It is a manner in which Congress shouldn't function. With all due deference, sir, this habit of adding amendments to important bills without full thought and consideration is not one of the best ways in which Congress functions.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you.

Mr. Harriman. It is particularly dangerous of course to apply that method in foreign policy.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Although I am not a member of this subcommittee I am delighted to participate. It is a pleasure to have you with us, Governor.

UNCLEAR DETERRENT

There has been a lot of talk recently about first use of nuclear weapons. Would it be a fair statement that for more than 25 years it has been a basic part of the strategy of NATO and the United States as a part of NATO that the presence of nuclear weapons in Western
Europe served as a deterrent against conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union?

Mr. Harriman. I agree.

Mr. Bingham. That deterrent depends upon the willingness to use those weapons if necessary to defend against a conventional attack?

Mr. Harriman. That is correct. If there is the attack and it is necessary. But there was agreement, particularly under President Kennedy, to try to have a sufficient defensive force so as to raise the threshold of the need for nuclear weapons. In all the contacts I have had there has been a very strong determination not to use nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons.

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**ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY**

Mr. Bingham. Turning to another area, which was discussed recently, presuming that American arms were used by Turkey in Cyprus, how do you feel about our resuming arms shipments to Turkey on a limited basis?

Mr. Harriman. I am frank to say I am not sufficiently familiar with all the details in that respect. I do think the situation has been mishandled as far as I can judge by this administration. It was neglected at the beginning. We should have protested violently against this coup that took place that threw Makarios out. Then we neglected to do what we had previously done, which was to bring pressure immediately to bear on Turkey to either stop the invasion or to stop them from moving ahead once they landed. Pressure should have been used at that time.

I don't know enough about the situation is going today. But I do think the administration ought to consult with the Congress and review what has been done and what can be done. Generally speaking it has not been useful to try to force people to do things by withholding aid or by publicly pressurizing them. It is an embarrassing situation for a country. I am not sufficiently familiar with the details. But I do believe the Congress should keep in touch with the administration and should be willing to give the administration sufficiently free hand to be able to negotiate a settlement which is reasonable and which forces Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and come to some agreement which although it recognizes the rights of the minority recognizes the rights of the majority.

I think that is about all I can do because I am not sufficiently familiar with the details. I think it would be most unfortunate if restrictions of our Congress made it impossible for the administration to use its influence today even though we can be very critical of their failure to act in the past.

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**CIA: COVERT AND OVERT OPERATIONS**

Mr. Bingham. Looking at page 5 of your statement you say that “the continued activity of the CIA, both in its intelligence activities and in its ability to help friendly peoples counter subversive activities against them.”

To what extent can that be done openly in your view and to what extent must it be done covertly?
Mr. Harriman. It depends upon the situation. I think much of it can be done openly. Much of it becomes known openly afterward. Much is known at the time. One unfortunate thing is that some of the things which can be done quite openly in the past, it has been the practice of the Congress not to be liberal with funds of this type to the State Department. It has been easier to get funds for the CIA. There is no doubt in my mind that the CIA because of the lack of supervision both by the administration and by Congress got into activities that they had no business doing in addition to which some Presidents attempt to use the CIA in a way which was inappropriate. It is an area in which the Congress ought to watch.

I can answer your question only in a general way. I can only say that many of the things that ought to be done have to be done quietly or else they would not be effective. They would do more harm than good.

Mr. Bingham. In other words—

Mr. Harriman. But I do think many things were done which were very constructive in a general way. I don’t know if that is a fair way to say it. I have known of some cases against what are called dirty tricks yet for the affirmative help of people that share our ideas but who are under pressure from groups who are highly financed by the Soviet Union. Those people will not be able to survive if they are not given enough financial help.

I mentioned for instance the Italian labor situation as an example. If it became generally known that this was done I don’t know that it would have been as effective if it had been done directly by the government rather than through the AFL-CIO. They had their people abroad. They were in constant contact with the non-Communist labor unions and helped to use their own influence as well as money. It has done much more effectively through them than by some open or overt government action.

Mr. Bingham. I think you have answered my question. In other words you would not rule out covert activities of a positive nature by the CIA?

Mr. Harriman. No, I wouldn’t rule that out at all. But I would want to know what the situation is, where it is. I know for instance the young people that were helped going to these youth congresses. In the meetings that took place in Moscow the non-Communist representatives from the United States and the West were made monkeys of by the Communists. When the CIA taught some of these young people that wanted to go what the score was and how to deal with it they made monkeys of the Communists on the street-corner debates, both in Helsinki and in Austria. They could have been done openly. But there was no money for it. There are distinguished people today who were then the young people. They were not agents of the CIA. But the CIA made it possible for them to learn what the Communists were up against, in addition to which we helped students going to Latin America and other parts of the world. Almost all the universities have at one time or another and pretty nearly all the big ones were penetrated by Communist cells. The students who went there were taught what they were up against. That could be done openly. The professors who go in exchange, all this could be done openly. The police school was done openly. That was run by AID.
But it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between what can be done openly and what should be done covertly.

Mr. Bingham. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Harriman. I think the activity of trying to offset the well-financed Communist groups that are active all over the world is a subject for which we should have agencies of the Government to watch carefully and help offset. When I say "our friends" I mean by that people that share the ideas of human dignity and freedom that we have.

Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Solarz.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say at the outset that I think you are really to be complimented for taking the initiative in organizing these hearings. I think so often in Congress we get so enmeshed in the minutia of day-to-day obligations that we sometimes lose sight of the larger picture. I think these hearings provide an unusual opportunity to take a long-range look at our foreign policy.

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

Governor, I wonder if you could give us the benefit of your judgment about what we ought to do in the event that North Korea launches an unambiguous attack on South Korea in light of the presence of our 42,000-man garrison in the South as well as the nature of our treaty obligations such as they are to South Korea. Do you think we ought to respond or disagree?

Mr. Harriman. That is a hard question for me to answer because I think as long as we keep our troops there and make it very clear that we are not going to let Kim Il Sung launch a second attack it won't happen. I think the only danger of an attack is if there were loud speeches by people in responsible positions that we ought to get out of Korea.

Korea is an area that can be defended. We proved that. We had little in 1950 when South Korea was attacked. We are well-heeled today. It is a peninsula where our naval forces can function, as well as air.

The trouble with Vietnam is that it was an unwinnable war. Korea was a winnable war. We won it. We threw the attackers back. I think we ought to do more to improve the armament of the Koreans. We have been rather reluctant to give them more arms for two reasons. One, we were afraid they might attack. Another, we were giving all our modern weapons to Vietnam. I think a study should be made and I think we should make them more independent by giving them better equipment. I understand that the North Koreans are better equipped than the South Koreans. But the South Koreans have shown that they will fight.

On the other hand, the situation on the ground is unfortunate for South Korea because Seoul is almost a stone's throw from the border, whereas the capital of North Korea is several hundred miles to the north. A quick attack could create a lot of difficulty. Therefore the South Koreans need a very strong defense to protect against a quick attack. But to answer your question, I don't think Kim will do this thing again.
There is no doubt in my mind that Stalin gave Kim the nod to attack, a fact that Mr. Khrushchev admits in his memoirs. I don't think Kim would get the support from either Russia or China as long as it is clear that U.S. troops are there and we have every intention to help defend the South Koreans. They will defend themselves mostly. But the backing of the United States is necessary.

Mr. Solarz. I realize your argument is that if we have American troops there it won't be necessary to defend them because the North Koreans will be deterred from making an attack in the first place.

But just for the purposes of discussion, if it should turn out that that assumption is unwarranted and that for whatever reasons the North Koreans attack anyway, what would be your position?

Mr. Harriman. I don't think you can bluff. If you say you are going to stand firm you have got to stand firm. You have to face up to it. But I think the South Korean forces, particularly if they are better armed, would be able to carry the main burden of the defense. The South Koreans always fought well with what little they had in 1950.

**MidEast Negotiations**

Mr. Solarz. With respect to the situation in the Middle East, as you know negotiations are now being conducted between Israel and Egypt through the good graces of the Secretary of State. From what we hear and read it would appear that the Israelis are under enormous pressure from our administration to make territorial concessions in the Sinai, which I suspect that, left to their own judgment and devices, they wouldn't even consider making. How do you feel about this? Do you think the effort by the Secretary of State to put pressure on the Israelis is justified and, if not, what your own feeling would be with respect to how we can achieve some diplomatic progress in that area?

Mr. Harriman. The Secretary of State did a remarkable job in getting the confidence of Sadat and the first agreement for disengagement. This is the first time America has had the confidence of the head of the Egyptian Government for many, many a day. I think he is to be commended for that.

I don't know enough of the gain to be had by this second move in order to have any opinion about it at all. My feeling is that we have got to go to Geneva sooner or later. We have got to look for a common settlement. I would like to see us put more effort into a permanent settlement. I don't fully understand the value of a step-by-step approach. Therefore I think we ought to concentrate on what I believe is conceivably possible today, that is a real settlement. That means bringing the Soviet Government into it. Brezhnev has stated to me privately and he has stated publicly that they are ready to guarantee a settlement. They will take an Arab point of view in the negotiations. But they indicated they were ready to be flexible. I think we have got to go to Geneva sooner or later and in some way go to a permanent solution. I don't understand the value of doing this step by step. There may be values which I don't understand. I don't want to express a complete judgment because I am not well informed. I do think it ought to be our policy to go forward with a settlement. I think it is possible. I believe we have got to bring the Israelis into it because
they will have to put pressure on the Arab countries to achieve a settlement.

May I say in that connection the Israel Government will really have to make some very important sacrifices. Whether this is worth the sacrifice or not, I don't know.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Mr. Solarz, Governor, one last question. I might say that you were the only person who had an opportunity to speak to, who knew, Trotsky. As a sometime student of Soviet politics, if I can move to the past from the future with the permission of the Chairman for a moment, I am interested in your answer as to what would have happened had Trotsky, and not Stalin, emerged triumphant in the struggle for power which ensued following Lenin's death.

Mr. Harriman. I don't think it is appropriate to this committee. If you want to have lunch with me one day we might discuss it. But I don't think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to take the time of this committee to guess what might have happened if Lenin had lived or Trotsky had followed or if Stalin hadn't taken over. Many people feel it was absolutely necessary to go through the horrible brutality of Stalin in order to get control of the people. The Chinese went through a terrible brutality in order to achieve the present position, as you know.

I mean that. I would be delighted to talk about it. It is a fascinating subject. But today we are dealing with future American foreign policy.

I think Brezhnev is ready to make concessions in international affairs in our interest, concessions from this position, and it is not easy for a Soviet leader to change his position.

One thinks of him as a complete dictator. But that is not true. They have got to get all the apparatus to agree. So I say to you that Brezhnev not only wants but needs progress in agreements with us. I don't use the word "detente" because people misunderstand its meaning. But agreements can be made in our interest. I don't think we ought to shy away from it. I think it would be reckless to miss this opportunity. This relates to present-day Kremlin politics. I would be very glad to discuss that today because it is of real importance for us to understand how this outfit operates. It is no longer one man. It is a group of people that are working together with one leader. He is the first, of course. But he hasn't unlimited power and he hasn't unlimited assurance of his position.

Mr. Wolfs, Mr. Bonker.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Bonker, Governor, the Vandenburg-Truman agreement has made possible 25 years of cooperation on foreign policy, not only in a partisan sense but in terms of the legislative and executive branches. Yet it seems that that relationship has deteriorated. Just this year we have seen great divisions between the executive and legislative branches with respect to our foreign policy in terms of economic and military aid for Cambodia and Vietnam and in Cyprus, where there is also
division, and in the Middle East. It becomes more acute when President Ford on his recent trip to meet with President Sadat was presented with a letter bearing 76 signatures of U.S. Senators expressing their support of Israel.

As a result we don't speak with what Secretary Kissinger terms "one voice" or central authority anymore on foreign policy. I wonder what you would suggest if we are to reshape our foreign policy—how we build a trust relationship once again between these two branches of Government.

Mr. Harriman. In the Constitution foreign policy usually comes under the executive branch. You can go back from the Truman days when there was very close cooperation. Truman didn't always like some of the things. But there was a disposition on the part of that administration to consult in advance where necessary, to consult in advance in order to get the enormous appropriations for these fantastically new proposals which Truman embarked on.

The Congress in recent periods has not been as close or as cooperative as it should be. I believe that Congress should insist on the Secretary of State presenting to the Senate and House his views on these different subjects in a simple enough way so that all of you—in a detailed enough way—so that all of you can understand. Much of it doesn't need to be so secret. Much of it can be said quite openly so the American public can understand it too. I think your job is really to force the administration to come clean with its policies and talk them over.

I think you ought to be willing to recognize that you cannot negotiate. You can't negotiate by legislation. I think you have to recognize that when you come to an understanding of policy you have to give the administration for better or for worse the authority to work out the arrangements under this general understanding that you have come to. But there is no reason why you can't come to an understanding of what your objectives are.

Certainly in some cases such as arms control you have to get two-thirds of the Senate to approve any treaty. So in that respect, at least, the Congress' voice is necessary to obtain.

OBJECTIVES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Bonker. I am interested in what you see as the basic propositions upon which you feel our foreign policy should be based, both in terms of setting objectives and in terms of humanitarian concerns.

I am wondering too whether you think that we are clearly beyond the postwar, cold war, domino theory philosophy which seemed to have dominated our foreign policy in the past and, if so, what do you see as the new forces which shape our foreign policy—the kinds of objectives which we should be looking for in developing this policy?

Mr. Harriman. That is a broad question to attempt to answer. I think one thing that ought to be made plain is that there was a very definite break in foreign policy from the Truman to the Dulles period. I mentioned my lack of respect for the first step which Dulles and ex-President Eisenhower undertook, which was to unleash Chiang. But his general approach, calling neutrals "trivial," the general approach of a righteous attitude, a crusade, changed completely the
Truman doctrine. Truman was a little flamboyant in his language because one of the reasons was Vandenburg said, "You have got to scare the Communists or else we won't pass this appropriation." This is well known. So there is no secret about it.

There is a very specific provision of that legislation that no American forces were to be used in Greece or Turkey. That was a principle that should have been adhered to.

Truman was damned because it is alleged that he lost us China. Then he gets damned because he was held responsible for the debacle in Vietnam. He was responsible for neither. I think he was right in not becoming involved in China and not being involved in the mainland. He did stand up in Korea in which as I said he was successful.

**IDEological Conflict**

There is a change in the world. I think we have got to learn from the great things we have done. We are apt to forget the great things we have done and think only of this horrible disaster of Vietnam. There is a disposition on the part of some people to back away from any responsibility. My own belief is that we are still in conflict with an ideology that wants to destroy everything that we believe in in terms of human dignity and human freedom. I think that is the main thrust of human strivings over the centuries. I think we are on the right side. Mr. Khrushchev spoke of peaceful coexistence some years ago. I immediately said it wasn't peaceful coexistence, it was competitive coexistence. We should accept that competition and so do our share in trying to help people battle what I consider the very evil force today of communism.

The same kinds of controls go over into the Communist governments even though they are nationalistic. There is no difference as far as I have seen so far—although there isn't any danger from Tito, the kinds of freedoms which we like to see in the world don't exist in Yugoslavia.

**Developing Nations**

But in answer to your question I simply say that I think we have an interest in what goes on everywhere in the world. But what we do in different parts of the world depends upon, No. 1, our capability. Equally important is our interest in it. We have the greatest interest in Europe but also in other parts of the world. I think we have been appallingly neglectful of developing nations, Latin America, Africa.

I was quite unhappy when the President of the largest African nation came to Washington and the President didn't even have time to see him. That was Nigeria. Nigeria represents almost twice the population of any other country in Africa. He didn't have a chance to see him. Now he is one of the important members of OPEC. I think we have got to pay attention to other people, understand their interests. If we can help them overtly, as Congressman Bingham says, we ought to do it.

I think the fact that we have neglected arbitrarily the interests of people is one of the reasons why the votes in the United Nations are as bad as they are. I think it is quite right to say that we are not going to stand for Israel being thrown out of the United Nations. It is nice
to announce it, that we are not going to permit it to happen in any United Nations that we can contribute to. But, at the same time, I think it is rather shocking to find that those votes are against our principles. I think part of that reason is because we have failed to take account of the interest of people in the world. Part of it is because we were overly involved in Vietnam. Part of it I think is because we haven't had an administration that cared enough about what is called the Third World, to develop a relationship of mutual respect and confidence.

Mr. Wolff. The gentlemen's time has expired.

Mrs. Meyner.

Mrs. Meyner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TRADE AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

Governor, I was delighted to hear you say that we indeed should trade with the Soviet Union just like any other nation does. Two weeks ago today I was in the Soviet Union and talking to Soviet leaders. They brought up again and again—and it was uppermost in their minds—a most favored nation. I just wonder what your opinion is of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. It had originally increased immigration. But do you think it has been counterproductive to our relations with the Soviet Union?

Mr. Harriman. I said before the debacle of our trade negotiations it would be counterproductive. It was bound to fail because I don't think you can mix ideology with practical considerations. Trade can have a bearing, certain types of trade. I think we have to be very careful in the security aspect not to give them technology which improves their military and technical abilities. But other than that we should go along with what the rest of the world is doing. I don't think we gain anything by trying publicly to get them to change their position.

I think we can have a great deal of influence privately and we could have had a great deal of influence on increasing the flow of immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union. As I recall it, before the Jackson amendment there were some 30,000 Jews permitted to leave. It is true that after the Jackson amendment they abandoned their scholarship-tax and also the immigration went up to 38,000. Now I think it is down to—

Mrs. Meyner. It is down; yes.

Mr. Harriman. To less than half of what it used to be. I think they suffered. I think the condition of the Jews in the Soviet Union has been adversely affected by the Jackson amendment. I think that is a fact that has not been disputed.

I am utterly opposed to what the Soviet Union has been doing. The question is, how we can use our influence. I think we can use it far better quietly. I think we should make it plain to them that they are not going to get full support in trade if they don't do better. I think with that 30,000 or 40,000 more Jews would be permitted to leave the country and there would not be as much persecution of those who want to leave.

It is a very unfortunate thing. It looks as if the scholars who want to leave or the scientists who want to leave are those that they are be-
ing rough with. I think it is utterly despicable. But there we are. We have seen the collapse of the Jackson amendment. We have seen the fact that the position of the Jews is difficult. There is no doubt that prior to the Jackson amendment many Jews had a very preferred position, a very high position, in the scientific world. I think something like 10 percent of the scientists were Jews even though the overall population was a little over 1 percent. Now I am told there is more suspicion of Jewish scientists because they don’t trust them. They look upon the most favored nation as much from a political standpoint. I am sure you got that impression.

MRS. MEYNER. Yes.

Mr. Harriman. Mr. Khrushchev talked to me in the early 1960’s about it. He was very colorful. He said, “Countries that don’t trade want war. If you don’t want war, you trade.” Obviously that is a little oversimplification. But he was that kind of a fellow. But this has been a thorn in their side, the fact that we have tried to discriminate against them and the rest of the world doesn’t. I think our influence has been reduced; our ability to help the Jews has been reduced by the manner in which it has been dealt with recently.

MRS. MEYNER. Thank you. Just one final observation, talking about the Russian wheat deal, a Soviet friend pointed out that——

Mr. Harriman. By the way, let me say that I think we ought to continue to have a very major interest in the position of the Jews and to do everything we can to allow the Jews to migrate to Israel. I don’t think we ought to abandon it even though we have had a setback by the wrong tactics. I think we ought to go ahead with it and make a major drive in this respect.

I don’t think it is tolerable for us to sit by and not do everything we can.

SOVIET RIPOFF

MRS. MEYNER. Just one final point, talking about the wheat deal, a Soviet friend pointed out that they had ripped us off on the wheat deal, but that the United States had ripped off the Russians when we bought Alaska.

Mr. Harriman. One thing about the Turks, they were the first to stand up to the Russians in October 1945. Russia wanted not only a base in the Dardanelles but also the eastern provinces which has been part of Armenia. And I spoke to Vishinsky about this and said this was an outrageous demand.

He said, “Well, it used to be ours 100 years ago.”

I said, “Are you going to demand all the territory that you have ever had? Are you going to demand Alaska?”

He said, “We will pay you what you paid us.”

Vishinsky was rather pleasant, more pleasant than Molotov, because he had a sense of humor. Molotov never knew any word other than “nyet.”

Mr. Wolff. Governor, we have another witness. But I have two questions as the result of my colleagues here. They prompt two questions that I would like to pose to you. You did mention the question of the Bay of Pigs. You mentioned the connection with the CIA, that it was somewhat CIA-inspired.
CIA AND THE BAY OF PIGS

Mr. Harriman. The CIA administered the Bay of Pigs, organized it.

Mr. Wolff. Was the CIA the tail wagging the dog? Or was it the administration?

Mr. Harriman. I was not one of the 13 who were consulted. I was ambassador at large who was traveling around the world. I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs decision. It was authorized to be organized by President Eisenhower. It was authorized by President Kennedy. That I think is well known in the public record. The CIA organized it and attempted to carry it out. It was a very poor job. Our intelligence was very faulty in that case. I don't think I can contribute anything to the discussion.

THE LAOTIAN ACCORDS AND THE "SECRET WAR"

Mr. Wolff. I recall years ago the fact—I think it was 1962—when you had just come back from concluding the agreements in Laos. Did the subsequent events of Laos that were brought out in both the Pentagon papers as well as testimony before congressional committees, did the agreements provide a cover in any way for a so-called secret war that went on?

Mr. Harriman. No, there was nothing in the agreement about the secret war.

Mr. Wolff. No, I don't mean that. Did the agreement provide a cover for us to conduct the so-called secret war?

Mr. Harriman. I wasn't familiar with the details of the "secret war." I wasn't involved with them, with the decisions. I understand that the North Vietnamese were helping the Pathet Lao. Souvanna Phouma was then the prime minister. He was happy to have us help as long as we didn't do it openly. The understanding with him was that we would keep it quiet. The impetus for keeping it quiet in this case came from the Lao Government.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Governor. We appreciate your being here with us. I am sure you have contributed to our wealth of knowledge, so that we can attack the problems we face, better armed toward future solutions.

Mr. Harriman. Thank you. If I may as a last word wish you well in these deliberations. Again, I can't help but feel that they will be most constructive. I am very much delighted that you are undertaking this work. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Prof. Hans Morgenthau, university professor of the New School for Social Research; distinguished scholar, writer and expert of U.S. foreign policy who has served as consultant to Departments of State and Defense. Among his many books are "A Defense of National Interests" and "A New Foreign Policy for the United States," which was written in 1969.

Professor Morgenthau, I understand you have a prepared statement. However you have agreed to give us the statement in summary if you will.
STATEMENT OF HANS MORGENTHAU, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, NEW YORK; FORMER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND PRESENT STATE DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT

BIOGRAPHY

Hans J. Morgenthau, Director, Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, City University of New York, and Former Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, is a native of Germany, where he received his education. During his long career as lawyer, scholar, and consultant to government agencies, Dr. Morgenthau has authored numerous books and articles in the fields of political science and foreign affairs.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. If you don't mind, could we put the statement in the record?

Mr. WOLFF. Without objection, the full statement will be included in the record.

We thank you very much for coming, Dr. Morgenthau.

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I think it is an incontestable fact that the power of the United States has declined in recent years. If you consider Vietnam or the German-Brazilian agreement concerning the spread of nuclear know-how or the situation in Chile or in Greece or in Turkey, it is obvious that we are here confronted with a number of failures which are particularly surprising when one considers the fact that the foreign affairs of the United States are in more competent hands than they have been for most of American history.

In other words, you have here a paradox: the fact that American policies are not successful and yet they are managed by one of the most brilliant and able Secretaries of State the United States has had.

Obviously this is not the result of a mere accident. I think one has to probe into the hidden causes of this paradox. First of all, let me say that the international world has rapidly changed in recent years, to a much greater extent than American foreign policy has been able to adapt itself to those changes.

Take, for instance, the policy of movement which has occurred throughout the world, especially among the super or would-be superpowers, the United States, China and the Soviet Union. This development has led to a loosening of the ties of alliances which used to create power blocs rigidly opposed to each other and trying to out-maneuver each other.

I think we have learned to try to use our power for our interests. We recognize the fact that the most important and most destructive power we have, which is nuclear power, is not an adequate instrument for making one's will prevail. In other words, with nuclear power you can wipe your enemy off the face of the Earth, but you can't do anything else with it. You can threaten him to make him change his mind. But when you cease your threats, there is nothing more you do about it. So we find ourselves in the paradoxical position that we have more physical power than any nation ever had in history, and we are capable of destroying every man, woman and child living on this planet. But if Turkey does not do what we want it to do, we can't do anything about it. I think this paradox has not yet been sufficiently recognized.
or taken account of in the thinking and actions of statesmen and observers of foreign policy.

In other words, nuclear power is a purely negative power. It is the power of destruction. But you cannot build upon it anything positive as you can do with conventional power.

I should say in passing that a very similar phenomenon has occurred with regard to the new political power of oil. Obviously the discovery of the political uses of oil by the OPEC countries is a revolutionary event in history. For here are countries which are really countries only by way of politeness, whose names have hardly even been heard before. They established the oil embargo and they now have the power of life and death over the great industrial powers of the West. If the OPEC countries tell Japan, "Get rid of your emperor or no oil," the Japanese would be very hard put to know what decision to make.

But the political use of oil is again a negative factor. You can destroy with it, but you can't build anything upon it. So you have a strange situation to which our thinking and our actions haven't yet found an answer.

The most destructive factors in the new world of politics are negative. They are destructive. But there is nothing you can do with them in a positive way.

To be specific, one of the great weaknesses of our foreign policy—and I am not attributing what I just said as weakness to our foreign policy; obviously we cannot overnight discover the answers to such new phenomena—one of the upsetting weaknesses of our foreign policy has been the longing for stability. One administration after the other has spoken of stability as the ultimate goal of its foreign policy. But stability is like détente. You are bound to be in favor of it. You can no more be against détente than you can be in favor of bigger and better tensions, and you can't be in favor of the greatest amount of instability in the world, either. So you are uttering a triviality when you say, "We want stability." The real problem is, what kind of stability do we want?

Unfortunately in my view we have preferred the stability of the status quo, the stability of yesterday and the day before yesterday, to the stability of tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. That is to say we have almost instinctively sided with the forces throughout the world who have been against change, let alone in favor of radical reform or revolution.

For the time being we have been able to put a brake upon the revolutionary aspirations of large masses of humanity. But we are now finding that the measures of stability we have taken are no longer sufficient; for we are up against the fact, which we may like or not like but which is a fact nevertheless, that the great majority of humanity lives in a revolutionary or prerevolutionary age and large masses of people on different continents have one basic aim: a radical change in the status quo, a new stability, an elimination of the stability as it exists and its replacement by a new one.

So we have found ourselves, against our better instincts, almost always on the losing side because it so happens that those large masses of people who want change are impelled not only by weapons or by foreign support but by ideals, by moral convictions, which make them a formidable opponent even of the most powerful nation on earth.
Here again Vietnam ought to have taught us a lesson. We have here a weakness in our foreign policy which is not the result of an erroneous interpretation of a particular event, but of a basic philosophy. I would submit to the committee that as long as we don't part with this basic philosophy, as long as we instinctively choose the status quo in this struggle between stability and change or, if you will, revolution, we will always lose.

Those are some of the key remarks which are laid out in my prepared statement and which I want to put before you at this late hour.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS J, MORGENTHAU

Comparing today's world politics with what it was but five years ago, one is impressed both by the drastic changes which have obviously occurred, and by the continuities which have survived these changes. One is furthermore struck by the degree to which many of these changes were unplanned and even unanticipated by the most powerful nations. It must also be noted that the political world of today is much less manageable . . . and hence must more dangerous . . . than the world which, roughly speaking, came to an end with Richard Nixon's accession to power.

The configuration into which the political world congealed in the aftermath of the Second World War was relatively simple and fairly easily managed . . . two power-blocs, defined in ideological terms and rigidly grouped around two super-powers which restrained each other through the assurance of mutual atomic destruction (and which competed rather harmlessly and ineffectually for the allegiance of the nations of the so-called Third World, that is, those who had not joined one or the other of the power blocs). The main issue that pitted the two power blocs against each other was the territorial settlement of the Second World War, especially in Central Europe; and it was from that unresolved issue that the Cold War arose.

The Cold War was virtually liquidated by the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany, ratified in the treaties of 1970 and 1972 which recognized the territorial status quo in Central Europe and renounced the claim of the "Hahnslein Doctrine" that the Federal Republic was the sole representative of all Germany, East and West, one day to be united under its auspices. That liquidation was but virtually (that is, not quite) complete for two reasons: one essential, the other a direct descendent of the central issue of the Cold War. No agreement, however generously worded and faithfully executed can dispose of the fact that West Berlin is an enclave surrounded by the territory of a hostile state. The existent condition gives that state a power for good or ill which the Western nations cannot match. It is this condition which can become, especially in conjunction with wider issues, a source of conflict after the model of past Berlin crises.

On the other hand, while the Federal Republic has given up the unrealistic positions of the Cold War, it still holds to the proposition that Germany East and West forms one nation . . . "one nation in two states" . . . to be united one day, however remote. Hence the deadlock at the Geneva Conference on European Security over the wording of the recognition of the territorial status quo in Central Europe. The Soviet bloc wants the borders to be declared "irreversible . . . while the Western nations want the door to be kept open for peaceful change.

This genuine (however qualified) détente within the area from which the Cold War arose has been accompanied and strengthened by the ideological disengagement of East-West relations. These relations are no longer conceived by the governments concerned as a confrontation between two incompatible philosophies and "ways of life" which can only end in the world-wide victory of one or the other. Reading, for instance, Mr. Nixon's annual report to Congress on the "state of the world" one is struck by the almost complete absence of any reference to the world-wide aspirations of Communism. What remains of ideological commitments (for instance, with regard to Vietnam or Cuba) result from considerations of prestige and of domestic politics rather than from genuine conviction. A marked decline, rather than almost complete absence, characterizes Soviet ideological polemics against the evils of Western capitalism and Imperialism.

This ideological disarmament is not just a matter of rhetoric but touches the very core of the relations between East and West. The rigidity of alignments
which was characteristic of the Cold War was a function not only of the intractability of substantive political issues but also of the irreconcilable nature of the ideological positions. The liberation of foreign policy from its ideological orientation has cleared the road to the new diplomacy of movement which in our period of history has replaced the rigidities of the Cold War.

The new diplomacy offers the politically active nations new opportunities and confronts them with new risks—and more often than not one nation's opportunity turns out to be another nation's risk. Thus the settlement of old issues gives rise to new ones, and advantage will accrue to the nation that recognizes the newness of the new issues and choose the policies appropriate to them. Europe and, more particularly, the disarray of the Atlantic alliance provide empirical illustration of these general propositions.

The tendencies towards disintegration within the Atlantic alliance are, of course, of long standing. (I wrote as far back as 1965 an article entitled "The Crisis of the Atlantic Alliance"); Doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent, the fading of the perception of the Soviet military threat, the economic revival of Western Europe, and divergent national interests are all responsible for them. I made in the early 1960s a survey of the international issues confronting the members of the Alliance and did not find a single one on which all the allies saw eye to eye. These tendencies have been transformed into an acute crisis by the rhetoric of "partnership" indulged in by the American and Soviet leaders; by the unilateralism of American political, military and economic policies, many of them patently unwise; by the suspicions of the nations of Western Europe; and by the openly anti-American policies of one of them. The leadership of and close cooperation with the United States—accepted 20 years ago not as a matter of choice but as the condition of survival—are now widely experienced on both sides of the Atlantic as a burden to be lightened by the unilateral pursuit of particular national interests.

In the measure that the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance is loosened and American power and influence within it decline, the power and influence of the Soviet Union are likely to loom larger in the affairs of Western Europe. The Soviet Union, although no longer perceived as the kind of threat that it was during the Cold War, still is objectively the colossus bestriding the Eurasian land mass, against whom a viable European balance of power can be maintained only through the permanent military presence in Europe of the United States cooperating with the nations of Western Europe. In other words, the Atlantic Alliance has been the instrument through which the United States and the nations of Western Europe first restored and then maintained the European balance of power.

The decline of American power and influence, therefore, tilts the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union and, in consequence, increases the insecurity of the nations of Western Europe. These nations—ambivalent towards the United States, whose support they need but resent—may then perceive themselves as having been abandoned by the United States and having to face alone the Soviet Union, unchallengeable in its military power. It is this state of mind which would give the Soviet Union its long-sought-after opportunity to stabilize what it calls "European" security, which is in truth a euphemism for its own. Seen from the vantage point of the Kremlin, European security requires the reduction, if not the elimination, of American power on the Continent, the consequent emancipation of NATO, and the consequent isolation of the Federal Republic of Germany. The nations of Western Europe, isolated from each other and from the United States, would no longer be able to maintain a viable balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and would have to accommodate themselves to the Soviet hegemony over the Eurasian land mass.

This accommodation—were the Federal Republic of Germany to join in—would signify a drastic change in the distribution of world power. The Western orientation of the Federal Republic has been derived from calculations of comparative political, military, and economic advantage.

That orientation has not remained unchallenged from within the Bundesrepublik, even while rational calculation argued powerfully in its favor. If the development I have indicated above were to come to pass, rational arguments could indeed support an Eastern orientation. Traditionally fearful of the "Russian bear", a West Germany deprived of assured American protection would have to move into a neutral, if not friendly, political and military position vis-à-vis its towering neighbor to the East. That position would be greatly strengthened by the complementary relationship of the West German and Soviet econo-
The Soviet Union has obviously decided to supplement its own efforts at industrial modernization with a massive influx of Western technology. The Federal Republic is one of the most highly developed industrial nations, dependent on large-scale exports for its prosperity. Once the political, military and economic ties among the Western European nations and between them and the United States are loosened, the Soviet Union could offer a profitable alternative.

Such a development would also greatly relieve the anxieties over the Chinese threat which, at the very least in the short run, have influenced the Soviet stance in world politics. The so-called policy of détente pia-a-vis the United States owes its existence not only to economic considerations and the desire to destroy the Atlantic alliance as the foundation-stone of the European balance of power, but also (and foremost) to the fear of being caught in a confrontation, if not a war, at both the Eastern and Western frontiers of the Soviet Union. In the measure that the Soviet Union has become convinced that reconciliation with China is impossible ... and, in consequence, war with China must be considered to have become possible if not probable ... it must seek to relieve the pressure which the Atlantic alliance through the policy of “Containment” has exerted upon the Western frontiers of the Soviet empire.

In that search, the new American policy towards China presents both an opportunity and a risk. It hardly needs to be pointed out again that the normalization of relations between the United States and China was 20 years overdue when the first steps were taken in 1971. These steps mean little for the bilateral relations between the United States and China as long as the United States continues to recognize the Government of Taiwan and to stress in word and deed the validity of its commitment to that government. But they mean a great deal for the three-cornered relations among the United States, China and the Soviet Union.

The United States enjoys a freedom of maneuver between the two other powers, which allows it to take advantage of the implacable hostility between them. Both must compete for American support against each other, or at least prevent American support from going to the other side. These interests dictate within a rather narrow limits self-restraint in the pursuit of policies of which the United States might disapprove (via military support of North Vietnam and of “wars of national liberation” in general), and readiness for accommodation, again within rather narrow limits, to American preferences. The United States, in turn, while it has by no means the freedom of action Great Britain enjoyed from Henry VIII to Sir Edward Grey as the “holder” of the European balance of power, is at liberty to make at least small changes in its position between the two other powers in order to give an incentive to their pursuit of policies favorable to its interests.

China however is the country that has benefited most from the budding normalization of relations. It has done so in two major respects. Its admission to the family of nations and, in particular to the United Nations, has given it the opportunity to assume the leadership of the so-called “Third World of underdeveloped nations” against the two super-powers. While since 1917 the Soviet Union has identified itself with “the world revolution of the have-nots”, both on the national and class level, against Imperialism, China puts the two super-powers into the same leaking imperialist boat and takes over the traditional position which (at least in Chinese rhetoric) the Soviet Union has vacated.

Furthermore, the American initiative towards China has freed Japan from the restraints in its dealings with China, which the close coordination of its foreign policies with those of the United States had imposed upon it. While Japan could not afford to strike out on its own in normalizing its relations with China, once the United States started to do so, Japan followed suit. Weighing the potentialities of this new relationship between Japan and China, one can register complementary interests not dissimilar to those I noted as a potential basis of closer West German-Soviet ties. Japan is a highly developed modern industrial nation, which must export on a large scale in order to live. China presented an immense underdeveloped market for industrial machinery and products. In combination, they could indeed dominate Asia economically, politically and militarily. Such a combination would resemble the “Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” which Japan tried in vain to establish by way of conquest and which would now be based upon the mutual recognition of complementary interests.

The new mobility Japan enjoys as a by-product of the American initiative is not limited to its relations with China. As the United States can now maneuver within narrow limits between the Soviet Union and China, so can Japan. For
the Soviet need of foreign participation in the industrial and technological development is a standing invitation to Japan as it is to West Germany.

The new diplomacy of movement characterizes not only the direct relations among the super- and great-powers but also their indirect relations, through the intermediary of small powers. The most striking example is the Middle East. Until the October war of 1973, the Arab nations of the Middle East were lined up against Israel, each side supplied and supported by one of the super-powers. The rigidity of that alignment has now made way for an unprecedented flexibility of American policy, supplying and supporting not only Israel but also Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with a readiness to do the same for Syria, provided the latter is receptive. That policy obviously aims at the limitation, if not expulsion, of Soviet power and influence in the Middle East, just as Soviet policy seeks the limitation, if not expulsion, of American power and influence in Western Europe. If the Soviet Union emerged from such a change as the predominant power in all of Europe, so would the United States in the Middle East.

These opportunities for diplomatic maneuver were once the main stakes of foreign policy. Their judicious use was once the main instrument, short of war, by which nations tried to achieve their ends. Their usefulness has by no means been eliminated altogether; for it is still necessary for nations to compete for power and other advantages, to accommodate and reconcile divergent interests, to settle conflicts peacefully. But that usefulness has been qualified by two factors which have no precedent in recorded history: (1) the divorce of military power from economic and military power in so far as the latter is derived from the former; and (2) the availability of nuclear weapons, transforming war from a rational continuum with foreign policy, seeking to bend the enemy's will to one's own, into an instrument of the enemy's total destruction.

Throughout history, political power has tended to be a function of military power, and military power has in the modern age tended to be a function of economic, and, more particularly, technological power. I need mention only two examples from modern history. The political ascendency of Europe, especially in the form of colonial empires, was primarily due to a military superiority which, in turn, was the result of a technological differential in favor of the European nations. The political status of super-power is a function of the military ability to wage all-out nuclear war and to absorb a less than all-out one; an ability which, in turn, is due to industrial and technological developments. In consequence, a nation, or group of nations, completely devoid of a modern industrial and technological capacity and military potential, is able to wield political power over nations far superior to them in that capacity and potential. That ability results from the monopolistic and quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials essential to the operations of advanced economies and the financial power derived from that control. That dependence upon such controlled raw materials is itself dictated by industrial and technological advances—what is to say, industrial and technological backwardness is a protection against such dependence while such dependence is the price to be paid for industrial and technological advancement.

Two basic factors have in our period of history made possible this divorce of political power from military and industrial-technological power. (1) Free trade between the private producers and consumers of certain raw materials and monopolistically controlled trade through colonial and semi-colonial arrangements by the consumer governments has been replaced by monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic controls on the part of the producer governments acting in concert. Formerly the consumers could keep the price low through colonial arrangements and the control of consumption; now the producers can keep the price high by controlling production.

(2) Formerly producers and consumers of raw materials were tied together by complementary interests; the balance of which favored the consumers. The latter's needs were limited as compared with the number of potential producers and the quantity of raw materials available. He had, accordingly, a choice among several producers to buy from, and also of the quantity to buy from the several producers chosen. What was once a buyer's market has become a seller's market. The consumption of raw materials has enormously increased not only in absolute terms—between 1860 and 1913 imports of foods and raw materials to Great Britain increased 70-fold—but also relative to available
resources. This oil has become the life-blood of industrially and technologically advanced nations many of which are completely (e.g., Japan), or in considerable measure (e.g., the nations of Western Europe), dependent upon imports from other nations.

Many of these nations, especially in the Middle East, are one-product producers in that they are completely devoid of modern industry and technology and are in the possession of but one natural product: Oil. Acting in concert they can not only create havoc with the economies of the oil-importing nations by increasing the price of oil virtually at will, but they can also bring the industrial and technological life of the latter to a standstill and cause major social and political dislocations by shutting off the flow of oil completely or partially, permanently or temporarily. That is to say, since oil has become the life-blood of industrially and technologically advanced nations, control over the supply of oil implies control over the life of the oil-importing nations. This control has not only negative, destructive implications but, applied with sophistication, can become an instrument of political power. In other words, the oil-producing nations can make the supply and price of oil dependent upon certain policies on the part of the importing nations, supportive of and favorable to the former's interests.

Such a distinction between military and industrial-technological power, on the one hand, and political power, on the other hand, had it occurred at any time before the Second World War would have been quickly and effectively re-dressed through the use of military power by the politically disadvantaged nations. A colonial or semi-colonial relationship would have been established between the producing and consuming nations, restoring the traditional functional relationship between political, military and industrial-technological power. It is a distinguishing characteristic of the present period of world politics that the use of military power for those purposes indicated is no longer considered practicable. This is so for three interconnected reasons.

The moral climate permeating the age of de-colonization is hostile to attempts at the revival of open colonial relationships, however much of them may have survived under the cover of emancipation and national independence. Furthermore, this moral climate favors guerrilla wars on behalf of de-colonization, making military measures by consumer nations hazardous. Finally, the interconnectedness of interests in contemporary world politics, especially between super- and great-powers on the one hand, and former colonies on the other, the military issues in which one or the other of the nuclear powers is involved run a more or less immediate risk of being countered by another of the nuclear powers—and a conventional military confrontation cannot be completely isolated from the ability to wage nuclear war and their willingness to do so if the stakes appear to be sufficiently high. Consequently, the politically disadvantaged consumer nations have refrained from resorting to what was once considered the *ultima ratio regum*: military force.

The military impotence of well armed and otherwise strong powers *via-a-vis* nations weak in every respect but two (the quasi-monopolistic control of oil, and enormous financial resources flowing therefrom) points up the basic defect of contemporary world politics, the main source of global disorder, and the principal threat to the survival of civilization. It is the incompatibility of the Nation-State as a principle of political organization with the social forces at work in the form of the technology of transportation, communication and warfare, and with the quasi-monopolistic control, by relatively few nations, of the products of nature necessary to maintain civilization and life itself.

The technological revolutions of our age have rendered the Nation-State's principle of political organization as obsolete as the first modern industrial revolution of the steam engine did feudalism. The governments of Nation-States are no longer able to perform the functions for the sake of which civilized governments have been instituted. In the first place, to defend and promote the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of its citizens. Unable to perform these functions with regard to their own citizens, these governments are incapable of performing them in their relations with each other. Once atomic proliferation has armed many of them with nuclear weapons, they will have become not only each other's enemies, but the enemies of humanity, their own peoples included. For their traditional policies, carried out within a novel technological world, carry with themselves the seeds of universal destruction.

The international disorder and its denouement in a nuclear catastrophe, a dramatic potential in contemporary world politics, has been glossed over until
recently by the relative coherence of, on the one hand, the two blocs dominated by the super-powers and, on the other hand, the weakness of the nations of the Third World. Unless present indications deceive, I fear that it is exactly the new diplomacy of movement, initiated by the present American Secretary of State, which will bring these hidden tendencies towards anarchy and nuclear destruction to the fore. To create out of these disintegrative and destructive tendencies a "structure of peace" would test the ability of the greatest of statesmen of our time will be harking back to the vision which Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin shared—namely the division of the world into gigantic spheres of influence, whose mutual boundaries would be strictly defined and observed and within which a super-power would maintain peace and order.

**U.S. NEOISOLATIONISM**

Mr. Wolff, Professor Morgenthau, you say that we have selected or chosen the wrong side. Does that mean that you would either advocate isolation on our part or that you would advocate the support of revolutionaries on the other hand?

Mr. Morgenthau. I would certainly not support any isolationist movement, were it to exist. I personally find the argument about isolationism utterly unrealistic. In an age of intercontinental missiles, no rational man can be an isolationist. Isolationism in the United States is not an issue worth discussing.

Ten years ago that word was used as an attempt to discredit the critics of the Vietnam war who were called, myself included, "neo-isolationists." And their arguments were thereby dismissed in toto.

Mr. Wolff. If we do not take part in the revolutionary change which you say is occurring, if we remove ourselves from that, we are in a sense isolating ourselves from that particular event.

**U.S. SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS**

Would you take the other role then? Would you then support the revolutionary—

Mr. Morgenthau. I would take a look at the ideals which have inspired the United States in the past, the role the United States has played in the past in foreign revolutions and would adapt my position to those principles. That would lead me to the support of certain revolutions which were independent, autonomous, indigenous ones and it would lead me to the rejection of others which are stimulated and created from the outside. In other worlds, I would take not a dogmatic but a pragmatic approach to the support of revolutions.

Mr. Wolff. Do you think there are any countries of the world or any areas of the world that are basic to U.S. interest, that are basic to our intervention to save the status quo?

**U.S. SUPPORT OF STATUS-QUO**

Mr. Morgenthau. I would say that there are two such regions in the world. One is Japan and the other is Western Europe. I would say they are the cornerstones of our security, of our whole world politics since the end of the Second World War.

Mr. Wolff. I know you have been quite a spokesman on the question of the Middle East. Do you think there is any area there that is basic to U.S. interest at all?
Mr. Morgenthau. I would not say it is an area that is vital to the interests of the United States in the sense in which Western Europe and Japan are. But I would certainly say that the Middle East and the preservation of a credible position on the part of the United States and its allies in the Middle East is in the interest of the United States.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Morgenthau, we are very happy to have you here with your vast experience and depth of understanding. I am only sorry you cut short your testimony.

THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

Do you think it is possible to have real peace in the Middle East without solving the Palestinian problem first? Or is that contingent on—

Mr. Morgenthau. The answer to the question hinges on the definition of the Palestinian problem. It may well be that the Palestinian problem will wither away if nobody pays any attention to it. Compare the present silence and indifference with regard to Arafat with the enormous enthusiasm of the latest General Assembly of the United Nations.

But I would certainly say that some kind of participation by whatever means by the Palestinians is a precondition for a lasting Middle Eastern settlement.

Mr. Guyer. We have tried to induce some comment on Arafat by some dignitaries from the Middle East. They have been very reluctant to make any prophecies or statements about his durability. I was a little shocked to see a fellow get in the United Nations with guns on and suddenly become the head of a type of alchemistic cartel that seldom was seen before.

What do you think about his durability or “lastability,” whatever way you want to put it?

Mr. Morgenthau. That is very difficult to say. It requires a gift of prophecy to answer your question. But I would say a guy who has a gun with him has a better chance of survival than one who does not.

Mr. Guyer. That is all. I know the others have questions. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bingham. Dr. Morgenthau, it is a pleasure to listen to you. I have also had the opportunity to read your statement. I find your statement basically very pessimistic, indeed, I would say, gloomy. Is that a fair appraisal?

Mr. Morgenthau. I would prefer “pessimistic” to “gloomy.”

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDEAST

Mr. Bingham. Would you develop a little bit for us the thought that you express on the bottom of page 3? You seem to feel that if the United States is successful in working out a peaceful settlement in the
Middle East that the United States will in fact replace the Soviet Union or will have driven out Soviet influence in the Middle East. That is a rather startling statement that I haven’t heard from anyone else.

Mr. Morgenthau. You should have heard it from the Secretary of State. That is an optimistic statement if the event comes to pass. I really believe that, I don’t think there is any doubt in my mind. The main purpose of our policy in the Middle East is to provide a counter to the Soviet Union and, if possible, to limit if not to eliminate the power of the Soviet Union.

In other words what we have got here in a different setting is a repetition of the situation which occurred 100 years ago in the conflict between Russia and England over the so-called Eastern question.

Mr. Bingham. Do you think we would be following that policy in the Middle East were it not for the State of Israel?

Mr. Morgenthau. I am convinced we would pursue that policy regardless of the existence of Israel. In other words, the rationale for that policy has really nothing to do with the existence of the State of Israel. The State of Israel happens to be the occasion for putting that policy into practice. But it is not the rationale for it. We would oppose any kind of attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to expand and to stabilize its influence in the Middle East. Who is the beneficiary of that policy is a secondary question. It has been for a long time Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

U.S. INfluence in Western Europe

Mr. Bingham. You are suggesting at the same time that the way things are going in Western Europe our influence there will be reduced as the countries of Western Europe turn toward the Soviet Union?

Mr. Morgenthau. Yes. But that is a different matter. They do this primarily because of a misunderstanding and a misuse of the term “détente.” If you interpret “détente” as a general relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, so that there is really nothing to struggle about anymore, why should you have NATO also? NATO has been created for the very purpose of containing the imperialism of the Soviet Union. After all, you have to make up your mind. You can’t have it both ways. For the Europeans it is an enormously seductive interpretation of the situation to say that the danger from the East, from the Soviet Union, has disappeared, and in consequence, we don’t need a barrier or defense anymore. Instead let us talk about détente.

Mr. Wolfe. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Morgenthau. I address the same question I addressed to Governor Harriman in asking you whether you think that the congressional initiatives that Congress has adopted in foreign policy of late are worthy or whether Congress should once again take a back-seat role?
Mr. Morgenthau. Congressman, that is an excellent question which requires a dissertation on the whole history of the United States because the conflict between the executive and Congress has not been created by President X or by Senator Y. It is inherent in the structure of our Government. I remind you of Washington interpreting the Constitutional provision concerning the ratification of treaties by two-thirds of the Senate literally and going with the treaty to the Senate. He was so badly treated that he stormed out and said, “I will be damned if I ever go back.” Throughout American history there has been this conflict. Jefferson was all in favor of congressional control while he was in opposition. When he became Secretary of State he said the foreign policy function is executive altogether.

Especially if you look at recent history and the glaring abuses of Presidential power it is perfectly understandable and it is probably inevitable that the pendulum now swings in the opposite direction. Anybody who knows something about American foreign policy and its conduct ought to be very careful in allowing that pendulum to stay too much on the other side because when it comes to action, for better or for worse, only the President can act. The 500-odd Members of Congress can prevent. They can modify and qualify. But they cannot substitute a new foreign policy of their own for that of the President.

Mr. Gilman. Do you see that power as a shared power between the executive—

Mr. Morgenthau. Of course, it is a shared power. As Governor Harriman said, without the support of Congress, which is the support of the American people, no successful American foreign policy can be conducted.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Mr. Gilman. You state in your testimony to the committee that probably China has the most to gain from a tripartite arrangement. How best can we take advantage of this?

Mr. Morgenthau. I think we ought to make every effort to continue normalizing our relations with mainland China. I think we ought to be more forthcoming in making concessions to mainland China with regard to Taiwan. For this is of course the main stumbling block in our relations with mainland China. The Chinese are not sentimental about Taiwan. To them it is simply a matter of prestige. We are not going to have intimate or even normal relations with mainland China as long as there is a Taiwan Ambassador in Washington, not as ambassador of Taiwan but as ambassador of all of China. We have to consider the daily insult that constitutes for mainland China.

Mr. Gilman. Do you recommend that we undertake more initiatives in our attempt to build closer relationships with China than we have over the past few years?

Mr. Morgenthau. I have no inside knowledge as to how many initiatives we have taken which have not been taken up by the other side. From what I can see from the outside. I think we have done about as well as we could.

But I would still return to my main point, that without a solution of the Taiwanese problem, no initiative is going to do us much good.
Mr. Gilman: With regard to our policy in the Middle East do you feel the policy is proceeding in the right direction?

Mr. Morgenthau: It all depends on whether it is successful. If it is successful obviously it will be regarded as a masterstroke of statesmanship. If it fails obviously everybody will say, “Didn’t everybody know this was useless?” If it is successful, which I hope, I will not look so good. But if it is unsuccessful everybody will say, “Morgenthau was right again.”

Mr. Wolff: The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Gilman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solarz: Mr. Solarz.

Mr. Solarz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

About 13 years ago I had the privilege of hearing Dr. Morgenthau lecture at college. I remember our reading his books which we used as texts in my courses on international relations. I must say it never occurred to me then that I would have an opportunity to ask questions of you now in my capacity as a Congressman. But I am delighted nonetheless to see you again.

Future of Nation-State

At the end of your prepared statement, Dr. Morgenthau, you indicated that you felt that, largely as a result of technological developments, the nation-state had been rendered obsolete as a principle of political organization and to a large extent it might even be counter-productive in terms of the original purposes for which it had been formed. I wonder if you could give us some idea of your thinking with respect to perhaps alternative forms of political organization that might be more appropriate to the times in which we live?

Mr. Morgenthau: I can only say at this point that you need international organizations, really supranational organizations, which can face the worldwide problems we have to face. For instance, to deal with the environment on the basis of Luxembourg and the Netherlands is of course a plain absurdity. You cannot protect the environment against nuclear explosions on the basis of national sovereignty. Wherever you look you find that the technological problems upon whose solution the future of mankind depends have outpaced the institutional and procedural arrangements which were put into practice 200 years ago. So it is incumbent on us to do exactly the same thing our forefathers did, that is to create new procedures and new institutions which are attuned to the technological necessities of the time.

Mr. Solarz: Have you had occasion to write in your many articles about the specific possibilities which other forms of political organization might take? If you have I would certainly be interested.

Mr. Morgenthau: I have not done it.

Possible Resort to Force in Dealing with OPEC

Mr. Solarz: You testified at some length and also in your statement you refer to the inordinate measure of political influence which the
OPEC nations have as a consequence of their control over so much of the world's supply of oil. You even describe the level which our Japanese friends might face if some of the Arab countries decided to suggest alternative forms of political organization for them.

I wonder what your reaction was to Secretary of State Kissinger's statement on the possible necessity for us to resort to force in the event that the oil-producing nations attempted to strangulate our economy?

Mr. Morgenthau. Those things are not generally mentioned in polite company. But in international relations the last resort of kings is war because there is no other agency which can protect your interests if a more powerful enemy attacks them. You see, at least we don't need to walk around with guns to protect ourselves because we have the police force which does it for us. And we have a generally peaceful society. But where the law of the jungle reigns if you want to survive you have to play according to the rules of the jungle.

Mr. Solarz. Do you think that a resort to force say in the event of another oil embargo would be a possibility?

Mr. Morgenthau. To answer your question I would have to know more about the technical military aspects than I do. I would, however, say one thing. The American Armed Forces have not shown a particular capacity to adapt themselves to unorthodox warfare, for example, Vietnam. So I would look at this with a great deal of misgivings.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA AS VIEWED BY JAPAN

Mr. Solarz. You spoke in your prepared statement about the significance of Japan to the United States and the possibility of some kind of realignment in the Far East and, under which Japan might find it to its own advantages to form a much closer relationship with China.

What in your judgment would be the impact on Japan of a successful North Korean invasion of South Korea? I ask the question because we have been conducting hearings on the situation in South Korea. One of the major arguments advanced by the administration in favor of our continued commitment to South Korea is that if North Korea is successful——

Mr. Morgenthau. It would be catastrophic from the American point of view.

Mr. Solarz. Why?

Mr. Morgenthau. Especially coming after the Vietnam disaster. For what is so terrible is not that we lost in Vietnam. We were bound to lose, as some of us said 10 and 15 years ago. What was so devastating about Vietnam was the unreliability of the United States. The whole foreign policy of Japan has been based on a common defense with the United States. They were miffed about Secretary Kissinger going to Peking without letting the Japanese know about it, and so forth.

But if Korea is a dagger pointing at Japan, which is not defended by the United States, Japan will say, "The United States is not a reliable partner. Let us look for another more reliable partner."

Then the Chinese will tell them right away, "We are the ones."
Mr. Solarz. Let us assume that that happens, just to carry the analysis to its logical conclusion, and the Japanese determine that it was in their interest to shift their allegiances from us to the Chinese. Why would that necessarily be so bad?

Mr. Morgenthau. It would mean a drastic shift of the world balance of power. You have 800 million Chinese, able, industrious, not yet in full possession of modern technology but on the way to it, allied with Japan, another extremely able nation, which has already mastered the modern technologies. You would have a super-super-power in comparison with which both the Soviet Union and the United States would be second-rate superpowers.

You can say, “Who cares about power or superpower?” This would be isolationism. You can say, “We are not interested in what happens in the Far East.” But I wouldn’t say that.

REASSESSMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA

Mr. Solarz. We have heard a substantial amount of testimony to the effect that as between the South Koreans and the North Koreans there is pretty much of a military balance in terms of their ground forces but that the North Koreans have a substantial advantage in terms of air power.

If we were to modernize the South Korean air force, give them equipment they needed to defend themselves, in view of the apparent determination by the South Koreans to resist a North Korean invasion, would there any longer be a justification in the event war broke out for us to commit American lives to the defense of a nation which was theoretically capable of defending itself?

Mr. Morgenthau. Only theoretically because you are now getting into areas which you might call “the Vietnamization of South Korea.” That is to say, President Park forces his own people to be disloyal to him and to look for salvation elsewhere. And salvation appears to be just across the border.

So we are not going to have another invasion from the North of the South as clear-cut as the one of 1950. But what you are going to get is subversion, a disintegration of the South Korea regime from within, actively supported by the North. As an American, how do you handle that? That is the question.

ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY

Mr. Solarz. One final question if I might, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get the reaction of Dr. Morgenthau to the legislation which was reported out of our committee several days ago with respect to the drafting of the embargo of future arms shipments to Turkey as part of an effort to move along in negotiations on Cyprus.

Arguments were made to the effect that so long as the embargo was in effect the Turks would be unwilling or unable politically to make any significant concessions with respect to Cyprus but if the
embargo were lifted then that might create political preconditions for progress and negotiations and at the same time there would probably be assurance of our ability to continue our intelligence and other installations in Turkey.

I would like to get your reaction to that.

Mr. Morgenthau. Again I must say, with all respect to you, who are obviously on the other side of the fence in this respect, you cannot legislate foreign policy. You cannot make a law which says, "We give arms to another country only under such-and-such but not under such-and-such conditions" because you don't know what other conditions are going to arise which will make it desirable within 24 hours to give arms to that particular country.

I thought it was ill-advised to have that clause in the legislation to begin with. It was more ill-advised to leave it in there and to use it as a lever to have influence upon the Turkish decision. That policy, of course, was a complete failure.

Mr. Solarz. So you would favor lifting the embargo?

Mr. Morgenthau. I certainly would.

Mr. Solarz. Do you think that would produce any movement in the negotiations on Cyprus?

Mr. Morgenthau. I have no knowledge of Turkish psychology except what I read in the newspapers. I don't know.

Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Professor, I have two final questions. I know the hour is late. We appreciate your being with us and being so considerate in giving us the time you have.

One portion of the colloquy that has been engaged in between you and one or two of our members troubles me. That is the fact that you talk on the one hand of question of using the threat of a reduction of arms to Turkey as a lever. You can't continue to threaten these levers unless you are prepared to use them.

Mr. Morgenthau. I don't think I made that point. I would not make it. I think I was misunderstood. I don't think you can make that point because the Turks have other possibilities. They would call your bluff.

QUALIFYING STANDARDS TO RECEIVE U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS

Mr. Wolff. The question I am asking is whether we should have certain qualifications in the area of either arms sales or grants in aid of arms to a country whose policies may vastly differ from our own policies?

Mr. Morgenthau. That depends upon how likely I regard the possibility of manipulating arms or economic aid in such a particular instance. I have not thought about this. I cannot say that under such conditions I would and under such conditions I would not. The standard I would apply is the following: Is it likely to further the political interests of the United States?

Mr. Wolff. In the political interests of the United States we have our own basic democratic principles. It may be politically expedient at the moment on a security basis for us to favor one nation over another. But are we espousing our democratic principles at the same time?
Mr. Morgenthau. Then you are back to the question of where is the water's edge at which those democratic considerations must stop. How far can you go? Obviously you cannot put to a vote of Congress the proposition that two regiments of paratroopers ought to be put into action.

Mr. Wolff. Were we on the wrong side in Vietnam because we couldn't win? Or were we on the wrong side because we were favoring those who espoused principles that were contrary to the people?

Mr. Morgenthau. Both. We were on the wrong side because we couldn't win. We were on the wrong side because it was morally untenable for us to be where we were, and it was also politically impossible because of the distribution of political power.

Mr. Wolff. You talk about "morally untenable." Obviously I would like to engage——

Mr. Morgenthau. You have a better way of looking at the clock than I do.

Mr. Wolff. I am taking too much of your time. I really would like some time in the future to be able to continue or discussion.

Mr. Morgenthau. It is not a question of time. It is a question of energy. [Laughter.]

Mr. Wolff. We are not paid overtime here.

We thank you very much, Dr. Morgenthau, for being here today and giving us the benefit of your advice and experience.

The hearings will continue on the 22d, next week.

Chairman Morgan has just referred to this subcommittee two bills, one from Congressman Gilman and one from Congressman Delaney with reference to continuation of aid to Turkey. We will hold our first hearings on this next week.

Until the 22d the subcommittee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene July 22, 1975.]
MR. WOLFF. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today the Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee starts the second in a series of hearings to reassess our foreign policy. With the help of distinguished witnesses, we hope to outline the critical areas in the future and to explore the possible alternatives of a new and viable foreign policy.

We are on the eve of a new summit conference to be held in Helsinki in 8 days. It is a propitious moment to examine the principal decisions of the past so that we may gain a measure of guidance for the future.

In the course of this week's hearings, we have invited a group of witnesses who constitute an informal gathering of key Presidential advisers of the 1960's. We hope they will clarify for us the priorities of our interests abroad. We hope their experiences will help us to distinguish that which is essential, from that which is excessive.

In probing the areas of the past, I wish to emphasize this will not be an inquest.

In the years of reflection since they have left office, we hope to benefit from their insight as well as their hindsight. A reperception of past decisions may give us a measure of foresight.

Our distinguished witness today was Secretary of State under President Kennedy and President Johnson. Except for Cordell Hull, Dean Rusk has served in office longer than any other Secretary of State in the history of this country. During the 8 years, 1961 to 1969, Mr. Rusk held high office, the United States was involved in many critical situations, among them the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam war. Mr. Rusk is now a professor of international law at the University of Georgia.

I should like to yield for a moment to the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Zablocki, before we turn to our witness.

Mr. ZABLOCKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rusk, as you well know, in the reorganization of this committee carried out this Congress we changed the subcommittees into
functional subcommittees, 10 functional subcommittees. One of the purposes of this change was to permit the chairman, the members, and the staff the opportunity for in-depth studies and review in their fields on a functional basis.

That purpose has been ideally fulfilled in this subcommittee and I commend the chairman, Mr. Wolff, for scheduling this hearing in the form of an in-depth study on future foreign policy research and development. We are indeed very honored and privileged to have you before the committee as a witness. We have always looked forward to your testimony and I know you will make a presentation worthy of everybody's reading.

I want to further state that the full committee looks forward to receiving from this subcommittee recommendations and even legislation and resolutions which I know will be forthcoming. I know the chairman is looking for a real input from your subcommittee, Mr. Wolff.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement and without objection we will enter this into the permanent record. As I understand it, you would like to summarize that statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA; FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

BIOGRAPHY

Dean Rusk has compiled a distinguished record of service as a government official beginning with his appointment in 1946 as Assistant Chief of the State Department's Division of International Security Affairs and culminating in his appointment by President Kennedy in 1961 as Secretary of State, a position he held until 1969. Other posts he has held in the State Department include: Director, Office of U.N. Affairs (1947-49); Assistant Secretary of State (February 1949); Deputy Under Secretary of State (1949-50); Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (1950-51). In 1952 he assumed the presidency of the Rockefeller Foundation, a position he held until his appointment by President Kennedy. In addition, he served in the Army from 1940-46. He is currently Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia.

Mr. Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can be of any help to this important committee, I am delighted to be back in this room today and meet old friends on this committee.

I know the Congress is preoccupied with some major problems these days and I will try to be very brief.

The written statement which I offered was quite an informal and introductory statement which might raise some questions for further discussion and is in no sense complete.

At the beginning I tried to express the appreciation of one citizen for the undertaking in which you are now involved because I do believe that we are in a very special period of transition at present and that we need a far-reaching and extensive public discussion in order to recapture some compass bearings or to establish new compass bearings for the conduct of our foreign policy in the years ahead.

No President, no Congress, can pursue a major policy for very long without the understanding and support of the American people and they have both the right and the power at the end of the day to make those major decisions.
I hope that it won't be presumptuous of me to express the hope that your subcommittee might be able to hold some hearings with different members of your subcommittee in different parts of the country, both to give you the benefit of the diversity of views which you may encounter but also more particularly to stimulate discussion in other parts of the country on the issues to which you are addressing yourself.

I mentioned a period of transition. My generation has lived through some major events in world affairs, some of them of highest tragedy, such as World War II. And we are concerned about what it is we ought to remember and what it is we ought to forget. In any event, most of us are forgetting a lot of things very fast.

But, on the other hand, we have a responsibility to try to establish a discourse with a young generation which has had no chance to remember and which, in my judgment, is destined to play a unique role because that younger generation will be facing problems the world has never faced before.

I am thinking about the necessity for bringing the nuclear arms race to a definitive end and to eliminate the prospect of nuclear war, the prospect of irreparable damage to a fragile environment, the awesome problem of the population explosion, the long-range aspects of the energy crisis, the prospective disappearance or diminution of critical nonrenewable resources such as key minerals, relations among peoples of different religious, racial, cultural, national backgrounds and the list could go on and on.

So I think this present generation of young people is a very special generation. I do not believe that people of my age can tell them what their answers are going to be. If we are fortunate we can help them discover the questions or some of the questions. I have great confidence in them and I won't patronize them by trying to say why I have such confidence.

I am concerned out there in that part of the country that is west and south of the Potomac River about a certain mood of withdrawal from world affairs among the American people. Whether this is an understandable reaction to the agonies of Vietnam or whether we are moving into a cycle of isolationism comparable to the twenties and thirties it may be a little too soon to tell.

My own view is, in a nuclear world and in the kind of world in which we are inevitably to live, that isolationism is synonymous with suicide; there is no place to hide and we must determine—the President and the Congress, the American people—what our role is going to be in world affairs in the decades ahead.

I suppose that I can be forgiven for believing that the No. 1 problem before the human race remains the organization of a durable peace. I don't wish to sound pretentious but any Secretary of State has to live with that box which accompanies the President wherever he goes that controls nuclear weapons. And so, to keep this nuclear beast in its cage must be target No. 1 for the human race.

My generation came out of World War II believing collective security was the answer to prevention of World War III—article I of the United Nations Charter, various mutual security treaties, such as NATO, the Rio Pact, SEATO, and other agreements across the Pacific. I think we have to acknowledge that the idea of collective secu-
rity is eroding. I can understand why that should be so among the American people because the American people have taken something like 600,000 casualties in dead and wounded since the end of World War II and it has not been very collective. We furnished 90 percent of the non-Korean forces in Korea and 80 percent of the non-Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. I can understand why my fellow Americans wonder whether collective security is a good idea.

What I am concerned with—and I know this committee is going to help fill that vacuum—is that we are not really discussing what the alternatives are; if not collective security, then what? We cannot let ourselves be diverted from the question of how a durable peace is to be organized in a nuclear world.

I have called attention in my statement to one of the problems that I think the subcommittee will face and that we all face; that is, the shortage of space and time in conducting such a discourse. The written press has at most a limited number of column inches; the news announcers, only a few breathless moments. And yet there is an avalanche of relevant information falling in upon the world. The result is, we tend to talk about major policies in words and phrases which conceal as much as they reveal.

I have tried to indicate what the word “détente” might properly be understood to mean and what it ought not to mean.

I have objected to the use of the term “domino theory” as a euphemism to conceal something else that ought to be looked at frankly and examined for what it is—in this case, the Marxist doctrine of revolution. Take a look at it in this period of 1975 and see what it means. Maybe there are some changes we ought to be aware of. See what those who are committed say about it among themselves, about what they are willing and able to do about it.

I am dubious about the value of such words as “the world’s policeman.” I think that represents an alleged historical situation which is not factual.

My statement also calls attention to the extraordinary change in the structure of the international community, in the explosion of states, the numbers of states, members of that community. The U.N. architects were told in 1945 to prepare for membership of 60, with a possible expansion to 75. Now there are 188 members of the United Nations and there must be 12 or 15 just outside the door.

Now, this large majority of newly independent nations, many of them very small and with little involvement in world affairs generally, have brought about some major changes on the international scene. I have expressed concern about three aspects of it. The one is that when a group of a hundred get together—as they do at the Law of the Sea Conference or at the United Nations in talking about the “new economic order”—the most strident voices tend to prevail, the more moderate voices don’t speak up and don’t carry the day.

There is a gap, therefore, between the specific language used in fact and the de facto attitudes of many of these developing countries in the real world.

Second, when this group has a large vote at its disposal, that tends to serve as heady wine and they are not much inclined to negotiate if they think they have voting power.