I think they are going to have to come to realize that you can’t get very far in the present world scene without trying to get working relationships with the Soviet Union, Western Europe, North America and Japan who carry very heavy responsibilities in the international arena. I would hope this group would make a much more significant effort to negotiate toward a genuine consensus rather than rely upon voting power.

A third concern is, there are apparently some among this large majority who feel because they have a large majority, they can undo fundamental law, including the law of the U.N. Charter. I was disturbed when the Minister of Algeria, Bouteflika, a President of the General Assembly at the U.N., at the last session ruled that South Africa was excluded from participation in that session of the General Assembly. It seems to me that was a direct violation of the provisions of the charter with respect to the suspension or expulsion of the members to be found in articles V and VI. There are rumors some effort might be made to do the same to Israel in the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly.

The United Nations Charter not only is fundamental law but to many of us it was the basic condition for our support of and participation in the United Nations. I would hope this large majority would not become so foolhardy as to destroy the very organization which gives them their day in the Sun by neglecting the basic charter and treating it with contempt.

I do hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will go right ahead with persistent and untiring efforts to find a way to put limitations on the nuclear arms race. Most people have now forgotten that in 1946 the United States, United Kingdom and Canada went to the United Nations with the Baruch plan, under which all fissionable materials were to be turned over to the United Nations to be used for peaceful purposes and there would be no nuclear weapons in the hands of any nation, including ourselves. It was a sad moment in the human race when that proposal was turned down.

If we could find some answer to the problem of verification, the problem of hiding these weapons away in salt mines in Siberia or New Mexico, I for one would be very much in favor of going right to zero nuclear weapons today because, in terms of the safety of the American people—which is the primary objective of our defense—it seems clear we are much less safe today than we were before these weapons were invented.

If they succeed in flushing out and bringing to the Congress the Vladivostok agreement providing an aggregate ceiling of 2,400 launchers on each side, I suppose if I were a Member of Congress I would vote for the agreement because 2,400 is better than 5,000.

But I would hope the day after the agreement was concluded a maximum effort would be made to bring that aggregate down to 1,500 to 1,000, just as rapidly as circumstances would permit.

I am greatly concerned about the proliferation problem. This does not bother me as a matter of national conscience, because we start from the fact, as far as the United States is concerned, that one nuclear power was too many, going back to the Baruch plan.

But, without speaking in a pejorative sense about any single nation, we have always felt that the more these weapons spread into a variety
of hands around the world, the greater is the prospect that these weapons can fall into the hands of desperate people who might, under certain circumstances, play the role of Sampson and pull the temple down around themselves and everyone else at the same time.

I do not believe we can meet the problem of proliferation with simplistic generalizations. It takes almost a country-by-country kind of effort and it will be a rather complex effort. I think it is one that ought to be made and both the executive and legislative branches could well put their heads together to see what could be done in that direction.

I mentioned briefly my interest in the United Nations environmental program and my regret that Mr. Strong, a very capable leader, is limited in what he can do because of the limited resources he has. Although we are the leading contributor—something like $3 million a year—if I understand the situation, the result is he is not able to get a hard bite or major breakthrough on any of the major elements of his responsibilities.

I just raise the question as to whether the executive branch and the Congress might not be willing to consider at some point some earmarked additional money for one or two particular aspects of his program. If you wanted suggestions from me, I would suggest maybe scientific research because there are so many things we need to know about the environment we don't yet know.

Yes, support for action programs in the population field. We can only move on a voluntary basis at present among the governments of the world, who are split about half and half on the policy problems involved.

Hunger—on the one side, to try to play a responsible role in meeting the needs of those who are in a desperate position of starvation; historically we have been doing that since World War II. But we ought to understand and our friends abroad ought to understand that the United States does not have the physical capability of feeding starving people around the world in the years ahead.

It is beyond our reach, and therefore both in the international scene—places like the World Food Council or even our own national policy—we ought to try to press for those drastic steps of self-help which are going to be necessary if some of these countries are going to come anywhere near meeting their food needs. We simply cannot grow them in our own fields nor handle that problem from a fiscal point of view.

I am coming close to a conclusion of my oral comments. I mention one place where we might find a way to pull back from some of the types of involvement we have had in this postwar period. The power, wealth, and influence of the United States have been such that foreign offices right around the world take on the task of influencing American foreign policy as one of their major objectives.

So, when two nations get involved in a dispute somewhere, however far away it may be from us; they tend to come to the United States to get us to take their particular view. And since we normally do not give each side and cannot give each side 100-percent support, they usually both go away angry. I am thinking of India and Pakistan with respect to Kashmir, and many other situations into which we have been drawn; Britain and Spain are arguing about Gibraltar—
each came to us and asked us to get involved on their side; we simply told them they had diplomacy before the United States was born and we wouldn’t get into that question in any shape or form.

I believe we have played an unduly prominent role in trying to find a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the first instance that is a problem for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots; second, it is a problem for the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments, who are the guarantors of the settlement of 1960; the third echelon is the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of NATO. I mention that because Greece and Turkey are members of both organizations.

Perhaps the United States could be of help and in a friendly position at the fourth echelon but we have been drawn into the heart of it and, as everyone knows, both the Greeks and the Turks are very annoyed with us. It is difficult for us to find a solution between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, who feel very strongly about their longstanding difficulties.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I have had a feeling that somehow we have unnecessarily lost part of our hope and confidence in recent years. I think all of us can identify some of the elements that went into it; certainly the Vietnam situation did, Watergate and other things; we know what they are.

But when I look back over this period since 1945 and think of all of the things that the American people have done to try to make a little sense in the world and to play a decent and responsible role, it seems to me that the United States has written a rather moving story of responsibility, generosity and restraint.

There have been mistakes and disappointments, partly because foreign policy is that part of our public business we ourselves cannot control. We are living in a world of more than 140 nations, not one of which salutes when we speak. I don’t think that record is something for us to be ashamed about. I think we have managed in one way or another to give expression to the rather simple and decent purposes of the American people in the world and that those things can give us elements of hope and confidence as we face the future.

There are many, many items which go into foreign policy. From 1 to 3,000 cables a day go out of the Department of State. So we won’t be able to establish foreign policy guidelines with just a few simple sentences. It is a very complex matter. And I express my own appreciation to you and members of our subcommittee for trying to help decide what our guidelines are going to be in the next decade or two. Thank you, sir.

[Mr. Rusk’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committee on International Relations, although I have not sought opportunities to return to Washington since January 20, 1969, I am very glad to visit again with this great Committee of the House for which I have long held the highest possible esteem.

At the very beginning I should like to express my appreciation to the Committee for the study you are now undertaking about United States foreign policy for the future. I myself, believe that it is of utmost importance that the American people undertake a far-reaching public discussion in an effort to develop a consensus on the compass bearings which are to give us direction in the years
ahead. Hopefully, there can emerge a national and nonpartisan consensus not based upon the contending forces of partisan politics. A President and a Congress cannot pursue important public policies for very long without the understanding and support of the American people. Both the President and the Congress have heavy constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, and I, for one, welcome the initiative and leadership of this Committee in stimulating the public discussion which is now more urgent than ever.

We are in the presence of a major transition from one generation to another—a transition presenting some very special problems beyond the evitable phenomenon of age and succession. My generation is beginning to forget; a younger generation has had no chance to remember. It is not easy to establish the bases of an effective dialogue, but the effort has to be made.

What are we beginning to forget? I shall not take your time here to repeat the lugubrious story of the 1920’s and 1930’s. My generation of young people was led down the slope into the catastrophe of a world war which could have been prevented. The governments of that day were unwilling, within or outside the League of Nations, to combine to organize a durable peace in the face of persistent courses of aggression.

Did we learn the lessons of those years? Only in part. Collective security was written into Article 1 of the United Nations Charter and was reinforced by security treaties in this hemisphere, in NATO and across the Pacific. On the other hand, we demobilized our armed forces unilaterally and almost completely following V-J Day. In 1946 we did not have a division in our Army or an air group in our Air Force rated ready for combat. The ships of our Navy were put into moth balls almost as fast as we could find berths for them, and those which remained afloat were manned by skeleton crews. For three years during the late 40’s our defense budget was reduced to a little over 11 billion dollars.

Joseph Stalin, when reminded in a wartime conference by Winston Churchill of the point of view of the Pope on a particular matter replied, “The Pope? How many divisions does he have?” Stalin looked out across the west and saw the divisions melting away. He tried to keep the northwest province of Iran—the first case before the United Nations Security Council. He demanded the two eastern provinces of Turkey, ignored agreements providing for free elections for the political status of the countries of Eastern Europe; supported the guerrillas going after Greece from bases and sanctuaries in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, arranged a coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia, blockaded Berlin and gave the green light to the North Koreans to go after South Korea. Despite the strenuous efforts of revisionist historians, these were the events which started the Cold War. If the United States contributed to the origins of the Cold War, perhaps it was because we subjected Stalin to intolerable temptations, deriving from our own weakness.

I shall come back to the necessity for arms limitations presently, but at the moment I must express the gravest misgivings about unilateral disarmament not accompanied by corresponding actions by others.

Enough for the moment about those things we are inclined to forget. People of my age must try to understand that this present generation of young people now in our schools and colleges—or just emerging from them—is a very special generation in the long history of the human race. These young people have on their plates certain problems which are different in kind than any the human race has faced before and some of these problems must reach a rather definitive solution within the next few decades if homo sapiens is going to make it. I have in mind the harsh necessity of a definitive end to the nuclear arms race and the possibility of an all-out nuclear war.

I also have in mind such matters as irreparable damage to our fragile environment, the awesome problem of population growth, the longer term aspects of the energy situation, the prospect of the disappearance or sharp diminution of certain nonrenewable resources, such as key minerals, and relations among people of different racial, religious, cultural, or national backgrounds. This list could be substantially enlarged by other items, but the direction of my concern is apparent. These are the problems which caused me to decide to spend such time as remains to me in working with young people in the field of international law. In passing, let me say that I have an enormous respect for and confidence in this generation of young people, and I shall not patronize them by trying to say why this is so.

Although I believe that there are ways in which we must draw back from certain responsibilities to which we have become accustomed in this postwar period,
I am very seriously concerned about a mood of withdrawal from world affairs among many of my fellow Americans. We shall not solve our most urgent national problems over time without a high degree of effective international action. In any event, in a nuclear world, there is no place to hide and isolationism is almost synonymous with suicide.

It should be noted that foreign affairs is that part of our public business which we ourselves cannot fully control. Beyond our borders are more than 140 nations, each with its own problems, traditions, aspirations, ambitions and capabilities and no one of which simply salutes when we speak. We should understand, therefore, that elements of disappointment and frustration are an inevitable part of our experience with the rest of the world. We should not let these irritations, however, cause us to try to live like a hermit nation—the very effort would doom us to disaster.

It seems to me that the Number One problem before the human race remains the organization of a durable peace. My generation came out of World War II believing that collective security could be the key to the prevention of World War III. But let us not delude ourselves—the idea of collective security has significantly eroded. I can understand why that should be so among the American people. We have taken approximately 600 thousand casualties in dead and wounded since the end of World War II—and the effort has not been very collective. We provide some 80% of the non-Korean forces in Korea and some 80% of the non-Vietnamese forces in Vietnam. I can understand a fellow American who wonders, therefore, if collective security is a very good idea.

What we are not doing, however, is talking seriously about this question and which alternatives are available to us, if any, as we turn away from collective security. It may be that our answers for the future will be far more complex than a simplistic idea such as collective security but our answers cannot afford to overlook the problem posed by armed battalions on the march.

At this point it might be well to remind ourselves of the limitations of time and space which impair an effective public discussion of serious and complicated matters. There are not enough trees in the world to permit the written press to print all the news that is fit to print. Our friends in the news media face the very difficult task of deciding how to use the limited column inches and the few breathless moments on electronic journalism to report a fraction of the blizzard of information falling in upon the world. We readers and listeners cannot spend all of our time in reading and listening; we have to try to get our jobs done. The result is that we tend to talk about major policies in shorthand—in words and phrases which conceal as much as they reveal.

For example, we have heard a great deal about the word détente. Does this mean that a new heaven has arrived on earth in which all major problems and dangers between potential adversaries have been resolved? Obviously not, but there are degrees of illusion and euphoria about the word which deserve a note of caution. For some, détente seems to mean that the Cold War is finished. Have we unilaterally repealed the Cold War only to find that others continue to wage it? Properly understood, it seems to me that détente represents a necessary and persistent effort to find possible points of agreement on large matters or small, between those who might consider themselves adversaries in order to broaden the range of common interests and to reduce the number of issues on which violence might occur. It does not mean losing our wits, giving away our heritage or undertaking agreements which are not in our own interest as well as in the interest of others. Attempts to find such agreements are not a recent invention but permeate the entire postwar period. One recalls the Baruch Plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons; Secretary of State George Marshall's invitation to the Soviet Union to participate in the Marshall Plan, the Austrian State Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty of the Eisenhower Administration, President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Civil Air Agreement, the Consular Agreement, the Nonproliferation Treaty, the space treaties of the Johnson years and the Four-Power; Berlin Agreement, the beginnings of the SALT agreements and effort to improve trade of the Nixon and Ford years.

We share with the Soviet Union a major common interest represented by both sides, namely, the prevention of an all-out nuclear war. We should try, it seems to me, to broaden that common interest by other agreements if and when such agreements become possible without forgetting the major differences in commitment and purpose which remain basic to our two systems.
Another phrase which is more confusing than clarifying is "the domino theory." In reality this is a euphemism reminiscent of a game played on the living room rug which rests upon the problem of territorial and political expansion across international frontiers. The theoretical basis for such that has happened to provoke the expression lies in the Marxist Doctrine of the world revolution. In another era the same problem was posed by "Mehl Kampf". Surely it is not asking too much to take an honest look at what the doctrine of world revolution appears to mean today, what those who are committed to it are saying about it among themselves, and what actions are being taken to advance the world revolution. It may be that the answers to these questions will change from time to time—but at least the question should be examined as honestly as possible.

Another shorthand phrase which confuses our public discussion "the world’s policeman." The United States has never attempted that role, our own people would not support it, and other nations would not tolerate it. There are some situations where we have undertaken obligations by our most solemn constitutional processes because the United States concluded that the security of certain areas was vital to its own security. But that has not meant that we have circled the globe looking for places in which to intervene in connection with the same 400 situations of violence which have occurred since 1945.

A major change in the world situation has come about by the explosion of state members of the world community. When the architects of the United Nations were instructed in 1945 as to the basis for planning the new headquarters of the United Nations—then with a membership of 51—the architects were told to prepare for a membership of 60 with a possible expansion to 75. Today there are 138 members with at least another dozen waiting in the wings. Today, less than 10% of the world’s population and less than 2% of the financial contributions to the United Nations can cast two-thirds of the votes in the United Nations General Assembly.

This voting power is heady wine, and we should not be unduly surprised if those who have been drinking it are not always sober. We can understand the point of view that a large number of newly independent nations would want some adjustments in the international law in which they had no part in forming, but we must make it very clear that new international law cannot come into being without the consent of the major legal and political systems of the world, including the Soviet Union, Western Europe, North America and Japan.

There are three features of this new large majority in the United Nations which cause me real concern. The first is that the sociology of large group interaction indicates that the most strident voices tend to prevail in the so-called Group of 77 (now 100) and that the more moderate voices either do not speak up or are brushed aside. We should not suppose that all of the resolutions passed by such a majority, in fact, represent the considered views of all of the developing and newly independent countries.

For example, the new charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States would, if read closely, virtually stop the international flow of private capital; there are many developing countries, however, who do compete successfully in private capital markets and offer attractive and assured investment opportunities. My second concern has to do with diplomatic technique. Where such a group thinks that it has an overwhelming vote at its disposal, its leaders are not very inclined to negotiate seriously and in good faith to try to find a generally accepted answer. We find this tendency present in discussing the "new economic order" and in such matters as the Law of the Sea. The result is likely to be a series of empty resolutions—empty because they do not adequately represent the views of those who carry major responsibilities in the world community.

A third concern is that this large majority is tempted to think that voting power can undo fundamental law—such as the law of the United Nations Charter. For example, Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter deal with the questions of suspension or expulsion from the United Nations. Any attempt by a voting majority to deprive members of the United Nations of their rights as members in disregard of Articles 5 and 6 can have no other effect but the destruction of the United Nations.

As for the United States, I believe that we should make it very clear that the United Nations Charter is the basic condition for our participation in and support for the United Nations. Majorities in the General Assembly must not be allowed to believe that the General Assembly, even with an overwhelming vote, can amend the Charter.
It is not easy to cover in any brief statement matters which could properly require several books about the future of American foreign policy. Perhaps I should conclude by violating my own injunction against shorthand by calling attention to certain questions which I believe deserve major and urgent attention. I am under no illusions that a person of my age can or should try to write prescriptions for the decades ahead. Perhaps all that I can do is to help identify and underline some of the questions.

At the top of my mind is the problem of restraining the unlawful use of force as a means for settling disputes among nations. On this point, I am deeply persuaded that it is important for the United States to be predictable and to avoid the miscalculations and misjudgments in other capitals which have played their own role in setting off wars which no one wanted.

I would hope that your Committee’s discussion would help to clarify our policy and attitude—particularly in those areas where we have formal treaty engagements. On this point, however, I would emphasize that the point is not merely the attitude of the United States but involves the attitudes of all other members of such alliances.

After I joined President Kennedy’s Cabinet, I learned that it had become routine for the Secretary of State of the United States to go to each meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers and to reiterate in the most solemn terms the fidelity of the United States to the NATO Treaty. I told my fellow NATO Foreign Ministers that I would discontinue that practice because I could not accept the notion that this was appropriate for the United States speaking alone; I further stated that if the NATO Foreign Ministers wished to have a common repledging session in which all would reaffirm their commitments, the United States would participate. I do not believe that it is wise for us to have equivocal commitments. We should find ways to make it very clear that we mean what we say in those commitments which are to continue, and we should terminate any which do not represent our real intentions.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I attach the highest importance to the effort to bring the nuclear arms race under control and to turn the level of nuclear weapons sharply downward on the basis of mutual and reliable obligations among the nuclear powers. I must say that if we could find an answer to the problem of verification (against hiding nuclear weapons in salt mines in Siberia or New Mexico), I would be in favor of an immediate return to the Baruch Plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

From the point of view of safety of the American people, which is the primary purpose of our defense, it seems quite clear that we are much less safe with nuclear weapons than we were before these wretched things were invented. Thus far, the SALT talks have achieved little more than a welcome and drastic limitation on ABM’s and some limitation on submarines. I have great respect for the difficulty and complexity of the problems involved, but I would hope that we would press this effort as strongly and as realistically as possible. If it becomes possible to achieve an agreement on the 2,400 launchers of the Vladivostok Agreement (and that is not yet assured), I would hope that we would move immediately to try to reduce that aggregate to at least one-half such a total.

I am very much concerned about the prospective proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of more and more nations. If there are governments who think that we are simply trying to maintain a self-serving discrimination between those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not, I would remind them that the United States tried to ensure that there would be no nuclear weapons in national hands and that the possession of nuclear weapons does not liberate but imprisons.

I do not believe that the problem of proliferation can be dealt with by simple generalizations. It will require a diversified effort on many fronts. The greater the number of leaders who have nuclear weapons at their disposal, the greater becomes the chance that these weapons will fall into the hands of someone who may elect to play the role of Samson and bring the temple down around himself and everyone else at the same time.

When one looks ahead for several decades, one cannot escape the fact that the Family of Man is confronted with certain major issues which affect us all and which will require a major common effort if we are to deal with them effectively. For the moment, let me just mention the problems of the environment and of population explosion.
On environmental matters, we are very fortunate that the United Nations Environmental Programme is under the leadership of Mr. Maurice Strong of Canada. I have been concerned by the fact that his resources are so meager that the UNDP effort is not gaining the momentum which we urgently require. One who is genuinely interested in the environment is dismayed by the slender resources which can be allocated by UNEP to the various elements of the problem which need attention. I realize that the Congress has serious problems with a large federal deficit and with a United States contribution which is disproportionate to the contributions of others. It may be, however, that the Administration and the Congress might be willing to consider an earmarked categorical grant to UNEP on one or two matters of much urgency.

On the population issues, the nations of the world appear to be divided about half and half on the policy issues involved. I see no present prospect of dealing with the matter on a basis of coercion, but I would hope that we would be willing to cooperate as extensively as possible in supporting programs which rest upon the voluntary decisions of governments and peoples to get at this dangerous question. Unless voluntary action can make a major impact rather quickly, this present generation of young people will see the truisms of Malthus take over and exploding populations will once again become a major cause of war.

As far as hunger is concerned, I believe that the United States should try to play a responsible role in meeting the urgent needs of those who are in desperate danger of starvation. However, the United States does not have the physical and fiscal capacity to feed the hungry people of the world. The scale is simply beyond us.

I would hope, therefore, that the United States and the World Food Council would emphasize the necessity for each country to take the most drastic action with respect to its own food production. If there are nations who think that insistence upon self-help is an unwarranted intervention in their internal affairs, they should be reminded that their calls upon us for help are an interference in our internal affairs. Having had something to do in the past with what is now called the "Green Revolution," I would not attempt to take your time to sketch out the array of measures which are needed if we are to prevent starvation.

There is one matter in which I think the United States should try to pull back from certain involvements which have been habitual with us in the postwar period. The wealth, power and influence of the United States have made influence upon American policy a major goal of many foreign offices right around the world. When two nations, however remote, find themselves in dispute or conflict with each other, each habitually has come to us asking us to support their own view of the dispute. If we fail to support both sides 100%, then both go away angry with us. There have been times when we have been able to contribute to the solution of such a dispute, but more often the parties themselves refuse to make the necessary accommodations and enjoy an anti-American resentment. I believe that we should be more careful about being drawn into such quarrels.

Both Britain and Spain, for example, asked us to become involved in their dispute over Gibraltar. We simply reminded them that they had diplomacy before the United States was born, and that we would not get into that problem in any way, shape or form.

I happen to believe that we have been too much involved in the Cyprus dispute—including the days when I was Secretary of State. In the first instance, the responsibility rests upon the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The second echelon of responsibility rests with Britain, Greece and Turkey, who are the co-guarantors of the Cyprus settlement of 1959-60. In the third echelon, I would put the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of NATO (Greece and Turkey being fellow members of NATO). If the United States can be of any help to any of these, so much the better, but I would hope that we could find some way to make it clear that we cannot be responsible for the unwillingness of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to cut through their longstanding animosities and to find a way to live together on that common island.

The foreign policy of a great nation like the United States, in a world of more than 140 nations, must of necessity be a very complex matter not capable of being summarized by a few words or sentences. Some one to three thousand cables go out of the Department of State on every working day throughout the year. Often small things can be just as important as the large events which seize the headlines. Self-criticism is the life blood of a vigorous democracy but self-flagellation can be destructive. When we look back upon the actions of the United
States during and since World War II, we see a nation which has written a
moving story of responsibility, generosity and restraint. Enormous wealth and
power have been harnessed to the simple and decent purposes of the American
people. There have been mistakes and disappointments in the past as there will
be in the future, but it is not a record of which we should be ashamed and is
a basis for moving into the future with hope and confidence.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I am sure all of
us here have profited by not only the written statement that you have
submitted to us but your oral statement as well.

Certainly you raise a number of questions. If we are to fulfill our
responsibility here as well, we have to necessarily ask some of the hard
questions that require answers perhaps we don’t as yet have.

You did talk of our pulling back from involvement. I ask you, in
reference to your own association with Vietnam, does that have any
bearing on your views today?

VIETNAM AND THE U.S. COMMITMENT

Mr. Rusk. During the Truman administration there was discussion
in the staff about the ideas which later became the SEATO Treaty.
That was opposed at that time. I was then Assistant Secretary for Far
Eastern Affairs.

The reason for the opposition was that some of us felt it would be a
mistake for the United States to go into Southeast Asia and make an
alliance with some of them and not with all of them and let our own
presence be a divisive factor in the region, that it might be better for
us to wait until the entire region developed its own regional conscious-
ness about its own security, at which point we could stand in a strong
second line reserve behind the region as a whole.

But then the situation changed drastically during the Eisenhower
administration. We concluded the SEATO Treaty with only one dis-
senting vote in the Senate.

So, when President Kennedy became President, he was faced with
the fact the SEATO Treaty not only was, in a technical sense, the law
of the land, as it was, but the SEATO Treaty engaged the question
as to the fidelity of the United States to its security treaties. To some of
us that was a very important matter.

Bear in mind that in 1961-62 we had gone through a very severe
crisis over Berlin, initiated by Mr. Khrushchev in the Vienna summit
meeting in Vienna in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis. So we were
very much concerned about what might happen if other capitals were
to make the judgment that our security treaties were not serious and
would move on the basis of an expectation there would be no reaction
by the United States. Well, that was the situation in 1961.

I myself have decided that I will remain where President Kennedy
and President Johnson were. I don’t think we know the end of the
story yet.

I am sure in my own mind, watching these things very carefully at
the time, somewhere in 1968 a majority of the people came to the con-
clusion if we could not tell them when the Vietnam struggle would be
concluded, we might as well chuck it. We should respect that decision
because the American people have the power and the right to make
that decision. It may be two or three decades before we know where the
course of wisdom, lay, either in getting in or out as we did.
I find myself in a curious situation on this; I hope the events of the next two decades will be so positive and constructive in the direction of a durable peace that future historians will be tempted to say that President Kennedy, President Johnson, Rusk, and McNamara overdid it, it was not necessary after all. No one can want the justification that might come from a catastrophe that would cause people to say, "Yes, those fellows were right."

Mr. Wolff. We seem to have opened up the Pandora's box of Vietnam. We could spend perhaps years discussing that.

Mr. Rusk. Right.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Wolff. One element that has troubled the American people, especially in light of recent developments of revelations that have come as a result of some CIA activities, is the question as to the effect the CIA has had on national policy.

You were privy to reports from the CIA, the DIA and the intelligence community within the State Department. Which does take precedence? What was your experience in the area of credibility? To whom did you give credence in our three sources and, are three sources necessary?

Mr. Rusk. Just after the war, when I was special assistant to Secretary of War Patterson, I supported at that time his view that there should be a single intelligence agency in the U.S. Government. On the basis of experience since then, I have come to the other view—that it is of the highest importance that there be competitive or diverse sources of information available to policy officers.

That would mean to me intelligence activities in the Department of Defense—of course, I am biased—but I would say particularly in the Department of State, its Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I do not think we should allow policy officers to become imprisoned by single sources of information.

I think that was one of the contributing elements of the tragic incidents of the Bay of Pigs. Those recommending the operation were themselves the source of information on which judgments were supposed to have been made and we were not allowed to bring in the other talents and resources of the Government; it was handled by too few.

I do think that CIA is an utterly indispensable information-gathering agency for the United States. And I hope that some of you will have a chance at some stage to look into that as it applies to particular fields such as arms limitation possibilities and things of that sort.

Again, long memory may get in the way on this, but if I could just take a minute or two, in the fall of 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, I was assigned as a captain in the Army to G-2, Military Intelligence, War Department General Staff. My job was to organize an entirely new section of military intelligence covering Afghanistan, the Indian subcontinent, Burma, Ceylon, Australia, and the British Pacific Islands, that vast part of the world.

When I got there—and I gather, my card fell out of a sorting machine, because I had been in England for 3 years—I asked what information we had to start from. They showed me one tourist guide on India and Ceylon, one military attaché report from London in 1925 on India, some clippings from World War I. That is all.
It is incredible to recall how badly off we were in the very months before Pearl Harbor and the beginnings of World War II in the most elementary information about the rest of the world. We asked our fliers to fly the Hump from India to China with maps of one to one million, with large areas marked "unmapped." We have come a long way.

I would agree there should be somewhat tighter controls on certain aspects of CIA, both by the legislative and the executive branches. But I think the job they do in collating the flood of information that is coming in on the world and making it available to policy officers is an utterly indispensable function.

Mr. Wolff. I would like to ask one final question, however, I have a whole series of questions raised because of some of the things you have said—I would like, however, to follow the question of the CIA for just a moment.

I take it that you have in your statement spoken highly of the information-gathering apparatus of all of the intelligence functions. I think what is being questioned today are the possible excesses that have been engaged in by various branches of Government, including the CIA as an agency.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DIEM ASSASSINATION

We do not have any proofs as yet but we have heard various statements made about assassination attempts being recommended or actually made. Was there any U.S. involvement in the Diem assassination?

Mr. Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the answer to that question is no, for a great variety of reasons. Now, we did, for several weeks before President Diem's death, try to bring about some important changes in his policies because it was obvious to most people, particularly with the policies that he allowed his brother Nhu to pursue, that he was alienating the Buddhists, the armed forces, students and other major segments of the population. We saw no way in which he could survive if those policies were to be continued.

So we publicly put certain pressures on him with respect to our AID program and things of that sort and it was known publicly we were very discontented with some of the things he was doing. We tried to persuade Diem to send his brother abroad to other posts such as ambassador to Washington or ambassador to another country.

I don't believe CIA killed his brother. When Ambassador Lodge was in Saigon, he telephoned President Diem and tried to get him out of the country. He turned down these offers of help and tried to make his way to another part of the country where he hoped people would give him support. He was caught and unfortunately killed.

So political assassination, pinpointed political assassination, just has nothing to be said for it either in principle or in terms of practicality. Hoping for a coup d'etat is another thing but even there the CIA record has been greatly exaggerated. I think there were 82 coups d'etat during my years as Secretary of State and I can't think of any brought off by the CIA. Coups and rumors of coups are part of the daily stuff of international life.

I have testified under oath before the Senate special committee and before the Rockefeller Commission, there was never any discussion
whatever between me and President Kennedy or President Johnson about any assassination of any foreign leader, not a breath or whisper of any such discussion. No one in the Government ever recommended assassination to me. I never instructed anyone to pursue the question of assassination. We all took it for granted that pinpointed assassination was just out of bounds, contrary to policy. If something slipped somewhere, that is something that should be looked into and measures taken so that it doesn’t happen again.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Burke.

UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. NUCLEAR WEAPONS BALANCE

Mr. Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I am glad to see you. I would like to ask you several questions. On page 4 of your statement you say: “We share with the Soviet Union a major common interest represented by both sides—namely, the prevention of an all-out nuclear war.”

Then you go on to say that we shouldn’t forget, however, in doing that, the basic differences between our ideologies as far as government is concerned.

Isn’t that a rather naive statement because hasn’t it become somewhat apparent the Soviet Union wants nuclear superiority over us?

Mr. Rusk. You know, we have to be quite careful about such notions as parity and balance. When you talk about a balance of power, each side wants the balance, like a bank balance; they want a credit differential.

Mr. Burke. But for a purpose?

Mr. Rusk. That is right, so these notions of balance of power tend to mean a race.

I am inclined to think, Mr. Burke, that after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union—if you take leadtimes into account, the Soviet Union embarked upon a major buildup of its nuclear forces and those have been coming into deployment now for the last few years.

I think we ought to watch that very carefully, hopefully to try to get some sharp limitations so this doesn’t go on indefinitely. If we can get limitations that can be adequately verified, to what extent we continue to race then will turn somewhat on the judgment made by you people in Congress.

One must take into account the factor of overkill; is there a point at which additional weaponry in this field is relatively meaningless in strictly military terms?

The problem is that these numbers can have a meaning in the perceptions in people’s minds. I can imagine, in a situation where the Soviet Union might feel it has a sufficient superiority, that it would suppose then that we would roll over and play dead under certain circumstances. They could be wrong.

Mr. Burke. They could be right, too, because of the idea of isolationism building in our country that you talked about.

Mr. Rusk. That is right. There have been a good many crises prevented in the postwar period because they might have said in other capitals: “We had better be careful because those fool Americans might do something about it.”

Mr. Burke. You had a great deal to do with foreign policy for a long time and your negotiations with the Soviet Union I don’t think
were particularly successful. We had the nuclear buildup and it was our nuclear superiority that did a great deal to hold down some of the threats and movements of the Soviets.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

But don't you think the statement Khrushchev made still goes today insofar as the Soviet leaders are concerned, respecting the desire for world domination, including crushing us if necessary?

Mr. Rusk. I personally do not believe that the countries governed by the Communist Party—I am not talking about monolithic communism—have abandoned the doctrine of the world revolution. Those of us who are committed to notions of constitutional democracy must not be under any illusion in that regard.

I said in my written remarks that the word "détente" apparently means to some people that the cold war has been unilaterally repealed by us while others continue to wage it.

You know, sometimes, Mr. Burke, I feel I am speaking from another planet because some people just brush that aside as being words coming from a hard-nosed old dinosaur of the cold war.

I remember before the cold war started we tried to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the United Nations, in the Baruch plan and Marshall plan, but I think Stalin started the cold war, I think we have to look at these things frankly and try to avoid illusion and euphoria.

SOVIET CREDIBILITY AND ARMS LIMITATIONS

Mr. Burke. I certainly agree with you but I was wondering about your suggestion about the Baruch plan; it hasn't worked for 25 years; I don't know why you think it will work now or we could trust the Soviets any more when, in each of our SALT talks, the Soviets have gained.

Mr. Rusk. I think it is possible to get agreements where the question of trust does not enter in, where the verifiability of the agreement is such that we can know whether or not the agreement is being performed.

Mr. Burke. You can do that only through intelligence, which is now being criticized in our country.

Mr. Rusk. You can do that in some of these agreements with only the most sophisticated intelligence. It is very important. I happen to believe I can quite honestly say to my fellow American citizens that they don't have to worry about the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 because if the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space, we would know about it almost immediately and tell them about that.

Mr. Burke. We can do that—their satellite that is up in the air right now—we don't know if it has nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Rusk. If they broke the agreement, though, I think that would wreck such an agreement.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Burke. There seems to be a great deal of talk about the United Nations and the fact that once again it is dominated to some extent by

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what they call the Third World of uncommitted nations. What do you think is our future as far as the United Nations is concerned? What should we do about the problems facing us?

Mr. Rusk. I am torn on this one, sir, because I was in charge of United Nations affairs in the Department of State when it was just getting off the ground. I have attended 17 of the General Assemblies of the United Nations. I believe the family of United Nations organizations is indispensable in the international community. I am concerned about some of the trends I see, such as ignoring the basic charter.

One other example that I mentioned to one or two of you earlier: Kiwanis International just had its big international convention in Atlanta, Ga. They told me UNESCO had recently sent them a formal communication stating that, unless Kiwanis International severed its ties with Kiwanis associates in Taiwan, Kiwanis would be expelled as a nonmember organization of UNESCO. This is utterly ridiculous.

So we have got, I think, to give some friendly but stern warnings to some of these nations that, if they are not careful, they themselves can destroy the United Nations. I am concerned about it.

Mr. Burke. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolf. Mr. Zablocki.

We have a vote on the floor. I think what we might do is sort of rotate ourselves here so we can get over to vote and then get back.

Mr. Zablocki. I will be very brief. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on my own time I would like to join the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee in welcoming you here this afternoon. As I said earlier, and I would reiterate the subcommittee is very fortunate to have the participation of one of the country's most able and experienced public servants in the field of international affairs.

ALTERNATIVES FOR A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE U.N.

Relative to the references on pages 6 and 7 on your statement to which Mr. Burke referred, it seems to me that one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration in forming our future foreign policy is our role in the international organization. It is certainly of particular interest to these hearings. As you know, Secretary Kissinger issued a stern warning a week ago.

In your opinion, is a stern warning the only step the United States can take to prevent the United Nations from becoming another League of Nations?

Mr. Rusk. I think it is important for what might be called the principal members of the U.N. to make it very clear that this majority cannot simply run away with it. At the present time, less than 10 percent of the world population, with less than 2 percent of the financial contributions to the U.N., can cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly. But voting power has become separated from real responsibilities in the real world, and these two things must come together.

I personally indicated at the April meeting of the American Society of International Law that if, for example, the General Assembly were to repeat with regard to Israel what it did last year with regard to South Africa and tried to keep Israel from participating in the General Assembly, we should make it very clear we would withdraw from participation in the General Assembly, keep our membership in
the Security Council, and expect you gentlemen to decide what we want to do with dues in the United Nations.

Mr. Zablocki. Shouldn't we have done that at the time Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations? Should not the United Nations have demonstrated firm support for the National Republic of China?

**Expulsion of Taiwan from U.N.**

Mr. Rusk. From a constitutional, legal point of view, that was a somewhat more complex issue; but if they were pressing the universality of membership, I myself regret they didn't retain a membership for the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Mr. Zablocki. I personally feel we were not aggressive enough and did not do an effective enough job in pressing the issue.

Mr. Rusk. You know, after we had no longer any support from our NATO allies, for example, I think all had gone the other way by that time and, when the vote came at a time—this is not necessarily a critical comment—when Mr. Kissinger was in Peking, I really think it was almost impossible to avoid that vote.

Mr. Zablocki. I think we took into consideration the population and the largeness of the country and neglected to stay with our ally because it was a smaller country.

**Responsibility for Resolving Cyprus Dispute**

I note on page 9 you believe we have been too much involved in the Cyprus dispute over the years and you spell out on page 9 the four echelons; but, in reality, given the situation, certainly in the first instance, as you say, the responsibility rests upon the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Under any stretch of the imagination, could they have resolved this when Greece and Turkey became involved in Cyprus? When they became involved, of course, the second echelon was the three guarantors—Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece. It seems an impossibility to have resolved it, particularly when Great Britain didn't show any interest.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Zablocki, could we ask the Secretary to ponder that? The second bell has rung, and we will get the answer when we come back.

Mr. Zablocki. May I just finish the question and the Secretary may ponder it. The third echelon, certainly the Secretary General of the United Nations publicly stated that the Cyprus question was an internal matter and it was not for the United Nations to delve in it. the United States being an ally of both, it seems we just sort of got enmeshed into the problem.

We did contribute military assistance to both of our allies and it was used in the conflict in Cyprus, and we therefore have no alternative now but to see if we can resolve it. Therefore, as you know, the House will soon consider a bill which would partially lift the current arms embargo against Turkey in order to promote a peaceful solution to the Cyprus conflict.

The question is: Do yo think such a step on the part of the United States would be useful at this time despite your prepared statement of the four-echelon approach?
Mr. Rusk. I am glad to have a few moments to reflect on that.

Mr. Wolff. The subcommittee will stand in recess to answer the
vote.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. Wolff. The committee will resume.

When we recessed, Mr. Zablocki had asked the Secretary a question.

However, I am sure that the Secretary has had ample time now to
answer you.

Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Rusk. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Zablocki, you posed an extremely
difficult question, and perhaps my comment will reflect some of the
bias of my own lurid past.

There are some disputes which are extraordinarily stubborn and
intractable because of the deep feelings which exist on both sides. I,
think of the problem between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the
tragic situation in Northern Ireland, the generation-long difficulties
between India and Pakistan, the serious problems in the Middle East
where the feelings on both sides may make it impossible for the gov-
ernments on each side to make the concessions necessary for peace and
remain governments.

With great respect, let me say that it has been my observation that
where two sides come to the negotiation table where each one is con-
vinced it is speaking for God, you have a very difficult negotiation.
And in any of these situations that involve that element, a settlement
is extraordinarily difficult.

Back in the mid-1960's, it was our impression that the large Greek
Cypriot majority had overthrown the constitutional settlement of 1959
and 1960 on the basis of which Cyprus became independent and be-
came a member of the United Nations.

At that time, we brought our relations with Turkey almost to a
breaking point in an effort to prevent Turkey from going to war
against Greece. Anyone now who visits Turkey will find as a matter
of household conversation a famous telegram President Johnson sent
to the Prime Minister of Turkey on just that point: At that time
Greek arms and Greek personnel were being used in Cyprus and un-
doubtedly there were some on the Turkish side as well.

It is true, I think that Turkey used U.S. supplied arms for pur-
poses for which they were not intended by us.

Mr. Zablocki. So did Greece.

Mr. Rusk. So did Greece, so has France in Algerih, so has Portugal
in Africa, so have India and Pakistan, so they are not alone in that.

DISPUTES INVOLVING NATIONS USING U.S. ARMS

With great respect to the Congress, I have a feeling there is a situa-
tion here that is so difficult and so complicated that the Congress
might want to be very careful about intruding a legislative fiat because
you have enormous power down here at Capitol Hill and what you do
is in public on the record with elements of prestige and face and sen-
sitivity, and the capacities of government to survive that become
involved.

I would hope—and I do not know what is possible as far as the
Congress is concerned—but I would hope that some way could be
found to relieve some of these questions of prestige and face in order to give the parties some more time to see if they cannot find a solution.

I personally would hope the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, would become more active because you see, if the United States gets involved in a dispute of that sort, then our status as a superpower becomes an additional complicating factor because each side expects miracles of us. The Greeks, in effect, said you should have gone to war to keep Turkey from invading Cyprus. The Turks will say you should give guarantees Cyprus would not be subjected to internal injustices.

They might be a little more restrained if they were in another presence, the Secretary of NATO, the Secretary General of a United Nations.

At the end of the day there is no answer unless the Greek and Turkish Cypriots learn to live together on that island. If they are not willing to do that, then the only answer is for one of the other of the communities to get off the island and that is no solution.

So I would, myself, believe that the Congress might want to be very careful about how it uses its enormous power in the midst of a very difficult and delicate negotiation.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now, over the years, particularly in the last two decades, the Congress was apparently not meeting its obligations. Suddenly, however, Congress awakened to the understanding that it had vast power, and used it in trade relations by amending the trade bill to give the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status in return for increased immigration of Jews. That was counterproductive.

Last year the Congress in the Cyprus question, placed an embargo on Turkey that was also counterproductive.

My question is: To what extent can Congress most responsibly and effectively play its important role in foreign policy, under what restrictions or self-imposed limitations? If we try to formulate foreign policy in a fishbowl, we seem to aggravate situations rather than supply the formula for resolving these problems.

But the main question is: To what extent can Congress really meet its responsibilities and obligations and still not be irresponsible?

Mr. Rusk. Mr. Chairman, since I have had the pleasure of meeting with committees and subcommittees of the Congress hundreds of times, I for one don't underestimate the power of Congress in the foreign policy field. It is true that for a public legislative branch it is very difficult to be subtle and there may be circumstances where answers have to show a little planned ambiguity.

I am not talking for the executive branch about this but let me speculate on the basis of what I have been reading in the press. On the matter of trade with the Soviet Union, if you don't want trade with the Soviet Union this is as good a reason as any not to have any, but let us assume that was not the purpose. I suppose what some people were hoping for was a little deliberate ambiguity, that on the one side the de facto situation would permit a very substantial number of Russian Jews to immigrate but, on the other, we would not rub the Russians' nose into an issue of internal policy.
In other words, in practice you would do one thing; in principle you
would sort of leave it up in the air. Well, now, legislation destroys the
possibility of ambiguity; it was too clearcut. And so it is my impres­
sion that the de facto situation now is worse than it was at the time
that action was taken.

I don't see any answer to it other than the closest consultation be­
tween the executive branch, particular the President and the Secretary
of State, and—well, you will have to decide whom in the Congress. I
always found that candid consultation with the leaders of this great
committee made a big difference. I don't know what the situation is in
the House of Representatives now with respect to who can speak for
the Congress. That is something that you gentlemen would know more
than I.

But I don't see any substitute for the kind of careful, quiet consulta­
tion that can make it clear that the two branches of the Government are
proceeding toward the same objective.

NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES

Mr. Zablocki. In 1972, Mr. Secretary, you agreed that a Joint Com­
mittee on National Security and Intelligence could be the proper legis­
lative forum to receive and promote such consultation. Unfortunately
Senator Mansfield of the other body is opposed; the Murphy Commis­
sion has recommended the establishment of such a Joint Committee on
National Security but the Senator vehemently opposes it.

Mr. Rusk. You have been in some of the meetings to which I am
going to refer. At certain moments of crisis the President will call
down to the Cabinet room in the White House a group of congressional
members to talk it over, unfortunately at a late stage in his own think­
ing but the key Members of the Congress are involved in the problem.

I sometimes wonder why it wouldn't be well to have that same group
on a kind of point consultative basis, not with legislative responsi­
bilities but to be available for a more continuing dialog.

I want to report to you gentlemen that out in the back country when
I expressed the hope that a Republican President and a Democratic
congressional leadership could set aside 1976 politics for the remainder
of this calendar year and put their heads together to try to give us
some guidelines for a bipartisan foreign policy, I always get applause.
But the New York Times, being a realistic newspaper, reported my re­
mark on this subject as "spitting in the wind." Maybe this is a hope
that has no chance at the present time.

But I do think we have got to find some better mechanism for a con­
tinuing discourse at the top between the President and the Congress
on these major issues of foreign policy.

Mr. Zablocki. I think in this area, hope must spring eternal. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Wolff. I feel that I am entitled to one prerogative here before
I pass the questioning over to my colleague over here on the left.

CONGRESS AND INFORMATION

Mr. Secretary, one of the problems that we have faced in Govern­
ment in the conduct of our foreign affairs is that we have operated in
the past with being selective as to who is privy to what. This has caused us a lot of problems, and not that we want to operate in a fishbowl, but is it not true that when we sit as a member of the Committee of the Whole House, 435 Members, each one of us is entitled to that same information that a specified or specific group has had or has been privy to in the past.

I know it is difficult to do but we are each representative of an individual portion of this Nation and each one of us casts just the one vote. So if you limit the number of people to whom information is to be given in the decisionmaking process, don't you destroy the very principle of democracy?

Mr. Rusk. You pose a very difficult dilemma. I don't know of any legislative body in the world where each member of the legislature has an even amount of information about matters of defense and foreign policy. Some division of labor, I think, is inevitable.

I think the public has a general right to know but I also think the public has a right to have its public business conducted in a responsible fashion and there are times when information must be limited.

Mr. Wolff. We are not talking about the public. We are talking about Members of the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Rusk. If you will forgive me, sir—you know the high esteem in which I hold you—I really think when you are talking about 435 Congressmen, you are talking about the public.

Mr. Wolff. I would hope that would be true.

Mr. Rusk. I think it is very hard indeed to expect 435 Members of Congress to—I don't want to get into some delicate matters but you have had some illustrations of that recently.

Mr. Wolff. Whether that is good or bad for the country will be determined, I think, in the future. However, I think in a free society we have to take some of those chances in order to preserve that free society.

Mr. Rusk. There was a time—well, President Johnson used to talk about the whales in the Congress.

As a political scientist, I could make a pretty good argument about the whale system but we don't know what the succession to that is. Maybe we need some pilot fish identifiable.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I join with my colleagues in welcoming you before us and we certainly appreciate your broad view of where we have been and what we are doing.

VALUE OF SUMMIT MEETINGS

In the past, some questions about the effectiveness of summitry have been raised, the chiefs of state meeting together and forming policy. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of summit conferences?

Mr. Rusk. Back in April 1960, at a time when the last thing in my mind was that I would be called to be Secretary of State, I published an article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly in New York in which I objected very strongly to summitry, summit negotiations—goodwill visits, yes; but summit negotiations, no.

I think every Secretary of State has some serious problems about negotiations at the top for all sorts of reasons. One of the reasons is
that these people do not have the time to invest in a careful, persistent, dogged kind of negotiation to reach the right agreements, and the pressure of time sometimes leads to agreements which don’t stand up very well.

The trouble is that Presidents don’t agree with Secretaries of State on this. There is something about the chemistry of being President that causes Presidents to want to talk directly to the other fellow.

So you just have this constitutional fact that you can make all the arguments in the world about some of the disadvantages of summity but my guess is, Presidents are going to engage in a little of it from time to time.

VALUE OF “SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY”

Mr. Gilman. So, too, Mr. Secretary, some Secretaries have been engaging in direct negotiations and there has been some criticism of late of shuttle diplomacy. What is your opinion of the effect of that sort of diplomacy?

Mr. Rusk. In that same article in 1960 I said the Secretary of State shouldn’t travel so much, and then I proceeded to travel 860,000 miles.

I didn’t object, quite frankly, to Mr. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. There the stakes are very high, the dangers are very grave; and I don’t see anybody else trying to make peace out there.

European diplomacy has been virtually paralyzed about the Middle East because of their oil situation. The Russians sprinkle a little gasoline on it from time to time:

The Secretary General of the United Nations doesn’t take a very active part. I have a feeling somebody should try to make peace even though the prospects are rather dim, so I don’t object. I was sorry he didn’t succeed in that last go-around.

Of course, I was extraordinarily fortunate in my time in having Government a polo stable filled with top negotiators, like Averell Harriman, George Ball, Llewellyn Thompson, Ellsworth Bunker, Cyrus Vance, Harlow Cleveland—so that burden didn’t fall upon me in the way it is apparently falling on the present Secretary of State.

But, in general, I think the Secretary of State should try to play, or take as much part as he can, in the formulation of policy right here. Harry Truman once had the idea we ought to have a Secretary of State who would be posted in Washington and we would appoint ourselves a fellow called the Minister of Foreign Affairs who would be a half-notch below the Secretary of State and he would go visit these foreign ministers. That didn’t work when we named Philip Jessup to fill that role; they wanted to talk to the guy who was supposed to be doing the work back here in Washington.

So I think we ought to try to find a better answer to that problem than we have found in the past.

LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Secretary; I know you have been taking an active role in the Law of the Sea Conference and have done a great deal of work in seabeds and that sort of thing. Are we making real progress in that direction?
Mr. Rusk. Those of us working in that field appreciate your own personal interest in it. I think gradually over time there are certain subjects in which some consensus appears to be emerging. For those who followed the proceedings in Committees Nos. 2 and 3 in the Conference on the Law of the Sea, the economic zone, overflights, passage of straits, archipelago waters, there are some possibilities we are in reach of a pretty broad consensus on those subjects. But we are right back to square 1 on the question of the resources of the seabeds.

I must say I am very gloomy at the moment over the possibility that we can complete a general Law of the Sea Treaty if it is to include the seabed issue. I think again some of our friends in the developing countries have some great illusions about what is possible in that field. And we are very far apart on that at the present time.

Mr. Gelman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolffe. Mr. Yatron.

Mr. Yatron. Mr. Secretary, I, too, would like to take this opportunity to say welcome to you here today and how much of a pleasure it is to have you testify before our committee.

RELATIONS WITH GREECE

In following up on the Greek-Turkey situation, we hear so much about the importance of Turkey to the United States, and my question is: Wouldn't you say that Greece is equally as important?

Mr. Rusk. Yes, I think so. I was among those who, back in the Truman administration, worked very hard to get both Greece and Turkey included in the NATO alliance. I happen to have a very high personal regard for Mr. Caramanlis of Greece. I think he is one of the great statesmen of this postwar period. I don't underestimate the importance of our relations with Greece.

Mr. Yatron. Would you say they are of equal importance or does one weigh heavier than the other in terms of the bases in both countries?

Mr. Rusk. It is a little hard to put them on the scale. I should think where they are in a dispute with each other, that we should try to be a friend to both and try to help them find their way toward an agreement. We can't impose an agreement upon them. They are independent nations; they are not our satellites. If there is anything we can do to help them find a basis of agreement and do it on a basis of friendship toward both of them.

BALANCE OF BENEFITS IN UNITED STATES-SOVIET AGREEMENTS

Mr. Yatron. Last week Governor Harriman was here before our committee and he stated that both the U.S.S.R. and the United States benefit from agreements in the area of disarmament, nuclear testing and, with the exception of the last wheat deal, of increased trade. Now, do you feel that in our relations with the Soviet Union we are getting much more than we are giving?

Mr. Rusk. If you look at some of the important agreements that have been achieved with the Soviet Union in this postwar period, the Austrian State Treaty is very much in our interest, the Antarctic Treaty is very much in our interest and both working well; the Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty very much in our interest—manmade strontium 90 has practically disappeared even though the Chinese are still testing.

If Pan American gets into any problems in Moscow, we can create some problems for Aeroflot in New York.

Nonproliferation treaty—I think we both have an interest in trying to restrain, if possible, the further buildup of nuclear weapons. The sharp limitation on IBM’s, I think, is necessary on both sides. That is apparently working very well.

Trade—I would be in favor of trade, provided it is genuine trade in the sense of moving goods and services in both directions.

I may sound like a cold warrior at this point but I am not particularly interested in long-term, large-scale loans at low interest rates to subsidize the Soviet economy with large amounts of American technology without getting something back from the other direction that we can use—minerals, energy, or whatever it might be.

So, on the basis of a legitimate trade, I would be in favor of it. Now, something like the wheat deal—let us leave out the earlier wheat deal—I think there are two separate questions: The economic issue and the political issue.

To test the economic issue, I think it would be worth asking: Would we be in favor of selling that additional amount of food grain or feed grain to traditional buyers—to Britain, Germany, or Japan—in order to measure the economic impact on our society. We tend to confuse the economic issue by thinking of it in terms of the Soviet Union.

Let us look at the economic side in the first instance to see if we can afford to sell that grain. Then, after that, take a look at the politics of it in terms of that amount of trade with the Soviet Union.

I realize there are people in this country who object to our sending that amount of grain to the Soviet Union but I suspect there are people in Moscow who are worried about sending $1 billion in hard currency or gold to these “Fascist imperialists” in the United States. I think at the moment we would probably be glad to exchange some grain, if our crops are as good as predicted to be, for hard currency to buy some oil with. We have to earn foreign currency. I hope the economic and political factors will help us make a judgment.

Mr. YATRON. What do you think of the other wheat deal as far as the effect on consumers and prices?

Mr. RUSK. I think the wheat deal was unfortunate, yes.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND THE BALTIC STATES

Mr. YATRON. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the schedule to agree on status of borders in Europe—what effect will this have on our nonrecognition of the annexation of the Baltic States if we agree to the frontier inviolability?

Mr. RUSK. As you know, sir, we continue to receive diplomatic representatives from the three Baltic States. This is a matter of great traditional concern to us and I think any of us who are committed to the notions of freedom would find it very difficult to abandon that idea.

I think, as a practical matter, there is not likely to be a change except by a general war, in which there may be nothing left, or by changes
that occur over a long period of time. I have much confidence in the vitality of the little virus of freedom that Thomas Jefferson put into the phrase "Governments acquire their just powers from the consent of the governed."

I would tolerate a good deal to open up windows in order that this sort of thing can permeate throughout these countries—Eastern Europe, Baltic States, the Soviet Union itself. It will take time but, in the absence of a war, it is going to take time anyhow.

There would be those who would say that our attitude is quite unrealistic. Maybe there are times when you do have to hang onto some ideas, whether you can see them immediately accomplished or not.

Mr. Yatron. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Woff. Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is nice to see you again. We all feel a little richer when you are with us.

I was wondering, do former Secretaries of State ever have class reunions or get together? It would be nice to sit in and listen to your dialog as to your relative services and exchange of views.

Mr. Rusk. The alumni association is not very large. For a time I was the only one and now there are only two former Secretaries of State. So it isn't a very large convention when we get together.

RELATIONSHIP OF PRESIDENT TO SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Guyer. I am curious about a couple of things. First, you made a brief reference to the relationship of the President to the Secretary of State. Would you have a mathematical guess as to the number of times the Secretary is more persuasive than the President? In other words, are there times when the Secretary of State makes policy for the President?

Mr. Rusk. Dean Acheson once remarked: In the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State, it was of the greatest importance that both of them understand at all times which one was President. Usually if a Secretary of State forgets that, there is a new Secretary of State—Mr. Lansing under Wilson, Byrnes under Harry Truman.

However, no two men are going to look at every problem alike. What I think is a most productive relationship is a vigorous interchange between the two, debate. Most often those debates are in private. In his book, President Johnson revealed two or three matters on which he and I disagreed and, whenever those papers come out of the library down there, they will find others.

There must be a full, free, and vigorous exchange between the President and his Secretary of State. I think most of the time—bear in mind the mass of foreign policy business—most of the time they are in agreement. Basically foreign policy stems from the kind of people we are and the kind of world environment in which we live.

If a thousand cables go out of the State Department today, my guess is, every member of your committee would probably agree with 95 percent of them and few if any would vary because we have a Republican rather than a Democratic President. There is a continuity about this mass of foreign policy that is important.
A President cannot be his own Secretary of State partly because a Secretary of State cannot be his own Secretary of State. When you send out a thousand cables a day with your signature on the bottom, you might see seven or eight before they go out; there must be an extensive delegation of authority and responsibility to other officers of the Department of State. The President and the Secretary of State must supervise that process.

I won't ask anyone to believe this little figure but I make the comment and let it hang there: During my 8 years, 2,100,000 cables went out from the Department of State with my name signed to them. I saw only a tiny fraction of 1 percent of them. I can remember only four or five of those telegrams that had to be pulled back and redrawn and sent out again because the officers failed to get the point of policy the President and I wished them to follow. To me that is an extraordinary job by the professionals in the Department of State.

Most of the time the President and the Secretary see eye to eye; most of the time the Secretary can go ahead and set policy because he knows the policy of the President. There are times when there will be lively differences.

Mr. GUYER. That is a very comprehensive answer. I often wondered, and I have my own version about cables. I think they are carefully composed to say practically nothing. As a matter of fact, like much of our testimony—there is nothing offensive—it is perfumed. There are no brass knuckles, unless we are down to a “fish or cut bait” situation and that is another story.

Mr. RUSK. You have to say nothing at considerable length sometimes.

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT TRADE

Mr. GUYER. I think this is true.

One other thing, there is a growing kind of movement now to have more congressional authority in relationships between countries. I am not sure it is all good or bad yet, but to what degree do you think we should be imposing the ground rules of acceptance of our relationship or trade conditions between countries?

There is an old saying: There are only two kinds of people in the world, the righteou's and the unrighteous, but the righteous tell you which are which.

I have the feeling sometimes we set up the guidelines of what the real ground rules are. For example, Mr. Wolff mentioned one time in our committee that there are some 40 countries that have different sets of mores as to what constitutes civil rights.

Do you think that should be a condition of trade acceptance or should we be very cautious about how we impose these embargoes?

Mr. RUSK. On that particular issue, I think the influence of the United States ought to be and in support of the basic notions of human rights. I could name a good many countries called dictatorships where, in terms of the man on the street, he has a larger participation in what we call human rights than would have been the case had it not been for the United States and its influence.

On the other hand, I have some reservation about trying to handle that problem by legislation.
If another country would come to you gentlemen and say, "We are not going to trade with you unless you put 10 women and 7 more blacks into the Senate," we would explode.

To put it another way, if you got out a list of all the countries with which we have relations and you went down the list and ticked off those countries that by any stretch of the imagination had what we call constitutional democracy, you check a fourth of them and you are finished. Human rights, as a fact as distinct from words, are in a minority in the world.

You can withdraw from that world if you want to with all sorts of protestations but we have to live on this speck of dust in the universe so we have to work with the situation as we find it and do our best to support the notion of human rights.

We couldn't even get the United Nations to appoint a High Commissioner of Human Rights who had no authority, just a kind of gadfly, someone to consult with governments about these issues, because a lot of these countries wouldn't have even that, you see.

CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS IN FOREIGN POLICY

On the larger question, I think there is a major problem about the extent to which the Congress can or should get into details of day-to-day foreign policy. It has nothing to do with ability or constitutional authority. It relates in the first instance to your time. I don't believe the public has any comprehension of how difficult it is to be an elected Member of the Congress with every issue of public policy in front of you on which you have to cast responsible votes, with all your committee work, and then get reelected. I don't know whether you have the time to become an effective partner in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

Of course guidelines, you have the overwhelming power under the Constitution. The executive branch can do almost nothing in the foreign policy field without legislation, appropriations, or approval of treaties and agreements.

So you have to make the judgments, it seems to me, sir, with great respect, as to how much of this you really want to try to exercise. My guess is that the pendulum tends to swing a little on this, and perhaps at no single moment would anyone feel that they have exactly the right answer.

Mr. GUYER. To belabor the question, the reason I was curious is, we have the free world, the Communist world, and the Third World, and I think part of the job of the Congress is to find a meaningful relationship with all of the countries of the world in a climate of peace and good will. It is going to be difficult if we keep setting up judgments of what we expect.

I think you people have been very useful to us because we are trying to forge a kind of new approach. As I look back over history, we have had a major war every 22 years of our existence. I think there is a better track record if we can become meaningful and genuine in our attitudes, and people like you can give us much helpful advice.

Mr. RUSK. On that last point, one interesting example I have often thought about was the so-called Hickenlooper amendment to the for-
eign aid bill. Most of you will remember that. The administration op­posed that at the time. Actually it worked out pretty well before it had to be applied. But if you got to the point of having to apply it, then the house of cards tumbled down, because it really meant the breaking of relations between us and that particular country.

But it was a very powerful—and I don't know whether there is any way in which the Congress can hold some of these things in reserve and have an understanding with the executive branch as to the difference between effectively reflecting the wishes of the Congress on some of these matters without forcing a particular action prematurely.

Mr. Wolff, Mr. Secretary, on that point, a question, whether it be trade restrictions or some other type of action taken by the Congress, you bring me to a predecessor of yours, Mr. Dulles, who talked about the question of "brinkmanship," bringing us up to the actual brink of war and then somehow or other something was to happen in the interval to avert war. Where do we draw the line?

DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It is suggested we don't put in trade restrictions for the protection of human rights but we go to war in order to protect the rights of freedom of people and their human rights. We did recently—back again to Vietnam.

Mr. Rusk, I think there is no more solemn duty on the part of the President and the Congress than to find between themselves a clear answer to that question which is supported by the American people. It is too dangerous to bluff. As far as I am concerned, an alliance which we don't mean should be scrapped.

Therefore, it seems to me the President and the Congress should determine, taking into account that circumstances change, should determine what are those situations where we consider the security of those areas to be genuinely vital to the security of the United States and make that determination and make it clear so that no one could be under any misapprehension about it.

Maybe I am a prisoner of my own past but I can't forget Adolf Hitler was convinced Great Britain would not fight and that the last thing in the world Adolf Hitler thought was that the United States would get involved in a war.

THE WORLD REVIEWS OUR COMMITMENTS

Mr. Wolff. Aren't we approaching that type of situation today, where people throughout the world, as a result of recent experience, do not know whether or not we will live up to our commitment, or our responsibility, and therefore they can do almost anything they want to?

Mr. Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to sound bitter on this point, but I think there are a good many people who are asking this question who have not earned the right to ask it. When someone who has made no effort turns to the United States because of Vietnam and asks, "Are you really reliable?"—after we have lost over 50,000 dead and 200,000 or more seriously injured—they have no right to ask that question.
Nevertheless, the facts of life are here and I just don't think that it is safe for the United States to be unpredictable on this point.

PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN COMMITMENT

Mr. Wolff. If you will follow polls of recent date and the reflection of American public opinion, there are very few people in the United States today who are willing to fight for almost any place that exists in the world. Should that cause a question in your mind?

Mr. Rusk. I much more value the insights which you gentlemen get when you go back to your own districts and the kinds of conversations I have in small communities in various parts of the country than I do these polls.

I don't think there is any way in which Dr. Gallup or anybody else can ask 1,600 people for an oversimplified answer to an oversimplified question and get their real views about a very complicated situation in advance of the events that is, as a hypothetical matter and before the President and the Congress have asserted leadership. That is why I put so much emphasis on the importance of the President and the Congress determining where our policies should lie and to make it clear.

My guess is you would have a pretty strong indication of support from the American people in that process.

CONFLICT BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

Mr. Wolff. If you get to a point of conflict between the Congress and the President which you have had on a number of circumstances, where should the decisionmaking end?

Mr. Rusk. I think in that circumstance in the foreign policy field the country is just in deep trouble.

But, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe under those circumstances the decision can be made—I don't believe on an issue of this sort a President can act alone.

Now, obviously no decision is itself a major decision if you are the United States; that is why I think this willingness to try to recreate the essential elements of a bipartisan foreign policy is an overriding problem these days.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Burke.

Mr. Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PURPOSES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Secretary, I would like to make a determination in my own mind what foreign policy is.

Now to me I know this is again an oversimplified question. I am going to open the door to your own personal opinion.

To me, if we are going to have a good foreign policy, first it must be determined what is good for our country and, second, what is good for the national security as far as our people are concerned, which to me it seems has been part of the overall way we have looked at trying to stop any nuclear warfare.

But that was only one part.
Now what actually would your interpretation be of a good foreign policy? And I know I might have oversimplified it but what would you say if we are looking for a good policy, what would you look for?

Mr. Rusk. Dean Acheson once remarked that the essential purpose of American foreign policy is to try to create a world environment in which this great experiment in freedom of ours can survive and flourish.

With 140 nations in the world, this necessarily means a considerable array of details. But I would think that wherever you found a country that was independent, able to live in peace with its neighbors, concerned about the problem of its own people and willing to cooperate in the international community that there was a situation in the interest of the United States, whether we call them technical allies or not.

Mr. Burke. But that is their part, what is our part as far as our foreign policy, so that we could go back to our constituents and say, here is why we want to spend our taxpayers money.

I think we all understand the depth of humanity, and so on and so forth, but most of the countries today are becoming strongly nationalistic while this country is becoming more and more disorganized as to what our future and our goals are.

Mr. Rusk. It would be difficult for me to come up with just a few sentences that would come anywhere near an adequate answer there. Perhaps I might be able to write you a letter and comment on this a little.

Mr. Burke. I wish you would.

I would like to say if you could supply that for the record, we would be delighted to have it.

Mr. Rusk. It's an important question. You get those questions all the time and, when I go out visiting with groups, I get the same question but I would like to have a better answer than I have in mind at the moment.

U.S. ROLE IN CRITICAL AREAS

Mr. Burke. I ask that for another reason, because the world situation particularly in the Middle East and the Arab nations and Israel with the possibility the Communists may take over both Italy and certainly Portugal, at least there is a problem of dissension and disunity with people in the country, the problem of Greece and Turkey and the problems of course which I would like to touch on a little later, that is the movement of the North Koreans against the South Koreans.

What would you think our future is in the evolving nations which might result from the disunity in the world today?

Mr. Rusk. We do have some major problems, beginning with the consequences of a termination of the situation in Southeast Asia, which may not have fully developed yet, the belligerence of the North Koreans toward South Korea, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, the Middle East and so forth.

In the long run I must say, Mr. Burke, that I am pretty optimistic. I have an old-fashioned confidence in this country.

During the Berlin blockade of 1948 one of his colleagues asked General Marshall how he could be so calm in the midst of crisis. He said, "I have seen it worse."
This country has lived through some grievous things but we have been through some pretty difficult times here at home among ourselves. I would hope some of these problems would help to unify us a bit.

Mr. Burke. The reason I asked that was because of the situation in Cyprus which seemed to cause another possible division in what our ultimate action will be in case the North Koreans move against South Korea.

Mr. Rusk. I referred in my informal written remarks to the difference between self-criticism, which is the life blood of a democracy, and the kind of self-flagellation which can destroy it. We have been through a period of considerable self-flagellation. We have apparently gotten into a garbage can era of journalism.

I think we will bounce back from that.

I understand that in a certain key place here in Washington there is a bust of Harry Truman. Now Harry Truman had great confidence in the grassroots of the American people to do what is needed to be done at the end of the day if they understand what it was and why, because he was from the grassroots.

My guess is his confidence was deserved and I would hope those carrying terrible responsibilities here in our National Capital would not underestimate the willingness of the American people to do what is needed if the safety and the well-being and the integrity of our society call for it.

Mr. Burke. You are talking of the people, I am talking about the Congress. I am not sure what the Congress, or perhaps the American people, would do if we do have a problem.

FEAR OF RED CHINA

Your suggestion about isolationism and I think somewhere back in—I won’t try to guess the dates—you once made a statement about why should we fear the Red Chinese, how many they will have on the continent and what they will do if they get nuclear weapons, which you said would be a great threat to the American people and our future.

I think you put a time limit of 20 years.

Do you want to retract that statement?

Mr. Rusk. I stated at the time what I thought was three facts. One was there would be a billion Chinese, I don’t know anyone that doesn’t think there will be.

Second, they would be armed with nuclear weapons, and I don’t know anybody that doesn’t think that.

Third, we don’t know what their policies will be. I don’t think anybody does know. A member of the Senate once said that that remark of mine, prompted him to run for the Presidency. That was a catastrophic consequence of a passing remark.

But, no, I think that we have to live with these things year by year. I think it will take some time before our relations with the Peoples Republic of China will be very productive.

The problem of Taiwan is still very much a bone in the throat for both sides. It will take some time. Maybe it will have to wait until there is a change in regime before we will know exactly where we stand.
In the case of the Soviet Union we are dealing with the second generation; Mr. Mikoyan was the last of the old Bolsheviks in the Soviet Government. We don't know what the next generation of leadership will look like in China but they will be different.

Mr. Burke. I would like to thank you again but I want to thank you for when I was a freshman, a kind thing you did for me.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Secretary, one or two more questions.

You have been very gracious with your time. I hope you have not been taxed here by trying to respond to each and every statement there has been from the membership.

I want to try to delve for just a moment into your decisionmaking.

THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS OF A SECRETARY OF STATE

When you sat and had to make the decisions as Secretary of State, as to a particular problem which took precedence, the moral consideration, the economic consideration, the military, political? What really goes on in a Secretary's mind and how do you come about arriving at the answers.

Mr. Rusk. When a pilot takes off a complicated jet aircraft he unrolls in front of himself a rather considerable list of questions which he asks himself before he takes off in the plane.

Similarly I think a policy officer has in his own mind a very large number of questions which he asks himself about each question that comes along.

I have sometimes thought of doing an article on this policymaking check list.

On that list will be all the elements you just mentioned, the moral considerations, the constitutional position, the statutory position, the public opinion position, the economic, the security, including such questions as what is the question and whose question is it?

Is it one for us or one for somebody else, the attitudes of other governments, just a long list of questions.

The problem that a policymaker faces is, unless he is careful, unless he gets a good deal of help from some talented people, he can overlook a factor which turns out to be more important than he realized and he is always haunted by that possibility of overlooking something that turns out to be very important.

Mr. Wolff. Are you ever haunted?

Mr. Rusk. I am a little like Harry Truman, I would go home and go to sleep and not look back too much. There is not much you can do about yesterday. You can think about it and maybe try to recover from some of your mistakes and learn something for tomorrow but you can't help being concerned about some of the tragedies that occur in the world and you wonder whether if you had done just a little bit more or a little bit less, the situation might have been different.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Zablocki.

TERMINATION DATE FOR ALLIANCES

Mr. Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I particularly noted in your statement the reference to alliances. Of course, alliances are made by governments and governments change.
Our alliance with a new government may not be really in keeping with our earlier policies.

Therefore, the question is, in reference to treaties and alliances: Would it help to improve relations between countries if they had a termination date or renewal date after a period?

Mr. Rusk. At the present time all of our alliances except the Rio pact are subject to 1 year's notice of termination by any member of the alliance.

In the case of the Rio pact that time period is 2 years.

As you know, we began NATO with a 20-year period and then it became a year to year basis.

It seems to me—well, I personally would prefer that after a serious review by those of you who are carrying responsibility that, if we determine that we do want to continue certain alliances—as I hope we do myself—that we would find clearer ways to reaffirm them so there could be no misunderstanding about them.

I realize this is again—to use a phrase of a friendly newspaper—this is "spitting in the wind," but I think we would be glad to consider another 10-year flat extension of the obligations of the NATO Treaty provided France rejoins the military arrangements of NATO, Portugal gets itself straightened out and Greece and Turkey settle their mutual quarrel.

Because another flat 10-year run of the NATO Treaty, I think, would help to eliminate any questions that might be in anyone's mind in reference to the question asked by Chairman Wolff, as to how serious we were about this alliance.

So I think that you people here in Washington need to look at these questions very seriously and decide for us and make it clear what your decisions are.

Mr. Zablocki. Treaties in particular, some of them are obsolete.

Mr. Rusk. I would suppose now that the SEATO Treaty is of no importance, not only given the fact that Britain, France, and Pakistan have virtually withdrawn anyhow and that Thailand and the Philippines are moving to the neutrality of the Asian group of nations.

I think the CENTO arrangements have rather withered away because both Iran and Turkey have established reasonably normal relations with the Soviet Union and over time, under those circumstances, an alliance tends to wither away.

That doesn't mean there couldn't be other situations that could be very dangerous.

Mr. Zablocki. One of the problems that this subcommittee particularly is hoping to find some answers to is future foreign policy. We learn from past experiences but, over the short period I have been in Congress, I have come to the conclusion that policies were formed to meet current circumstances.

We had a foreign policy to meet the totalitarian Communist threat, and then the cold war and a policy to work with neighboring or divided nations.

My point is that we do not formulate policies with a view to anticipating and perhaps preventing problems. Rather, we seem to react to a troubled world in formulating our policy.
FUTURE POLICY FOR UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS

At the present time, looking toward the future, in my humble opinion the world food and fiber needs are the greatest problem to which nations should be actively engaged in finding a solution.

To develop such a future policy new could help us avoid a real problem with the committee of 77 and other underdeveloped countries. They all want to be industrial countries. We became strong because of our agricultural development. We have a problem, not that we want to put on their backs our system. We must find ways to cut back on military dependence so that the monies and resources that are now used for the purpose of meeting military threats could be better used for research and development of national resources to meet the food and fiber needs of the world.

We will have to look for the countries that are now the food and fiber producing countries. But will we be able to find a forum all the world will see as a necessity to follow in order to meet this world problem?

Mr. Rusk. I believe that the United States can make a major contribution towards the food problem within the limits of the Malthusian curve. I don’t believe there is any way to meet the hunger problem indefinitely into the future unless something happens to the population explosion. But we may have 20 years’ time in which to grapple with that one.

The United States is in a position to make a unique contribution. Maybe it was luck, maybe it was wisdom but in the Lincoln administration you will recall we invented the land-grant college system in this country and we made scientifically and academically respectable those fields of human knowledge and science which were directly relevant to development.

I would hope that we would keep open the doors of our great institutions in this country, particularly our agricultural colleges and our technical institutes for the easy transfer of technology to these countries who are going to need it if they are going to come anywhere near meeting their food requirements.

I spoke against the background of some activity in this field as a private citizen back in the fifties. It would be very important for the world to know what came out of the World Food Conference and to try to exercise a good deal of discipline on other countries with respect to the steps which they themselves must take if they are going to feed their own people.

President Johnson in his book refers to a point in which we had a disagreement at the time—in retrospect I am inclined to think he was right—when India had two bad monsoons in a raw.

President Johnson stopped our food ships going to India until India took the steps at home that gave India some chance to feed their own people because we simply didn’t have the grain.

At the time there were those who felt this was a rather harsh thing to do, but his motivation was a humanitarian recognition that unless those steps were taken in India, a lot of Indians were going to starve.

It isn’t easy for a government to impose that kind of discipline on other countries, but the World Food Council, an international body, could do that without creating the kind of political problems that would exist if we tried to do it by ourselves.

So I think this is something that has to be taken with the greatest seriousness.
But there are times you know when it is very difficult for the U.S. Government or the American people to be more concerned about feeding starving people than the governments or leaders of those people themselves.

You and I can remember when we had food ships standing off Biafra in considerable numbers and the colonel leading the Biafrans would not let us put the food there to give to people who were starving.

So there are limits to what we can do even though we might be willing to with the greatest of good will.

Mr. Zablocki, Mr. Secretary, with communication between peoples improving to a point where there is a radio in almost every remote part of the world, certainly people will not permit the recurrence of the instance you have just recited in the case of Biafra. I think people will demand of their governments throughout the world a greater interest in their welfare.

Mr. Rusk, I think that is right. There may be situations where the people would have that attitude, but do not make it effective in their own particular countries.

There may be other things we will have to do looking forward to the next decade or two.

Here I am not a scientist and will probably be rapped on the knuckles by scientists, but given the energy situation, it may be necessary for us to try to breed back down the certain more simple varieties of certain food crops in order to find a better balance between yield on the one side and fertilizer requirements on the other.

As you know, these miracle rices produced in the Philippines have a very high demand for fertilizer, that means energy and foreign exchange for a country like India. So it may be we will have to go back down the genetic ladder a little bit and try to find a combination for varieties that may not yield quite as much but have a lower demand for fertilizer.

Mr. Zablocki, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the observation. Mr. Secretary, I was heartened by your statement that you have great confidence in our youth and that they will respond objectively and responsibly in the future.

I am sure everybody joins you in that hope. Certainly there is growing evidence that we in Congress are particularly looking toward academia for some of the answers to our political, economic, and energy problems. You name it, and we will look forward to those who will follow us to have the answers to the problems we are today coping with on trying to cope with.

Thank you.

Mr. Wolff, Mr. Secretary, could we prevail upon you for a few more minutes of questions?

Mr. Rusk, Yes, sir.

Mr. Wolff, I really must express the thanks of this entire committee for your coming in and spending so much time with us, giving us the benefit of your experience.

Before I said I pushed away some questions because you had been so provocative in some of the statements in which I tried to elicit answers.

Now, I would like to get back to those, because I think it is important that the record be cleared, specifically in the question of Vietnam, be-
cause naturally we want to try to avoid the mistakes we have made in the past.

WHAT WAS THE VIETNAM "MISTAKE"?

The mistake we speak of in Vietnam, was it a mistake of ours to get involved or a mistake in that we failed?

Mr. Rusk. Well, I think it was a mistake to get involved and then fail. Now one can approach it from either end. You can take your choice as to which end you consider to be the mistake.

I think we are just kidding ourselves if we don't accept the fact that we had a serious setback as a result of what has happened in Southeast Asia.

What could have been done differently along the way? That is a very long story that I would hope people in the executive branch and the Congress and the universities and war colleges would give a lot of thought to and review that entire experience and see what we might learn for the future about it.

I have tried to think a bit about it and the more I think about it, the more the list of possible lessons lengthens.

THE DECISIONS OF INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. Wolff. In that famous Ridgway report it was strongly recommended at that time that we keep out of Asia.

In what way do you think there was sufficient change to warrant a new decision or was that report never really specifically evaluated?

Mr. Rusk. Up until 1952, as far as the Pacific was concerned, we had stayed offshore—and this is not intended as a partisan remark at all.

We had treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In the fifties we then made treaties with Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

Although it was debated at the time, I don't think that in the mid-fifties the full implications of concluding the SEATO Treaty fully came home to everybody. It was a very serious thing for a President and a Senate with only one dissenting vote to say that under certain circumstances each party shall "take steps to meet the common danger."

This was an era in which people were hopefully talking of massive retaliation, a phrase which lost its meaning and purpose with the development of a two-way full nuclear exchange.

There was a solemn moment there that I think was not adequately explored.

As one citizen, I am so glad your committee is digging into some of these things, because I do think the consequences of the things we do ought to be looked at very carefully before rather than afterwards.

CONGRESS AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

I am not now lobbying about anything but I call your attention to a little point. There is a bill before the Congress, at least one, maybe more, to declare unilaterally a 200-mile fishing zone off our shores.
I can understand why that bill is important because we have been 9 years trying to get some international law in this field and we haven't gotten it yet and our fish stocks are in trouble because of it. In that bill, when it gets to the enforcement proceeding, it authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Transportation to use the Coast Guard to enforce this bill and if they find it necessary, to turn to any other department of Government; namely, the Defense Department for assistance in enforcement.

Now, when you pass that bill, as you probably will, first look at the constitutional point, you authorize the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Transportation or the Defense Department. When you authorize the use of the Defense Department, do you want that covered by the War Powers Resolution? I am just suggesting we look at these things a little way down the road. That is why I am so glad this subcommittee is doing exactly what you are doing.

OUR COMMITMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

Mr. Wolff. I see we again have a vote. One final question.

You talk of treaties, you talked about various responses, judicious responses, limited responses and the like. You spoke of Korea. The other day we heard from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger about the question of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary. I think the President made some reference to this as well.

How do you feel about this situation so far as South Korea is concerned? I am not talking only of the use of the tactical nuclear weapons, but our overall role in Korea's defense. Do we still have the same ties or responsibility to Korea that we had before?

Mr. Rusk. It is hard for me, Mr. Congressman, to separate Korea from Japan and the whole situation in the Northern Pacific among the great powers, Soviet Union, China, the United States. This is a matter for those who are carrying actual responsibility from the American people to decide. You are entitled to my own personal view. I think that we ought to assure the people, 33 million people of South Korea, their protection against an all-out attack from the North.

That being so, I don't relish the idea of going through another episode as the 1950 agony. I don't think anyone has a right to call upon us for that, friends or foe.

I realize there are tactical nuclear weapons in Korea. If you conclude, as I do, as to security of Korea, I would leave those tactical nuclear weapons there and make it very clear to people on the other side that they would be insane if they thought there was any possibility that a President of the United States would allow those nuclear weapons to be captured.

My guess is that would be the end of it.

Mr. Wolff. I am afraid, too, that is the end of this hearing, unfortunately.

We do have a vote and we have kept you much longer than I am sure you or we intended. We are very appreciative, Mr. Secretary, for your coming here and being so frank with us.
Mr. Rusk, Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.

Mr. WOLFF. I wonder, before we leave, however, if we have some further questions that we could submit to you, would you answer them for the record?

Mr. Rusk. I will do my best.

Mr. WOLFF. The subcommittee stands in recess until tomorrow at 3 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 3 p.m., Wednesday, July 29, 1975.]

[The following questions were submitted in writing to Mr. Rusk:]

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR. RUSK

Question. What are the critical issues and areas of greatest priority for a foreign policy during the next decade?

Answer. The overriding problem for the human race continues to be the organization of a durable peace. What might have been a lofty aspiration through human history, has now become, in a nuclear world, sheer necessity. If the idea of collective security is rapidly eroding, then we must search urgently for possible alternatives.

Along side of the necessity for limiting the use of force among nations, we must address ourselves to new questions which are different in kind than those the human race has faced up to this point. The long-range aspects of energy, the prospective diminution in or disappearance of non-renewable resources such as key minerals, the protection of the environment, the awesome problems raised by the population explosion, hunger, the dangerous gap between rich and poor nations, the relations among peoples of different race, religious and cultural backgrounds. Some of these problems can lead to a joint effort which can reinforce peace, but, if we neglect them, could become so divisive and contentious as to introduce new causes of war.

Question. How do you view the bilateral relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China during the next decade?

Answer. Despite fundamental differences, the United States should continue to search for points of possible agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union and China. Such agreements are possible if they are in the interest of both sides and there is no basis for suspicion or fear about their compliance with such agreements. Without losing our wits or indulging in euphoria, we might be able to build steadily upon common interest and reduce the range of issues on which violence might occur. I would counsel against attempts to manipulate the Soviet Union and China against each other; they are much too intelligent to let us do that and the effort could be dangerous.

Question. When did you first become convinced that Soviet and Chinese interests did not run parallel? In 1972 you spoke of the possibility of the Sino-Soviet split being healed one day: What evidence do you have? Is it in the interests of the United States that the split be maintained?

Answer. There were signs of Soviet-Chinese friction in the late 50's, and these became much clearer in the early 60's. We should not base our own policy on the inevitability of hostility between Moscow and Peking. The leaders of these two totalitarian regimes can change directions very quickly—witness the Stalin-Hitler Pact which preceded World War II. We must be alert to the possibility that Moscow and Peking might postpone their bilateral quarrels and cooperate on a joint program which could be injurious to the free world. The United States has no interest whatever in a military conflict between Moscow and Peking nor should we take sides if one should occur. Whatever one thinks about United States interests in regard to a Moscow-Peking split, there is very little which we can or ought to do about it; the factors and forces involved are beyond our reach.

Question. How do we define our "vital" interests? Do you feel our present commitments need a re-assessment? Which ones? Under what conditions might U.S. "intervention" be permissible?

Answer. We should use the expression "vital interests" very sparingly and reserve it for those matters which are directly related to the safety and the life and death of our nation. One example of the extravagant use of the term is to be found in the Preamble to the Captive Nations Resolution passed by the Congress in July, 1959.
We should always keep our commitments in mind and reassess them from time to time. Commitments are worthless unless they have the understanding and support of the American people and of the Congress. It is difficult to think about commitments in the abstract—in the absence of a practical situation in which the nature of the threat is apparent to all. Some of our earlier commitments have changed. SEATO has disappeared for all practical purposes. Normal relations between Iran and Turkey on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other have caused CENTO to wither away. As for existing commitments, I personally believe that we should continue those in this Hemisphere, Western Europe and the Northern Pacific.

Question. Keeping in mind the "secret war" in Laos and the Cambodia bombing raids, is it possible for the United States to conduct an "open" foreign policy and an effective one? Do you feel that a lack of openness in the conduct of foreign policy has a serious adverse effect on our democratic process?

Answer. I know of no country where issues of foreign policy are more widely known and more generally debated than in the United States. I know of no secret which would interfere with the ability of an American citizen to come to a responsible, personal judgment about any significant question of foreign policy if such a citizen were to make a minimum effort to obtain information which is readily available. There is no way in which negotiations can succeed in resolving disputes if they are conducted in the atmosphere of a football stadium. The results of such negotiations should be public. I know of no secret commitment on the part of the United States. I do not believe that diplomatic confidentiality in the course of negotiations has a "serious adverse effect on our democratic process." Our Founding Fathers clearly understood the necessity for quiet discussions with other governments. Without them, we would lose our capacity to communicate effectively with other governments and the cause of peace would be deeply impaired. Inflammatory reporting by the news media, who bear no responsibility for results, can fuel fires.

Question. How do you view the large-scale vending of arms to Third World nations? Would you comment on the fact that during the India-Pakistan conflict, Greece-Turkey hostilities on Cyprus and in the Middle East, both sides are fighting with American weapons?

Answer. I have been disappointed for many years about the relative lack of interest in arms limitations among the non-nuclear countries of the world. Our interest throughout this post-war period in trying to reduce these lesser arms races have been unsuccessful. We were not able to get an agreement on level of arms between India and Pakistan. We were not able to interest the Soviet Union in an understanding among external arms suppliers about levels of arms in the Middle East. In some situations the United States has an interest in maintaining an arms balance in order to deter the likelihood of major hostilities; but this is only a second best solution. It is unhappily a fact of life that arms which might be sold or supplied for one purpose can be used for another purpose if the country involved considers that its vital national interests are at stake. There is no easy answer, but a certain caution and prudence on the part of the United States would be in order.

Question. What can the United States do to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World nations?

Answer. I see no general formula to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each nation tempted to go nuclear presents a unique problem and we should devise such measures as we can which would be appropriate to each nation.

Question. How should the United States deal with recent advances of communism in southern Europe—with particular reference to Portugal and Italy?

Answer. In the first instance, problems such as those now being posed in Portugal and Italy should be the primary concern of our European NATO allies. For a variety of reasons, some of which are known to the Congress, the United States is presently somewhat immobilized. Portugal and Italy are in Europe and it is Europe's responsibility to take the lead if any action is to be taken.

Question. For how long can the U.S. balance her moral commitment to Israel with her economic interest in Arab oil? How might the United States solve this conflict within her foreign policy?

Answer. We should understand how stubborn and intractable are the issues between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The feelings on both sides are so strong and deep that it is doubtful that the governments involved can make the concessions necessary for a general peace agreement without being overwhelmed. Perhaps more time is needed to allow longer thoughts to prevail and to give a chance
to the fresh insights of new generations on both sides. Neither the United States alone nor the United States and Russia combined can make peace in the Middle East—those who live there are the only ones who can bring about that result. About all that we can do is apply patience and persistence at moments and on points where we might be helpful, but we cannot prescribe the answers. It is of the utmost importance that the United States embark upon a crash program of conservation and research and development to reduce greatly our dependence upon foreign oil. We continue to live in a fool’s paradise—partly because our leaders in both parties seem afraid to call upon us at the grass roots to do what has to be done if we are to avoid complete calamity in the energy field.

Question. You often saw a parallel in Vietnam with the Korean situation? Do you now see a parallel with Vietnam in the current Korean situation?

Answer. There are major differences between South Korea and South Vietnam. South Korea is stronger and has a much more homogeneous society. Further, the security of South Korea is intimately related to the security of Japan and the situation in the entire North Pacific.

Question. What do you think were the major and enduring achievements of your eight years in high office? Your major errors? How do you think the role of Secretary of State might be changed or re-structured for a more effective foreign policy?

Answer. What has given me the greatest personal satisfaction about my eight years as Secretary of State is that I was able to be of some assistance in adding eight years to the period since a nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. We have now put behind us thirty years without a nuclear war; that is a very important thing to be able to say given the grievous crises which we have had since 1945. There were many other elements of satisfaction, including the resolution of the Berlin crisis, 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis and other dangerous disputes. In addition, there were programs such as the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, assistance for developing nations, and a large number of activities of a positive and constructive nature. The greatest mistake, in my judgment, of the Kennedy and Johnson years was the Bay of Pigs.

The role of the Secretary of State will vary with the personalities and wishes of successive Presidents and with the qualities and inclinations of each Secretary of State. I do not believe that a formal restructuring of the role of the Secretary of State would bring about improvements in foreign policy. Foreign policy derives from the kind of people we are and the world environment in which we live and these do not change radically when a new President or a new Secretary of State assumes office. We have the most complex constitutional and political system in the world and it requires an enormous amount of time on the part of those who serve in our government to make it work at all. There may be those who think of the President as a chief executive, sitting in the Oval Office striking off decisions all day long. It would be equally accurate to think of him as a sheep dog trying to round up enough people to go in the same direction for a long enough period to have something called a policy. Typically, a Secretary of State will spend at least one-half of his time on the domestic arrangements required to have a policy before he talks to foreigners. The various elements in this process are in constant flux and change, and I know of no simple formula to insure improvement.

Question. What is your view of the Congressional role in future foreign policy?

Answer. The Congress has an enormous role in foreign policy. Most of our action in foreign affairs requires legislation; budgets, the approval of nominations or the approval of treaties or agreements. Clearly, there has been an increase in the power of the President in foreign relations. But, in my judgment, this has not been at the expense of the power of the Congress. The fact is that the power of Congress has increased enormously in the past few decades as it has asserted jurisdiction and action with regard to almost all aspects of our daily lives. One may deplore this rapid increase in the powers of the Federal Government as a whole, but it has occurred.

I do believe that the Congress could play a more effective role in foreign policy if it organized itself for more effective action internally and for more regular and intensive consultation with the Executive branch. I do not see how this can come about unless the Congress is willing to let designated leaders or Committees speak for the Congress on a great many matters. Foreign policy involves so much mass of detail, it is simply impracticable for 535 Members of Congress to play an intimate role in the day to day conduct of our foreign relations.
The subcommittee met at 3 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Wolff. The subcommittee will come to order. Today, the Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee opens the third in a series of exploratory hearings to reassess our foreign policy. Our distinguished witnesses are among the major decisionmakers of the last decade. With their help, we hope to clarify the vital interests of the United States and from their experience, we hope to view past decisions so that we may more precisely identify the critical issues of the future.

In addition, it is one of the hopes of this subcommittee to explore the future course of Congress in the conduct of foreign policy. As our ranking member, Mr. Zablocki said yesterday, it will be the task of the Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee to eventually recommend resolutions and legislation that would enable Congress to assume its proper role in foreign policy.

We are fortunate today in having two witnesses, both intimately connected with our major foreign policy concern of the sixties: the Vietnam war. We will have the opportunity today to examine the principles and the processes by which our foreign policy was conducted at a most critical time. In large part because of the Vietnamese experience, the Congress saw fit to pass the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to secure more information on the conduct of foreign policy. The national security of this country is of prime importance to all branches of Government.

Our first witnesses today, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, has had a long and distinguished career. General Taylor was Chief of Staff, the Army Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.

Our second witness is Mr. William Bundy, presently the editor of the prestigious quarterly Foreign Affairs. Mr. Bundy was a high official of the CIA from 1951 to 1961. He has served from 1961 to 1964 as the Deputy Assistant and then Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense. From 1964 to 1969 he was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Department of State.
We are very happy to have both of you gentlemen with us today. As we were discussing prior to coming in here, your views do not necessarily coincide, although they may at times. We hope to benefit from your experience and we hope to set a course for this Nation for the future.

Many people have criticized us from time to time for not looking far enough down the road making decisions from crisis to crisis. We hope to avoid that in the future.

General Taylor, we are very happy to have you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BIOGRAPHY

Maxwell D. Taylor was born in Keytesville, Missouri, August 26, 1901. He attended Kansas City Junior College, Missouri, was graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1927. He served as Assistant Military Attaché in Peking. In March 1944, he became Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division and led the division in the airborne assault on D-day, June 6, 1944. From 1945 to 1949 he was Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy. From 1955 to 1956, he was Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In 1961 he was appointed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From 1964 to 1965 he served as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. He is married to the former Miss Lydia Happer and has two sons.

General Taylor, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I was about to decide what aspect of foreign policy and national security might be appropriate to the occasion. I hit upon one which happens to be an old favorite of mine, namely the meaning of national security. It demands and requires change and also its impact upon other forms of national policy, both domestic and foreign.

If we take for national security the English meaning of its terms, it should mean the protection of those things which are valuable to us as individuals and as to a nation. If we take that assumption, I think it is quite clear that the number of valuables, those things warranting protection, are constantly changing both in number, identity and distribution around the world.

While I don't think there is a physical law linking national security and national security valuables with other factors, I think they do grow and change somewhat in proportion to the growth and population both of our wealth and the growth of our gross national product.

Furthermore, these valuables increase in number. They spread around the world. Recognition, I believe, of our growing dependence on foreign resources, particularly in the economic field—we are constantly seeking more markets and sources of raw materials.

Now, as the number of valuable things we have increases, obviously, the danger and the threat thereto also tends to increase with new targets and their appeal to new predators and troublemakers. Not only do we have a human factor in contemplating the dangers to our national security and our valuables, but we are now seeing that in the economic and in the environmental field.

There are inanimate forces, if you will, which certainly have a great impact upon those things to which we attach value. I would suggest
perhaps population growth worldwide is a dominant factor which is not only with us today, but which can be projected into the future and that projection is always increasing in terms of the consequences, adverse consequences to be anticipated from the human growth of population.

Similarly, we are all aware of the growing importance of economics in our lives, both as citizens having to pay our bills here at home and also as a nation trying to adjust our balance of payments in the international market.

The importance of the cartel, the organization to wage economic warfare in time of peace is a very definite threat, not necessarily great, but of enormous importance to us primarily because of the OPEC cartel controlling oil prices.

So not only as the scope of our national security expands, so do the valuables and so do the threats. But unfortunately if I interpret the situation correctly, I would say that at such a time we as a nation are seeing a decline in those available national resources that we have to call upon to assist us in providing the security implicit in national security.

First, we have seen, we know the economic situation that faces us most of our lives. We are all in economic trouble in varying degrees. As taxpayers, we know our individual reluctance to pay more taxes for virtually any cause at the present time and certainly we are particularly reluctant to do it for overseas causes which seem rather remote to our present problems at home.

Our national morale is low at this time, a phenomenon which grows out of the Vietnam war, Watergate and now out of the economic recession in which we are living and this is accompanied by a general distrust or malaise in our population, a distrust of our leaders and in many cases of our institutions as well. Certainly, there is a postwar reaction against the military—against military budgets, military service and military solutions of foreign affairs.

Finally, as we analyze our relative military strength with the Soviet Union, our principal rival, I think we are bound to confess that our strength is declining in relation to that of the Soviet Union. I am not saying we are inferior, but in relative strength, both in the strategic field, naval field, and conventional field, that the changes that are occurring are generally favorable to the Soviet Union.

Then, we are feeling the effects of the disaster to our foreign policy in Southeast Asia, a disaster which is hard to interpret at this short range, but nonetheless is serious and is likely to remain with us in some aspects over a considerable period of time. We are losing the respect which we enjoyed in terms of our power and leadership. We are seeing it in our relations with our allies who are showing uncertainty as to whether they want to continue to link their lot with us.

We are seeing it in the uncertainty about our military bases, not only in the Far East, but also in the Mediterranean. Then, from outside-based foreign comment, it is a common observation that the United States is suffering from a weakened presidency and the conflict between the White House and the Congress is raising questions in foreign minds as to who is really in charge in Washington. So these are conditions, we could say, that are adverse to our national security and make it more difficult to achieve that degree of protection we should seek under the present circumstances.
Now, how does that affect our foreign policy? That is an extremely long subject which could be discussed at great length, but I would like to make the point, Mr. Chairman, that the more one reflects on national security policy, the more virtually identical it appears to me.

I have the utmost difficulty thinking of any element of foreign policy, any program of foreign policy that is not of some interest to national security. So in one aspect that point—and it is debatable and I hope I will be cross-examined by the gentlemen who don’t agree—it is quite clear I think, that those the decisionmakers and the artisans of national security policy and of foreign policy should be either the same or they should be very closely related so the thinking of one would impact very quickly upon the thinking of the other.

It is also clear, I believe, as one reflects on the sources of power to support national policy, that they are essentially on the same courses, the power of the Executive, the power represented by Congress and its legislative responsibilities, the power represented by diplomacy, by our economy and by our military forces. All of these contribute power, not only to national security, but to national foreign policy as well, which is only natural if indeed the two are virtually identical.

So not only should those who make our foreign security policy work hand in hand, they should agree roughly on what are the valuables worth protecting. I am sure we would not agree among ourselves if we decided to make a list, we would have a debate at considerable length bearing in mind that every entry we made on such a tabulation, we imply a willingness to expend resources for security.

They should also agree, I would say, on the geographical location of most of our valuables. We can’t protect the entire world. We can’t defend the North Pole or the South Pole. We must be aware of where this center of gravity of our interest lies. It lies primarily in North America, in the Western Hemisphere, but then overseas in certain areas where we have our principal markets and the sources of our raw material.

Now, if indeed we could agree on those matters, what do we need to protect and where are they to be found, that guidance would be of enormous importance to the State Department and the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces to give the kind of guidance which has never been given in the past, to my knowledge.

It would also give us guidance as to where to look for our friends. Our vast number of alliances, we have some 52, are those which grew out of the cold war, out of the feeling that the need for friends, which primarily was a need to contain communism which was a very real threat of that period and isn’t entirely dismissable as a threat today, but with the growth of our economic problems certainly I would think that we should consider economic factors as of primary importance.

Supplementary economics takes on a new importance as we seek new alliances. Certainly the proximity of those allies is going to be very important and makes, indeed to me, our relations with Latin America and with our immediate neighbors Canada and Mexico far more important than we had thought about them in the past.

Now, just to conclude these remarks, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that if indeed we take the point that national security is far broader than the military defense, although it includes military defense, if indeed it means really the protection of all those things of real im-
importance to us wherever found, against whatever enemies of whatever sources, and if we agree that foreign policy and national security policy are indistinguishable and the same people should work on the goals and programs and the coordination, then we are at least giving guidance to our government and to those elements of government, both executive and the legislative branches which I would think would be of considerable value.

Also, I would add just one warning, one which has, I think, come out of history—the great danger of living beyond one’s means in foreign policy, particularly in this period when the needs of security are increasing and the resources are declining. In the past, we have often been guilty of allowing our foreign policy objectives to outrun the resources available to achieve them and thereafter to protect the gains. The objectives and supporting means must be in balance. Changes in one should cause adjustments in the other.

When security resources threaten to be inadequate to support foreign policy, it is time to trim the sails and head for more quiet waters, safely within the essential primary source of our interests where the adequacy of protection is relatively assured.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much, General Taylor. Without objection, your formal remarks will be put into the record in addition to this very fine summary that you have made.

[The statement referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

If we regard the task of national security as the protection of the principal national valuables—that is, assets, interests and sources of power which we value as individuals or collectively as a nation—we must recognize that the scope of that task is rapidly expanding. The valuables requiring protection increase in number in some rough proportion to growth in population and gross national product. Their geographic distribution widens with our growing dependence on foreign markets and sources of raw materials to meet the needs of our economy.

We are discovering the importance of our economic interests in lands far removed from this hemisphere—the Persian Gulf, Nigeria, and Indonesia for oil, South Africa for chromium and uranium, Australia for bauxite, iron ore and lead, South Korea for tungsten, New Caledonia for nickel, Malaysia for tin and rubber. Favorable trade relations and open sea lanes to such areas have become assets of prime importance to national security.

As our valuables increase so do the possible threats to their safety. The danger of war will always be with us as long as the motivations for violence continue to exist—fear, hatred, envy, rapacity and fanaticism. But the content of the threat is changing under the influence of new factors—the growing military preeminence of the U.S.S.R., indications forecasting a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the accumulation of conventional weapons in countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, discontent with the status quo among the emerging nations. Economic and environmental factors are creating conditions adverse to peace and stability—worldwide inflation aggravated by the price of oil; global shortages of food, fertilizer, and arable land, leading to famine, drought and floods; bitter competition between nations for new sources of food and raw materials. The success of OPEC in raising oil prices is stimulating efforts to form new cartels for controlling the price of commodities such as bauxite, copper, phosphate, tin and rubber.

As we are exhibiting political and social traits which diminish the security of assets to which we have attached great value in the past—a general loss of national unity and purpose, social polarization into rival factions contending for the benefits at the disposal of government, pervasive distrust of authority and institutions, and a decline in effective government at a time of intractable problems of uncompromising urgency.
In a period when the valuables requiring protection increase and the dangers thereto proliferate, the national resources available to provide them protection are declining as the result of various causes. In the first place, in the wake of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandals, national security has fallen into disrepute, suspected of being used by government as a cloak for official misdeeds and a subterfuge for encroachment upon civil liberties and a free press. Military budgets are viewed as exorbitant and wasteful; foreign programs as diverting funds which should be applied to domestic needs. The nation is tired of foreign involvements, mistrustful of military solutions, and disappointed in unhelpful allies. The problems of inflation and recession turn the national interest inward, away from causes of concern overseas.

The sudden disaster which befell American policy in Southeast Asia has been a major blow to our security, reducing world respect for American power, limiting our ability to influence world events, and undermining further our confidence in our institutions and in ourselves. Our conduct has given cause to our allies to doubt our future reliability and has led some like Thailand and the Philippines to seek accommodation with Communist neighbors. Our overseas bases have become insecure not only in the Western Pacific but also in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Our security suffers also from the debilitation of many of our allies who continue to support us. Europe and Japan have suffered severely from the effects of the exorbitant rise in oil prices. Political weakness is endemic in most of the European democracies, arising from a concurrence of uninspired leadership, narrow parliamentary majorities, and serious economic problems in addition to those created by oil. Communist parties are exploiting these conditions, particularly in Portugal and Italy. Cyprus remains a divisive issue both for NATO and for our national relations with Greece and Turkey.

American military strength has been impaired by the Vietnam war and the rapid reduction of forces which ensued. Military budgets, while rising dollar-wise have been insufficient to offset inflation, to pay the high price of volunteers, to replace equipment losses in Vietnam and in subsequent transfers of stocks to Israel, and at the same time to modernize overage weapons and equipment.

There is considerable question regarding the ready availability of the forces which we have in case of an emergency. While the War Powers Resolution of 1973 has never yet been invoked, its provisions place restraints on the authority of the President as Commander-In-Chief which are certain to raise Constitutional issues the next time a President feels obliged to resort to armed forces or even to reinforce an overseas garrison without prior statutory authority or declaration of war. The debate between the President and Congress at such a time would offer unlimited possibility for delay, precluding any decisive action such as President Truman, took in resisting the sudden invasion of South Korea, or President Kennedy in establishing a naval quarantine of Cuba.

The adoption of the all-volunteer system for raising military manpower injects further uncertainty into the readiness of our military forces for prompt use in sustained combat. While it is possible to maintain a fairly small expeditionary force of volunteers in readiness for immediate dispatch overseas, we cannot expect volunteering to replace the battle losses which such a force will suffer after entering hostilities—casualty lists do not attract volunteers for the infantry. Very shortly, the President and Congress would have to agree on calling up reservists, recalling the draft, or both. Until such an agreement is reached, a cautious President, faced with the terms of the War Powers Resolution and unsure of a reliable source of trained manpower would be likely to await a declaration of war, and a decision on manpower before sending troops overseas into action from which Congress might recall them.

These changes in the scope of national security and the decline in resources available to support its programs are of direct concern to foreign policy. Most of the programs of foreign policy are for the attainment of objectives which contribute to national security. The resources for carrying out foreign policy programs are drawn from the reservoir of Executive, diplomatic, economic and military power generated to meet the needs of national security. A decline in these resources diminishes the means available to carry out foreign policy.

These considerations suggest thoughts regarding the relationship between foreign and security policymaking. An obvious one is that, since most foreign programs support the goals of national security and since the power generated to assure national security supports foreign policy, the artisans of security and...
foreign policy should either be the same officials or be closely associated with one another.

In cooperation, they should reach agreement as to the identity and location of the valuables which will require protection under the conditions anticipated for the future. As a practical matter, we shall never be able to protect everything of value everywhere—we shall need to delimit a primary security zone of defensible dimensions, encompassing most of the valuables necessary for our continuation as a great and prosperous power. While the heaviest concentration of such valuables is in North America, we also have many important markets and sources of raw materials as far south as the Tropic of Cancer. Outside this hemisphere, we must maintain contact with our overseas garrisons and our principal trade partners in Europe and Japan. In addition, we shall have growing interests in sources of scarce raw materials in countries such as Australia, Indonesia, South Africa and Nigeria which though distant are likely to be accessible under most conditions. It will be essential to our security to protect the principal air and sea routes linking these extra-hemispheric areas to the United States.

Such a primary security zone would not be a sphere of influence to which we would limit our political, economic and military activities—in normal times, the entire globe would be our oyster. But its protection would be the highest priority requirement of national security to which fully adequate resources must be assigned. Its boundaries would serve to indicate to the State Department where it is most important to cultivate friends and allies, to the Department of Defense where to direct its primary strategic attention and military planning, and to economic policymakers what markets and imports to count upon in a time of intensified economic warfare. Overall, we would know where we must be able to exclude or suppress troublemakers, where they would be challenged at some risk, and where they must be tolerated because of the remoteness of the scene from American power or proximity to that of an enemy.

I mentioned the need to cultivate friends and allies in relation to the needs of our future security. Whereas in the post-World War II period we needed allies who could contribute to the containment of Communism, now our foreign policy should direct its efforts to maintaining a favorable world power balance and assuring firm relations with nations which produce raw materials in short supply at home and provide markets for our exports. Such an orientation toward economic considerations would emphasize relations with hemispheric inhabitants like Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil—often taken for granted in our fixation on more distant interests. Foreign policy must henceforth contain a larger segment of economy policy in the interest both of national security and national well-being.

We shall also need cooperative friends abroad to collaborate with us in solving some of the vast international problems which transcend the capabilities of any single nation—those arising from excessive population growth, global food and energy shortage, and the desperate conditions in many emerging countries. If we do not bestir affluent nations to massive efforts to help the destitute we may soon live in a hostile world of warring camps divided on lines of wealth, race, or revolutionary ideology.

In this period when the needs of security are increasing and the resources declining, we owe a word of warning to foreign policymakers that they should be careful to plan within the limits of their likely means. In the past we have often been guilty of allowing foreign policy objectives to outstrip the resources available to achieve them and thereafter to protect their gains. The interplay between objectives and supporting means must be continuous, changes in one causing appropriate adjustments in the other. When security resources threaten to be inadequate to support foreign policy, it is time to trim sails and head for more quiet water, safety within the primary security zone where the adequacy of protection is relatively assured.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. BUNDY, EDITOR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

BIOGRAPHY

A graduate of Yale University and Harvard Law School, Mr. Bundy is editor of the quarterly, Foreign Affairs. Mr. Bundy was a high official in the Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1961. He has served from 1961 to 1964 first as Deputy Assistant Secretary and then as Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense. From 1964 to 1969, Mr. Bundy was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. During the years 1969-1971, he was visiting professor and research associate, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure to be before this committee again in a setting very familiar to me from past years. I have always had the greatest admiration for this committee.

I have submitted as my statement the full text of an article which I wrote last fall called International Security Today and I will simply make this oral statement to run very quickly over some of its highlights.

Let me say that in confining my remarks to international security, I am very conscious of the broader scope that one might attach and probably now should attach to the term “national security,” the point General Taylor has just been making. In my mind, if you look at the totality of our foreign policy, those matters that fall under the ceiling of economics, dealing with other industrialized countries, dealing with the OPEC countries, the problems of energy resources, food, all those countries’ problems belong at least as high, and I would say generally on a higher priority basis than the issues that have traditionally fallen under the heading of international security.

Then there is an emerging group of problems arising in relations between developed and developing nations, such as law of the sea, things like long-term resources, commodity agreements, North/South relationships—all of those are vitally important parts of any comprehensive agenda of future foreign policy.

I have, however, chosen to confine myself to the field of international security in its more traditional sense because I think there is a limit to what any one witness can and should put before you.

In a nutshell, my thesis in my statement is that we have over the years had a tendency in this country to try to put all the things we were doing abroad under one overarching principle—of opposition to communism from roughly 1947 until at least the late 1960’s and most of that period that historians call the cold war.

I think we would all agree that one of the problems, one of the ways of thinking that got us in the Vietnam war was this tendency to think of any threat involving a Communist element of being of equal significance and requiring a thorough response wherever it might be.

I think one of the rather general points of agreement among people who have been trying to feel their way, and many of these have been going toward a new basis for foreign policy, has been that we should get away from such monolithic single-principle ways of looking at the world in the field of security or any other.
Mr. Wolff. Mr. Bundy, if you don't mind, that is the second bell for a vote. We will suspend here for a few minutes while we go over to vote and then return.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. Wolff. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order. I am sorry for the interruption. Our members will be coming in and out. This is one of those crisis days that we have. A number of votes are occurring on the floor as well as committee meetings on legislation that is going to come before us tomorrow. The resolution of Turkey is going to come before us tomorrow as well as the sale of Hawk missiles to the government of Jordan. There are meetings being held on that now. Would you please continue?

Mr. Bundy. As we try to get away, then, from any single overarching theory of security and American policies in the field of security, one possible way is to say that because we got overextended as we certainly did in Vietnam that we should pull back entirely and not intervene anywhere, at least in the Third World.

I think you have to take a more reflective view on that and you can go about creating such a view by the measures we used to use when I was in the policy-formulating area in the 1950's, conceptions of what Americans' crucial or vital interests are, gradations of interest and saying therefore we should take a strong line because of the precise adjective we choose to demonstrate the weight of the interest we have in a given area.

I don't, myself think that is very useful. You usually end up in a rationalization, that is, you are using the adjective that you arrived at for a host of other reasons. Therefore, I suggested in my statement that we look at certain areas of the world to see what we think a reasonable pattern of peace would be in relation to these areas and then ask how much does that pattern matter to the United States.

What is an effective role for us to play in relation to that area? That is a framework of thought that I refer to the committee. In carrying that out, I have named three areas. First: the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviets, the security of Europe and the security of Northeast Asia, including both Japan and South Korea.

I think it is fundamental to any security policy that we should have an effective balance of nuclear and conventional power with the Soviet Union. That is easy to state but particularly difficult if the nuclear side, the strategic arms side, should turn into continuing race—since I wrote the article, the Vladivostok agreement has put a cap on it, if it can be agreed, so perhaps we are a little less in danger of an unlimited race. But we still face the necessity of trying to work for lower levels of nuclear arms on both sides.

This has the most critical bearing, as we have seen in the recent non-proliferation review conference, as to whether other nations are going to try to get into the nuclear weapons business. The United States was in a very embarrassing position in this conference urging other nations to subscribe to the nonproliferation treaty and so on while it was quite clear that the obligation that the treaty imposed on the nuclear weapons powers, chiefly the Soviet Union and ourselves, to get at a reduction of their own nuclear forces had not been carried out.

So there are wider reasons to seek a nuclear reduction and of course there are basic elements of trying to reduce tensions and reduce the
clear economic burden, which gets me back again to General Taylor's point that our own economic welfare is fundamental to any concept in the field of security. Those are a few words on the balance with the Soviet Union.

An inescapable obligation, I believe, is our commitment to Europe. NATO has stood for 26 years. It has kept more than the peace, it has kept the confidence of Europe. It has kept a climate in which Europe has made very great progress—not always doing things we would like, but standing for similar values, standing for the basic things that we stand for. That is a commitment we must and should maintain.

The third of these areas where it seems to me we have also a strong commitment is Northeast Asia, which means Japan and Korea as well. In the case of Korea, we have American ground forces on the land and air forces within very short distances. I think we have to maintain that commitment as well, partly because those areas, or at least Japan, are one of the great centers of economic power of the world. Moreover, I think it is frankly healthier that Japan should not be tempted to embark on a large additional military outlay of its own. That is basically a healthy position, one much healthier in terms of the attitudes of other countries in Asia and of the past experience that they at least cannot possibly forget in the Second World War.

Now, I regard Korea as an integral part of that Northeast Asian commitment and it is for that reason, as I have spelled out in the statement, that I believe that we should maintain a very firm posture there. That doesn't mean every last man necessarily of the 40,000 men we have there now, but it does mean that we should maintain that force and should maintain an adequate level of assistance, or the opportunity for the Koreans to purchase military arms, so that South Korea can maintain a firm deterrent military posture.

That position is under fire at the present time because of what unquestionably are inexcusable repressions on the part of the Park regime—no question about that—and it raises in this particular context the issue of how the United States should conduct itself toward a regime that must be described as dictatorial and is operating in ways contrary to all of our democratic ideals.

I think you have to take those situations on, but on a case-by-case basis, never accepting them happily, but in this case the strategic situation is such that if we were to attempt to withdraw, I think it would create a significant danger of an attempt of some sort by the North against the South which would likely engage the great powers that surround Korea on the ground and almost necessarily would engage us as well.

We are for better or worse necessarily the guarantors of that situation—the guarantors one might say both ways. Our presence is directed overwhelmingly against action by the North against the South. It serves also to remove, I think, effectively any possibility of any rash action by the South against the North. Korea is the Poland of Asia as has sometimes been said: 'It is a place of inherent danger. It is a place where if a vacuum were to be created, sooner or later it would engage the great powers who surround it. Hence, it seems to me that we should maintain that posture.'

I would not join with those who urge a deliberate reduction in our support for Korea to show our disapproval of President Park. I think