the administration has been wise, unlike the cases of Greece and some other ones I could think of, in not appearing to condone Park's behavior.

We have privately, if I understand it correctly, expressed our feelings, but the opposition in Korea of which I have some knowledge would be the first to say that they would like to see the situation handled in their own way. It is to us not an unfamiliar situation, parallel in many ways to the declining years of President Rhee in the late fifties when in the end liberal elements and students stood up to the Government and overturned it and I think that is what is likely to happen in Korea. I don't know when, but I think it will be a Korean solution.

It is a cycle all too familiar in Asian governments generally and particularly familiar in Korea and the opposition there feels as strongly as Park that they fear Kim Il Sung in the North. There is no question of their underlying position and I would tend to be guided by that feeling in this and other situations where we are dealing with dictatorships—what is the underlying view of the people.

So I think the fact that there is this repression should not change our strategic posture and our basic way of looking at Korea. A number of people have suggested recently that we should be looking for some future agreement in Korea involving the Soviet Union, Japan, China, and ourselves. I think this is indeed a long-term hope and need. But in view of the very strong hostility between Peking and Moscow I don't think it is a likely or practicable venture in the near future or one we should anticipate by disengaging ourselves in any degree. We need to stand firm in short there.

The common thread of those firm posture cases is that these are great centers of economic power in the world. They are areas in which the structures of peace, to use the basic rubric that I am using in this whole analysis, do exist and have worked. While it is not cheap to maintain the insurance premium, if you will, on these structures of peace, these are cases where it is impossible to envisage a truly stable situation that wouldn't threaten really great power conflict without the posture and the continuing contribution of the United States.

These are cases, one might also say, where our policy since 1945 has worked and has given hundreds of millions of people an opportunity for peaceful and constructive lives and that is not a small contribution and is one I think we can maintain.

Those are the firm cases. When you move beyond those cases, one needs I think to be very much more careful and selective. To take an easy case at the other extreme, Africa is a case where, as shown by the Congo U.N. intervention in 1961, the game is to keep the great powers from getting into a confrontation situation. That is a sound policy and I think it should be maintained. It may be tested if there is conflict between the white nations of southern Africa and the black nations.

There would be very serious conflict there. I think it could be handled by the U.N., but not by any formal great power rivalry.

Next, I would turn to Latin America. While we are accustomed to think of Latin America as a particular American concern and for years the foremost American concern, and our alliance ties run very deep there expressed in the Organization of American States, I would
say that we should be moving toward a kind of dissociation of the
great powers in Latin America, similar at least in principle, although
with a very different sweep of other activity, to the situation that pre-
vails in Africa.

That is, we should be thinking very seriously in terms of abandon-
ing the OAS treaty or at least downgrading, putting to one side, the
security aspects, leaving American security problems to be handled by
the Latin Americans overwhelmingly.

There are morals in that which I won't take the time to spell out in
my oral statement, in our behavior toward Chile and other circum-
stances. We must be prepared to let things happen that in the old way
we would have regarded as very dangerous Communist upsurges—
dominoes, political or military—and not act as we have sometimes done
in the past. So that is the very major change that I am talking about.
I think that is the direction I think we should be moving in Latin
America.

Next, Southeast Asia. At the time that I wrote this article I hadn't
anticipated what has now happened in Vietnam, but I assumed that
something like it would in due course happen and I think the recipe I
have given in the formal statement would hold. We should be looking
toward a Southeast Asia where no great power appears to threaten
any great power in or from Southeast Asia, an area where four great
powers exist, though not on the same footing:

Japan's influence is overwhelmingly economic. The presence of the
Soviet Union is limited; it and China for the moment are preoccupied
largely elsewhere, and our own position is now economically greater
than it was a decade ago. Although we have the Philippine situation as
a special case, I think we should be looking to a different kind of
equilibrium in which the nations of the area largely take over the
responsibility for their own security.

Then I set great store by the Organization of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, which I think can be expanded, which is already a very useful
get-together framework—not a secure thing in itself, but one where I
think they could develop more.

That is a broad outline in short, but Southeast Asia should be looked
at as a case of strategic dissociation.

Now you come to the most difficult geographic areas, the Middle East
and areas contiguous to it, because as you look at the Middle East, you
must think of the Balkans to the west and north and of South Asia to
the south and east. South Asia today, particularly after the Indian
victory in 1971 over Pakistan, is a case where there is no longer any
reason that should lead us to be involved or take sides.

Indeed, as I have argued in the paper, it was a mistake probably to do
so in the very beginning. So that is a relatively easy case. It does, how-
ever, involve the difficult questions that this committee and I am sure
others in the Congress have been concerned about—are we getting into
some kind of naval race in the Indian Ocean?

My own instinct would be to say that we should go ahead with the
Diego Garcia base as a modest effort, but we should then be seeking an
agreement with the Soviet Union which would get our forces elimi-
nated or under very tight control on either side—again, an example of
great power dissociation.
The Balkans, to take the other extreme, are an equally difficult case, especially in the case of Yugoslavia. Their great power dissociation can be only a long-term hope, that over time the nations of the Balkans will develop their own internal strength working together and so become an area that neither great power meddles with, neither we nor the Soviet Union, and that would not threaten the peace.

The most difficult case of all is the one of the Middle East and it affects the others. There is no escaping, for the time being certainly and as far ahead as the eye can see, what in effect is a strong moral commitment to Israel and at the same time the set of relationships with the Arab nations that includes our desire to work out over a period of time a proper relation in the supply and pricing of their oil on which we are more dependent than we should be, and that dependence is a vital fact. But what we should be working toward is to assist in producing an agreement between the Arab States and Israel which would have as its ultimate objective the acceptance of Israel as a state in the area. I think there must be some solution for the Palestinians in the West Bank area or some form of self-determination that could be carried out with respect to the parts of the area that are not part of Israel in the West Bank.

But what we should be looking toward is a situation where the danger of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States is reduced or eliminated. That danger was made acute to all of us in October of 1973 at the time of the alert of all forces that was carried out at that time. That confrontation danger should, one hopes, eventually be reduced by a situation in which Israel is accepted.

I am not trying to pretend we can get a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem easily. Indeed it is very difficult to see a settlement that does not involve a possibly more firm commitment to Israel than we now have.

You should do things that assist and avoid doing things that detract from the picture that you have in your mind, and the picture that we ought to have in our minds is a Middle East that would not be an area of great power confrontation.

Now, that is my thesis in a nutshell, Mr. Chairman. I haven't tried to talk about the Sino-Soviet situation which may be the worst single danger in terms of peace. War isn't likely at this time, but we must never have it out of our minds. There is not much we can do about it. We should not take advantage of the Sino-Soviet hostility, but I think we should try to pursue the broad posture of détente with the Soviet Union and direct relationships with China that are now objective.

I have talked too long, but that is a set of framework of thinking and a set of specific applications of that thinking in the area of security for the consideration of the committee, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bundy follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Hon. William P. Bundy**

**International Security Today**

The tendency of Americans to think of foreign policy in universal terms goes back to the beginning of the Republic. As George Reaman has pointed out most forcefully, from "no entangling alliances" to "making the world safe for democ-
racy" to the Truman Doctrine, the argument over what to do abroad has habitually been conducted as if it concerned the acceptance or rejection of some single touchstone principle or slogan. Temperament and geography joined to form this tendency; we were a nation set apart both physically and in the perceived roots of our national identity. And history decreed that in its terms of time we should move with breathtaking speed from a nation seemingly unaffected by the wars and struggles of others to one that has seen itself, at least since 1941, deeply affected by any substantial conflict anywhere in the world.

Today, misguided universalism is one of the principal charges brought against postwar American policy, especially in universitides and among younger men and women. The Truman Doctrine, distorted well beyond its language, let alone the practical actions of its authors, is seen as the root of a worldwide American posture that became, in the 1950s, a new "Imperialism." And in the 1960s President Kennedy's Inaugural appears at the rhetorical apogee of American activism, and the tragedy of Vietnam as its ordained culmination.

One could argue at length the substance of these views, especially the charge of "imperialism." If one insists (with the backing of history and the dictionary) that the primary meaning of empire requires an intent to control or dominate in one's own interest, then it seems to me a total distortion of anything that even John Foster Dulles, let alone John Fitzgerald Kennedy, had in mind. I incline to the recent judgment of Alastair Buchan, a discerning, and on occasion unsparing, critic of the United States:

"... if one examines serious American thought over the past quarter-century ... one will find a consistent thread—going back even to the wartime years—that reflects any ambition of American dominance, in favour of a plural relationship of many centres of power and responsibility, codified by a variety of multilateral agreements and subject to the constraints of international law."

To follow up this thought with the care it needs would be "...the scope of this article." What is relevant here is that one of the principal contributors to the charge of imperialism, and to its ready acceptance in many quarters, has been just this tendency of American leaders to express themselves in universal terms. The worst case and grossest miscalculation thus became symbolic instead of aberrant, and colored all else.

Ironically, the critics of universalism all too frequently fall into the very vice they condemn. Because America got into trouble in the Third World, it becomes a "plain lesson," apparently, to ignore what goes on there. And even on a more sophisticated level the theme of "intervention" has been the centerpiece of much writing and of many college courses in foreign relations, as if all choices were somehow generically alike, all starting points the same, and history and geography compressible into the vise of some single theorem.

While the searing experience of American participation in Vietnam continued, prolonging its torture year by year, it was perhaps natural for disillusioned Americans to seek the origins of the war in an oversimplified version of postwar history, and to project its lessons in terms that tended to be as universally negative as the previous policies had been thought to be unthinkingly activist. And perhaps one should even be tolerant of the urge that led the Administration in 1969 to propound the Nixon Doctrine, seeking to define American security policy in terms of universal principles of common action, chiefly that associated nations should take a larger share of the responsibility for their own defense. In hindsight, perhaps the kindest thing that can be said of that Doctrine is that it was only a smokescreen pending the development of new relationships with China and the Soviet Union. At any rate it left unanswered all the key questions of relative importance and closeness of ties even among the nations more or less aligned with the United States, and gave no guidance at all for such situations as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even in East Asia, the geographical area where it most clearly applied, it was often ignored, while in the case described by its author as "its purest form"—Cambodia—the results hardly call for emulation.

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1 See John Lewis Gaddis, "Reconsiderations: The Cold War: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs, January 1974.

2 The Buchan quotation is from his Reith Lectures, of the fall of 1973. For a recent acute comment on the issue of American Imperialism—drawing a useful distinction between "imperial" and "imperialist" behavior—see Charles Franckel's review of Raymond Aron's The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973, in The New York Times Book Review, July 21, 1974, p. 2. In another lecture from which the present article has been adapted, delivered at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service in April 1973, I went a little further into the issue, far enough to be cleanly persuaded that it is complex and demanding, above all, of precision both in example and definition.
If the first Nixon Administration is seen by history as a largely successful rear-guard action to limit the reaction to Vietnam and prevent it from swinging right over to an isolationist and militarily weak posture, this considerable accomplishment will surely be ascribed rather to its dealings with Peking and Moscow than to any contribution from the Nixon Doctrine. As it has wisely been allowed to fade into limbo, however, the same President was caught up beginning in 1972 in a new wave of oversold slogans and descriptions of policy, with “détente” and “a generation of peace” leading the way.

“Let us talk things, not words,” Justice Holmes once wrote. The hard problems of international security have not disappeared. Indeed, more than ever, in a time when economic problems have top priority, is it necessary to be as careful and precise as possible about the claims of security on American attention and effort. Suppose, then, one were to wipe the slate clean of slogans and doctrines, and proceed without seeking the frame at the outset some abstract formulation of American national interest. Suppose, specifically, one were to examine the regions of the world, one by one, asking for each particular region two questions: (1) In view of power realities and potential threats of international conflict, what conditions there would be most hopeful for relative peace and for national independence and development? (2) How much does it matter to the United States whether those conditions are maintained (or attained where they do not exist), and what should the “American role” be?

To think of the world in regional terms is, in fact, justified by more than the desire to get away from pernicious abstractions. In the leveled world that existed after 1945, it was inevitable that two superpowers should come into being, and their interaction remains central. But now, as the glacier of the cold war has receded both in Europe and Asia, the regions of the world have reassessed a life of their own; their resistance to outside domination and influence is much greater; most are, in the true sense, nonaligned; and the number of nations entitled to rank as major powers is much larger, with some of these aspiring to dominant roles within their regions. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet hostility is now at least as important as the continuing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Indeed, as Alastair Buchan has noted, the whole power structure of the world has changed out of all recognition in the short space of only about ten years. In the new situation, it makes sense on the face of things for American policy to handle each regional arena as separately as possible—to identify with the forces at work in each region, dealing directly with the superpower rivalry where we must, but striving to keep that rivalry, or the quarrels of any great powers outside a particular region, out of the picture to the maximum extent possible.

It turns out that there is “something old, something new, something borrowed, and something blue” in such an approach. “Old” where the superpower rivalry persists and is reflected in a major force confrontation, “new” where the rivalry has receded and should be kept that way; “borrowed” where an additional transition is briefly required; and “blue” for the toughest set of cases, where the rivalry cannot be soon disentangled and where the gravest threats to world peace exist—or at least those the United States is most in a position to affect. There remains one area little subject to American influence or action, the land frontier between the Soviet Union and China, and one cannot omit a coda on this subject.

Let us start, then, by examining these “old” areas, in which the American role remains inescapably at the core of what happens. These are: the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the security of Europe, and the security of Northeast Asia, above all Japan and Korea. The basic analysis of the late 1940s—that it would be gravely threatening to world peace and to American security alike if the Soviet Union were ever in a position to gain effective control of the major resources of Western Europe and Japan—remains at least as valid today, when the ecumenic power of these two great centers of civilization has multiplied beyond the furthest dreams of postwar American policy-makers. And the security of these areas depends on the maintenance of some sort of strategic balance by the United States.

Until the last few years or so, it has been possible to take that balance almost for granted. Even when the Soviet Union, after the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, set out to catch up completely with the United States in the later 1960s, one could not see the basic effectiveness of the American strategic nuclear posture being seriously disturbed—for it had been clear for years that
each side had an ability to damage the other, even if it hit first, that went far beyond any rational use of force. This was Churchill’s balance of terror raised to new peaks.

In about 1966, however, it began to be clear that the Soviet Union meant to press still further, to create a situation in which it attained what is called nuclear superiority and used the psychological impact of this achievement to awe others. This is the situation that the United States sought to meet—with limited success, it now appears—in the SALT I negotiations, and that now has been addressed both in the SALT II discussions and in Secretary Schlesinger’s challenging proposals in the current defense budget.

Obviously, it should remain the American objective to keep a situation of effective parity, and at the same time to work toward major reduction in strategic nuclear capabilities. But, especially after the Moscow experience this June, we must now face up to the distinct possibility that the present Soviet leadership, far more heavily influenced than American leaders have very been by military voices, will not settle readily for mutual agreements that would meet these objectives. Fine if they will, but if not, what should we do? Do we pursue them wherever they go, or stand pat at a certain point, adding to our capabilities only those elements clearly required?

I think the latter must be our basic answer. One cannot ignore psychological factors, but I am strongly attracted to the line of argument developed by General Maxwell Taylor in the April issue of Foreign Affairs, that if we remain competent and above all cool, the spectre of Soviet nuclear superiority becoming important additional power will turn out to be a will-of-the-wisp that has simply wasted vast Soviet resources. Refinements and continued research may be needed—all I understand Secretary Schlesinger to be now proposing—but in the last analysis the United States should refuse to be lured further in an unending strategic arms race. At some point, I believe, we must in effect say to the Soviet Union: “What you are doing is a colossal diversion of resources that should be employed for your people and for others. Neither we nor others will let you obtain the power advantages you apparently seek in this crude way. Moreover, we and others will take your diversion of technical capacity into account in weighing whatever economic exchanges you may propose to meet deficiencies in your people’s welfare that your own policy has permitted.” If it came down to just such a test of economic power versus nuclear/psychological power, I do not believe we would lose.

In advocating this course, a major consideration is that it is not, in fact, new increments of Soviet strategic nuclear power that could at any time overawe Western Europe and Japan. In the outpouring of rather esoteric writings on the present problem of European security, some writers talk as though the jeopardy of American cities were a new factor; on the contrary, it is an old story, a case of déjà vu if ever there was one, which in fact formed the core of de Gaulle’s appeal against reliance on America more than a decade ago. To the extent that this thought could enter the European (or Japanese) bloodstream, it must have done so then; the “more” that is now in question will not make any significant difference.

However, the growth of Soviet military power in recent years has, it seems to me, had one very major effect on the continuing role of America in helping Europe and Japan maintain their security—by which one must mean not only simple independence but an atmosphere free from pressures or compulsion. Over the years, it has been axiomatic in American policy statements that in due course, and preferably sooner rather than later, the European NATO countries should assume greater responsibility for the defense of their own territories.

On the nuclear side, however, this makes even less sense today than it did a decade ago, when the United States went wrong at Nassau. Meaningless beyond a certain point in relation to American nuclear power, Soviet nuclear power nonetheless makes any such European power more than ever vulnerable, if anything an invitation to attack rather than a useful deterrent. More than ever, however unfortunate it may appear to some, strategic nuclear power cannot be truly shared.

The real question in Europe is, of course, whether the Europeans cannot do more to assure their defense on the ground. This is a tangled subject, on which any direct cut gives only the illusion of an answer. Obviously, as George Kennan points out in his recent article in Foreign Policy (and Michael Howard earlier in what is called “Finlandization”)—is both an exaggerated spectre and one that, to
the extent it exists, could be readily avoided if the European NATO nations put modest additional effort into their ground (and air) defenses. Equally obviously, a Europe lulled by détente and preoccupied with economic concerns is not about to make such an effort unless the threat comes to seem much greater, or unless more economical defensive military techniques come into play (here, especially in the light of the Yom Kippur War, there must be real possibilities in the field of conventional weapons alone, within this decade).\footnote{See "Some Military Lessons of the War," in Strategic Survey 1973, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp. 32-50.}

The result is a conundrum I believe Americans simply have to live with. The increase in Soviet conventional forces and weapons in the European theater is formidable. Europe is more than ever dependent on the American nuclear umbrella, and the required degree of confidence in that umbrella is linked to substantial American forces on the ground and to continued American leadership in NATO military affairs. Of course, this does not mean that present force levels are sacrosanct—but any reductions should not be significant unless compensating Soviet force reductions could conceivably be agreed at Vienna. As for the balance-of-payments impact, of course we should have as much offset as possible for the foreign-exchange cost of our troops, but in a world where the slightest change in comparative exchange rates—or oil prices—can dwarf the impact of troop costs on the economies of America and her NATO partners, it is time to put even that aspect into proper perspective more than Congress did in the Nunn-Jackson amendment last year.

The same basic conclusions concerning the American role apply in the case of Japan and Northeast Asia generally. Japan has been through a series of shocks in the past three years, two named after President Nixon in 1971, one more recently that Japanese leaders sometimes call the "arabushokku." Nonetheless, it is striking, especially to the visitor who experienced the moods of 1971 and 1972, how much Japan has become in the process more independent, more resilient—and much more clearly oriented away from military measures of any sort, let alone nuclear power, as an answer to the serious problems of her economic interdependence with the world.\footnote{See Saburo Okita, "Satellite Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, July 1974.} When Mr. Fukuda slashed the budget last December to fight inflation, he lopped off a full proportion of the Japanese defense budget—and in the mood of Japan today any idea of nuclear weapons is completely to one side. I believe Japan's mood is not only inevitable—beyond our capacity to influence if we wished—but healthy for the whole structure of peace in Asia.

Rather Japan—and Korea which remains, in the Japanese term, the dagger pointed at Japan's heart—must depend for their security and continuing confidence on two conditions. One is a continued balance among the four great powers of Asia, which appears reasonably assured, barring a complete reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union. The other, now I believe more fixed than ever in the Japanese mind, is the American Security Treaty. Lately, of course, Japanese opposition to that treaty has been muted by the known Chinese acceptance, even endorsement, of it; more basically, my hunch is that even as Japanese subjectivity feelings toward the United States have been rudely shaken by a number of disagreeable incidents in the past four years, so the rock of defensive reliance and interdependence has emerged if anything more firmly fixed.

As for Korea, it lives surrounded by the three great resident Asian powers and for that reason dependent on the fourth, the United States. I see no serious threat to peace in Korea at the present time, though I am deeply concerned over domestic trends that seem to reflect a too-familiar Asian cycle in the embryonic stages of learning democratic self-government. But Korea remains by geography alone a dangerous place, and one where any local eruption would almost surely engage great powers directly. The insurance premium of American military assistance and 20,000-40,000 forces on the ground, which none have reason to fear, is a very modest one indeed, and one that no other country, least of all Japan, could handle.
as pressure-by-action is quite another. The experience with Diem in Vietnam in 1963 has shown us two of the difficulties of such a course—the unpredictability of the result (that the "right" people may not be the ones encouraged to take power), and above all the deepening of American involvement which comes from having played a visible role. In the wake of the tragic assassination of Mrs. Park, one does not know what to predict in Korea. But whatever change may take place, its sources should be wholly Korean (as indeed they were in both 1950 and 1961).

In short, if one looks at the great centers of economic power in the world, which are also the great historic centers of war in the twentieth century, one sees that there are structures of peace in being that have worked remarkably well for 20 years or more. Call them local balances of power, cases of effective deterrence, even situations of strength; their existence is vital to any structure of world peace, and worth a great deal of effort to preserve. And, I believe, on any objective judgment the American role in these areas remains today as important as it has been at any time since World War II; one cannot imagine a structure of peace in Europe or Northeast Asia that did not involve a major American presence and ties there. Here is where American policy since 1945 has clearly worked, and with some impact on the opportunities for peaceful and constructive living of hundreds of millions of people. If it be argued that the chances of aggression in these areas are small—as they are—the response should be (1) that it is the American posture that has kept these chances low, and (2) that in an affluent atmosphere, the requirements of confidence is, if anything, more demanding—the threshold of disruptive external pressures lower—than in the earlier years when turmoil was almost taken for granted.

At the same time, neither the major NATO nations nor Japan are now in any significant sense actors on the security scene in other areas of the world. In the light of history this is a startling fact, and if history were our guide we should expect to see it change. I am inclined to think that it will not do so; that the combination of multiple dependence on other countries: for the substance of economic life, basic trends away from nationalist goals, and the effect of affluence will keep Western Europe and Japan "sort of" areas in terms of exerting traditional fronts of power around the world. Yet this does not for a moment diminish the importance of maintaining security in these areas for its own sake. And in terms of its effect on world peace the result surely is mixed: one may mourn Western Europe's addiction from a responsible role especially in the Middle East (as Fritz Stern does brilliantly in a recent Commentary), but East Asians generally would be deeply concerned if Japan ever became assertive there.

At any rate, few formulations have deserved, and had, more rapid burial than the talk of a five-power world balance of power in which President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger engaged two short years ago. It is fundamental—and was before the flash of lightning of the October War made it starkly clear—that Europe and Japan are today powers that neither threaten the independence of others nor can be expected to act effectively in the security sphere except solely, and even there modestly, in their own defense. Perhaps they are models of what all nations might become in an interdependent world.

III

From Europe and Japan—where the structure of security and the U.S. role are clearest—let us move to the polar "new" case of Africa. Egypt and North Africa apart, here the clash of great powers in the postwar world has been least, after a near-collision in the Congo in the early 1960s. More recently, the experience of the Biafra rebellion suggests not only that outside nations do well to avoid taking sides in African quarrels (as the French did to their cost), but that even humanitarian outrage may lead to misguided policy conclusions through inadequate understanding. In short, it is plainly the right rule of thumb to let disputes in Africa sort themselves out and to avoid great-power involvement.

This rule may again be strained if conflict should arise between a grouping of the Black nations of the area and the white-dominated countries of the south, a possibility that may have been brought nearer by the impact of change in Portugal. In such a case, there would certainly be most uncomfortable choices of

posture for many nations, the United States included. And it would be an immense
test of diplomacy, ending—one must hope—in a new boost for U.N. peacekeeping.
In short, if Western Europe and Northeast Asia are cases where it is impossible
to visualize lasting peace without an American role, exactly the reverse is true in
Africa. There every consideration of geography, limited local power and past histor
converges to a clear conclusion. There the action and interaction of the great
powers must and can be kept to levels that will never cause their relations one
with another to be drastically affected. In such a region of dissociation, military
forces of superpowers and great powers alike should not appear except in re
sponse to a Resolution of the United Nations or the clear-cut request of a respon
sible regional group of nations.

IV

In geography, historical association, depth of American private involvement,
and at the present time in alliance ties, Latin America could hardly appear more
different from Africa. Yet I would argue that in a spectrum of American involve
ment that runs from Europe and Northeast Asia, at one extreme, to Africa
at the other, Latin America belongs not only nearer, but very near, to the African
pole. From now on, its security problems should be left to Latin Americans to resolve.

There are four strong reasons for this conclusion: all have evolved rapidly in
the past decade; together they warrant a complete change in the kind of thinking
that led to the formation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948,
the disastrous Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961, and the Dominican Intervention as
recently as 1965. First, experience in Cuba and elsewhere has made it evident
to the Soviet Union, and to Communists generally, that there is no praiseworthy
threat or not, it calls less and less for anything resembling concerted OAS action.

Second, Latin America now has a diversity of outside nations to turn to,
especially for economic ties. The resurgence of European investment and the
growth of Japanese interest are economically healthy and good for easing, over
time, the frustrations of excessive dependence on the colossus of the North. Less
happy, but largely beyond our control for the moment, is the multiplication of
arms sources for too-eager purchasers.

Third, individual Latin American nations are much stronger than in the past,
with Brazil in particular emerging as a major regional power; potentially domi
nant over her neighbors. This situation may have its dangers in terms of intra
regional threats to peace, but the problem is not one on which outsiders can help.

In such a plural and self-reliant Latin America, the fourth aspect is that the
United States cannot now play a useful security role even if it would. At best
we can ease tensions by keeping a low profile and, I suggest, guiding our economic
treatment of difficult regimes (left or right) more by the consensus of Latin
American opinion and less by principles for the protection of foreign investment
that have less and less abstract appeal or validity in the eyes of developing
nations generally. In Chile, for example, we went far enough to be blamed, not far
even to affect the outcome. Our acceptance of Allende was right; some of our
economic pinpricks, through multilateral organizations were ill-advised.7

My own conclusion (hardly original) is that it is time we wound up the OAS
tie, or at least put to one side its security aspects. (We would thus be shedding
at one stroke 22 of the 43 formal allies so ringingly invoked by advocates and de
tractors alike of the past American posture.) Let Latin Americans decide how
they wish to handle threats to security there: Let all the great powers have access
to Latin America freely, provided they behave themselves as judged by Latin
Americans. We would find, I believe, that our cultural and trade ties both would
benefit from such a security divorce between Latin America and the United States.

Left thus to itself, Latin America may not be wholly peaceful, but the chance
that its problems will engage the risk of wider hostilities could drop to zero—and
above all it would be a much more healthy situation for all Americans,
North and South. If a capsule term were needed, one might speak of a neutralized
Latin America, just as Africa has always regarded itself as neutral.

7 See Paul D. Sigaud, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," Foreign
Affairs, January 1974.
"Neutralized." The word is like a bell, bringing back associations with Southeast Asia, to which I turn next.

It is a slippery word, used about Southeast Asia at times as a euphemism for Chinese control (notably by the French in the mid-1960s; it is a feature of French views that they have always tended to see China as inevitably dominant throughout East Asia)—at times too it has been the label for individual agreements that were in fact temporary makeshifts, as in Laos. But as a broad description of the proper situation for Southeast Asia, it has plain validity today, and is more and more the way events and policies on all sides are moving.

Not that movement toward a wide regional association has been rapid or yet important; the high hopes some of us in government held for a while in the late 1960s, especially for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), do not seem likely to be soon realized. Perhaps, in a self-reliant Southeast Asia, Indonesia may at some point pose the kind-of threat to its smaller neighbors that Brazil might do in Latin America; and North Vietnam may end up in control of most of Indochina, one way or another. There is no way to assure peace in Southeast Asia, or development either—which now seems likely that oil and other minerals will make most of the countries more prosperous than anyone supposed possible a decade or two ago. (Let the New Left economic revisionists account for the fact that important economic stakes have come into being only as the United States withdraws.)

The real point, though, is that a modus vivendi among the four great powers of Asia does exist fairly solidly with respect to Southeast Asia. For a long time to come China will have as her top priorities a potential conflict with Russia and her own internal development (not to mention the succession problem now so acute). Japan remains wholly an economic actor, and while Russian interest has grown in recent years, it remains well below a level that can be regarded as threatening.

In this situation, the United States should remove its military presence from the mainland just as rapidly as possible. One must allow a short grace period for Indochina to sort itself out: from a recent visit there I believe the greatest chance of collapse in Vietnam, by far, lies on the economic side, and that it would be tragic if an American refusal of adequate economic aid (to recover from an artificial economic situation we did so much to create for them) were to contribute to that result. But essentially, we must accept that our withdrawal is irrevocable, and specifically that the continued presence of U.S. air forces in Thailand is both a wasting bluff vis-a-vis North Vietnam and a substantial impediment to Thai progress. Thailand does remain a crucial country, and there is a case for dispensing SEATO in favor of a limited-term American treaty of support for Thailand (which is all SEATO has really been for years). But the large American military presence in Thailand makes no sense at all: the visitor can discern, while it is wholly out of keeping with the promising move to civilian government there, and with the efforts of that government to return to the traditional, and now very sensible, Thai policy of dealing evenly with all great powers.

Offshore, our naval and air bases in the Philippines have the weight of tradition, and the negative merit that they do not seriously aggravate the local situation but are on the whole welcome and accepted. Nonetheless, once the end game in Indochina is over, the case for retaining anything substantial there seems to me much weaker. A major naval base can be useful in support of the Seventh Fleet, but certainly neither naval nor air bases are worth any significant cost either in terms of aid to the Philippines or, perhaps more serious, in terms of potential involvement in Philippine politics or internal insurgency problems. Whatever we need for strategic purposes should be available in Guam—and at first blush I am most skeptical of the case now being pressed for bases in Saipan or anywhere else in the present Micronesian Trust Territory.8

Southeast Asia is, then, a "borrowed" situation, which should and can move to the new and desirable status of great-power dissociation—or, if you will, strategic dissociation coupled with full economic access for all, on terms laid down by the local countries. The question today is how long the transition period must be. So far as the American posture is concerned, I hope it can be very short.

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An eminent advocate once had to argue before the Supreme Court an appeal that involved three crucial issues, two very strong for his side, the third weak-to-fatal. As he began his argument, Justice Holmes put his head down on his arms and closed his eyes, after saying gently: "When counsel reaches the third point in his brief, he may count on my undivided attention."

My "third point" is, of course, the Middle East and its surrounding areas—South Asia and the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf area, the Arab countries and Israel, and the Balkans.

South Asia and the Indian Ocean, if they stood alone, would be an easy case for the "new" principle of great-power dissociation. Certainly no great power should covet India, or any part of South Asia, for its own sake. At an earlier period, the United States became for a time deeply concerned with India's security at a time when she was threatened by China; more recently, the Soviet Union has been trying to enlist India, and to take advantage of Indian territory, as part of its effort to contain and oppose China at every point around the periphery of Asia. As long as China courts Pakistan, India will be somewhat responsive to extra Soviet efforts—but a serious, perceived threat from China seems unlikely again, and the India of Mrs. Gandhi, or any likely successor, will, I believe, be most unlikely to give the Soviets significant military bases or any other direct help. The whole thrust of Indian policy remains, rightly opposed to this, directed toward serving India's own interests along basically nonaligned paths.

Yet the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean forms a part of the Soviet efforts to exert power in the Persian Gulf and in the Horn of Africa. It is the connection with the Middle East that tends to drag South Asia into great-power rivalries—just as it was this connection that led the United States into what I regard as one of the clearest single errors in all our postwar policy, the 1954 decision to bring Pakistan into the Baghdad Pact (and SEATO as well) and to arm Pakistan extensively.

Unfortunately, whatever the United States does toward India today is darkened in Indian eyes by the memory of our posture in the 1971 Bangladesh war. There, apparently largely to keep on the good side of China during the courting period of our rapprochement with Peking, we tilted toward Pakistan and sent the Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. Our policy, then seems to me to have been a classic case of doing the wrong thing in a regional situation for the sake of wider relationships—exactly the reverse of the priorities I am urging in this article, and one of the prime examples against "universal" principles as a guide. It is in large part the memory of this episode that makes Indians unanimously condemn the current Administration effort to build up the remote Island of Diego Garcia as a base from which naval and air transport forces could operate in case of need.

Compared to the numerous ships the Soviet Union may have in the Indian Ocean area at any time, the expansion of Diego Garcia is, even in regional terms, a modest response. With the Suez Canal opening up sometime this year—which will take most Soviet ships but not the larger American ones—I am prepared to believe the Diego Garcia development makes sense. Another factor may be that, since the experience of the Yom Kippur War has made alarmingly plain how difficult it can be for the United States to send any kind of arms or forces to the Middle East, we need even the most roundabout means of access. Ideally, as Iranians in particular are suggesting, an overall agreement for both superpowers to keep their forces out of the whole Indian Ocean area would be the most sensible solution, but that is not yet in sight. For the time being we have to live with a partial exception to the rules of a South Asia left to itself, but only at sea and I hope not for long.

The crucial problem, of course, is the Soviet offensive in the Middle East generally—an offensive aimed at effective influence in the Arab countries and with a special thrust at Iraq, an opportunistic backing of the Dhofar rebels, and political action in Somalia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. One can understand a Soviet desire not to have hostile states to the South—and the recent trend for Iran and Turkey, for example, to put their relations with the Soviet Union on a reasonable footing is wholly understandable. Yet the attempt by the Soviet Union to take advantage of the Arab-Israeli struggle, for whatever influence it can get, and to spread its efforts all through the area remains all-too-reminiscent of classic Russian policy aims in the past, made far more critical by the depend-
enforce on Middle East oil of Europe, Japan, increasingly the United States, and—as we realize more today—a host of developing nations.

In weighing what kind of security structure could preserve peace in the Middle East, one must start with the fact of Soviet military preponderance. Turkey is protected by NATO, and Iran by its own rapidly growing, military capabilities and by a relationship with the United States so close that in the event of clear aggression the chance of the American nuclear deterrent coming into play must appear substantial; if worst came to worst, Iran would make of its northern areas a “scorched earth” to resist Soviet invasion. But in the area as a whole, it is inevitable—and merely underscored by the British withdrawal from the Gulf and by the difficulties the United States experienced in 1973 in bringing its power to bear—that the Soviets could prevail in any large-scale conventional confrontation in the area. It is not in the cards for the Middle East ever to become an area where peace is kept by “total engagement”—by a combination of nuclear deterrence and an effective barrier of conventional forces. With the advantage of hindsight, one can now see the whole formation of the Baghdad Pact as a mistake simply for the reason that it appeared to be aiming at such a situation, but with no real possibility of achieving it.

Similarly, if one thought even partly in the obsolete patterns of the 1950s, it could be argued that the American position in the Middle East should rest on close ties with Iran and Israel, the most powerful nations in the area militarily. The picture of Iran and Israel as American surrogates is one that haunts intelligent Arab minds; even today one has to fight it off when discussion becomes really frank in Arab countries. It is, I am sure, a profoundly false picture—belying not only the independence and self-reliance of these nations, which are not by the furthest stretch of imagination “client states,” but the intent of American policymakers for many years past. We support the independence of these two key countries for their own sakes, gratified at the progress each has made in improving the lot of its people (and seeing in this the vindication of past policies that go back to 1946 and 1948), and we see in them nations that can play important roles in a regional structure of peace—but not for one moment at American bidding or for the sake of specifically American interests.

What, then, of a regional structure of peace? Already one can see such a structure emerging in the Persian Gulf area, disrupted only by excessive Soviet military support for Iraq and by Soviet political and subversive activities around the periphery of the Gulf. With the withdrawal of the British in 1971, many feared a vacuum there. Instead, Iran and Saudi Arabia have emerged as effective regional powers, capable of handling any but the most grave threats from the outside. If, and it may be a big if, these two very different nations can learn to work together, if both exert their power with restraint, and if Iran balances its relations, as is now doing, with Pakistan and India to the south, then a stable and reasonable structure may be well along in the making.

The Arab-Israeli confrontation is, of course, far more difficult—not to see the answer, but to realize it. That Egypt and Syria have now joined Saudi Arabia and Jordan in seeking measured ties to the United States is a major change for which President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger deserve great credit. It reflects once again the ingrained tendency of Arab nationalism to resist Soviet influence—not to become dependent on any great power—and this is one of the cornerstones for the future. But new ties with Arab states will not be permanently effective and constructive unless they are accompanied by a reasonable and just settlement of the basic issues between the Arab states, as well as the Palestinians, and Israel. If, the biggest “if” of all in the world today, that could be accomplished, then and then only would self-denial by the Soviets, the giving up of their 20-year effort to fish in troubled waters, be virtually forced on them by the stabilized force of Arab sentiment.

Moreover, as negotiations continue toward an ultimate settlement, it is not too early to seek to frame the kind of superpower situation that should be an explicit or implicit part of the ultimate structure. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a major magnet—but not the only one—tending to draw the Soviet Union and the United States into direct involvement and commitments in the Middle East. The easing of that conflict would be only a partial success if the outcome brought either superpower into a position the other could regard as threatening. Specifically, the United States may have to take on substantial added commitments to both Arab states and Israel, as part of the process of getting a settlement. I heartily concur with the argument of Nadav Safran, elsewhere in this
issue, that such commitments will be worth making if they are the price of peace. But at the same time it seems to me axiomatic that as much of the burden as possible should be placed on the United Nations, and that whatever bilateral aid is furnished by the United States to one group of nations should not become the occasion for the Soviet Union redoubling its efforts with another group.

To put it differently, the United States may have to accept an interim role as the warrantor (Mr. Safra's phrase) of the agreements, and as the power with strong ties to both sides. But it should be the object of American policy to disengage from such commitments just as rapidly as possible, and in the meantime to take every possible step to make sure that the Soviet Union cannot regard them in an adversary light. For in the long run, although a strategic Middle East cannot ever be "neutralized" in the sense that areas more remote from the superpowers' territory and interest can be, it must at least be an area where no major power feels threatened, and where all have access for peaceful purposes. This is no small order.

Before leaving the Middle East, I must refer to one area that Americans do not usually link to that area, but that the Soviet Union does. This is the situation in the Balkans, and most particularly the question of Yugoslavia. Here I cannot improve on the analysis and prescription of John C. Campbell in last July's Foreign Affairs. Conceding the present dangers, especially in the period after Tito dies, he sees the long-term hope in just the terms I have been using throughout this article:

"A respectable degree of regional cohesion, combined with a tacit code of non-intervention by outside powers, is the kind of pattern that may be emerging in other areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. It is still a rather nebulous concept for those regions, and to envisage it for a group of nations so close to the U.S.S.R. and including members of the 'Socialist Commonwealth' requires more than a little imagination. Yet it is not unimaginable that the Balkan nations may increase, inch by inch, their cohesion and their ability to act in their own behalf; that a network of peaceful economic and other relationships between them and the rest of Europe will grow up, which no one will want to destroy; and that the weight of the United States and of China in the world balance, though neither attempts to build a specific anti-Soviet grouping in the area, can have some restraining influence on Soviet decisions. For a complex border region which has never known security it may be the only way out."

As for the situation of Greece and Turkey—linked partly to the Balkans, partly to NATO, partly to the Middle East—no regional ruble would have helped the United States to guide its actions through the tragic events of this summer. American policy toward both countries has suffered from other preoccupations, and in Greece from a failure to show much greater coolness toward the colonels and all they represented. But Cyprus was and remains inherently an apple of discord, and the most one can hope is that Soviet hopes of an enduring shambles will be disappointed and the NATO flank restored. For NATO and American protection do still matter here.

VII

In going through the regions of the world and assessing what a reasonable structure of peace might be, I said earlier that a coda had to be reserved for the contingency of armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Although the influence of the United States on that situation may be small, it is extremely helpful that we now have balanced relationships with both nations and have made clear our total opposition to a conflict that would be both a disaster for mankind in itself and a breeder of deep trouble for the future however it came out. If the threat should at any time become more acute, I see a strong case for the other nations of the world, acting in concert, to apply the strongest possible deterrent measures. Economic sanctions in particular have a new meaning today; one need not be guided by their failure against Italy in the 1980s, or more recently against Rhodesia.

As for the state of the Sino-Soviet relationship short of war, their hostility has of course been a major factor tending to defuse the dangers to peace in East Asia during this transition period. Yet we need not fear that the two will ever again work together as they did in the 1950s, and if a change in either should produce an easing of tension between them, it could contribute in a different way to a world of regional security systems based on the self-denial of great powers.
I have gone on too long and still only scratched the surface of a vast subject. To the long catalogue of possible conflicts between nations, one must add the problem of terrorism by groups or individuals, to which no answer is yet in sight. And some would argue that the question of access to resources raises whole new, or very old, possibilities of military action; it is a nightmare that I cannot see coming to pass unless there is a failure of world statesmanship, including American, on a scale amounting to breakdown. Surely an equitable pattern of sharing and rewards can be brought about well short of that point.

Most of all, I have not tackled the question of reducing the appalling burden of armaments in the world today—this has been deliberate, for on the old chicken-and-egg question whether arms races are more important than tension, I am on the side of tension. If regional situations can be stabilized, then it will be possible to get nations to reduce their arms, and even the problem of multiple sources of sophisticated arms, now involving our friends more than rival Communist suppliers, could lend itself to specific agreements limiting a traffic that less and less has any fragment of economic excuse.

Nor have I tried to apply my conclusion to an assessment of the conventional American force posture. Here, in a nutshell, I believe psychology—vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is more important than at the outer reaches of the strategic arms issue. If we are to maintain the kind of firm posture I believe is essential in Europe and Northeast Asia alone, these needs would dictate something very close to the ground and air forces we now have. Moreover, I believe our naval forces must now be emphasized somewhat more, as part of a general posture of fire prevention—"counter-intervention" in Professor Samuel Huntington's phrase—that is, the capacity to bring small increments of military force quickly to bear at any point where Soviet or other intervention is threatened. It is a hard time for military planners; the range of contingencies is great, and should more and more embrace joint military participation with several other nations, acting at the request of the United Nations or of regional groups of nations and with the objective of stopping or at least localizing conflict where it arises.

Unfortunately, the prospect of outright and enduring peace remains remote—as we have been reminded too much since President Nixon employed that rhetoric. The world is more complicated than that. The challenge to limit conflict, to permit people to get on with the business of living, is one that will not go away. I hope it is some help in meeting that challenge to suggest that from now on, as we Americans become able to think more cooly and objectively about problems of peace, we should also do so on a more precise and regionally oriented basis, pursuing many policies rather than a single over-arching one, accepting complexity as a fact of life, and adapting the American role not to any single vision of the world but to the realities of power and political attitudes in its diverse parts.

Mr. Wurth. Thank you, Mr. Bundy. I think both of you gentlemen have set the stage certainly for us to inquire further into some of the reasons why you have come to these conclusions. I think it is important for us in trying to set a framework for the future to try to profit by a review of some of the problems that we have had and the way we have perceived those problems as well as a review of past errors, if there have been errors.

**VIEW OF VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT**

I would like to throw the first question to General Taylor. In your statement, you spoke of the disaster in Vietnam. We are just coming out of that syndrome now, the whole question of Vietnam. In my recent travels throughout the world, heads of state have questioned me as to our ability to be able to perform the same functions that we did before.

You said a disaster. Was it a mistake to have gotten involved in there in the first place or a disaster because we failed?

General Taylor. Mr. Chairman, in my notebook, I just happen to have an outline of what we did wrong in Southeast Asia. I have 14
points and I believe you would have to call me back for 2 or 3 days to cover them all. If you want me to just pick the terminal phase, to me the greatest tragedy so far as policy is concerned, was, as I saw it, the cease-fire of 1973 and its aftermath.

It was far from ideal agreement because we deliberately connived at the Big Lie—with a capital B. L.—which Hanoi had been propagating for years that they had no soldiers in the South. Yet anyone who paid any attention knew that they were there. Nonetheless, we accepted a cease-fire which presumed they were not. But we knew they had 150,000 or 200,000 North Vietnamese troops in the northwestern part of South Vietnam.

We did that in order to get our prisoners back and I must say I had great sympathy for our negotiators who had to decide whether to accept that or not. They did accept it and I said publicly that I thought we were not coming back with bands playing and flags flying, but at least we had brought our flag back, and I felt we had met the basic purpose of some 13 years of effort in Southeast Asia, namely to give South Vietnam an opportunity to choose its own form of government and not have the Communist form of government imposed by force of arms.

PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO FINAL VIETNAM DISASTER

Unfortunately, it didn’t turn out that way and both the executive and the legislative branches in my opinion made serious mistakes. The executive branch failed, as I understand it, to explain clearly to Congress the commitment that was being made by our representatives with regard to the continuation of military aid. Congress was not involved in the very strong intimation, if not a threat, that we would resume the bombing of Hanoi if they violated the cease-fire.

On the side of the legislative branch, the action taken in subsequent months, the one which made it illegal to retaliate against North Vietnam if indeed they violated the cease-fire which they proceeded to do, remove from the President any chance to make his threat plausible.

Whether he should have retaliated or not is beside the point. Meanwhile the growing indications which certainly we opened in this country, certainly they observed in Saigon, that a termination of American military and possibly economic aid was just a matter of time led to the decision on the part of President Thieu to undertake a withdrawal of troops which his commanders were incapable of doing.

EVALUATION OF RECOMMENDATION TO SEND FIRST COMBAT TROOPS INTO VIETNAM

Mr. Wolff. Could we go a little bit further. The report that General Ridgway prepared in 1954 warned that any involvement in Indochina would lead to defeat or full-scale warfare.

Did you recommend to President Kennedy that we in 1961—I believe it was you who recommended that we use combat troops in Vietnam. Was there any evaluation of the Ridgway report any thought given to it at that time?
General Taylor. In 1961 I took back to President Kennedy many recommendations, one of which was to send in not combat troops, but a logistics force of engineers and medical units to assist in the Mekong flood, and thus to try out the reaction to an American military presence. Thus, we could withdraw the troops if we wanted to after the flood situation was over.

In other words, it was a trial approach to see what the reaction to the presence of American troops would be. I made that recommendation because among other reasons President Diem had requested American troops and we had to give him a reply.

I believe your question is pointed more at did we ever ask ourselves whether he should have intervened in the first place. I don't recognize your quotation from General Ridgway. He said it would be a great error to intervene under the circumstances in South Vietnam at the time of Bien Dien Phu. Any generalization that we should never send military forces into Asia—well, I would never make it. I would never want any troops anywhere unless it was strictly in the national interest. So really the question in the case of Vietnam has always been was it in the national interest to intervene at the time or not.

Mr. Wolff. The point is, this was the thrust of the report as I understand it. But the important element that had been advised many times over is that if you are going to get involved there, that you have to get involved fully or not at all.

EXPLANATION OF GRADUAL INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Why was the strategy set up to go in in the fashion that we did?

General Taylor. Going in slowly, the so-called gradualism?

Mr. Wolff. Yes.

General Taylor. There were a number of reasons. One was the overall concern at the outset of the reaction of the Soviet Union and China. Nobody knew exactly what our direct military involvement would mean in international circles, particularly in our relations with those two countries.

The feeling was let's feel the situation out and see what happens. I think a deeper feeling was one which was expressed by President Kennedy so many times in all his directives to me that this is a Vietnamese problem basically and we want the Vietnamese to do their own fighting and the Americans to do only those things that have to be done which can't be done by the Vietnamese—a very sound principal, I felt.

So there was always the feeling of let's build up the Vietnamese with minimal military help from the United States to see if they cannot carry the load, so hence the gradualism which developed.

INFLUENCE OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Bundy, we talked earlier too and I am not going to talk about the question of the assassinations that is being handled by other committees, but the question that I would like to throw to you is whether or not the CIA or the DIA or the State Department research organization, INR, are they somewhat the tail that wags the dog? Do they make the decisions, or in the context of some of these events were the decisions made by others?
Mr. Bundy. I take it you are referring to their intelligence contribution to the major national policy decisions. Certainly the State Department doesn’t engage in covert operations abroad. As intelligence agencies, the CIA, DIA, and INR part of State are, as I always visualized it when I was in the business and this was the side of the business I was in, advisers and should be regarded as advisers.

The responsibility for intelligence in any agency is to provide the top policymakers with the most thorough picture of the facts of a given situation. I shouldn’t use the word “facts,” Mr. Chairman, because I still remember the teacher in my law school who said, when you were asked to state a case and you said “The facts in this case are so and so,” said “Don’t give me the facts. Only God knows the facts. Tell me the evidence.” At any rate, the most thorough picture of the evidence in a given situation and the best available judgment on where it is tending, and we used to be asked this frequently in the national intelligence business, what would be the consequences if the United States took X and Y actions. In all this, intelligence is an advisory function.

Mr. Wolff. Sometimes doesn’t it create a momentum of its own?

Mr. Bundy. It may in a few cases, but it is a little like the old statement “The power to tax is the power to destroy,” and Justice Holmes replied “not while this court sits.” In other words, not if you have policymakers on top of their job. So very seldom, so seldom that I simply can’t find an occasion.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE BAY OF PIGS

Mr. Wolff. May I refer you to the Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, but that is the covert action side. One of the key elements in the Bay of Pigs was that the State Department intelligence agency were not involved. The DIA as far as I know was not involved in any way, shape or form. The Bay of Pigs was exactly the kind of thing that an intelligence advisory organization exists to at least give a chance of avoiding.

The Bay of Pigs was an operators’ situation. The operators in the CIA and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with only a few people from the top levels of the Departments of State and Defense—presented the situation to the President without the kind of comprehensive intelligence input that has taken place in every other major decision that I can recall, practically.

EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Mr. Wolff. We have a CIA. We have a DIA and then we have within the Department of State an intelligence operation itself. Do we need three organizations like this? Don’t they come into conflict?

General Taylor. I think they are necessary, sir, although perhaps not in the same relationship that exists today. The DIA is primarily for collecting military intelligence and it represents the collective interests of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The CIA in the sense we are talking about is the senior organization that pulls in national intelligence from all contributors: DIA, State, FBI, and where appropriate, AEC and so on.
So there is a need for an organization that will try to assemble those things of interest to the President and his immediate advisers. Yet the system also serves those who are interested in technical information, for example, the Pentagon wants to know about the technical performance of aircraft, tanks, ships, and things of that sort and must have that information and must have an inhouse organization to process it.

So this is a sort of dichotomy of interests, national and departmental, in intelligence which has troubled the organizational people ever since the National Security Act, 1947.

Mr. Bundy, I would say that there certainly has to be a set of service intelligence organizations and preferably a pooled-together organization. DIA is that, although I am not clear as to how effective it is on that job. On the military intelligence side, military intelligence is a very specialized business. You are looking at hardware, guns, battle units. You are doing things that people have to be experienced to do well.

So there is a need for an organization or organizations to deal with the function of military intelligence and then there is clearly a need for an organization to deal with the function of political intelligence and what that should be and it is in the area of political intelligence that your overlap is perhaps greatest. The State Department research outfit and the CIA draw on people who are working in political intelligence all over the world. There is a perfectly serious argument that you ought to have the whole of that in the State Department and not have a separate outfit.

That is a view that Secretary Acheson used to hold—that the whole idea of a separate, necessarily somewhat overlapping Central Intelligence Agency that would be in the political business was a mistake. The argument within the State Department was that the regional bureaus could do it all and you didn’t need any research outfit. In effect, you ended up getting both a research outfit in State and a Central Intelligence Agency functioning.

**Separation of Political Analysis From Policymaking**

I have seen case after case where there was overlap, having two sets of judgments. But having particularly a Central Intelligence Agency judgment that was divorced from any close ties to policies and provided stereoscopic and more objective judgment was still, I think, worthwhile.

You can’t get away from the fact of an intelligence tie to policymakers. DIA has never been able to get away from it completely and even INR (in State) can’t help but be caught up in the atmosphere of the policymaking organization of which it is a part. Therefore, you got something very distinctly new in a Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, doing the national intelligence estimates, which happens to be an assignment by the act of 1947. The Director of Central Intelligence was given that job and also the job of analysis of the Soviet Union and China—centralizing that—and I am talking now wholly about the overt side of the Agency.

The same method proved out over the years, over and over again, to improve the product—obviously human error has still existed, but
I think we have a much better product and much better intelligence advice through having the structure we do have.

**INACCURATE COUNT OF VIETNAMESE COMMunist STRENGTH**

Mr. Woff. One further question. In our research we did find an article in a magazine by a former CIA employee who asserted that the estimate of North Vietnamese troop strength was deliberately underestimated. They were purposely maintained at lower levels; is that true?

General Taylor. The answer is, if I am right, it is not true. There were very sharp arguments between the intelligence people. There were three corners, as I recall: Our intelligence people in South Vietnam, DIA, and CIA on the strength of the enemy, but who do you count as the enemy?

Would you count those nonexistent troops in North Vietnam insofar as you can identify them? Do you count all the guerrilla battalions of the Vietcong? But then you get down into the ancillary bodies, the porter groups that are put together intermittently to carry supplies, the little village representatives of the Vietcong who are doing simply political tasks, and you get into a gray zone where the question is where do we stop counting?

**LACK OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN VIETNAM**

Mr. Woff. General, I was in Vietnam. What was wrong with all this intelligence-gathering function that we had going? Why is it that we couldn't get information? What I am saying is I am given to understand that in the war that we made an aerial mosaic of Vietnam to determine just exactly how many villages there were in Vietnam.

In fact, Mr. Bundy, I believe it was during your time that the President asked you about how many villages there were in Vietnam, villages or hamlets, and someone told him 3,000 or 4,000 and when the aerial mosaic came out, there was something like 8,000.

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that particularly, but I do recall getting dizzy looking at the most detailed possible photographs of Vietnam whenever we had to decide on any marginal military operation or things of that sort. If there was not 100 percent coverage, some of the areas were not ones that we were operating in in any particular degree, in the Ca Mau or the Highlands.

**EVALUATING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION**

I think a lot of the intelligence evaluations that came to us, largely through the CIA and through the detachment of the CIA outfits, were a good deal better than other evaluations that came to us through operating channels. As far as the overall intelligence job was concerned, I am afraid that problem was never lack of material of what might be medium-grade quality, that is, all kinds of standard information and location and that kind of thing. It was making judgments from that and the lack of experienced people constantly on duty, the shorter tours of duty. But I am giving you a very rough picture.

I think the judgments were faulty in many cases not for lack of medium-grade material, but for lack of top-grade material, real
penetrations of the other side, real knowledge of the kind that we had in World War II from breaking enemy ciphers and from all kinds of other things. I happened to work on that during the war.

We didn't have top-grade material. The other side had a big edge on us. They were way ahead throughout the war. There is no escape from that conclusion. It was one of the colossal milestones of trying to conduct a war of this sort where the North Vietnamese had a much more effective apparatus to begin with.

Mr. Wolter, Mr. Guyer,

Mr. Guyer, Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult to carry on a dialog when we have this kind of business that we have on the floor. Somebody said it is like trying to watch television while they keep turning the dial all the time.

SECRET IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

I don't know very many countries in the world that have an open-house search of so-called cloak and dagger operation. I am told there are something like 2 million agents in the world, 400,000 in the Soviet Union alone. Isn't it true there are things that should not be revealed?

In other words, we know, for example, in the fight on crime, if it were not for information by stool pidgeons we wouldn't make very many arrests. I think Dean Rusk was correct when he said if World War II was put on the screen every night for the public to see, we wouldn't have won the war. There are things you don't bring to the surface and things that must be done in a secret kind of way. I see no good reason to put agents' names in the Yellow Pages.

The Secretary of State at that time told us that the only hope of a cease-fire was to pretend that certain troops weren't there—and I think that is generally true. I don't know how many men, 100,000, 125,000. Everybody knew they were there, and I find it hard to know how civilians can have military judgments when we impose certain kinds of demarcation lines.

CONTRADICTIONS IN NUCLEAR POLICY

Where do you get to the point of people not believing what you are doing? For example, if they know we will never drop the first nuclear bomb, there is no point in even talking about that. Would you say that we in America would be the ones to drop the first nuclear bomb? I don't think we would.

General Taylor. I wouldn't expect it, but I would add I don't think we should ever say “never” in describing our future behavior to anybody.

Mr. Guyer. We have the SALT talks in which they are talking about the limitation of strategic weapons.

General Taylor. This is a world of many conflicts, but because of the enormous implications of war, or war at least between the major powers, one would think and I would hope that we will be very, very slow in resorting to overt warfare on the scale of World War II.

But, I think there is going to be a tremendous competition among nations to keep alive in this world with the population growing, with hunger rife, with shortages of resources that are essential to national
economies. There are so many causes for conflicts ahead, it is really frightening and we have to be able to respond.

BASIS FOR POLICY DECISIONS TOWARD INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

Mr. Guyer. How far should we go in policymaking, which is the chief motivation of this committee? Should we impose our way of living on other people? Can we successfully have relations with all countries—there were more than 148 of them the last time I looked.

Mr. Bundy. I don't think we can set it as the aim of our policy to have other nations behave as we do. We aren't by any means perfect in living up to our ideals—far from it. I don't think you can affect other nations on an individual basis. I do think that whether a nation is democratic or not that ought to be a significant factor in our attitude toward it.

There are cases such as Korea, as I stated in my testimony, where we have to accept situations that involve a degree of dictatorship and repression because the strategic situation is so critically important that you have to do that and we have to deal with nations such as the Soviet Union that are clearly totalitarian dictatorships.

Mr. Guyer. We don't hear a criticism of North Korea. I understand from the testimony of one of the people in Korea that South Koreans enjoy about 90 percent of the same rights we do.

Mr. Bundy. A great deal can be said in South Korea. In North Korea, that is totalitarian dictatorship.

Mr. Guyer. I don't hear of any freedom of the press there.

LIMITS OF U.S. INFLUENCE AMONG CLIENT STATES

Mr. Bundy. None whatsoever. In dealing with nations dependent on us when they are what is called client states, however close the ties and however great the dependency, they are going to think in the end their way and you can hope to influence it by your example and you can hope to influence it by saying what you think is a sounder and more progressive way of governing, but in the long run they are going to do it their way. They come out of very different cultures so the short answer is I don't think you can do it.

I still think that it is a major concern to make the world a more healthy and safe place for nations to enjoy the blessings and inefficiencies of democracy.

STANDARDS FOR TRADE—STANDARDS FOR FRIENDSHIP

Mr. Guyer. Howard K. Smith said here on Flag Day that there are only five countries in the world that are democratic, that we have survived for 50 years. We talk about everything from Rhodesia to the Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union as it relates to our trade agreements. We are talking in terms of holding back arms from Turkey. Now we are selling arms to both sides in the Middle East. It is a matter of degrees.

Mr.沃尔夫。Let's go a step further if we could, on the question of what delineates friends or allies. What delineates when we should help one nation or another? Does what impinges upon our national interest
in the United States override an overall security interest? I am talking specifically now about Turkey. I am talking specifically now about the question of the raising of poppies, opium poppies in Turkey that find their way back to the United States in the form of heroin, this is just as much of a war that we are conducting today as against a physical enemy attacking a NATO force.

**BROKEN AGREEMENT BY TURKEY ON OPIUM PRODUCTION**

What would be your recommendation on something like this, whether or not we should continue our aid. Put the Cyprus question to the side. We are faced with a situation where Turkey after not only consultations but an agreement with the United States, agreed not to produce opium. We found that 80 percent of the opium to make heroin that comes into the country was of Turkish origin.

The Turks decided that they would go back into the business. They said that they would control it. Every law enforcement man I have spoken to says that they cannot control it. If they could have controlled it before, it would have been done.

So now we are faced with the decision shall we render aid to Turkey to support NATO's eastern flank while Turkey doesn't support us and supports the dope habit of some 600,000 people in the United States?

General Taylor. First, I would say that that is a national security issue. The health of our people and the control of the drug traffic are certainly in the national interest and they are also national security interests. A meaningful answer is not something you can address just to that issue because Turkey has other assets which are very valuable to us in terms of bases and intelligence sources and the control of the Dardanelles.

**WEIGHING FACTORS IN FRIENDSHIP**

Mr. Wolff, What good are the bases over there if our home bases are being invaded?

General Taylor, I am coming to that. Without the Dardanelles you cannot consider military action in the eastern Mediterranean and I hope you never will. But if one is inclined to consider military action in the Middle East, you can't do business there unless you have the Dardanelles closed and Turkey is the only power that can close it.

Mr. Wolff, General Goodpaster was here and testified before the full committee. He said it was within our capabilities to close the Dardanelles and to close the Straits of Marmara.

Mr. Guyer, We did have 20 bases in Turkey.

General Taylor, My only point, sir—it is a good one but it doesn't answer your question—is that when you consider our national interest vis-a-vis Turkey, you certainly have to consider the opium question, but you also have to consider all of these other matters and then stand back and decide where the balance lies before making your decision.

Mr. Bundy, I am not quite sure about this but I am not aware of any categorical commitment by Turkey at any time to stop this. I think it was an implication that they would do so and we would give them some aid for a while.

Mr. Wolff, As a memorandum and agreement.
Mr. Bundy. Then I am not adequately informed, but at any rate I do not believe it was a firm international obligation. But you have to ask yourself, I think, whether it is going to be likely, given the nature of human beings and Turks in particular, to get them to behave better on this matter by withholding aid. It makes you feel better, I am sure. It makes us all feel better.

Mr. Wolff. Why should we be giving money to support someone who is operating against our national interests?

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Mr. Bundy. I am only talking about the practical problem. You know how we would feel in the United States if somebody said "I would have given you this, but I won't because of the way you are behaving toward blacks." This isn't a constructive way usually to get people to do the things you want them to do and there is a very large problem—as I think Dean Rusk may have been saying yesterday—with all of those categorical advance sanctions to other governments as conditions for aid, that the aid will be withdrawn if the nation confiscates the property of Americans without compensation or whatever it may be.

This is the problem with those attempts at sanctions. It is one thing to negotiate very strongly on the aid over a matter of the opium and say obviously we can't give you any help for agriculture in those areas if you are not going to agree to stop opium. That is a perfectly reasonable position. It is directly connected with the matter you are discussing, but to say we will withhold military aid which we would otherwise give you because of your behavior on a different matter is not usually a persuasive posture to be in. It doesn't usually get the fellow to do what we want him to do.

DOWNPLAYING OF NONSECURITY PROBLEMS BY STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. Wolff. The point I would like to make is the Murphy Commission report criticized the State Department for its downplaying of narcotics.

I don't see the same sort of commitment by our people who are involved in foreign policy decisions to the narcotics problem that I do with matters relating to the maintenance of status quo in our foreign relations. We do not seem to possess the same degree of commitment to attack those problems that exist here at home and this is something that troubles me.

Mr. Bundy. I don't want to get into detail on this because I have no official connection with it in any way, shape, or form so I would only give my impression in this matter, and I talked to several who did work as hard as they knew how to do it for years on end on Turkey. It is from them I get the impression that it doesn't work very well.

DIFFICULTIES OF SECURING TURKISH COOPERATION ON OPIUM ISSUE

The Turks were in internal political turmoil in which their overall attitude to the United States was a factor and it became politically
profitable to say, "Nuts to you." That is a regrettable fact. We all know cases where it has become politically profitable in this country to kick this or that country abroad in the teeth. That is what happened in the Turkish case. We have to look at it at least from the standpoint of the other person.

These farmers in Turkey have become dependent over the years on opium in these areas and that is the problem. I don't know whether we went about it the right way or not. I am only saying that I don't trust in general terms the efficacy of withdrawal of aid as a way of persuading people to do something that they will only do if they want to.

Mr. Wolfe. Perhaps this a prelude to a hearing that we are going to have on Monday on the whole question of the use of withdrawal of aid from those countries who do not cooperate with us in the area of controlling narcotics.

I think we should accept that one aspect in the determination of foreign policy and I might commend you to that portion of the Murphy Commission report that deals with narcotics and comes down pretty hard upon the State Department. I think Jack Anderson's column today has some reference to this.

I have intruded upon your time.

Mr. Gruenberg. I think that we are on an entirely different subject. Poppy seeds can only last so many years for planting purposes. It was an election year and we had talks in terms of compensating farmers with processing plants, canning factories, and things that compensate for their loss of income.

**ALTERNATIVE ROUTES OF PEACEFUL PERSUASION**

What do we as a country do as a meaningful alternative to persuading people to cooperate, short of war? For example, we were dealing with the missing in action and prisoners of war—a very heartbreaking experience. There is something between 1,300 and 1,500 people unaccounted for. We have prevailed upon the North Vietnamese. We have written letters to the Prime Minister. We have gone through all the neutral channels and the humanitarian groups—and quite recently an inspection plane was shot down, killing several people. What do we do to persuade—well, the U.N. was formed to prevent hostility.

General Taylor. We have diplomats and their skills and techniques. We can try persuasion and inducements of many sorts, such as paying one way or another for what we are trying to get. We can make threats and apply pressures of various kinds—international opinion, public opinion, U.N. opinion. After that we could fall back on the gunboats. We ought to be able to think of other measures in the economic field. We have the greatest economy in the world with means readily available for use, but not without interminable delay.

For example, it took 2 years to decide on the trade bill with the Soviet Union for collateral reasons that I am not aware of. If we could have ready access to the weapons that are within the economy, we would have many other forms of effective pressures. Finally we could resort to military force of various kinds applied. We have quite a long list of possible alternatives.

Mr. Gruenberg. What peaceful means do we have? What must we do to keep a good atmosphere, a good relationship?
General Taylor. One way is to make treaties with other countries.

Mr. Guyer. Do you have any idea how many treaties we have made with the Soviets and how many they have broken in 25 years? A treaty with them is sometimes only an exercise in penmanship.

General Taylor. I would like to see some treaties made to take economic factors into account. Treaties could serve to assure that we shall have access to the raw materials that are getting in short supply.

Mr. Wolff. How do we get access to those things if the countries don't want to give us access?

General Taylor. They will want to if it involves their self-interest.

Mr. Wolff. Suppose it is just in our interest. Suppose it is not in their self-interest to give us access to those things that we need. I am talking now of energy, oil in the Middle East.

General Taylor. We have unused domestic sources ourselves.

Mr. Wolff. We don't have enough of it to go around. What would be the response if we did not have the energy and we were denied the access to that in the Middle East?

General Taylor. I don't know anything offhand. Had we anticipated adequately in advance these shortages which were predictable, and which can't be found in countries which are normally friendly to us, we should keep on friendly terms with countries which do have exports to meet our deficiencies. We have a terrible problem on oil because we have allowed ourselves to be surprised without alternatives and we are going to have to fight our way out of a bad situation.

But we still have our coal reserves here. While we cannot get completely out of the tunnel, coal properly exploited will give us a pretty visible light. I would think in a fairly short period of time.

Mr. Guyer. They probably couldn't have gotten the first barrel of oil out of the ground without American technology in the OPEC countries. I think the drills and bits we set out there were the first means they had to bring oil to the surface.

Mr. Wolff. I know we have been keeping you gentlemen here for some time. I wonder whether both of you gentlemen would comment on how you see the congressional role in the future. We do have a role and what should that role be?

CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Bundy. That is a very difficult question to answer, Mr. Chairman. I certainly believe very strongly in the consultative role of Congress on major policies to a much greater degree than I think has normally prevailed in past years.

CONSULTATIVE ROLE

I think in the years where there was really a national consensus on policy and a disposition to trust the Executive, the consultative role of the Congress in practice fell into decay; that is genuine consultation as opposed to the kind of hectic, last minute type with which you gentlemen are probably all too familiar. Consultation simply did not take place and so I would put that as heading number one—effective consultation with the Congress—and I think necessarily if that is to be sophisticated and to be effective, that has to mean with
the Congress in a representational sense, that is, to the relevant committees.

The obligation of the Executive to keep the Congress well posted on what is going on and what its intentions are is a very important part. But if the Executive is to be forthcoming on matters that may for the time being almost necessarily be confidential, this involves an acceptance by the Congress of an obligation to treat these discussions themselves as executive session or confidential. I say that with something greater freedom in this committee because I recall what were very profitable sessions with various subcommittees and with this committee as a whole over a long period of years. I think they helped people's minds form and provided understanding and provided material. So that is my first heading: Consultation.

WAR POWER; POWER TO APPROPRIATE

Now then, there are certain broad generic headings such as the war power and the power to appropriate, which are inescapable, at least the power of appropriation is inescapable. The war powers proved to be very escapable and an effort has been made to codify that. In any war situation the Congress will be affirmatively asked to a much greater degree than in the past. Congress does have what should be a real power, the power to withhold the money to support a given activity. But if Congress is presented with the situation where American military forces are already landing, it is very difficult to say no, we won't supply the money to keep them going and to defend them. You can be put in a position where it is practically impossible for you to say no.

There is a great deal that has to be done and kept in mind constantly so that the power of whether to fund or not to fund or to vote to authorize requires a lot in situations involving military force.

SANCTIONS

Now, the third question is the intervention of the Congress on political issues and it is in that area where the Congress tries to set down criteria for the behavior of the Executive, that a country will be cut off from aid or from trade privileges or from some other favorable U.S. activity if it does something specified that we believe to be contrary, if it trades with North Vietnam during the Vietnamese war, if it expropriates without compensating and in the case of this drug situation if it is engaged in drug traffic and refuses to accept reasonable limits or to subscribe to international limits, and so on.

The overall record I have to say I think has not often been successful, the attempt to draw these with precision so that they hit the target and not some other target so that you don't, as has been the case with the Jackson amendment, queer the whole course of our relationship with Peking and the People's Republic by including them on an emigration issue. However bad their practice is, it doesn't affect people we care about in the same way that the Soviet practices affect them. We didn't intend to hit China. We did in that act and it is a clear case of difficulty of marksmanship.
So I think that is a factor, and I think you have to be careful. I think there is a valid point that was made by Secretary Rusk yesterday that often the threat of a congressional action if they don't behave is much more effective and can be used much better than if the sanction is employed.

But of course the limitation there is you can't keep a threat hanging over forever and by some sword of Damocles, the thread will break. So these are just a few thoughts on it. The broad thrust of my remarks is I think Congress was much too much put to one side over a long period of time. There should be pressure now to bring it into the act. But the Founding Fathers didn't think Congress could make foreign policy and I think that remains true in principle and practice; it has to be the Executive, but an interchange of views and thoughts and reflections on it is something that to my mind comes at the top of the list.

Mr. Guyer. I think more and more the office of Congress is going through a change, a vissitude in the sense that people now have an awareness they didn't have 70 or 75 years ago.

I can recall that the missionary would come in and talk about India. Nobody in that entire town had ever been outside that country or State. I went back home Sunday and you will find that some of the kids just out of high school have been around the world and back. They have a larger voice, they are knowledgeable and familiar and well-informed.

I think that is one of the reasons we have to have a meaningful dialog in the formation of foreign policy.

Mr. Wolff. We are going to wait until the second bell and that will give me the chance to ask one more question, if I could. On Vietnam, I believe that you said that we could have won that war in Vietnam. Am I correct in that?

POSSIBLE VICTORY IN VIETNAM

General Taylor. I think we had it in our power to accomplish the broad purpose for which we got in, which would have constituted victory.

Mr. Wolff. Could that have been accomplished without the use of nuclear weapons?

General Taylor. Yes. We had it in our hands in the cease-fire. It never occurred to me to think of nuclear weapons in connection with Vietnam. I have often been asked about it, but I have never had the thought myself.

Mr. Wolff. If we did have the ability to accomplish our objectives you say at the time of the cease-fire, why is it that we weren't able to accomplish that objective before the cease-fire?

General Taylor. I am afraid I have to repeat myself, that both the executive and the legislative branches contributed to a situation that ended in disaster.

Mr. Wolff. That brought about the cease-fire?

General Taylor. No, indeed. It brought about the collapse of the forces of South Vietnam.

Mr. Wolff. Let's go back a minute. The cease-fire existed not because we were winning.
General Taylor. We were beating the hell out of them. This is the first time the Air Force has ever been allowed to use bombing without very heavy restrictions and it had the great advantage over the “smart” weapons to the extent the bombing put pressure on Hanoi to the point that for the first time they came into conference obviously ready to settle and did settle.

Mr. Wolff. But the fact is that when the cease-fire was arranged, it was arranged with the preconditions, the preconditions being the eventual pullout from Vietnam.

General Taylor. That is right, but we were dealing with a situation which South Vietnam would have been able to handle had they gotten the military and economic aid which they felt they were promised.

Mr. Wolff. What about the situation that occurred at the end where everything was abandoned? Was this an indication that they would continue to fight?

FINAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE DEFENSE IMPOSSIBLE

General Taylor. This is an evidence of what happens when panic occurs from a variety of things: very bad generalship and the performance of certain senior officers. But I must say I don’t view panic as an evidence of the unwillingness of the South Vietnamese Army to continue to fight. They simply managed to get themselves so snarled up as to make further defense impossible.

Mr. Wolff. Gentlemen, I know we have kept you here too long. We certainly appreciate the benefit of your views. They will contribute to our own assessment. You both have played a significant role in our history. I hope we can put your experiences to good use.

Thank you very much and could we ask that if there are any further questions from committee members who haven’t been here, we could send them on to you to be included in the record.

We thank you again. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow 8 o’clock.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 3 p.m., Thursday, July 24, 1975.]

[The following questions were submitted in writing to General Taylor and Mr. Bundy:]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL TAYLOR

Question. How do you define our “vital interests”? Do you feel our present commitments need a reassessment? Which ones? Under what circumstances would you support U.S. “intervention”? Where do you foresee this? The Azores? Panama?

Answer. As I understand the term, a national interest may be a principle, such as freedom of the seas; an asset such as the Panama Canal; or a source of national strength such as national unity or the national coal reserves. To qualify as a valid national interest, the President and the Congress should consider it worth running considerable risk or expending significant national resources to gain, retain or enjoy the interest in question. To determine that the presumptive interest really is worth such a price, responsible officials should first weigh the likely cost and the expected gain from success and then estimate the probability of failure and its cost if failure should ensue. Only if the expected gain from success exceeds the estimated cost of failure and if the consequences of failure appear an acceptable risk to run is the government justified in embarking on the contemplated course of action. If these conditions are not met, the project under consideration is not truly in the national interest.
If we use the term "vital national interest" precisely, it should refer to something essential to the existence of the government or the nation. In practice it usually means merely an interest with a high priority for national support.

A "commitment" is often a promise to or a contract with a foreign government undertaken to defend or advance a national interest. Since our interests change with time and circumstances, it is only prudent to reexamine all our important commitments periodically to verify that they are still consistent with our interests as we currently perceive them. One of the defects of our Vietnam policy was the assumption by successive administrations that the commitments contained in the Truman Doctrine were still valid, whereas its principles had lost their appeal for a large segment of the American public.

United States interventions in foreign affairs may take many forms—diplomatic as in the case of Secretary Kissinger's mediation in the Middle East, Congressional as in the recent action in stopping military aid to Turkey, economic as in the annual foreign economic aid program, military as illustrated by the military aid program at one extreme and by armed intervention at the other (e.g., South Vietnam, Korea, Santo Domingo). Any intervention of any kind should be preceded by a test of the national interest—will the expected gains exceed the costs of success and justify the risks and consequences of failure? I find it impossible to assess the likelihood or desirability of intervening in such places as Panama or the Azores without first knowing the time, circumstances, form and purpose of the intervention. Any intervention worthy of support must satisfy the national interest formula.

**Question.** Keeping in mind the "secret war" in Laos and the Cambodia bombing raids, is it possible for the United States to conduct an open foreign policy that is also an effective one?

**Answer.** I do not know exactly what is meant by an "open foreign policy." What is open to whom, when? It could mean "open to Congress," "open to foreign governments" or "open to the American people" wholly or in selected parts. In point of time, it could mean open to any of the above from the germination of the idea in the mind of a foreign policy planner, from its approval by a President, upon its presentation to Congress by the Executive branch, or following its actual implementation.

Generally speaking, I would feel sure that no effective foreign policy would ever be possible if it were open to everybody at any time—in short, openness must be conditional. Further, the degree of permissible openness depends on the issue and subject matter involved.

**Question.** How do you view the large-scale vending of arms to the Third World nations—with particular reference to such recent wars as the India-Pakistan and the Greece-Turkey in which both sides are fighting with American weapons?

**Answer.** The arguments usually advanced for such sales are that they create friendly relations and provide Washington with political leverage vis-a-vis the arms buyers. They have a favorable effect on our trade balances and exclude rival industrial powers from the foregoing advantages.

On the other hand, large scale sales of arms expose us to the charge of the post-World War II period that the United States is a "merchant of death," stimulating arms races and recourse to arms by its sales. If a recipient country becomes involved in hostilities, our freedom of political action is impaired by a certain degree of obligation to provide replacements and spare parts for the arms we have sold. In rebuttal of one of the arguments in favor of arms sales, the record does not verify that the United States has had much success in influencing the foreign policy of countries armed with our weapons. However, this may be a fault of our diplomacy, which cannot be charged to the arms sale policy.

Personally, I have no enthusiasm for the massive sales of arms in which we have recently engaged—to some extent at the expense of the combat readiness of our own forces. Any future sales should be tested by the national interest formula and approved only if the outcome is very strongly affirmative.

**Question:** How could the United States have won the war in Vietnam?

**Answer.** To me, winning the war would have been tantamount to preventing the imposition of a Communist regime on South Vietnam by force of arms. We had an excellent chance of winning in this sense at the time of the cease-fire in January 1973 and its subsequent implementation. To do so would have required the following actions on the part of the United States Government:

(a) Our negotiators would have refused to accept a cease-fire which knowingly allowed North Vietnamese forces to remain in South Vietnam.
(b) The President and Congress would have united in threatening military reprisals if North Vietnam violated the cease-fire and launched a new offensive;

(c) The President and Congress would have united in assuring a continuation of the military and economic aid to South Vietnam necessary for its continued self-defense;

(d) Under the terms of the newly enacted War Powers Resolution, Congress would have given statutory authority to the President to take the actions implicit in (b) and (c) above.

In fact, our behavior was the reverse of the foregoing and the outcome was the reverse of victory—a disastrous defeat largely self-imposed.

**Question.** How would you re-structure the relationship between the "artisans of security and foreign policy" to effect a more viable foreign policy?

**Answer.** In the attached article, "The Exposed Flank of National Security," I describe at some length a restructuring of the National Security Council (NSC) into a National Policy Council (NPC) in order to provide a single Executive mechanism for integrating foreign, domestic, and military policy. If this concept were carried out, the activities of the NPC should be made to dovetail with those of appropriate bodies in Congress in order to receive an early Congressional reaction while a specific policy is in the formative stage.

Later, Congress would obtain a full view of the product when the Executive branch presented it to Congress for authorization and funding. This would be the occasion when Congressional committees could examine the validity of the national interest of the recommended policy. After approval, the appropriate committees would supervise its implementation and examine critically the evidence of success or failure.

While I am not qualified to express detailed views as to how this linkage between the Executive and Congress would be effected in practice, I am quite sure of the essentiality of establishing a close and cooperative relationship between all "artisans of security and foreign policy" in both the Executive and Legislative branches.

**RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR. BUNDY**

**Question.** What are the critical areas and issues of greatest priority for a foreign policy during the next ten years?

**Answer.** Avoiding nuclear war and achieving a more equitable and effective world economic structure.

**Question.** How do you assess the relationship between China and Russia and how do you think it may evolve over the next ten years? How can the United States exploit this relationship in order to enhance the achievement of her own interests?

**Answer.** I foresee continuing difficulty between China and Russia, and believe that this is an inherent advantage to the United States, but that the United States cannot "exploit" the relationship in any direct way.

**Question.** How do we define our "vital" interests? Do you feel our present commitments need a reassessment? Which ones? Under what conditions would you support a U.S. "intervention?" Where do you foresee this?

**Answer.** I have always thought it rather futile to try to define precisely what our "vital" interests are. In the article and statement I presented to the committee, I gave the best picture I could of what commitments I thought were important and which should be sustained. The conditions for a conceivable "intervention" are far too diverse to cover in any summary form.

**Question.** Keeping in mind the "secret" war in Laos and the Cambodia bombing raids, is it possible for the United States to conduct an "open" foreign policy that is also an effective one? Do you feel that a lack of openness in the conduct of foreign policy has a serious adverse effect on our democratic process?

**Answer.** The "secret" war in Laos was well known to every Congressman and Senator who ever inquired seriously. The Cambodia bombing raids were something else again, for reasons that I think the Congress would have supported had it been informed, but where it was not. The rest of the question is a good deal too broad to deal with effectively. In general, obviously we must be a good deal more "open" than we were, particularly in the Nixon Administration. And the corollary is that a lack of openness does have a serious adverse effect on our democratic process in times where there is not a very strong consensus in sup-
port of a broad line of policy—as of course there was during the Second World War and for a considerable time during the cold war. In other words, there must be much more openness, and I am basically inclined to be sympathetic to the arguments advanced by Nicholas Katzenbach in his article in the October 1973 issue of Foreign Affairs.

**Question.** How do you view the large scale vending of arms to the Third World nations—with particular reference to such recent wars as the India-Pakistan and the Greece-Turkey in which both sides are fighting with American weapons?

**Answer.** I view the large-scale vending of arms with considerable concern. The particular cases of India-Pakistan and Greece-Turkey involved conflicting considerations, where I think the dilemma would have been very hard to avoid in the Greek-Turkish case, but where a basic mistake was made in the India-Pakistan case from 1954 onward. There will continue to be cases where there are basic threats to a country that warrant the supply of American arms on some basis, and in a few cases the supply of such arms will run the risk that the arms will be used in some regional conflict. In other words, the dilemma cannot be wholly avoided, but in present circumstances it should be possible to do much more than in the past to avoid getting into the kind of box we got into in those two situations.

**Question.** What can the United States do to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World nations?

**Answer.** The United States can do a great deal to reduce the chances of nuclear proliferation. Excellent suggestions were contained in Lincoln Bloomfield's article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, and of course there is no escaping the basic importance of further reduction of nuclear arms as between the United States and the Soviet Union—difficult as this is. Part of the problem is the best possible safeguards, but by far the larger part concerns the broader political relations of the United States and other advanced countries with the nations that might have nuclear aspirations. This is a large and complex subject, and means that the matter cannot be normally addressed in isolation from one's view of the overall security picture. But there is a great deal we can do in individual cases, in some cases by making our commitments absolutely clear (Japan and Korea), in others by trying to tamp down the kind of regional rivalries that could lead nations to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

**Question.** How do you view the emerging nationalism in Asia differently than you did in the Sixties? By what standard do we recognize or start normalization of relations with communist countries such as Vietnam?

**Answer.** There is no doubt whatsoever, now as in the 1960s, that nationalism in Asia is the strongest single force at work. I have not changed my view on this in any respect. The question of relations with communist countries is a very difficult one. I would think one approached the question of normalization with Vietnam with considerable caution and with a very strong eye to their actual behavior. At the moment, I do not see any great gain in jumping into relations with the government of North Vietnam, which of course effectively controls the South as well, but I would not hold off indefinitely either; in the long run we should try to have communications with them.

**Question.** How should the United States deal with recent advances of communism in southern Europe—with particular reference to Portugal and Italy?

**Answer.** This is an impossible subject to deal with in any summary form. In general, it seems obvious that we must not get directly involved, and that covert political activity would be almost certainly counter-productive. At the same time, if non-communist leaders do get control in Portugal, I would hope we could find ways to indicate our support for them and our readiness particularly to assist in the underlying economic problems that will make their task extremely difficult. Italy is just plain too "fifty" to comment on at the present time.

**Question.** How long can the United States balance her moral commitment to Israel with her economic interest in Arab oil? Is there an ultimate solution?

**Answer.** The only way the United States can balance its commitment to Israel and its economic interest in Arab oil, in the long run, is to see an Arab-Israeli settlement that really lasts. Otherwise, we shall be placed in an increasingly difficult position. As to whether such a settlement is in fact possible, I am at the moment moderately hopeful, although it will take a lot of effort and a considerable period of time.
Question. What is your view of the Congressional role in future foreign policy?

Answer. As I said to the Subcommittee, I think Congress must take a more active role in keeping itself informed in foreign policy, in key cases, through truly active consultation with the executive branch in its formation. At the same time, I do not believe Congress is normally qualified to set foreign policy, and that a number of the congressional interventions of the past year have been seriously at the expense of the necessary flexibility of American policy.
A REASSESSMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Wolff. The subcommittee will come to order.

The situation that exists today is a very difficult one for those of us on this subcommittee, as well as our witnesses for the day, because there are many things happening here in the Congress.

At the present time there is being debated on the floor the resumption of military assistance to the Government of Turkey. Shortly after the debate has been concluded, the full Committee on International Relations will meet to make a determination on the sale of Hawk missiles to the Government of Jordan.

Our subcommittee opens today the fourth in a series of exploratory sessions to reassess our foreign policy. With the help of distinguished visitors, we hope to outline the critical areas and issues of the future and to explore possible alternatives of a new and viable foreign policy.

Our collective attempt to perceive the future political issues necessitates a review and further insight of the U.S. relations with other countries.

We shall try to determine the vital U.S. interests and their relative importance. We hope to come up with ideas which would combine meaningful design with flexibility.

Today we are most fortunate to have one of our senior statesmen with us, a man who served as a colleague in the other body, Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, who has had a long and distinguished career.

Mr. Lodge was Senator from Massachusetts from 1936 to 1952. He has since served the United States in many capacities, as Ambassador to Vietnam from 1962 to 1967, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1965 to 1969, head of the U.S. delegation to the Vietnam peace talks in Paris during 1969, and as Ambassador to the United Nations and at present, the President's Special Representative to the Vatican.

We are very happy to have you here with us today, Mr. Ambassador, and we are very appreciative of the fact that you, knowing the workings of the Congress, will bear with us under the circumstances.

Would you proceed please?
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE VATICAN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BIOGRAPHY

Henry Cabot Lodge was born in Nahant, Mass., on July 5, 1902. He graduated from Harvard University in 1924 and received a law degree from Northeastern University in 1938. He was a Senator from Massachusetts from 1936 to 1952. He served as U.S. Representative to the United Nations from 1958-60, Ambassador to Vietnam from 1963-67, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1968-69 and as Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks in Paris during 1969. At present, Ambassador Lodge is the President's special representative to the Vatican.

Ambassador Lodge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate very much the honor of appearing before this distinguished committee. I believe you and your associates are to be congratulated for your foresight in conducting this inquiry into the basis for our future foreign policy. Nothing could be more vital.

I think it can be said that one self-evident fact about the world today is that its most difficult and dangerous problems—be they of health or economics or energy or pollution or, of course, of war and peace—can only be solved on an international basis. Individual nation-states, even ones that are as big as the United States or the Soviet Union, cannot successfully cope with any of these problems alone.

Yet, one self-evident paradox about the world is that the United Nations, the international organization created precisely for the purpose of finding international solutions, often receives a massive vote of no confidence in various America opinion polls, even though a majority does not want actually to abandon it.

Consider these few figures: In 1951, only 43 percent of the American people, according to the Gallup poll, were satisfied with the progress of the United Nations. In 1959, the Gallup poll showed that an all-time high of 87 percent thought the U.N. was doing a good job. But in 1971, this had fallen to a low of 35 percent.

Ambassador Scali in 1973 spoke of a poll indicating that only 34 percent of the American people thought the United Nations was doing an effective job.

At the United Nations headquarters in New York City, the number of visitors fell from 1,116,000 in 1967 to 765,000 in 1972, and that was a record low. It had never been as low as that before. And then in 1973 the number was even 13 percent lower.

Now, this critical attitude of people in the world’s biggest and most powerful country is a deadly serious threat to the United Nations, and to our hope for peace. And it amply justifies the sagacious decision of your committee to conduct this investigation.

If I may be so bold I would predict that within the next year you here in Congress will surely have some far reaching decisions to make about the future of the United Nations, which may indeed involve its very existence. So I think this is a good time and a good opportunity
to present a broad picture of the United Nations, to consider its successes, its failures, and its future prospects.

So I am going to submit respectfully a list of pluses and minuses.

In the past 25 years, the U.N. has given important help in these situations: The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1947; the Communist withdrawal from Greece in 1949; resisting the aggression in Korea in 1950; the cease-fire or truces in Indonesia in 1949, Kashmir in 1965, and Cyprus; ending outside interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs in 1958; preventing the Congo from becoming a cause of confrontation between the great powers in 1960; ushering the erstwhile colonies of Africa into the family of nations; and creating a new United Nations Emergency Force October 25, 1978, which was followed on October 27 of that year by Egyptian-Israeli meetings for the first time in 17 years.

The new United Nations Emergency Force differs from the one created in 1956 in that it can only be removed by a vote of the Security Council. It also has a new provision that Poland, a Communist power, is to be a member. Those are two very important improvements, even though the road is still full of boulders and obstacles.

Then, I believe that while I am listing the pluses, I should mention four major U.N. Conferences in 1972-75, each of which made a start on four world problems: Environment, law of the sea, population, and food.

Now for one more big plus:

The first priority of the United Nations is peace and security. The second, far ahead of any other, should be economic and social development. Along these lines, the United Nations development program, by preinvestment surveys and technical education, has advanced the fundamentals of a good life: Food, shelter, health, and education. Because it is done “multilaterally”—that is, many nations working together—rather than “bilaterally,” which is the United States working with one country alone, $1 of input by the United States generates more than $6 worth of actual development work. Thus, over the years our proportion will get smaller and the recipient nations’ proportion gets greater because the U.N. development program, which includes such things as worthwhile agencies such as the World Health Organization and the Children’s Fund, gets more and more people into the act. I believe that much, although not all, of our own bilateral AID program for economic and social development abroad could be channeled through U.N. agencies, with advantage to us and to the recipient nations.

And I ask: How many of these pluses could have happened without the United Nations? I think if we hadn’t had a United Nations practically none of them would have happened. There would have been no way of doing it.

Now, here are some undeniable minuses:

With the advantage of hindsight, one can now see that much trouble would have been avoided if, before the French left Indochina, we had used the United Nations in the early 1950’s, somewhat as the United Nations acted in the Congo in 1960, as an international presence to prevent the area from becoming the cause of big power involvement.

Later, the United Nations did nothing about Vietnam, chiefly be-
cause it lacked the tools and the will. Also, the Communist powers, notably North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, opposed bringing the Vietnam question into the United Nations.

To give some more minuses, in 1966 the Soviet aggression against Hungary could not be stopped by any method short of war.

In 1968 Czechoslovakia could not be protected against a Soviet takeover.

In 1971, the United Nations did not make a determined effort to persuade the Government of Pakistan to cease its brutal behavior toward what was then East Pakistan. Nor did the United Nations prevent or try to prevent India from invading East Pakistan.

These are all U.N. failures. Now I ask the question: In all candor, can we doubt that these failures would have occurred even if there had been no United Nations?

There are other defects, Mr. Chairman: Voting does not correspond with the ability to carry out the things which are voted; there is an alarming tendency not to consider questions on their merits, but to vote in blocs; the lateness in starting the meetings; the windiness of the oratory; the lack of germaneness and the much too lengthy so-called debates all make a bad impression.

There can today, in our United Nations of 132 members, be little confidence that even if a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the Security Council or General Assembly, a majority of the members would treat it as such and would come to the aid of the victim.

And the suppression of aggression is, after all, the purpose of the United Nations as set forth in the charter.

Then I cite the vote at the last session, 105 to 4 with 20 abstentions, which recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and gave Mr. Arafat honors proper to a chief of state, a thoroughly outrageous event which understandably infuriated so many people that some are talking about the United States withdrawing from the United Nations.

Now, I don't think it would be wise to withdraw, although I understand the feelings that prompt that opinion. But I believe our attitude toward the U.N.'s troubles should not be to leave it, but to reform it.

And this leads me to make these suggestions:

Member states should change the United Nations so that voting more nearly corresponds with the ability to carry out the things which are voted.

Many detailed changes are proposed in the report of the President's Commission on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations published in 1971, which I am sure you have here in this committee. If you haven't, I suggest that it would be a suitable document for inclusion in your record.

I cite a few: Small states should renounce their right to vote and become associate members; if any state pays less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the U.N. budget, it would become an associate member; the United States would commit itself in electing members of the Security Council to place primary emphasis on the contributions which the candidate can make; half of the 10 elected seats in the Security Council would be rotated among the larger states, and a nation like Japan, Mr. Chairman, or, I might add, Brazil, for example, would always be a member of the Security Council.
The United States should be able to translate into political influence and power its status as a financial mainstay of the United Nations.

And here is a point which I wish particularly to stress. We should not show undue respect for the General Assembly. Some witnesses, I understand, have suggested we just leave the General Assembly. I don't suggest leaving it, but I do suggest that we not show undue respect for it, that we should never forget that the decisions of the General Assembly are purely hortatory, recommendatory, and do not have the force of law.

The General Assembly is not like a legislative body. Its members are not chosen by districts of approximately equal population. It is sort of a diplomatic conference. Everyone represents a government. There is no such thing as members directly representing the public as a legislator does.

We should not treat it as though it were the voice of world opinion which it isn't.

Only the Security Council has the power to issue legally binding action orders, and in the Security Council we are one of the "big five," and each one of us has the veto.

I think we ought to make our big efforts in the Security Council. In the 8 years that I was there, I found that the Security Council is often an even better forum for presenting subjects to public opinion than the General Assembly is. We ought to use it and the U.S. representative ought to make the Security Council his principal place of activity.

We ought also to use the General Assembly differently. There is a tendency to have frequent rollcall votes in the General Assembly, which tend to magnify and perpetuate the world's divisions.

Those tactics may be all right in some places, but the General Assembly is not the place constantly to be having rollcall votes because the purpose of the General Assembly—and I am quoting from the Charter—is to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations and not magnifying disputes.

So, I think the members should be constantly trying to find ways to harmonize the actions of nations and they should be looking for a consensus. They should be exchanging views in the lobbies and searching for phraseology and forms of words which will have a harmonizing effect, and they should not be agitating for rollcall votes on contentious questions.

Finally, I voice my hope that members will rededicate themselves and strengthen their determinations actually to suppress aggression, which, after all, is what the U.N. is all about and which many members of the U.N. today, I regret to say, seem to have forgotten.

All you have to do is go to New York and go to the delegation lounge and you will find out in 15 minutes that that is not what most of the members are thinking about.

Remember Winston Churchill's words that peace is not promoted by throwing small nations to the wolves. That is a good thing to remember, I think, today.

Now, I have no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about all these changes. I don't propose them to you this afternoon because I think this can be done in 5 minutes, but I believe that an eloquent effort to make these changes is very much worth making. I think to have them presented and have them argued is a very important thing to do.
Remember that since 1945 there have been 14 international and 24 civil wars, all with substantial casualties. The world is still a dangerous place, and we, this human race, need all the help we can get, and one of the things that can be helpful is the U.N.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Wolff, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We have just had join us Hon. George Ball. Will you join us at the table?

Mr. Lodge, with your acquiescence, I think we will take the statement of Mr. Ball and then sort of try to get our membership to question both of you.

We are very fortunate indeed as well today to have join us, Hon. George Ball, who is a frequent visitor to the Hill. He most recently offered his solution to the present Turkish arms embargo crisis, which is right at the present moment being debated on the floor of the House.

We are very grateful, too, to have Mr. Yatron a member of this subcommittee with us today. He is personally very interested in the debate, but is so interested in what you gentlemen have to say that he is joining us here now rather than being on the floor at the moment.

Mr. Ball was Under Secretary of State from 1961 to 1966 and was the Ambassador to the United Nations in 1968.

Mr. Guyer as well on the Republican side has joined us here at the table, and I think we should proceed without further delay, since I am sure that any moment now we might be interrupted, and I think Mr. Ball will excuse us if we interrupt him for a vote on the floor on just this question to which you have recently so ably addressed yourself.

Mr. Ball, if you will begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE BALL, LEHMAN BROTHERS, NEW YORK, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

BIOGRAPHY


Mr. Ball, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I know that you have the very important business of the vote on the Turkish military sales program this afternoon and I will try to summarize the statement which I have submitted to the committee just now.

I want to take a somewhat different approach to the problems of the future than I think, prior witnesses have. I am delighted that the committee is addressing itself to the international policies that the United States is going to have to adopt in the years to come.

It seems to me that it is time that we Americans talked seriously about this question.
During the past few years, we have concentrated primarily, it seems to me, on eliminating some of the accumulated aberrations of past American foreign policy.

One aberration was our involvement in Vietnam. I am not sure that Ambassador Lodge and I are in total agreement on that issue, but at least it has now become moot.

After heaping death and destruction on Indochina for a very long time, we finally succeeded in achieving an extrication, which has, as we all know, had a bloody and unhappy denouement.

We have also largely corrected the aberration that resulted from our persistence in the fiction that Taipei was the capital of the Chinese mainland.

We have gone some way to establish politer communications and easier relations with the Soviet Union, although, in my view, we have paid a very high price for our obsessive concentration on Moscow and Peking, in the deterioration of our relations with our allies in Western Europe and Japan and with many nations in the rest of the world.

Finally, we seem to be on the verge of working out a bilateral arrangement between Israel and Egypt that may postpone a resumption of the struggle and conflict in the Middle East.

I think I should say to this committee that in my view, however, there are substantial risks in this enterprise. At the moment, the world is fortunate in having in the relevant capitals of the Middle East reasonably moderate leaders, a situation, I know, that has certainly not always prevailed in the past and may not always prevail in the future.

So I would suggest that there is at least reason to debate whether we should seek to buy time by a partial solution which really doesn't come to grips with any of the fundamental substantive problems under circumstances where delay may be the enemy of peace.

This proposed solution does nothing to resolve the festering issues of Palestine or the Golan Heights or Jerusalem, and any partial settlement between Israel and Egypt that isn't followed by an intensive effort to tackle these hard substantive problems may well, in my judgment, be laying the groundwork for a catastrophe 2 or 3 years down the road, after the oil wealth of the oil-producing Arab states has built the military arsenals of Arabia to a point of overwhelming strength.

The foreign policy of a great nation such as the United States necessarily includes a very long list of unfinished business at any moment, and today it seems to me the list is longer than ever.

We face a whole new set of complications in seeking to build an effective system of international economic relations, for a world that is changing with dramatic rapidity. Yet, we are doing very little, I think, but talk about it.

At the same time, there are forces at work that will very greatly change the physiognomy of the world, producing difficulties of a character and magnitude never before dreamed of.

Since any statement that I might make to the committee about the future foreign policy of the United States must necessarily be highly selective, I would like to concentrate my remarks today—and I shall make them as brief as possible—on the predicament that is now being created by a rapidly expanding world population and by the proliferation of both nuclear and conventional arms.
Unhappily, predictions regarding the effect of probable rates of population growth on world affairs have been obscured by a shrill and excited debate over only one aspect of the problem. That concerns the fundamental question as to whether, unless drastic action is taken to flatten the demographic curve, we are going to be able to sustain the number of people that are likely to inhabit this world in another 20 or 25 years.

Just how fast the world population will increase over the next half century or century, no one can say with assurance, although many try and arrive at differing answers.

There is, however, a general agreement that 25 years from now, in the year 2000, the population of the world will be at least 6,200 million people. This is the medium estimate made by the United Nations committee of experts who studied the problem in 1973. Actually, they have scaled it down slightly from the original 6.4 estimate.

What happens after that, whether the population of the Earth doubles in the following half century, is going to be determined, to a considerable extent, by the actions that are taken and by the social and economic changes that occur within the next 10 or 20 years.

Not that this growth in population will be in any sense evenly distributed. In the developed countries, the demographic pattern has so changed that the present rate of natural increase is less than 1 percent a year.

People today in the developed countries expect to grow old enough to know their grandchildren, which is an extraordinary phenomenon in a great part of the world.

During the past decade, the rate of population growth has been decreasing, but in developing countries we have a very different situation, for the average rate of natural increase even today is currently estimated at 2.6 percent.

If the developing countries could, by widespread family planning, and all that implies, achieve a two-child family—and that would be a very difficult achievement—a two-child family average by the end of the century, that would still mean a world population of 8 billion people by the year 2050.

Though the achievement of this goal seems highly optimistic, the nations of Asia and the Pacific did agree on approximately that target at a meeting that followed the Conference on Population at Bucharest, and it is an objective to which we ought to give our wholehearted support.

If it could be achieved by all the developing countries through an intensive effort in which we would have to take the lead, it could make a difference of several hundred million people by the end of the century, which could mean a critical difference in the ability of the world to feed itself.

Now, the reason why, in spite of what we do, we cannot check the rise in the demographic curve abruptly is a phenomenon known as population momentum. When a population grows rapidly, as has been the case for the less developed countries for a period of years, the result is an increasingly young age structure.

Since that means that the number of individuals that each year becomes prospective parents is constantly increasing, there is no way to
check the growth of population quickly. The pattern has already been established by the young that are already in existence.

So what does this imply for the future?

The first point is that, if we are not going to let the world population growth outrun the food supply, we are going to have to make a tremendous effort to expand agriculture around the world.

It is not enough for the United States to export its grain surpluses. In fact, if we aren’t very careful, we may, by providing grain to poor countries in other than emergency conditions, discourage them from expanding their own production, and the fact is that the greatest potential for expanding food production now lies outside of the United States. We have gone far in expanding on our production, but there are limits to the extent to which we can go.

A second point is that, if we are going to intensify our efforts to facilitate family planning, we have to do it quickly, and we have to do it on a comprehensive basis.

If that isn’t enough, we must at the same time assist the developing countries to achieve that economic and social progress that will make family planning widely acceptable.

There have been strong, rather violent, disagreements among the learned professors on almost every aspect of this problem, as you gentlemen know, including a long-continued dispute between the advocates of family planning on the one hand and the development economists on the other as to how population growth can best be checked.

I am not going to enter into that dispute today, other than to suggest to you that, in my view—and I think it is the view of most people who are looking at this objectively—efforts along both lines are indispensable, and I would like very much to commend the action of the Congress for adding $30 million for family planning over and above the executive branch request, something which was very recently done.

Now, I realize how unrealistic it may sound today to talk about intensifying our foreign aid efforts at a time when most of the discussion in this country is how we are going to reduce our huge budget deficits.

Yet, unless we face up to the problem, we may well find ourselves dealing with a world population that is out of control, where there will not be enough food for everyone.

We may, in other words, have to face those appallingly difficult moral problems involved in such cold-blooded concepts as “triage” or “the lifeboat ethic,” where we have to choose whom we are going to feed and whom we are going to let starve.

Certainly it will be a tragic day for our humane values if we find ourselves in that dilemma—if we let that situation occur.

Even if we do squarely face this global predicament and even if we take heroic actions to deal with it, we are still going to find ourselves in a world that is growing, in the words of Alice in Wonderland, “curiouser and curiouser.”

For, given the element of population momentum, the population of the development countries is going to increase enormously in the next 25 years, no matter what we do about it, although what we do or don’t do may well make the difference between a manageable and a totally unmanageable situation.
The very fact of overcrowding means that people will interfere more and more with one another's well-being. As a result, we shall have to endure increasingly elaborate rules and regulations, and each will have to accept greater constraints on his own behavior to avoid conflict.

Moreover, when not only the number of people is multiplied, but each consumes twice as much of a finite stock of resources as before, the constraints on individual actions and decisions can become very urgent and very irksome.

Thus, the shrinking of living space that results from increasing population density will, without question, bring profound social and political repercussions.

It will mean herding together vast numbers of wretchedly poor human beings and transforming many capitals into cesspools like Calcutta, which, if it continues to grow at its present rate, will, in the words of a very high United Nations official, mean—and I quote him—"60 million people just struggling for survival on the banks of the Hooghly River at the end of this century."

Crowding humanity together is certain to influence the foreign policies of many nations. Prof. Henry Steele Commanger has pointed out that the spread of nationalism in Europe after the French Revolution coincided with the occurrence of the first great population explosion in modern history, so it is hardly surprising that, in some of the overcrowded nations of the Third World, we are today noting an intensifying nationalism that borders on xenophobia.

But, overcrowding, which means too many people in relation to territorial space or the resources of a nation, is not the only problem posed by demography run wild.

In a population with high fertility, there will be, as I have noted, a constant expansion of the lower age groups. In Egypt today, for example, 45 percent of the population is under the age of 14, while the ratio of youths to adults is even more exaggerated in some other Third World countries.

Moreover, that imbalance will inevitably grow more extreme from one year to the next, so long as population growth rates of 2.5 or 3 or 3.5 percent persist.

Thus, an increasing part of the population of many countries will be below the age levels where they contribute to the economy and they will have to be sustained by a progressively smaller fraction of the population of working age.

Let me suggest to you, that the situation at the moment is that in developed countries, such as our own, there are something like four adults supporting every child. In the less developed countries, it is about 1 to 1, and it is growing less than that.

This becomes an impossible situation, with an increasing percentage of young children unable to contribute to the economy of the country, who are a burden on the economy and a decreasing percentage of adults who must support them through their own economic contribution.

This cannot help but have profoundly unsettling consequences. Inevitably it will mean increasing migration to the cities, as family farms cannot be continually divided up without reducing plots below the minimum size at which they can be farmed economically.
Yet, a rising flood of applicants into the urban job market can create massive problems. It can bring intolerable pressure on already inadequate housing, threaten wage scales, and, most serious of all, result in a burgeoning unemployment that, in turn, can stimulate emigration to neighboring countries which already regard themselves as overcrowded.

Since, deprived of the guidance of priest and family, the young migrants to industrial centers are easy prey to Communists and other left-wing or right-wing agitators, there will be a swelling torrent of political extremism throughout the poor areas of the world.

I could speak at length about such countries as Bangladesh, where problems appear practically insoluble, but, to bring the point home clearly, consider the prospects for Mexico, with its population now growing at 3.2 percent or more a year, and thus destined to double in 22 years.

Unless the Mexican Government takes far more decisive steps to slow the growth rate than it is now doing, the present 57 million people in Mexico will further increase to more than 130 million in the next 25 years.

Think what will happen as mounting waves of adolescents swamp the labor market. Although in 1960 some 750,000 young Mexicans became 15 years of age in that year and presumably began looking for employment, in 1970 the number had increased to 1,200,000, and by the year 2000, unless the growth rate is sharply reduced, it will be more than 3 million.

Now, obviously, there will be far too few jobs for such a vast number, even assuming an extraordinary rate of economic development.

So there will no doubt be pressure on these young men and women to steal across the border into the United States, where an estimated 6 million of their brethren are already illegally in residence. These are figures from the Bureau of Immigration.

In the meantime, it is estimated that, as a result of domestic migration, the Southwestern States will themselves fill up to the point where, by 1995, the 40 million now living there will have increased to 60 million.

This, of course, is but a single illustration of a very large problem. By the end of the century, we shall be living next to a Latin America of 600 million people, and the problems that will create are immeasurable.

Today we are seeing some early intimations of those problems, clouds no larger than a man’s hand. One phenomenon certain to come is a fearful extension of guerrilla warfare, as young people in the less developed countries find that, even though they may be college graduates, there is no place for them in the labor force.

Thus, a problem recently noted in a number of countries, the appearance of desperate gangs of adolescents operating outside the law, is only the foreshadowing of a problem that will be intensified year by year as the youth element in the populations of poor countries grows increasingly large, while the net growth in their economies remains sluggish.

What that will mean in practical terms is a vast increase in kidnapping and other crimes of violence. We have already seen these,
We have noted these in the last 2 or 3 years. This is only the beginning. They are problems with which liberal societies are very ill-equipped to cope.

Moreover, it seems only logical to assume that at some point overblown populations, particularly in certain large, poor countries, will prove too much for the limited capacities of governments to keep order and provide services.

In Bangladesh, for example, this is already happening. With an appalling population density and a population increase of 40 percent in the last 13 years, its present population of 75 million is likely to double in 23 years and exceed 170 million by the year 2000, while the 2.25 million added mouths that must be fed each year will require an annual increment of 350,000 metric tons of cereals.

Though Bangladesh is dependent on food imports, it has no possibility of earning the foreign exchange to finance such imports.

With the population increase rapidly forcing people into the cities, even the Bangladesh Government concedes that the rate of unemployment and underemployment is at least 30 percent. Nor are the effects necessarily confined with national borders.

Already, Bengalese are illegally crossing into India and Burma, to the point where the Indians may feel compelled to intervene, even at the risk of greatly straining their own already badly tattered political fabric.

What we must expect in certain large countries, therefore, is that excessive population growth will simply overwhelm governments.

At the risk of offending my friends in the subcontinent, I would suggest that this could happen, for example, to India. Today, the Indian population is approximately 600 million, but the medium projection of the United Nations is that it will exceed 1 billion by the end of the century.

I do not see how a population of that vast size can possibly be maintained by the rather sluggish Indian economy or how it can ever be effectively governed by the bureaucracy in Delhi, even with substantial decentralization.

What may occur is hard to predict, but I would not be surprised to see the country break into fragments, some of which may be economically nonviable.

Unpleasant as it may be, we should forthrightly face the fact that some overcrowded countries, particularly those of large dimensions, may either disintegrate or be taken over by authoritarian regimes, as expanding populations exceed the magnitudes manageable under tolerant governmental systems.

The comparison that most rapidly springs to mind is, of course, between Indian and China, which, in terms of population, are the two largest countries in the world.

Both are miserably overcrowded. Much of China's land area is mountainous or otherwise uninhabitable, so that seven-eighths of the population, or roughly 700 million people, are crowded into the eastern one-third of the country, which is about the size of Argentina, and must live on the produce of less than 12 percent of the surface area of the country.

India, with only one-third the land of China, but slightly more extensive agricultural lands, today contains nearly 600 million people.
To the extent that statistics are at all reliable, the per capita income of the two countries is about the same, in the neighborhood of $100 a year.

Yet, though the basic economic and physical circumstances of the two countries are not far different, their social, economic, and political structures are poles apart.

India has developed what it still proudly calls the world’s largest democracy, although the aptness of that term may be questioned in the light of recent events.

China, on the other hand, is organized with the rigor of a beehive and under an all-pervasive political control, with the people indoctrinated from childhood in a rigid code, their thinking conducted on a mass basis and their economic activity regimented by an intricate bureaucratic command system.

Yet, repulsive though the Chinese system may be to anyone devoted to the values of the West, the Chinese nation today seems capable, largely through its own efforts, of gradually beginning to move toward more efficient agriculture, industrialization, and progressively higher standards of living.

Though the extravagant claims of the Peking Government must be substantially discounted, it seems probable that China will, in a few years, approach a relatively stable demographic situation that will insure a population with a diminishing, and ultimately a zero, growth rate.

Unhappily, an objective prognosis for India is necessarily less sanguine. With an overblown bureaucratic structure that sometimes seems to impede, more than stimulate, progress, and with great disparities of wealth between a rich class and the vast mass of wretchedly poor, it is hard to foresee how, under its present governmental system, India will be able to manage or overcome its problems.

I do not mean to suggest for a moment, Mr. Chairman, that the Communist structure of China is good and Indian democracy is bad. No one educated in Western libertarian traditions could possibly accept such a conclusion.

But I have a very simple point to make: If population is permitted to outrun resources in any huge country with a low standard of living, the people may face the hard choice between repression or ultimate chaos.

I would suggest, therefore, to this committee that within the next 25 years, we are likely to have to cope with a highly turbulent Third World.

Yet, we cannot shrug off responsibility in the belief that America can hold aloof from these developments. That option is no longer available. For, along with the vast growth of population we are witnessing, are two other alarming trends.

One is that the nuclear oligopoly, the limitation of the nuclear club to five advanced nations, is no longer intact, and an alarming proliferation of nuclear weapons seems almost inevitable.

The second is that the United States has, quite ill advisedly, I think, taken the lead in injecting vast quantities of the most sophisticated conventional weapons into some of the most unstable areas of the world.
Quite clearly, for many reasons, not the least of which is the asymmetry of obligations taken by the nuclear and nonnuclear powers, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has not worked as well as many had hoped, and it is not, as I see it, likely to prove an effective deterrent to proliferation.

Approximately 25 countries have already acquired nuclear reactors of one kind or another, and 52 are likely to be operating them by 1980.

Though there are still formidable obstacles to obtaining plutonium or enriched uranium, the fissionable material that is needed to make bombs, a number of states may be able to get over that hurdle.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that, if they set about it seriously, states such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan could all have some kind of nuclear device in anywhere from 3 to 10 years. Certainly for Japan and South Africa, a 3-year time span should probably suffice.

In addition, there is an increasing possibility that we may awaken some morning to find that some group outside the law has, through theft or chicanery, acquired enough fissionable material, to make a nuclear explosion, for, after all, the technology is now widely available and the ability to build some form of nuclear device is within the competence of many young Ph. D.'s in physics.

What makes the prospects particularly ominous is that a number of countries, in, for example, such a passion-torn area as the Middle East, have acquired rockets or aircraft capable of configuration for nuclear as well as conventional warheads, so that the delivery problem is no longer a major obstacle once a nuclear device has been reduced to portable size and properly armed.

To my mind, the widespread dissemination of conventional weapons presents problems almost as serious as nuclear proliferation.

In 1974 we sold and granted, something in the neighborhood of $11 billion of conventional weapons, and this year the total is likely to be of the same order of magnitude.

This, I may say, Mr. Chairman, by way of parentheses, is the reason that I testified the other day on the Turkish military program, simply because I felt it very important that we not take too cavalier an attitude with regard to the restrictions that we place on the use of the conventional weapons that we grant or sell to nations, or we are going to find ourselves supplying nations in turbulent areas with the weapons they are going to use against their neighbors with freedom, and, consequently, we may find ourselves turning little wars into big ones without meaning to do so.

In addition, the Soviets have been supplying weapons to many parts of the world, as have the French and the British. Moreover, some of the weapons left behind following the military collapse in Southeast Asia may well find their way into irresponsible hands in many parts of the world.

I mention this only to give the committee some impression of the kind of world for which we must prepare, one that will be marked by tumult and violence, particularly in the overcrowded areas where population is excessive in relation to resources, technology, or space.
We shall, in fact, have to devote much of our diplomatic efforts during the next few years coping with the enormously difficult problems of the Third World.

But we can never accomplish that unless we drastically alter our whole method of conducting foreign policy. The highly focused diplomacy of the past few years, in which we have concentrated our attention almost obsessively on the two principal communist powers, except for bravura efforts to deal with the problems of the Middle East, will become increasingly inadequate, in my judgment.

Recently, we have been shocked to discover that the developing countries are forming a common front against the richer countries and seeking—this is something to which Ambassador Lodge just addressed the committee—and seeking, through highly disciplined bloc politics, to dominate the United Nations and other international bodies. Some have suggested that we should—and I quote—“go into opposition” and actively confront the Third World in those forums.

I agree that it is essential that we answer complaints against us with firmness and that we stop turning the other cheek, just as Ambassador Lodge has suggested, when we are attacked unfairly and abused in the Marxist jargon that has become so predictable and so tiresome.

We should, with patience and candor, use the international forums to explain and to expound American positions.

Yet, that is only one means of communication available to us, and it has the disadvantage implicit in all multilateral discourse: That, by addressing the representatives of Third World en masse, we may merely increase the polarization between rich and poor nations rather than diminish it.

What is even more important is for us to reinstitutionalize our diplomacy so as to restore a full-fledged system of relationships with foreign governments at multiple levels, and on a bilateral basis.

Today, foreign governments no longer treat our Ambassadors with the respect once accorded representatives of our great country for the very obvious reason that they are not treated with respect by the Secretary of State.

Whenever a serious problem arises in a particular capital, the Ambassador is normally pushed aside while the Secretary flies out in his airplane or sends one of his personal staff to take charge.

That, in my view, is an absurd way to conduct a foreign policy in a world where we have diplomatic relations with more than 130 countries and I think we pay dearly for it.

One of the reasons why we now find ourselves facing Third World nations arrayed in blocs is because we have let our direct bilateral relations atrophy, while we have concentrated our diplomacy on secret maneuvers, involving only a handful of personalities who cannot possibly deal with more than one or two problems at a time.

A great deal more could and should be said about our current vogue for a highly personalized diplomacy of maneuver, which, in my view, is an anachronism, much better suited to dynastic Europe in the 19th century than to the complex and interdependent world of today.

Much also could be said about the play of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States and the rather special position of China in the complex equation of world power.
But I know you have been hearing considerable testimony on this latter problem, and, as I suggested at the beginning of this statement, Mr. Chairman, I felt it useful to devote my prepared remarks to a subject that has not received such wide or careful attention.

Our country is going to have to face many new problems in the years to come, some for which past experience will furnish little useful guidance, and I am happy that this committee is now devoting time and thought to the future. The future will not be easy for anyone, and particularly not for our own country, with the responsibilities that are ours not only because of our wealth and power, but because we know that, if we do not provide leadership, no other country is going to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolfs: Thank you very much, Secretary Ball. I thank both you gentlemen for very profound and provocative statements. We know it will contribute much to the general overview that we are trying to bring into actual focus here in these hearings.

We intend to pursue these hearings over a fairly lengthy period of time, so we will be able to get input from a fairly wide variety of sources.

We are going to adhere to the 5-minute rule today, even though we have a few members present, because I am afraid at any moment we are going to be called for a vote. Therefore, I am going to skip some of the questions that I would normally address to you to try to get into some of the issues that I think are vital to some of our determinations.

First of all, Ambassador Lodge, you lay heavy emphasis upon the United Nations and its abilities and inabilities as a world forum and as a world force.

I noticed, however, there here we are faced today with the question of whether or not we should sell arms, highly sophisticated arms, to Jordan.

One area that you did not address yourself to in your statement was the 1956 crisis in the Middle East when you were Ambassador to the United Nations.

**Reflections on Suez Crisis of 1956**

I am wondering, if there had been a different result at that time, had we not stopped the British and French and the Israelis, would we be faced today with taking a vote on whether to give arms to Jordan?

Ambassador Lodge: Well, I think President Eisenhower was afraid that the action in the Suez might lead to World War III, and the Soviet representative at the time made statements which justified a good deal of alarm.

I think he thought that that was the sort of thing that was at stake and that, in the interest of peace, he ought to try to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal.

Mr. Wolfs: The point being, however, upon reflection—and here our committee has the responsibility—if you will notice, the designation of the committee research and development of foreign policy.

When the Soviets at that time made the obvious threat that you refer to, were they as capable of making the response at that time as they would be today?