Mr. RIEGLE. Well, it is interesting. I have thought about that a lot myself and I am not anxious about the idea of centralism versus centralized mechanisms just in and of itself. But I think that is where we are coming to in terms of what has happened. In other words, I think the enormous complexity of the problem of insuring some kind of rough equity in how things are done is going to require group action however you want to label it and relief come from somewhere. Maybe I am wrong on this but my own internal clock tells me that there is not an awful lot of time to think about doing this, and to not think about doing it is to sort of waste what time there is.

Somehow I think we have to go about some kind of a way to approach foreign policy, if you will, in that context which to me is a new context and I think narrows it down too much. I think we need a new framework. I am not sure the United Nations can be tinkered with and made to become the vehicle. I think that would probably take more time and achieve a less than satisfactory result.

Mr. HALPERN. Let me give you two other thoughts, I am not sure how far they take us. One comes from rather touching scene, I think, at the Tel Aviv airport when the Secretary of State was greeted by the relatives of the Israel prisoners of war in Syria. He had just come back with the list and they gave him flowers and he was reported to be close to tears. He said, "This reminds us that foreign policy questions ultimately have to do with lives of human beings."

Turn that around and say not ultimately but right from the beginning foreign policy has to do with how it affects the lives of human beings. The chess games played by diplomats are much less important than what we do really in the lives of people in the United States and people in other countries. I think that is a different way of thinking about the problem.

The other is, I think, to recognize that the United States is so strong and so secure that we need not approach every problem with the assumption that the security of the United States is at risk. We can afford to say that whatever benefit we get from our security from a strong Greece and a strong Greek military capability—assuming there is such a thing—we are so strong and our security is sufficiently great that we can forego whatever security benefits we get from our active alliance with Greece. We can respond to what are our own feelings to say we don't want to have anything to do with the colonels who destroyed democracy in Greece. We are strong enough and rich enough and secure enough to approach a great many problems with that attitude. Our security is not at stake here so let's surprise everybody and do what we think is right.

Mr. RIEGLE. Thank you very much again for coming today, Mr. Halpern.

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Halpern, I do not accept the conclusion that the United States of America intervened with any commitments to any country anywhere for humanitarian reasons. That just does not happen.

Mr. HALPERN. I think that is right.

Mr. RIEGLE. Now the question that recurs to me is what are the benefits that have accrued to the United States. Let us say from our commitments to Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan—what benefits? I just can't see them.
Mr. HALPERIN. Let me clarify the misunderstanding of what I said. I do not believe we should enter into security commitments for humanitarian reasons; I believe we should send food to Africa and not worry about how that affects the balance of power.

Mr. NIX. We have done that.

Mr. HALPERIN. I think that the United States does have a vital security interest in Japan because I think that we have a vital security interest of preventing a situation in which Japan comes into military conflict, and I think a sure way to prevent that is to maintain security.

Mr. NIX. I still would go back to what I said a moment ago. I know of no instance in which a country permitted itself to the protection or the aid in other countries unless some benefit either immediately or at a later time would accrue to the country acting as beneficiary.

Mr. HALPERIN. I agree.

Mr. NIX. Now what concerns me most is what are we getting from these countries? Who made mistakes in the instances where we got something except the loss of our lives and loss of our money? That is why I would like to see all of the commitments examined and analyzed, and I think the American people would be interested to know who made the decisions, what benefit accrues to the United States of America, what prompted the decisions. Those are the things I want to know.

Mr. HALPERIN. I agree. I would add that the decision is made again every year. Every time we fail to renounce the SEATO Treaty we have renounced the commitment.

Mr. NIX. I represented the United States at the last SEATO meeting or was one of the representatives at the meeting in New York and I have never seen a more worthless organization in my life, it accomplished nothing. The only speech worthwhile was by Lord Hume—I think his name is Hume, the British representative. It was high sounding, a beautiful speech, but that is all.

So I just must ask myself the question over and over and over again, what are the benefits? That is one of the reasons why we proposed to hold hearings and examine all of the outstanding commitments, to determine for ourselves. I don't know what weight our opinions will have but at least we can let the American people know that we are interested in conserving our energies, the lives of our people and some of the money that we have thrown away. That is my concern.

Do you have any suggestions?

Mr. RIEGLE. No. I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NIX. Mr. Halperin, first I would like to submit for the record your statement in 1973 to the Recordings Institution publication entitled "The Next Phase of the Foreign Policy" and that will be made a part of the record at this point.

The above mentioned statement follows:

Mr. HALPERIN. I agree. I would add that the decision is made again every year. Every time we fail to renounce the SEATO Treaty we have renounced the commitment.

Mr. NIX. I represented the United States at the last SEATO meeting or was one of the representatives at the meeting in New York and I have never seen a more worthless organization in my life, it accomplished nothing. The only speech worthwhile was by Lord Hume—I think his name is Hume, the British representative. It was high sounding, a beautiful speech, but that is all.

So I just must ask myself the question over and over and over again, what are the benefits? That is one of the reasons why we proposed to hold hearings and examine all of the outstanding commitments, to determine for ourselves. I don't know what weight our opinions will have but at least we can let the American people know that we are interested in conserving our energies, the lives of our people and some of the money that we have thrown away. That is my concern.

Do you have any suggestions?

Mr. RIEGLE. No. I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NIX. Mr. Halperin, first I would like to submit for the record your statement in 1973 to the Recordings Institution publication entitled "The Next Phase of the Foreign Policy" and that will be made a part of the record at this point.
ship. Each is the other's largest overseas trading partner with a total annual volume of over $10 billion. Japan is protected against external threats to its own security and that of other East Asian nations by American military power; the United States is able to project that power by using a large complex of bases on Japan and Okinawa; Japan has remained nonmilitary. The close bilateral relation has also allowed both countries to cooperate in dealing with certain types of broader economic problems, as reflected in their cooperation in the Asian Development Bank and in the consortium for Indonesian aid. Not the least of the benefits of the alliance is that neither country has had to take into account the possibility of hostility between them.

Today, however, much of the cement that has held the relation together has been weakened. A deterioration—even a rapid and substantial one—during the decade cannot be ruled out unless both countries move to put the relation on a new footing reflecting both their common interests and their potential conflicts.

The decision by President Nixon in November 1969 to return administrative control of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 not only opened the way, according to then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, for a new era of close U.S.-Japanese relations, but also marked the end of the postwar period for Japan. President Nixon has echoed this in saying that the postwar period in American foreign policy is at an end. In this new period, while a different and more effective relation between the two countries will be possible, some loosening of the ties that have bound them together thus far will be inevitable. In fact, underlying the Nixon administration's agreement to yield special U.S. base rights on Okinawa was the perception that not only is the alliance important to the security and other interests of the two countries, but also that it is in some ways fragile and may well be subjected to serious strain during the 1970s.

Some Japanese regarded the U.S.-Japanese alliance in general, and the Mutual Security Treaty in particular, as a necessary evil, rather than as a good in themselves. They recognized that Japan could quickly end its occupation status and regain its rights as a totally sovereign nation only if it were prepared to enter into a security relation with the United States that included maintaining American bases in Japan. They also believed that the reversion of Okinawa would be much longer in coming unless it took place under a Japanese-American alliance. In the period of Sino-Soviet cooperation and intense cold war following the Korean war, some Japanese believed that the security alliance was necessary to protect them against aggression from the "communist bloc." Finally, many believed that Japan's economic recovery and growth depended on substantial American assistance, which would only come with an alliance. Each one of these pressures to maintain the alliance has now, of course, lessened. Japan is a fully sovereign nation, and has achieved the return of Okinawa. Although it still depends on the American market to absorb 80 percent of its exports, its economic relation with the United States is no longer that of a client state. Moreover, few in Japan now take seriously the threat of external attack by either Russia or China. China is believed to lack both the capability and the intention to pose a threat, and the Soviet Union any strong motive for doing so.

The new "American posture" reflected in the Nixon doctrine also reduces the pressures that have maintained the alliance. In the past, Americans were afraid that Japan would lose control of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and this fear provided the strongest rationale for the security relation. Given the split between Russia and China and Japan's great economic strength and cohesion, few Americans now feel there is any real risk of Japan's coming under the control of either or both of the communist giants. Some Americans saw the maintenance of the special base rights in Okinawa as depending on continuation of the treaty with Japan; with the reversion of Okinawa and the decline of the American presence in the Far East, having bases in Japan and Okinawa will appear less critical, and this in turn makes the treaty seem less necessary. Moreover, the United States has become more selective about its alliance relations and is unlikely to seek to hold the alliance with Japan against Japanese pressure to terminate it.

Despite the weakening of the forces that maintained the alliance in the postwar period, both Japan and the United States would benefit from the continuation of close relations and would suffer substantially from their deterioration. Growing bilateral economic problems would be difficult to solve unless they arose in an atmosphere of trust, allowing their amicable discussion. And the wider economic and political goals of the two countries, particularly in Asia, would be more difficult to reach if they did not work together closely.
If the two countries began to drift apart, their conflicting interests could cause an acceleration of the process. A trade war could lead Japan to seek closer political relations with China and the Soviet Union. This in turn could cause disquiet in the United States. The already fierce competition for markets in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America and disputes over such issues as monetary policy, textiles, and American investment in Japan could lead to political rivalry. As the gulf widened, Japanese leaders might conclude that they could no longer rely on American security guarantees and that Japan needed a vastly increased defense effort, including nuclear weapons. To secure a consensus for rearmament, Japanese leaders would have to appeal to nationalistic and latent anti-American sentiment. Japanese rearmament in such a setting would not only be a substantial setback to American nonproliferation efforts but also create intense concern throughout Asia. This concern would lead to pressure on the United States to maintain military forces in the area to protect these nations against Japan.

Deterioration in U.S.-Japanese relations need not go this far, even if the intimacy of the past cannot be maintained. Given the potential areas of disagreement, however, once the feeling of closeness is lost, the drift will almost certainly be substantial. In fact, one cannot rule out the possibility that the change will be even more fundamental. Between major powers with the economic potential to damage each other, intermediate positions between alliance and hostility may be unstable.

If the bonds of alliance were broken and disputes between Japan and the United States began to occupy the attention of both governments, military planners on both sides would begin to notice that some of the pressures which made for conflict in the past still exist. For example, the growing Japanese influence in the greater East Asian area, which many Americans now see as desirable, could be seen as a threat if Japan were looked upon as potentially hostile.

Territorial disputes between the two countries also are not inconceivable. Most Japanese do not view the trust territories they once controlled in the Pacific as inherently Japanese, as they do Okinawa, the Bonins, and the northern territories held by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, if Washington does not find a way to bring the territories into a permanent association with the United States in a manner acceptable to the residents of the islands, and if U.S.-Japanese relations turn sour, the trust territories people may well turn to Japan for support. A Japanese government that viewed the United States as increasingly hostile might be tempted to intervene, and the trust territories could loom as a potential territorial conflict.

If each came to think of the other as a potential enemy, the cost to both would be large. In this situation, Japan would not only have to rearm very substantially and perhaps build a nuclear capability, but would also have to change its relations with the Soviet Union or with China to avoid the possibility of a conflict on two fronts. The domestic impact in both Japan and the United States of such a change in Japanese posture is difficult to calculate. On the American side, some increase in defense expenditures would almost certainly be necessary, and some concern about the extent to which U.S. industries were dependent on production in Japan would be natural. Trade restraints would be added to the detriment of both nations.

One does not have to believe that there is any real possibility of relations deteriorating this far to accept the great value to both countries of continuing a close relation. The benefits of the current relations are many, and the costs of any drifting apart would be so significant—and of a larger rift so substantial—that they justify concern, even if the probability that these events will occur seems small.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

As suggested above, the decision to return Okinawa to Japan provides the starting point for all assessments of U.S.-Japanese relations, just as Okinawa as an unresolved issue was the focus of bilateral relations until the Nixon-Sato meeting in November 1969. The expectations created by the Okinawa reversion on both sides of the Pacific were the seeds of a significant misunderstanding.

For most Japanese, the return of Okinawa was long overdue. Okinawa is Japanese territory, and almost a million Japanese were living on the islands under occupation control twenty-five years after the war and long after the end of American occupation of all German territory. Most Japanese predicted a rapid deterioration of bilateral relations if Okinawa were not returned. This, many of them say, was why U.S. policy was merely removing a major irritant in the relationship and treating the possibility of a new relationship.
Most Americans, however, saw reversion as a means of forming a new partnership. From an American perspective the return of Okinawa during the Vietnam war was an act showing great confidence in future Japanese leaders. Since the President would pay a price with the American military and its supporters at home, and since there would be reduced military flexibility as a result of the Okinawa reversion, it was assumed that Japan in return would be prepared to make future sacrifices to cement the U.S.-Japanese relation.

The fruits of this misunderstanding were visible almost immediately in the dispute over textiles. President Nixon, during his 1968 campaign, had made a commitment to seek an international solution to the problem of imports of man-made and woolen textiles. While both sides worked hard to avoid any implication that the United States was demanding a quid pro quo on textiles in return for the reversion of Okinawa, most American officials felt that Japanese Prime Minister Sato owed the President something, and there could be little doubt in Sato's mind that the President wanted to be repaid in the matter of textiles. Whatever Sato's personal feelings of indebtedness may have been, however, the climate in Japan simply did not allow him to acknowledge that Japan had an obligation to pay. Since they viewed the return of Okinawa as overdue, most Japanese would not concede that any change in textile policy was owed the United States. The opposition charged that Sato made an Okinawa textiles deal, and the Japanese government was forced to deny the charge. By 1970 many Japanese officials, including Sato, were willing to move on textiles to stop a harsh trade bill from passing Congress and to prevent a deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations. However, they were hamstrung by the charge that they were paying off an Okinawan debt.

The Japanese did not see any economic merit in the arguments put forward by the United States to justify a restraint on trade. Because the Japanese textile industry, which consists of a large number of mostly small firms, is much less susceptible to government influence than other industries, the ability of the Sato government to act was curtailed. On the American side, the position was shaped by the President's commitment to protect U.S. textile producers, as well as by expectations generated by the belief that Sato had twice promised the President a textile agreement. With the Nixon administration feeling that Japan owed the United States, in general, and the President, in particular, a favor in return for his generosity on Okinawa, and with the Japanese feeling that the issue had to be considered on its merits since nothing was owed for a belated ending of the occupation, an impasse on textiles seemed inevitable. Although the impasse was finally resolved under heavy U.S. pressure late in 1971, the episode will leave a bitter taste in the mouths of officials and the American public in Japan. It is symptomatic of what can happen in the future.

Before the textile issue had been resolved, U.S.-Japanese relations were further exacerbated by the manner in which President Nixon's trip to Peking was announced in July 1971. During previous months, the American and Japanese governments had been engaged in intense and detailed consultations on the China issue, particularly on United Nations representation. Japanese officials and press described these discussions as the first example of genuine consultation between the two governments in an effort to develop a common position. Thus it was a considerable shock to the Japanese to learn that, at the same time and without informing them, President Nixon was negotiating directly with Peking. Moreover, the secret visit by Henry Kissinger and the surprise announcement that the American President would go to China was a replay of a Japanese nightmare. Throughout the postwar period the Japanese have feared that the United States would beat them to Peking. Leaders of the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) were uneasy about such a move, for two reasons. First, that the United States might "sell out" Japanese interests to improve relations with Peking, and, second, that the domestic political consequences of the move. China has long been a major political issue in Japan, and it became particularly important in 1971, the press, opposition parties, and factions in Japan accused the government of refusing to improve relations with Peking because of American pressure.

The result in Japan of President Nixon's dramatic announcement of his impending trip to China was thus (1) to deal a setback to the United States in its desire to normalize relations with Peking; (2) to undermine Sato's arguments that he had a personal relationship with President Nixon; (3) to undermine the belief that genuine consultation between
the two countries was possible; and (4) to weaken Sato and the dominant pro-American/LDP faction because of their reluctance to move on the China issue.

Thus, by July 1971, despite the Okinawan reversion treaty which had been signed in June, Japanese-American relations were at a low point because of textile and China policy. The situation became even more critical in August, when the United States—partly in response to a long-standing Japanese unwillingness to revalue the yen, which U.S. policy makers felt gave Japan an unfair competitive advantage over the United States and thus was responsible for the growing American deficit in bilateral trade—made a series of economic decisions that adversely affected Japanese interests. While resentment mounted in both countries at what each considered the other's indisposition to adopt sensible, cooperative economic policies, leaders on both sides remained committed to the need for a close relationship; as evidenced by the 1971 meeting between President Nixon and Emperor Hirohito in Alaska and the 1972 meeting between the President and Prime Minister Sato in California. The latter meeting was, however, soon overshadowed by the President's February 1972 trip to China. A later presidential meeting in Hawaii with Prime Minister Tanaka, who had succeeded Sato, achieved some progress on specific issues and resulted in a better climate of U.S.-Japanese understanding.

CURRENT ASSESSMENT

How do the leading actors in Washington and Tokyo look upon the current state of U.S.-Japanese relations, and what trends can be discerned?

There appears to be considerable consensus among American officials, congressional leaders, and others about the desirable future of Japanese-American relations. Bilateral relations between the two countries are viewed as critical to future American policy in the Pacific. Beyond that, it is generally believed that Japan should “do more”; that while low defense and aid budgets have contributed to the economic miracle that has made Japan the third industrial power of the world, now it is Japan's obligation to devote a larger fraction of its resources to security and development, particularly in Asia. There is agreement that Japan should step up its economic assistance and that it should be more active politically in Asia. There is also widespread feeling that Japan should reduce barriers to trade—both tariff and nontariff barriers—let American businessmen invest more freely in Japan, and align its exchange rate more realistically with the dollar.

On the question of Japan's role in security affairs, there is some difference of opinion and a good deal of ambivalence in American attitudes. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is reported to have implied to Japanese leaders, during a visit to Japan in July 1971, that Japan should increase its defense expenditures and take part in protecting such countries as Taiwan and Korea; some Americans feel the same way. Other U.S. officials reportedly take a different view. They recognize that the Japanese political situation simply will not allow Japan to assume more responsibility for security and that Asian countries are not eager to have Japanese military protection. Extensive Japanese rearmament and the assumption by Japan of security obligations beyond its own territory would probably lead eventually to a Japanese nuclear capability. As noted earlier, such a program could be sold in Japan only as part of a nationalist, anti-American campaign, which could lead to Japanese-American hostility and increased instability in Asia. Far from lessening America's defense burdens, a greater Japanese defense effort might well require a larger American presence in Asia. At the moment, the official policy of the U.S. government appears to be to encourage the Japanese to expand their defense capability so they can provide fully for the conventional defense of Japan but not to push Japan beyond that to a security role in Asia as a whole.

Leaders of the Japanese government and others in Japan concerned with Japanese policy are also uncertain about what future Japanese security expenditures should be. This uncertainty arises within the context of an emerging consensus on the Japanese role in the world and the nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship during this decade.

For the past half dozen years Japan has been engaged in a debate about its function in the world and what part military capability, including nuclear weapons, should play. In the early 1960s it was almost impossible to have a serious public discussion of these issues in Japan. The nuclear taboo was very strong, and any notion that Japan might be responsible for security beyond its borders or
develop a national nuclear capability was considered outside the realm of the politically possible and not worth discussing. Now the situation is changed. The discussion of Japanese nuclear capability focuses on strategic and political arguments, with almost no reference to the moral issues that dominated thinking ten years ago. From this discussion and the changed political climate has emerged a consensus which might be summarized as follows.

As the third industrial power of the world and the greatest economic power in Asia, Japan must be active in East Asian political and economic affairs. Moreover, Japan has the right to be treated as a great nation, to have its views taken into account by the superpowers and by Asian states. To fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of a great power, Japan must take part in regional affairs, in such organizations as the Asian Development Bank, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Japanese-sponsored Southeast Asian development committee, as well as in such organizations as the United Nations. Japan should also (according to this consensus) be given a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Negotiations such as those to establish International Atomic Energy Agency procedures for inspection under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must take fully into account Japanese interests and Japanese sensibilities. Japan must increase its economic assistance to Asian states (although the term of that assistance are still being debated) and concern itself with such regional problems as the future of Cambodia and the economic development of Indonesia.

On all of this there is a wide measure of agreement. But there are uncertainty and disagreement about whether Japan can both fulfill its obligations and receive the recognition due it without developing a substantially larger military capability. The Japanese are aware that no nation in the past has been treated as a great power without having at its disposal the weapons of modern warfare; but they also recognize both the great cost of developing a nuclear capability and the changes in the international system that may enable them to function effectively while relying on the American nuclear umbrella.

Over the next several years the Japanese will seek to establish themselves in the world without embarking on a nuclear development program. Should this fail, should Japan not receive the deference and have the influence Japanese leaders believe it is entitled to, and in particular, should Japan be unable to establish what the Japanese consider true equality with the United States, then it is likely to move somewhat reluctantly toward developing a national nuclear capability and toward a position considerably different from that of the United States.

The reasons the Japanese have reached a consensus to try to establish Japan's place in the world without developing a nuclear capability are set forth in an article by Kichi Saeck, a leading Japanese defense specialist and former commander of the Japanese Defense College. Saeck's argument is worth summarizing at some length because it reflects this consensus and illuminates the kinds of arguments that are persuasive to Japanese political leaders, as well as to scholars and journalists.

Saeck begins by considering how Japan should react to the developing Chinese nuclear capability. He notes that the American guarantee is not complete protection, but warns that an independent Japanese deterrent would also fail to solve all of the problems created by the Chinese capability. Thus risks and gains must be weighed. In doing this, Saeck points out four fundamental difficulties that would arise from a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons:

1. Japan's development of nuclear armament would result from a lack of confidence in the American deterrent. Hence, it would substitute "an imperfect Japanese deterrent" for a "sufficient" American deterrent.

2. Because of geographic and population asymmetries, Japan would require superiority over China. This quest for superiority would produce an endless arms race.

3. Japan would also need a deterrent against the Soviet Union and the United States, which it cannot develop.

4. Changes in Japan's constitution and "Basic Law of Atomic Energy" would be required. Efforts to obtain such changes would generate "socialist political turmoil."
Sasaki goes on to say that it would take Japan more than a decade to build an independent deterrent and that this would be a period of maximum danger. Thus he concludes that “Japan should do its best to ensure its security without acquiring nuclear weapons.” He points out that domestic social and political conditions would make it very difficult to proceed now with a nuclear program and that Japan would not fall far behind if it waits. He continues:

In the meantime, the Japanese can wait and see whether the efforts of arms control focusing on the strategic arms limitation talks as well as the maintenance of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bipolarity will succeed in persuading second-class nuclear states to realize that nuclear arms do not provide political and military dividends commensurate with their cost. In the worst case, if Japan were to suffer some disadvantages because she did not make haste with her nuclear armament, this would not endanger Japan’s existence but only pose a problem of prestige and political influence, which would not be irretrievable.

Finally, he expresses the hope that the United States will recognize the conditions that will allow Japan to continue this policy?

It is also unnecessary for Japan to fear that her reliance on the American nuclear deterrent will automatically lead to a loss of Japan’s political independence. It is consistent with America’s national interests for her to place Japan under the protection of her nuclear deterrent. In addition, the leaders of the U.S. government recognize, correctly, that nuclear weapons are inadequate as an instrument of political control and inconvenient as a back-pressure for diplomatic bargaining.

Japan’s success in its efforts to be the first power to eschew such armaments will largely depend on the nature of U.S.-Japanese relations. If leaders on each side are sensitive to domestic political constraints on the other side and if they are conscious of the fragility as well as the importance of the relation, prospects for its improvement consistent with the interests of both countries will be better and the danger of a rupture that might trigger greater nationalism in Japan will recede. Whether the relation moves in this direction will depend on how a number of specific issues—security, China policy, and economic problems—are handled in this decade.

SECURITY ISSUES

In the 1970s, American and Japanese leaders must seek agreement on what the threats to their security are and on what each country should do to meet them. For reasons described above, the United States should not urge Japan to assume security commitments beyond its borders or to develop a capability for combat operations except in direct defense of Japan. Instead, the United States and Japan should agree on the function of American bases in Japan in various contingencies and reach an understanding that the United States will not intervene militarily in East Asia unless the Japanese government is prepared to publicly endorse such intervention.

Under such an understanding, the United States would no longer determine its response to security threats and then inform Japan. Rather, the two governments would consult and agree on what should be done. In the event of threats to Taiwan or Korea, this would be a practical necessity, since the United States would need Japan’s permission to conduct combat operations from bases in Japan (including Okinawa), which would have to be used to defend these areas. In the case of Southeast Asian countries, U.S. interests would be defined by the Japanese interest; we would not intervene in these countries unless Japan was prepared to support our intervention in a way consistent with its domestic constraints. For we would intervene in these countries only if we felt this necessary, to continued Japanese confidence in the American deterrent and to a close and harmonious U.S.-Japanese relation.

Developing a common understanding of these issues will probably require the creation of new institutions. To this end, a forum that regularly brings the secretaries of state and defense in contact with their Japanese counterparts in working sessions may be useful.

* The political structure of Japan is such that the prime minister, who is in turn responsible to a bicameral Diet, cannot be dismissed by the emperor without the cooperation of the emperor’s representative, the regent.‘Thus, if the emperor were to dismiss the prime minister, the prime minister would have to resign. Since the emperor cannot dismiss the regent without the cooperation of the prime minister, the emperor can dismiss the prime minister only if the prime minister consents to the dismissal.~

* This, p. 18.

* Ibid.
THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND U.S. BASES

One of the most important, if least tangible, issues in Japanese-American relations during the 1970s will be the extent to which people in both countries come to look upon the Mutual Security Treaty as one involving equal contributions by both countries. Paradoxically, many Americans and many Japanese have viewed the treaty as unequal, although they have meant quite different things by that.

For the Japanese the treaty is unequal because it provides for American rights to bases in Japan. Some Japanese believe the bases are there exclusively to protect American security interests, not the mutual interests of the United States and Japan, although many now see the treaty and American bases as contributing to Japanese security. On the other hand, many Americans feel that the treaty commits the United States to defend Japan but not Japan to defend the United States, and that it is for that reason unequal.

Unless both nations come to see the treaty as equal, it is unlikely to survive the 1970s. Even if the relationship between the two governments became a more nearly equal one, it is possible that many Japanese would continue to view the existing treaty as a symbol of the occupation period, as one that has been imposed on Japan and was therefore inherently unequal.

Surely it is sensible over the next five years to simply allow the treaty to continue in operation, as both governments have decided to do. In the long run, perhaps by the end of the decade, it might be wise to consider whether a new treaty is not needed to destroy the myth of an imposed and unequal one.

In the meantime, the question of American bases in Japan may reach the crisis stage. Americans, viewing the bases as Japan’s only contribution to regional security, have been annoyed by Japanese pressure to close them. Nonetheless, since many bases are in heavily populated areas, pressure from the local population is likely to increase. The United States has been responsive to this pressure in the past; there are considerably fewer U.S. bases in Japan than there were ten years ago. But during the 1970s the United States is likely to reach what it considers an irreducible minimum, which will include naval ship repair facilities, air bases (perhaps on a standby basis, and some communication and other miscellaneous installations. A Japanese effort to close these minimum bases would put a great strain on U.S.-Japanese relations.

It is important that both governments head off this potential crisis. The United States should be prepared to close less important bases one step ahead rather than one step behind Japanese public opinion. Full use should be made of opportunities both for joint basing, under which American forces would use Japanese bases, and for standby basing arrangements, under which Japan would maintain bases for the use of American forces in a crisis. Most important, the two governments should agree on these steps and on the value of the remaining U.S. bases under a more general agreement on the security policies both governments will follow.

KOREA

In their joint communiqué of November 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed that the security of South Korea was important to the security of the United States and Japan. Certainly Japanese leaders would consider an attack on South Korea a threat to Japan’s security. The Japanese would also be opeparated if they came to believe that the United States was backing away from its commitment to Korea. This would be disturbing not only in its implications for Korea itself, but also in its implication of a possible reduction in the American commitment to Japan.

In fact, the American interest in Korea is largely the result of Korea’s importance to the American-Japanese relationship. The American bases in Japan (including Okinawa) are critical to the air defense of Korea. For both these reasons the United States should seek to develop a common understanding with Japan on Korean security. The two countries should discuss the likely threats to that security and what each one can do to meet them—recognizing that Japan cannot assume any formal responsibility for the defense of Korea.

It is in this context that the issue of American troops in Korea and military aid to Korea should be examined. The withdrawal of all American ground forces from Korea would raise grave doubts in Japan (as well as Korea) about American intentions. The United States should therefore be prepared to maintain a residual presence until diplomatic progress in settling the Korean problem has gone further, at the same time looking to Japan to become the primary source of economic aid to Korea (which it probably already is, in resource transfers),
China policy may well be the major issue in U.S.-Japanese relations during the 1970s.

In attempting to bring about normal relations with Peking, American officials should recognize that American-Japanese relations are even more important than American relations with China. A Japan hostile to the United States would be a greater threat to American security in the 1970s than China. And U.S. economic relations with Japan are vastly more significant than any that could be formed with China.

Future American moves toward China should be made only after consultation with Japan and should include an appreciation of the way the China issue cuts in Japanese domestic politics.

Following the agreement on the reversion of Okinawa, China policy became the major foreign policy issue in Japanese domestic politics. Opposition parties, some LDP leaders, and the press urged the government to improve relations with Peking. For many years LDP leaders had hidden behind the United States by implying that Japan could not move toward China without upsetting the Japanese-American relation. President Nixon's trip to Peking stripped away this cover, forcing the Japanese to argue the question on its merits.

There are powerful supporters of Taiwan in the Liberal Democratic party and among the industrialists who point out Japan's historic ties with Taiwan and its economic relations with the island. They have been reluctant to make a gesture toward the mainland at the expense of relations with Taiwan. Most LDP leaders preferred the status quo.

However, this position became increasingly untenable. After China was admitted to the United Nations and the United States had opened diplomatic contact with China in the wake of President Nixon's trip, pressure in Japan to establish diplomatic relations became irresistible. Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to China was the turning point.

Even so, LDP leaders are likely to favor the continued independence of Taiwan. In fact, during the course of the next few years, it may become clear that Japan attaches greater importance to keeping Taiwan independent than does the United States.

America's China policy will, however, affect Japan's attitudes. The options open to the United States are discussed in Chapter 8. Here only the importance of close consultation with Japan need be noted. In moving to establish normal relations with China, the United States should keep two facts in mind:

- Good relations with Tokyo are, for reasons indicated, far more important than improved relations with Peking.
- Japanese leaders will view American willingness to consult and cooperate in China policy as an indication of American willingness to treat Japan as a great, equal, and independent ally.

Economic Issues

Although economic issues are discussed in detail elsewhere in this book, it may be useful to discuss their political effect on U.S.-Japanese relations because of their importance in shaping these relations.

Trade policy and related monetary problems are likely to be the most active economic issues between the United States and Japan for the next few years. Questions of the value of the yen, of Japanese textile exports, and of American exports to and investment in Japan have been at the center of the U.S.-Japanese relationship since the reversion of Okinawa. The failure to settle the textile question until October 1971, despite the strong incentive for leaders on both sides to do so, and the fact that even an interim monetary agreement could not be achieved until December 1971 suggests the great difficulty of resolving major economic conflicts on other issues quickly.

The Japanese view is that the United States has entered a period of protectionism, which was reflected in the economic measures announced on August 15, 1971. From an American perspective, the problem is Japan's willingness in removing the vestiges of past protectionism, despite its substantial balance of payments and trade surpluses and the continuing rapid growth of its economy. Americans argue that the yen has been overvalued in recent years; that Japan is not moving fast enough to free trade and remove restrictions on U.S. investment; and that the industry-government collusion of "Japan, Inc." gives Japanese exporters tremendous competitive advantage over U.S. industry, in both American and other markets.
Any accommodation of resulting domestic political pressures on leaders in the two countries will have to be found on a mutual basis. Protectionist pressures in the United States will be difficult for any president to resist under the best of circumstances; it will be almost impossible to do so unless he can point to unilateral moves toward freer trade. Japan can thus best head off American protectionism by opening its economy to more American investment and trade.

Such actions, however, offend important political groups in Japan. Some aspects of the Japanese way of doing business would have to change if there were large American firms with control over their own capital operating in Japan. And as Japanese tariffs fell, it would become clear that there are important non-tariff barriers to trade, which will be difficult to surmount in the face of Japanese business and social style.

The obstacles to an accommodation are thus large and evident. Nevertheless, unless they can be overcome, growing economic friction, which will spill over and affect other aspects of U.S.-Japanese relations, is inevitable.

These obstacles can be most effectively dealt with in multilateral forums. Unilateral action taken by one country without consulting the other, such as the measures announced by the United States in August 1971, may make it more difficult for the two countries to work out cooperative answers to common problems. Nor are economic issues affected by Japan and the United States primarily bilateral questions that can be dealt with effectively in a bilateral context. Trade, monetary, and related problems typically need to be approached in broader contexts, that look to basic reform of the world monetary system and of international trade. In this wider setting, it may be easier to generate the larger political impulse toward agreement that will be essential to success, and it may also be easier for both governments to make concessions without seeming to "give in" to the other.

Multilateral action will be important not only in addressing trade and monetary issues, but also in providing aid to developing areas, particularly the countries of Southeast Asia. Both the United States and Japan will be devoting substantial resources to this end. It will be important to avoid the impression either that the two countries are not working in a parallel way—since, Japan, moving alone, is likely to be viewed with concern and suspicion by many Asian countries—or that they are competing to impose their will on smaller countries. The United States and Japan can best avoid either of these impressions by providing aid through international consortiums, organizations, and procedures.

Some progress toward addressing U.S.-Japanese economic problems in a multilateral framework has already been made. What were originally Atlantic institutions—notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Group of Ten—have been stretched to include Japan. The two countries also work together in such worldwide organizations as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and in such regional organizations as the Asian Development Bank and the Indonesian aid consortium.

CONCLUSION

For a variety of historical and cultural reasons, Americans have been more sensitive to the concerns of Europeans, Latin Americans, and even our potential adversaries in the Soviet Union and China than to those of the Japanese. If the United States and Japan are not to drift apart, at great cost to both, this must change. Officials and private citizens in both countries will have to dedicate themselves to the task of enlarging their relationship to incorporate new forms of consultation and interaction between the two governments and societies, which will help leaders on each side to understand the domestic political problems of the other and to convince their compatriots that these must be met symmetrically.

The necessity for this is occasioned by large changes in the international scene—including a revival of Japanese power and confidence. These trends will create new problems—involving security, China, and economic questions—that will require new attitudes in both the United States and Japan.

In the immediate postwar period the United States could make major decisions with reasonable confidence that they would be accepted by other governments, shattered by the way and dependent on our power. Now, the former confidence will require greater understanding of other countries' views and greater willingness to accede to these views than has been shown in the past. American
officials will have to avoid the temptation to take Japan for granted, as they have so often done. Japan's interests and its sense of honor will have to be included in American calculations.

This American posture will make it easier to achieve the comparable changes which will be required in Japanese policy. Japanese leaders must resist the temptation to blame unpopular Japanese policies on the United States. In many cases in the past, the Japanese government has told its people that it could not prevent the United States from carrying out certain operations from Okinawa, or even from Japan, since under the Mutual Security Treaty Japan had no basis for objecting. On other issues, such as China policy, the Japanese government has implied to its people that it was constrained by American pressure. With Okinawa's reversion, the Japanese government will have to assume responsibility for any combat operations from Okinawa; and it must begin to share responsibility even for military activities that are permitted under the treaty without consultation. If the notion that the treaty is unequal and a derogation of Japanese sovereignty is to be avoided. On other issues, such as China, the Japanese government will publicly have to assume responsibility for its position instead of hiding behind the United States.

If this new U.S.-Japanese relation is to be brought about, expanded dealings at the governmental level on political issues will have to be supplemented by increased contact between Americans and Japanese concerned with a whole range of problems. Steps in this direction have been taken; efforts are being made to work together, at both the official and the private levels, not only on foreign policy issues but on such problems as pollution and urbanization. More Americans are visiting Japan; and rising Japanese incomes in the next few years should also make it possible for a larger number of Japanese to visit the continental United States.

The term "special relationship" has become one of the most overused and meaningless phrases in international dialogue. Seldom does a public statement by a U.S. official about another country conclude without allusion to the "special" relation between the two countries. But in the case of the United States and Japan the phrase does have a special meaning.

Despite their great differences in historical development and culture, Japan and the United States are alike in many ways. Both are moving into the post-affluent age. Both have restless younger generations, which question the values of society. The population of both is beginning to be concerned about the pollution of the air, the rivers, and the land arising from urbanization and modernization. Although the two nations fought a bloody war, it is one that many of their citizens are too young to remember.

Relations between the United States and Japan must thus be seen against a broader background. Not only must Japanese leaders come to feel that Japan can live in dignity while relying on the American deterrent, but also citizens of the two countries, without denying or seeking to suppress strong feelings of national identity, must have a sense of international community that will enable them to work together to strengthen peace, conquer the problems of modern society, and help developing societies move ahead as rapidly as they can.

Failure to meet this challenge will not only decrease the relative security of the two nations in an insecure world, but also raise doubts as to whether the white West and the nonwhite East can find a way to coexist on our shrinking planet. Success may most readily be found not only by improving bilateral U.S.-Japanese security relations but also through an emerging community of developed nations that can bring the two countries together with other industrial societies in addressing their common economic and social problems. Change in U.S. policy toward Japan is most likely to be effective if it is part of a larger change in American policy toward the industrial world as a whole.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]
OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, Hon. Robert N. C. Nix [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will come to order.

The key question that we must answer in these hearings is what U.S. interests are so vital that the American people would be willing to commit the American infantry to combat in order to protect that interest in the future.

Another way of stating the same question is to ask for what policy reasons in Asia would the American people consent to the revival of the draft, because the use of an American Army means the use of draftees. That has been our experience over the past. We would not have embarked on the campaign to protect every village in South Vietnam if massive numbers of men had not been provided by the Selective Service.

In the past, the only alternative to all-out war after the deployment of American ground forces in combat is a war of attrition, where American casualties are traded for time and ground. Now, will the American people stand for such tactics again?

Our question then is one directed to finding out what interests are most vital in the eyes of American citizens, not what is important or interesting to the best and brightest of our experts. The United States, unlike Asian powers, has the option of reducing its involvement in Asia at will. Russia, China and Japan face each other in such a way that they cannot reduce their effort.

Therefore, it is reasonable to ask, what is our minimum interest in Asia, and what is our maximum interest. How should we appraise our mutual security treaty with Japan? Can our obligations to that part of Asia be met by maintaining the American nuclear umbrella? That interest does not require garrisoning of troops in Korea, Okinawa, in a military sense. We have 70,000 men in these areas. About 19,000 in Japan.

Our men in Japan are usually assigned to air or naval functions. Can we continue to fulfill this role without the danger of entanglement that ground forces present? At the same time, it must be pointed out that the stationing of 30,000 men in airbases in Thailand involves a different situation, since our airbases there were built to serve the bombing of South Vietnam, a function now forbidden by statute.
I take the position that a time limit must be set on our involvement in Asia. We have been in South Korea for 24 years, in South Vietnam 10 years, in Cambodia 4 years and heavily involved in Japan for 29 years. I feel it is time for Asians to man Asian barricades.

If the Nixon doctrine of which we have heard so much—if it means anything at all, it means that the only U.S. forces maintained in the Pacific will be our naval and air forces based in the mid-Pacific. In time, our naval forces may even be able to replace our air forces, since the development of antiaircraft missiles, the development of submarine warfare and pilotless aircraft make that replacement possible.

What all this means is that, in my view, it is time to bring home at least 100,000 American soldiers and airmen from the Pacific, and in addition to this, the deliberate and positive steps toward complete and total withdrawal.

The first witness we have today is Hon. Donald N. Fraser, appearing here as National Chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action. Congressman Fraser is also chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements. His experience has been wide and indepth.

I am particularly pleased to welcome you, Congressman Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. FRASER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA**

Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If it is agreeable, I would like to put my statement in the record and supplement it with some remarks.

Mr. Nixon. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Fraser. First, the service that you are rendering by having the question of U.S. forces in Asia aired and discussed is invaluable. The opportunity that you are providing for people both in and out of Government to express their interest and concern about U.S. policy in Asia is going to contribute significantly to wiser decisions, both in the executive branch and in the Congress.

Let me at the outset endorse the position you have just taken in your capacity as chairman of the subcommittee. I support withdrawal of 100,000 troops from the Pacific and Asian region. I think there is ample evidence that our forces there are in excess of any legitimate U.S. security interest, and that this commitment represents not only an added burden on the U.S. taxpayer, but represents a presence which can lead us into unwarranted difficulties if certain events should take place in some of these countries.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to see our experience in Vietnam lead to a general withdrawal from world responsibility. I testified with respect to our NATO commitments last year, and urged that we not let an unhappy experience in Asia lead us to an indiscriminate withdrawal and abandonment of commitments around the world.

What I do think, however, is that the Vietnam experience should lead to a more careful and thoughtful evaluation of where the real security interests of the United States are to be found, and that we fashion our policies based on searching inquiry and analysis.

It is my view that the United States has three major security concerns. One is the defense of the continental United States and our
territories and possessions. By the continental United States, I also mean Alaska and Hawaii. That is the first obligation for our military policy.

There is little question that we are relatively immune from any threat from any quarter in the world with the possible exception of the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. For that reason, we maintain a strategic deterrent which costs us some $15 billion a year and this is an adequate deterrent, and it is about the best we can offer to provide such protection as is possible against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.

The second major security interest of the United States is centered in Western Europe. I say that because Western Europe is the second most important concentration of economic power and potential military power outside the United States. It is an area that shares our views about human dignity and the rights of man and the importance of self-government. It is for this reason, I think, that our NATO Alliance—while it needs modification and reforming—is an important alliance, and it is the reason I support—and so does ADA support—continued presence of troops in Europe.

The third important security interest, in my view, is to be found in Japan. I come to this view for two major reasons. One is that Japan is, I think, the third most important country in the world economically. It is a democracy, and moreover Japan has been led to rely on the U.S. power for her self-defense.

With these three major areas of primary security interest in mind, we then are led to the question of what other interests we have in the Pacific that would lead us to station there hundreds of thousands of troops and other elements of the armed forces. For myself—and speaking for ADA—we do not find in other areas of the Pacific any immediate threats to U.S. security posed. Many of the countries of Asia have yet to find their way through the process of development and in most the growth of strong and vital democratic institutions is not manifest.

Many of these countries experience authoritarian rule, corruption and inordinate disparity income between the elites, who run the countries, and the masses of the people, who characterize the societies.

What may happen in these countries is important to the people, who live there, and it is important to us in the sense that they are a part of the same world community as we are. But that is quite a different matter from saying that what happens to them is of direct importance and interest to the United States from the point of view of our own security.

So, it is my view of the Pacific-Asian region that the United States should give primary attention to its alliance with Japan, and that we should maintain a modest level of troops essential to make our commitment to Japan credible. But it is also my view, which the Japanese share, that we do not need to keep the number of troops in Japan including Okinawa that we have there at present.

In particular, it seems to me that a significant number of troops could be withdrawn from Okinawa.

A strong U.S. naval presence in the Pacific is important, but what I question is the assignment of 85,000 U.S. troops to Thailand. These
are air force units which remain there, threatening reinv olvement of
the United States in insurgency and civil war in Asia.
As the chairman correctly pointed out, Congress has forbidden any
such intervention. But keeping these forces there can lead only to
trouble: Trouble by reason of reinv olvement in some of the disputes in
Asia, and also because within Thailand itself they represent an exces-
sive commitment in a country which is still subject to internal tur-
noil, insurgency, and which has not yet matured politically. It is my
view that these forces should be withdrawn.

The forces that we have on Taiwan, although small in number, ought
to be looked at carefully. I think that our bilateral treaty with Taiwan
should not at this point be abandoned, but there is no reason to believe
that the Chinese offer a present military threat to Taiwan. The Chinese
mainland Government does not have a military capability of launching
any significant seaborne invasion. Their naval capability is rela-
tively modest, and I think under these circumstances, the lower our
profile in Taiwan, the better for the United States.

I would call attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that a statement
which was issued July 31 of last year by 14 experts on Asia con-
cluded, as the chairman has, that we ought to withdraw 100,000
troops. These experts include such people as Robert Barnett, formerly
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Roger Hilsman,
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eastern Affairs; Earl
Ravenal, former Director, Asian Division, Office of the Secretary of
Defense.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, if it is appropriate, that the statement
which this group of 14 experts issued last year be inserted in the record
at this point.

Mr. Nix. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The statement referred to follows:]

MEMORANDUM—JULY 31, 1973

STATEMENT ON ASIAN TROOP REDUCTIONS

The United States is completing a significant reduction in our involve ment in
East Asia. We have withdrawn from direct participation in the conflict in
Vietnam, and are soon to refrain from all direct combat operation in Indochina.
We have also begun to establish mutually beneficial relationships with the
Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

Because of these factors, we, the undersigned, believe that substantial reduc-
tions can be made in those military forces now deployed in East Asia and the
Western Pacific. There are now 227,000 military personnel stationed in these
areas, of whom 46,000 are in Thailand; 18,000 are in Japan; 15,000 are in the
Philippines; 40,000 are in the Ryukyu Islands; 42,000 are in South Korea; 9,000
are in Taiwan; and 58,000 are afloat. We feel that at least 100,000 of these can be
returned and deactivated with no harm either to our national security or our
important interests in the area.

It is our sincere hope that Congress will take such firm and timely action
as is necessary to bring our East Asian force level in line with present diplomatic
realities.

Endorsed by:

Robert Barnett, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs
Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, Harvard Law School (Chinese Law)
Chester L. Cooper; Special Assistant to Gov. Harriman for the Paris Peace
Conference on Vietnam
Alvin Friedman, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Morton Halperin, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. FRASER. These are the essential elements I want to mention in my testimony:

The United States has military bases in the Philippines. I am not prepared to suggest these should be abandoned, but I would make the point that just as in Thailand a large military presence can become a target of those who are in opposition to the incumbent governments, so in the Philippines, these bases and troops leave us vulnerable.

With a revised military profile in the Pacific, we should take a very close look at the level of forces associated with these bases and the extent to which the bases are needed.

South Korea is the other country that I want to discuss. South Korea has military forces which are in excess of those of North Korea. We have given them extensive assistance including military aid designed to modernize their military establishment. We have removed one division from South Korea, and I think it is time to consider removing the remaining forces now in South Korea.

In advocating the removal, I am not suggesting that the United States would remain indifferent if aggression should recur on the part of North Korea against South Korea. But I do not believe that it is essential that we maintain such a large military establishment in South Korea given the existing military balance of power between the North and the South.

Mr. Chairman, my statement points out that there have been views expressed from time to time by officials in this administration suggesting that we might withdraw forces from Korea, but the signals that we get from those administration officials are not reassuring. While, in one case the statement has been made that we would reduce forces if and as our modernization program goes forward, other statements suggest that we are going to use other factors to justify present troop strength in South Korea.

I am not particularly impressed with the government in South Korea. It is authoritarian. They put people in jail for making rather simple statements. Not too long ago, there was a report that some protestant ministers in South Korea were jailed because of statements critical of the Constitution of their country.

I do not want to suggest by this that North Korea is any better but only to suggest that the South Korean Government is not a government that deserves the degree of commitment that democratic societies do.

Finally, let me make the observation that we have a number of treaties in the Pacific. We have the multilateral treaty, the so-called SEATO Treaty. We have bilateral treaties with Japan, Philippines,
Taiwan, and South Korea. I think at least so far as SEATO is concerned, the time has come to abandon that treaty as an important factor in U.S. decisionmaking. It is largely a paper treaty at the present time. It served as legitimization of our intervention in Vietnam. But it has served no really useful purpose, and I think with withdrawal of important countries from that treaty, the United States should also abandon any effort to maintain the treaty in force.

Mr. Chairman, those are my views, and in general, the views of Americans for Democratic Action. We think these hearings are important. We hope the conclusion the subcommittee will draw will be that forces should be withdrawn. But in any event, our Asian commitments represent an important part of our involvement in world affairs and they certainly deserve the searching examination which these hearings are permitting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Fraser’s prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. FRASER

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action on United States military commitments and deployments in Asia. I am here to urge that the U.S. begin withdrawing substantial numbers of our troops stationed there.

Despite the withdrawal of our combat forces from Vietnam, a recent ADA study showed that as of September 30, 1973, the U.S. had 173,000 land-based forces in Asia. This compares with 156,160 based in the same countries in 1964 which was before the build-up of U.S. forces in Vietnam and at a time when we considered that our Asian treaty commitments required the use of U.S. ground forces.

The U.S. maintains troops in Thailand, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and Guam. We have eight naval task forces stationed in the Pacific. They include 720 aircraft, ten Polaris ballistic missile submarines based at Guam and 2-3,000 tactical nuclear weapons.

The U.S. forces far exceed the number needed to protect legitimate U.S. security interests in Asia. We should withdraw the bulk of U.S. land forces stationed there.

A withdrawal of land-based forces from Asia is not meant as a first step toward a “new isolationism.” I pointed out last July 16th in a statement on NATO that we had to avoid over-reaction to our involvement in Vietnam which could lead to an indiscriminate pulling back. I urged that we go slow in withdrawing forces from Europe. We do not want to repeat the bitter experience with isolationism in the 1920’s and 1930’s.

But our current military policies in Asia should be based on an intelligent appraisal of U.S. interests in Asia. We have a role to play in Asia: We have important trading relations with many countries in Asia: Australia and Taiwan, for example, were our eighth and twelfth largest trading partners in 1972. Japan is one of the leading economic powers of the world and one of our most important trading partners. Moreover, Japan is a democratic society whose security is important to us.

The Nixon Doctrine calls for a lower military profile in Asia. While U.S. combat forces have been withdrawn from Vietnam, little else has been achieved in terms of military disengagement from Asia despite Nixon Administration rhetoric. Yet conditions have changed in that part of the world.

A group of experts familiar with Asian affairs, almost all of whom were officials in past administrations, focused on those changes in a statement of July 31, 1973. These 14 experts included Robert Barnett, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Far East Affairs, and Earl Ravenal, former Director of the Asian Division of Systems Analysis in the Pentagon. They pointed to the cessation of all direct U.S. combat operations in Indochina, the beginnings of détente with the Soviet Union and the establishment of relations with China, to support their conclusion that we should return and deactivate 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia. They said this could be accomplished "with no harm either to our
national security or our important interests in the area." Mr. Chairman, I ask that this statement be included in the Hearing Record at this point.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger apparently agrees with the position that the current number of U.S. ground troops in Asia is too high. In a December 1973 interview published in *Fortune* magazine, Schlesinger concurred with the view that military deployments must change to meet changing conditions; he foresaw a sizable reduction in the numbers of U.S. conventional forces remaining in Asia.

The Secretary's conclusion is realistic considering the substantial cost of maintaining thousands of U.S. troops abroad indefinitely. The costs include not only the 202,000 total of U.S. forces in Asia but also the approximately 90,000 Defense Department-employed civilians (as of 1972) and the 50,000 dependents of these military and civilian personnel living in Asia. A recent analysis by the Center for Defense Information concludes that the U.S. spends about $20 billion a year to prepare for the possibility of war in the Pacific Ocean area. The $20 billion estimate includes the cost of U.S. troops based within the U.S. but prepared for an Asian conflict. Twenty-nine percent of active duty military manpower or 650,000 are earmarked for this possibility.

The Nixon Administration must understand that U.S. ability to accomplish our foreign policy goals in Asia through military might is severely limited. Yet our forces in Asia are structured to refight the Vietnam war. For example, the 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand are primarily in Air Force units prepared to resume bombing in North Vietnam if a new offensive is undertaken. The Pentagon has estimated that it costs $463 million to support these forces. Without getting into a debate on the effectiveness of bombing an insurgency, it is sufficient to point out that U.S. Air Force units are prohibited by Congress from bombing in Indochina without prior congressional approval. These forces should be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of the American presence in Thailand not only would save money but is important for another reason. The Thai government faces an insurgency. The U.S. has become involved in the counter-insurgency efforts by training Thai forces. American Special Forces and CIA personnel have participated in this. The U.S. has provided U.S. military advisers in the field as well as in Bangkok. In fact, immediately after President Nixon's initial proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon traveled to Bangkok and in a July 25, 1969 statement declared: "The United States will stand proudly with Thailand against all of those who might threaten it from abroad or from within." Committing the U.S. to counter threats from within is a direct route to a new Vietnam. U.S. troops should be brought home to avoid such a possibility.

There is a parallel situation in the Philippines. The U.S. now maintains about 14,000 troops in that country. Yet there is guerrilla warfare in the Philippines with several different groups involved. As Professor George McF. Kahin pointed out in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 6, 1974, "The existence of major and geographically extensive American naval and air bases in the Philippines underpinned only aggravates the possibility of American military involvement there." The continuation of Clark Air Base and the Subic Naval Base should be carefully scrutinized in relation to our essential security needs.

South Korea is another country from which troop reductions are both feasible and desirable. The United States presently deploys 42,000 troops in South Korea. Yet there has been no extensive fighting in the area for decades. Our relations with North Korea's northern neighbor and protector, China, are improved.

Military, our South Korean ally is much stronger than North Korea. President Park, who has been ruling South Korea under martial law since 1972, has in addition to the 42,000 U.S. troops (only about 7,000 of which are combat forces), a total of 600,000 South Korean ground combat forces, many of whom gaining combat experience in Vietnam. In contrast, there are about 30,000 North Korean ground combat forces, most of whom have not fought for 20 years. An Institute of Strategic Studies report of 1969–70 concluded that even then the South Korean army was amply prepared to defeat any invasion from the North.

For over 20 years we have poured billions of dollars into the Korean economy and that country's military machine. In 1972, for example, the pay, upkeep and operating costs for the U.S. troops in Korea totaled $584 million, while economic and military assistance totaled another half billion dollars. In addition, in 1971 the United States began a five-year, $1.5 billion modernization program of the South Korean military forces.
It is time to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea. Secretary Schlesinger hinted at a Pentagon plan under consideration to withdraw some of the U.S. forces from Korea; a mobile reserve based in Hawaii and Guam would serve as a substitute. But this hint is only one of several contradictory signals. In early 1973, then Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson promised that “further withdrawal of United States forces in South Korea would be phased with the completion of the modernization program.” Only a few months later, Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements backed away from this withdrawal pledge by declaring that the threats and risks to South Korea, rather than the modernization program progress, would be the determining factor in future troop deployments. We are apparently faced with a never-ending commitment, at a considerable cost, to an ally who does not need our troops.

The 8,000 troops in Taiwan are another relic of days past. Taiwan is perhaps the best example of a situation, substantially altered, but the U.S. troops commitment remains the same.

The country where a continuing deployment of U.S. troops seems justified is Japan, yet even here reductions can be made. Japan is economically one of the strongest nations of the world and our most important ally in Asia. The U.S. treaty with Japan after World War II sets severe limits on Japanese military forces. U.S. forces were to provide security for that country. It has been a highly successful relationship, but one that recently has been severely tested by a series of Nixon “shocks” to the Japanese policy-makers.

While I believe that the U.S. commitment to Japan should be supported with a significant U.S. force there, reductions in the 35,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan and especially in Okinawa are indicated. In a trip to Japan last year, discussions with Japanese officials indicated that while a continued U.S. military presence is highly desired, perhaps half the present number of U.S. troops would be sufficient to maintain that presence.

The U.S. commitment to SEATO needs re-examination. SEATO, at one time had eight participants: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, the United States and the United Kingdom. Of the eight members, Australia did not participate in the 1973 naval maneuvers, France is inactive and owing dues payments, New Zealand is phasing out its participation and Pakistan withdrew on November 1973. It is my view that SEATO is anachronism. It remains only as a cover for possible United States re-intervention in Asia.

Mr. Chairman, in my testimony I have suggested a number of countries where the United States could and should make substantial military reductions. It is my hope that this Subcommittee will continue its careful examination of the American commitments to Asia and that you will recommend a lower U.S. military profile in Asia. Such a policy would result in substantial savings in outlays, an improved balance of payments and a more realistic foreign policy.

Mr. Nix, Thank you, Congressman Fraser.

Our views are the same as to the withdrawal. But I am concerned further that we, this subcommittee, should examine all of the commitments of the United States of America existing at this time. I am concerned to know what in my judgment and in the judgment of the subcommittee will be the benefits allegedly accruing to the United States of America because of our participation in these commitments. I want to know who made the decisions to commit the United States of America—I am not talking about the advise and consent, that type of thing—I am talking about other commitments that are not participated in by the Senate of the United States, and there are many others of that kind.

So, we are compiling a list of these commitments of all types in which the United States of America was involved from 1776 up until World War II. I want an analysis of them. I want a study of them, and I want to see the subcommittee arrive at a judgment as to what participation we can have; how can we effectively offer our criticism of what is being done and how can we mount a sufficient power to compel changes in what is being done.
I think the American people are entitled to have a hand in their Government, at least to that extent. That is the sort of thing that I am deeply concerned with, and that is the sort of thing that I should like to pursue.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. I have no questions. You are echoing a thing I suggested last week; that I felt in so many of these areas—we were finding out in the energy field there has never been an inventory or a comprehensive study made of existing reserves, resources, and so on. I apologize for coming in late last week also, but the chairman has voiced the very feelings I have, that when you have a period elapse of more than 20 years since a conflict and you have no idea how many myriad verbal and written agreements have been made that could tangle-foot us into flypaper in any one situation in the world, and also certainly with the improvement of weaponry and technological advances of defense, it appears that stationing myriad numbers of troops just for the sake of having people quartered there is not either the best expenditure of manpower nor the best investment of our money, time, and talents.

I would just simply say that I appreciate what Mr. Fraser has said here. He has given us much analysis, and our chairman has very eruditely stated what I think the committee would like to hear. I am looking forward to such analysis of commitments so we might have a chance to look at them.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Fraser.

Our next witness is Mr. Ralph N. Clough, Brookings Institution, senior fellow, former State Department official.

Mr. Clough, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF RALPH N. CLOUGH, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.; FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL

Mr. Clough. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like to, if I may, to read a brief statement.

Before doing so, I would like to endorse the statement which Congressman Fraser made at the outset of his remarks on the importance of the investigation this subcommittee is making. I think it is exceedingly important to provoke a greater public debate than has occurred yet on what the numbers and types of U.S. forces ought to be in these days in the East Asian-Pacific area, and what the interests of the United States are which justify the presence of these forces.

I am concerned, as Congressman Fraser was, that there might be an excessive tendency to withdraw everything, but at the same time I agree with him and, with you, Mr. Chairman, that the forces that we now have in that region are certainly greater than can be easily justified on the basis of a careful analysis.

Now, if I may, I would like to proceed with my statement, which is built around six propositions, which I believe would constitute a sound policy for the United States in the East Asia-Pacific region for the next few years.

These propositions are in line with present administration policy, and the high priority which they attach to pursuing détente with the
Soviet Union and China as a means of diminishing the danger of nuclear war. They differ from administration policy principally in their greater emphasis on maintaining close relations with Japan and their lesser emphasis on the importance of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. The propositions are set forth starkly for emphasis and are then explained, justified, and somewhat qualified in the remainder of the statement. The propositions are:

(1) The most important single U.S. interest in the region is the relationship with Japan.

(2) Other U.S. security interests derive their importance chiefly from their relation to this primary interest, making U.S. interests in Northeast Asia more important than those in Southeast Asia.

(3) U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are not important enough to justify intervention there by U.S. Armed Forces.

(4) The current disposition of both China and the U.S.S.R. to seek expanded relations with the United States—in part because of their differences with each other—has created an unusual opportunity to lay the foundation for a more peacefully and stable international order in East Asia.

(5) Creating such a new order will be difficult unless Japan remains a lightly armed, nonnuclear power, collaborating closely with the United States.

(6) Therefore, in adjusting the level of U.S. forces in the region both to the need to demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. and China a continuing U.S. interest in the region and to the progress of détente, the United States should be careful to retain such forces and bases as may be necessary to maintain Japanese confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan.

The importance of Japan: Because it is the largest aggregation of industrial power and technical skills in the non-Communist world outside North America and Western Europe, Japan far exceeds any other non-Communist country in the Asian-Pacific region in importance to the United States. Japan is our largest overseas trading partner and has become the predominant economic power in East Asia.

It has great capacity to contribute to stability and progress in that region along lines compatible with U.S. purposes. But if its largely undeveloped military potential were developed, allied to the power of the Soviet Union or China and turned against the United States, the global balance of power would shift drastically to our disadvantage. Thus, the great importance to the United States of continued friendly relations with Japan is obvious.

The United States should judge its other security interests in East Asia primarily, although not exclusively, from their relationship to the crucial United States-Japan connection. Looked at from this viewpoint, the U.S. commitment to South Korea is particularly important because U.S. failure to fulfill this commitment in the event of renewed conflict in Korea would shake Japanese confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan.

Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan are more ambiguous, owing to the complications introduced by present and potential relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, one can conceive of circumstances in which a U.S. failure to back Taiwan would seriously damage United States-Japanese relations.
As for Southeast Asia, there is little evidence that the United States-Japanese relationship would be seriously affected if the United States should fail to intervene militarily there, except in the remote possibility that Chinese or Soviet forces should attack a friendly power in that region.

The Japanese were more alarmed than relieved when the United States intervened militarily in Vietnam. Japan never has been an enthusiastic supporter of U.S. policy there. Southeast Asia is relatively more important to Japan than to the United States, accounting for some 10 percent of Japan’s foreign trade and dominating the sea route traversed by over 90 percent of Japan’s essential petroleum supplies.

Yet the great majority of Japanese believe that Japan’s access to trade and transportation routes can and should be assured by means other than military intervention. While the Japanese Government would prefer non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia, it would not see the seizure of power by a local Communist party in a Southeast Asian state as posing so serious a threat to Japanese interests that Japan should either intervene with its own forces to prevent it or urge the United States to do so.

If United States military intervention in Southeast Asia is not justified as necessary to maintain a firm United States-Japanese relationship, it is even less justifiable on the basis of direct U.S. interests in that region. Southeast Asian nations account for less than 3 percent of U.S. foreign trade and direct investment abroad. No combination of these nations could conceivably pose a direct military threat to the United States.

We have, in a sense, magnified U.S. interests in Southeast Asia in recent years by large-scale intervention in Vietnam with U.S. military force and by the language with which that intervention was justified. Having withdrawn most of that force, thus greatly diminishing U.S. ability to influence the eventual outcome in Vietnam, the U.S. Government should also be deflating the rhetoric with which it describes the importance of that outcome to the United States.

Once U.S. prestige is no longer so heavily engaged in Vietnam, U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are likely to be seen again by most Americans in the rather modest proportions they assumed before our deep involvement there.

These interests are important enough to justify a variety of U.S. Government actions to protect them—but not military intervention.

The fear that Southeast Asia might fall under Chinese hegemony if the United States were not prepared to intervene militarily appears ill-founded. Overt Chinese invasion of a Southeast Asian country seems extremely unlikely. The Chinese are preoccupied today and probably for some years to come with the Soviet military threat to the north, and the resultant need they feel for improved relations with the United States and Japan.

Moreover, neither their doctrine nor the equipment, training, and deployment of their armed forces suggests preparation for offensive use against a neighbor. They continue to advocate the “liberation” of non-Communist countries by local Communist parties, to some of which they provide small amounts of material support. But for the past several years, they have shifted increasingly toward cultivating
the governments of Southeast Asian countries, playing down their support for revolution.

Nationalism, a growing force in Southeast Asia, is likely to be a strong barrier to any Chinese effort to establish hegemony over the region through Chinese dominated Communist parties. The leaders of all non-Communist Southeast Asian governments are strong nationalists, and thus in a position to exploit against any Chinese oriented Communist party the deep-seated fear of Chinese domination held by most Southeast Asians.

Nationalist Burmese leaders, almost fanatical in their devotion to nonalignment, have held in check for more than 20 years a Chinese supported Burmese Communist rebellion, demonstrating that impeccable nationalist credentials may be more important than foreign help in rallying a nation to resist Chinese pressure.

Moreover, any Southeast Asian Communist Party which did succeed in seizing power would almost certainly have to demonstrate its freedom from Chinese control in order to rally the nationalist support necessary for this purpose.

Thus, U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia should be ruled out, first, because U.S. interests there are not important enough to justify it, and second, because Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia is improbable even in the absence of a U.S. willingness to intervene with military force.

I agree with the view of the administration that for a long time to come, the overriding objective of U.S. global policy should be to develop relations with the Soviet Union and secondarily with China which will steadily diminish the danger of military confrontations with these adversary powers that could explode into nuclear war.

The fact that the primary military concern of both Moscow and Peking in East Asia is their confrontation with each other offers an unusual opportunity to the United States and Japan to turn away from past emphasis on military confrontation with China in order to weave a web of agreements, tacit understanding, trade, and other relationships with the two Communist powers in the East Asian region.

All this should open new channels for influence, and create groups in all four countries with vested interests in expanding peaceful relationships, thus pushing military force increasingly into the background.

While the differences between the U.S.S.R. and China have tended to improve the prospects for the United States and Japan to improve their relations with each, it would not be in the U.S. interest for large-scale war to break out between the two Communist powers.

Hence, it will be important for the United States to continue to make this view clear to both and to treat with both in as even-handed a manner as their differing circumstances permit, avoiding actions which might dangerously increase the risk of war between them.

The fragile webs of relationships with the U.S.S.R. and China are growing in strength and complexity as trade, travel and cultural and technological exchanges expand. With greater experience and greater reciprocal confidence, more complicated arrangements can be tried, such as tripartite exploitation of Siberian resources among the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States; tripartite exploitation of undersea oil among China, Japan, and the United States, explicit or tacit
agreements for reducing the risk of big power military involvement in conflict in Korea or Southeast Asia and the opening of a dialog on arms control between the United States and China.

In time the growing importance to all concerned of avoiding actions which would increase the risk of military confrontation should cause differences among the big powers over Taiwan and Korea to diminish in importance, even if no final solution of these issues is reached for many years.

The more that the parties involved come to accept the need for political rather than military solutions, the more U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan and South Korea are likely to decline in significance. The tacit understanding between the United States and China on Taiwan embodied in the Shanghai communique of February 27, 1972, constitutes an important step in the right direction.

Progress along the lines outlined above will be difficult unless Japan remains a lightly armed, nonnuclear power. Traditional habits of thought cause some to argue that Japan, as an ally of the United States, should take on military responsibilities outside its home islands in order to lighten the U.S. military burden.

This view fails to take account of the disturbing effect a heavily armed Japan with nuclear weapons would have on east Asia. China and the U.S.S.R. both would be compelled to add to their arguments and many of the smaller nations of the region would see a military minded Japan as a danger to them. The trend among the big powers toward diminishing emphasis on military force in their relations in the region would be reversed.

Prospects for breaking away from traditional reliance on military force in the foreign policies of the big powers, which is becoming increasingly dangerous in the nuclear age, will be greatly enhanced if the United States follows policies that sustain the Japanese people in their unprecedented commitment to eschew powerful military forces.

The Japanese contribution to the stability of the region should be in the form of greatly expanded and improved programs of economic and technical aid rather than military commitments.

The United States should rely on the pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China to create the conditions for a reduction in U.S. military forces in East Asia and Japan can best contribute to the success of such a policy by remaining a lightly armed, nonnuclear power.

Implications for U.S. military forces deployed in East Asia: Adherence to the principles stated above would lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand, as their further military use in Southeast Asia would have been ruled out. It would lead, ultimately, to the conversion of U.S. bases in the Philippines to Philippine bases.

The reduction of the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia should occur gradually, however, not precipitately, in order to avoid severely destabilizing repercussions.

Not even the Chinese are pressing for a rapid dismantling of the U.S. Military Establishment in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the U.S. military presence in that region, even though it were not intended for actual use there, would still have political and symbolic importance.
Consequently, the United States should seek to make the withdrawal of its forces from the region contingent, at least in some measure, upon tacit or explicit agreement of the other big powers not to intervene with their own forces in that region.

The timing and modalities of U.S. withdrawal could be coordinated with the ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations, consisting of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines—countries, which have called upon the big powers to recognize Southeast Asia as a zone of peace and neutrality.

Further withdrawals of U.S. forces from South Korea should be possible as progress is made in consolidating the détente with China and the U.S.S.R., further diminishing the risk of involvement by those powers in any renewed Korean conflict. Consideration should also be given to possible international agreement on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, as a means of further reducing the risk of a clash there escalating into nuclear war.

Any withdrawal of U.S. military power from South Korea should, however, for reasons stated above, be done in such a way as to avoid undermining Japanese confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan.

Withdrawal of the relatively small number of U.S. military personnel from Taiwan, as provided for in the Shanghai communique, would not significantly affect the defense of the island, and is unlikely to disturb the Japanese.

The presence of U.S. forces in Japan strengthens the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, but at the same time creates some political problems for the Japanese Government. Thus, it will probably be necessary to continue gradually, but steadily, to reduce and consolidate U.S. bases in Japan, while retaining the core needed to give substance to the United States-Japan security treaty, primarily the U.S. naval and associated air forces centered on the principal U.S. base at Yokosuka.

In the process of drawing down U.S. forward deployments in the western Pacific, as justified by the progress of détente, it might become necessary to compensate to some extent for the withdrawal of forward forces by strengthening mid-Pacific bases.

The United States should be in a position to strengthen quickly naval and air forces in the vicinity of Japan in an emergency and should avoid appearing to concede to the Soviet Union or China naval superiority throughout the waters of the region.

Some might consider the foregoing policies too optimistic in their assumption that the U.S. détente with the U.S.S.R. and China can continue to be strengthened. Obviously, no one can be fully confident on that point. If the expansion of peaceful relations with the two adversary powers should come to a halt and military factors should become dominant in big power rivalry in East Asia, other U.S. policies would be called for.

Should the military threat to Japan increase, the Japanese might be compelled to turn to large-scale rearmament. But the portents are reasonably good that for the foreseeable future the United States can and should base its policy on working closely with a lightly armed, nonnuclear Japan to expand and strengthen a variety of peaceful re-
lations with the U.S.S.R. and China and thus to diminish the role of military force in big power relationships in East Asia.

Mr. Nix. Thank you, Mr. Clough.

I feel that the inescapable conclusion that I must arrive at is the prospect of breaking away from the traditional reliance on military force in the foreign policy of the big powers, and this will be with us far into the future.

Would you say that?

Mr. Clough. I don't see that we can see very far into the future at the present time but, as far as we can see, the prospects I would agree look good.

Mr. Nix. As far as we can see into the future, what I just said would be true?

Mr. Clough. Yes.

Mr. Nix. That being true, there is nothing that is occurring that will lead us to the conclusion that we otherwise would be—

Mr. Clough. Not at the present time.

Mr. Nix. So, therefore, what I said at the beginning must be accepted; that as far as we can look into the future, the prospects of breaking away from traditional reliance on military forces in the foreign policy of the big powers will continue.

Now don't you think the course adopted by the Japanese Government after their defeat was the wisest course that any government could possibly have adopted? Would you say that?

Mr. Clough. I agree. I think they were favored by an unusual set of circumstances, including the commitment of the United States to provide for their security and a particularly favorable conjunction of economic conditions which made it possible for them to develop—

Mr. Nix. Do you know of any such occurrence in history where the defeated nation was the recipient of infinitely more benefits as a result of the protection given by the victor nations?

Mr. Clough. There may be such cases but I cannot recall one.

Mr. Nix. Would you not say that at the present time the Japanese Government, the Japanese people, are experiencing the most favored position, a position more favorable than any other country in the world?

I ask you the question because you have the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and on this side the United States of America, all contending for world dominance, world power. And there is Japan getting richer and richer every day because of that contention and because of the conflicts between the contending powers.

Is that not true?

Mr. Clough. Japan certainly is taking advantage of the fact that it is not required to have a military force but can concentrate on trade and economic development. Of course, the future of the Japanese economy is unclear at the moment because of the energy crisis. We cannot project past success of the Japanese too far in the future at this point.

Mr. Nix. And because of the very question you mentioned, the energy crisis, we cannot project the relationship between Japan and the United

---

The views expressed in this statement are the sole responsibility of the author and do not purport to represent those of the Brookings Institution or its officers, trustees, or other staff members.
States or Japan and the Soviet Union or Japan and the People's Republic of China.

What Japan will do, as we in the United States will do, is to take the action that suits and best serves its interests depending on the circumstances at the moment. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Clough. Quit true, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nix. So if Japan's position is uncertain, our position is likewise uncertain and the positions of the other powers in that part of the world are equally as uncertain, wouldn't you say that?

Mr. Clough. Yes.

Mr. Nix, Mr. Wolff.

Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clough. I know that there have been a variety of interpretations of the world détente. I wonder if you could give us your interpretation of détente, because I note you indicate that the future of our commitments to various areas of the world are really dependent on détente with the Soviet Union and with Cuba.

What does détente mean to you?

Mr. Clough. To me it means really two things. First and probably most important is an effort to develop a degree of communication with the adversary powers so that you are less likely to have the kind of crisis that blows up to the point where you have a military confrontation and a danger of nuclear war.

The second element of détente—and this tends to support the first—the second element is the expansion of a variety of relationships, trade relationships, technological exchange, travel, cultural exchange, the efforts to create interest groups in those countries, in our countries who have a vested interest in the continuing of peaceful relations, who would resist efforts on the part of peoples in their own societies who might want to go in the other direction.

Mr. Wolff. On that score, the first part of your explanation of détente we have seen in another area of the world. I am talking now specifically of the Middle East—that détente, has not operated too well. Otherwise we could not have come to the confrontation that we arrived at, a point where we had to call for a strategic alert.

It was obvious in that particular area of the world détente is not operating.

Mr. Clough. I would not agree it is not operating.

Mr. Wolff. According to your original definition, part of your definition of détente, we do have the cosmetic aspects of détente, the exchange of missions, the exchange of associations, trade associations, but when it comes down to the real crunch, there is existent now in another theater, removed from the theater of Southeast Asia into the Middle East, where there did exist a strong confrontation, one that almost let us into a breakup of not only détente but into a real confrontation.

Now, maybe if some parts of détente did not exist then perhaps this confrontation would have deteriorated into war. But it seems to me we are laying a little bit too heavy reliance upon the façade of détente that has been spoken about so glowingly, where really we have established a communications link rather than true détente. Détente to my mind implies that we operate in either a quid pro quo manner or certainly where it becomes a two-way street.

I do not see that type of relationship now with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Clough. I would certainly agree with you that détente is fragile and it has its limitations. I am not an authority on the Middle East. I do not know precisely what the effect of détente was in limiting the degree to which we approached a military—

Mr. Wolff. Let's go back to the Middle East for just a moment. The only reason I refer to the Middle East is because we have had concrete examples of the effect of actions on both sides that perhaps have had a determinative effect on the question of détente.

Some time back, in the Middle East, in 1970 when we were both in the throes of the early stages of détente, the Soviet Union fortified by the Egyptian Government took a unilateral step of fortifying the Suez Canal.

There has been a succession of events that leads me to question the serious intent on the part of the Soviet Union to really engage in détente. This is why I might have serious questions as to your reliance upon détente which, as you have indicated, is very fragile as a deterrent and give us the opportunity of engaging in something we all seek, the idea of disarmament that would bring about a peaceful world.

So I am somewhat questioning the area of what sort of reliance we should have upon the question of détente until it is really demonstrated that it is effective.

Mr. Clough. Let me make two points, if I may, in response to that.

The first is that in the nuclear age—when you consider that the ultimate ends, the end result of a confrontation that cannot be checked at some point, is a nuclear exchange that would be devastating to both the Soviet Union and the United States and perhaps lead to extinguishment of humanity on the earth, there is really no option in that kind of situation but to seek a better understanding that will avoid that kind of catastrophe.

Mr. Wolff. The point I am making is the question of a differential between the word détente and understanding. I don't think there is true détente today. I think there is some limited understanding on both parts, but I don't think there is détente.

Mr. Clough. We may be talking about different definitions of the word. When I said in my initial statement my definition of détente, I talk about communication. I did not mean just the ability to talk with each other face to face.

What I mean by communication in that context was the understanding on the part of both parties of the limits beyond which it would be very dangerous to go if you want to avoid a nuclear conflagration.

I think that understanding has been developed to some extent with the Soviet Union over the past several years.

Mr. Wolff. The only point being that in the area of discussion I do recall we avoided a nuclear confrontation, but we came pretty close to it at the time of the Soviet-Cuban situation.

There was not détente really that existed at that time. But we did avoid the nuclear confrontation because it was a recognition on the part of both parties that it would lead to the destruction of all mankind if we came to a nuclear exchange.

Mr. Clough. It came perilously close to that.

Mr. Wolff. We don't know how close we came to that situation in the Middle East recently.

You talk about the question of the Japanese with a limited military activity. Are you familiar with the percentage of GNP on which they base their defense budget.
Mr. Clough. Less than 1 percent.
Mr. Wolff. Today?
Mr. Clough. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wolff. I think it is somewhere around 2 percent.
Mr. Clough. It is still under 1 percent.
Mr. Wolff. Their GNP, however, is expanding at a very substantial rate or at least it has.
Mr. Clough. Up until the energy crisis.
Mr. Wolff. About 25 percent—at one time their military budget—a little less than half of 1 percent and they doubled that.

So that they are expanding at a fairly rapid rate. They are expanding their military capability at a fairly rapid rate. Yes, I would agree with you that our desire should be to see to it that because of their relationships with other of the Asian nations, to see that there is a limitation on their capability and yet provide them with some measure of protection.

That is why I am concerned with the statement you made about the Philippines where there has been a historic relationship between the United States and the Philippines. If we were to in some way jeopardize this relationship through a substantial removal of troops, it is questionable, in the same fashion that you question our ties to Korea as to whether or not this would affect the Japanese to the point of feeling that perhaps this is a first step in our returning to our native shores.

Mr. Clough. That is why I believe it would be important when we consider the ultimate disposition of the bases in the Philippines that we link any such action with big power agreement on something such as the ASEAN countries have proposed, making that whole area of Southeast Asia an area of peace and neutrality in which there will be certain self-denying obligations accepted by the big powers to keep their own forces away from intervention in the area. If it were done on that basis, I do not see that it would have any serious effects on our relationship with Japan.

In fact, the Japanese would applaud that kind of an arrangement.

Mr. Wolff. One final question. What significance do you attach to the recent North Korean initiative where they asked to sit down with us at a peace conference? Do you attach any significance to that at all?

Mr. Clough. I think it has to be taken primarily as a political and propaganda ploy to put pressure on the South Koreans. I don’t think they expect us to accept that proposal, to sit down and talk with them and certainly we should not.

Mr. Guyer. Mr. Chairman, I was very interested in Mr. Wolff’s statement and I am just curious, being a newcomer in the international relations field, pretty much of how much weight we seem to put on words.

I recognize that semantics is a very important kind of an approach—just a case in point—I am told in the State of Florida several times the subject of legalized abortion came up, and each time the bill failed until they changed the title of the bill to the “Mother and Child Health Protection” and it passed.

This is what leads me to think Mr. Wolff is on some very interesting ground because I never heard the word “dispute” until I came to Washington. I looked it up in the dictionary and it said: “freezing
of tension between countries." I listened to Mr. Kissinger. He said it is not a love affair. Another time he said, it is a relationship between adversaries. This all begins to take different meaning. It is like going into an energy mill and talking about windfall profits. The word is reprehensible because people don't like to see bonanzas go to anybody. We have not found a suitable substitution for it. I have a feeling some of these time-honored cliches between countries have become hurdles instead of pathways.

I think this subcommittee could make a very important contribution to not only the big Committee of Foreign Affairs but also to the larger area of the Congress and the family of nations in trying to bring into focus things that have drifted in the last 20 or 25 years into a new kind of light.

I look on the maps around this room and all I see are a bunch of lines—one through Korea which is North and South Korea; one through Vietnam, North and South Vietnam. You go to Palestine and you find Israel and Jordan. Everybody is drawing a line, and then we have problems trying to hold the line.

If we are going to get into a real solution of the body social and international relations, it is going to take a perception, greater understanding of our people, reassessment for example, of what strength ought to be, what military ought to be.

I talked to Mr. Schlesinger yesterday and I asked him, is there any truth to the matter there are some troops being sent into Southeast Asia again? He said, no, there are still 900 civilians in South Vietnam, American civilians.

We heard there were some troops going back in. This is not maybe germane to what you are talking about, but it leads up to, I think, a real careful invitation to look at your testimony in the wisdom of your backgrounds in a new light because I don't think we should suddenly become all hawks and doves and pros and cons.

I think we should start getting into this partnership people are talking about, partnership for progress in which we do admit the necessity of change, we do admit the efficacy of some new approaches.

I remember a few years ago when our present President was Vice President. He went on a handshaking tour of South America. When he got back, he found half of the people he had been shaking hands with were the wrong people.

I also felt in an academic way there should be a prevailing relationship between countries that is not subject to hills and valleys and ups and downs and feasts and famines every time you change administration. I think if this committee could somehow come up with some kind of comity and amity of peoples with a realistic approach, I think it is possible to reduce manpower, but I do not think it should be done on the floor of Congress. That is the most hazardous place to decide where you cut troops. It should be done by the people who know the most about the peoples involved.

If nothing else comes about, maybe this committee could become that viable vehicle by which some of the objectives could be arrived at and perhaps the future might thank us some time.

That is more of a comment than it is a question.

Mr. Nix. The little I know about Kissinger and their relationships with each other—events have been that there is no basic change in those relationships between that and those other years and the years in which we are living.
The same mistrust is evidenced. The same fierce desire to protect one's interests is still evident. The same jealous regard for one's boundaries is still evident. The same fear of aggression by others is still evident. The same lust for power is evident. The basic characteristic of mankind in my view is not altered to any appreciable extent.

There is one thing, however, and that is the sure knowledge that man has in his power the instrument of complete and total destruction. That to me is the only difference existing at this time in history.

I therefore feel that realizing that we can study and analyze the arrangements that we are entered into in the past, using the knowledge that I mentioned a moment ago about total destruction, we can perhaps convince some people that we must find a level of understanding that is going to save all of us.

That is all I have to say.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Chairman, if I could for a moment—you talk of the ASEAN association, naturally. SEATO did not prove too effective; did it?

Mr. Clough. No. Partly because most of the members were not located physically in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Wolff. But if you take Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines and put them together, they do not very much have a defense capability without an additional umbrella?

Mr. Clough. It depends.

Mr. Wolff. It would depend on who the adversaries are.

Mr. Clough. It would depend on who you are talking about defending them against.

Mr. Wolff. But we did find at the time of World War II we could contemplate the moves made by Japan prior to that time. Since that time with changed relationships and what have you, you do not have the same sort of an adversary position.

However, let's look down the road; if we can and talk about an area being able to remain neutral through the strength of its position as well.

It seems to me that the ASEAN operation itself may have problems in that it would not only try to parallel what SEATO did, but try to set up in addition to trade relationships the other types of relationships that would exist in an operation of this sort.

It would ultimately get to a defense treaty operation, plus certainly if we are not threatened by the loss of one of these nations to another—perhaps Malaysia would be threatened by a loss of Singapore or Singapore by a loss of Malaysia—so therefore they would have to have some sort of less adequate defense arrangement.

If they have a weak defense arrangement, what really good is that?

Mr. Clough. Mr. Wolff, I think I could best respond by citing a very interesting speech that was made in January by the Thai Foreign Minister on the subject of ASEAN and what he sees as the long-term solution there.

When they talk about a zone of peace and neutrality, they don't expect it to come about tomorrow. It is a long-term goal.

But he said that there are two requisites for achieving this. The first requisite is that the countries themselves—the ASEAN countries themselves—must be responsible, strong and stable. Without that it could not achieve its purpose.
The second is that the big powers must accept the importance of the
neutrality of the region.

If you have both of those conditions you could then have an effec­
tive defense arrangement. They might have security arrangements
among themselves which would be quite satisfactory so long as the
big powers had agreed among themselves not to intervene in those areas
with their forces.

One important point, to quote the Thai Foreign Minister. What he
hopes for within that part of the world is not the old-fashioned balance
of power but what he calls a “balance of interests” and among these in­
terests is the interest of each of the big powers—Soviet Union, China,
Japan, and the United States—in not having any of them intervene
with their own forces.

Mr. Wolff. That is the ideal state, however. I wonder if we are ever
going to reach that. With the energy crunch upon us, Indonesia looks
like a target of one of the superpowers of the future to seek the re­
sources that exist in Indonesia, whether it be in energy or any of the
other raw materials they have.

Also the other fact that today, with the exception of Thailand, most
of these nations of Southeast Asia could no longer be considered
democracies by any means and they are at the whim of one man who
knows and who can reach into his mind to find out what his objectives
are for the future.

So I would say we are really in a very fragile area in Southeast Asia
today. I do certainly subscribe to many of the things that you have
indicated, but I think we must continue the search for not only ideal
solutions but practical solutions to the problem.

Mr. Cough. Sometimes a vision is needed to bring about a solution.
This vision may look like an ideal and it may not be the one that is
finally arrived at, but I think it provides a useful vehicle by which to
proceed.

I do not see readily before us a better solution. I do not see that a
continuing responsibility on the United States, for example, to keep
peace in the area would be a good solution. That would be much worse
in my opinion.

Mr. Wolff. I can agree with that but I do not want us all to be mis­
led by the cliches, as my colleague Mr. Guyer has indicated, of détente,
and the whole idea of nonaligned nations being an area of peace and
tranquility. That just does not exist.

The so-called nonaligned nations—I have tried to get a definition
of what a nonaligned nation is and it is an impossibility to get that
just as it is with détente.

Mr. Cough. I don’t think we should permit ourselves to be led down
a garden path using the cover of a cliche to be the vehicle for our mis­
interpreting what could be at the end of the road.

Mr. Gut. As an example, the right wing conservatives are hostile
against détente. They regard any détente with the Peoples Republic
or with the Soviet Union as a sign of weakness on our part and they
have an entirely different definition than we indicate here around this
table.

Mr. Wolff. Neither you nor I are aligned with the right wing or
the left wing, so it is all right.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to
call of the chair:]
The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, Hon. Robert N. C. Nix (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will come to order.

The need for nations great and small to rise above their self-interest because of nuclear weapons is today the ultimate reality; it means that we share a common interest in survival with our Communist rivals. In a sense then, the populations of both camps are hostages to the other because of the vast loss of life should there be a nuclear exchange.

The nuclear problem, while great, is a problem added to all of the other common ills of mankind. At the end of the Second World War a vacuum was created which drew the Soviet Union and the United States into a direct confrontation because for other nations there were no other sources of protection or assistance in the world.

The rise of the People's Republic of China added to the hostility and fear in the world because they began their challenge of the Soviet Union for leadership in the Communist world and for leadership of the Third World Nations. In 1950 they challenged the United States by sending troops into Korea at the time when the United States was the only nuclear power in the world because they believed the United States would not resort to nuclear weapons over the issue of Korea.

From the time of the Korean War until now, guerrilla wars became the weapon of war in the Far East. The most notable success for this type of operation took place in Vietnam, not because Communist forces are guaranteed an outright victory but because they have proven that while guerrilla forces may not win outright, they can continue their campaigns for extended periods of time—in the case of Vietnam, for 20 years, in Malaysia in a losing effort for 10 years. As a result, the United States finds itself with dual commitments in Asia for protection from outside invasion and for aid to our allies in guerrilla war supplied from outside the borders of the affected country.

New issues have arisen in Asia because many nations can stand on their own feet. The world is, in a sense, a multipower world but three nations have a nuclear weapon capacity—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

It is every country's business that the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China reach an understanding which reduces the chances of nuclear exchange. This, of course, puts a great strain on our collective security system.
Our military structure in Asia has to change with the times, and that is the reason for these hearings.

Today we are privileged to have as a witness Dr. Dwight H. Perkins, the East Asia Institute, Harvard University.

We welcome you, Dr. Perkins. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DWIGHT H. PERKINS, EAST ASIA INSTITUTE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

More than a year after the end of direct American involvement in the war in Vietnam and some 20 years after the Korean armistice, the United States still maintains roughly 185,000 military personnel and vast quantities of weapons and equipment in bases scattered across East and Southeast Asia. Each of these bases has its own history and often the original purpose for which a base was established has little relevance to current American concerns in Asia. The central question today is whether these bases have acquired new roles that contribute to important American objectives.

America has a variety of interests in Asia but there is one that does or should override all others. All of America's legitimate concerns in the region will be best served by the independent evolution of each of the states of Asia in accordance with each nation's perception of its own goals and needs. It would be utopian to expect that this evolution will always be peaceful, but American policy should be designed in a way that at least insures that our efforts do not increase the level of internal strife or turn local territorial disputes into major confrontations involving the great powers. Many of the U.S. military bases in Asia today, however, contribute to instability—not stability—in the region both within and between nations.

Large conventional bases in the area serve to promote stability only if nations exist which are threatened with a major conventional armed attack. These bases can then serve as a deterrent against such an attack or, deterrence failing, can provide support for the defending armies. But there are not many places in Asia where a major threat to independence and stability is likely to come in the form of a conventional armed attack. The two possible exceptions are on the Korean and Indochinese peninsulas and even there the probability of an attack is fairly high only in the latter of these two areas.

Certainly Chinese armies are not likely to sweep across the region with or without an American deterrent. It is not clear what the People's Republic of China would gain from such an exercise other than the lasting enmity of all nationalist patriots in the area, Communist or otherwise. Although it is always difficult to describe another nation's major foreign policy goals, particularly a nation as secretive as China, China's actions indicate that they do not intend to use their army to occupy large areas not belonging to them or to protect friendly regimes from internal coup d'état. After their initial offensive in the India-China War, for example, Chinese troops quickly withdrew from all territory other than that long claimed to be China's. And the last Chinese soldiers in North Korea withdrew long ago.

For those not inclined to trust China's future intentions whatever the past, there is still no reason to support large American bases in
Asia. There are 1 million heavily armed Russian troops strung along China’s northern border and the Chinese, at least, believe that the Russians are itching for an excuse to attack. No sensible Chinese leadership would commit large numbers of troops in a southern or eastern adventure under such circumstances.

The Korean peninsula does present special problems. Our troops in the Republic of Korea are a tiny fraction of the armed might available to the South Korean Government and are there today mainly as a guarantee of a larger American response in case of attack. American troops were also retained in Korea as our quid pro quo for the Korean divisions sent to Vietnam. One would hope that the United States could find some better way to guarantee its commitments than to place large numbers of armed hostages in various threatened nations. We have honored treaties without such guarantees in the past. What is needed is a credible air, naval, and transport capacity that could bring adequate force to bear on the peninsula when and if it were needed; and such a force does not require an American division already in place when the South Korean Army has 600,000 soldiers of its own.

The situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is too complex to deal with in any detail here. Many of the American bases in Asia were developed or expanded in order to support American military forces in Vietnam. Their continued existence can only be interpreted as a desire on the part of the United States to hold open the option of reentering that war or at least the appearance that it is holding open such an option. Even for those who wish to retain this option (and I am not one of them) one would think that America’s carrier forces and base in Guam would be adequate for this purpose.

Thus such conventional deterrent as is required throughout Asia can be provided without large numbers of forward bases in the region. Nuclear deterrence, of course, is supplied mainly by American submarine and land-based (in the United States) missiles.

The problem with most American bases in Asia, however, is not just that they are unnecessary. These bases actively contribute to instability in much of the region. There are two principal sources of instability in Southeast Asia today. The first is internal and is a product of conflicts between ethnic groups, between the rich and the poor, and between those in and out of power. Sometimes these conflicts have not involved violence, but often disputes have escalated into rioting and civil war. There is a continuing civil war in Burma and there were major ones earlier in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia (not to mention Vietnam and Korea). There is no reason to think that this internal warfare will come to an end any time soon.

The problem with American bases in Asia in this context is that the very existence of these bases tends to discredit local governments in the eyes of their own people, particularly those with strong nationalist feelings. Why, these people ask, does the government need American troops to protect it from its own people? Where there is a credible external threat this attitude is muted, but as I have argued, there is no credible external threat in such of the region. The problem is exacerbated by all the forms of entertainment that develop near these military bases, but these are not the real problem. Incidents between American troops and the local people can always be manufactured in the unlikely event that they fail to occur naturally.
Thus the very existence of these bases tends to undermine the governments they were presumably built to protect. And if the decline of that government's ability to govern leads to rebellion and guerrilla war, these same bases are useless until the conflict turns at some later stage into a large scale conventional war (as happened in Vietnam in the mid-1960's).

A second major source of conflict in the region is that between nations, usually over some disputed piece of territory. The India-China and India-Pakistan wars, Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, and the current dispute between Thailand and North Vietnam over Laos are some of the principal cases in point. As in the case of internal strife, it is unrealistic to expect these conflicts to disappear for some time to come. Many areas are only weakly tied to the national center (East Pakistan now Bangladesh, for example) and others lack much national identity of any kind (Laos is a prime example).

The main contribution of foreign bases in these conflicts is to escalate the level of warfare and to threaten to turn a local dispute into a great power confrontation. For the most part, the United States should not be concerned with whether a few square miles of jungle belong to one country or another. The United States should retain some desire and ability to help prevent such conflicts from escalating into major wars. But it is difficult to conceive of the circumstances where we should need large bases in place prior to the start of such a war in order to prevent it from escalating. It is more likely that the existence of such bases would contribute to escalation by bringing in some other major power on the opposite side.

I am not suggesting in this statement that there is no role whatsoever for any American bases, only that that role is limited and the number of bases and troops needed to fulfill this limited role is far smaller than what we presently have stationed in Asia and apparently intend to keep there. I have also not been able to touch on several important issues in this brief statement. The role of Okinawa and other bases in Japan, for example, involves a number of issues different from those relevant to bases in Southeast Asia. But perhaps these other issues could be dealt with in the question period.

Thank you.

Mr. Nixon. Thank you, Dr. Perkins.

Dr. Perkins, what are some of the circumstances under which you feel that American bases would be justified in countries in this area?

Mr. Perkins. Well, I think we still, for example, have a clear commitment to the defense of South Korea, that we need to have capacity to move troops to that area or, at least air and naval forces to that area in case of a major attack. I don't think such an attack is very likely, at least not on a large scale. The base in Okinawa, for example, plays an important role in the support of Korea.

If—as I think we should—we withdraw over a period of years virtually all of the remaining troops that we actually have stationed in Korea, I believe some 42,000, we would probably have to have some other comparable base, either in Okinawa or possibly in Guam or alternatively forces back in the United States that could be moved rather quickly to the area.

We also have an alliance with Japan in which we cooperate with Japan in the defense of the Japanese islands. I would expect that there
would be need for some bases in Japan, particularly naval support bases, in the decade ahead in order to fulfill that role. It is very difficult to see any comparable need in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Nix. In your opinion, what benefit or benefits accrue to the United States of America because of its commitment to Korea?

Mr. Perkins. I think the major benefit is a negative one. The withdrawal of an American commitment I think would contribute to instability on the peninsula. I think it probably would encourage North Korea to be somewhat more adventurous. I am not sure that even if it encouraged North Korea it would have very much effect because the North Korean Army is not as large as the South Korean Army so that an appraisal of the situation would be that the South Korean Army could probably defend itself without the U.S. commitment as long as it was only fighting the North Koreans. I do not think the American commitment makes it possible to avoid finding out by contributing in a small way to the defense of the peninsula.

I think the Koreans are one of the most destabilizing elements in the Asian context at the moment but I think there are those who would argue that we ought to get out of Korea because of the present nature of the Korean Government, that it is becoming extremely authoritarian and beginning to restrict—not beginning but very vigorously restricting the freedoms of the people within South Korea. My own sense of the situation is that would not be the proper response in these circumstances. That is, I believe that withdrawal from Korea and the increase in the feeling of insecurity in the South Korean context would probably in fact increase the authoritarian pressures within the South Korean Government rather than decrease them.

Mr. Nix. In the event that we repudiated our commitment to that country, withdraw all of our forces, and then conflict erupted between the powers in that country, do you think the United States would feel a humanitarian responsibility to go in and restore order?

Mr. Perkins. Well, I have serious doubts whether the United States could very readily restore order at that point.

Mr. Nix. Would it have a responsibility in your view to seek to restore order?

Mr. Perkins. I think we would have a humanitarian responsibility, if there were some reasonable way in which we could stop the fighting, to try to stop the fighting, yes. I mean this would be a war between two very large armies with enormous bloodshed. With two very large, very well equipped, highly disciplined armies the destruction would be enormous.

I would hope that American policy would, and the reasons for maintaining its minimal commitment to the Korean peninsula would be to avoid that situation occurring. If it did occur and there was a role America could play to bring it to an end quickly with a minimum of bloodshed, I think that we would be under some obligation to try.

Mr. Nix. See, I put the question to you about the restoring of order because as a result of my limited experience with relationships between nations I seem to have concluded that nations never intrude into the affairs of others unless they see an advantage to themselves. I don't see any humanitarian motives prevailing by far in the majority of the cases in which intervention has occurred, and I cannot attribute to the United States of America qualities in that regard contrary to those that I find in other peoples and other countries.
So I must assume that in all of the commitments to which the United States entered it must have been contemplated that there would accrue to the United States a benefit, and I think that is true of every other nation. I find it difficult to discern the benefits in many instances. Many times we have gone in, we have intervened and we have found after the intervention that the benefits are not there and yet we have stayed in those areas expending the funds of the United States of America and doing no visible service to the countries that have been entered. That is one of the considerations that really disturbs me.

Mr. Perkins. Well, I agree with much of that statement particularly as it applies to Southeast Asia, and I am not thinking so much about Vietnam but the great power intervention, and most of the conflicts of Southeast Asia I would agree serve this purpose. The only thing I think I would disagree with you on is it is not clear to me what the United States gained from much of that intervention, either. And it is not entirely clear to me even whether there was much to be gained by British intervention and others that have intervened in one way or another in these internal wars, the civil wars of one sort or another in the region.

If we leave aside the past, I am quite clear in my own mind that most of the likely kinds of wars that are likely to occur in that region are ones in which our intervention would only raise the level of bloodshed or would change it in some way into great power confrontation and that that does not serve our interests and it does not serve the interests of the people of the region. It might serve the interests of some particular group at some particular time that happens to be in power and happens to be losing—they might find it to their advantage to call in the United States as a way of maintaining themselves, maintaining their own particular regime of government while in power, but that it seems to me is not an American interest to try to maintain particular governments. The governments of Asia are going to change periodically and many of them we are going to find fairly unattractive and others will be more friendly to the United States but I don't think that kind of shift in government, the likely kind, would justify American intervention.

Mr. Nix. Now in your statement on page 2 you said:

Although it is always difficult to describe another nation's major foreign policy goals, particularly a nation as secretive as China, China's actions indicate that they do not intend to use their army to occupy large areas not belonging to them or to protect friendly regimes from internal coup d'etat after their initial offensive in the India-China War, for example. Chinese troops quickly withdrew from all territory other than that long claimed to be China's.

Now to me I accept that as a valid conclusion. One has to come to that conclusion. So in that part of the world at least, Japan, and the Soviet Union, what are we to fear? Our relationship with Japan is one in which we are its protector with our nuclear umbrella protection. We have détente with the Soviet Union. What is our position in that part of the world?

Mr. Perkins. Well, when one discusses Japanese foreign policy and America's role in the defense of Japan, one of the difficult things one always is discovering, either as an American or in my experience as a Japanese, is just what is the nature of the threat to Japan against which one must defend. I think to the extent there is a military threat
to Japan it is a very distant one and probably largely comes from the Soviet Union and is only a threat in the sense that if Japan were completely defenseless it is conceivable that the Soviet Union might in some way try to take advantage of that.

What is perhaps of more immediate seriousness is that whether there was such a threat, if Japan were genuinely defenseless the chances are that any Japanese Government under those circumstances would feel that it had to do something about it and that what you would see in Japan if, for example, we withdraw our commitments to Japanese security, would be I think a movement toward the buildup of Japanese military forces, both conventional and also nuclear forces. There is, as you know, a nuclear allergy in Japan but that allergy is something that I think the Japanese have been weakening on gradually over the last decade or more and that the Japanese might consider very seriously developing nuclear capacity if in fact they had no support from the United States.

I am not suggesting necessarily that would be the rational thing for the Japanese Government to do, it is my assessment of what they probably would do under those circumstances. I think it is in our interests since we can do it—in my own opinion—at a relatively low cost or at virtually no cost in terms of human lives and not at terribly great expense, although I do not have the figure in terms of military hardware and the like, that it is well worth maintaining that commitment; it is well worth it.

Mr. Nix. It seems to me or at least the thought has occurred to me that the United States decided within that sacred confines up there where they decide things there that we will go in here and provide the shelter and protection to Japan and we then will reap the benefit in trade, the economic feature of it. If we do not do that, then the Soviet Union will do it; and the Soviet Union would have done that and justified it by saying, "If we failed to act in this manner, then the People's Republic of China will do it." So whoever did it saw an advantage to themselves and we have reaped that advantage in the rising soaring economy of Japan, have we not?

Mr. Perkins. Yes.

Mr. Nix. But the Japanese have been smarter than anyone else because from the ashes of defeat they developed into the second, third most economically powerful country in the world spending 1 percent of their gross national product only, and only that, for armament. Now that is the best of possible worlds that they have had. Would you agree with that, sir?

Mr. Perkins. Yes. I think the Japanese policy has been very successful but they have gotten their minimal security needs taken care of at minimal expense to the Japanese and have had a very successful economic development program. I mean it has its problems as we are seeing now in the lack of social welfare and heavy ecological cost and the like as a result of that fast growing but on the overall Japan is far better off than it was 20 years ago; and I think everyone in Japan would feel that way.

I think from the standpoint of the United States it is important that Japan is wealthy and is stable and with which we have, I think, on the whole a very mutually beneficial trading relationship.

Mr. Nix. Yes, very much so.
One of the objectives of this subcommittee is an examination of the commitments entered into by the United States, all of the commitments, and it is a monumental task of course. An analysis of those commitments and an answer to the question as to why those commitments were made and to further question of what benefits have we received from those commitments and the answer to another question as to what advantages we have contributed to mankind because of our commitments and our sacrifices—those are the things that I think we should get answers to and those are the fields of inquiry that should be of great entrancing importance to the American people. If they had those answers, had the benefit of the analysis that I have spoken of, then they would have a greater appreciation of the problems faced by this country over the years and the mistakes we have made or the brilliant decisions we have arrived at—I can’t see very many but there must have been some, although the Lord has been very good to us.

So I want to thank you very much, Dr. Perkins, for having given us the opportunity and the benefit of your testimony and discussion, it has been something of value to the subcommittee. I want to suggest to you that at another time it would be our pleasure and certainly to our benefit if you could consent to come back to us.

Mr. Perkins. Thank you.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]
OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, the Hon. Robert N. C. Nix (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will come to order.

We have heard a great deal in recent years with the rise in prominence of Secretary Kissinger, about balance-of-power politics. The Secretary wrote a book about the career of Metternich the Austrian diplomat who practiced balance-of-power theory at the 1814 Congress of Vienna in an attempt to preserve the Hapsburg Empire. Needless to say, regardless of Metternich or his theories, the Hapsburg Empire disappeared some time ago.

The balance-of-power theory concerns us here today because on March 1, 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated that one reason for keeping our troops in forward bases in Asia was to counterbalance the Soviet armed presence in Asia to the benefit of the People's Republic of China. His testimony was also to the effect that this was more than acceptable to the Republic of China.

It is also important to note that as a military matter our troops in South Korea, for instance, serve almost no military purpose but are retained there for political reasons. Secretary Schlesinger testified that they could be taken out of South Korea and kept as a mobile reserve, presumably in the mid-Pacific or in the United States.

While our policy as to the removal of troops from forward bases in Asia seems stagnant, the U.S. Government at the same time is taking control of two-thirds of the island of Tinian in the mid-Pacific for military purposes. Thus we can at least hope that in the future we will withdraw from our forward bases in Asia, even though we have more men in the Western Pacific and Asian bases than we had prior to the beginning of the Vietnam War.

The United States provides an American defense umbrella for Japan which includes not only bases in Japan and 19,000 men but 38,000 in Okinawa and to some extent our forces in South Korea as well as nuclear protection.

With these forces in mind it is worth noting then that the Soviet Union and Japan have recently initiated an agreement for the joint development of Siberian coal. This means that the Soviet Union has dropped preconditions such as the insistence on agreement by the Japanese to build a 2,500-mile pipeline to Western Siberia for oil transmission. On the Japanese side it means that they have decided to go ahead in a joint venture for oil development with the Soviets with-
out American participation and without insisting on the settlement of their dispute over the Kurile Islands with the Soviets.

All of this means that the joint development of Siberian oil by Japan and the Soviet Union is becoming a reality. It also means that the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok will have ready access to oil and will become a staging ground for the expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Pacific. One would wonder why we would need to maintain a defense force to protect Japan from the Soviet Union, its commercial partner, or remain in the Japan area to counterbalance Soviet military influence in Asia.

Our bases in Thailand, most of which are airbases, really protect South Vietnam rather than Thailand since South Vietnam and not Thailand is threatened by invasion from North Vietnam. Bombing did not prevent the supplying of North Vietnam's forces in South Vietnam during the war. Since that time a considerable buildup has taken place in South Vietnam to the extent that some sources allege that 18 months of supplies are on hand now for a North Vietnamese offensive. If an offensive takes place, it will certainly signal a capacity to carry on an offensive for a long period of time without new supplies. What good would our bombing do except visit retribution on North Vietnam which is governed by a group little concerned with casualties as shown by their 28-year war to create one Vietnam?

We are all aware, of course, that bombing anywhere in Indochina is forbidden by statute, even though the maintenance of airbases for bombing is not.

What this adds up to is that the application of a balance-of-power theory in Asia will always provide new reasons for old bases and troop commitments.

Before such policies replace tripwire theories and other pseudo reasons for keeping our forces in forward bases, we must bring home at least half of our defense complement. American bases in the mid-Pacific can serve any reasonable defense policy except immediate engagement in hostilities.

Our naval and air forces can protect the United States and its allies at long range as well as at short range. Other nations can follow foreign policies that are best for their countries and we can come to terms with such policies. But we must start immediately to bring home our 35,000 men in Thailand, our 35,000 men in Okinawa, and our 40,000 men in South Korea before someone thinks of new reasons for keeping them there. The Hapsburg Empire has little to show us by way of example.

Our first witness today is Hon. Robert S. Ingersoll, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you. You may proceed whenever you are ready.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. INGERSOLL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

Mr. Ingersoll, Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with this subcommittee. Shortly after I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the beginning of January, I left for a 6 week visit to my parish—as some of my irreverent colleagues call the area. While I have had occasion to meet some of you, and particularly your distinguished chairman, this is my first appearance at formal hearings before this committee. I therefore wish to take this occasion to say, as I have said privately, that I hope to work closely and cooperatively with you. I will make every effort to keep you informed on important developments and will be as responsive as I can to your requests.

While we may reach different conclusions on given issues, this will be the result of honest differences of review rather than lack of consultation or misunderstanding: I deeply believe that a meaningful foreign policy can be conducted by a democracy such as ours only if it is understood and supported by its people which means, in the first instance, the Congress.

It is altogether fitting then, in light of its responsibilities, that this committee should inquire into U.S. defense commitments in Asia. Those commitments are an important element of our policy toward the area and it is essential that there be a full understanding of their scope and their implications.

Since the word “commitment” has been bandied about a good deal, I propose for the sake of clarity to limit the sense of that word to the obligations we have undertaken in defense treaties. In Asia we have signed six such treaties: 4 bilateral, with the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan; and 2 multilateral, ANZUS with Australia and New Zealand, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and its organization SEATO, with Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, France and the United Kingdom. (Pakistan was a member but after formally terminating its part in the treaty it withdrew last year.) This treaty is the only formal defense link between Thailand and the United States; all other members have other security agreements with us. A protocol to this treaty also extends its protection to so-called “Protocol States,” with their consent, in the event of armed attack. South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were originally designated “Protocol States” but both Cambodia and Laos have renounced the protection of the treaty.

The wording of these agreements varies but in general they provide for consultation whenever a party considers that the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any party is threatened. These agreements further state that each party recognizes that an armed attack on any party would endanger its own peace and safety and that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In the case of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty the commitment to act on the part of the United States is limited to instances of Communist aggression.

It should be noted that these treaties do not attempt to define the specific action to be taken in the event of external armed attack. Thus, these commitments do not bind us to any particular course of action; depending on the facts of the situation, our options might range from merely undertaking diplomatic activity to the provision of assistance, to the extreme of taking action involving the use of armed force. Our obligation would be to act in good faith to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes.
Commitments in the form of defense treaties express a country's perception of its deepest national security interests. A defense treaty is in effect a formal recognition of the commonality of security interests between two countries, a recognition that the security of one country is important to the security of another. It is a public manifestation of this fact and has a dual consequence—it provides the interested parties a degree of mutual reassurance regarding their security and it puts all other countries on notice that these parties stand together. When one of the parties is the United States, the treaties become an enormously important factor—a given, fixed, stabilizing element in an often fluid international situation. Taken together, the defense treaties signed by the United States in Asia reflect with utmost clarity the historical American position in this area; while the United States does not seek hegemony in the region, neither can it accept the domination of Asia and the Pacific by any other nation or combination of nations.

This position formed the basis of American policy in Asia in the 1930's when we opposed Japanese expansion and in the quarter century following World War II when we assisted Asian countries to resist aggression or pressure by Asian Communists.

We fought World War II even though we had no treaty commitments in either Europe or Asia; we fought in Korea in 1950-54 even though we had no treaty commitment at that time with the Republic of Korea. Plainly, the absence of commitments does not shield us from becoming involved in major conflicts and may even lead to conflict when it otherwise might not occur. It was perhaps a recognition of this possibility as much as any other fact that led the United States in the last 25 years to enter into more treaty arrangements than ever before in its history.

The generation which fought World War II returned determined that major war should not happen through miscalculation, and that to secure peace the United States would have to play an active role in the world and to commit itself, in advance, to the defense of the interests it deemed vital. This generation believed that only by committing ourselves would we prevent other countries from again miscalculating American security interests and risking another catastrophe. Underlying this view was the judgment that World War I and World War II would not have happened had the United States played a more responsible role in international affairs and had it defined, clearly and in time, the nature of its national interests.

Mr. Nix. Mr. Ambassador, may I interrupt to advise that I have got to answer that bell and I would like to recess the subcommittee for 5 minutes while I walk to the floor.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Fine, sir.

Mr. Nix. The reason I do that is because I have a desire to return to Congress next year.

Mr. INGERSOLL. I shall await your return.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. Nix. The subcommittee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Ingersoll.

Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our defense treaties have been major stabilizing elements in the world and have largely achieved their main objective—to prevent war through miscalculation. There has been peace in Europe since World
War II. Generally there has been peace in East Asia and the Pacific since 1954, with the single tragic exception of Indochina. The experience of this century seems to me quite conclusive: we have gone to war even without any treaty commitments; we have avoided wars in part by the structure of defense treaties which we have signed.

Treaties reflect a country's security interests but they must be credible to be effective deterrents. The parties to a treaty must be perceived by other countries to have not only the will to fulfill their obligations but also the means to do so. For the United States in Asia this has meant the creation of a network of bases and facilities and the deployment of forces.

But these have been the subject of constant change and adaption.

—In December 1969 there were 764,000 U.S. forces deployed in Asia, including forces afloat; excluding our troops in Vietnam there were approximately 290,000 forces in the region at that time. Today that number is under 180,000, including some 21,000 afloat, a drawdown of some 110,000 in addition to withdrawals from Vietnam.

—Of this number some 38,000 are in Korea where they continue to contribute to the peace and stability of this critical region. This compares with 64,000 at the end of 1969.

—About 16,000 are stationed in the Philippines where U.S. bases historically have been key links in our strategic posture in the Western Pacific. This compares with 25,000 in December 1969.

—Some 6,000 are on Taiwan where our presence is related to the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan itself under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. This represents a reduction of over 3,000 since 1969. Our deployments in Taiwan will continue to be reviewed and we anticipate that further reductions will occur consistent with the Nixon doctrine and an improvement in security conditions.

—There were in December 1969 89,000 troops stationed in Japan (including Okinawa). There are now approximately 55,000 giving substance to the security treaty which is at the heart of our close bilateral relationships.

—And 36,000 are in Thailand where they add weight to our effort to bring about a peaceful settlement in Indochina, down some 12,000 from the high point of 48,000 in 1969. Reflective of the improved situation in Indochina, we and the Royal Thai Government have just announced our intention to further reduce the U.S. military presence in Thailand by approximately 10,000 authorized positions by the end of 1974.

I believe, on the basis of my recent travels, that the countries of the region fully appreciate the importance of this security system in which others such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom also participate, to peace and stability in Asia. Even though the proposal to ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations—for the neutralization of Southeast Asia contemplates the eventual termination of security ties with nations outside the region, four ASEAN members participate either in SEATO or the five-power defense arrangement between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. The fifth ASEAN member, Indonesia, tacitly approves of their participation.
These multilateral and bilateral treaty arrangements have provided an underpinning of continuity and assurance that has facilitated, not impeded, cooperation among these nations and an adjustment of relations with former adversaries. We should not undermine the sense of confidence that has developed among the nations of the region by prematurely dismantling these security arrangements. Uncertainty and doubt would result from such unilateral U.S. action, which could well be misinterpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Asia and could also affect the willingness of others to do their share in contributing to development and security in the region.

Since I served as Ambassador to Japan, let me say just a word about our relationship with this great country which is the keystone of our Asian security system. Japan is the third economic power in the world; yet it continues to maintain only limited military forces and remains deeply committed to the provision of its constitution renouncing war. It also has shown no interest in becoming a nuclear power. This imbalance between economic and military power is made possible and acceptable by Japan's security relationship with the United States.

I believe our interests are well served by this situation. We have excellent and cooperative relations with this creative and dynamic country. At the same time, today's Japan is accepted by all the countries of the area, including China. If ever Japan were judged to be returning to an earlier militarism, tensions would rise throughout Asia, countries would arm, and China in particular would react strongly. The situation would be thrown into even more serious relief were Japan to acquire a nuclear capability.

Thus I believe the confident alliance between Japan and the United States, the key to which is our security treaty, serves the interests of ourselves, of Asia and of the world.

In examining our defense arrangements, I believe it becomes quite clear that they are beneficial to this Nation. Too often there is a tendency to view our efforts abroad as acts of generosity, to consider only the benefits enjoyed by other countries, as if our defense ties were a protective shield thrown over weaker countries by a generous America whose sole interest was the welfare and peace of others.

Although I recognize and value America's generous motivations in foreign affairs, I strongly believe that a viable policy must be firmly rooted in the native soil of national interests.

Our defense treaties are so rooted. They have helped to create a climate in Asia which has advanced those interests and has permitted the United States to have more extensive and deeper relations with the countries of the area than any other nation. In many ways, the United States—not geography—is the unifying factor in that part of the world. The benefits we derive are:

1. Political: We are able to work cooperatively with Asian countries toward many ends we favor;
2. Economic: the stability fostered by our defense ties has contributed to Asia's economic growth; a quarter of our trade is now with Asia and that proportion is rising;
3. And perhaps most important, we derive benefits related to our security. Despite all the tensions and dangers of these years, peace...