SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ
Part IV

REPORTS
OF THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES

SUBMITTED TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

OCTOBER 4, 1976

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(II)
FOREWORD

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

This report has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations by the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs as Part IV of the series on the Seizure of the Mayaguez.

The information consists of reports provided the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs by the Comptroller General of the United States and does not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on International Relations.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.

(III)
Hon. Thomas E. Morgan,  
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am respectfully transmitting to you three reports by the Comptroller General of the United States to the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs relating to the subcommittee's investigation of the seizure of the United States vessel, Mayaguez.

Shortly after the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia to Communist forces the U.S. vessel Mayaguez and its crew were seized by Cambodia. Immediately following the seizure the International Relations Committee and its International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee began an intensive effort to learn the facts surrounding the crisis. Both during the crisis and following Cambodia's release of the vessel and its crew questions were raised both in Congress and the press about the handling of the crisis by the President and the executive branch and the nature and scope of diplomatic and military actions taken to secure release of the Mayaguez and its crew.

One indication of the depth of congressional concern was introduction of three separate resolutions of inquiry sponsored by 38 Members of Congress which directed the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives information concerning seizure of the Mayaguez and its crew and subsequent efforts to release them. These resolutions were referred to the Committee on International Relations and subsequently to the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs.

The Mayaguez crisis happened in the immediate post-Watergate and post-Vietnam era when a pervasive air of skepticism surrounded virtually every action of our Government. This intensified the normal sense of deep concern in Congress about an international crisis and led to a determination that the reestablishment of mutual confidence was vitally needed between the Government and the people and between the executive and legislative branches. This could only be accomplished by in-depth congressional exploration of the handling of the Mayaguez crisis and by the public disclosure of as much information as possible relating to the conduct of the public's business in time of crisis. It was also thought that subjecting the crisis management operations of our Government to congressional scrutiny might lead to improvements in management of future crises.

In order to carry out its responsibilities to investigate the Mayaguez crisis the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs pursued two separate courses of action. The first was a lengthy series
of hearings which began formally on May 14, 1975, while the crisis was reaching its climax. The hearings included testimony by numerous executive branch witnesses including the Acting Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Members of Congress, and Charles T. Miller, captain of the *Mayaguez*. These hearings have been printed under the title, "Seizure of the Mayaguez," parts I, II, and III.

The second course of action taken by the subcommittee was to request the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an in-depth investigation of various aspects of the crisis and to report back to the subcommittee. The Comptroller General was most generous in assigning substantial resources to carry out the subcommittee's request. It is these reports which are transmitted herewith. The first two, "System to Warn U.S. Mariners of Potential Political/Military Hazards: SS *Mayaguez*, a Case Study," and "Executive-Legislative Communications and the Role of the Congress During International Crises," were released to the public previously but are incorporated here to provide as comprehensive a record as possible of the subcommittee's actions.

The third report by the Comptroller General, "The Seizure of the Mayaguez—A Study of Crisis Management," was originally submitted to the subcommittee in classified form at the insistence of the President's Adviser for National Security Affairs. His decision was made despite the fact that the Departments of State and Defense, which provided the information on which the report is based, had no objection to its release in an unclassified form. Negotiations between the subcommittee and the special adviser eventually led to agreement that substantial portions of the report could be declassified and released. In my judgment those portions of the report which remain classified are minor and not necessary for a full understanding of the substantive points made in the original report. The subcommittee appreciates the great contribution made by the Comptroller General and the staff of the General Accounting Office to the work of the subcommittee in the conduct of its inquiry into the events surrounding the seizure and eventual release of the *Mayaguez*.

I am confident that the subcommittee has developed as full an understanding of the *Mayaguez* crisis as the cooperation of the executive branch would permit. That cooperation was, however, not as complete or forthcoming as I wished or expected. While I appreciate the serious security considerations which must be respected when reviewing an area as sensitive as crisis management I believe that it is incumbent on our Government to scrutinize more carefully than we have yet done international crises of the past in order to insure that we can minimize dangers to our citizens, both civilian and military, and maximize the opportunities for peaceful resolution of crises in the future.

DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs.
OTHER PARTS OF THE SERIES ON "SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ"

HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

Part I—May 14 and 15, 1975

WITNESSES

Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Affairs)
Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Col. Zane E. Finkelstein, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Hon. John M. Maury, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Part II—June 19, 25 and July 25, 1975

WITNESSES

Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Hon. John Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State of California
Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York
Hon. Patricia Schroeder, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado
Gerald A. Malla, Esq., attorney at law, representing Sealand Service, Inc.
Charles T. Miller, Captain of the Mayaguez

Part III—July 31 and September 12, 1975

WITNESSES

Hon. Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary of State
Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Hon. William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Col. Vincent Dambrauskus, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Communications-Electronics Directorate

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System To Warn U.S. Mariners Of Potential Political/Military Hazards: S.S. Mayaguez, A Case Study
Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce

A system to warn mariners concerning potential political/military hazards affecting U.S. shipping was reestablished in 1948. State Department has the primary responsibility for issuing special warnings.

More than 19 hours elapsed after Government agencies in Washington, D.C., learned of the S.S. Mayaguez seizure before mariners were advised to avoid the area. This delay was partially caused by a failure of State Department activities to promptly inform the office responsible for issuing special warnings. The seizure followed earlier incidents in the same general area.

Actions have been taken to identify problems and implement corrective measures. This report contains recommendations for further improving the warning system.
The Honorable Dante B. Fascell  
Chairman, Subcommittee on International  
    Political and Military Affairs,  
Committee on International Relations  
    House of Representatives  

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 9, 1975, asked us to review the system for warning U.S. mariners of potential political and military hazards and to discuss the system as it related to the Mayaguez incident.

The report notes that following the Mayaguez seizure, some actions were taken to improve the system. Also included are our recommendations for further improving the effectiveness of the warning system. Therefore, as arranged with your Subcommittee staff, we will distribute the report to the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, other congressional committees; and other interested parties.

The Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense were provided the opportunity to comment on a draft of this report. The Departments of State and Commerce responded in writing; and the Department of Defense provided verbal comments. All comments were considered in preparing the final report.

Sincerely, yours,

[Signature]

Comptroller General  
    of the United States
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CRITIC</td>
<td>A message containing urgent intelligence information</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMAHC</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>HYDRO.</td>
<td>Radio navigational warnings broadcast in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTS/HYDRO-</td>
<td>PACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
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The U.S. Government operates a radio system to broadcast to mariners regular navigational warnings and special warnings of matters affecting U.S. shipping. The Defense Mapping Agency has primary responsibility for issuing navigational warnings.

The State Department has primary responsibility for issuing special warnings although other Federal agencies may draft a special warning and request issuance.

Special warnings are used to disseminate to mariners political/military information affecting U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy. Since reintroduction of special warnings in 1948, 45 plus 1 update have been issued. (See pp. 2 and 3.)

The S.S. Mayaguez was fired on and boarded by Cambodian armed forces on May 12, 1975. Mariners were not advised to avoid the area until more than 19 hours after Government agencies in Washington, D.C., learned of the seizure.

This delay can be attributed, in part, to the failure of various activities within State to promptly inform its Maritime Affairs office about the seizure. (See pp. 6 to 8.)

Incidents occurred off the Cambodian coast, prior to the Mayaguez seizure, but were not brought to the attention of State's Maritime Affairs office until after the Mayaguez seizure. (See pp. 10 to 11.) The Maritime Affairs office had not adequately informed other State Department activities and other...
Government departments of the type of situation which should be brought to its attention. (See pp. 4 and 8.)

There are two broadcasts each day, but the warning system does not assure the timely receipt of information because U.S. merchant mariners are not required to monitor the broadcasts. (See p. 5.)

Following the Mayaguez seizure, actions were taken to identify weaknesses in the warning system and to implement corrective measures. (See p. 13 and 14.) GAO believes there is need to further institutionalize and formalize the warning system to strengthen its future effectiveness.

The Secretary of State should:

--Delegate specific responsibility for issuing special warnings to the Maritime Affairs office.

--Ensure that internal guidelines are further developed to set forth specific procedures to be followed by Maritime Affairs in issuing or clearing for issuance special warnings.

--Ensure that State's regional bureaus have a clear understanding of their responsibilities in promptly informing Maritime Affairs of political/military events affecting U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy.

--Make sure that the Department's Bureau for Intelligence and Research keeps Maritime Affairs fully apprised of all intelligence matters affecting U.S. shipping.

--Enter into interagency agreements containing the above criteria and guidelines and the appropriate responsibilities.

--Direct that the Maritime Affairs office, after learning of political/military events affecting U.S. shipping, use the next available broadcast to alert mariners to the potential hazards.
The Secretaries of State and Commerce should jointly encourage U.S. steamship owners/operators to:

--Require their vessels to monitor at least one U.S. hydrographic broadcast each day.

--Supplement the broadcast of a U.S. special warning by transmitting the warning to their vessels which may be near the critical area. (See pp. 16 and 17.)

Both State and Defense Departments agreed there should be formal interagency agreements covering special warnings and State said it had taken action to prepare such an agreement.

State Department says GAO recommendations regarding U.S. steamship owners/operators are well taken but believes such actions fall within the purview of the Commerce Department and the Defense Mapping Agency. GAO believes that, because of the foreign maritime policy implications of U.S. shipping, the State Department should take an active part in encouraging the steamship companies to implement the suggested measures. (See pp. 17 to 19.)
CHAPTER 1

RADIO NAVIGATIONAL WARNINGS

The United States maintains a system for broadcasting long-range-radio hydrographic warnings to U.S. mariners on the high seas to give them navigational safety information as quickly as possible. There are two general types of warnings: (1) navigational warnings, which contain such information as changes in buoys, lights, and other navigational aids; floating dangers; and naval operations and (2) special warnings, which are more political/military in nature and include such things as declarations of hostilities and territorial sea claims. The Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center (DMAHC) is responsible for originating and issuing navigational warnings.

The Department of State has the primary responsibility for issuing or approving the issuance of special warnings when information indicates that such warning may be justified. This responsibility, however, has not been formalized in any interagency agreement, and there are no written criteria and guidelines setting forth the conditions and circumstances which could warrant issuance of a special warning.

WARNING SYSTEM

Radio navigational warnings for the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and contiguous areas are called HYDROLANTS. Radio warnings for the Pacific Ocean and East Asia and contiguous waters are called HYDROPACS. (See app. I.) The warnings are broadcast from U.S. naval radio stations in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans by radiotelegraph to U.S.-flag merchant vessels and by radioteletype to U.S. naval vessels. Radio stations for Atlantic broadcasts are located in Norfolk, Virginia; Londonderry, Northern Ireland; Reykjavik, Iceland; and Thurso, Scotland. Radio stations for Pacific broadcasts are located in San Francisco, California; Honolulu, Hawaii; Guam; San Miguel, the Philippines; and Yokosuka, Japan.

Radiotelegraph broadcasts are made to merchant vessels twice daily at about 12:30 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. eastern daylight time, (1630 and 0430 Greenwich mean time). The time varies somewhat between stations due to the particular time zones the stations are broadcasting into. Specific broadcast times and frequencies for each station are contained in such publications as DMAHC's Radio Navigational Aids and the Naval Telecommunications Command's Naval Telecommunications Procedures. Each navigational warning (HYDROPAC
HYDROLANT) is broadcast twice after it is received by the radio station, once on each of the next two scheduled broadcasts.

**SPECIAL WARNINGS**

Special warnings are originated as a necessary supplement to regular navigational warnings. They are used to disseminate to all mariners information which is both political and maritime in nature and which may affect U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy. Thus, these warnings inform U.S. mariners of political/military hazards and, when issued, are broadcast over both the HYDROLANT and HYDROPAC systems together with navigational warnings.

Special warnings are numbered consecutively irrespective of the year issued. Following initial broadcast, they are published in DMAHC's weekly Notice to Mariners and all editions of its Daily Memorandum. The texts of all special warnings still in effect are reprinted in the first January issue of the Notice to Mariners, and a numerical listing of those in effect is printed weekly in the Notice to Mariners.

**Genesis of special warnings**

When Germany declared a blockade around England in 1939, the U.S. Government found it needed to disseminate certain official public announcements to all ships at sea but had no method for doing so. Officials from the State and Navy Departments and the Maritime Administration met to discuss the problem. Out of this meeting grew the concept for special warnings. It was decided that such warnings would cover political information proclamations of the United States and foreign governments which the State Department wanted to disseminate to all U.S. ships, but primarily those at sea. The results of this meeting, however, were not well documented. According to the State Department, the record is not clear as to what types of political developments or statements would be made subjects of special warnings. State was responsible for message content and, therefore, for drafting the message text, which was to be approved by the Office of Naval Operations and sent by the Navy's Hydrographic Office 1/ on its navigational warning broadcasts. After the end of World War II, issuance of special warnings was stopped.

1/This office was the predecessor to DMAHC, which was established on July 1, 1972.
In early 1948 the State Department determined that such a system was still required and requested that special warning messages be reinstated. The reintroduction was made on May 27, 1948, with the same basic ground rules established in 1939.

Frequency of special warnings

Only 45 special warnings and 1 special warning update have been issued since reinstatement of the system was announced on May 27, 1948, with the broadcast of special warning 1. (See app. II.) Seven special warnings and the single special warning update remained in effect as of December 31, 1975.

Special warnings have generally tended to cluster around significant political/military events. For instance:

--On May 27 and 28, 1948, six special warnings were issued regarding actions of various Middle East countries following Israel's proclamation of independence. Three special warnings were subsequently issued which canceled the six special warnings.

--Between June 24, 1949, and February 10, 1950, five special warnings were issued pertaining to announcements and actions of the Chinese Government.

--In 1962 five special warnings were issued dealing with U.S. quarantine of offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUING WARNINGS

Due to the political sensitivity of special warnings, the State Department, through its Office of Maritime Affairs, has primary responsibility for issuing or approving the issuance of special warnings although there is no specific delegation of such responsibility. Other Federal agencies may, however, request or draft the text of a special warning. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations, acting for the Defense Department, normally prepares special warnings concerning military matters while the Treasury Department is responsible for items involving contraband or smuggling activity and the Commerce Department for items affecting U.S. foreign trade. The State Department retains responsibility for clearing such special warnings and authorizing their release for broadcast, although it acknowledges there have been instances where State clearance was not obtained before a special warning was issued.

Although it seems to be generally understood that State's Maritime Affairs office has this overall responsibility, it
has not been formalized in any interagency agreement or memorandum of understanding. In fact, with each periodic personnel change in the Maritime Affairs office, it has been necessary for DMAHC to brief the new personnel on the functions of DMAHC and operation of the navigational and special warning system.

We also noted that State had not developed written guidelines and instructions concerning its special warnings responsibilities. The only statement outlining procedures for issuing special warnings was, according to State, contained in a February 1972 internal memorandum. (See pp. 40 and 41.) The memorandum, issued to State's four geographic bureaus, provided some general guidance on procedures for requesting issuance of a special warning. The memorandum, however, did not assign ultimate responsibility within State for the preparation and release of a special warning, nor did it provide for centralized collection of information on political/military events affecting U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy.

DMAHC has primary responsibility for originating and issuing navigational warnings. These warnings normally deal with navigational safety matters, such as buoys and lights. On occasion, however, some HYDROLANT/HYDROPAC messages have contained political/military information. For example, in 1973 a navigational warning was issued which advised that the right of innocent passage might not be recognized and vessels might be detained if they entered Cuban territorial waters within 3 miles of Cuba's coast. Also, during the 1973 Israeli-Egyptian conflict, HYDROLANT messages were issued to advise mariners of several proclamations by Middle East governments concerning entry and safety in their territorial waters, but no special warning was issued. During the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian conflict no navigational or special warning was issued despite the fact that shipping in the area was endangered.

It appears that some political/military incidents may warrant a navigational rather than a special warning. State and DMAHC, however, have no written criteria and guidance for determining when an incident warrants a special warning or a HYDROLANT/HYDROPAC message.

RECEIPT OF WARNINGS

The Military Sealift Command requires that ships which it owns or has under contract copy 1/ at least one hydrographic

1/The messages are in Morse Code and must be written down so that the text may be recorded.
broadcast daily. If it is in port, the vessel normally obtains copies of broadcasts from the local communications center.

U.S. merchant vessels not under the control of Sealift Command are not required to monitor, copy, or acknowledge receipt of U.S. hydrographic broadcasts to insure timely receipt of information. This matter is generally left to the ship operators/owners and vessel captains. A recent Maritime Administration survey of five U.S.-flag carriers revealed that only two companies specifically required their vessels to copy DMAHC's hydrographic broadcasts. DMAHC estimates that only about 50 percent of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet receives its navigational warning messages. As for the S.S. Mayaguez, its radioman monitored navigational information broadcast by a British radio station in Hong Kong.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review of the U.S. navigational warning system showed that:

--The responsibility for issuing special warnings had not been formalized in any type of interagency agreement.

--There were no clear and formalized criteria and guidelines setting forth the conditions and circumstances which could necessitate issuance of a special warning.

--State had no written internal instructions or guidelines clarifying specific roles and responsibilities regarding special warnings and the procedures to be followed in issuing special warnings.

Furthermore, the current navigational warning system does not insure the timely receipt of information by U.S. mariners because they are not required to monitor any of the twice daily hydrographic broadcasts nor to acknowledge receipt of special warnings.

AGENCY COMMENTS

The State Department agreed that the responsibility for issuing special warnings had not been formalized. In commenting on the matter of internal guidelines and instructions, State cited the February 1972 internal memorandum discussed on page 4 but acknowledged that it was not possible to determine whether the memorandum was definitive enough in its instructions.
CHAPTER 2

ISSUANCE OF SPECIAL WARNING 45

At about 3:18 a.m. 1/ on May 12, 1975, the S.S. Mayaguez was fired on and boarded by Cambodian armed forces approximately 6-1/2 nautical miles from the Cambodian island of Poulo Wai. The ship's radio officer sent several mayday calls, which gave the vessel's position and stated that it was proceeding to an unknown Cambodian port. The mayday was picked up locally, and a message about the seizure was received in the Washington, D.C., area at approximately 5:12 a.m. More than 19 hours after receipt of this message in Washington, special warning 45 advising mariners to avoid the area of seizure was broadcast. The warning stated:

"SHIPPING IS ADVISED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE TO REMAIN MORE THAN 35 NAUTICAL MILES OFF THE COAST OF CAMBODIA AND MORE THAN 20 NAUTICAL MILES OFF THE COAST OF VIETNAM INCLUDING OFFLYING ISLANDS. RECENT INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED OF FIRING ON, STOPPING AND DETENTION OF SHIPS WITHIN WATERS CLAIMED BY CAMBODIA, PARTICULARLY IN VICINITY OF POULO WAI ISLAND. THIS WARNING IN NO WAY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIAN OR VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS OR AS DEROGATION OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR UNITED STATES FLAG VESSELS, OR DEROGATION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS."

At the time the Mayaguez was seized, various offices within the State and Defense Departments knew of prior incidents in which Cambodian forces had fired on or detained merchant vessels of other nations. However, the offices responsible for issuing special and navigational warnings were not informed, and U.S. mariners were not alerted to the potential hazards in the area until after the Mayaguez was seized.

RECEIPT OF INFORMATION BY STATE

The State Department maintains two 24-hour-watch centers to bring substantive matters to the attention of appropriate State officials as quickly as possible and to serve as liaison with operations centers of other Government agencies. State's Operations Center maintains one watch and has the primary responsibility for alerting State officials on all substantive matters coming to its attention 1/All times are given in eastern daylight time.

1/1/
except intelligence source material. State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) maintains the second watch and serves as State's primary link with the U.S. intelligence community. The INR practice was to alert State officials outside INR only on intelligence source material.

One of the Mayaguez's mayday messages was received by an employee of an oil exploration company in Indonesia who informed the American Embassy in Jakarta. The Embassy, in turn, informed Washington of the seizure about 5:03 a.m. on May 12, 1975, in a CRITIC (urgent intelligence information) message. Messages designated CRITIC are routed through the intelligence communications network directly to the National Security Agency and from there to various intelligence activities. The INR watch received Jakarta's initial CRITIC message about 5:12 a.m.

INR instructions provide for the officer on duty to immediately inform State's Operations Center watch officer of all incoming CRITICS. The INR watch officer erroneously assumed that, since the message originated from a U.S. Embassy, the Operations Center had also received a copy and therefore took no action. In accordance with standard procedures, the National Security Agency called the INR watch about 5:20 a.m., calling its attention to the CRITIC and a followup message. However, the INR watch still did not alert the Operations Center.

The National Military Command Center called the military representative at State's Operations Center about 6:00 a.m. and alerted him to the existence of the CRITIC messages. Since the Operations Center had not received them, the Command Center transmitted them via long-distance xerography. Upon receiving the copies, the Operations Center alerted the duty officer of State's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at 6:15 a.m. and made copies of the messages available for early morning pickup by State's Offices of the Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Deputy Secretary, Political Affairs, and East Asia. According to State, the item was also included in the telegraphic portion of the Secretary's morning summary.

The East Asia bureau's duty officer, in turn, alerted the country director for Cambodia at 6:35 a.m. The country director was unable to reach his counterpart in Defense's International Security Affairs office immediately but spoke with Defense on the telephone at 7:30 a.m. Following his arrival at State, the country director briefed a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the East Asia bureau on the CRITIC messages. This official, in turn, discussed the matter with his counterpart at Defense and briefed the
principal State official who would be representing East Asia
at the Secretary's 8:00 a.m. staff meeting.

During this entire process, State's Maritime Affairs
office was not alerted to the seizure because neither the
Operations Center nor INR had been previously informed that
the office should be informed of such matters.

OFFICE OF MARITIME AFFAIRS NOTIFIED

Officials in the Maritime Affairs office first learned
of the Mayaguez seizure about 9:15 a.m., when the Cambodia
country director called to inform them and to ask for cer-
tain information about the Mayaguez. A Maritime Affairs
official called a local office of Sea-Land Service, Inc.,
which owned the vessel, obtained such information as crew
size, type of cargo, and destination; and passed it to the
country director. At that time, the country director asked
whether any warning notice had been sent to mariners, since
the seizure followed two previous incidents in the same
general area. The Maritime Affairs official said his office
had not issued a warning because this was the first
notice they had concerning problems off the Cambodian coast.

The Maritime Affairs official then checked with per-
sonnel at DMAHC between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. and was told
that DMAHC had not issued any type of warning. He then
discussed the matter further with the country director,
and they decided that the Maritime Affairs office should
prepare a warning message.

DMAHC AND MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND NOTIFIED

Officials at DMAHC first learned of the Mayaguez
seizure when a Military Sealift Command official who had
previously worked at DMAHC called about 9:00 a.m. and asked
if they knew of the seizure and whether DMAHC had put out
a warning. The Sealift Command official was told that the
incident was in the nature of a special warning and was re-
f erred to specific individuals in the Ocean Affairs Branch
of the Chief of Naval Operations (hereinafter referred to
as Naval Operations) and State's Maritime Affairs office.

The Military Sealift Command first learned of the
seizure at 7:15 a.m., when an officer from National Mili-
tary Command Center called Sealift's Command and Control
Center and said the Mayaguez had been fired on and boarded;
however, he would not cite the information source. Prior
to this, someone from the National Military Command Cen-
ter had called the Sealift Command at 5:30 a.m. and asked
if it had the Mayaguez on time charter but would not say
why he wanted the information. As previously noted, the
Military Sealift Command called DMAHC at 9:00 a.m., in-
quiring about putting out a warning to mariners, and sub-
sequently called Ocean Affairs Branch.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL WARNING TEXT

Sometime after 10:00 a.m., a person from the Maritime
Affairs office called Naval Operations’s Ocean Affairs
Branch and asked for suggested language for a warning mes-
sage. The caller was referred to an official at DMAHC who
had already told Ocean Affairs Branch that DMAHC was work-
ing on a navigational warning message draft.

Prior to this, DMAHC had checked on both the claimed
ownership of Poulo Wai, near where the seizure occurred, and
on territorial sea claims of Cambodia and Vietnam. Based
on this information, DMAHC’s draft message advised mariners
to stay more than 12 nautical miles off the coasts of Cam-
bodia and Vietnam, including offlying islands. According
to DMAHC, the draft message was ready by 10:30 a.m.—in
time to be issued as a HYDROPAC on the 12:30 p.m. hydro-
graphic broadcast if DMAHC were to have been advised to do
so. DMAHC modeled its draft message after the wording
used in special warning 35.

This warning advised mariners of several recent ship
detentions by the Somali Government and advised them to
exercise extreme caution in waters off Somali. The warn-
ing also included a statement that it should not be con-
strued as U.S. recognition of Somali’s 12-mile territorial
sea claim.

A Maritime Affairs official called DMAHC between 11:00
a.m. and noon and asked for its thoughts on the basic mes-
sage, and DMAHC provided its draft. The draft text, as
then written, was for 12 nautical miles, the territorial
limit claimed by the former Cambodian Government. The
Maritime Affairs official then discussed the text with the
Cambodia country director, and it was decided that the sug-
gested distance for remaining offshore should be 20 nau-
tical miles, which would provide a safety factor for vessels
sailing through the area and leave adequate navigational
room. The Maritime Affairs official then called Naval
Operation’s Ocean Affairs Branch, read the draft text,
and requested the necessary Defense Department clearances.
The Maritime Affairs official spoke again with the Cam-
bodia country director who suggested they hold up release
of the message until they knew the results of the National
Security Council meeting. At this point they had already
missed the noon hydrographic broadcast.
Some time in the early afternoon of May 12, a Maritime Affairs official cleared the message with the National Security Council's Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The Task Force suggested that a phrase referring to derogation of the freedom of the high seas be added to the final sentence of the text. The Maritime Affairs official then cleared the message text with State's Legal Advisor office.

At about 4:30 p.m., the Ocean Affairs Branch informed the Maritime Affairs office that it had learned the Cambodians were apparently making exaggerated territorial sea claims, and it suggested staying 35 nautical miles off the Cambodian coast. The 20 nautical mile limit previously established for the Vietnamese coast was not changed.

By 6:30 p.m., the final drafting and clearances had been completed and at that time the Maritime Affairs official telephoned DMAHC and read the message text. The DMAHC official typed the message, verified it with Maritime Affairs, and carried it to the Naval Oceanographic Office communications center 1/ at 7:05 p.m. The center transmitted the message about 9:27 p.m. to HYDROPAC radio stations and about 10:23 p.m. to HYDROLANT stations. This was in time to make the hydrographic warning broadcast at about 12:30 a.m., although it was more than 21 hours after the Mayaguez was seized. State's communications center received its copy of the HYDROLANT message about 10:25 p.m. (See app. III.)

PRIOR INCIDENTS

Following the Mayaguez seizure, numerous allegations by news media claimed that the U.S. Government had been aware of problems encountered by merchant vessels off the Cambodian coast. Particular references were made to the firing on and pursuit of a South Korean vessel and the boarding and detention of a Panamanian vessel.

These particular incidents did occur and certain agencies within the U.S. Government did know of them before the Mayaguez seizure. However, the information was not brought to the attention of the Maritime Affairs office, Ocean Affairs Branch, and DMAHC, which have key roles in alerting mariners to political/military hazards, until after the Mayaguez was seized.

1/The communications center is co-located with DMAHC and processes the outgoing messages for it since DMAHC has no communications center.
Korean vessel

On Sunday, May 4, 1975, at 6:00 a.m., State's Operations Center received a phone call from the American Embassy in Korea inquiring about a Defense Department report concerning the possible capture of a South Korean vessel by a Communist ship. The Embassy had received a telephone call from a Korean Government official asking for U.S. Government assistance in rescuing the vessel. The Embassy asked that State's Korea country director be alerted to the situation.

The Operations Center called the country director at 9:20 a.m., and he in turn alerted a principal official of State's East Asia Bureau. At about 12:17 p.m., the Operations Center learned through military channels that the Korean ship had escaped the pursuing vessel and was apparently headed for a different port and, therefore, the case was considered closed.

At the time of this incident, State's Operations Center had not been instructed to alert the Maritime Affairs office concerning such events. Nor was the Korea country director aware of the Maritime Affairs office's responsibility for issuing special warnings to mariners and, therefore, of its implicit need to receive information on political/military hazards affecting U.S. mariners.

On May 5 the Foreign Broadcast Information Service wire service carried a report about the shelling by what was apparently a Communist boat. This information was received by the Operations Center but was not made available to the Maritime Affairs office. State told us that the information was reported in the INR afternoon summary on May 5, but Maritime Affairs was not briefed because INR was not aware of Maritime Affairs' responsibility for issuing special warnings.

Panamanian vessel

On May 7 a Panamanian vessel en route to Thailand from Singapore was seized by Cambodian Communists and, according to public news accounts, was released about 36 hours later. This information was available within the U.S. intelligence community but apparently was not made available to the Maritime Affairs office and DMARDC until after the Mayaguez seizure.

CONCLUSIONS

The decision to issue a warning to U.S. mariners concerning political/military hazards at sea is, to a large extent, a matter of judgment on the part of responsible officials in the State Department and in Naval Operations.
Such a decision depends on the timely availability of all relevant information pertaining to the situation. We believe that, if the offices responsible for issuing navigational and special warnings to U.S. mariners had known of the prior incidents and the seriousness of those incidents, some type of warning would have been issued before the Mayaguez seizure.

We believe that, given the responsibilities associated with issuing a special warning as discussed in chapter 1, the State Department should have responded in a more timely manner by issuing a navigational or special warning on the May 12 12:30 p.m. hydrographic broadcast rather than 12 hours later. As the situation became more clearly understood, State could have followed its initial warning or alert with more specific information.

AGENCY COMMENTS

State Department agrees that, if the appropriate responsible offices had known of the prior incidents, some type of warning would have been issued before the Mayaguez was seized.

Regarding the timeliness of issuing a warning following the seizure, State said the need to clear and coordinate the special warning with agencies involved, including the highest levels of the National Security Council, precluded its issuance on the 12:30 p.m. May 12 hydrographic broadcast. Undoubtedly certain clearance procedures are necessary before issuing a special warning, but we believe State's position further supports our conclusion that some type of advisory warning should have been issued on the 12:30 p.m. broadcast. Following this, there was ample opportunity to broadcast additional information as the situation clarified itself. In addition, we have no evidence that they cleared the special warning with the highest levels of the National Security Council or that it was necessary to do so.
CHAPTER 3

ACTIONS TO IMPROVE WARNING
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the Mayaguez seizure, the U.S. intelligence community established an interagency committee to identify procedural improvements to insure the timely dissemination of special warning information to U.S. merchant vessels. Agencies represented on the committee included Navy's Office of Naval Operations and Military Sealift Command; Defense Mapping Agency, including headquarters and DMAHC personnel; Maritime Administration; the Central Intelligence, Defense Intelligence, and National Security Agencies; and intelligence activities of the Navy and State Departments. As a result of this committee's work, DMAHC said it will implement the following procedural improvements in broadcasts of future special warnings:

--Increase broadcast time from twice on 1 day to twice a day for 3 days.

--Broadcast the special warning at the first of each hydrographic broadcast.

--At the time the warning is issued, it will also be transmitted to U.S. steamship companies. This will alert shipowners so they can also notify their ships if they desire to.

--Maritime Administration will be notified when a special warning is issued.

Additional changes are discussed below.

STATE DEPARTMENT

At the time the Mayaguez was seized, State had no procedures for alerting the Maritime Affairs office concerning incidents which could necessitate issuing a special warning to U.S. mariners. The Maritime Affairs office has now informed State's Operations Center and geographic bureaus about the types of situations that the Operations Center should bring to Maritime Affairs attention, including:

--Outbreak of hostilities involving any nation with a coastline.
Any reports of hostile actions against the military or civilian shipping of any nation when it appears that the shipping was on the high seas or engaging in innocent passage through territorial waters at the time it became the victim of hostile action.

Any announcements or pronouncements by a foreign government that it has changed the extent of its territorial sea or intends to increase the defense of its sovereignty inside its declared territorial waters.

Following receipt of this criteria, the Operations Center and, according to State, INR prepared a watch instruction informing their watch officers of the need to alert the Maritime Affairs office to the above types of incidents.

As noted in chapter 2, the initial information regarding seizure of the Mayaguez was provided to various government intelligence agencies and activities, including State, in CRITIC messages. Because of a misunderstanding by State's INR watch, the information was not immediately made available to the Operations Center. According to State, all future CRITIC messages will be immediately exchanged between State's INR watch and its Operations Center. The duty officers of each will then consult on the further alerting of State officials. The Operations Center and, according to State, INR have in turn issued watch instructions which provide for alerting the Maritime Affairs office to substantive CRITICs or other reports which suggest a Mayaguez-type affair; i.e., incidents at sea having political overtones.

State Department said in commenting on recommendations made in a draft of this report, that internal guidelines covering special warnings have been issued. The guidelines provide for recommending that DMAEC issue a navigational warning if a particular situation does not merit a special warning. These guidelines were developed in October 1975 by State's Maritime Affairs office and provided to State's Operations Center and to INR. (See pp. 42 to 44.)

These guidelines represent a step in developing internal procedures for issuing special warnings. They do not, however, set forth clearly the procedures to be followed by the Maritime Affairs office in issuing special warnings. The guidelines were not directed to State Department's regional bureaus, nor do they address the responsibilities such offices may have in keeping the Maritime Affairs office adequately informed of political/military matters affecting U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy.
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

The establishment of the U.S. Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System, although not a direct outgrowth of the Mayaguez seizure, was announced by the Maritime Administration on August 8, 1975. The idea of the locator system started taking shape in late 1973, and it became effective November 1, 1975. The purpose of the locator system is to keep national agencies and certain military authorities informed of arrivals, departures, and locations of U.S.-flag merchant vessels throughout the world.

The locator system applies to U.S. merchant vessels of 1,000 or more gross registered tons engaged in foreign commerce of the United States and not operating under control of the Military Sealift Command. These vessels are required to submit reports upon departure and arrival at all ports and every 48 hours while at sea. Reporting vessels have direct access to Navy and Coast Guard communications facilities, and no charge is applied to locator system messages. The receiving facilities in turn transmit the reports to the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center.

According to the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Flag Merchant Vessel Locator Filing System reporting mechanism should provide a more positive accounting of U.S.-flag merchant vessels engaged in commerce and allow more positive action in crises.

Maritime satellite system

A commercial maritime communications satellite system is being established. The system will include communications satellites stationed over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; shipboard terminals comprised of such equipment as an antenna equipped with automatic steering to keep it locked on the satellite at all times; a console with communications and control equipment; and a teleprinter and telephone; and shore stations on U.S. east and west coasts to operate with the system. According to the Maritime Administration, the system will be capable of providing high-quality commercial teletype, data, and voice communications via satellites 24 hours a day to ships and offshore facilities. It was expected that the Atlantic satellite would be fully operational by the end of 1975 and the Pacific satellite by mid-1976.

At least one large international oil company has leased several shipboard terminals to provide communications with its tankers while at sea. The Maritime Administration has
leased six terminals, to be installed aboard six U.S.-flag merchant vessels as part of a cooperative cost-sharing program between the Administration and the vessel owners. Maritime officials estimate it will be 10 to 15 years before the satellite communications capability of the merchant fleet becomes widespread. Basic problems revolve around convincing merchant mariners of the need to upgrade their communications capabilities and determining how the sophisticated equipment and additional personnel required onboard the ships will be paid for.

Selective calling system

Various international groups have been working on the development of an adequate and standardized maritime selective calling system for a number of years. In 1972, U.S.-flag shipping companies asked the Maritime Administration to use its resources to coordinate and initiate the development of a selective calling system to meet current and future needs of the industry.

Upon installation of equipment both on ship and at shore facilities (including commercial and selected Coast Guard radio stations), the system will, according to the Maritime Administration, allow shore-based radio stations to selectively alert ships which are in potentially dangerous areas. This is accomplished by attaching a selective calling unit to the ship's high-frequency radio receiver which is preset to prescribed frequencies. A signal from a shore radio station on the ship's assigned frequency will set off an alarm on the ship. Since radio receivers on merchant ships are not continually manned, the alarm will serve to alert the vessel's captain or radioman to an important incoming message.

The Military Sealift Command is planning to install 63 selective call units on ships which it owns, and the Maritime Administration plans to assist in installing about 100 units in shore facilities and U.S. merchant vessels. According to the Maritime Administration, the cost of each unit, about $4,000 plus installation costs and costs of upgrading communication equipment to interface with the system, may serve to slow universal adoption of the system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some actions have been initiated to identify and correct weaknesses in the warning system. However, because of the infrequency of special warnings and personnel changes, we believe there is a need to further institutionalize and formalize the system to insure its future effectiveness. We recommend, therefore, that the Secretary of State:
--Delegate specific responsibility for issuing special warnings to the Maritime Affairs office.

--- Insure that internal guidelines are further developed to set forth specific procedures to be followed by Maritime Affairs in issuing or clearing for issuance special warnings.

--- Insure that State's regional bureaus have a clear understanding of their responsibilities in promptly informing Maritime Affairs of political/military events affecting U.S. shipping and foreign maritime policy.

--- Insure that the Bureau for Intelligence and Research keeps Maritime Affairs fully apprised of all intelligence source material affecting U.S. shipping.

--- Enter into formal interagency agreements which set forth responsibilities together with the criteria and guidelines.

--- Direct that the next available hydrographic broadcast, after learning of political/military incidents affecting U.S. shipping, be used to alert mariners of potential hazards. If necessary, this initial alert could be followed by more specific language as the situation becomes clarified.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce jointly encourage U.S. shipowners/operators to:

--- Require their vessels to monitor at least one U.S. hydrographic broadcast each day.

--- Supplement the broadcast of a U.S. special warning by transmitting the warning to their vessels which may be near the critical area.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND ACTIONS

In addition to the previously discussed changes, State Department said it is also considering the possibility of distributing to all diplomatic posts a standard operating procedure for informing it of situations that may necessitate the issuance of a special warning. We agree that this should be done.
State agrees that its Bureau for Intelligence and Research should keep the Maritime Affairs office apprised of all intelligence material affecting U.S. shipping. Both INR and the Operations Center have developed internal instructions to insure that such intelligence material is brought to Maritime Affairs attention.

State and Defense Departments agree that there should be interagency agreements which set forth responsibilities, together with criteria and guidelines. State said it had initiated the formalization of such an agreement with members of the National Security Council staff.

State said that it would incorporate our recommendation on using the next available hydrographic broadcast, after it learns of political/military incidents affecting U.S. shipping, as part of its standard operating procedures for issuing special warnings.

The State Department said that our recommendations involving U.S. steamship owners/operators were well taken, but it believes such actions fall within the purview of the two Government agencies most closely associated with their implementation--DMAHC and the Department of Commerce (Maritime Administration). We believe, however, that because of State's interest in the foreign maritime policy implications of U.S. shipping, it should play an active role in encouraging the steamship companies to implement the suggested measures.

Commerce Department agrees that the Secretaries of State and Commerce should jointly encourage U.S.-flag steamship operators to require their vessels to monitor at least one U.S. hydrographic broadcast each day. It said the Maritime Administration will take steps to call the attention of all U.S.-flag steamship operators to the need of copying radio navigational warning messages.

Commerce recognizes that the effectiveness of disseminating special warnings requires validation of their receipt. Future special warnings will, therefore, include the request that U.S.-flag merchant ships in the general area of the incident acknowledge to DMAHC receipt of the special warning. Since the Maritime Administration has already asked operators of U.S.-flag merchant ships to cooperate by having their vessels honor the request, we are no longer making a specific recommendation on this matter.
Commerce has also suggested that, since the Maritime Administration has a specific interest in political/military incidents which could affect U.S. shipping, it should be immediately notified by State's INR of any incident that would be normally reported to Maritime Affairs.

State and Commerce comments on our conclusions and recommendations are included on pages 35 to 39 and 46 to 48, respectively.
U.S. LONG RANGE RADIO NAVIGATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM

NOTE

Ships approaching or traveling along the U.S. coast should also receive the appropriate "Local Navigational Warnings" broadcast by the nearest U.S. Coast Guard station.

Source: Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center, Publication 117B (Radio Navigational Aids)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning number</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Canceled</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45 update</td>
<td>6/14/75</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hostile activities between Khmer and Vietnamese air and surface forces have been noted in the vicinity of Po loi Bai and other nearby islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>5/12/75</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping to remain more than 35 nautical miles from Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles from Vietnam due to recent incidents reported concerning the firing on, stopping, and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>12/17/73</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supersedes and cancels special warning 41 whereby Department of Commerce and Transportation permit U.S. carriers to call at People’s Republic of China but does not change the prohibition against calling at other Communist ports in North Korea or Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>8/ 8/72</td>
<td>12/12/74</td>
<td>Reminder that special warning 42 is still in effect and repeats the subject matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>5/ 8/72</td>
<td>12/12/74</td>
<td>Ports of North Vietnam mined and will activate on May 11, 1972. Entry at own risk. U.S. and South Vietnam will take measures to stop all military supplies to North Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>2/17/72</td>
<td>12/17/73</td>
<td>U.S. ships and aircraft may not enter any ports of China, North Korea, or Communist areas of Vietnam. This supersedes and cancels special warning 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>12/10/71</td>
<td>12/12/72</td>
<td>The Pakistan Government announced that all merchant ships entering Pakistani ports should exhibit navigational lights to avoid collision, and specified other lighting procedures listed in the special warning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This is a supplemental warning and does not in any way change special warnings 37, 38, and 39.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>12/9/71</td>
<td>12/12/72</td>
<td>Neutral ships may be subject to visit and search on the high seas or in port of either India or Pakistan. India and Pakistan institute contraband procedures. This special warning includes lists of each country’s items of contraband.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>12/8/71</td>
<td>12/12/72</td>
<td>Merchant ships in Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea will be unable to communicate with Indian ports by radio. Ships destined for Indian ports should give itinerary to closest Indian Mission, Embassy, or consulate in the country of last port of call before proceeding to India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>12/4/71</td>
<td>12/14/72</td>
<td>State of war between India and Pakistan. India has contraband procedures on supplies intended for Pakistan ports, which could help in the prosecution of war against it. Ports in East Pakistan occupied by West Pakistan have been blocked. Indian attacks on Pakistani merchant ships. Two ships heavily damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning number</td>
<td>Issued</td>
<td>Cancelled</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>7/29/71</td>
<td></td>
<td>Same warning as 35, except the wording &quot;or an derogation of the right of innocent passage for U.S. ships&quot; was added. This special warning cancels and supersedes special warning 35.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>7/20/71</td>
<td>7/29/71</td>
<td>Several recent incidents of ship detentions by Somali Government. Extreme caution to be used in waters off Somalia, which claims a 12-mile territorial sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>Quarantine established pursuant to Presidential proclamation of October 23 is terminated. This cancels special warnings 30, 31, 32, and 33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>10/27/62</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>In connection with quarantine of Oct. 23, a clearance system has been instituted &quot;clearcort&quot; to avoid unnecessary shipping delays. Applies to ships going to foreign ports and foreign ships going to Cuban ports with no offensive weapons or associated material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>10/25/62</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>In connection with October 23 quarantine, use of international submarine identification procedures will be in effect in the waters near Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>10/25/62</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>Reference special warning 20. The prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles includes propellant and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>10/24/62</td>
<td>11/20/62</td>
<td>Reactions to quarantine of offensive military equipment may make windward passage of Yucatan channel and Florida Straits dangerous. Alternate routes specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>3/1/62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Embargo effective Feb. 7, 1962; on all importation from Cuba and Treasury licenses to authorize importation of Cuban goods will not normally be issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>3/16/60</td>
<td>3/16/60</td>
<td>Cancels special warning 25 and this order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>11/3/58</td>
<td>11/3/58</td>
<td>Cancels special warning 26 and this order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>7/15/58</td>
<td>11/3/58</td>
<td>Lebanese Government requested U.S. military aid in restoring order in Lebanon. U.S. aircraft and warships will commence intensive operations to a distance of 150 miles seaward. Ships in this area should adhere closely to standard recognition procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>6/7/57</td>
<td>3/16/60</td>
<td>Cuban authorities advise navigation in Cuban waters is now under Cuban naval control from Santiago west to Dillon. All navigation there must be cleared by Commander, Naval District, Oriente, Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>10/19/55</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel announced that, as of Sept. 11, 1955, the maritime frontier of Israel is a distance of 4 miles from the coast at the low waterline along with the above airspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning number</td>
<td>Issued</td>
<td>Cancelled</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>5/10/53</td>
<td></td>
<td>Due to repeated attacks on offshore islands near the China mainland, but which belong to Taiwan, defensive mines fields have been laid in the territorial waters of such islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>12/28/54</td>
<td>12/28/54</td>
<td>Naval blockade of Korean coast suspended by Article 15 of Armistice Agreement. Cancels special warning 16 and this warning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>11/4/52</td>
<td>Cancels special warnings 8 and 17; 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 are superseded by special warning 19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>12/22/50</td>
<td>2/17/52</td>
<td>Secretary of Commerce announced that no aircraft or ship registered in the U.S. shall enter any Chinese Communist port or any other place under their control. Any cargo headed for such ports shall be returned to port of origin or to U.S. or Japanese territories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>7/4/50</td>
<td>12/28/54</td>
<td>Naval blockade of Korean coast ordered by U.S. President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>4/11/50</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Egyptian Government announces Alexandria harbor closed from sunset to sunrise. Ships entering Egyptian territorial waters during such time may be fired upon. Special warning 2 canceled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2/10/50</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Chinese Government announces that effective Mar. 12, 1950, certain special territorial waters will be closed temporarily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>12/29/49</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Chinese Government announces the mining of the approaches to the Yangtze River and Shanghai. No channel has been left free of danger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>12/17/49</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>U.S.-flag ship-Sir John Franklin was fired upon by 2 Chinese vessels while approaching Port of Shanghai. This is now rendered too an extremely hazardous area to ships. American lives and property should not be exposed to such risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>11/14/49</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Chinese Government announces that certain specified territorial waters and some specified ports will be temporarily closed effective Nov. 7, 1949.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>10/6/49</td>
<td>11/4/52</td>
<td>Special warnings 1, 2, 6, 11, and 12 remain in effect. Warnings 4, 5, 5, and 7 are canceled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6/24/49</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Chinese Government announces on June 20, 1949, that effective June 25, certain specified territorial waters will be closed temporarily and that vessel entry will be strictly forbidden; otherwise prompt action will be taken. Also 5 previously open ports are now closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5/27/49</td>
<td>8/27/49</td>
<td>Cancels special warning 3 and this message after action. Lebanese Government has canceled restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12/31/48</td>
<td>10/22/49</td>
<td>Greek Government announces 5-mile shipping limit along certain sections of the coast. Ships will be stopped and if there is resistance will be sunk. Passenger vessels on regular routes are excepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/13/48</td>
<td>10/3/52</td>
<td>Financial shots along Palestine coast may be extinguished without warning. Vessels are cautioned accordingly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/28/48</td>
<td>10/6/48</td>
<td>Reference special warning 5. The U.S. protests to prohibit the freedom of navigation of the high seas in those areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>10/6/49</td>
<td>Egyptian Government announced dangers exist for ships approaching by land or sea due to mines and blocks of obscuring smoke.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>Egyptian Government announced that effective May 16, 1948, all Egyptian waters within 5 miles from coast prohibited from sunrise to sunset. Use is prohibited unless from Try to Red Nukra.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>4/27/49</td>
<td>Egyptian Government announced that effective May 16, 1948, all Egyptian waters within 5 miles from coast prohibited from sunrise to sunset. Specific navigational instructions given as to how and in what direction to red Nukra.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>5/27/48</td>
<td>Egyptian Government announced that effective May 16, 1948, all Egyptian waters within 5 miles from coast prohibited from sunrise to sunset. Specific navigational instructions given as to how and in what direction to red Nukra.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III

#### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO ISSUANCE

#### OF SPECIAL WARNING 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time (Eastern daylight)</th>
<th>Principals involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/2/75</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>Thai fishing boats</td>
<td>Seven Thai fishing boats with 27 fishermen were seized and later released by Khmer Communists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/4/75</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>South Korean freighter</td>
<td>A South Korean freighter was fired upon by Khmer Communists but escaped capture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/7/75</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>Panamanian vessel</td>
<td>A Panamanian vessel was detained but released the following day by Khmer Communists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12/75</td>
<td>3:18 a.m.</td>
<td>Oil exploration company</td>
<td>A representative of an oil exploration company in Jakarta, Indonesia, received a mayday call from the Mayaguez stating “Have been fired upon and boarded by Cambodian armed forces at 9 degrees 43 minutes north/102 degrees 53 minutes east. Ship is being towed to unknown Cambodian port.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m.</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy, Jakarta</td>
<td>The oil exploration company's representative notified the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta after losing radio contact with the Mayaguez.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:03 a.m.</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy, Jakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Embassy in Jakarta sent an unclassified CRITIC message to the National Security Agency in Washington, D.C., informing it of the seizure of the Mayaguez.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:07 a.m.</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy, Jakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Embassy in Jakarta sent a follow-up message to the National Security Agency informing it that the exploration company's representative was still in contact with the Mayaguez. The message stated “Vessel under its own power. Following one gunboat to Sihanoukville, proceeding very slow. Ship owned by Sea Land. No casualties. Crew does not feel to be in immediate danger. Troops on board do not speak English. Crew standing by for any instructions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:12 a.m.</td>
<td>Intelligence and Research Bureau (IRB), State Department</td>
<td></td>
<td>The unclassified CRITIC message from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta was received by IRB's intelligence watch but was not passed to State's Operations Center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time (eastern daylight)</td>
<td>Principles Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:17 a.m.</td>
<td>5/12/75</td>
<td>Naval Command Support Center</td>
<td>Unclassified CRITIC message received by the duty captain from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:20 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence and Research Bureau, State Department</td>
<td>The National Security Agency called the INR Watch to call its attention to the CRITIC messages, but INR did not tell State's Operations Center about the call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:30 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Military Sealift Command, Defense</td>
<td>An officer on the staff of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) telephoned the Sealift Command duty officer and asked him if it had the Mayaguez on time charter. The duty officer replied that they did not, and provided the NMCC officer with background information on the ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:00 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations Center, State Department</td>
<td>The military representative in State's Operations Center received a telephone call from NMCC alerting him to the U.S. Embassy message. Since the INR watch had not provided copies of the messages to the Operations Center, NMCC transmitted copies to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:15 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations Center, State Department</td>
<td>Upon receipt of the copies from NMCC, the Operations Center alerted the East Asia Bureau's duty officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:15 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>East Asia Bureau, State Department</td>
<td>East Asia Bureau's duty officer telephoned the country director for Cambodia who was unable to reach his counterpart at Defense,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:15 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Military Sealift Command, Defense Department</td>
<td>Military Sealift's Command and Control Center received another telephone call from NMCC and was told that the Mayaguez had been fired on and boarded. The caller declined to provide the source of the information but said it should be taken as factual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:20 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence and Research Bureau, State Department</td>
<td>The INR watch officer briefed the Director of INR preparatory to the Secretary's 8:00 a.m. staff meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:30 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>East Asia Bureau, State Department</td>
<td>East Asia Bureau's country director for Cambodia notified one of East Asia Bureau's deputy assistant secretaries of the incident. This official, in turn, discussed the situation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and briefed the East Asia Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Principals Involved</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12/75</td>
<td>The White House</td>
<td>The President was informed of the seizure of the Mayaguez.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:00 a.m.</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Secretary of State's daily staff meeting was held.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30-9:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center (DMABC)</td>
<td>An official of the Military Sealift Command's Cargo Division telephoned a DMABC official to check whether any warning had gone out to U.S. mariners. The official replied that none had gone out and that this was his first notification of the incident. He gave the Sealift Command official telephone numbers of people to contact: those of Maritime Affairs office and Naval Operations, Ocean Affairs Branch.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Ocean Affairs Branch, Naval Operations</td>
<td>The DMABC official telephoned the Ocean Affairs Branch and said he had just received a call from the Sealift Command concerning seizure of a U.S. ship off the coast of Cambodia and asked whether a special warning would be issued. The Ocean Affairs officer said he would find out what he could and get back to him.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:15 a.m.</td>
<td>Maritime Affairs Office, State Department</td>
<td>State Department's Cambodia counter director telephoned a DMABC official at Maritime Affairs and told him of the seizure of the Mayaguez and asked him to obtain information on the vessel's cargo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Maritime Affairs Office, State Department</td>
<td>An official in Maritime Affairs talked to DMABC and was told that no warning had been issued. (The DMABC official had called Maritime Affairs at 8:10 a.m. but line was busy).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>Ocean Affairs Branch, Naval Operations</td>
<td>A Military Sealift Command official telephoned Ocean Affairs and asked whether something was going to be issued. The Sealift Command official said it planned to put something out to their ships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>DMABC</td>
<td>An Ocean Affairs officer telephoned the DMABC official and provided him with additional information on the seizure.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Principal Involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/12/75 10:00 a.m.</td>
<td>Maritime Affairs Office, State Department</td>
<td>Shortly after 10:00 a.m., an official in the Maritime Affairs office called the Ocean Affairs Branch seeking suggested language for a warning message and was referred to DMABC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:10 a.m.</td>
<td>DMABC</td>
<td>The DMABC official alerted the Naval Oceanographic Office's message center that DMABC would probably be going out with a special warning some time that day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 a.m.</td>
<td>DMABC</td>
<td>DMABC had a draft warning message ready for the noon hydrographic broadcast in the event it would have been asked to issue a HYDROPAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon</td>
<td>Maritime Affairs Office, State Department</td>
<td>A Maritime Affairs official called DMABC to obtain its thoughts on a proposed message and was given the text of the draft warning prepared by DMABC. The draft text was discussed with State's Cambodia country director, and it was decided to change the mileage limit for remaining offshore from 12 to 20 nautical miles. The Ocean Affairs Branch was requested to obtain the necessary Navy Department clearances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 noon</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the East Asia Bureau briefed the Deputy Secretary on the Mayaguez situation in preparation for the upcoming National Security Council meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 noon to 12:45 p.m.</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>National Security Council meeting to discuss Mayaguez seizure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00 p.m.</td>
<td>Ocean Affairs Branch, Naval Operations</td>
<td>An Ocean Affairs officer called Maritime Affairs and said the draft of the special warning had been cleared with the appropriate Navy offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:50 p.m.</td>
<td>The White House</td>
<td>First official public announcement of the Mayaguez seizure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early afternoon</td>
<td>Maritime Affairs Office, State Department</td>
<td>The Maritime Affairs official cleared the draft warning text with the Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea and State's Legal Adviser.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>