

IV. IF THE COMMUNISTS WIN . . .

[From the Washington Daily News, Nov. 25, 1969]

A DEFECTOR'S VIEW—"IT WOULD BE A BLOODBATH . . ."

By Don Tate

SAIGON, November 24.—A former North Vietnamese army colonel who defected after 21 years of Communist Party membership said here today a communist takeover of the south would result in a bloodbath.

He is Lt. Col. Le Xuyen Chuyen. He joined a suicide youth group in North Vietnam when he was 15, was decorated by Hanoi as a war hero, helped write the sapper manual for the North Vietnamese army and was slated for command of a division at the time of his defection.

Asked in an interview if the possibility of a bloodbath in the event of a communist takeover had not been exaggerated, Lt. Col. Chuyen said: "It could not be exaggerated. It will happen."

Wouldn't unfavorable world opinion deter it?

Lt. Col. Chuyen laughed. "Who would be around to report it? It happened in North Vietnam and nobody cared. You Americans wouldn't be here to see it. Once out, you would never come back. It would just happen. World opinion? It does not even grasp what is going on here right now."

He said, that while any American atrocity always gets a big headline, the calculated, day-to-day murder of civilians by communist terrorists is virtually ignored.

Lt. Col. Chuyen estimated some 5 million people in the south are on, what he called, the communists' "blood debt" lists. For every 100 on the lists 10 to 15 would pay with their lives, another 40 would be imprisoned and the rest would undergo "thought reform," he predicted.

Included on the lists are a million Catholic refugees who fled North Vietnam, some two million South Vietnamese troops, government officials down to the hamlet level and paramilitary groups, more than 100,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defectors, some 100,000 South Vietnamese working for the Americans and numerous elements of the "bourgeois" class.

Captured communist documents define "enemies of the people" as including "anybody who grumbles about the revolution; anybody with suspicious past activities or who acts suspiciously; individuals who display a backward ideology or dishonest concepts; exploiters [anyone benefitting from the labor of others]; tyrants [anyone working for the government]; anybody whose relatives are working for the enemy in any way; members of religions who still remain deeply superstitious," etc.

One document states what will happen when the communists take over: "Even after the Fatherland is completely liberated the fight will continue, fierce and complicated. Then the real tasks of eliminating reactionaries, informants, American henchmen, religionists, etc., will begin."

REDS BRAG OF SLAYINGS

SAIGON, November 25.—The Reds who invaded the old imperial capital of Hue during their bloody 1968 Tet offensive killed nearly 2,900 anti-communist citizens, according to captured enemy documents made public yesterday.

The Allies put the figure closer to 3,000. So far 2,737 bodies have been found in sand dunes and creek beds in and around Hue.

The Red document called the massacre a complete success and said: "Hue was the place where reactionary spirit had existed for over 10 years; it only took us a short time to drain it to its roots."

VIETNAM: IF THE COMMUNISTS WON

By P. J. Honey

(Excerpted from *Southeast Asia Perspectives*)

Professor P. J. Honey of London lived for a number of years in Vietnam, is the author of a major work on the North Vietnamese regime, "North Vietnam Today," and is widely recognized as one of the Free World's foremost scholars in the field of Vietnam studies, especially as they relate to North Vietnam.

1. Vietnamese Communism—The Formative Years

Communism in Vietnam was the achievement of a single individual, Nguyen Tat Thanh, better known to the world by the alias he later adopted, Ho Chi Minh. He learned his trade of professional revolutionary at the University of the Toilers of the East in the Soviet Union during the early days of the Stalin era, and first applied his newly acquired skills in Canton, where he worked on the staff of the Russian Consul Mikhail Borodin. To understand Ho's political philosophy and methodology, one must begin by examining his thinking at that time and the techniques he employed, for he inculcated both into his disciples by word and example.

* * * * *

At the time of Ho's arrival in Canton during 1925, a Vietnamese independence movement already existed in southern China, organized and led by the greatly respected nationalist leader Phan Boi Chau. This organization would have proved a formidable rival to Ho's intended Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association, not least because Chau's fame and prestige far overshadowed that of Ho. The latter therefore resolved to liquidate the movement together with its illustrious leader, and did so in the following way. Having arranged with the French Security Service to deliver Phan Boi Chau for a reward of one hundred thousand piastres—a very large sum indeed at that time—Ho invited Chau to a meeting in Shanghai. The unsuspecting nationalist leader, who had failed to remark that the meeting place was just inside the boundary of the French Concession,¹ went to the house and was immediately arrested by French police. Ho's ally in this plot was Phan Boi Chau's own representative in Hong Kong, Nguyen Cong Vien, who was at that time using the name Lam Duc Thu, and the two divided the reward equally. Chau was

¹ An area within Shanghai formerly administered by the French authorities under the old "unequal treaty" system.

brought back to Vietnam, tried, and sentenced to death for his revolutionary activities.²

Some of Ho's followers subsequently reported that he had given them the following reasons for his act of treachery:

- (1) Chau was too old to be of any further use to the revolution.
- (2) The upsurge of patriotism that would inevitably follow Chau's trial and condemnation, would create a favorable revolutionary climate in Vietnam.
- (3) The reward money would help to finance the training of new recruits.

The first of these reasons is an obvious attempt to minimize Ho's guilt, but the second and third reasons provide a revealing insight into the callous pragmatism that was to become the hallmark of Ho's later political activities. The ruthlessness, the total disregard for human life and suffering, were always present in Ho's actions, though he frequently disguised these characteristics behind gentle words and a benign exterior.

Ho again used Nguyen Cong Vien to subvert and destroy Phan Boi Chau's nationalist movement. It was the practice of the movement to bring young Vietnamese patriots to China for revolutionary training, and the young men selected were required to send two photographs of themselves to Nguyen Cong Vien before their departure. Those of them who, during their political and military training at Whampoa Academy,³ had shown themselves receptive to Ho's communism and had joined the Revolutionary Youth Association were returned secretly to Vietnam. The rest, who rejected communism and remained faithful to the nationalist cause, were arrested when they crossed the frontier into Vietnam by a French Security Service official, who invariably possessed a copy of the photograph they had sent to Hong Kong. Nguyen Cong Vien, when informed by Ho of the impending return of an "unsuitable" student, provided the French Consulate at Hong Kong with details of the route and a photograph, for which he received a monetary reward. The arrested nationalist students were imprisoned, so that contact between the nationalist movement in Vietnam and its organization in Canton was progressively weakened and ultimately broken altogether. Those nationalists whose suspicions were aroused by the unfailing arrest of "unsuitable" colleagues did not dare to return to Vietnam, but instead enlisted in the Kuomintang Army. . . .

These early examples of Ho Chi Minh's working methods illustrate the extent of his dedication to the accomplishment of his ultimate goal, and the extreme nature of the measures he was prepared to use. The goal he had set himself, even at that early date, was unquestionably the establishment of a Communist regime in Vietnam. Convinced that he must first bring about a bourgeois democratic revolution before proceeding to the Communist revolution, he took considerable pains to conceal his ultimate aim from all but his fellow Communists; for com-

² EDITOR'S NOTE.—The threatened execution of Phan Boi Chau produced such ominous rumblings of nationalist dissent that the French authorities, fearful of the political consequences of his martyrdom, commuted his death sentence and placed him under continuing house arrest. He died while under house arrest.

³ The military academy established by Chiang Kai-Shek in 1924 to train politically-minded officers for the Kuomintang Army.

munism would certainly have failed to attract support from those bourgeois elements essential to the realization of the first stage. Nevertheless, he remained ready at all times to destroy any non-Communist person or group, however much these might have supported him in the past, should he consider them a threat to the success of his future plans. The two classes of persons he was most concerned to eliminate were potential enemies of communism, and potential rivals who might at some future time attract to their own political movements supporters who would otherwise have accepted Ho's own leadership.

2. *The Bourgeois Democratic Revolution.*

At a later stage of his revolutionary progress, in August 1945, Ho Chi Minh was present inside North Vietnam as the leader of the Viet Minh movement he had himself created. At his disposal he had a small military force, weapons supplied by the World War II Allies, and a network of Communist Party cells throughout the country. * * *

The very great majority of Vietnamese knew little or nothing about communism or the Viet Minh. But all were perfectly well aware that the French were in prison, that colonial rule had, for the moment at least, ended, and that a Vietnamese government was once more in control in Vietnam. Popular rejoicing was nationwide. Ho and his Communist comrades, who were unquestionably masters of both the Viet Minh and the Provisional Government, were everywhere regarded as liberators and patriots. It is instructive, therefore, to observe Ho's actions on assuming power because, although the Communist Party was then smaller, less experienced, and less organized than it now is, little change has taken place in the top leadership and there is no reason to suppose that the Party's behavior pattern at that time was markedly different from what it would be today.

Firstly, the political groups which had collaborated with the Japanese in the hope that they might prevent the return of French imperial power to Indochina, the Dai Viet Party in particular, were outlawed and their leaders arrested. Simultaneously, the Viet Minh seized control of all information media, requisitioning the radio station at Bach-mai, all printing and publishing houses, and all stocks of paper. Almost at once, it published its own newspapers and took direct control of all broadcasting, thus acquiring a monopoly of news dissemination. Then the revolution commenced in earnest. The following is a description of what took place, published in the book *Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952* by Philippe Devillers, a French writer well-known for his sympathetic attitude towards the Vietnamese Communists:

In the villages and towns, (Vietnamese) notabilities and officials in their hundreds were singled out, molested, arrested, and even massacred by unrestrained groups led by agitators who were frequently unknown (locally), without provoking any reaction from the populace, itself generally terrorized but, on occasion, consenting. All the prisons, all the jails, thrown open at the same time, poured out on the country political and common law prisoners drunk with the thought of freedom and revenge . . .

People soon gave up counting the number of beatings, seizures, extortions of money, and "confiscations of goods belonging to bourgeois fascists and counterrevolutionaries," arbitrary arrests and assassinations after (or even without) a farcical trial by hastily assembled "peoples courts."

Footnote.—The Communists gave the impression of coolly executing a systematic program of eliminating those who would eventually oppose them. That is the reason why they were to execute numbers of well-known people belonging to conservative classes or simply to political parties offering an alternative to the Indochinese Communist Party. One could name, among so many others, *Pham Quynh* and *Ngo Dinh Khoi*,⁴ both arrested and executed by order of the Liberation Committee on August 23rd close to Hue . . . ; the Trotskyists leader *Ta Thu Thau*, executed in Quang-ngai while returning from Hue to Saigon; the elderly *Bui Quang Chieu* of the Constitutionalist Party; the leader of the Independence Party, *Ho Van Nga*. Others suspected of sympathy for the 'colonialists,' that is to say of 'treason' were to be imprisoned or interned and condemned, men such as *Nguyen Tien Lang*, the protégé of Governor Robin, etc.

The above extracts, it should be pointed out again, were written by a man widely known over many years for his sympathetic attitude towards the Vietnamese Communists, and who still supports their cause with the spoken and written word today. The eyewitness accounts of these events given to the present author by Vietnamese who lived through them are even more detailed and horrifying.* * *

* * * * *

A year later, in mid-1946, the communists had disposed of all the organized resistance to their regime in North Vietnam with the sole exception of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party). In July, General Giap moved his forces against these remaining opponents, and the following extract from the same book of Philippe Devillers describes the action :

After bloody clashes, its (that is, the government's) forces retook control over the towns of Vinh-yen, Viet-tri, and Phu-tho, completely clearing the Phu-tho—Tuyen-quang—Ha-giang axis. In the Cao-bang—Lang-son region they consolidated their positions. Their successes were less clear-cut in the Red River Valley; Lao-kay, on the frontier, was nevertheless occupied.

But it was in Hanoi that the great blow was struck. A succession of police raids on VNQDD centers during July 11th, 12th, and 13th led to the arrest of about 120 people, and to the seizure of arms, documents, and materials for forging money. The offices of the newspaper *Viet Nam*, principal organ of that party, at 80 Grand Buddha Street, were taken ;

⁴ The older brother of *Ngo Dinh Diem*, who later became President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam.

far from being suspended, the newspaper reappeared six days later, but under new management and under the control of the censors . . .

At the end of July, therefore, the Viet Minh Government had consolidated its strength. It had practically eliminated its rivals. It no longer faced adversaries capable, without external help, of overthrowing it.

Thereafter, the ascendancy of the Communist-controlled United National Front was unchallenged, and Ho Chi Minh was able to lead the movement into a war against the now returned French on December 19, 1946, with the approval and support of the great majority of the Vietnamese people. From then until the end of 1950, the resistance movement conducted its "anti-imperialist" struggle relatively harmoniously and with only minimal internal dissension. At the beginning of 1951, however, the Communist leadership decided the moment was opportune to shift to the "antifeudal" phase of the struggle, that is to say, to change the objective of the revolution from simple overthrow of colonial rule to the twin objectives of defeating colonialism and establishing communism. The Indochinese Communist Party, ostensibly dissolved in November 1945 lest non-Communists be dissuaded from supporting the resistance, reappeared under the changed name of Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, or Vietnamese Workers Party. A new slogan was adopted, "The antiimperialist and anti-feudal fights are of equal importance;" and communism became the overt controller of the revolutionary movement.

* * * * *

During the years 1951 and 1952, Communist Party control over every area of activity in the resistance zone was strengthened and consolidated in preparation for a campaign that might strain the Party to the utmost but which would eliminate, once and for all, the possibility of further internal challenge to the Communist regime thereafter. That was the agrarian reform campaign, an operation of some complexity for which minute and careful preparations had to be made. In February 1953, when both peasants and traders had been reduced to a state of penury and debt by the impossibly high taxes imposed on them, a campaign of terror was unleashed by order of the Communist Party Central Committee. It lasted for fifteen days, two terrible weeks in which no single person was safe from denunciation, torture, arrest, or assassination, when indiscriminate violence raged unchecked and the Party authorities made no move to intervene. After the campaign had ended, as abruptly as it had begun, by personal order of Ho Chi Minh, every citizen was aware of, and overawed by, the might of the Party. But the two weeks of terror proved to be no more than a demonstration of what the Party could do. It imbued all with the desired dread of the Party and ensured instant compliance with Party wishes, but much worse was to follow.

* * * If the objective of the Communist leaders had been simply to acquire ownership of the land in order to redistribute it more equitably, or to create agriculture cooperatives, nothing would have been easier than to promulgate a decree confiscating all land. By insisting

on the creation of "people's courts," however, whose members were themselves too terrified to do anything other than agree to pass the frightful sentences demanded of them, the Communist authorities obliged the whole people to accept responsibility for these atrocities. Moreover, lest anyone should entertain any doubts about what was being done, all executions were carried out in public and everybody was obliged to be present to witness them.

* * * * *

* * * Some idea of the scale on which the murders were carried out is apparent from the disclosure by Nguyen Manh Tuong, in his address to the National Congress of the Fatherland Front in October 1956, that the slogan used by the Communists throughout the campaign was, "It is better to kill ten innocent people than to let one enemy escape." No official figure has even been divulged by the Communist authorities of the total number killed during this orgy of butchery, and none is ever likely to be * * *

* * * * *

* * * The 1954 Geneva Accords legitimized such domination by the Communists in North Vietnam, which is why a million North Vietnamese availed themselves of the opportunity to flee to South Vietnam. Such evidence as is available suggests that the numbers of those leaving North Vietnam at that time would have been very much greater if the Communists had honored the terms they accepted at Geneva and permitted all who wished to do so to leave the country unimpeded. In the event, however, they prevented large numbers from going, which forced some of those whose intentions were frustrated to resort to such desperate measures as putting out to sea on flimsy, hastily constructed bamboo rafts. A few were picked up by passing ships, but the numbers of those who drowned or starved can never be known.

The mass exodus from North Vietnam following the Geneva Accords was a very important propaganda setback for the Vietnamese Communists, because it proved to the watching world the falsity of their claims to the support and approval of the Vietnamese people as a whole. The refugees undoubtedly cause grave offense to the Communists. If they already believed themselves in danger from the Communists in 1954, and believed it firmly enough to abandon their homes, lands, and ancestral graves, they are convinced that the danger is still greater today. That is why the North Vietnamese who have settled in South Vietnam are inflexibly opposed to a Communist military victory, a coalition government in which some portfolios are held by Communists, or the establishment of any Communist bridgehead in South Vietnam. These people have learned from bitter personal experience how a numerically tiny Communist Party can, by dint of its disciplined, organized and total ruthlessness in pursuit of its objectives, impose itself on a whole people.

4. *South Vietnam*

* * * The insurgents [Ed: Viet Cong in the early 1960's], for their part, were largely dependent on South Vietnamese assistance. Since

this was not offered voluntarily, they were obliged to take what they needed by means of armed force or terrorism. At first they employed selective terrorism, killing or abducting officials, educated persons such as teachers, and men of influence. When they wished to assassinate someone publicly, as an exemplary punishment designed to cow others into submission, they tried to select victims whom they knew to be unpopular or corrupt. As the fighting spread, however, and their needs became greater, the insurgents resorted more and more to indiscriminate violence. Hanoi recognized that this would inevitably prove counterproductive, and large numbers of captured documents bear strictures along these lines from Hanoi to commanders in South Vietnam. These criticized their political indoctrination campaign for its ineffectiveness, and pointed out that armed terrorism would antagonize the South Vietnamese people at a time when their willing cooperation was desperately needed. Other documents, sent from South Vietnam, argue that the political cause was itself too weak to motivate people; and since cooperation was essential, there was no alternative to enforcing it by terrorism. In the course of time, the brutality and cruelty of Viet Cong methods progressively antagonized the South Vietnamese * * *

5. The Tet Offensive and Its Consequences

By the end of 1967, it had become clear to the Communist leaders in Hanoi that their military strategy was disastrously wrong. If persisted in, it would lead to the early destruction of their forces fighting in South Vietnam. A change had to be made, and this took the form of massive surprise attacks on all the cities and towns of South Vietnam simultaneously. Not only would armed assaults be mounted, but every effort would be made to induce the South Vietnamese people to abandon their own government and proclaim support for the Viet Cong. Surprise would be achieved by commencing operations during a period of truce agreed to by both sides for the occasion of the lunar new year, or Tet. To assemble sufficient troop strength for the execution of such a grand offensive, known now in the West as the Tet Offensive, the Communists were obliged to denude the countryside of cadres. In the event, total surprise was achieved, but the rest of the plan went hopelessly awry. The Communists had completely misunderstood the mood of the South Vietnamese people, failed to bring about any popular uprising against the government, and were eventually driven out of all the places they had entered, suffering huge losses in the process. Had it not been for the wildly inaccurate and alarmist reporting by the foreign press corps in South Vietnam, the Tet Offensive would have been an unrelieved failure for its authors. As it was, the panic of the press correspondents was communicated to the American public, which brought irresistible pressure to bear on the President to change his policy in Vietnam. In response, President Johnson first restricted, and then ended, American bombing in North Vietnam in return for Communist agreement to participate in talks to be held in Paris. Thus, the only advantage to accrue to the Communist side from the Tet Offensive came, not from their own efforts, but from the hysteria their attacks induced in the American and other foreign correspondents. Rarely in the history of modern warfare has any nation been so ill-served by its own press.

Yet it was the Tet Offensive that finally destroyed Vietnamese Communist hopes of military victory in South Vietnam. In cities and towns throughout the nation, the brutal killing of defenseless civilians by the Communist soldiers dispelled any expectation, still nurtured by some individuals, that they might contrive to reach an acceptable accommodation with the Communist side. From that time onwards, it was clear to all that the Communists were not prepared to consider individual cases but would deal only with categories and classes, seeking to eliminate those they imagined to stand between them and their ultimate objectives. Generally speaking, the Communists failed to seize and hold for any appreciable time the targets of these attacks, but the behavior of their troops in the course of the fighting was such as to inspire abhorrence and dread in the civil population.

The one exception to the general military pattern was the Central Vietnamese city of Hue, which was occupied by the Communists for more than three weeks. * * *

* * * * *

7. Communist Views of Hue

The prevalence of famine, disease, and flood in many parts of Asia has made premature, violent death all too common a phenomenon, and engendered in the people a stoical acceptance of what cannot be avoided. The fatalism of Asians in the face of frightful disasters never fails to amaze Westerners. But despite this inbred tolerance to adversity, the systematic and unfeeling massacre of so many ordinary residents of Hue struck horror and revulsion into the people of South Vietnam. Those Hue citizens questioned by this writer professed, in addition, incomprehension; they simply did not understand how Vietnamese people could behave in so brutal a fashion to their compatriots. For them, the massacre provided incontrovertible proof that the Communist insurrection had abandoned all pretense of seeking to liberate the people of South Vietnam, and was undisguisedly attempting to establish an oppressive and intolerant Communist dictatorship. Defectors from the Communist side were not similarly puzzled, though they encountered considerable difficulty in explaining their reasons to a person who had not experienced years of regimented existence under a Communist regime, isolated from outside contacts and subjected daily to the psychological pressures of Party press and radio. Two of the most lucid former Communists interviewed by this writer were senior army officers, Colonel Tran Van Duc, who defected to the government side in April 1968, and Colonel Nguyen Thanh, who defected in May 1970. Neither had participated in the events at Hue, but both had taken part in the attack on Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Being military men, they could tell only of their own state of mind conditioned by their experiences as Communist soldiers serving in South Vietnam.

* * * * *

The colonels both accepted that their behavior during the years of military service appeared horrific in retrospect, that they had been living in an unreal, nightmare atmosphere created by the Party; but

both strongly affirmed that they had remained unaware that this was so. Both men also stated that if they had massacred civilians, even needlessly, they would not have been punished by their superiors. Should the bloodshed subsequently be judged unnecessary, or even damaging to the Communist cause, they would have had to confess that their judgment had been faulty, and promise to make efforts to improve their understanding; but they would have received no punishment. If, on the other hand, they had avoided a massacre of civilians for humanitarian reasons and thereby failed to accomplish their mission, they would equally certainly have been denounced for "sentimentality," for "lacking a solid political base," and for indiscipline, and they would have risked serious punishment.

* * * * *

* * * All the defectors—they included men such as Dr. Pham Thanh Tai, a former Professor of Political Science at Hanoi University; Vo Thank Tong, a specialist in banking; Captain Le Phat Nguyen, who earlier worked in the General Staff Headquarters in Hanoi; Vo Ngoc Co, an intelligence agent; and so on—cited precedents and official Communist statements to support their unanimous conclusion that a massacre would be inevitable. Members of successive South Vietnamese governments, civil servants, military officers, policemen, religious figures, intellectuals, politicians, and professional men would be among the first to be killed. All political parties would be destroyed, and the office holders in them executed. Nor was there any disagreement over the elimination of the refugees who had fled from North Vietnam or of defectors from the Communist forces including, of course, the speakers themselves. Disagreement did arise over the fate of the bourgeois classes—the businessmen, landowners, shopkeepers, and so on. While it was generally agreed that all would be arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, not everybody agreed that all would necessarily be killed immediately. Some of the speakers pay continuous attention to consolidating the repressive apparatus of the people's democratic state, the people's army, the people's police, the people's control institute, the people's tribunal, and so forth." The same radio station, broadcasting on March 21, 1968, said: "All citizens are bound to take an active part in denouncing counterrevolutionary elements, in providing dictatorial organs with evidence and documents, in supervising punishment . . . of counterrevolutionary elements." North Vietnamese press and radio have referred to all in South Vietnam who have opposed the Communist insurrection as "hooligans," "lackeys," "exploiters," "counterrevolutionaries," and the like, and have repeatedly mentioned the "blood debts" such persons have incurred. Solemn promises are constantly made that full payment of those debts will be exacted. Historical precedent and recent example make it impossible to doubt that the Communist leaders intend to keep their word.

8. Conclusion

Should the Vietnamese Communists win undisputed control of South Vietnam, either by military victory or through a "coalition government" in the fashion of some countries of eastern Europe, they will act exactly as they have done in the past. They will seize control

of all South Vietnamese information media and use them for their own purposes. They will expel the foreign press corps and all other foreigners, and will then close the frontiers of the State. Once all non-Vietnamese witnesses have been removed, they will proceed to exact payment of the "blood debts." In a deliberately created atmosphere of terror, they will establish thousands of *ad hoc* "people's courts," before which will be arraigned all those individuals and groups the Party has decided to eliminate. Those unfortunates will be accused of "crimes" which have no existence in civilized societies. They will face charges of being "counterrevolutionaries," "enemies of the people," "exploiters of the people," and a host of similar meaningless things, and they will be found guilty by jurors too terrified to do anything but obey the orders of Party cadres. All believed to pose a threat, real or potential, to the Communist regime will be killed at once, and some of the remainder may be permitted to postpone execution as long as they continue to work as unpaid slave laborers. Calculated on the basis of past Communist deeds, and given the size of South Vietnam's population, the minimum number of those to be butchered will exceed one million and could rise to several times that figure. While the massacre is in progress, the outside world will know nothing of it, for foreigners will have been expelled and no mention will be made by the Communist information media. Because the battles will be over and the big guns will have ceased to fire, peace will be said to have returned once more to Vietnam.

APPENDIX

VIETCONG AGENCY PLANS LIQUIDATION OF NATIONALIST PARTY MEMBERS

United States Mission in Vietnam, Press Release, June 17, 1968

Communist instructions on eliminating members of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (*Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*) are given in a captured document released today. The document, dated March 29, 1968, is a secret directive by a Viet Cong unit identified as "Agency T. 775".

It reveals that the agency has been ordered "to place more emphasis on the extermination of Nationalist [Party] ringleaders and the disintegration, from top to bottom, of their organizations."

"The destruction of Nationalist Party reactionaries is not a one-shot affair," the directive says. "It is a continuous process. We must destroy them by every means available or capture them alive when we can for exploitation purposes. . . . We must do this in such a way that by June 1968 the Nationalist Party committee members at district and village levels will be frightened into abandoning their activities, their offices and their Party. By July 1968, the Nationalist Party organization at provincial level will be unable to activate their members, and will become paralyzed."

An element of the U.S. Americal Division captured the document in Quang Ngai Province. Nationalist Party members have been active in that province and in Government of Viet-Nam armed forces there.

Agency T. 775 claims that during the recent "general offensive and uprising" it killed 96 "wicked tyrants", captured 148 others and disintegrated many rural pacification teams. In addition, it says, "90 Nationalist Party members fled to other provinces, abandoning their party positions."

Calling for an increase in the activities against the party, the agency specifies these missions to be carried out in areas, towns and cities controlled by the Government of Viet-Nam:

Carefully investigate the offices of the Nationalist Party at district, province, town and village levels.

Get an accurate estimate of its [Nationalist Party] strength.

Make appropriate plans so that suicide units are able to suppress the [Nationalist Party] ringleaders, the wicked tyrants who owe many blood debts to the people, right in their dens.

Strive to liquidate, as soon as possible, isolated Nationalist Party elements who are living in various cities and towns and who are oppressing the people.

Make all efforts to obtain documents on the organization of the Nationalist Party.

The agency says it will not sentence to death Nationalist Party members who "have shown their regrets by sending letters to us expressing their intention to surrender and atone for their faults." It calls for the re-indoctrination of those not deemed dangerous elements. [The full text of the directive follows:]

Agency T. 775
Tran Quoc Tuan
No. 121/PI
AH-a39/sic/

DIRECTIVE (SECRET)

On the Strong Repression of Nationalist Party [Quoc Dan Dang] Members

The anti-revolutionaries have become confused and panic-stricken because of our ever greater exploits scored during the recent General Offensive and Uprising. We killed 96 wicked tyrants, captured 148 who owed blood debts to the people, and destroyed and disintegrated many rural pacification teams.

The reactionary Nationalist Party clique was also dealt a crushing blow. Specifically in their infra-structure, 90 National Party members fled to other provinces, abandoning their Party and positions.

The violent, armed uprising of the people is a force for the repression of the anti-revolutionaries.

However, due to their obdurate nature and their consciousness as belonging to an exploiting class definitely opposed to the revolution, the Nationalist Party members, before their hour of death, are plotting with the tyrants, the puppet administration and army and rural pacification teams to harass both new and old liberated areas by means of military, political, psychological warfare and espionage activities, sowing confusion and disturbing order and security.

Supported by the Americans, the armed Nationalist Party clique [i.e., QDD members in various armed organizations of the GVN.—Ed.] harbored the illusion of reoccupying neighboring areas of cities and towns [that have come under our control]. Therefore, in order to safeguard the Revolution; to continuously expand the liberated areas close to [GVN] towns and cities; and to pave the way for the achievement of the final victory, we must strongly and constantly repress and deal heavy blows to the counter-revolutionaries, especially the Nationalist Party clique.

T. 771 [Agency] ordered T. 775 [Agency] to place more emphasis on the extermination of Nationalist [Party] ringleaders and the disintegration, from top to bottom, of their various organizations. However, those who were misled should be tolerated.

For the sake of the progress of the Revolution, we must firmly grasp the meaning of absolution with regard to the enemy, the counter-revolutionaries and especially the Nationalist Party clique.

To face the current situation, T. 775 proposes the following measures to be taken by local authorities:

A. In the enemy controlled areas, towns and cities:

—Carefully investigate the offices of the Nationalist Party at district, province, town and village levels.

—Get an accurate estimate of its [Nationalist Party] strength

—Make appropriate plans so that suicide units are able to suppress the [Nationalist] ringleaders, the wicked tyrants who owe many blood debts to the people, right in their dens.

—Strive to liquidate, as soon as possible, isolated Nationalist Party elements who are living in various cities and towns and who are oppressing the people.

—Make all efforts to obtain documents on the organization of the Nationalist Party.

Targets for elimination are members of the [Nationalist] Party committees at province and district levels, the senior party members and the secretaries of village party committees. As for the wicked members of the village party committees, if they continue to sabotage the Revolution after they have been indoctrinated and warned several times, they should also be eliminated.

Those who are subject to elimination but have shown their regrets by sending letters to us expressing their intention to surrender and atone for their faults will be pardoned and have their lives saved.

As for the Nationalist Party members who belong to the poor and middle peasants class and who have recently joined the Nationalist Party because they had been misled or bought off, who now repent and quit their organizations, concerning these people, our general policy is tolerance and application of on-the-spot re-education.

The armed organizations of the Nationalist Party, such as the special action units and reconnaissance units, must be eliminated.

The destruction of Nationalist Party reactionaries is not a one-shot affair. It is a continuous process. We must destroy them by every means available or capture them alive when we can for exploitation purposes. We must utilize and provide guidance to several kinds of forces which we will use in destroying [the Nationalist Party members] such as armed intelligence units, special action units, special forces units, secret guerrillas, our infrastructure agents and the population bearing acute grudges against the [Nationalist Party members.] We must do this in such a way that by June 1968 the Nationalist Party committee members at district and village levels will be frightened into abandoning their activities, their offices and their Party. By June 1968, the Nationalist Party organizations at provincial level will be unable to activate their members, and will become paralyzed.

B. In the newly-liberated areas after the General Attack and General Uprising:

We must seek out and arrest all Nationalist Party members. Those from [Nationalist Party] chapter committee member level and up are to be handled by our district [party] authorities for exploitation purposes, those from [Nationalist Party] chapter committee chairman level and up are to be handled by our province [party] authorities.

Efforts should be made to *discover and destroy all Nationalist Party* secret organizations to insure that they will not harm us later.

Investigations should be made to obtain a complete roster of local Nationalist Party members. Divide them into two groups: the first including those who stayed in the liberated areas and the second including those who succeeded in fleeing. Greatest efforts should be made to capture those who are dangerous [to us]; those who deceitfully surrendered to us; those who were planted in friendly areas with the mission of harassing us; and those who were formerly special action team members, reconnaissance agents, policemen, or public security agents, etc. All Nationalist Party members who are considered as having joined the party by mistake should be indoctrinated immediately. We must have them work for the village to denounce their past activities. After it is found that they are innocent, we may leave them in local areas for further indoctrination under the guarantee of their families.

Publicize the crimes committed by the reactionary Nationalist Party clique, so that the people will realize that they [Nationalist Party members] are only the henchmen of the imperialists and they [the people] should take precautions against their [Nationalist Party members'] perfidious plots.

—Maintain security.

—Motivate the struggle of the masses against the enemy and *repress* the anti-revolutionaries.

—Bring the movement into full force and create enthusiasm among the people.

—Expand and consolidate the liberated areas.

—The nearer the victory, the more fierce the struggle against anti-revolutionaries; and *this struggle must be violent, continuous, persistent and directed*, mainly, against the reactionary Nationalist Party clique.

Upon receipt of this directive, A.H.'s of A's [sic] are required to study it carefully; formulate specific plans; and forward them to the Standing Committee of A [sic] for consideration. Proper implementation of this directive is also required. Results and difficulties in the execution of this directive should be regularly reported to T. 775.

Date: 29 March 1968

T. 775

/s/ NHAM

2. THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Report by Truong Chinh, No. 2 man in the Politburo of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party of North Vietnam—Broadcast by Hanoi Radio September 18, 1969.)

Concerning dictatorship; it has been made clear that the dictatorship of the laboring people's majority will be realized, as opposed to counterrevolutionaries and exploiters who are in the minority and who refuse to convert themselves. Establishment of dictatorship aims toward the gradual abolition of classes, realization of a classless society—that is, communism—and self-destruction of the bourgeois dictatorial state. Under the socialist democratic regime, enemies of the people and of socialism are not allowed to enjoy democratic rights.

The proletarian dictatorial state determinedly prevents the use of slogans of democratization of the regime in order to weaken or abolish the proletarian dictatorship, belittle or deny the revolutionary leadership of the working class and of the Communist Party, or achieve step-by-step the "peace evolution" strategy and push the country to proceed gradually toward a liberal bourgeois system and eventually return to capitalism. At the same time, it is imperative to struggle against all manifestations of the national bourgeoisie, the enemy of proletarian internationalism which isolates and pushes the country into the arms of world capitalism.

On the other hand, it is necessary to struggle against officialdom and commandism, the system of family organization under one head of the family, and a personal cult, because they, too, are against the spirit of socialist democracy and cause serious consequences to the state. More often than not, they are used by the reactionaries as a weapon against the revolution. Our party has asserted that our people's democratic dictatorship does not mean the end of the class struggle, but continuation of the class struggle under a new form with new measures when the working class has assumed power.

To carry out this struggle, the working class must continuously strengthen its leadership on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, the highest principle of proletarian dictatorship. At the same time, the working class must unite with other classes. Therefore, our people's democratic dictatorship must rely mainly on the worker-peasant alliance and, simultaneously, on the national unified front.

It is absolutely necessary for the people's democratic dictatorship to use violence against counterrevolutionaries and exploiters who refuse to submit to reform. Therefore, we must pay continuous attention to consolidating the repressive apparatus of the people's democratic state, the people's army, the people's police, the people's control institute, the people's tribunal, and so forth. At the same time, we must continuously take care to develop democracy for the people, to insure the people's right to collective ownership, to build and ceaselessly strengthen and improve the socialists (system) and to see that civilian organs fulfill their role as the highest powerful organs of the state at all levels.

REFERENCE MATERIAL ON COERCION AND TERROR IN COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM

1. P. J. Honey, Editor

North Vietnam Today—Profile of a Communist Satellite; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1962.

Introduction by P. J. Honey. pp. 8-13: A brief summary of the efforts of the Communist regime in North Vietnam to consolidate its control over all segments of the population by methods of persuasion and coercion from 1955 to 1960.

"*Intellectuals, Writers and Artists*" by Nhu Phong. pp. 80-87: A description of the unsuccessful efforts of the North Vietnamese intellectuals to maintain their freedom of expression during the fifties and the methods used by the Communist regime to coerce them into a uniformity of thought.

"*Economy of North Vietnam*" by William Kaye, pp. 107-108: The author provides a short outline of the programs of agrarian reform and the socialization of agriculture in North Vietnam during the fifties and the methods of terror employed by the regime to force the unwilling peasants into accepting the system.

2. Hoang Van Chi

From Colonialism to Communism, A Case History of North Vietnam; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1964.

Chapter 7, pp. 90-100: A description of the "first wave of terror" which the Communist Viet Minh launched in February 1958 to exact support from the population and to eliminate any opposition in the areas which they controlled.

Chapter 12, pp. 139-159: Description of the Communist methods of indoctrination developed during the period 1953-1955 in preparing the population for the later campaigns to "liquidate" certain broad classes of peasants during the land reform.

Chapters 13-15, pp. 163-208: Explains in detail the 1954-1956 land reform campaign describing the coercive methods used by the regime to force certain segments of the rural population to denounce and to kill large numbers of other peasants. Makes very clear that the entire rural population, both rich and poor, suffered extensively during this campaign of terror.

Chapter 16, pp. 209-220: Explanation of the Communist regime's attempt to soft-pedal some of their harsher methods after the completion of land reform in 1956. Contains statements by important Communist leaders admitting the details of the regime's terroristic campaign in the country.

Chapter 17, pp. 221-239: Briefly describes peasant revolts which occurred during 1956-1958 in protest against Communist land reform and the North Vietnamese army's major moves to crush these rebel-

lions. Also outlines the regime's efforts to bring the North Vietnamese intellectuals to heel during 1956-1958.

3. *Joseph Buttinger*

Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled; Frederick A. Praeger; 1967.

Vol. II. p.p. 911-916: Short description of the trials, assassinations and imprisonments which took place during the land reform program of 1954-1956. Also includes a description of the Nghe An peasant rebellion in 1956 and of the measures used by the Communist regime to suppress it.

4. *Bernard B. Fall*

The Two Vietnams, A Political and Military Analysis; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1967, 2nd Revised Ed.

Chapter 8 "The Garrison State"; Chapter 9 "Road to Socialism"; A description of the consolidation of the Hanoi dictatorship and of the excesses employed by the Communist cadres in the implementation of the land reform program. Includes statistics on the number of persons killed and imprisoned.

5. *Bernard B. Fall*

The Viet Minh Regime; Institute of Pacific Relations, Revised 2nd Edition, 1956.

An extensive description of the Viet Minh's systematic liquidation of the nationalist partners in the coalition experiment of 1945-1946 and of the Hanoi regime's consolidation of a Stalinist dictatorship.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: For the most part, the excerpts incorporated in this study have dealt with the human cost of communism in the most basic sense—that is, its cost in terms of human lives destroyed. But the human cost of communism does not stop there. Its draconian rule involves a further, unquantifiable cost—in liberties destroyed, human creativity blighted, lives foreshortened by long terms at forced labor, and the agonizing fear of constant surveillance by the secret police.

[The following two appendixes are incorporated in this study because they help to bring to life the merciless and capricious nature of the Communist dictatorship. Item No. 1—a public order promulgated by President Ho Chi Minh on March 21, 1968—established a long list of “crimes” that could be punished by life imprisonment or capital punishment.

[How this law was implemented is established by item No. 2, which deals with the trial of a group of young musicians accused of making counter-revolutionary propaganda by playing pop or “golden” music. The leader of the group was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and the other members of the group received sentences ranging from 12 to 4 years.]

THE HANOI DICTATORSHIP

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON INSURGENCY PUBLISHED

HANOI.—The Hanoi press today made public an order of the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam promulgating the decree on punishment for counterrevolutionary crimes.

The decree stipulates that counterrevolutionary crimes are crimes of opposing the fatherland, opposing the people's democratic power, sabotaging socialist transformation and construction, undermining national defense, and undermining the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation which is aimed at defending the north, liberating the south, and reunifying the country.

The decree lists the following 15 counterrevolutionary crimes:

1. The crime of treason to the fatherland;
2. The crime of plotting to overthrow the people's democratic power;
3. The crime of espionage;
4. The crime of intruding into the territory and harming the security of the DRV;
5. The crime of armed rebellion to oppose or undermine the people's democratic power and the people's armed forces;
6. The crime of banditry in remote or coastal areas, for counter-revolutionary purposes;
7. The crime of defecting to the enemy or fleeing to foreign countries, for counterrevolutionary purposes;

8. The crime of murdering, beating, injuring, or kidnaping other people or threatening to kill them for counterrevolutionary purposes;

9. The crime of sabotage of all kinds, for counterrevolutionary purposes;

10. The crime of undermining the solidarity bloc of the Vietnamese people;

11. The crime of opposing or sabotaging the carrying out of state policies and laws, for counterrevolutionary purposes;

12. The crime of disrupting public order and security, for counterrevolutionary purposes;

13. The crime of making counterrevolutionary propaganda;

14. The crime of attacking jails, kidnaping prisoners, organizing escapes from jails or evading imprisonments, for counterrevolutionary purposes; and

15. The crime of harboring counterrevolutionary elements.

Those guilty of the above-mentioned crimes are liable to prison terms ranging from 2 years to life imprisonment and capital punishment.

"GOLDEN" MUSIC AND "RADICAL CRACKDOWNS" IN HANOI

COURT SENTENCES POP MUSIC GROUP FOR PLAYING 'GOLDEN MUSIC'—
"PHAN THANG TOAN AND HIS GANG HAVE BEEN SENTENCED"

Hanoi VNA International Service (in English), March 21, 1968

From 6-8 January 1971 the Hanoi Municipal People's Court heard the case against Phan Thang Toan, Nguyen Van Duc, Nguyen Van Loc, Ha Trung Tan, Tran Van Thanh, Ly Long Hoa, Pham Van Ngo, and Le Van Thung, who were accused of disseminating depraved imperialist culture and counterrevolutionary propaganda and of opposing state policies and laws.

During the temporary occupation of Hanoi by the French aggressors, Phan Thanh Toan, now 37 years old, was a puppet soldier and assigned to the cryptographic section of the enemy's central military research agency. Toan confessed that, after staying behind in the north, he did not like our regime, approved of the reactionary views of the "Nhan Dan-Giai Pham" clique and continually dreamed of a "free" and dissolute life like that in the United States and Saigon.

Toan gathered a number of bad elements, such as Nguyen Van Duc, Nguyen Van Loc (a driver for the Hanoi merchandise company who was convicted of stealing gasoline and fired), Ha Trung Tan (unemployed), Tran Van Thanh (a mechanic who left work to be a cowboy), Pham Van Ngo (a fitter who left work to be a cowboy), and Ly Long Hoa, and formed them into a band to play golden music (nhac vang). When they performed for money at wedding and engagement parties, they sought ways to sneak in some golden music in order to popularize it and to feel out the tastes of the youths. They shared responsibility in obtaining smuggled golden music records, searching for and collecting old golden music, and writing down the

words of psywar music from the U.S. and Saigon stations. They taught each other these songs. They industriously copied the manner in which the songs were sung—heart-rending, provocative, and romantic—in order to spread them and seduce youths. They gave each other such flattering names as “Number 1 Singer” or “Number 1 Guitarist.”

With such tricks, this clique enticed a certain number of young boys and girls who loved music but who were artistically immature and caused them to follow their clique. They held frequent musical parties in places decorated to look “mysterious,” which reflected the flattering words they used and the stories they told each other about the dissolute, degrading, and orgy-filled life of the capitalist class. They encouraged and induced young boys and girls to live a depraved life. Those youths who had been poisoned by this mode of living became lazy, left their jobs, their schools, and their families to follow the band. They did not take advice from their families, schools, firms or agencies, or their friends. Toan and his gang would inject the poison of discontent in them—which is, the philosophy of an American-style “free” life, the reactionary philosophy of “art for art’s sake.” Then they slandered our society, saying that there was no freedom and that in our society there was no room for artists to flourish. They seduced our youths with strange, fantastic, remote, and abstract dreams of a completely reactionary content. And finally they induced youths dreaming of an American or a Saigon life-style to oppose our regime and to avoid the labor task and military obligation.

These criminal acts and tricks are dangerous and perfidious. They are obviously reactionary and directly affect the promising youth of our country. A number of young boys and girls have been under the effect of this poisonous, degraded culture and have indulged in this dissolute, depraved and orgy-like way of life. A number of others, who had had jobs or who had been attending school, have left work and school to lead a depraved, cowboy life and have ultimately committed hooliganism, theft, rape or “blackmail” or have engaged in counter-revolutionary propaganda.

This clique’s misdeeds have affected the movement to maintain order and security, impaired the implementation of a number of state policies, especially labor production and military obligation policies, seriously harmed the well-being and dignity of women and the morals and way of life of many people, and have spread distorted propaganda opposing socialism at a time when the entire country is fighting against the U.S. aggressors.

Toan and his gang’s misdeeds could not escape the people’s notice. Toan on several occasions had been summoned to the security agency and warned and advised. However, he stubbornly maintained his bad habits.

Because of the seriousness of the above case, the court sentenced Toan to 15 years imprisonment and the forfeiture of his citizenship rights for 5 years after his release; Nguyen Van Duc to 12 years imprisonment and to the forfeiture of his citizenship rights for 4 years following his release; Ha Trung Tan to 8 years imprisonment and to the forfeiture of his citizenship rights for 4 years following his re-

lease; Ly Long Hoa, to 6 years imprisonment and to the forfeiture of his citizenship rights for 3 years following his release; Tran Van Thanh to 5 years imprisonment and to the forfeiture of his rights of citizenship for 3 years following his release; Pham Van Ngo to 4 years imprisonment; and Le Van Trung to 18 months imprisonment.

The court also declared that all evidence be confiscated and that the depraved, reactionary cultural works of the defendants and those other depraved works related to this case be destroyed.

Because of this reactionary political case, parents, schoolteachers, youth and women's groups and comrades at all levels of the state administration must realize that greater attention should be given to the education of teenagers in order to severely criticize and curb in time those teenagers who like to form gangs, who prefer play to work, miss school, leave their jobs and their families, and who are fond of eccentric styles of dress and commit acts of hooliganism. Patience will be needed in educating them, but determination and radical crackdowns on bad elements who continue to poison youth will also be required.

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization in this index.)

A

	Page
Ackland, Len E.....	34, 35, 38
AFL-CIO	73, 76
Agency T. 775.....	113, 114, 116
Agrarian reform.....	7, 40
Agricultural and trade taxes.....	14
AID	76
American atrocities.....	69
American bombing.....	100
American Friends of Vietnam.....	10
An Chau.....	97
An Giang.....	97
An Phuoc.....	79
An Thanh.....	81
Armed reconnaissance units.....	55
ARVN	51, 58
Asia	110
Asia Publishing House.....	40
Au Van Hoa.....	96
August (1945) revolution.....	5-7

B

Ba Xuyen Province.....	79
Bac-Ninh	22
Bach-mat	105
Bai Dau	90
Bandung	24
Bao Bai.....	11
Baren River.....	69
Battle of Hue.....	89, 92
Bauer, William E.....	41
Ben Tre Province.....	53
Berla	30
Berlin	30
Bien Hoa.....	97
Bin Tuy Province.....	79
Binh	14
Binh An village.....	79
Binh Dinh.....	80
Binh Dinh Province.....	56
Binh Duc.....	81
Binh Duong Province.....	81
Binh Hoa.....	80
Binh Long.....	81
Binh Trieu.....	80
Binh Tuong Province.....	79
Binh Xuyen.....	12, 18
Bolshevik revolution.....	4

	Page
Borodin, Mikhail	108
Bromke, Adam	41
Brotherhood of Asian Trade Unions (BATU)	72
Brussels	30
Buddhist monk	18
Bui Quang Chieu	11, 106
Bui Quang San	79
Burchett, Wilfred	39
Buttinger, Joseph	10, 11, 35, 119

O

Cai Doi ("new life" helmet)	80
Cai Lay	82
Cambodia	9
Can Lao	59
Can Tho	81
Canton	108, 104
Cao Bang	16, 106
Cao Dai	13, 88
Catholic bishop	18
Catholic refugees	101
Catholics	24
Central Africa	87
Central Intelligence Organization	48
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN)	46, 48, 57
Fourth Congress of	80
Security Section	49
Chau Doc Province	80
Chesneaux, Jean	11
Chiang Kai-shek	18, 104
"Chieu Hoi" (open arms)	48
China	1, 4, 7, 15, 26, 103, 104
Chinese Communist armies	2
Cho Thong	90
Cholon (Cholan)	76, 81
Christian Century, The (publication)	34, 83, 43
Chuong Thien	80
Civil Health Service	54
Clifford, Clark	34, 88
Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC)	46
Committee of Liberation	11
Communist	1-3, 6-14, 24, 26, 34-46, 50, 52, 59-62, 70, 73, 77, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 107-112, 118, 119
Communist China	98
Communist Party	2, 72, 101, 107, 108, 117
Central Committee	36, 107
Indochinese	106, 107
North Vietnam, 10th Congress	19
Soviet Union, 20th Congress	4, 21, 30
Communist Provincial Committee at Bien Hoa	42
"Communist State and the West, The"	41
"Conflict in the Far East, The"	41
Confucianist	18
Congressional Record	71
Conquest, Robert	1, 4
Constitution (North Vietnam)	81
Constitutionalist Party	11, 106
CUP (combined unit pacification)	69, 70
Current Affairs Committee	48
CVT. (See Vietnamese Confederation of Labor.)	
Czechoslovakia	80

III

D

	Page
Da Mai Creek.....	92
Da Nang (Danang).....	69, 77, 81, 82, 98
Dai Loc.....	82
Dai Viet.....	12, 48, 59, 88
Dai Viet Party.....	105
Dak Son (village).....	3, 8, 66-68, 80, 97, 98
Dalat Province.....	79
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam.....	107
Dang Van Huong.....	16
Dang Van Viet, Col.....	10
Declaration of Independence (North Vietnam).....	81
Democratic Lawyers, International Association of.....	30, 87
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, DRVN).....	23, 25, 35-37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 120
Provisional Government of.....	5
Devillers, Philippe.....	105, 106
Diem.....	35, 36, 38, 71, 72
Dien Bien Phu.....	18
Dinh Tuong.....	81, 82
District National Police Service.....	49
Djakarta.....	17
"Documents Relating to the British Involvement in the Indochina Conflict, 1945-65" (paper).....	43
Dong Gi.....	90
DRV, DRVN. (See Democratic Republic of Vietnam.)	
Duc Duc.....	3, 77
Duc Pho District.....	60
Due Hanh.....	79

E

Eastland, Senator James O.....	1
"Economy of North Vietnam" (book).....	118
Europe.....	111

F

Fall, Bernard.....	6, 7, 10, 23, 35, 36, 47, 119
Fatherland front.....	28, 82
National Congress of.....	26, 108
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi.....	6
France.....	23
Free trade union movement.....	71
In South Vietnam, list of CVT cadre who have lost their lives.....	74, 75
French consulate, Hong Kong.....	104
French liaison mission.....	38, 39
French protectorate.....	18
French Security Service.....	5, 103, 104
Friedman, Max.....	10
"From Colonialism to Communism" (book).....	10, 13, 36, 118
Front for the liberation of the south.....	42

G

Geer, Cpl. Stephen.....	70
General offensive.....	52, 53, 55-57, 60, 114
General uprising.....	52, 60, 61, 114, 115
Geneva.....	97, 108
Geneva accords.....	108
Geneva agreement.....	7, 18, 34, 36-42
Geneva armistice, 1954.....	35
Geneva Conference on Indochina, 1954.....	48
Gia Dinh.....	73, 76, 79, 82
Gia Hoi High School.....	90
Giap, General.....	106

IV

	Page
Government of Vietnam (GVN)-----	7, 35, 38, 39, 41-43, 46-62, 113, 114
"Great Terror, The" (book)-----	4
GVN. (See Government of Vietnam.)	

H

Ha Trung Tan-----	121, 122
Ha Van Lau, Col-----	43
Ha-giang-----	106
Haiphong-----	28
Hanoi 5, 6, 12, 24, 26, 28, 29, 39-43, 47, 48, 69, 72, 94, 101, 106, 109, 111, 119, 121	121
Hanoi Radio-----	9, 78
Hanoi University-----	19, 111
Heath, D. C., & Co.-----	45
Hendleton, Sgt. Billy-----	71
"Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952" (book)-----	105
Hitler-----	94
Ho Chi Minh-----	8-7, 12, 14, 17, 21, 23-25, 33, 36, 37, 94, 103-105, 107, 120
Ho Nai village-----	96
Ho Van Nga-----	106
Ho Viet Thang-----	19, 81, 82
Hoa Hao-----	12, 13, 88
Hoa Phat-----	99
Hoang Thuy Nam, Col-----	42, 43
Hoang Van Chi-----	7, 10, 13, 26, 36, 118
Hoc Tap (newspaper)-----	5, 22
Hoi An Province-----	81
Honey, Prof. P. J.-----	2, 3, 10, 103
Hong Kong-----	103, 104
Hosmer, Stephen T.-----	2, 7, 9, 10, 45
House of Commons (British)-----	43
House of Representatives-----	79
Hue 2, 8, 9, 11, 54, 57, 61, 78, 81, 83, 89, 92-94, 102, 106, 110	110
Hue massacre-----	2, 3, 90, 95
Hue University Medical School-----	79
"Human Cost of Soviet Communism, The" (publication)-----	1
"Human Cost of Communism in China, The" (publication)-----	1
Hundred flowers-----	26
Hungary-----	24, 30
Huong Thuy district-----	90
Huynh Huu Be-----	64
Huynh Phu So-----	12, 13

I

Independence Party-----	106
Indochina-----	1, 2, 9, 18, 105
Indochina war-----	13
Indo-Chinese Democratic Front-----	5
Information Service-----	49
Institute of Pacific Relations-----	119
"Intellectuals, Writers and Artists" (book)-----	118
International Control Commission (ICC)-----	24, 34, 35, 37-44, 61, 78, 96
Eleventh Interim Report-----	35, 42
First Interim Report-----	38
Tenth Interim Report-----	35, 42
Interzone IV-----	24

J

Johnson, President-----	109
-------------------------	-----

V

K

	Page
Kahn, Prof. George McT.....	35, 38
Kaiser, Robert G.....	83
Kaye, William.....	118
Khanh Hoa.....	80
Khrushchev.....	4, 21
Kien Hoa Province.....	82
Kieng Tuong Province.....	80
Kim Nam.....	80
Kon Bobanh.....	98
Kon Sitiu.....	98
Kontum Province.....	98
Kuomintang Army.....	104
Kuomintang China.....	18

L

Lam Van Sang.....	64
Lam Duc Thu.....	103
Land reform.....	17, 19-22, 26-38, 59, 63
Lang Son.....	16, 106
Lao-Dong Party.....	23, 27-29, 31-33
Central Committee.....	33
Third People's Congress.....	31
Laos.....	9
Le Phat Nguyen, Capt.....	111
Le Son.....	80
Le Van Thieu.....	97
Le Van Thung.....	121, 123
Le Van Vien.....	12
Le Xa Dong.....	90
Le Xa Tay.....	90
Le Xuan Chuyen, Col.....	2, 101
Le Yhanh Khol.....	11
Lenin, V. I.....	3-6
Leningrad Party.....	3, 4
Leninist.....	4
Liberation Committee.....	106
Liberation Press Agency.....	78, 80
Lien Viet Front.....	5
Life (magazine).....	84
Lin Piao purge.....	2
Lives lost, GVT cadre, in South Vietnam for free trade union movement.....	74, 75
Luu Quan.....	70, 71
Luu Sau.....	70
Ly Long Hoa.....	121, 123
Ly Yen.....	80
Lycee Albert Sarraut.....	26

M

McGee, Senator Gale.....	71
MACV.....	51
Mao Tse-tung.....	3, 4, 26, 95
Marxism-Leninism.....	17
Mekong Delta.....	81, 97
Military region headquarters.....	46
Military Security Service.....	48
Miller, Lt. Thomas.....	69
Minister of Agriculture.....	24
Ministry of Justice.....	31
Ministry of Public Security.....	48
Montagnard.....	8, 66-68, 80, 97, 98

	Page
Montpellier, France-----	26
Moscow-----	4, 21
Murti, Dr. B. S. N.-----	40
My Lai (Mylai)-----	7, 69
My Tho-----	81, 82

N

Nam-Dinh-----	22
Nam Hoa district-----	90
Nam Thanh-----	80
National Assembly-----	6, 12, 32, 71, 72, 79
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)-----	6,
	48, 78, 79, 80, 87
National Government-----	87, 88
National Police-----	48, 58, 62
Nationalist party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, VNQDD)-----	12,
	48, 59, 60, 79, 88, 106, 113-116
New class-----	28
Newsweek (magazine)-----	64
New York Times (newspaper)-----	34, 35, 68
Nghe An Province-----	85, 37, 120
Nghê-An Soviet-----	24
Ngo Dinh Diem-----	11, 106
Ngo Dinh Khoi-----	11, 106
Ngo Ton Dat-----	5
Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh)-----	5
Nguyen Binh-----	12, 12
Nguyen Cao Ky-----	73
Nguyen Cong Vien-----	108, 104
Nguyen Dac Dan-----	79
Nguyen Manh Tuong-----	21, 26, 108
Nguyen Thanh, Col-----	110
Nguyen Tat Thanh (Ho Chi Minh)-----	108
Nguyen Tien Lang-----	106
Nguyen Van Dinh-----	79
Nguyen Van Duc-----	121, 122
Nguyen Van Loc-----	121
Nguyen Van Sam-----	11
Nguyen Van Thieu, President-----	76
Nguyen xuan Nguyen, Dr-----	29
Nhan Dan (newspaper)-----	20-24, 28, 32
Nhu Phong-----	118
Nixon, President-----	84, 85, 71
North Vietnam-----	2,
	3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 20, 26, 34-39, 43, 44, 48, 61, 85, 98, 97, 101, 103, 105,
	108, 109, 111, 118
"North Vietnam Today" (book)-----	108, 118
"North of the 17th Parallel" (book)-----	39
Nutt, Anita Lauve-----	10, 34

O

"On the Question of Communist Reprisals in Vietnam" (publication)-----	10
Open Arms Service-----	49
Operation Exodus-----	96
"Our Attitude When We Return to Our Villages" (article)-----	24

P

Pacification teams-----	49
Paris-----	85
Paris peace talks-----	43, 94
Party for Independence-----	11
Paul, Opl. D. M-----	70

VII

	Page
PAVN	91
People's agricultural reform tribunals	23
People's courts	87, 41
People's Liberation Armed Forces Command (PLAF)	79, 94
People's Self Defense Force (PSDF)	8, 70, 99
People's tribunal, special	36
People's tribunals	89, 40
"People's War, People's Army" (book)	6
Pham Quynh	11, 106
Pham Thanh Tai, Dr.	111
Pham Van Ngo	121, 123
Phan Boi Chau	5, 103, 104
Phan Thang Toan	121, 122
Phu Cam	94
Phu Tho (Phu-tho)	81, 106
Phu Thu district	90
Phu Thu Salt Flat find	94
Phu Yen Province	81
Phuoc Long	67, 97
Province	80
Province unit	51
Phuoc Thanh	79
Phuthanh	69-71
Pike, Douglas	2, 3, 8, 9, 88, 84
Police field forces	48
Political struggle	17, 20
Porter, D. Gareth	34, 35
Portland	38
Poznan	80
Praeger, Frederick A. (publishers)	6, 10, 11, 23, 85, 86, 41, 119
Preliminary accord, March 6, 1946	5
Provisional government	105
Public Security Service	49

Q

Quang Da special zone	53
Quang Nam	99
Quang-ngai	106
Quang Ngai Province	57, 82, 113
Quang Tin	81
Quangnam Province	71
Quangngai	68
Quynh-Luu district	35
Quynh-Luu district, Nghe-An Province	22

R

Radio Hanoi	92, 117
Radio Liberation	94
Radio Moscow	26
Rand Corp.	10, 34, 46
Rangoon	26
Rectification of errors	17, 19, 20, 24, 41
Red China	3, 9
Red River Valley	106
Republic of South Vietnam	97
Republic of Vietnam	76
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces	48
Revolutionary development team	97
Revolutionary Youth Association	104
Robin, Governor	106
Robinson, Douglas	68
Russell tribunal	64, 65

VIII

S

	Page
Saigon -----	2,
3, 12, 26, 39, 41, 46, 48, 58, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 89, 92, 95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 106, 110, 122, 123	
Saigon-Cholon-Gia region headquarters -----	57
Saigon-Vung Tau Road -----	97
Sand dune finds -----	90
Schoenman, Ralph -----	64
Security Service -----	53, 58
Senate (South Vietnam) -----	71
Shanghai -----	103
"Smaller Dragon, The" (book) -----	11
Son Tra -----	98
Song Be -----	67, 68
South China Sea -----	90
South Vietnam -----	1-3,
5, 8-10, 22, 34, 37, 41-43, 45, 49, 53, 59, 60, 62, 65, 69, 71-73, 77, 78, 83, 84, 88, 90, 95, 97, 108-110, 112	
Liaison, mission -----	78
List of CVT cadre who have lost their lives in, for the free trade union movement -----	74, 75
"South Vietnam's Internal Problems" (book) -----	47
"Southeast Asia Perspectives" (publication) -----	10, 103
Southern Catholic -----	3
Soviet -----	4, 24
Soviet Union -----	3, 9, 103
Stalin -----	3, 4, 30, 95
Stalingrad -----	94
Stalinist -----	4, 119
Stalinist leaders -----	12
State Department -----	38
Stern, Laurence -----	69
"Street Without Joy" (book) -----	23
Suez -----	24
Sui Chon -----	97
Sun Yat Sen -----	5

T

Ta-Thu-Thau -----	6, 12, 106
Taiwan -----	71
Tan (peasant) -----	21
Tang Quang Tu pagoda -----	79, 90
"Task of Breaking the Enemy Control and Eliminating the Tyrants in the City, The" (training document) -----	56
Tate, Don -----	101
Taussig, H. C. -----	25
Tay Ninh Province -----	80
Tet -----	15, 58, 78
Tet offensive -----	8, 52, 54, 55, 57, 73, 77, 80, 109, 110
Than Dao -----	79
Thanh Hoa -----	26
Thu Duc -----	80
Thau Thien Province -----	79-81, 89
Thien Ham -----	90
Thieu government -----	72
Thieu-Ky government -----	73
325th Division -----	24
Thua Thien Province -----	53, 91, 99
Time (magazine) -----	66
Tokyo -----	83
Tongas, Gérard -----	7, 37, 40, 41
"Topics: History and the Bloodbath Theory in Vietnam" (newspaper column) -----	35

	Page
Tra Hy (refugee camp)-----	80
Tra Loi-----	79
Tran Dien, Senator-----	78
Tran Huu Quyen-----	76
Tran Ngoc Chau-----	71
Tran Quoc Buu-----	72, 76
Tran Quoc Tuan-----	114
Tran Van Dac, Col-----	2, 83, 88, 89, 110
Tran Van Giau-----	12
Tran Van Lu-y, Dr-----	8, 97
Tran Van Thanh-----	121, 128
Tri-Thien Hue-----	9
Truong Chinh-----	6, 19, 24, 27, 28, 32, 117
Truong Tu Anh-----	12
Trotskyist struggle group-----	12
Tuy Hoa-----	81
Tuyen Duc-----	79
Tuyen-quang-----	106
"Two Vietnams, The" (book)-----	10, 23, 35, 119
UBKC-----	24
U.N. (United Nations)-----	24
United National Front-----	11, 107
United Nations, Charter of-----	30
United States-----	52, 59, 65, 68, 120-122
Americial Division-----	113
Army-----	68
Embassy, Saigon-----	38
Government-----	43
Information Service-----	83
Marine-----	69-71
Mission-----	55
University of South Carolina Institute of International Studies-----	1
University of the Toilers of the East-----	103
Uren, Philip E-----	41

V

Vi Le-----	80
Vietcong (Viet Cong)-----	7-9, 45, 47, 48-62, 64-84, 96, 101, 108, 109, 113
Security Service-----	46-48, 55
"Viet Cong, The" (book)-----	2, 83
"Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future" (publication)-----	10, 45
"Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, The" (monograph)-----	83, 85
Vietminh (Viet Minh)-----	11-14, 23, 24, 34-36, 41-43, 48, 69, 96, 105, 119
Viet Minh Front-----	5
Viet Minh Government-----	107
"Vietminh Regime, The" (book)-----	23, 119
Vietnam-----	1, 5, 15, 18, 19, 23, 34, 64, 66, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 98, 95-97, 103, 104
Vietnam News Agency-----	78
Viet-Nam (newspaper)-----	12, 106
"Vietnam: The Bloodbath Argument" (article)-----	34
"Vietnam Divided" (book)-----	40
"Vietnam: The Dragon Embattled" (book)-----	10, 11, 119
"Vietnam: If the Communists Won" (article)-----	10
Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang. (See Nationalist Party.)	
Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT)-----	72, 73, 74, 76
Cadre, list of, who have lost their lives in South Vietnam for the free trade union movement-----	74, 75
Vietnamese mission-----	38
Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association-----	108
Vietnamese Trotskyist movement-----	5
Vietnamese Workers Party-----	107
Viet-tri-----	106
Vienna-----	26

X

	Page
Vinh	24
Vinh Binh	80
Vinh Hanh	64
Vinh Loc district	90
Vinh Luu	90
Vinh Tho	79
Vinh Xuan	80
Vinh-yen	108
"Violations of the Geneva Agreement by the Vietminh Communists" (publication)	38
Vo Ngoc Co	111
Vo Nguyen Giap	6, 14, 19, 96
Vo Thanh Tong	111
Vo Van Nga	11
VPA	24

W

Walker, Prof. Richard L.	1
War of resistance	27
Warsaw	64
Washington Daily News, The (newspaper)	101
Washington Post, The (newspaper)	69, 88
Whampoa Academy	104
Wicker, Tom	84, 85, 88
World Health Organization	97
World Health Organization, Geneva	8
World Peace League	26
World War II	5, 30, 96
World War II Allies	105

X

Xuan Dieu	15
Xuan O	90
Xuan Hoa-Van Duong	90
Xuan Thoi Thuong	79

