POW's IN CAMBODIA

Mr. Gilman. Gen. Vernon Walters testified in March of 1976 before our MIA Committee with regard to Cambodia that several U.S. personnel known to be captured in Cambodia prior to April 1975 have never been accounted for. These were known captured Cambodians had acknowledged capture.

Do you have any thoughts about what we could do to try to get information from Cambodia? We can't talk to them apparently. Our committee met with Cambodian representatives on one occasion or another before the change of governments and made request to them but never had any information forthcoming.

Chairman Wolff even visited the Cambodian Embassy while he was in China and found an empty household awaiting him. I guess they knew he was coming. He left a letter from our committee in the Cambodian Embassy and never received a response.

Do you have any thoughts about what we can do with trying to get information from Cambodia?

Mr. Shields. With regard to Laos first, Congressman Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. I would like to touch on Laos in a moment but if you would touch on Cambodia for the moment.

Mr. Shields. I think that we certainly ought to reexamine the issue now that there has been a change in government. I would think the government now in place or tentatively in place would be more approachable than the previous government.

I know the Presidential Commission requested an opportunity to go to Pnom Penh and discuss these issues. It was turned down. I think there was no hope at all with that government. I am not sure what chances exist now, but we should make the request in the hopes something would be forthcoming.

LAOTIAN LACK OF RESPONSE

Mr. Gilman. With regard to Laos, the League of Families representatives went to Laos in the early 1970's. I have also visited Vientiane on several occasions with the select committee and individually. On each occasion when we raised the issue with the Laotian Government, they said that when they looked for their missing, they would look for ours.

Apparently they have not done much looking because we have not heard anything from the Laotian Government.

As I recall, through Dr. Shield's office we even submitted cases in the Laotian language, and there has never been a response. And General Walters even commented in his testimony that U.S. personnel known to have been captured in Laos have not been accounted for. We have received no information.

Do you have any thoughts about what we can do to try and get information from Laos? I might add that there is a great number of reports about our prisoners being held in the Sam Neua Caves in Laos. Yet, not one prisoner to my knowledge that ever came back ever indicated he had been held in the Sam Neua Caves.

What has happened to all of these men, and what can we do to try to get some information in that direction?
GRIM SITUATION

Mr. Shields. The men who returned from Southeast Asia during Operation Homecoming, who had been listed as having been captured in Laos, had in fact been held for most of their experience in prison in Vietnam.

In regard to Laos, the situation at that time looked very grim. It has not changed greatly. There certainly were individuals who were alive in captivity at one time in Laos.

DETAINED CIVILIANS

The case of David Hedlicka is a matter of public record, and there are others. I must say again, Congressman Gilman, that this is something which depends on an objective analysis of the facts.

After the close of hostilities for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, a civilian, Emmet Kay, flying for Air America, was downed in his aircraft. He was captured. We received some information which indicated to us he was held prisoner, and we established contact with the Pathet Lao and let them know we knew he was a prisoner of war. He was a civilian but he was being detained by the Pathet Lao forces. He was released later in the general release of Thai forces and exchange of prisoners between the two Laotian sides.

Some time later, subsequent to that, we learned that Charles Dean, simply a tourist in the area, had also been detained by the Pathet Lao forces. We had excellent intelligence on him which indicated he was detained. It was probably better than I have ever seen on virtually any other man. He was able to smuggle out things like identification cards, even a McGovern campaign button. People described his capture and confirmed that he was held. We sent personal representatives to the Pathet Lao in his behalf.

My belief at that time was that, just as in the case of Emmet Kay there would be some discussion back and forth, and the Pathet Lao would perhaps discuss the issue and obfuscate for a while, but that in due course he would be released. But to my knowledge we know nothing more of him to this day.

Since the fall of South Vietnam and the change of governments in Laos, he remains an enigma. What happened to him I don't know. He certainly was alive, I believe, as late as 1974 or early 1975.

Why the Pathet Lao denied any knowledge of his captivity when we were able to pinpoint his location of detention I don't understand. Why Emmet Kay was treated in one way and why Charles Dean was treated in another I am at a lose to understand.

FEELING OF MISTRUST

This is what makes this issue so difficult and, I think, another instance of why there may be a feeling of mistrust, because it is very hard to understand these things, and the feeling is that unless you are privy to all the information, that something is being withheld. But in these cases I have mentioned, nothing is being withheld. I simply don't understand why they evolved the way they did.
Mr. GILMAN. General Walters almost hinted that with regard to North Vietnam, the returnees knew of men who had been seen in captivity but not in a prison system. Many of these were not accounted for and are now on a list for which we have asked the DRV to account.

Recently a 15-volume set of uncorrelated information was made available to the public and distributed to the members. In a great deal of that information there were sightings of Caucasians, for example—I believe this was from that uncorrelated information—three-quarters of this report is blacked out, but it says, "Subject. Reported sighting of detained Caucasians in North Vietnam, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, diplomats comment on Americans left in Vietnam," and then a blacked-out portion. Then it reads, "In late February 1978, a prison camp containing Caucasian prisoners, located about 6 or 7 kilometers from Ham Yen and Hoang Lienoon Province"—than a blacked-out portion. Comments did not give their physical condition. That I believe was a 1973 report.

The uncorrelated reports have any number of documents of this type that refer to Caucasians. This was in late February 1978. The document itself said in late February 1978.

Here I have a letter from the Department of Defense National Command Center about two unidentified Caucasians sighted with Pathet Lao, July 24, 1974.

There are pages after pages of this sort of uncorrelated information.

Do you have any recommendations how that information can best be utilized in trying to obtain information from the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia?

CORRELATED DATA NECESSARY

Mr. SHIELDS. I would be concerned if we simply presented them with a mass of uncorrelated information because I know that in the Department of Defense and the State Department during the time I was there, we made every effort to check out sources and references, aerial photographs, and so forth, and found it very difficult to do.

My concern would be that if we simply passed on a mass of uncorrelated information—and we know that in fact in a number of instances these reports were fabricated—that would then become mixed and blended with the good information, the hard information; and the good information would be tainted by the bad, and it would all simply be thrown out.

I think we have enough information which is good, which is hard, which we have substantiated, to make the case without regard to that body of very loose and uncertain information.

Of course, that is why an accounting, in which U.S. teams would go into the field, would be the best way to resolve these issues. I don’t know if that is ever going to come, but certainly we would be able to judge by the reaction to our own hard information the kind of response which we were receiving from the Vietnamese.

I repeat, that is another reason why the families are concerned, because in a number of cases where the information has been hard, has been substantiated, the reports from the Vietnamese have been negative and indicate probably a lack of good-faith efforts by the Vietnamese.
HARDCORE CASES

Mr. Gilman. When the select committee was winding up its work, both Mr. Guyer and I objected to the premature closing of our investigation. We felt the committee should have continued its work, which probably could have resulted in a great deal more activity than has been demonstrated in the past few years. However, as the committee wound up its work, in its reports it indicated, as I recall from memory, that there are 150 hardcore cases that information should be available where there had been reports from the Vietnamese and photographs and unquestionable proof that these men had either been captured or the Vietnamese had information regarding these people.

As you look back on it now, is it your information and your thought that there are that number of cases that they could give us information on?

Mr. Shields. There are probably more cases than that which I would like to have the opportunity or would have loved to have had the opportunity at the time—I am no longer involved from that standpoint—of sitting down and saying all of these photographs—for example, these things indicate to me that at one time at least you had knowledge of these individuals. You say you no longer have that, how can we help you develop that again?

As a matter of fact, the Department of Defense passed on to the Vietnamese information which indicated circumstances of loss, pinpointing of sighting, and that kind of thing. I would think that in probably more cases than that we would have a basis for making a specific inquiry for which we would expect to have a substantive reply.

Mr. Guyer. We have to close in 2 minutes.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUGGESTIONS WANTED

Mr. Guyer. I want to say in conclusion Mr. Gilman referred to what they call the blue-ribbon list that Secretary Kissinger first had. He presented that personally for a response, and those people were known, facts were known. He never got a satisfactory reply either.

I was going to suggest we have so little physical help in a staff this size and a task force of this proportion, but what I would like anybody who is here to do, who has either a question or a suggestion, if you would like to stay a few minutes and see to it that staff gets it for our benefit, I think it would serve a good purpose.

Anybody in the audience, because we don't usually have people in the audience testify but any unfinished things you were thinking about, anybody that is here on the staff will stay and we would like to have that information.

I also am going to say along with what Mr. Gilman said, if the league which lacks a sizable encyclopedia now on all these records, if they felt it would serve a good purpose, we could field these to the proper computers who have the facilities and try to get a meaningful result from them, which we would be happy to do.
Mr. Gilman. One additional thought before you conclude, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sieverts indicated to me out in the hallway that this committee, the International Relations Committee, had on a previous occasion documented the cases. It has prepared somewhat of a memorial book as you suggested. Is that correct, Mr. Sieverts?

**Published Korean Volume**

Mr. Sieverts. After the Korean war, this committee, with Congressman Zablocki as chairman of this subcommittee, published a volume with the photographs and short biographies of the unaccounted-for personnel after the Korean war. So there is a precedent for this committee publishing such a volume.

Mr. Guyer. Even in one U.S. cemetery they have the name of every man that didn't come back, over 30,000.

Mr. Sieverts. In this case it would be a book of those listed as unaccounted for or missing. It was a very analogous situation after the Korean war, and this committee played that role at that time.

**PRC Assistance**

Mr. Guyer. I understand there are over 100 Congressmen going to China. I see no reason why we should not get in touch with those chairmen today and put that on their agenda, since in Cambodia—where the genocide is already over two million—we don't know who is in charge. But we do know China has access, and there is no reason why records would not be available. We should ask them before they leave to make this the No. 1 consideration on their agenda, since they are going over there during the recess.

Mr. Shields. About that list of 150—I understand now the reference to 150 that was only a representative sample. That was not intended to be exhaustive in any way whatsoever. It was only to be a representative sample of good cases and one small enough so that instead of having large volumes and saying, do all of this now, efforts could have been directed in a more manageable way.

Mr. Guyer. But it was not unreasonable to expect they could give an accounting of that number with what information we gave them.

**Press for Full Accounting**

Mr. Gilman. Dr. Shields, based on the work you have done, and looking back, and all the information, do you recommend that our Government continue to press for a full accounting despite the fact that we presumptively declared most of these people dead?

Mr. Shields. When I was in the Pentagon, the pledge made at that time—and I do not believe it has been withdrawn—was that a status change would have no effect on the efforts to account for missing Americans, and I would think that if the opportunity presented itself today with North Korea, we would be concerned about finding out what happened to those men from that war for whom no accounting was ever received.

Mr. Guyer. The only problem with that is once the American people read it is down to 110 or 115, the interest is gone.
Mr. SHIELDS. They believe we do understand what happened in the case of these——

Mr. GUYER. If they were thinking 110 or 111, they would say, “We looked long enough, we have gone far enough,” and suddenly the people are not with you. Here in Congress I have that feeling now. You bring this up, they will vote for it; but if you ask after the vote, none of them are around. You guys are just swinging in the dark, and we are getting nothing but lip service from our own people.

Mr. GILMAN. There is no question, Dr. Shields, that we should further pursue this issue, and there should be additional information available to us by the government of Southeast Asia.

Mr. SHIELDS. I certainly think we should pursue this by every available means. I would add one caveat which is to say I don’t believe the question of status changes can forever wait the receipt of information.

I felt at one time, and it was Defense Department policy at one time, that best efforts would be made to obtain an accounting; then a judgment would be made as to whether there was a likelihood of further information.

Mr. GUYER. I notice you did say you changed your viewpoint. Somebody asked Senator Dirksen once the same question. He said, “Senator, just 2 days ago you voted yes on the same issue and now you voted no.” Dirksen said, “Yes; and flexibility is one of my great virtues.” So I do think seriously that people who do not change their mind have not been listening to the information, because our judgment is no better than the information we can get.

So, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
MONDAY, MAY 7, 1979

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:55 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lester L. Wolff (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Wolff. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we conduct another in our series of hearings to carry out the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs for continuing oversight on the issue of American prisoners and missing in action in Southeast Asia. The subcommittee took on that task at the beginning of the 95th Congress, after the Select Committee on POW/MIA's terminated at the end of the 94th Congress.

RESOLUTION FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE

Since early 1977, the subcommittee has had a series of hearings, talked with many officials, visited the Casualty Identification Laboratory in Honolulu, and interviewed several Indochinese refugees, in an effort to determine that all available information is being actively sought and appropriately used. Last year, we reported legislation introduced by our colleague, Mr. Gilman, calling for United Nations assistance in pursuing a full accounting of those missing in Southeast Asia. We are reporting a similar measure again, this time sponsored by Mr. Guyer, who is chairman of a Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on POW/MIA's. We will take a moment at the appropriate time to act on reporting this measure to the full committee.

In view of the unexpected return of Marine Pfc. Robert Garwood our efforts have assumed a much greater urgency. This single, dramatic event is vivid proof that the MIA issue demands diligent and continuing inquiry on the part of all agencies charged with that responsibility.

LACK OF UNDERSTANDING

We have also sought to serve as a means of communication and a sounding board for those concerned citizens who are interested in this subject. And in that capacity, we have observed that there is a regrettable lack of trust, and a great deal of misunderstanding with regard to official American policy and procedures toward the POW/MIA issue.
For example, there has been a systematic effort to review the status of the prisoners and missing throughout the current administration with no additional information on individual cases, and despite increased refugee reports that there may be Americans alive in Indochina. Furthermore, our Government has talked to the Vietnamese Government on this subject and presented its response as forthcoming and cooperative, a judgment that I feel, and some of the members of our subcommittee feel, is open to question. Taken together, these steps have led some people to believe that the issue may have been swept under the rug for political or diplomatic reasons. Whether or not there may have been such efforts, we will not permit this issue to be ignored, but will pursue it to an honorable conclusion.

Provide forum for reports

To assure appropriate attention on this issue, we have dealt with a series of specific issues which we thought deserved full attention. For instance, we provided a forum for Ngo Phi Hung, who claimed to have seen half a hundred American prisoners in Saigon after the fall of that city to the Communists. We have interviewed Air Force Lt. Col. Albert Shinkle, published his testimony, and obtained an evaluation from various agencies of the executive branch of his allegations. We have informally questioned Private First Class Garwood for whatever information he could then provide us, and will continue our questioning of him when he can testify without jeopardizing his forthcoming proceedings with the Marine Corps.

But, it has become apparent to my colleagues on the subcommittee and the task force, as well as myself, that more than specifics are at issue here. We need a systematic look at the United States present handling of this issue.

Systematic policy needed

Therefore, in the interests of better communication and a thorough understanding of the problem, we have already heard testimony on April 10 from Ms. Ann Mills Griffith, the executive director of the National League of Families and Missing in Southeast Asia, and Dr. Roger Shields, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. With today's hearing we hope to continue not only to describe our system of dealing with POW/MIA's, but to seek ways to improve it. For these reasons we are happy to have before this subcommittee our distinguished witnesses, Robert Oakley and Brig. Gen. T. C. Pinckney. We would like them to respond, as appropriate to their areas of responsibility, to the following specific issues:

One: The President's policy reversal on seeking an accounting from the Vietnamese, as well as the changed and accelerated review of status of prisoners and missing.

Two: The processing of live sighting reports. There is need for a clearly defined and clearly understood procedure to collect, evaluate, and disseminate current reports, including screening on a systematic basis, I would say, of Indochinese refugees.

Three: The basis, if any, for assurance that the SRV will cooperate on an accounting for MIA remains, if normal relations are ever re-established with that country.
Four: The need to press the Vietnamese more vigorously on the basis of informed background regarding the fate of American prisoners and MIA’s.

Five: The need to make it clearer to the American public that the Vietnamese have not been forthcoming.

Six: The failure to monitor compliance of the services with policy directives designed to encourage distribution of full pertinent data to the families and next of kin of prisoners and missing; and,

Seven: As an overriding concern—are there any more Americans like Robert Garwood in Vietnam, and what can we do about it?

I should point out that due to scheduling circumstances forced upon the subcommittee, we were unable to have Gen. Eugene Tighe of the Defense Intelligence Agency with us today. We, therefore, will reserve such questions that might appropriately be addressed to General Tighe until such time as he can appear.

Mr. Guyer, do you have a statement you would like to make at this point?

Mr. Guyer. Nothing, Mr. Chairman, except to thank you for your perserverance, without which we would not be continuing these inquiries; and the fact that we have had your full cooperation which gives us the vehicle, now, by which we can proceed toward our common objective. That is, for a full accounting and repatriation, return of all Americans from Southeast Asia.

I am most anxious to hear the testimony.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Gilman. No opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Oakley, would you proceed, then, please? Without objection, your full statement will be included in the record, if you would like to condense your remarks, or read them.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. OAKLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Oakley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will abbreviate my remarks and try to address the specific questions that you have raised.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, from the outset this administration and the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, have consistently followed a policy aimed at obtaining the fullest feasible accounting of our missing personnel. In keeping with this policy and as one of his very first foreign policy initiatives after taking office, President Carter sent a Presidential commission to Indochina to explore directly with the Vietnamese and Lao how such an accounting might be obtained. The commission was headed by Mr. Leonard Woodcock and included congressional representation.

WOODCOCK COMMISSION

In a statement issued by the White House on March 12, 1977, the President noted that in sending the Woodcock commission to Vietnam and Laos, he was “hopeful that this step we are taking will meet with a positive response and put in motion a process that will obtain the fullest possible accounting for our men who sacrificed so
much for their country. At the same time, we recognize that information may never be available on many of them. Some were lost over water, or heavily forested areas and mountainous terrain, where information may never be found or will be very slow in developing. So, we are not unrealistic in our expectations.”

After the commission’s return from its March 16 to 20 trip to Vietnam and Laos, it issued a report detailing its findings and conclusions. According to the report, “The highlight of the commission’s talks was the SRV’s formal undertaking to give the United States all available information on our missing men as it is found and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed.” The report concluded that, “In the commission’s view, the best hope of obtaining a proper accounting for MIA’s lies in the context of improved relations” between the United States and Vietnam.

MEETING WITH VIETNAMESE

After reviewing the commission’s report the President announced it was on the basis of this report that he would respond favorably to a Vietnamese proposal that our negotiators meet in Paris to begin talks on the possibility of normalizing relations.

Mr. Chairman, as you and the other members of the subcommittee are aware, we met with the Vietnamese in Paris on three occasions, May, June, and December 1977, to discuss the prospects for normalizing relations between our countries. At all three meetings we stressed that two factors would have an important effect on our ability to proceed toward normalization: Vietnamese willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region, and continued Vietnamese efforts to provide us with the fullest possible accounting for our missing men.

Specifically, regarding the missing in action issue, we stressed that we do not consider our missing men as something to be bargained over, which had been the case on occasion in the past between Vietnam and the United States, as it had in similar circumstances between France and Vietnam. We stated that the United States would reject any attempt to link this question to aid. We emphasized that the Vietnamese have a simple humanitarian obligation to help resolve the MIA question.

MIA LINKED TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The Vietnamese refused to accept the U.S. position on normalization. Instead, they insisted that together with Vietnamese efforts to resolve the missing in action question the United States should accept its obligations under the Paris Accord of 1973 to provide economic assistance to Vietnam.

Last fall we met with the Vietnamese in New York for several rounds of unofficial discussions.

Mr. Wolff. Would you bring the microphone closer to you?
Mr. Oakley. Yes, sir.

RECENT DISCUSSIONS

We next met with the Vietnamese in New York for several rounds of unofficial discussions during the fall of last year. These discussions
appeared to make some progress, and the Vietnamese indicated that they were no longer demanding U.S. aid as a quid pro quo for normalization or for continued progress on accounting for missing in action. For our part, we reiterated our belief that the Vietnamese could and should be doing more to resolve the MIA question, and referring to recent events in the region, asked for clarification on three developments of importance to the United States: The implications of the November 3 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; Vietnam's intentions toward Kampuchea; and the upsurge in refugees from Vietnam.

Vietnam, of course, mounted a major invasion of Kampuchea on December 25 of last year and now occupies large areas of that country; moreover, it has shown no inclination to seek a political rather than a military solution or to consider an independent Kampuchean Government representative of its own people, rather than beholden to another country. Under the circumstances, including the continued massive outflow of refugees, there is no question of any movement toward normalization of relations with Vietnam at this time.

MIA ISSUE PART OF NORMALIZATION

Thus, Mr. Chairman, throughout our talks with the Vietnamese in Paris and New York, U.S. negotiators have stressed, in keeping with the President's policy enunciated at the beginning of his administration, that Vietnamese good faith in helping us to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our missing men would have a direct bearing on our ability to normalize relations with them. Vietnamese behavior toward their neighbors is also extremely important. This remains our policy and you can be sure it will be fully reflected whenever we might meet with the Vietnamese again for talks on normalization of relations or any other subject.

Various initiatives and actions by the Congress have been extremely helpful as a means of demonstrating to the Vietnamese that U.S. policy with regard to obtaining the fullest possible MIA accounting, has the complete support of the entire U.S. Government and the American people.

I would also like to note the fine work of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia in insuring that the views of the segment of the American public most affected by the MIA issue—the relatives of our missing men—are made known to the administration so that they can be reflected in turn through our official statements to the Vietnamese.

In recognition of the league's valuable work, Department officials have met regularly with its representatives so as to keep them informed regarding the status of United States-Vietnamese negotiations and the possibility of normalization, as well as to see how we can best work together to achieve further progress on MIA matters.

SRV COOPERATION

It has been asked, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the question of normalizing relations with Vietnam, what assurance does the United States have that the SRV will cooperate on an accounting of MIA's should relations be established. I cannot state with assurance that this
would be the case. However, I would simply note that it has been our experience that the Vietnamese have generally been more forthcoming in terms of remains returned and information made available during periods when prospects for normalization appeared more promising than when they did not.

I would also note that our efforts to date to send our MIA experts to Vietnam, either to talk to the Vietnamese search teams first hand, or actually conduct searches themselves, have been to no avail. Following normalization, we would be able to place people in Hanoi and perhaps later in Ho Chi Minh City—Saigon—who could at least talk to Vietnamese experts on a regular basis. There would also be at least a faint hope of actually taking part in searches in the field, although we cannot be sure.

Our experience during the July 1978 Vietnamese visit to the MIA identification facilities in Hawaii has demonstrated that discussions between the United States and Vietnamese experts are decidedly more effective when conducted on a face-to-face basis. I would not wish to overstate the usefulness of such direct liaison—since actual results will still depend on Vietnamese willingness to carry out search efforts and on what can be located—given the problems of terrain, time, and weather.

Nevertheless, direct liaison would provide us with some capability of monitoring their MIA efforts, a capability we do not have under current circumstances.

INFORMATION GIVEN TO VIETNAM

I would like now to address briefly the measures which the Department of State has been taking to obtain an accounting, irrespective of the prospects for normalization. One of our most important procedures in this regard is the MIA liaison arrangement in Bangkok which came into being as a result of agreements reached during the July 1978 visit to our MIA identification facilities in Hawaii. U.S. personnel responsible for MIA matters in Bangkok consult on a regular basis with their counterparts at the SRV embassy there and hand over dossiers containing information on specific MIA cases for use by the Vietnamese in their recovery efforts.

At the conclusion of hostilities, we had provided information to the Vietnamese on all of our missing men. The dossiers that are passed to the Vietnamese in Bangkok, and elsewhere as the occasion arises, serve to pinpoint those cases where we believe positive results would be particularly likely. The Vietnamese have acknowledged that these procedures are useful. Approximately one-half of the remains returned thus far have been those of individuals for whom dossiers had been passed to the Vietnamese.

REPORTS BY REFUGEES

Another important program involves efforts by our embassies and consulates in Southeast Asia to obtain information from refugees regarding Americans lost in Indochina. As part of this program, American missions in appropriate countries have formally notified the various voluntary agencies involved in refugee relief and resettlement.
efforts, the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Community on European Migration, and the Missions of France, Canada, and Australia, of the continuing U.S. interest in acquiring all information relating to MIA's and have asked them to bring any such information to our immediate attention.

In addition, personnel engaged in interviewing refugees have been requested to be particularly alert for any indication of information regarding MIA's. Should such information come to light, the refugees are immediately contacted by MIA specialists for extensive debriefing sessions.

**INTEREST FOR DATA WELL KNOWN**

Our interest in obtaining information on MIA's is well known among the refugee camps in Asia. We have taken specific steps to insure that this is the case, including making arrangements for the display of posters at refugee transit centers overseas in the Lao, Hmong, Khmer, Vietnamese, and Chinese languages. In addition, as I have said before, UNHCR, ICEM, and voluntary agency personnel manning transit centers have been alerted to the need to direct any refugees with information to us. There are also radio broadcasts and loudspeaker announcements in camps prior to visits by JCRC personnel, again indicating our interest in refugees having information on missing in action.

Once the refugees arrive in the United States, INS officials have been helpful in obtaining some MIA information during their interviews. The voluntary agencies who help to resettle refugees cooperate both with the Department of State and with the League of Families in seeking information. In all, since 1975, refugees have provided 234 reports on possible MIA's or MIA remains; 176 of these during the past year.

**GARWOOD CASE**

The Garwood case provides a good example of how these procedures function. As soon as the State Department received a report that Private First Class Garwood was in Hanoi, and as soon as we were able to form a positive opinion of its reliability, Secretary Vance personally sent a message to the Vietnamese requesting they provide us with whatever information they had and allow him to return to the United States. In their response the Vietnamese indicated that Garwood was indeed living in Vietnam and that he was free to leave for the United States. We alerted Representatives Elizabeth Holtzman and Billie Lee Evans—who were already en route to Hanoi at that time—and the International Commission of the Red Cross to Garwood's situation. As you know, we were eventually able to arrange through the ICRC for his return to this country.

A similar effort was made with regard to the information made public by the refugee, Ngo Phi Hung, to the effect that he had seen and had contact with 49 American prisoners in South Vietnam during the periods 1975-77. We asked the Vietnamese authorities for information on this report. They replied promptly denying this claim stating there were no American prisoners in Vietnam. General Pinckney can address our continuing efforts to establish the validity of Mr. Hung's information.
OTHERS LIKE GARWOOD

The Garwood case in particular highlights, again, the question we have constantly before us of whether there are other Americans like Private First Class Garwood in Vietnam and, if so, what we can do to effect their departure. This possibility was raised with the Vietnamese during the Woodcock commission visit to Hanoi. At that time, in response to numerous direct questions, the Vietnamese assured us that all Americans who had been taken prisoners and were alive had been returned to the United States under article 8(a) of the Paris Accord, and that all Americans who remained in Vietnam after April 30, 1975, and who registered themselves with Vietnamese authorities had been allowed to leave Vietnam. This response obviously leaves a loophole which can be made to fit a case like Garwood's. Obviously, we do not consider helpful the use of this sort of debating tactic rather than a frank, full response.

DEBRIEFING GARWOOD

In conjunction with our efforts to obtain Private First Class Garwood's departure, we again asked the Vietnamese whether there were any other Americans living in that country, voluntarily or otherwise. As you know, they categorically denied the existence of any such Americans, dropping the reference to any qualifiers. Since we take nothing on faith in this area and have no means of directly determining whether this latest Vietnamese statement is accurate, the next step will have to be to evaluate whatever information Private First Class Garwood might have on possible Americans in Vietnam.

If, as in his own case, there is specific information provided which appears credible on MIA remains or living Americans, we will again be in a position to approach the Vietnamese with the expectation of getting a satisfactory response. However, before this can be done, we will have to await a thorough debriefing of Mr. Garwood which, we understand, will not occur until his situation with the Marine Corps has been clarified.

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress again that we believe the Vietnamese could be doing more to resolve the MIA issue, which has caused so much anguish for so many American families for too long. We have reiterated our position in this regard both directly to the Vietnamese and publicly to the American people and will continue to do so. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that past experience has demonstrated, unfortunately, that the problem of obtaining a full MIA accounting is never an easy one.

I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss this important subject and will be very happy to respond to any questions you might have, Mr. Chairman, or to those of other members of the subcommittee.

Mr. Wolff. We thank you very much, Mr. Oakley.

We will reserve questions until we have had the opportunity of hearing both statements. Therefore, General Pinckney, if you would please proceed.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. T. O. PINCKNEY, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General PINCKNEY. Is this all right on the microphone?
Mr. WOLFF. As long as you project.
General PINCKNEY. I will use my best parade ground voice.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to represent the Department of Defense here today because we deeply appreciate your efforts on behalf of our servicemen missing in Southeast Asia.

The Department of Defense, more than any other part of the Government, is aware of the sacrifice made by these men and understands the sorrow, anguish, and frustration that the families of these missing men have endured. We share their sorrow and frustration because these are men with whom we have lived and fought side by side. Therefore, because the goal of this committee is to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our fallen friends and comrades, we are committed to assist you to the fullest and welcome this opportunity to exchange views.

You have requested our comments of various aspects of U.S. policy with regard to the MIA issue within the purview of OSD/ISA. Those points are the reinstitution of status reviews and the distribution of information to families and next of kin. I will also describe the current realignment of PW/MIA responsibilities within OSD/ISA and discuss our purposes and intentions as we proceed under that realignment.

REINSTITUTE STATUS

In August 1977, the Department of Defense announced plans to reinstitute individual status reviews for those American servicemen listed as prisoner of war or missing in action as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. This is our obligation, but nevertheless, one undertaken reluctantly. That determination to reinstitute status reviews followed unprecedented efforts by the executive and legislative branches to account for missing U.S. servicemen. These efforts included a congressional committee investigation, a Presidential commission, and diplomatic approaches by the State Department.

The Secretaries of the armed services have endeavored to conduct casualty matters with full respect for the rights of the missing members, with compassion for the families and, in accordance with the Missing Persons Act, the decree issued by the District Court in New York in McDonald v. McLucas, and service regulations. Under these legal requirements, status reviews are conducted by the missing serviceman’s respective service on a case-by-case basis, starting with those who have been missing the longest. There has not been any attempt to deviate from these established procedures.

While we have made every attempt not to delay these reviews due to a shortage of DOD manpower or resources, the reviews have been proceeding more slowly than originally anticipated because of the unanticipated volume of Freedom of Information requests.
DIFFERENCE IN ACCOUNTING AND REVIEWING

We should note that the change of status in no way alters the U.S. Government's intent to obtain as full an accounting as possible of our servicemen, whether missing or deceased. Status reviews and obtaining an accounting are two distinct issues, two separate processes. Negotiations with the Indochinese governments will continue with the goal of obtaining as much information as possible on all unaccounted servicemen. The casualty status of an individual will not affect our attempts to account for him. In fact, much of the specific information received from Vietnam, or obtained as a result of our own efforts, has concerned personnel who had been classified as killed. On the other hand, we should recognize squarely that the U.S. Government does not have the information necessary to establish conclusively the exact fate of these men, nor can we be confident that we will secure access to such information. Hanoi has consistently appeared unmoved by appeals to charity or humanitarian considerations. Indeed, the SRV has repeatedly used MIA information and MIA remains as bargaining chips at the negotiating table. Our policy must take that unpleasant fact into account.

INFORMATION TO FAMILIES

Turning to the distribution of information, it will remain the policy of the Department of Defense to provide full pertinent data to the families and next of kin of prisoners and missing.

The magnitude of the intelligence community's efforts to gain information includes thousands of debriefings and interrogations, information from sensitive sources, unclassified information from the media, and eye witness reports from those who participated in combat actions in which Americans were lost. Although every effort was made to avoid any omission of pertinent records from consideration for release, the sheer volume of the material has made it virtually inevitable that a few documents might be overlooked. This explains why 9 or 10 substantive reports out of the thousands that were processed have been released to next of kin years after the reports were received. In spite of efforts to process the records with vigor and thoroughness, human errors do occur. But we have consistently attempted to avoid such incidents in the past, and we will continue to do so in the future. As the committee is perhaps aware, the Department of Defense recently incorporated the Office of PW/MIA Affairs under the director, East Asia and Pacific Regions, the position I fill.

I should like to explain this new arrangement briefly. I believe you have in the copy of my statement that you have in front of you the chart, showing the arrangement.

[The chart referred to follows:]
General Pinczney. Under the new reorganization the normal day-to-day functions of the Office of POW/MIA Affairs will not change significantly. However, those aspects of the POW/MIA issue pertaining to our relations or negotiations with Vietnam will be handled by those people who know the governments with which we must deal and have a first-hand interest in the resolution of the MIA issue.

I wish to be very careful not to mislead anyone by implying that major substantive changes will result from the reorganization. Such an expectation would be unrealistic. We pledge to do our best to be responsive in as understanding, comprehensive, and timely a fashion as our resources and appreciation of the facts permit. We will strive to be continuously and personally sympathetic to the feelings of the families and to the goals of this committee. To that end, a former prisoner of war has been central to handling MIA matters in OSD for the past 4 years. Capt. Ray Vohden is here today and I wish to take this opportunity to express publicly our deep appreciation for his devoted service in this significant and demanding responsibility. Captain Vohden is sitting behind me.

To continue Captain Vohden's empathetic approach, his successor will also be a former prisoner of war, Lt. Col. John Fer, who is also present, seated behind me. Although Colonel Fer will not assume his duties until June and there will be some overlap, Captain Vohden departs in July, I wanted to take advantage of this opportunity to introduce him to you, Mr. Chairman, to other members of the committee, and to your staff.

REVIEW DOD PROCEDURES

My first order of business had been to review the entire handling of the POW/MIA issue within the Department of Defense. This is a complex issue, as you appreciate, and our review is still underway. There is much to know and to understand. Parenthetically I might mention a new contribution to our understanding of this problem, a book which has just been published by our National Defense University Research Directorate. It is available at the Government Printing Office bookstores and is called, "The Missing Man: Politics and the MIA", written by Capt. Douglas L. Clarke, USN. The book is particularly useful for those without experience in this important American social and foreign policy problem, since it includes a historical review of the whole subject.

As I have familiarized myself with the new responsibilities of this office it has become increasingly clear to me what our approach must be. These are our intentions:

DOD INTENTIONS

First: I intend to monitor closely—facilitating where necessary—compliance by the Armed Services with existing policy directives involving the provision of pertinent information about missing in action and prisoners of war to next of kin. Such information must be made available unstintingly and without delay, either when it is
requested by a family, or when it comes in as new information from Indochina. I have reminded the individuals concerned of their responsibilities in this area, and I will continue to do so.

Second: DOD will maintain the capability to monitor and evaluate any accounting made by Indochinese governments with respect to accuracy, completeness of reports on individual cases, and the extent of reporting on all casualties lost within each of the countries of Indochina; and to accomplish identification of remains.

Third: We will insure the retention of a viable capability to collect, collate, evaluate, retrieve, and disseminate intelligence information on American missing in Indochina.

Finally, whenever it is appropriate, American agencies will continue to provide the Indochinese governments with bilingual case summaries, developed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and DIA, on all missing Americans.

These are for the most part modest objectives that are within our capability, and I intend to see that we accomplish them. I wish we could do more. If opportunities arise, we shall seize them. Of course, in a broader sense, there is nothing anyone can ever do to alleviate bereavement—for one suffers in the lonely pathways of the heart—but we can at least try to insure that we do not compound that grief through indifference or insensitivity.

Thank you.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS GARWOOD

Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Oakley, on the bottom of page 11 of your testimony, you say the Garwood case provides a good example of how the procedures of investigation function. As soon as we received a report that Private First Class Garwood was in Hanoi and were able to form a positive opinion of its reliability, Secretary Vance personally sent a message to the Vietnamese.

Now, Mr. Garwood, we understand, sent three messages. Are you saying this was the first one that was received by the State Department?

Mr. Oakley. The first message of which I am aware, sir, was the one which he sent through an individual from another government who works for an international agency, whom he met in a hotel bar in Hanoi. That was the first report that we had since, I think, 1969 of the existence of Private First Class Garwood alive in Vietnam.

Mr. Wolff. Are you aware of any other messages that he may have sent?

Mr. Oakley. No, sir; I am not. T. C., have you?

General Pinckney. No, I remember seeing the traffic on the incident that you mentioned.

Mr. Wolff. It was considered fairly open information that a Garwood did exist, however; am I correct in that?

Mr. Oakley. He had dropped out of sight completely for several years, Mr. Chairman. The last time that we had a definite report of him was in 1969. So, there had been a period of 10 years when no one heard anything about him. There were no reports of his having died, he had just dropped off the face of the Earth, so far as our information indicated.
Mr. Wolff. Are there any other people who are in a similar position to Garwood, that have dropped out of sight, who could possibly be in a similar position to a Garwood, that you know of? Either you or General Pinckney.

Mr. Oakley. I think there is possibly one.

General Pinckney. There is a Private McKinley Nolan who was last reported in Vietnam, or in Cambodia near the Parrot's Peak area, apparently a defector; reportedly married to, or at least living with, a Vietnamese woman with a couple of children. The last report on him was about 1974.

Mr. Wolff. Has any information been requested of the Vietnamese Government regarding him?

General Pinckney. Let me again refer to DIA. He says on more than one occasion.

Mr. Wolff. And what was forthcoming from the Vietnamese? What I am trying to elicit from you is an understanding as to whether or not in cases where we do have some hard information, as in the past, they are forthcoming with any information on those individuals.

General Pinckney. No information at all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Was there any specific request made about Garwood, since we did have some information that he was alive in 1969, the last piece of information?

General Pinckney. He says, yes, on more than one occasion as well.

VIETNAM DODGES QUESTIONS

Mr. Wolff. And the answer from the Vietnamese was no information?

Mr. Oakley. The sort of answers that were given to members of the Woodcock commission.

Mr. Wolff. That there was no one captured, or there was no one taken by them as prisoners.

Mr. Oakley. Very carefully hedged against just this sort of eventuality that people might indeed be in Vietnam of their own free will, but saying there were no prisoners there. It is fascinating to go back and read the record, the way they dodge that direct question.

Mr. Wolff. They cannot very well dodge it if it were a specific name.

Mr. Oakley. No, sir.

REPORTS BY REFUGEES

Mr. Wolff. There is one other point that we are very anxious to obtain any possible information. We have also the responsibility on the refugees committee, and have requested the Department of State to vigorously pursue any information, knowing full well that there are some people who would like to take advantage of that situation and use information that has no validity whatsoever as a device for securing favored treatment.

However, you do indicate on page 10, Mr. Oakley, that personnel engaged in interviewing refugees have been requested to be particularly alert for any indication of information. Now, does that mean
that you are aggressively seeking the information, or that you are passively seeking the information?

Mr. Oakley. No, sir. Thanks to the exchanges we have had with you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Guyer, and the members of this committee, we have stepped up our efforts to obtain information. I think that we have a better realization of the relationship between information and a refugee’s desire to come to the United States. I think the refugees themselves have gotten a little bit better idea. As the number of people that we have been willing and able to take into the United States has increased, this idea of buying their way in has apparently decreased.

As I have said, we now have posters up around the camps; interviewers are asked to put this question to refugees, and radio broadcasts ask for MIA information. And there are special personnel who are MIA specialists, who occasionally go into the camps to conduct interviews.

PROGRESS MADE

Mr. Wolff. Have you developed any information from this, and when was this technique begun?

Mr. Oakley. Yes, sir. As I say, since 1975 there have been 234 reports on possible MIA’s.

Mr. Wolff. We did not ask this until 1978.

Mr. Oakley. 176 of these during the past year, that is 1978.

Mr. Guyer. On that subject I noticed you did say 176 during 1978. Now, that is three times the amount of the previous years reported. Now, was there some new information there, or what accounts for that upsurge of numbers?

Mr. Oakley. The much larger number of refugees primarily, Mr. Guyer.

Mr. Guyer. I did not mean to take the chairman’s time, but I noticed that the figure was up.

Mr. Oakley. A combination of more aggressive action on the part of the U.S. Government and voluntary personnel in the camps; and the much larger number of refugees who are interviewed, which went up substantially. We probably interviewed well over 100,000 refugees in the course of 1978 in other words approximately one out-of every two refugees. This is substantially above anything that we had done before. So, I think it is a combination of the two.

It is too bad General Tighe is not here because he could get into detail about what happens if we get a report of this sort.

Mr. Wolff. We are going to ask him this when he comes.

Mr. Oakley. They go back and ask other refugees if they have any confirmation, and things of that sort.

Mr. Wolff. My time has expired.

Mr. Guyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; you can have all the time you want.

I am curious, you said you talked to one out of every two refugees, and that gets into the thousands. Have you had any evidence of Americans having been seen alive from any of those people?

Mr. Oakley. We have found nothing that was sufficiently specific as to the identity of an individual at a particular place at a particular time, Mr. Congressman. As I said, General Tighe and his people can give you a better reading of that than I can, but we have not
had the sort of specific identification that we were able to match up to someone’s record, such as we had in the case of Garwood.

Mr. Guyer. Probably General Tighe will tell us how these were processed and how they were checked out.

CLASSIFICATION OF GARWOOD

I am curious about Mr. Garwood. For one thing, his case is 14 years old; in fact, the oldest Marine POW case, I think, of record. Why was he not carried under a presumption of death? What was his classification? In other words, when did the Government first have an indication that he was alive, and if there was no information as to his situation, why was there no presumptive finding of death in his case?

Mr. Oakley. Well, there was information from returned POW’s about him that he was alive.

Mr. Guyer. How did you carry him on the files?

General Pinckney. POW, prisoner of war.

Mr. Guyer. So, you knew he was alive, or knew he was not dead.

Mr. Oakley. We knew he was alive as of the last report.

Mr. Wolff. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Guyer. I will be happy to.

110 MIA/POW’S TO DATE

Mr. Wolff. Are there any other people carried as POW now, or have we eliminated that classification?

General Pinckney. There are 110 carried as POW/MIA; they could fall into either category.

Mr. Guyer. That is as of what date, that 110?

General Pinckney. That is as of today.

Mr. Guyer. 110 that are still POW/MIA.

General Pinckney. That is correct.

Mr. Guyer. Thank you.

One question I was curious about. We have sat down with Mr. Woodcock, and I think his commission did do a fine service. Was he briefed in writing and if so, is there any copy of the briefing that he received before he went?

General Pinckney. Yes.

Mr. Guyer. Could this committee have a briefing, or is that classified?

General Pinckney. Yes.

PRESIDENTIAL ASSURANCE

Mr. Guyer. I would like to see that because I think it would help us to know what it was he was provided with. I am very much inspired by what was given today in testimony, but between us and when the mission takes on its true meaning, there seems to be a communications gap. For example, when we talked to the President he said, “You have my full assurance,” and we know he cannot do this day and night; but sometimes they either put it on the back burner, or forget to make it a priority matter. We hope that right fresh from your testimony we can proceed from there with some meaningful results. We know it is a “never-never land” and there are some things.
we will never know, but we certainly can find a lot of answers that have not been forthcoming, I think.

I yield to Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I certainly welcome having our experts here before us today, Mr. Chairman, and I want to commend you for pursuing the issue which has been too long neglected by most of us in Government, including the Congress.

Mr. Oakley, you mentioned at the outset of your testimony that our State Department has consistently followed a policy of pursuing the fullest feasible accounting of our missing personnel.

COSMETIC APPROACH

I have had the impression in the last few years that our approach has been chiefly cosmetic. While we indicate we are seeking a full accounting, essentially we have adopted the conclusions of the Select Committee on the MIA's on which Mr. Guyer and I served, and to which we objected. We objected to the premature closing of the work of that committee. Unfortunately that committee arrived at a conclusion that most of the men were dead and there was very little hope for the future.

It seemed to me that same conclusion was adopted by the Woodcock commission when they went over, and there have been very few initiatives undertaken by the administration since the closing up of the working of the Select Committee on the MIA's.

U.S. INITIATIVES

My question to you is, specifically what worthwhile initiatives have we undertaken these past few years to attempt to arrive at a full accounting, to fulfill the objectives that you are talking about?

Besides sending a commission over that met with the Hanoi officials and came back and said the same thing that the select committee said, that there is very little hope out there?

Mr. OAKLEY. Mr. Gilman, all I can say is, whenever we have met with the Vietnamese and talked to them about anything, we have included an approach on MIA's. When we have had specific information we have gone back with the specifics. The results have not been as positive as we would have liked because the Vietnamese response—with the exception of the Garwood case where we had particulars that we could point to, and we knew we had the situation absolutely cold. In that case they responded, "Yes he is there" because they knew we had clear evidence to this effect.

So, certainly, we have not been able to do anything that has produced great results, although some of the things that we have undertaken in our conversations with them have proved helpful. We asked them for example to send some of their own personnel to the Joint Casualty Reprocessing Center in Hawaii, which they eventually did in July of 1978. We had several days with them there, where they were introduced to our techniques in order to improve accountability; We have talked to them about the procedures which we used on other occasions as well. Whenever anyone has gone to Hanoi—visiting congressional delegations and State Department officials alike—have continued this conversation; as well as during our meetings with the Vietnamese elsewhere.
The results are there. We have gotten some additional remains and some additional information on MIA’s, but it is far from being a full accounting of all those whom we still carry in our rolls as missing.

LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED

Mr. Gilman. Well, essentially, besides getting some “token boxes of bones” every time a congressional delegation made up its mind to go pay them a visit; and besides having a few meetings, there has really been very little accomplished since 1975, when the MIA Select Committee closed up shop?

Mr. Oakley. Well, even there, Mr. Gilman, with all due respect to the select committee, what you got back has been very skimpy ever since the end of the war.

Mr. Gilman. My question, Mr. Oakley, is, besides arranging for a meeting or two and keeping our lab functioning, what initiatives has our Government undertaken to try to resolve the issue?

SKIMPY RESPONSES

Mr. Oakley. Mr. Gilman, we have approached the Vietnamese whenever we have had a meeting with them on this subject. As you say, the response has been very, very skimpy. But we have very little leverage on the Vietnamese in this respect. We have talked to other governments; we have talked to international organizations and asked them to join us in talking to the Vietnamese about it, but that has not produced impressive results, either.

Mr. Gilman. We presented some 150 hard cases to the Vietnamese that our Defense Intelligence people thought they had some information about and could give to us; is that not correct?

Mr. Oakley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gilman. When the Woodcock commission went over.

Mr. Oakley. And subsequently, sir. As I said, through Bangkok now, we have links set up there, we have presented a large number of dossiers.

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Oakley, have we received any response on those 150-some hard cases?

REMAINS RECEIVED

Mr. Oakley. We have received about half the remains that we have gotten in the past 2 years, sir, we believe, in response to the dossiers because these remains are those of individuals on whom special dossiers, hard cases, had been provided.

Mr. Gilman. The remains that we received since Woodcock presented the 150 hard cases were included in those 150 cases?

Mr. Oakley. Those and others, where we have sent special dossiers, giving as much detailed information as we could pull together on precisely where someone went down, the circumstances—the things that might be expected—giving them as much information as we could on where to look.

Mr. Gilman. How many remains have we received since the Woodcock commission went over?

Mr. Oakley. Let me check that, just a second. I think the number is 34, sir.
Mr. Gilman. About 34 out of 150 hard cases. Do you feel that this is the kind of cooperation that warrants normalization of relationship? The President said, "I have always taken the position that when I am convinced the Vietnamese have done their best to account for the service personnel"—and I am quoting from your testimony—"who are missing in action, at that point I would favor normalization."

Do you call this the kind of cooperation that warrants a normalization attitude?

Mr. Oakley. It is very difficult for us to judge, Mr. Gilman.

NORMALIZATION

Mr. Gilman. I am asking if you would judge it. Do you feel that they have been cooperative enough to warrant normalization?

Mr. Oakley. In my judgment the best way to obtain further information on MIA's, based upon everything we have seen in the past, if that were our primary objective vis-a-vis the Vietnamese, would be indeed to normalize relations with them, sir.

Mr. Gilman. You are not answering the question. Do you feel that they have been cooperative with us up to this point?

Mr. Oakley. They have given us some cooperation. I would not be in a position to say that they have given us everything they have, sir. The position of the administration as you know, is that, so far as the MIA issue is concerned, we are ready to proceed to normalization in the expectation that this is the best way of accomplishing further progress; rather than making it in some way linked to specific actions on their part.

Mr. Wolff. The gentleman's time has expired.

DECREASE IN PERSONNEL

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, if I might just address one more question to General Pinckney.

General Pinckney, you mentioned about the retention of a viable capability to collect, collate, evaluate, and retrieve, and so forth. I keep hearing reports that we are paring down the personnel, paring down the budgeting of the people we were involved in the process. Can you tell us now just how many personnel we have lost and where we stand with regard to the capability; do we have as many personnel today as we had a year or two ago, working on this problem? Do we have as much capability as we had a few years ago?

General Pinckney. I cannot give you the precise numbers. Compared to 2 years ago today we would have fewer people because the workload is less. However, we still have all the capabilities we had. We have just as much capability, say, to identify a set of remains.

Mr. Gilman. Let us take Captain Vohden's office. How many people do you have now, Captain?

Captain Vohden. There was a time when I had four or five people; that number has been reduced because some of my functions have been delegated to others' offices.

Mr. Gilman. How many people do you have now, Captain?

Captain Vohden. I work there by myself.

Mr. Gilman. How many did you have 2 years ago?
Mr. Gilman. How many people did you have then, Captain?

Captain VoHden. I think I had five people.

Mr. Gilman. And you are doing the job yourself today.

Captain VoHden. No, sir, I have three men from the Air Force who are TDY.

Mr. Gilman. Are there any other offices at work on the MIA issue in Defense, any of the branches?

General Pinckney. Yes, sir, within each of the services.

Mr. Gilman. Who is in charge of the Air Force office now?

General Pinckney. Colonel Fracht.

Mr. Gilman. And how many people does he have working with him?

Captain VoHden. He has the same number or even more than he had 2 years ago.

Mr. Gilman. What about with regard to the Army?

Captain VoHden. The Army just lost a sergeant who has been working in the job for years. I anticipate they will have someone else to assume that responsibility.

Mr. Gilman. Then you are the only one that has been cut down, Captain, in personnel?

Captain VoHden. No, sir.

Mr. Wolff. The gentleman's time for his one question has expired.

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolff. Mr. Mica.

COORDINATION OF INFORMATION

Mr. Mica. I have several brief questions to follow up my colleague's question. Each of the services, as I understand it, has an MIA task force or group working on this problem. Are you coordinating, I would assume, every week, or every month, or every so many months on the information, putting it together? How often is that done, General?

Captain VoHden. Are you talking about the information we get from refugees, and soon?

Mr. Mica. All of the information. It seems to me if you have three, or four, or five different branches of the service all looking at this problem, I am sure you get together on a regular basis. I just assume, and I am just asking, that you do get together once a month with the other branches of the service to put this information together. It seems to me that without it you are all working on one big puzzle with the pieces in four or five different locations.

Captain VoHden. Let me say this, each service has a casualty office in which they have a responsibility to conduct status reviews, and also to provide information, new information, to the next of kin. Basically, the way this process works—and I think General Tighe will testify to this at a later time—we get reports from the intelligence community and they go to DIA. DIA analyzes them, and then the reports are given to the service casualty offices.
Mr. MICA. Are you telling me you do not get together with the other branches?

Captain Vohden. Yes, sir, I do. Not over reports, there is no need to do that, that is not our function in the casualty offices to analyze these reports. This is a function of the intelligence community. They analyze the reports, and then they provide them to the casualty offices who in turn provide them to the next of kin.

Mr. MICA. I am not sure of what I just heard here. What I am looking for—and I thought the answer was obvious—that you all get together, whether you call them reports or something that has been reviewed and analyzed. It does not seem to me it is a group even as big as this full committee. There are three in your group, three in each of the services. Have they ever sat down together and looked over the current information?

Captain Vohden. Yes, sir; we get together on a weekly basis, or twice a month.

Mr. MICA. That is what I mean.

Captain Vohden. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. MICA. You do get together. When was the last time you did?

Captain Vohden. This morning.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS NEEDED

Mr. MICA. All right, I appreciate that. Now, let me just ask you—and I might just refer back also to my colleague’s question on page 3 about the President indicating that there is a great deal of cooperation. I had your testimony marked here.

It seems to me when this committee heard about Private Garwood, the response we got from the Vietnamese was that, “You never asked the question of whether there were any Americans who had defected, who were helping us, who chose to live in Vietnam.” In other words, that we were not specific, were there any who were deserters, any POW’s, MIA’s and so on.

The point is, have we revised at any time in the recent future, gone back with new questions, stated a little differently, a little more specific? I just came back from a trip to China and I found out that every time you ask the question, if you say it a little different, you get a different answer.

Mr. Oakley. I will try to answer that question, sir. When the Woodcock commission went to Hanoi they were very specific, but they got a fuzzy answer. When we went back on with the information that had been provided us by the man who met Private Garwood, we were able to elicit the admission that indeed he was there. At that stage we put the question again—Mr. Vance did in his request about Private Garwood—and he asked to know whether there were other Americans who might have been in his category, pointing out that they had ducked this before and that we were not pleased with this approach. The response was, there are no others.

Now, I would not say that this is true. We have no means of confirming that, all we can do is to keep looking as best we can and, wherever we get reports, try to check them out, sir.

Mr. MICA. Did I understand you correctly to say that you think they have been fairly cooperative, but you have no way to judge if they have been totally cooperative?
Mr. Oakley. There has been cooperation. I would doubt that it has been complete cooperation. Once again, we do not have enough independent intelligence to enable us to determine the degree of cooperation. It has been the judgment of the administration that the best overall approach in terms of getting more information on MIA's as well as in terms of our other policy objectives, would have been to normalize, up until the developments of last fall, to which I refer in my statement, which put the whole thing on the sidetrack where all movement has been suspended.

COOPERATION OF OTHER NATIONS

Mr. Mica. Are you satisfied that we have had the cooperation of other nations in helping us locate MIA's or POW's, any nation that might have any information? For instance, I mention this again, in China they indicated they had no knowledge; I do not know whether that is correct or not.

Mr. Oakley. We have had a number of reports from different governments about the presence of Americans in Vietnam. Once again, they are usually the very same vague kinds of reports we get from refugees. A national of a foreign government in Vietnam for some purpose, or some international organization, would say, "Well, I heard there is an American, or a caucasian at this particular location." Once again, nothing we have been able to pin down with the exception of the Garwood case.

Mr. Mica. I would like to request, at least my own feeling would be that we pursue, again, on a regular basis—it does not take much more than a letter and a stamp, if not a phone call—to any and all nations that might have any information, who are working with the Vietnamese, as to continued information on the list of names we are looking for, the 150, what is left of the 150. I think that request should be a constant, regular request; reword it every possible way we can to express our intent that we will not let this issue drop.

Finally, let me just say that I think they have been playing games with us all along. That is my own opinion just from what little I have heard in 4 to 5 months on this committee. They probably knew about Garwood and they may know about others. I do not know, and I do not want to raise anybody's hopes.

Mr. Oakley. I am sure they knew about Garwood.

DISCUSSIONS ON REGULAR BASIS

Mr. Mica. But they sure did not answer us when we asked. I think that we ought to be asking those questions in every form, at every opportunity.

When was the last time we asked whoever would be the highest official about POW's and MIA's in Vietnam?

Mr. Oakley. The last time we had a discussion with the Vietnamese was last December, sir.

Mr. Mica. That has been too long, in my estimation. I think we ought to do it on a regular basis through intermediaries, through nations who do have proper relations with the country, as often as possible.
Mr. Oakley. Let me take that back, sir; also, when we had news of Garwood, Secretary Vance covered the broad issues of all MIA's, as well as any Americans left alive at that stage. We got a negative response.

Mr. Mica. I think most would agree, people who are not even fervently involved in this, when you have 100, 200 Americans missing, to let a period go from last December—what was that, about 7, 8 months—without even asking, that is the very least we can do, to do that on a regular basis. I hope you will do it very soon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Soviet Assistance

Mr. Wolff. Let me follow Mr. Mica's line of questioning for a moment—and this may not be your bureau so you may not be aware of it. I take it we are in regular communication with the Soviets. Have we questioned the Soviets regarding any help they might be able to give us in convincing the Vietnamese that any assistance they can render to us will have a decided effect upon the feeling of the American people regarding normalization?

Have we attempted to pass on this information; do you know?

Mr. Oakley. We have in the past informed the Soviets of our general attitude toward the Vietnamese and toward normalization. We have not, insofar as I know, Mr. Chairman, made any specific requests, about Soviet assistance on the MIA issue. I cannot remember when it could have been. So, that is a good point.

Mr. Wolff. Do you not think that would be a logical thing for us to do? After all, I know that when we have an "interest section" someplace we generally use that interest section and try to pursue cooperation. Would this not be a logical approach to take?

Mr. Oakley. We can try it, sir.

Mr. Wolff. We are trying to reach an agreement on SALT. We have many things in common with the Soviets. Why would there not be a compassionate element of attempting to achieve their cooperation in pursuing the idea of a more open attitude by the Vietnamese? I tell you one thing, I think it was Dick Holbrook who came before the subcommittee, who said that he felt the Vietnamese had more information on MIA's and they were not forthcoming and were using this as a device to dribble information to us from time to time.

Now, if that be the case, do you believe that they have more?

Mr. Oakley. I expect they do, but we cannot say for certain, Mr. Chairman.

Pursue Information

Mr. Wolff. Well, pursuing the line of Mr. Mica's questioning, if you believe that they do have, would it not be a logical assumption that you would pursue as vigorously as possible, could the idea of trying to elicit that information, rather than attempting to adopt a passive attitude and use it on an occasional basis with these people?

Mr. Oakley. Mr. Chairman, we have pursued it, as you know, over the years and over the months.
MOTIVATE U.N. RESPONSE

Mr. Wolff. May I make a request from this committee, and I believe it would be a request from the full committee, that you approach the Soviet Government and request their assistance to help us. Since they have better relations with the Vietnamese than we do, it would seem to be a logical avenue of approach.

I would also like, before I pass to Mr. Dornan who was a member of the task force, your opinion of the legislation—you have a copy of it—Mr. Guyer and his group of cosponsors have put together in order to motivate the United Nations to do more than they have been doing on this question. They talk about human rights and compassion, and everything else, but it is only "human rights" if it is certain humans.

Mr. Oakley. Let me make one other point of clarification, again with respect to Congressman Mica's point. At the political level, the last approach we made was when Mr. Vance went to the Vietnamese with respect to Mr. Garwood in, I believe, February. At the operational level, as I indicated in my testimony, our JCRC Liaison Office in Bangkok is in frequent touch with the Vietnamese Embassy there to pass dossiers and things of that sort.

NEED TO ASK

Mr. Mica. Let me respond, if I may. I appreciate that information, but that does not wash, as far as I am concerned, to go 7 months—7 months—without even asking. It seems to me we could continually ask. Then, to have somebody come out of the blue, be returned to us and say, "Well, we asked once and we talked about it; we never raised the other issue again," and that has been months since then. At the very least we could have referenced one-half dozen different letters, or contacts, or calls to say, "Hey, we found out about this. There is some interest. We are not going to let it die. We want to do something." To me, I think we have been remiss...

I will do a letter myself, as a matter of fact, and maybe you can deliver it.

COSMETIC APPROACH

Mr. Gilman. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Mica. Yes.

Mr. Gilman. This goes to the very heart of what I was discussing before, that we have taken on a cosmetic approach to the problem. We meet with them on rare occasions. We collect a few boxes, but yet, we do not undertake any initiative, any solid program, any long-range program to try to really unearth the information we should be receiving from these countries.

I would hope that our administration would take a good look at where we have been and where we are going on this issue. It seems to me we could be undertaking a lot more than we are at the present time. Rather than reducing our personnel and meeting infrequently, let us try to adopt a substantial program that will finally resolve this issue.

Mr. Guyer. Just two things before Mr. Dornan. Mr. Chairman, could we have inserted in the record today a statement of the mission of the task force, so that would become part of the committee's record? I think it should be.
Mr. WOLFF. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The statement referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF MISSION OF THE TASK FORCE ON POW/MIA'S, 99TH CONGRESS

The Task Force on POW/MIAs was established by Chairman Lester L. Wolff of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, to provide a bipartisan group to assist in fulfilling the task of the Subcommittee of oversight of the POW/MIA issue.

PURPOSES

(1) To require the Administration to seek from the government of Vietnam a full accounting for Americans last known to be prisoners or missing in Indochina.
(2) To require the Administration to make full disclosure of all appropriate information in the possession of the U.S. government with regard to the fate of American prisoners and missing.
(3) To assist in more effective communication between the Administration, various departments of the Executive Branch, and the Congress, and between the U.S. Government and the families of American prisoners and missing.

METHODS

(1) Under the aegis of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, conducting hearings with witnesses from the Depts. of Defense and State to clarify and if possible to improve administrative procedures affecting POW/MIA concerns.
(2) Recommend changes in policies and procedures on the basis of testimony by both interested persons and government witnesses.
(3) Seek available information from all reliable sources which may cast light on the fate of deceased POW/MIAs, or the whereabouts of any survivors.
(4) Obtain best possible evaluation and dissemination as appropriate of such information.
(5) Recommend legislation as appropriate.

To achieve these purposes, and to use these methods, the Task Force welcomes comments and suggestions from any person who has an interest in this subject.

COMMENTS BY FORMER POW'S

Mr. GUYER. The second thing is, I wonder if either Captain Vohden or Colonel Fer want to make any comments as former prisoners of war with regard to this issue. I wonder how you feel, maybe how the families feel, about normalization being the price to pay for what we are getting. I think that might be a tough question.

Mr. WOLFF. With due regard to you, Mr. Guyer, I think that would put these gentlemen—

Mr. GUYER. In sort of a spot, I guess. I withdraw that. But I would invite either of them to make a comment, since they are both here; and we have the advantage of having you men who really have been out there and know what you are talking about. I would like to have any comments you would like to make, either one, or both of you.

HARD STAND NEEDED

Captain Vohden. I was in Vietnam for 7½ years, something like that, and I have my own personal feelings toward communism and so on and so forth. But I can understand that there are perhaps two ways in which we can try to get an accounting. One in which we take a hard stand, so to speak. If we take that hard stand, then there is a possibility we may get nothing. I think that happened from maybe 1973-74-75, we got just a few remains.
Mr. GUYER. Was it not strange that when they went into the United Nations that nobody raised a question about qualifications to join the United Nations, about doing something humanitarian that was not your fault or mine?

Captain VONDEN. When we recognized them?

Mr. GUYER. Yes.

Captain VONDEN. That is true.

Mr. GUYER. There was one instance where we could have done something.

Captain VONDEN. Yes; but on the other hand, perhaps, the approach we are taking now, in which we are trying to normalize, resulted in our receiving considerably more remains that we have before.

Given the nature of communism it is going to be very difficult, I think, under any circumstances to get what we want; it is going to be extremely difficult. So, I can see a lot of merit in what we are doing now. It is still difficult, and I do not think there is anything we can do in which we really are going to get the full accounting that we want.

Mr. GUYER. When you were in prison, I am sure you had a lot of nights and days when you were wondering if anybody was doing anything, and we get that same feeling here. I wrote a letter to the President the other day. I think it is imperative that we sometimes face the top man, we should not take it out on each other. You fellows have a job to do, and so do we. I did write the President and Mr. Wolff, and asked if he would not meet with a couple on this committee. I am waiting for an answer.

Thank you, Colonel?

Colonel Fer. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to respond, but I think I would have to defer until I felt more comfortable in the job in order to comment on these things that you have raised, other than my own personal experiences.

Suffice it to say that with regard to those experiences I never lost faith in my country. I did not worry about ever coming home, I knew I would. So, you see, I am concerned with one thing and that is serving my country in the uniform, as I expected to do. To comment on some of the things that are involved in this particular job before I am fully qualified to do so, I would ask your indulgence.

Mr. GUYER. I would just say this, you know what our job is, and if you men have anything at all that you can put in our hands as new weapons to open the curtains and turn on some lights, and get some answers, we sure would appreciate it.

Mr. Wolff. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Dornan.

"WAREHOUSING"

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Oakley, about 1½ years ago former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to me—and I believe I am almost quoting him verbatim—"of course the Vietnamese have several hundred cases that they could account for immediately." He said, "I resist using the word 'warehousing', but in a sense they have this information, if not the boxes of bones, warehoused, to be used for political purposes."
Now, do you have any background or knowledge beyond Dr. Kissinger's where you would say that was an improper or unfair conclusion for him to come to, given his years of expertise in Southeast Asia. And, working on the problem, whether or not you feel he worked on it correctly?

Mr. Oakley. Mr. Dornan, I think we all regret the fact that General Tighe is not here because DIA has the most accurate information as to what we know precisely, or what we judge, or what we guess, or what we think, insofar as the U.S. Government is concerned. Anyone can have his own opinion and I would not contradict Dr. Kissinger. On the other hand, I would say that I have seen no hard evidence that indicates to me that they have this much information on this many people, or this many remains sitting at a certain place that they could just pull out whenever they wished.

I do believe they have information they have not given us, as I have said before. How much they have I really could not say, sir.

VIETNAMESE LIES

Mr. Dornan. Well, I think he based his conclusion, as I think any fair person would who has worked this problem for a period of years, on sheer common sense. If you take those people that crashed just in the downtown area of Hanoi and Haiphong who have not been returned to us—their remains—if you look at just the B-52 crews who went down in the month of December 1972, this issue was highly politicized and up front in the negotiations. If you look at the Arlo Gay case where he was alive, within almost shouting distance of where the Woodcock delegation visited, and they lied—at least by omission—to the Woodcock commission. The Vietnamese made fools of them.

If you look at the Robert Garwood case in a larger, fairer sense of people who were asking to be let into the United Nation and asking for economic aid, you would just have to come to the conclusion that Dr. Kissinger is probably correct; that, in a loose sense of the work "warehousing", they have a lot of information and/or remains that they could give to us forthwith—probably over several hundred.

Now, are you aware, working this problem, exactly what an open wound this is across the country, the thousands of families? I mean, the real depth of it. Are you aware how politicized the Academy Awards were this year? Did you watch the awards, the Academy Awards?

Mr. Oakley. No, sir; I did not.

POLiticIZED ACADEMY AWARDS

Mr. Dornan. Well, I was there, three rows in front of Tom Hayden. He screamed out in anguish when John Wayne said the "Deer Hunter" had won the award as best picture. In all of the existence of the Academy Awards since 1928, there has never been such a tasteless and graceless host academy presentation, saying that the movie which won the award should not have gotten it.

Do you know why it became so politicized at the awards, this battle between the soft-core pornography of the movie, "Coming Home";
versus the "Deer Hunter"? Because of the way it showed—the Deer Hunter, that is—the treatment of American POW's. There is still so much political passion involved in this issue that I do not think it is going to go away until there has been an obvious, up-front, good-faith effort. And this included the President of the United States himself, given his experience with his own "favorite uncle," who was declared dead. He was, in effect, missing in action, and came home to a remarried wife. I discussed this personally with the President. He said, "You have a very good memory, Congressman"; and I do. When I related these facts to him from his own book, "Why not the Best," that that favorite uncle of his came home to a broken life, a destroyed marriage. He admitted to me, the President of the United States, that it obviously shortened his uncle's life.

COSMETIC APPROACH

Now, I agree with my colleagues when they say this is a "Band-Aid" approach. The unusual thing about this case with our Government is, I cannot find " heavies", villains, the bad guys in the State Department, or in the DOD, or in the Congress. In spite of this cosmetic approach we are all of one mind, we are all trying to resolve this problem. I do not find any Jane Fonda at any Government level deliberately trying to sweep this under the rug. But the Woodcock commission was perceived by some of us to be a joke in the sense that it was cosmetic. The woman who went on this commission knew nothing about this problem before she left; learned nothing there, and came home to talk about kindergarten and school training, and got giant multimillion dollar contract from some United Nations body. She should not have been one of the five distinguished people. I might add, for the record—since I am not using names here I could be making this up, I assure you, I am not—military men at the second level of the Woodcock commission who had to stand behind the front page personalities told me they were ashamed to be Americans. That they thought that trip and subsequent trips had the nature of a disgrace to them because of some people groveling for autographs and giving the Vietnamese the impression they did not have to come up with any accounting, that they were going through the motions with these trips.

BOAT PEOPLE

I think that the tough approach that Captain Vohden suggested is the only approach that we should take right now. I will give you an example why. This very week more people will die on the high seas, in the South China Sea, than all of the American POW's who were ever shot down in the entire decade of the war, including the 566 returned POW's, the ones that died of torture, the ones that died of cholera, the ones that died of abuse; the hundred or so that Colonel Cassler said never made it in from the villages because they were executed in the villages. The entire number of all the American aviators and enlisted men captured in Vietnam do not equal the souls that will die on the high seas this week, last week, a week last month, or any week since the boat people started on their sad journey.
NORMALIZATION HALTED

I would just like to ask you this question—and I would like you to tell me if this is wrong. My impression is that the administration was hell-bent-for-leather for recognition, and their plan was screwed up by two things. The boat people phenomenon, the ugly scene of thousands upon thousands of people dying on the seas of South China—sharks, dehydration, starvation or drowning; followed up by the invasion of Vietnam, Communist Vietnam, into Cambodia.

Now, if those two things had not happened, the boat people disgrace and that invasion into Cambodia, do you not think that by now the Carter administration would have recognized, given full diplomatic recognition to the Vietnamese nation?

Mr. OAKLEY. They might have, sir. I discussed that, as a matter of fact, in the statement I prepared and delivered before you came in.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, I appreciate that. I am convinced that it would have happened. I do not see that any logical person can say they would not have been recognized by now.

What I see as the difference between the government's consultation on this issue and not cranking in the remaining MIA families into the process, is that the Government has a track record of zero over a 15-year period in showing to any family member how an offer of good will has elicited more information from the Government in Vietnam, all of Vietnam. The only thing that they have ever responded to was toughness on this issue, where they could see clearly that unless they were forthcoming, that we were locked in concrete. But I do not think they have seen any consistent pattern in our Government. I think it is easy to prophecy now, after having every prediction I have made over a 10-year period with this issue come true, and worse, on what a soft approach would get us. I am convinced that if we were to recognize them tomorrow morning, in the face of the boat people nightmare, and in the face of their recent invasion—dismissing the invasion that it was the bad guys attacking Satan, I still think there would be nothing forthcoming, because I do not know who would specifically ask for it—not the President, I guess, or the Secretary of State.

I do not see why they would want to respond because it brings up an issue they have been lying over, including Garwood and Arlo Gay; over the issue in general, or sitting on these remains for a period now of 6 years.

What, out of normalization, do you think would elicit their forthcoming attitude?

INCREASED COMMUNICATION

Mr. OAKLEY. Well, a number of the Members of Congress have suggested, including you gentlemen here, that we should have much more communication with them, apparently in the expectation that increased communication can produce increased results. One of the reasons we do not have it is that we do not have any diplomatic contacts. We can send them a letter.

The second point is that certainly in the past 2 years, we have gotten more remains and MIA's than we did in the two previous years, in-
cluding the period during which we told them that there would be absolutely no admission into the United Nations unless they came up with something—we got nothing.

But, as I say in my statement, sir, we do not have any assurance that normalization would indeed produce a full accounting, or an increased accounting. We have tried to delink the questions of economic assistance, normal diplomatic relations, and MIA’s, something which the Vietnamese insisted upon for quite a while, saying, “We will provide information on MIA’s when you honor the check which Nixon wrote to Pham Van Dong in accordance with the Paris Agreements.” That is something that this administration has resisted because we feel that is pure, clear blackmail. Therefore, we have delinked these things.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, Mr. Oakley, the reason they did not respond to the United Nations issue was that they were getting proper intelligence readings from everywhere else in the world. They did not need our vote; they were going to run roughshod right over us, and they did.

STRONG LEADERSHIP

But the fact remains, on economic aid, bilateral economic aid, if the President of the United States said, “This is my final, definitive statement as long as I remain in office, there will never be a nickel of aid going to your country unless we get an accounting on at least a substantial number of cases, and the return of some more remains.” If he even held out for the Red Cross, he would look good, worldwide. To say to them, “You pick the team, make it the Red Cross from some neutral nations, but we want Red Cross—at least advisers—to be with teams that go into some of these site-areas where we know there are remains.”

Besides, it is not a question of remains. I agree with Dr. Kissinger. They have taken the remains out of all the downtown areas of their major cities, in that whole rundown in the Red River Valley. Those remains are stored somewhere. They were making combs out of the metal of the F-105’s and B-52’s. Jane Fonda bragged about bringing some back with her. Now, if they could make combs out of the airplanes, they certainly knew what happened to the human remains from those crashes.

I think the problem now has reached a point where it is up to two things: The tremendous leadership of Chairman Wolff on this committee and this task force, and the President of the United States himself. There is no action on the Senate side except for some good will out of a handful of Senators. I am convinced that the American people do not know, because this Government has not transmitted the proper message to them, of how badly the North Vietnamese have dragged their feet on this issue, and how they have made fools of us.

I yield back to the chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. I thank the gentleman; I thank him for his very nice comments. We are expecting a vote on the House floor in another few minutes. I would like to thank the gentlemen who have appeared here today, updating the information we do have.

I think from the tenor of the questions and the statements that have been made you realize that we are looking for more aggressive
action on our part in order to try to resolve this to the satisfaction of all concerned.

As Mr. Dornan said, I think there is no one pointing any finger at any one individual, or any group of individuals, within Government, but we would just like so see more movement; we would like to see this issue raised to the level that it deserves.

**NATIONAL POW/MIA RECOGNITION DAY**

Let me just say in closing, I sent a letter to the President on May 4, and I am really surprised upon learning that last year we had designated National POW/MIA Recognition Day, that there was no formal, Federal level ceremony being planned to commemorate the spirit of the proclamation.

I have asked for a commemorative service to be held at the National Cathedral. That is the least that we can do as a Nation to honor the memory and to keep in the forefront of the American people's attention, the fact that we still have a problem that needs to be resolved. On that basis I would ask your cooperation—the mails are not too good at late. I would ask that you gentlemen who happen to have some close contact with the administration today act as somewhat of our "mailmen". Even my colleague who is on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, I think, will agree with me that we need some special delivery right now on this particular problem.

I think it is a situation that really requires high-level attention.

Mr. Gilman.

**PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN**

Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to unduly delay the hearing. I would like to ask, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, if General Pinckney could provide the committee with a breakdown of the personnel that is presently at work on the MIA issue in the Department of Defense, and in the various branches of the Service as of this date, compared to what it was in 1975, at a time, I think, when the departments were fully functioning; along with some of the monetary figures, the budget figures, what is being expended?

I would also like to ask, Mr. Chairman, that General Pinckney provide the committee with a description of what occurs when the various branches of service receive reports that refugees have information concerning our missing in action; what sort of a followup do they do, and how much information have they received, of this nature?

General Pinckney. Mr. Gilman, may I commend that you raise this last question with General Tighe, because he will be able to respond directly. I can provide it for you, but I would get it from him.

Mr. Gilman. All right, if you prefer that we raise it with him. You do not have a procedure for handling refugee information?

General Pinckney. The Defense Intelligence Agency does. It is primarily responsible for that. For example, they investigated and compiled the report on Ngo Phi Hung's claim of POW sightings.

I would be glad to give that to you now.

Mr. Gilman. What is your relationship with General Tighe, so that I am familiar with that?

General Pinckney. General Tighe is the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.